elections

• LEBANON: ‘This election has brought to the forefront new voices speaking about rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent general elections in Lebanon with Lina Abou Habib, director of the Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship at the American University of Beirut.

  The Asfari Institute seeks to bridge academia and civil society activism. It does so through knowledge production, convenings and the creation of safe spaces for learning, dialogue and exchange. Located at the heart of the American University in Beirut, it functions as a regional hub for civil society working for diversity, inclusion, equality, accountability and sustainability.

  What change resulted from the 15 May general election?

  Despite taking place in an extremely complicated, uncertain and turbulent political and economic context, the process resulted in the election of many new independent candidates coming from civil society and calling for change. These new voices have political agendas that are very different from those of traditional ruling parties: they call for a new, more accountable governance system and for women’s rights, among other issues. These agendas include road maps for overcoming the ongoing deep economic crisis. And most importantly, they focus on how to stop the political race to the bottom that’s been happening in Lebanon.

  Most of the independent candidates who were elected are linked to the 17 October protests, the uprisings that took place in 2019, when people clearly said that they had enough of the political elite that had become – and continues to be – outrageously corrupt. The 17 October Revolution was a unique moment because protesters had such diverse, inclusive and feminist voices – feminist demands became an integral part of the political demands of the revolution. For instance, sexual harassment became a political issue because the voices of the LGBTQI+ community and migrant women domestic workers were also represented. No demand was compromised or put aside.

  By that time, it became clear to us what system of governance we aspired to. It must be based on equality, inclusion, diversity and respect for human rights. The revolution also gained momentum because the same thing was happening in Chile and other countries where people were rising up. Hence, I do not exaggerate when I say that the feminist voices of the 17 October Revolution inspired political participation in the 2022 election.

  It is important to note, however, that some independent members of the new parliament do not share the agenda of the 17 October Revolution and have quite regressive rhetoric. For instance, newly elected member of parliament Cynthia Zarazir called for the death of Syrian refugees on social media. Having people like her in parliament represents a new challenge. Aside from that, I would say that this election has brought to the forefront new voices speaking about rights and pointing the way forward out of the current crisis.

  How did the feminist movement work collectively in preparation for the election?

  There was rallying behind feminist candidates such as Zoya Jureidini Rouhana, who pushes for an compulsory egalitarian family law, a top priority for Lebanon’s feminist movement. Rouhana is the founder of KAFA (‘enough’) Violence and Exploitation, a feminist civil society organisation that was behind several legal reforms in Lebanon. Moreover, it champions political discourse on gender-based violence. Her electoral campaign was in line with that. It is a rare moment when you have a feminist candidate running on a feminist agenda in a general election – and this was partly possible thanks to the voices that became heard in October 2019. The political movement took shape and gained more feminist voices during those uprisings.

  Feminists mobilising around the elections forced candidates to state their position on gender equality, including the rights of the queer community. In return, independent candidates who sided with gender equality were attacked by the regime and conservative forces. One way for government officials and supporters to disparage and attack somebody is to say they are going to endanger the family. This is very unfortunate, but at the same time, it is fantastic that this important conversation is taking place in the public sphere and these issues are being discussed as part of the overall social and political dialogue.

  In sum, the inclusive and intersectional feminist movement of Lebanon has succeeded in elevating feminist discourse to the public and political arena. But there is still a long way to go: the new parliament includes only two additional female members compared to the previous one, as only eight women were elected, out of 115 candidates nominated by traditional parties, opposition groups, and civil society. These results are still lacking in terms of reaching a critical mass to exercise feminist influence in parliament.

  What’s next for the civil society movement following the election?

  The real battle is just about to begin. The election showed that change is possible, but it is still not enough. The next step for us is to figure out how we will hold independent members of parliament accountable. They must be accountable because they won as a result of our collective movement.

  We will still be facing a corrupt and oppressive regime and serious issues such as illegal arms and a heavily militarised society, economic downfall, destroyed livelihoods, broken public institutions and irresponsible and unaccountable policymaking. As such, civil society in its diversity, and especially the intersectional feminist movement, should remain vigilant.

  The conversation we started must continue, and we need our international allies to help keep it going, and certainly not be complicit with the regime. We have a collective responsibility to monitor human rights violations, talk to feminist activists and help amplify the voices of Lebanon’s intersectional young feminists.

  Civic space in Lebanon is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS monitor.
  Get in touch with the Asfari Institute through itswebsite and follow@AsfariInstitute on Twitter.

• LESOTHO: ‘We must work hand in hand to promote democracy and hold our leaders accountable’

  CIVICUS speaks about the 7 October election in Lesotho with Libakiso Matlho, executive director of Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust-Lesotho (WLSA). 

  WLSA is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Southern Africa and working to promote women’s leadership and eradicate gender-based violence. It contributed to the recent election process by providing voter education. 

  How would you assess the recent election   in  Lesotho in terms of its   transparency   and fairness?

  Looking at the overall proceedings I would say they were transparent and fair. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) did a good job. All candidates were given a  platform to share their manifestos as well as their campaigning approaches at different  levels, including through the media  and public gatherings. Independent candidates did not face any threats. Nobody experienced any restrictions in terms of the exercise of their right to reach out to members of the community and potential voters. Voters were free to attend candidates’ forums and political party rallies.

  There were two major challenges, however. One concerned voter civic education, which started a bit later than normal and therefore lasted only about three or four weeks, so it was not as broad as should have been.

   The other challenge had to do with the dynamics of the campaign, which was affected by conflict among candidates during public forums. Some participants invited to take part in the discussions also caused chaos. This  unfortunately led to a few discussions being cancelled before all the candidates could present their manifestos in some areas, especially those that were marked as hotspots.

  Do you foresee any election-related conflict?

  It is hard to predict, but this election seems to have been a bit different from others in the past, which makes me wonder.

  Around 65 political parties and 2,560 candidates competed in the 7 October election. For a small country with a population of two million, that is a huge number of people. And many might find it difficult to accept the outcome if things do not happen according to their expectations. 

  The election itself was peaceful, but political tension mounted as votes were counted over the following days. The results were announced on 11 October: the opposition Revolution for Prosperity party came first but was short of a majority, with 56 of 120 seats, while the incumbent All Basotho Convention party (ABC) came second. It is not clear whether ABC will contest the results and its supporters will take to the streets in protest. If this happens, clashes with rival parties might occur and security force repression could follow.

  I would not rule conflict out but rather consider it as likely to happen as not.

  Do you think the failure to pass constitutional reforms had an impact on the election results?

  I think the failure to pass the Omnibus Constitutional Bill, which had been years in the making, probably had a strong impact on the electoral process, and will definitely have an impact on what happens next.

  The bill sought to amend key provisions regarding political parties, candidate selection, floor-crossing in parliament, the appointment of senior officials and the role of the prime minister, whose removal would require a two-thirds majority. In May, all major parties in parliament committed to pass the bill by the end of June, but disagreements held it up much longer.

  One of the key issues of contention concerned the electoral law, which only allows party leaders to submit a proportional representation party list. With the current system, 80 members of parliament are elected in constituencies and 40 are elected through a proportional division of votes. Small parties are negatively affected because to get some proportional representation seats, they are forced to come together into a list with larger parties, and if they are unable to merge with other parties they are left out.

  Another key issue wasthe politicisation of the security sector, which contributes to political instability. The reforms proposed a way to deal with this.

  The reforms were eventually passed as parliament was reconvened for an urgent session but, following a series of legal challenges, the Constitutional Court declared them null and void at the last minute before the election.

  The failure to pass the reforms will also contribute to continuing difficulties in maintaining coalition governments. Lesotho has had coalition governments since 2012 that have never served a full five-year term due to conflicts that led to their dissolution. In 2017 ABC formed a six-party coalition government, but because of internal conflict Prime Minister Tom Thabane was forced to resign in 2020 and was replaced by Moeketsi Majoro.

  Coalitions have not made for stable and effective governments. The coalition-forming process also confuses voters because ideologies are not a big factor when putting them together. This makes voters a bit sceptical that their parties will remain faithful to their mandate.

  These were some of the issues the reform was meant to address, but unfortunately they remain unaddressed to this day.

  What did voters expect from the election?

  One of the expectations voters place on political parties is that they will work on improving service delivery. This includes fixing infrastructure and providing access to water and electricity, among other things. Lesotho also has high rates of unemployment and widespread problems of gender-based violence and femicides, as well as high crime rates that people hope will be addressed by the new government.

  Basotho people are not happy with the way the public sector has been managed over the years. Employment is mostly driven by nepotism and political affinities. People are uneasy because political parties on the campaign trail are quick to promise they will fix these things but once in power they fail to deliver.

  We have also seen a lot of instability in a key industry, the textile industry, with COVID-19 only making things worse. People were already dealing with bad working conditions and when the pandemic hit many were fired unfairly. This led to worker strikes and has negatively affected foreign investment. Elected leaders need to find means of retaining foreign investment while ensuring good work conditions.

  How can the international community support civil society’s work to strengthen democracy in Lesotho?

  During the election, civil society faced the challenge that almost all funding for civic education came from the IEC, that is, from the government budget. This could potentially compromise civil society’s watchdog role. Additionally, these funds are never sufficient to allow civil society to conduct its work thoroughly.

  The international community should support capacity building so that civil society can conduct robust advocacy during and after the election period. Collaboration between international and local CSOs is also important. For the recent election local CSOs took on voter education alone, without any involvement by international CSOs. We must work hand in hand to promote democracy in our countries and hold our leaders accountable.

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  Civic space in Lesotho is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with WLSA through itswebsite orFacebook page.

• MALAWI : « La société civile attend du nouveau gouvernement qu’il donne la priorité aux droits humains »

  CIVICUS s’entretient avec Michael Kaiyatsa, directeur exécutif par intérim du Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), au sujet des récentes élections présidentielles au Malawi, qui se sont déroulées dans le contexte de la pandémie de COVID-19 et ont abouti à un changement de gouvernement. Le CHRR est une organisation de la société civile (OSC) qui soutient et promeut la démocratie et les droits humains au Malawi. Sa mission est de contribuer à la protection, la promotion et la consolidation de la bonne gouvernance en donnant aux communautés rurales et urbaines les moyens d’exercer leurs droits. Fondée en 1995 par d’anciens étudiants exilés qui sont rentrés dans le pays, attirés par la promesse d’une nouvelle démocratie, elle opère à travers deux programmes principaux : la mobilisation et l’autonomisation des communautés et la surveillance et la formation en matière de droits humains.

  

  L’élection présidentielle a eu lieu au Malawi en juin 2020, en pleine pandémie de COVID-19 et en pleine crise politique. Quels rôles ont joué la société civile et le système judiciaire dans la réalisation de l’élection ?

  Je pense qu’il est juste de dire que les manifestations menées par les avocats et la société civile ont ouvert la voie à la tenue d’une nouvelle élection présidentielle. L’élection qui s’est tenue le 23 juin 2020 était un nouveau scrutin ordonné par la Cour constitutionnelle du Malawi le 3 février 2020, lorsqu’elle a décidé d’annuler l’élection présidentielle du 21 mai 2019, en invoquant des irrégularités massives.

  Lors de la présidentielle de mai 2019, le président sortant Peter Mutharika a été déclaré vainqueur au scrutin majoritaire à un tour, avec 38,57 % des voix. Cependant, l’opposition a affirmé que l’élection était frauduleuse. Elle a cité, entre autres, l’utilisation présumée de liquide correcteur Tippex pour modifier les chiffres sur les bulletins de vote. Le Dr Lazarus Chakwera, du Malawi Congress Party (MCP), et le Dr Saulos Chilima, du United Transformation Movement, ont demandé à la Cour constitutionnelle d’annuler les résultats de l’élection présidentielle. Tous deux ont invoqué des irrégularités généralisées, notamment l’utilisation de Tippex et des signatures manquantes sur certaines listes de résultats.

  L’arrêt historique de la Cour constitutionnelle, validé ensuite par la Cour suprême, constitue une illustration remarquable de l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire dans la démocratie naissante du Malawi. Cependant, la clé de cet arrêt n’est pas seulement l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, mais aussi les mois de manifestations de masse menées par la société civile. Les protestations étaient si soutenues et vigoureuses qu'elles ne pouvaient être ignorées par les institutions démocratiques majeures comme le pouvoir judiciaire. La Human Rights Defenders Coalition, un groupement influent de la société civile, a courageusement conduit des milliers de personnes dans les rues à maintes reprises pour protester contre les résultats erronés des élections de mai 2019. Cette action a été particulièrement importante car elle a considérablement augmenté la pression sur le pouvoir judiciaire et d'autres institutions démocratiques incontournables pour qu'ils agissent comme il se doit. Il ne s’agit pas de sous-estimer le rôle joué par le pouvoir judiciaire. Les juges se sont vraiment levés pour défendre la démocratie. Avant l'arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle, il y a eu plusieurs tentatives de corruption des juges pour que l'arrêt soit favorable à l’ancien président Mutharika ; un banquier de premier plan a d’ailleurs été arrêté dans le cadre de cette affaire de corruption. De nombreuses menaces ont également pesé sur l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire avant la tenue de la nouvelle élection, notamment une tentative du gouvernement de mettre à la retraite anticipée des juges de haut rang de la Cour suprême quelques jours avant l’élection. Les juges auraient pu facilement succomber à cette intimidation et statuer en faveur de Mutharika, mais ils ne l’ont pas fait. Au contraire, ils ont tenu bon et ont rendu un jugement qui a radicalement changé la façon dont le Malawi est gouverné.

  La société civile a contesté avec succès la décision du gouvernement précédent d’imposer un confinement. Pourquoi l’a-t-elle fait, alors que d’autres pays dans le monde mettaient en œuvre des mesures similaires ?

  La société civile voulait que le confinement soit suspendu jusqu’à ce que le gouvernement trouve un moyen de protéger les personnes les plus pauvres et les plus vulnérables. Les groupes de la société civile étaient mécontents que le gouvernement n’ait pas mis en place un filet de sécurité sociale pour les personnes les plus vulnérables pendant le confinement, ce qui a conduit la Human Rights Defenders Coalition et d’autres OSC à demander une décision de justice pour la suspendre. Il s’agit d’un instantané de la réalité que vivent de nombreuses personnes au Malawi au quotidien.

  Il est également important de noter que la demande de la société civile est intervenue après que des milliers de commerçants informels dans les villes de Blantyre et de Mzuzu et dans des districts tels que Thyolo soient descendus dans la rue pour protester contre le confinement avec des banderoles sur lesquelles était écrit « nous préférons mourir du coronavirus plutôt que de mourir de faim ». Beaucoup de ces vendeurs sont des gens qui gagnent leur vie au jour le jour et un confinement aurait pu les affecter gravement. La société civile et les citoyens soupçonnaient de plus en plus le gouvernement d’essayer d’utiliser le confinement pour justifier l’annulation ou le report des élections.

  Quel a été le taux de participation aux élections ? A-t-on craint que les citoyens ne se déplacent pas pour voter par peur de contracter le virus ?

  On craignait que les gens ne se rendent pas aux urnes en grand nombre par peur de la contagion dans le contexte de la pandémie. On craignait, par exemple, qu’étant donné la nécessité de ne pas se réunir en grands groupes et de maintenir une distance sociale, les citoyens préfèrent ne pas quitter leur domicile pour voter, par souci de leur propre santé et de celle de leur famille. Il y avait également un risque important que les personnes dissuadées de voter appartiennent de manière disproportionnée aux groupes d’âge plus élevés ou aux personnes souffrant de maladies préexistantes. Ainsi, la légitimité de l’élection pouvait être sapée par des restrictions injustes imposées à certains segments de la société et donc par leur participation inégale.

  Ces craintes se sont en partie concrétisées. La participation des électeurs a été plus faible que lors des élections précédentes. Sur les 6 859 570 Malawites inscrits pour voter en 2020, 64,8 % ont voté. Ce chiffre est inférieur à celui de mai 2019, lorsque 74,4 % des électeurs inscrits avaient participé. Mais le faible taux de participation pourrait également être attribué à l’insuffisance des campagnes d’éducation civique et électorale. Contrairement aux élections précédentes, la plupart des OSC n’ont pas été en mesure de mener à bien ces campagnes en raison d’un manque de ressources. L’incertitude quant à la date des élections a rendu difficile la mobilisation des ressources par les OSC. La précédente Commission électorale du Malawi (MEC) n’a pas donné suffisamment confiance à la population pour que les élections aient lieu dans le délai imparti de 150 jours. La date officielle de l’élection a été fixée à peine deux semaines à l’avance, et il n’a pas été facile de mobiliser des ressources pour mener une éducation civique et électorale dans un délai aussi court.

  Cependant, il est également possible que certains Malawites aient évité de se rendre aux urnes à cause de la pandémie de COVID-19. Le jour de l’élection, on comptait déjà 803 cas documentés et 11 décès dus au COVID-19 au Malawi. Il est donc possible que certaines personnes - en particulier les personnes âgées ou celles ayant des problèmes de santé préexistants - se soient abstenues de se rendre aux urnes.

  Quels ont été les défis de l’organisation d’élections pendant une pandémie ?

  L’expérience du Malawi a montré que l’organisation d’élections pendant une pandémie peut être très difficile. Les mesures de précaution émises par le gouvernement n’autorisent pas les rassemblements de plus de 100 personnes. Cependant, la plupart des partis politiques ont ignoré cette restriction et ont organisé des événements de campagne qui dépassaient ce nombre.

  L’un des principaux défis auxquels la MEC a été confrontée lors de ces nouvelles élections était la nécessité de donner la priorité à la santé et à la sécurité des électeurs tout en garantissant l’intégrité des élections. La MEC dispose généralement d’un budget pour l’éducation des électeurs qui est utilisé avant chaque élection. Cependant, comme cette nouvelle élection n’a pas été budgétisée à l’avance, la MEC a dû faire face à des difficultés financières, qui ont été aggravées par la pandémie de COVID-19, car elle a nécessité l’achat d’équipements de protection individuelle, ajoutant des contraintes budgétaires supplémentaires.

  La MEC a également rencontré des difficultés importantes en ce qui concerne la production et la distribution du matériel de vote. Le Malawi importe beaucoup de matériel électoral d’autres pays. Alors que le Malawi se préparait aux nouvelles élections, de nombreux pays étaient en confinement total ou partiel en raison de la pandémie. Cela a eu des répercussions sur les préparatifs des élections, car certains fournisseurs ont eu des difficultés à transporter des matériaux au-delà des frontières internationales. En conséquence, l’impression des bulletins de vote, qui a eu lieu à Dubaï, a connu des retards importants.

  Un autre défi a été que les partis politiques n’ont pas pu surveiller le processus d’impression des bulletins de vote, comme cela a toujours été le cas, en raison des restrictions de voyage liées à la COVID-19. Une autre conséquence importante de la pandémie a été l’absence d’observateurs électoraux internationaux. Compte tenu des restrictions de voyage imposées dans le monde entier, la capacité des observateurs internationaux à contrôler les élections a été considérablement réduite. Et comme mentionné ci-dessus, la pandémie a également affecté la participation électorale.

  Maintenant que l’élection a abouti à la nomination d’un nouveau président, qu’attend la société civile du nouveau gouvernement ?

  La société civile attend beaucoup du nouveau gouvernement. Principalement, elle attend que le programme du nouveau gouvernement donne la priorité aux droits humains et renforce les libertés fondamentales de tous les Malawites, conformément aux normes internationales en la matière. On attend également du gouvernement qu’il agisse pour protéger l’espace de la société civile. La nouvelle élection présidentielle s’est déroulée dans un contexte d’attaques concertées du gouvernement contre la société civile et le pouvoir judiciaire. Nous attendons du nouveau gouvernement qu’il tienne sa promesse électorale de protéger l’espace civique et de permettre aux OSC de fonctionner librement.

  Dans son manifeste électoral de 2019, le MCP, qui dirige l’Alliance Tonse (un mot qui signifie « nous tous »), une coalition de neuf partis politiques formée quelques semaines avant la nouvelle élection pour déloger Mutharika, a promis de soutenir le fonctionnement des OSC locales et internationales de défense des droits humains grâce à un cadre politique, institutionnel et législatif permissif et habilitant, et de faciliter le développement progressif d’une société civile pleinement capable de demander des comptes au gouvernement et de faire respecter les droits des citoyens. Nous espérons que le nouveau gouvernement donnera suite à cette promesse et retirera le projet de loi oppressif sur les ONG de 2018, qui contient un certain nombre de dispositions susceptibles de constituer une menace pour la capacité des OSC à fonctionner. Le projet de loi augmenterait le montant de la pénalité imposée à une OSC en infraction avec la loi, qui passerait de 70 dollars US actuellement à 20 000 dollars US. Il prévoit également une peine de sept ans de prison pour les dirigeants d’OSC reconnus coupables de violation de la loi. Ainsi, par exemple, si vous tardez à envoyer un rapport à l’Autorité des ONG, vous risquez une amende de 20 000 dollars US. En outre, les directeurs de l’organisation pourraient être envoyés en prison pour sept ans. Il s'agit d'une disposition ridicule. C’est le genre de disposition que l’on ne trouve que dans les États autoritaires. Nous espérons également que le nouveau gouvernement supprimera le nouveau régime de cotisation, qui est répressif et impose une lourde charge aux OSC, et rétablira l’ancien système de cotisation. Les nouveaux frais que les OSC doivent payer au Conseil des ONG ont été augmentés en janvier 2018, passant de 70 dollars US à 1 400 dollars US.

  De quel soutien la société civile malawite aura-t-elle besoin de la part des partenaires internationaux pour aider à soutenir la démocratie au Malawi ?

  Maintenant que les élections sont terminées, il est urgent que la société civile se réunisse et élabore une feuille de route et des plans d’action comprenant un mécanisme solide de contrôle des actions du gouvernement. Pour ce faire, et en particulier pour développer leurs capacités à demander au nouveau gouvernement de rendre compte de ses engagements, les OSC ont besoin du soutien des OSC internationales. Les OSC ont également besoin d’un soutien financier pour renforcer leur rôle en tant qu’acteurs de la gouvernance et de la responsabilité locales. La viabilité financière est essentielle pour que les OSC locales deviennent des organisations résilientes et efficaces. Les OSC et les donateurs internationaux ont un rôle clé à jouer pour contribuer à la durabilité des OSC locales. Enfin, les OSC ont besoin du soutien moral des OSC internationales pour être plus efficaces. Pendant la campagne pour l’intégrité des élections, les OSC locales ont reçu un soutien massif de la société civile internationale par le biais de déclarations dans les médias et de lettres aux autorités. Nous espérons que ce soutien se poursuivra tandis que nous nous lançons dans la tâche ardue de surveiller les actions du nouveau gouvernement, notamment en ce qui concerne la lutte contre la corruption et la fin de la culture d’impunité qui prévaut depuis longtemps en ce qui concerne les violations des droits humains.

  L’espace civique au Malawi est classé « obstrué » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contactez le Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation via sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@CHRRMalawi sur Twitter. 

• MALAWI: ‘Civil society expects new gov. to place rights at the top of its agenda’

  CIVICUS speaks with Michael Kaiyatsa, acting Executive Director of the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR),about the recent presidential election in Malawi, which were held in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and led to a change of government. The CHRR is civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at supporting and promoting democracy and human rights in Malawi. Its mission is to contribute towards the protection, promotion and consolidation of good governance by empowering rural and urban communities to exercise their rights. Founded in 1995 by former student exiles who returned home to the promise of a new democracy, it operates through two core programmes: Community Mobilisation and Empowerment and Human Rights Monitoring and Training.

   

  Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and a political crisis, the presidential election was held in Malawi in June 2020. What was the role of civil society and the judiciary in ensuring that the election took place?

  I think it is fair to say that judges and civil society-led protests paved the way for the fresh presidential election to be held. The election that was held on 23 June 2020 was a rerun ordered by Malawi’s Constitutional Court, which ruled on 3 February 2020 to overturn the 21 May 2019 presidential election, citing massive irregularities.

  In the May 2019 presidential contest, the incumbent, Peter Mutharika, was declared winner, in the first-past-the-post system, with 38.57 per cent of the vote. However, the opposition claimed the poll had been fraudulent. They cited, among other things, the alleged use of Tippex correction fluid to change vote tallies. Dr Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party and Dr Saulos Chilima of the United Transformation Movement petitioned the Constitutional Court, seeking to overturn the presidential election results. The two cited widespread irregularities, including the use of Tippex and missing signatures on some result sheets.

  The Constitutional Court’s historic ruling, later validated by the country’s Supreme Court, represents a noteworthy illustration of the independence of the judiciary in Malawi’s maturing democracy. However, key to the ruling was not only the independence of Malawi’s judiciary but also months of civil society-led mass demonstrations. The protests were so sustained and vigorous that they could not be ignored by key democratic institutions like the judiciary. The Human Rights Defenders Coalition, an influential civil society grouping, courageously brought thousands of people to the streets on a regular basis to campaign against the botched outcome of the May 2019 election. This was particularly important because it significantly increased the pressure on the judiciary and other key democratic institutions to do the right thing.

  This is not to underrate the role played by the judiciary. The judges really stood up to defend democracy. Prior to the Constitutional Court ruling there had been several attempts to bribe the judges to ensure that the ruling went in former President Mutharika’s favour: one prominent banker was arrested in connection with the bribery case. There were also numerous threats to the independence of the judiciary prior to the rerun, including a government attempt to force out senior Supreme Court judges through early retirement just days before the rerun. The judges could have easily succumbed to such intimidation and ruled in favour of Mutharika, but they did not. Instead, they stood firm and delivered a radical judgement that has changed the way Malawi is governed.

  Civil society successfully challenged a decision by the former government to impose a lockdown. Why did civil society object to it when other countries around the world were implementing similar measures?

  Civil society wanted the lockdown to be put on hold until the government could come up with some way to protect the country’s poorest and most vulnerable people. Civil society groups were unhappy that the government did not outline a social safety net for vulnerable people during the lockdown, which prompted the Human Rights Defenders Coalition and other CSOs to seek a stop order from the court. It is a fact that many people in Malawi operate on a hand-to-mouth basis.

  It is also important to note that the civil society challenge came after thousands of informal traders in the cities of Blantyre and Mzuzu and in districts like Thyolo had taken to the streets to protest against the lockdown with placards that read, ‘We’d rather die of corona than die of hunger’. Many of these vendors are daily wage earners and a lockdown could have badly affected them. There was also growing suspicion among civil society and the citizenry that the government was trying to use the lockdown to justify the cancellation or postponement of the elections.

  How was the election turnout? Were there worries that Malawians would not come out to vote for fear of contagion?

  There were worries that Malawians would not come out in their numbers to vote because of health concerns caused by the pandemic. It was feared, for example, that with the need for limited exposure to large groups and social distancing, citizens might be less likely to leave their homes to vote because of concerns for their own health and that of their family members. There was also a major risk that those deterred from voting would be disproportionately from older age groups or people with underlying health conditions. The legitimacy of the contest might therefore be undermined by unfair restrictions placed on certain segments of society and thus by their uneven participation. 

  These fears were partly realised. The voter turnout was lower than in the previous election. Of the 6,859,570 Malawians registered to vote in 2020, 64.8 per cent voted. This was down from May 2019, when 74.4 per cent of registered voters participated. But the low turnout could also be attributed to inadequate voter and civic education campaigns. Unlike in previous elections, most CSOs were unable to conduct civic and voter education due to resource challenges. The uncertainty of polling dates made it difficult for CSOs to mobilise resources. The previous Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) did not give people confidence that the elections would take place within the stipulated 150 days. The official date for the polls was fixed only around two weeks before the elections, so mobilising resources to conduct civic and voter education at such short notice was not easy.

  However, it is also true that some Malawians may have avoided the polls because of the growing COVID-19 pandemic. By election day, there were 803 documented cases and 11 recorded COVID-19 deaths in Malawi so some people – possibly older people and those with pre-existing health conditions – may have stayed away.

  What were the challenges of organising elections during a pandemic?

  The experience in Malawi has shown that organising elections during a pandemic can be very challenging. The prevention measures outlined by the government do not allow gatherings of more than 100 people. However, most political parties ignored this restriction and held campaign meetings exceeding this number.

  A key challenge faced by the MEC during this fresh election was the need to put the health and safety of voters first while ensuring the integrity of elections. The MEC usually has a voter education budget that is utilised ahead of each election. However, given that this fresh election was not budgeted for earlier, the MEC faced financial challenges, which deepened as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which required the procurement of personal protective equipment, adding further budgetary constraints.

  The MEC also experienced significant challenges with the production and distribution of voting materials. Malawi imports many election materials from other countries. As Malawi was gearing up for the fresh election, many countries were on full or partial lockdown in the wake of the pandemic. This impacted on election preparations, as some suppliers found it difficult to transport goods internationally. Because of all this, there were significant delays in the printing of ballot papers, which was done in Dubai.

  Another challenge was that political parties were not able to monitor the ballot printing process, as has always been the case, due to COVID-19 related travel restrictions. A further important consequence of the pandemic was the absence of international election observers. With international travel restrictions imposed worldwide, the ability of international observers to observe the election was dramatically restricted. And as already mentioned, the pandemic affected voter turnout.

  Now that the rerun election has led to the ousting of the incumbent and a new president, what does civil society expect from the new government?

  Civil society has many expectations of the new government. One of the key expectations is that the new government will place the promotion and protection of human rights at the top of its agenda and strengthen the fundamental freedoms of all Malawians in line with international human rights standards. It is also hoped that the government will move to protect the space for civil society. The fresh presidential election took place amidst concerted government attacks on civil society and the judiciary. It is our expectation that the new government will fulfil its election promise to protect civic space and allow CSOs to operate freely.

  In its 2019 election manifesto, the Malawi Congress Party, which leads the Tonse Alliance (‘Tonse’ meaning ‘all of us’), a grouping of nine political parties formed weeks before the fresh poll to unseat Mutharika, promised to support the operations of local and international human rights CSOs through a permissive and enabling policy and institutional and legislative framework and to facilitate the progressive development of a civil society that is fully capable of holding the government accountable and defending citizens’ rights. It is our hope that the new administration will walk the talk on this promise and withdraw the oppressive NGO Act (Amendment Bill) of 2018, which contains a number of provisions that could pose a threat to CSOs’ ability to operate. The proposed legislation would raise the penalty fee imposed on a CSO in breach of the law from the current US$70 to US$20,000. It would also impose a seven-year jail term on CSO leaders found in breach of the law. So, for example, if you delay submitting a report to the NGO Authority, you could be fined US$20,000 and the directors of the organisation could be sent to prison for seven years. This is a ridiculous provision. It is a provision that can only be found in authoritarian states. We also hope the new administration will scrap the new fee regime, which is repressive and quite high for CSOs, and revert to the old fees. The new fees that CSOs have to pay to the NGO Board were increased in January 2018 from US$70 to US$1,400.

  What support will civil society in Malawi need from international civil society to help sustain Malawi’s democracy?

  One thing that is urgent now that elections are out of the way is for civil society to sit down and develop an action plan and roadmap, which can include a robust mechanism to check on the government's actions. In this regard, CSOs need the support of international CSOs, particularly to develop their capacities to hold the new government to account on its commitments. CSOs also need financial support to reinforce their role in local governance and accountability. Financial sustainability is crucial for local CSOs if they are to become resilient, effective organisations. International CSOs and donors have a key role to play in helping local CSOs become more sustainable. Finally, CSOs need moral support from international CSOs to be more effective. During the campaign for electoral integrity, local CSOs received overwhelming support from international CSOs through media statements and letters to authorities. It is our hope that this support will continue as we embark on the arduous task of checking the new government’s actions, especially in addressing corruption and the longstanding culture of impunity for human rights violations.

  Civic space in Malawi is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CHRRMalawi on Twitter.

  
  

   

• MALAYSIA: ‘Young voters could be Malaysia’s kingmakers

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Tharma Pillai, co-founder and Advocacy Director of Undi18.

  A youth civil society organisation (CSO) born out of the student movement, Undi18 successfully advocated for the amendment of article 119(1) of Malaysia’s Constitution to reduce the minimum voting age, allowing people over 18 to vote in the 19 November 2022 election.

  How did Undi18 start and what was your objective?

  In 2016, my co-founder and I were both studying in the USA and that year’s election inspired us. I came from a sciences and technology background, where most people don’t really care about these things. But seeing democracy in action and our US classmates engage with the electoral process made us reflect on our inability to vote in our home country, Malaysia. It was quite interesting that because they had the right to vote, they felt the responsibility of helping choose the best possible leader for their country.

  We started thinking of ways to replicate these practices and bring this kind of energy into Malaysian university campuses. It was only natural for us to focus on the right to vote because voting age in Malaysia was 21, which meant that a high proportion of college students were ineligible to vote. This did not happen in the USA, where the minimum voting age is 18. By 2016, some of our US classmates were voting for the second time in their lives, while I had never yet had the chance. We thought that would have to change 

  When we did our research, we realised that our demand was not radical at all, and in fact it was long overdue. We were one of only eight countries in the entire world with a minimum voting age as high as 21. We launched Undi18 – which means ‘Vote18’ – as soon as we came back to Malaysia. Our single focus was on the amendment of article 119(1) of the Federal Constitution to lower the voting age from 21 to 18.

  What tactics did you use to campaign for change?

  To make sure we had a stronger voice, in the first year we ran a digital advocacy campaign, something unheard of in Malaysia, where most civil society work and campaigning take place very much on the ground. We came into existence as a hashtag movement in February 2017.

  At the time we were not registered as a CSO. We didn’t have funding. Our team was very small. The campaign was our passion project. But due to effective digital mobilisation, it looked like we had so many supporters. That prompted the media to pick up on our story. We were always willing to work with people of all political leanings.

  Many Malaysian CSOs tend to side squarely with the opposition because for a long time our country had one-party rule. We of course worked with the opposition, but we also engaged with other parties. That also made us open to engaging with whoever criticised our movement and addressing any grievances directly.

  In addition to the digital campaign, we started off a petition and a memorandum to the prime minister. Unfortunately, we didn’t get too far with the government. We knocked on many doors and talked to many people, but the government viewed young people as inclined to vote for the opposition, so they disliked the idea of lowering the voting age for reasons of political calculation. But we gained traction with the opposition, which raised the issue in their manifesto. This gave us a lot of leverage when the opposition eventually came to power in 2018. They had promised to deliver change on this issue.

  How did you engage with the parliamentary process?

  As soon as the new government was inaugurated, we tried to convince them to introduce an amendment bill, but there were challenges. No constitutional amendment had ever been passed in Malaysia by a government without a parliamentary supermajority of two thirds, and this new government only had a simple majority. It took a year for the government to finally greenlight the
  initiative.

  But not having a supermajority, the government needed to negotiate with the opposition. We did our best to engage with political parties across the spectrum, especially those in the opposition, to convince them that this was not a partisan initiative and all could benefit, them included. We pleaded with them to support the bill for the sake of young people, democracy and Malaysia’s future. Luckily, the then-Minister of Youth and Sports was a very strong ally of ours and helped us navigate these obstacles.

  Thanks to these efforts, in July 2019 this became the first constitutional amendment in Malaysia’s history to pass with 100 per cent of the votes in the lower and upper houses of parliament.

  Were there any implementation challenges?

  There were postponements and delays. The agreement with the opposition was that the law would be implemented within two years. The two-year timeline was unusual, but necessary due to the technical difficulties entailed by the new automatic voter registration system.

  Repeated promises were made that this would be done by July 2021.But another change of government slowed things down, as the new government thought young voters would vote against it. In March 2021, it announced implementation would be postponed until September 2022 at the earliest, but it didn’t provide a clear date.

  We campaigned against this postponement and held protests across Malaysia, which grew to include larger issues fuelling public anger, including the economic situation, the shutdown of parliament and the poor management of the COVID-19 health crisis. We also sued the government. We filed a judicial review against the prime minister, the Election Commission and the government of Malaysia for postponing the implementation of the UNDI18 Bill beyond the due date. The High Court decided in our favour and ordered the federal government to implement the bill by 31 December 2021. Due to public pressure that was sustained thanks to the protests, the government decided against appealing the verdict and complied. As a result, the bill was finally implemented on 15 December 2021, and when the updated voter rolls were published one month later an additional 5.8 million voters had been included in the system and 18-year-olds could officially vote in the next election.

  What were the main elements of the amendment?

  The amendment had three components. First, it lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. Second, it also lowered the minimum running age to 18, meaning you could become an elected member of parliament at that age. And third, it established automatic voter registration for anyone turning 18.

  The 2022 elections were the first in which people between 18 and 21 cast their ballots. An additional 5.8 million new voters were added to the electoral roll issued in January 2022. Malaysia being a country of 33 million, this was quite a number.

  In Malaysia, ‘young voters’ are defined as those between 18 to 40 years old. After the changes, they account for 51 per cent of the electoral roll, up from 40 per cent. This means young people could make change happen. Malaysian politics are dominated by old people. At one point we had the oldest prime minister in the world – a 93-year-old man. Now for the first time, young voters could be Malaysia’s kingmakers. This is why youth turnout is a key element to watch when analysing the results of this election.

  Change started happening even before the polls opened. In the run-up to the election, many senior leaders were replaced with younger candidates in order to appeal to young voters. Overall, the number of young and new candidates increased. And all parties had more youth-centric manifestos, addressing some of the concerns expressed by young people, such as corruption, climate change, the state of the economy and healthcare.

  What more needs to be done to make policymaking more inclusive of younger people?

  I think Malaysia needs political rejuvenation, and that can be done through education. Our society gives too much power to older people, who of course don’t want to let go of it, whether it’s in government, civil society, politics, or business. To change things, you must train young leaders – but nobody is doing this kind of work. At Undi18 we are doing our best to fill that gap so that young people can take up the space, gain power and get ready to be the country’s next leaders.

  We strongly believe that informed voters are integral to democratic success, so we have been working with the Ministries of Education and Higher Education to advance educational programmes to address this issue systemically. We want educational curricula to emphasise democracy so the democratisation process beginsin schools. Some topics such as constitutional rights, human rights and the functions of the parliament are already in the syllabus, but they’re not emphasised enough.

  We also have our own programmes. We run outreach campaigns on social media platforms. We are quite active there as most of our target audience is there. We also run outreach programmes in schools and universities to educate students about their rights. And we have corporate, civil society, government and international partners to ensure we reach as many people as possible.

  ---

  Civic space in Malaysia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Undi18 through its website and follow @UNDI18MY and @TharmaPillai on Twitter.
• MALDIVES: ‘Calling this a free and fair election would be a betrayal to the people of Maldives’

  CIVICUS speaks about the upcoming presidential election in Maldives with Shahindha Ismail, founder of theMaldivian Democracy Network (MDN).

  The MDN, an independent civil society organisation (CSO) that since 2004 has worked to protect and promote human rights and the values and principles of democracy in Maldives, was arbitrarily deregistered by the government in 2019. Shahindha continues leading the organisation from exile in Germany and is currently completing a research project on violent extremism in Maldives, which she started as a Reagan-Fascell fellow at the USA’s National Endowment for Democracy.

  How does the Maldives government relate with civil society?

  The government is selective about the CSOs it engages with. More critical and vocal organisations receive no cooperation from the government. It has become commonplace over the past four-plus years to brush CSOs off and exclude us from government consultations as ‘unruly troublemakers’. The most worrying trend in this regard is the labelling, smearing and targeting of CSOs and individuals who criticise the government.

  Additionally, one of the biggest obstacles the government has placed on civil society work is its systematic refusal to release public information, which violates the Right to Information (RTI) Law. The government ignores invitations from CSOs that conduct assessments of governance quality, depriving them of the opportunity to discuss their findings and recommendations with government officials. Public expressions of concern and requests regarding the malfunction of government systems generally go unheard and ignored.

  Do you think the upcoming presidential election will be free and fair?

  No, I think the election that will take place on 9 September has already lost any semblance of freedom or fairness. The government has unfairly, even unlawfully, monopolised all political spaces months ahead of the election. The government has sought to eliminate all viable opposition and has used judicial institutions to place one obstacle after another in the way of opposition parties, depriving them of precious time for campaigning. The Elections Commission (EC) in particular is seriously compromised, which affects the very principle of election freedom and fairness.

  The latest news reports state that the incumbent, President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, has declared at a campaign rally in Thaa Atoll that tensions will arise if Maldives has to go to a second round of voting during the presidential election. It is a direct threat to voters, even an incitement to violence. Every election Maldives has had since the 2008 Constitution introduced multi-party elections has had two rounds and we have never had a violent election.

  In early August, the Supreme Court ruled that former president Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayyoom, the presidential candidate of the Progressive Party of Maldives, was ineligible to run. His conviction for corruption and money laundering is still under appeal.

  A few months ago, the EC delayed the registration of The Democrats, a new party formed by a splinter faction of the ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). This party had formed following allegations of election rigging during the party primaries, in which President Solih competed against former president and Parliamentary Speaker Mohamed Nasheed. Over 39,000 MDP members were then removed from the voter roll and did not get to participate in the primaries. The EC said it had checked The Democrats’ membership and application forms and found them to be in order but needed a further three to four months to verify them a second time. Only much later was the party officially registered.

  Weeks after this manoeuvre, the EC suddenly cancelled the registration of the Maldives Reform Movement, the party led by former president Maumoon Abdul Gayyoom, claiming it was short of around nine members to be eligible to remain registered, which the party denies.

  Additionally, the media is coopted by the government, so you rarely see objective or critical coverage of government actions. Media coverage often looks like government PR rather than news. Unsurprisingly, the disinformation that has plagued the campaign, often coming from the government, has only been legitimised and amplified by mainstream media. Civil society has had a very challenging time getting their voices heard.

  And the Solih campaign is using blatant tactics to influence voters that involve consistently abusing state resources, as civil society has repeatedly denounced.

  For instance, on 22 August, two weeks ahead of the vote, President Solih announced a 40 per cent pay rise for all government employees, even though the previous day the value of the Maldivian Rufiyaa had dropped again and the national external debt exceeds US$3.8 billion. Additionally, hundreds of government jobs and promotions were handed out at state-owned enterprises right before the MDP presidential primaries, and increases in financial benefits for health workers, teachers and retired people were announced just months ahead of the election.

  Another example of an attempt to buy off voters was the announcement of land distribution to the residents of Greater Malé, the capital city’s metro area. A list of over 19,000 eligible applicants was published in June 2023 and a confirmation list has just been published in August. However, while the government has announced that dredging will begin soon, it is not at all clear how much of the promised land is in reality above water. Large-scale infrastructure development projects such as airports, housing programmes and bridges have also been irresponsibly announced or contracted out with no information about when they will be completed.

  What’s at stake in the election?

  Concerningly, this election may result in a turn towards religious fundamentalism and deepened authoritarianism. Right now, President Solih’s only coalition partners are the Adhaalath Party and the Maldives Development Alliance, both notorious for their support of religious extremists. Solih’s alliance with the religious conservative Adhaalath Party in the upcoming election is particularly concerning, because over the past couple of years Adhaalath has taken extreme stands on various issues, such as condemning yoga as ‘prohibited in Islam’ and calling on the government to arrest anyone who practises yoga, and making public calls on the government to hunt down and punish gay men.

  At a recent rally, Adhaalath’s leader and current Home Minister, Imran Abdullah, announced that the party was ending its reformist stance and embracing the goal of establishing Islamic rule in Maldives. While Maldives has had a constitution based on the tenets of Islam and principles of Islamic Shariah for centuries, they are now going to try to enforce a Taliban-style rule veiled as Islamic Shariah. This is all the more worrying due to the fact that under Solih, the government has increasingly fallen under pressure from religious extremists, taking extremely undemocratic actions every time.

  What should the international community do to support a free and fair election?

  I think the international community needs to take civil society concerns seriously. As in previous years, election monitoring by civil society is underway. In addition to planned observation of the poll, CSOs have been monitoring the campaign by collecting information through RTI requests, mainly related to the ways abusive government spending is being used to influence the vote. Information is shared regularly, domestically as well as with the international community. The main local observer, Transparency Maldives, has repeatedly made statements regarding the government’s behaviour in relation to the election. These concerns are based on evidence; they are not hearsay or opinion.

  I hope that election monitors and the international community listen to Maldivian civil society’s repeated warnings. Repeated corrupt behaviour and abuse of state resources to deliberately influence the election should not be ignored by international election monitors, especially when the highest measure of a democracy is the existence on free and fair elections.

  Calling this a free and fair election will only legitimise the undue influence of the government on election processes and results. It would be a betrayal to the people of Maldives in every sense of the word. Maldives will not progress if its non-democracy is constantly labelled as a democracy.

  What’s your hope for the future of Maldives?

  My hope is to have a government that genuinely and actively promotes the fundamental values of democracy. One that will educate its people to respect human dignity and teach them to coexist peacefully. This, I believe, can only be done by including a rigorous national curriculum of civic education and providing avenues to learn, such as access to free libraries, educational centres and affordable higher education. Only then will our people be protected against the appeal of corrupt politicians.

  ---

  Civic space inMaldivesis rated ‘obstructed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Maldivian Democracy Network through itswebsite and follow@MDN_mv on Twitter.

• Maldives: All candidates and parties must commit to respecting and protecting civic freedoms

  

  As citizens of the Maldives prepare to cast their votes in presidential elections scheduled for 9 September 2023, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) and CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation call upon all candidates and political parties to pledge their commitment to upholding and safeguarding civic freedoms as an integral part of their electoral mandates.

• Mexico’s elections: The battle at the ballot box, the easiest one ahead

  By Inés Pousadela 

  In a study released earlier this month, researchers from El Colegio de México (Colmex) were emphatic about what they found to be the biggest challenge facing Mexico, as voters prepared to go to the polls on July 1. "The main problem in the country is inequality," said well-known journalist and academic Ricardo Raphael, presenting the report entitled Desigualdades en México 2018. “The second biggest problem in the country,” Raphael continued, “is inequality.”

  Read on: Open Democracy 

• MYANMAR : « Les partis d'opposition se plaignent que le corps électoral censure leur discours »

  CIVICUS s'entretient avec le journaliste lauréat Cape Diamond (Pyae Sone Win) au sujet des prochaines élections au Myanmar. Cape est un journaliste multimédia basé au Myanmar qui s’intéresse au domaine des droits humains, des crises et des conflits. Il travaille actuellement de manière indépendante pour l'Associated Press (AP). Il a assuré une couverture critique de la crise des réfugiés rohingyas et a travaillé avec de nombreux médias internationaux, dont Al Jazeera, ABC News et CBS. Il a également contribué au documentaire lauréat du BAFTA,Myanmar’s Killing Fields, et au filmThe Rohingya Exodus, médaillé d'or au Festival du film de New York.

  Prévues pour le 8 novembre 2020, ces élections seront les premières depuis 2015, date à laquelle elles ont abouti à une victoire écrasante de la Ligue nationale pour la démocratie (LND), et ne seront que les deuxièmes élections compétitives depuis 1990, date à laquelle la victoire écrasante de la LND a été annulée par l’armée.

  Quel est l'état des libertés civiles et de la société civile à l'approche des élections ?

  La situation de la liberté d'expression est très préoccupante. Au fil des années, des journalistes et des militants des droits de l'homme au Myanmar ont fait l'objet d'accusations pénales en raison de leur travail. Des lois restrictives, telles que la loi sur les télécommunications, la loi sur les associations illicites, la loi sur les secrets officiels et les dispositions du code pénal relatives à la diffamation, continuent d'être utilisées pour poursuivre les militants et les journalistes. La loi sur les défilés et rassemblements pacifiques a également été utilisée contre les manifestants.

  De nombreux partis politiques se sont plaints du fait que la Commission électorale de l'Union (CEU), l'organe électoral, a censuré des messages devant être diffusés à la télévision nationale avant les élections. Par exemple, Ko Ko Gyi, président du parti populaire, a déclaré que les changements apportés par la CEU dans son discours de campagne l'empêchaient d'exprimer pleinement la position politique de son parti sur les élections. Deux partis, le Parti démocratique pour une nouvelle société et la Force démocratique nationale, ont annulé leurs émissions électorales pour protester contre la censure.

  En même temps, les adversaires disent que le corps électoral est biaisé en faveur du parti au pouvoir, la LND, dirigé par Aung San Suu Kyi. C'est une question à laquelle nous devons être attentifs et dont nous devons parler afin de garantir des élections crédibles.

  Le corps électoral s’est-il rapproché de la société civile ?

  J'ai entendu dire que l'actuel CEU n'a pas cherché activement à établir un lien avec la société civile. Le CEU a d'abord interdit à l'Alliance du peuple pour des élections crédibles (APEC), l'un des plus grands groupes de surveillance des élections du pays, de surveiller les élections. La CEU a accusé l'APEC de ne pas être enregistrée en vertu de la loi régissant les organisations de la société civile et de recevoir des fonds de sources internationales. Bien que la CEU l'ait finalement autorisée à fonctionner, l'organisation éprouve des difficultés à le faire en raison des restrictions récemment imposées à cause de la COVID-19.

  Quelles sont les principales questions autour desquelles la campagne s'articulera ?

  La pandémie de la COVID-19 et la guerre civile en cours dans le pays sont nos principaux problèmes pour le moment. Il est très clair que le parti au pouvoir et le gouvernement ne prêtent pas suffisamment attention à la situation des minorités dans les régions qui souffrent de la guerre civile.

  Il est inquiétant que le pays traverse une pandémie, dont je pense qu'il n'a pas la capacité suffisante pour y faire face. Au 29 septembre 2020, nous avons eu un total de 11 000 cas signalés et 284 décès dus à la COVID-19. L'augmentation des infections au cours des dernières semaines est inquiétante, puisque nous n'avions eu qu'environ 400 cas confirmés en août. Je crains que la situation ne permette aux gens d'aller voter aux élections en toute sécurité.

  Plus de 20 partis politiques ont envoyé des demandes au corps électoral pour reporter les élections en raison de la pandémie, mais celles-ci ont été rejetées. Le parti au pouvoir n'est pas prêt à reporter les élections.

  Est-il possible de développer une campagne « normale » dans ce contexte ?

  Je ne pense pas qu'il soit possible d'avoir des rassemblements de campagne normaux comme ceux des dernières élections, celles de 2015, car nous sommes en pleine pandémie. Le gouvernement a pris plusieurs mesures pour lutter contre la propagation de la maladie, notamment l'interdiction de se réunir. Les partis politiques ne peuvent pas faire campagne dans des zones qui sont en situation de semi-confinement.

  Les grandes villes, telles que Yangon et sa région métropolitaine, ainsi que certaines municipalités de Mandalay, sont en semi-confinement, dans le cadre d'un programme que le gouvernement a appelé « Restez à la maison ». Au même temps, l'ensemble de l'État de Rakhine, qui connaît une guerre civile, est également en semi-confinement. J'ai bien peur que les habitants de la zone de guerre civile ne puissent pas aller voter.

  Pour s'adresser à leur public, les candidats utilisent à la fois les réseaux sociaux et les médias traditionnels. Toutefois, comme je l'ai déjà souligné, certains partis de l'opposition ont été censurés par la CSU. Certains membres de l'opposition ont dénoncé le traitement inéquitable de la CEU et du gouvernement, tandis que le parti au pouvoir utilise son pouvoir pour accroître sa popularité. Cela va clairement nuire aux chances électorales de l'opposition.

  Quels sont les défis spécifiques auxquels sont confrontés les candidats dans l'État de Rakhine ?

  Étant donné que tout l'État de Rakhine est soumis à des restrictions en raison de la COVID-19, les candidats ne peuvent pas faire campagne personnellement. C'est pourquoi ils font généralement campagne sur les réseaux sociaux. En même temps, dans de nombreuses municipalités de l'État de Rakhine, une coupure du service Internet a été imposée de façon prolongée en raison des combats continus entre l'armée arakanienne et les forces militaires. Je crains que les gens là-bas ne puissent pas obtenir suffisamment d'informations sur les élections.

  Le gouvernement du Myanmar utilise également la loi discriminatoire de 1982 sur la citoyenneté et la loi électorale pour priver les Rohingyas de leurs droits et les empêcher de se présenter aux élections. Les autorités électorales ont empêché le leader du Parti de la démocratie et des droits humains (PDDH) dirigé par les Rohingyas, Kyaw Min, de se présenter aux élections. Kyaw Min a été disqualifié avec deux autres candidats du PDDH parce que ses parents n'auraient pas été citoyens, comme l'exige la loi électorale. C'est l'un des nombreux outils utilisés pour opprimer le peuple Rohingya.

  En octobre, la CEU a lancé une application pour smartphone qui a été critiquée pour l'utilisation d'un label dérogatoire en référence aux musulmans rohingyas. L'application mVoter2020, qui vise à sensibiliser les électeurs, désigne au moins deux candidats de l'ethnie rohingya comme des « Bengalis », ce qui laisse entendre qu'ils sont des immigrants du Bangladesh, même si la plupart des Rohingyas vivent au Myanmar depuis des générations. Ce label est rejeté par de nombreux Rohingyas. De plus, aucun des plus d'un million de réfugiés Rohingyas au Bangladesh, ni des centaines de milliers de personnes dispersées dans d'autres pays, ne pourra voter.

  L'espace civique au Myanmar est décrit comme « répressif » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
  Suivez@cape_diamond sur Twitter.

• Myanmar elections show the regression of civic space over the last five years

  By Lisa Majumdar, Advocacy Officer, CIVICUS

  Amidst a flurry of high-profile elections this week, it will be Myanmar’s turn to go to the polls on 8 November. Nearly 100 political parties are contesting the country’s general election, with the upper and lower houses of the national, state and regional governments all to play for.

  This will be the second election in Myanmar since the end of military rule in 2011. But the contrast between the two could hardly be starker. While the 2015 elections saw a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) amid a groundswell of hope for democratic progress and human rights change, the upcoming election will take place in an environment of ongoing serious human rights violations, escalating attacks on democratic freedoms and discriminatory policies.

  Unfree and unfair

  The conditions for free and fair elections depend on an open civic space, where voters have access to information, can enjoy freedom of expression and opinion, and are able to organize and gather. Countries that purport to be democracies have a responsibility to ensure that these conditions are met, so that people can truly have a say in their own governance.

  But in Myanmar, these conditions are in short supply.

  As the CIVICUS Monitor has documented, there has been a sustained attack on civic space in the country over the last few years. Human rights defenders, journalists and critics have been criminalized and attacked for speaking up about human rights violations. A raft of old draconian laws are deployed by the government and military to silence dissent. 

  This already has created an unhealthy environment for elections. However, in the run-up to the election, authorities have compounded this by actively targeting electoral processes. 

  For example, Myanmar’s Union Election Commission (UEC), which has been accused by human rights groups of making critical decisions without transparency, has censored the speeches of political parties that want to broadcast campaign materials on state-run TV and radio networks. The election commission’s stringent guidelines on the content of speeches means that criticism of government policies by opposition parties has essentially been banned from state-run airwaves, denying voters crucial information. 

  Government-imposed internet restrictions in Rakhine and Chin States – which have now lasted for more than a year – has had a serious impact on the ability of voters in the affected areas to access information about candidates, parties, and their positions. 

  The government’s response to COVID-19 had a negative impact on media freedom, affecting the ability of the electorate to be informed. Journalists and media workers have been declared a nonessential business and face travel restrictions due to the government’s strict stay-at-home orders, hindering comprehensive coverage. Four national newspapers – the Standard Times, 7 Day Daily, the Myanmar Times, and the Voice Daily – announced their decision to suspend circulation of their newspapers from 23 September 2020. Notably, the publication of state-owned newspaper will not be affected. 

  Discriminatory policies 

  Most egregiously, though, the Myanmar government is preventing people from voting or from standing for election altogether. 

  It has systematically and deliberately disenfranchised voters from ethnic minorities, using the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law and the Election Law to prevent Rohingya candidates from running for office, even though most Rohingya families have lived in Myanmar for generations. 

  They include Abdul Rasheed, a Yangon resident whose father was a civil servant and who was born and has lived his whole life in Myanmar. Kyaw Min, the chairperson of the Democracy and Human Rights party, has also been barred despite having run in the 1990 election and spending years as a political prisoner alongside thousands of NLD activists and others.

  The authorities have barred an estimated 600,000 Rohingya from registering to vote in the election. None of the million Rohingya who fled genocide in Myanmar for neighbouring Bangladesh will be allowed to vote. This adds yet another layer of repression and discrimination on a community that has experienced ethnic cleansing and a systematic denial of their rights in recent years. 

  Voting has been suspended or cancelled in various constituencies in Kachin, Karen, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan States, and the Bago Region, with the election commission citing security concerns. As a result, over 1.5 million people will not be able to vote.

  It is a common feature of would-be autocrats to attempt to suppress the votes of those who disagree with, or are negatively impacted by, their policies. Myanmar is not the only country to attempt to do so; it is not even the only country to have done so this week. But for a country where optimism for change and freedom shone so brightly five years ago, this represents a bleak failure of democratic progress. 

  The two elections, five years apart, have bookended a downward spiral into gross human rights violations, attacks against dissenters, and a curtailment of democratic freedoms. While some countries have spoken up and stood by human rights defenders and victims of violations, other countries, particularly in the Southeast Asian region, have failed miserably to call out Myanmar on its actions.  Whatever the outcome of this elections – marred already by acts of censorship, racist voter suppression and other restrictions – we all must redouble our efforts to support civil society and activists to reverse the democratic regression we have witnessed since the 2015 elections.

• MYANMAR: ‘Opposition parties complain that the election body censors their messaging'

  CIVICUS speaks to award-winning journalist Cape Diamond (Pyae Sone Win) about the upcoming elections in Myanmar. Cape is a multimedia journalist based in Myanmar, covering issues of human rights, crisis and conflict. Currently freelancing for the Associated Press (AP), he has provided critical coverage during the Rohingya crisis and contributed to numerous international outlets, including Al Jazeera, ABC News and CBS. He also contributed to the BAFTA Award-winning documentaryMyanmar’s Killing Fields and New York Film Festival gold medal award-winner The Rohingya Exodus.

   

  Scheduled on 8 November 2020, the election will be Myanmar’s first since 2015, which resulted in a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD), and only the second competitive election since 1990, when the military annulled the NLD’s overwhelming victory.

  What is the situation for civic freedoms and civil society ahead of the elections?

  The situation for the freedom of speech is very concerning. Over the years, journalists and rights activists in Myanmar have been criminally charged for their work. Restrictive laws, including the Telecommunications Law, the Unlawful Associations Act, the Official Secrets Act and defamation provisions in the Penal Code, continue to be used to prosecute activists and journalists. The Peaceful Assembly and Procession Law has been used against those protesting.

  Many political parties have raised complaints that the Union Election Commission (UEC), the electoral body, has censored the messages that are set for broadcast on national TV ahead of the elections. For example, Ko Ko Gyi, chairman of the People's Party, said that the edits that the UEC made to his election campaign speech prevent him from airing the party's full political stance ahead of the elections. Two parties – the Democratic Party for a New Society and the National Democratic Force – cancelled their election broadcasts in protest against censorship.

  At the same time, critics say that the electoral body is biased in favour of the ruling party, the NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi. It’s something that we should keep our eyes on and speak out about to ensure credible elections.

  Has the electoral body engaged with civil society?

  I’ve been hearing that the current UEC is not that actively engaging with civil society. They initially barred the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE), one of the largest election monitoring groups in the country, from monitoring the election. The UEC accused PACE of not being registered under the law that applies to civil society organisations and of receiving funding from international sources. Even though the UEC subsequently allowed PACE to operate, the organisation is struggling to proceed due to the newly imposed COVID-19 restrictions.

  What are the main issues the campaign will revolve around?

  The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing civil war across the country are the main issues for us at the moment. It’s very clear that the ruling party and the government are not paying enough attention to the situation of minorities in regions experiencing civil war. 

  It’s worrying that the country is undergoing a pandemic, which I believe it does not have enough capacity to handle. As of 29 September 2020, we have had a total of 11,000 reported cases and 284 deaths due to COVID-19. A surge of infections over the last few weeks has been worrying, as we only had around 400 confirmed cases in August. I am concerned about whether the environment will be safe for people to go out and vote on the election days. 

  More than 20 political parties have sent requests to the electoral body to postpone the elections due to the pandemic, but they were rejected. The ruling party is not willing to have the elections postponed.

  Will it be possible to have a ‘normal’ campaign in this context? 

  I don’t think it’s possible to have normal campaign rallies such as those of the previous election in 2015, because we are in a pandemic. The government has taken several measures to combat the spread of the disease, including orders against gatherings of people. Political parties are not allowed to organise their campaigns in semi-lockdown areas.

  Major cities like Yangon and the Yangon Region, as well as some townships in Mandalay, are under semi-lockdown, which the government calls the Stay-At-Home programme. At the same time, the whole of Rakhine State, which is experiencing civil war, is also on semi-lockdown. I am afraid people in the civil war zone will not be able to go out and vote.

  Candidates are using both mainstream and social media to reach their audiences. However, as noted earlier, some opposition parties have been censored by the UEC. Some opposition members have denounced unfair treatment by the UEC and the government, while the ruling party is using its power to expand its popularity. This will clearly harm the electoral chances of the opposition.

  What specific challenges do candidates face in Rakhine State?

  As the whole of Rakhine State is under COVID-19 restrictions, candidates are not able to campaign in person. Therefore, they are mostly campaigning on social media. At the same time, a long internet shutdown has been in place in many townships in Rakhine State, imposed due to ongoing fighting between the Arakan Army and the military. I am concerned about whether people will be able to get enough information around the elections.

  The Myanmar government is also using the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law and the Election Law to disenfranchise Rohingya people and block them from running for political office. Election officials barred Kyaw Min, head of the Rohingya-led Democracy and Human Rights Party (DHRP), from running. He was disqualified along with two other DHRP candidates because their parents were allegedly not citizens, as required by election law. This is one of the various tools used to oppress the Rohingya population.

  In October, the UEC released a smartphone app that was criticised over its use of a derogatory label for Rohingya Muslims. The mVoter2020 app, aimed at improving voter awareness, labels at least two candidates from the Rohingya ethnic group as ‘Bengali’, a term that implies they are immigrants from Bangladesh, although most have lived in Myanmar for generations. This label is rejected by many Rohingya people. Additionally, none of the one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and another several hundred thousand dispersed in other countries will be allowed to vote.

  Civic space in Myanmar is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Follow@cape_diamond on Twitter.

• NICARAGUA: ‘For the government, these fraudulent elections were a total failure’

  CIVICUS discusses the recent elections in Nicaragua, characterised by the banning of candidates, fraud and repression, with a woman human rights defender from a national platform of Nicaraguan civil society, who requested anonymity for security reasons.

  

  What was the political context in which the 7 November presidential election took place?

  The context began to take shape in 2006, with the pact between the leaders of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Daniel Ortega, and the then-ruling Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC), led by former president Arnoldo Alemán. The aim of the so-called ‘Alemán-Ortega pact’ was to establish a two-party system dominated by both leaders, which did not work out for both: it resulted in a complete restructuring of the political system, including a reform of the constitution and the modification of election dates, which allowed the FSLN – which had failed to win the presidency on several occasions – to win the 2006 election with 38 per cent of the vote, never to leave power since.

  Once in power, the FSLN carried out several constitutional and electoral law reforms ordered by Daniel Ortega, in collusion with legislative, judicial and electoral institutions, to impose a constitution tailored to its needs and to allow himself to be re-elected indefinitely.

  Since the most recent package of electoral changes, carried out in May 2021, the electoral stage was already set so that the current government would win the election. The changes gave the FSLN control of the entire electoral structure, gave the police the power to authorise or ban opposition political rallies and took away funding for candidates.

  Already in December 2020, the National Assembly had passed a law to neutralise opposition candidacies: under the pretext of rejecting foreign interference in Nicaragua’s internal affairs, it prohibited the candidacies of people who had participated in the 2018 protests, labelled by the government as an attempted coup d’état financed by foreign powers.

  All these laws were applied by state institutions in a way that resulted in the banning of all democratic candidates who could in any way be viewed as positioned to defeat the FSLN candidate. The result was an election lacking all real competition.

  Was there any attempt to postpone the election until the proper conditions were met?

  First, in the context of the 2018 protests, which were heavily repressed and resulted in hundreds of deaths, several groups, including the Nicaraguan Bishops’ Conference, proposed holding an early election to resolve the crisis. Some also considered the possibility of forcing the resignation of the president due to his responsibility for the systematic human rights violations committed in the context of the 2018 protests.

  But Ortega refused to call an early election, and instead challenged the alleged ‘coup perpetrators’ protesting against him to get the people’s vote in the 2021 election. In the meantime, instead of proceeding with the electoral reform that had been demanded for years, he set about preparing the ground so that no one could challenge him in the elections.

  With the 2021 electoral process already underway, and in view of the fact that there would be no real competition, voices from civil society recommended suspending and rescheduling an election that would be clearly illegitimate and lacking in credibility, but this call was not echoed.

  How do you assess the election results?

  Clearly the overwhelming majority of Nicaraguan citizens viewed these elections as illegitimate, since only about 10 per cent of eligible voters turned out to vote. Some of those who did vote are government supporters, while others – such as members of the military and police and public servants – were compelled by fear and their work circumstances.

  These claims are supported by polling data from various civil society groups inside and outside Nicaragua, such as Coordinadora Civil, Mujeres Organizadas and Urnas Abiertas. On election day, some of these organisations did a quick poll on the ground, twice – morning and afternoon – and documented. through photos, videos and testimonies by some election observers invited by the government, that the majority of the population did not turn out to vote.

  From civil society’s perspective, these elections were a complete failure for the government, as they gave us all the elements to demonstrate at the international level that the president does not meet the minimum conditions of legitimacy to remain in office. It is not only Nicaraguans who do not recognise the results of these elections: more than 40 countries around the world have not recognised them either. The government conducted a fraudulent election to gain legitimacy, but it failed to do so because no one recognises it at the national or international level.

  What is the outlook for Nicaraguan civil society following the election?

  The panorama has not changed. What awaits us is more of the same: more repression, more persecution, more kidnappings, more political prisoners, more exiles. At the same time, this unresponsive and unaccountable government is completely incapable of solving any of Nicaragua’s problems, so poverty, unemployment and insecurity will also continue to deepen.

  In response, we can do nothing but sustain resistance and try to break the chains of fear, because fear is what this illegitimate government rules through.

  What kind of international support does Nicaraguan civil society need?

  Nicaraguan civil society needs all kinds of support, from support for building and strengthening alliances to amplify our voices, so we can publicise the political situation in Nicaragua and demand action in international forums, to financial and in-kind support to equip us with the tools with which to do our work, sustain our organisations and provide protection for human rights defenders who are being persecuted and attacked.

  Civic space in Nicaragua is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Nicaragua is currently on ourWatch List, which includes cases in which a severe and abrupt deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place. 

• NICARAGUA: ‘María Esperanza’s case is part of a growing process of criminalisation of social protest’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ana Lucía Álvarez, Nicaragua officer of the Mesoamerican Initiative of Women Human Rights Defenders (IM-Defensoras), about the case of María Esperanza Sánchez, unjustly imprisoned in Nicaragua since March 2020, and the ongoing campaign for her release.

  IM-Defensoras is a network of activists and organisations from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua that seeks to provide a comprehensive, regional response to the increasing violence against women human rights defenders in Mesoamerica. Founded in 2010, it seeks to empower and connect women defenders involved in various organisations and social movements to strengthen networks of protection and solidarity among them and to increase the visibility, recognition and impact of their human rights work.

  

  How long has María Esperanza been in prison, and why?

  María Esperanza was captured on 26 January 2020. She is an activist who for a long time accompanied relatives of political prisoners. I believe she began her activism and her organisation after the citizens’ uprising of April 2018. She was already being persecuted, so she was staying in a safe house. The police illegally and arbitrarily raided the house, without a search warrant, and arrested her. She was accused of trafficking narcotics, psychotropics and other controlled substances to the detriment of public health. Her trial is being handled by lawyer Julio Montenegro, who specialises in cases of criminalisation of protest and judicial prosecution of activists and human rights defenders. 

  Do you consider María Esperanza’s case to be part of a broader attack on civic space in Nicaragua?

  There is definitely a growing process of criminalisation of social protest in Nicaragua. The first upsurge in criminalisation came after Operation Clean-up, which ended around August 2018. This was a pseudo-military operation carried out by police and para-police forces to dismantle any organisation of territorial protection that the population had built through barricades in neighbourhoods and roadblocks around the country.

  Once Operation Clean-up was over, the criminalisation of those who had taken part in the civic struggle began. More than 800 people became political prisoners, before being released in 2019 by unilateral decision of the government through the Amnesty Law.

  María Esperanza had already been persecuted, harassed, put under surveillance and threatened before she was imprisoned for her human rights work. Her arrest and trial, like those of so many others, were plagued by irregularities. Violations of due process are systematic. In Nicaragua, the justice system is totally co-opted. It has collapsed and is under the control of the presidential couple: President Daniel Ortega and his vice-president and wife, Rosario Murillo.

  How has the situation of civil society changed since the 2018 wave of protests?

  More than 350 people were killed in a span of six months during the 2018 protests. The symbolic and emotional weight of that death toll in a country that has experienced civil wars, dictatorships and armed uprisings has been tremendous. In Nicaragua there has never been accountability, there have always been policies of wiping the slate clean, which has deepened the wounds.

  In addition to the suffering of the 350 dead, there were over 800 people imprisoned for political reasons, and while many have since been released from prison, we purposefully say that they have been released rather than that they are free, because after their release, political persecution has not ended for them. Systematic harassment by police and para-police forces continues, and it becomes an obstacle to the enjoyment of many rights, including the right to work.

  For these people, the effects of the economic crisis that the country is currently experiencing are compounded by the difficulties brought about by political persecution. They often cannot leave their home because there is a patrol outside, or they go out and they are followed, and then those who follow them learn the names of their employers and start to harass them as well.

  Persecution happens at the local, neighbourhood level. The ruling party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, has established various structures that are used to maintain territorial control through surveillance and repression: Councils of Citizen Power, Family Cabinets and Sandinista Leadership Committees. If you are an opponent or a human rights defender, there will always be a neighbour of yours who is involved in one of these structures and informs the regime and the police of what you are doing, and then you start to be persecuted and harassed, and maybe at some point you get arbitrarily arrested.

  Harassment and hypervigilance cause psychological damage not only to the persecuted individual but also to their family. This has had an impact on the increase in emigration, which is a dual phenomenon, caused by both political persecution and social need. Since 2018, 120,000 people have left Nicaragua, a huge number for a country of just six million.

  The 2021 presidential election openly exposed the regime’s lack of legitimacy. On what basis does the government stand?

  In the run-up to the 2021 election, persecution was only exacerbated. In order to carry out the electoral farce of November, the government imprisoned 10 presidential pre-candidates and many people with a key role in the electoral process and in the formation of alternatives. This sent a very clear message, as a result of which there is still a lot of self-censorship.

  Daniel Ortega has continued to concentrate and consolidate his power. We are currently living under a regime that has become totalitarian, where all freedoms are totally restricted. This is the only way the government can sustain itself, because it has no legitimacy. That is why repression and social control continue to increase rather than decrease. In the absence of such levels of repression and social control, the very high level of popular rejection of the regime would make it impossible for it to maintain political control.

  As a result, repression, territorial control, neighbourhood repression, the criminalisation of protest and social dissent, and the closing of spaces for the exercise of the freedom of expression and media freedoms can be expected to continue.

  Now a combination of laws has been passed that includes a Cybercrime Law. And we have already seen the first political prisoner convicted under this law, which does nothing other than criminalise the freedom of opinion.

  What the government is looking for with political prisoners is to use them as hostages. Among the people arrested recently are presidential candidates, businesspeople, bankers, lawyers, activists and human rights defenders. The government is trying to negotiate their release to gain legitimacy and international approval.

  The truth is that the government has no international support. The only foreign leaders who attended the presidential inauguration were Cuba’s Miguel Díaz-Canel, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and outgoing Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández.

  How can the international community support Nicaraguan civil society in its struggle for the recovery of democracy and human rights?

  We need to amplify denunciations of violations and sharpen accountability mechanisms. Civil society in Nicaragua has made a tremendous effort not only to document human rights violations but also to identify their perpetrators. Given that the justice system in Nicaragua has collapsed, and that civil society is doing everything within its power, the onus is on the international community to push for accountability and punishment of those responsible.

  Daniel Ortega’s regime is no longer a political project but an economic enterprise. Its control of the state allows Ortega to use corruption networks to his advantage. In the light of this, the international community should fine-tune its mechanisms, review economic sanctions and identify the companies that continue to do business, not always entirely legally, with the Ortega regime. Since many association agreements have democratic and anti-corruption clauses, they need to be made operational. Personal sanctions must also be imposed on the architects of corruption and repression.

  What kind of pressure should be exerted to get María Esperanza Sanchez released?

  María Esperanza was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Everything that has happened to her and to the rest of the political prisoners is completely arbitrary; that is precisely why we consider them to be political prisoners. What we demand is the unconditional and guaranteed release of them all.

  What happens to them will depend to a large extent on the strength with which the opposition and the international community manage to exert pressure, and on the correlation of forces that is established between the Nicaraguan government and the human rights movement.

  We must campaign and keep up the pressure. We must continue to put our finger on all the arbitrariness, illegalities and human rights violations. There are still people in Europe and other parts of the world who think Ortega is the idealistic revolutionary of the past, and not the despot he has become. The best way to expose dictators and human rights abusers is to keep communicating the truth on the basis of well-documented evidence.

  Civic space in Nicaragua is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Nicaragua is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watch List, which identifies countries in which a severe and abrupt deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.
  Get in touch with IM-Defensoras through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@IM_Defensoras on Twitter.

• NICARAGUA: ‘The regime seeks to annihilate all forms of autonomous citizen organisation’

  CIVICUS speaks with María Teresa Blandón, a Nicaraguan human rights defender and director of Feminist Programme La Corriente, a civil society organisation (CSO) whose legal status was recently cancelled by the authoritarian regime led by President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo.

  

  What is the reason for the current wave of intensified in repression in Nicaragua?

  Repression increased on the eve of the fraudulent 2021 elections, when the state specifically targeted the leaders of the main opposition groups who had been building alliances to participate in the elections, because even though they knew that conditions were extremely adverse, they insisted that this was the way out of the crisis.

  From January 2022 onwards, the Ortega-Murillo regime further escalated its offensive, possibly due to a failure in its political calculations: it had thought that once the electoral fraud had been consummated and the opposition was thrown in jail, the opposition would abdicate its role and the regime would obtain the endorsement of the international community.

  But neither of these things happened: the opposition did not resign itself and there was no international support; on the contrary, the regime’s isolation only deepened. The Nicaraguan opposition continued to constantly denounce the establishment of a de facto police state and to call for the regime’s exit through civic means. The CSOs that managed to remain in the country continued to denounce systematic human rights violations and repression, hence the approval of new laws to strip them of their legal status and assets.

  Faced with a lack of legitimacy, the Ortega-Murillo regime has deepened its strategy of annihilating any form of citizen organisation that is not subordinate to its interests. To date, more than 1,600 CSOs have been eliminated by the National Assembly and in many cases their assets have been confiscated through the application of laws that openly violate our country’s constitution, which recognises the right to free association and expressly prohibits confiscation.

  Until very recently, the power to cancel an organisation’s legal personality was in the hands of the National Assembly, but a new law assigned it to the Ministry of the Interior, which now has the absolute power to decide who has the right to associate and who does not. The procedure has been expedited and there is no recourse to appeal, which clearly speaks of the situation of defencelessness Nicaraguan civil society finds itself in.

  The judiciary has remained silent in the face of the unconstitutionality appeals filed in 2021, following the approval of the Law on Foreign Agents, which obliges CSOs that receive funds from international cooperation sources to report their activities at a level of detail that makes it practically impossible for them to operate.

  This way, the regime eliminates all forms of autonomous participation, leaves activists and human rights defenders in a more precarious situation, and obtains the resources it needs to feed the clientelist practices that are its trademark.

  One of the problems faced by the regime is precisely its lack of resources to sustain the community development projects carried out by many of the eliminated CSOs. It can no longer count on support from Venezuela, nor can it continue to expand the family businesses that the Ortega-Murillo clan has built while in power. Many of these companies have been sanctioned, including the one that monopolises the fuel business, which has forced them to carry out various manoeuvres to keep them active.

  What work does your organisation do?

  Feminist Programme La Corriente has existed for almost 30 years and was born with the aim of contributing to generating critical thought and encouraging new forms of participation by women in Central America. Over the last 15 years we have expanded our work with young people and sexual and gender dissident collectives.

  Throughout our journey, we have contributed to challenging heterosexism, misogyny and macho violence and built vital networks for the defence of rights. We have prioritised issues related to the prevention of violence, voluntary motherhood, women’s right to decide about their bodies and respect for sexual and gender diversity.

  Efforts to research the reality experienced by women, young people and dissident bodies have been key to the development of training and public communication programmes. For us it is of vital importance to strengthen collective action through social movements capable of thinking and acting on the changes required by Nicaraguan society. We are also part of Central American and Latin American networks and alliances, from where we contribute to advocacy processes with governments and global institutions.

  Precisely because we generate critical thought and defend rights, in May this year the National Assembly cancelled our legal status and in early July the police took over our facilities.

   

  On what grounds was the organisation ordered to shut down?

  Generally speaking, the arguments put forward by the Sandinista deputies who control parliament include an unfounded accusation that CSOs are potential money launderers because they receive funding from foreign sources, deliberately ignoring the fact that these sources are linked to governments and duly established cooperation agencies.

  They also cite alleged bureaucratic infractions such as the expiry of the term of the board of directors, failure to update statutes and refusal to provide information requested by the Ministry of the Interior. On the latter point, it is worth highlighting the abusive ministry’s intervention: in accordance with the new law, it requires CSOs to submit detailed information on each activity to be carried out and personal data of the people with whom they work.

  Such demands denaturalise the meaning of CSOs, turning them into an extension of the state, clear evidence of the totalitarian zeal of this regime. It is clearly an attempt to impose a model of absolute control that requires the dismantling of all forms of autonomous civil society participation.

  Likewise, by shutting down CSOs that work with low-income groups of the population, the regime is trying to regain control of what it thinks of as its social base, which it seeks to recover or retain by means of clientelist policies. This is why it has eliminated organisations that promote access to education for low-income children and young people, fulfil the needs of people with disabilities, promote access to land and other resources for rural and Indigenous women and provide sexual and reproductive health services and support for women who are victims of violence, among others. 

  CSOs that work in the field of citizen participation from a rights-based perspective and with a clear focus on the defence of democratic values have also been closed. They have been declared opponents of the regime and their representatives have been subjected to surveillance, threats, exile and imprisonment. It is also a kind of revenge for generating evidence that contradicts the official discourse and denouncing the systematic violation of rights by the Sandinista regime.

  Why has the regime specifically targeted feminist organisations?

  Hostility against Nicaraguan feminists dates back to the 1980s. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), as a guerrilla force turned into party that came to power, never really reflected on the patriarchal logics of power, but simply replicated them unceremoniously.

  The feminists of my generation had to endure an authoritarian and abusive relationship with the Sandinista government, which at different times expressed discomfort with the existence of women’s organisations, because from their perspective this weakened the unity of revolutionary forces.

  They exercised their veto power to prevent women’s collectives from placing demands related to macho violence and sexual and reproductive rights on the public agenda. The leaders of these collectives were silenced and forced to take on the priorities set by the ruling party leadership.

  The watershed that marked the feminist movement’s definitive break with the FSLN occurred in the late 1990s, when Zoilamérica Narváez, daughter of Rosario Murillo, who is both Daniel Ortega’s wife and Vice President, denounced the abuses committed by her stepfather for more than 20 years. When feminists clearly stood on the victim’s side it meant a break with the FSLN leadership, which has since perceived us as enemies. Zoilamérica’s denunciation encouraged further accusations involving other members of the FSLN national leadership, including the late Tomás Borge.

  Additionally, during the 2005-2006 electoral campaign, part of the feminist movement participated in an electoral alliance of opposition parties that included the Sandinista Renovation Movement, now UNAMOS, which the FSLN considers traitors to the revolution for having demanded democratisation of the party and questioned Ortega’s authoritarian and strongman leadership.

  As he returned to power in 2007, it immediately became clear that Ortega’s strategy was to dismantle feminist networks, which by that point had increased their capacity to put forward ideas and influence Nicaraguan society. The stigmatisation campaign began with a speech by Murillo in which she accused feminists of trafficking in women’s suffering and of wanting to impose a way of life alien to Nicaraguan culture. That same year, the government began to pressure international aid agencies to suspend their support for feminist collectives, causing many of them to leave the country.

  Among the main strands of the Ortega-Murillo regime’s discourse was its supposed commitment to gender equality: they proclaimed as a key advance the achievement of gender parity in all branches of government. This idea was taken up by United Nations (UN) bodies and multilateral financial institutions, but feminists provided clear evidence confirming the persistence of inequalities and the absence of public policies to address women’s demands.

  The absolute criminalisation of abortion, the absence of policies to prevent and punish macho violence, including sexual abuse against girls and adolescents, which is prevalent in Nicaragua, the absence of sex education, the failure to comply with the law that established the creation of a fund to distribute land to rural women and the violation of the labour rights of workers in foreign factories are among the many problems that remain unresolved by a regime that dares to compare itself with the countries that have made the most progress in terms of gender equality in the world.

  What should donors, and the international community in general, do to help Nicaraguan civil society?

  In such turbulent times and with so many hotspots of tension in the world, it is hard to appeal for solidarity with Nicaraguan society, which continues to bet on civic and peaceful change to move away from this new dictatorship and lay the foundations for the country’s democratisation.

  However, we must continue to appeal to democratic governments, regardless of their ideology, so they do not look away from what is happening in Nicaragua and support our just demands for the immediate release of political prisoners, the suspension of the police state, an end to the persecution of CSOs and the Catholic Church and the full restoration of our rights.

  We call for a coherent position on the part of democratic governments, UN agencies, multilateral financial institutions, regional integration blocs and political party forums to avoid any action that could contribute to prolonging the stay of the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship in power.

  At this point it is inadmissible that they denounce the regime’s systematic human rights violations, including the commission of crimes against humanity, while at the same time voting in favour of granting loans to the very same regime, which in addition to increasing a debt that is already greater than the country’s GDP gives it greater room for manoeuvre to remain in power.

  Active support for human rights defenders, independent journalists and CSOs is vital to sustain hope for democratic change that does not impose further suffering on the Nicaraguan people.

  Civic space in Nicaragua is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with La Corriente through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@LaCorrienteNica on Twitter. 

• NORTHERN CYPRUS: ‘Civil society is not involved in decision-making and is considered a nuisance’

  CIVICUS speaks with DeryaBeyatlı, Director of the Human Rights Platform,about the space for civil society in Northern Cyprus and the prospects for reunification in the context of the 2023 Cyprus and Turkish presidential elections.

  Established in 2021, theHuman Rights Platform isa Turkish-Cypriot civil society umbrella organisation bringing together seven human rights organisations guided by the vision of an egalitarian, democratic and inclusive society where human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected and accessible for everyone.

  What do you make of the results of the Cyprus presidential election?

  In the latest presidential election, held in February 2023, we saw a rise of nationalist and racist rhetoric. In response to losing ground, the left-wing Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) supported a candidate who was more nationalistic than the party itself, but was still defeated in the runoff by Nicos Christodoulides, who was backed by centrists and right-wing parties.

  It is clear to me that over the past few years Cyprus has been affected by the same shift towards radical right-wing politics that we’ve seen elsewhere in Europe.

  What does the Human Rights Platform work on?

  One of the main objectives of the Human Rights Platform is to document human rights violations committed by the government of Northern Cyprus, which is largely controlled by the Turkish authorities. I have observed that both society and the local authorities are becoming more racist, largely in reaction to the inflow of Black students who are lured with the promise of a job in Europe and trafficked into the northern part of Cyprus. Only in 2020 was human trafficking recognised as a crime in Northern Cyprus, and yet more than two years later, there has been only one court verdict in a case involving this crime. The authorities are unwilling to deal with human trafficking crimes and other human rights violations and keep blaming the victims instead.

  What is the current state of reunification talks?

  Ever since 1974, Cyprus has been split along ethnic lines, with Greek and Turkish Cypriots living on either side of the Green Line, a buffer zone under United Nations (UN) control. Christodoulides assumed that reunification talks might resume due to Turkey’s rapprochement with the west in search of relief to address damage caused by recent earthquakes and right after being elected said that the reunification of Cyprus is his priority. However, I think neither him nor Ersin Tatar, the current president of Northern Cyprus, who has strongly advocated for a two-state solution for many years, nor the Turkish and Greek guarantors are actually interested in the reunification of Cyprus.

  The two-state formula currently advocated by Tatar was put on the table back in 2002 by Rauf Denktash, the founding president of Northern Cyprus, and was widely rejected by UN member states, with the exception of Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly expressed his support for the two-state solution, so I don´t think his re-election changes anything.

  Reunification talks are currently on hold and I’m afraid we’re headed towards permanent division. Neither Turkey nor the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) are eager to give up the power they exercise and share it with Turkish Cypriots. We are in a sandwich position, where Turkey interferes with the local matters of Northern Cyprus and the RoC discriminates against Turkish-speaking citizens of the island.

  One of the numerous human rights implications of the division of Cyprus is that there are around 30,000 children of mixed marriages who cannot get RoC citizenship and hence become European Union (EU) citizens. Despite Turkish language being an official language of the RoC, official documents and legislation are all in the Greek language, leaving Turkish Cypriots out. Turkish Cypriots cannot open a bank account or establish an association unless they live in government-controlled areas. And the list goes on.

  What obstacles does civil society face in Northern Cyprus?

  The division of the island creates challenging civic space conditions in Northern Cyprus, where the Human Rights Platform is registered. We face many obstacles due to the fact that we work in areas not under the effective control of the government of RoC. It’s very difficult to make our voices heard and get access to funding available to EU member states because we are not legally registered in a member state. Yet we cannot do so, since we do not reside in the government-controlled areas. Our only funding opportunity is the Financial Aid instrument of the European Commission (EC), which is highly competitive and offers limited funds to civil society.

  The local authorities of Northern Cyprus prefer directing EU funds towards infrastructure and economic development, and regard supporting civil society as unnecessary and therefore a complete waste of funds. Turkish Cypriot civil society organisations (CSOs) aren’t involved in decision-making mechanisms and are considered a nuisance. Meanwhile, local public funds are only available to government-sponsored non-governmental organisations, also known as GONGOs, that are under the effective control of the Turkish Embassy and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership.

  Perceived by local authorities as a threat, Turkish Cypriot civil society is silenced and sometimes attacked on mainstream media. Public TV, radio and news agencies are almost inaccessible for us. CSOs working to protect human rights and safeguard democracy in Northern Cyprus are systematically marginalised. Since we maintain relationships with the EC, EU member states and the USA, we are often regarded as ‘foreign agents’ and threatened and blackmailed, sometimes openly but mostly discreetly. A widely used tactic is the use of fake social media accounts promoting extremely nationalistic content and blaming Turkish Cypriot civil society activists for trading the country to the Greeks or to imperialistic powers.

  What international support do Turkish Cypriot human rights CSOs need?

  Most international intergovernmental organisations and their agencies prefer to ignore our presence. Since we are in a place the existence of which they don’t recognise, they refuse to even meet with us, let alone hear us out. We need both political and financial support in order to get stronger and become more effective in our struggle to uphold democracy and human rights in Northern Cyprus.

  ---

  Civic space in Cyprus is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Platform through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihp_hrp and@DBeyatli on Twitter.

• OUGANDA : « Personne ne peut gagner les élections sans le vote des jeunes »

  CIVICUS s'entretient avec Mohammed Ndifuna, directeur exécutif de Justice Access Point-Uganda (JAP). Établi en 2018, le JAP cherche à faire avancer, encourager et renforcer la lutte pour la justice dans le contexte du processus de justice transitionnelle bloqué en Ouganda, des difficultés du pays à mettre en œuvre les recommandations de ses premier et deuxième examens périodiques universels au Conseil des droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies, et face à la réaction de certains États africains contre la Cour pénale internationale.

  Mohammed est un défenseur des droits humains et un travailleur de la paix expérimenté et passionné, avec plus de 15 ans d'activisme des droits humains et de prévention des atrocités aux niveaux local, national et international. En 2014, il a reçu le Prix des droits de l’Homme de l'Union européenne pour l'Ouganda ; Il a siégé au comité directeur de la Coalition for the Criminal Court (2007-2018) et au conseil consultatif du Human Rights House Network à Oslo (2007-2012). Il siège actuellement au comité de gestion du Comité national ougandais pour la prévention du génocide et des atrocités de masse.

  

  Quel est l'état de l'espace civique en Ouganda à l'approche des élections tant attendues en 2021 ?

  L'espace civique en Ouganda peut être caractérisé comme un espace harcelé, étouffé et pillé. La société civile semble être sur une sorte de pente glissante alors que les choses tournent de mal en pis. Par exemple, les organisations de la société civile (OSC) ont subi une vague d'attaques effrontées contre leur espace physique qui ont pris la forme d'effractions dans leurs bureaux en plein jour. Pendant ce temps, les attaques contre les OSC en général, et en particulier celles qui défendent les droits humains et encouragent la responsabilité, se sont poursuivies. Ces dernières années, un certain nombre de mesures législatives et administratives ont été adoptées à l'encontre des OSC et d'autres secteurs, comme la loi sur la gestion de l'ordre public (2012) et la loi sur les ONG (2016).

  Face aux élections générales et présidentielles, qui se tiendront le 14 janvier 2021, le ministre de l'Intérieur a établi que toutes les OSC doivent passer par un processus obligatoire de validation et de vérification pour pouvoir fonctionner. De nombreuses OSC n'ont pas été en mesure d'achever le processus. De ce fait, au 19 octobre 2020, seulement 2 257 OSC avaient terminé avec succès le processus de vérification et de validation, et celles-ci ne comprenaient que quelques OSC qui plaident en faveur des questions de gouvernance.

  Les OSC ougandaises sont fortement dépendantes des donateurs et étaient déjà aux prises avec des ressources financières réduites, ce qui a fortement affecté la portée de leur travail. Cette situation a été exacerbée par l'épidémie de COVID-19 et les mesures de verrouillage prises en réponse, qui ont sapé les efforts de mobilisation des ressources des OSC. Ainsi, la combinaison de ces trois forces - harcèlement, restrictions et accès limité au financement - a affaibli les OSC, obligeant la plupart à concentrer leurs efforts sur leur propre survie.

  Il semblerait que les enjeux des élections de 2021 soient bien plus importants que les années précédentes. Qu'est ce qui a changé ?

  La situation a commencé à changer en juillet 2019, lorsque Robert Kyagulanyi, mieux connu sous son nom de scène, Bobi Wine, a annoncé qu'il se présenterait à la présidence en tant que candidat à la plate-forme de l'opposition nationale pour l'unité. Bobi Wine est un chanteur, acteur, activiste et politicien. En tant que leader du mouvement du Pouvoir Populaire, Notre Pouvoir, il a été élu législateur en 2017.

  L'attention que Bobi reçoit des jeunes est énorme et il faut tenir compte du fait que plus de 75% de la population ougandaise a moins de 30 ans. Cela fait des jeunes un groupe qu'il est essentiel d'attirer. Aucun candidat ne peut remporter les élections ougandaises s'il ne recueille pas la majorité des voix des jeunes. Lors de la prochaine course présidentielle, Bobi Wine semble être le candidat le plus capable d'attirer ces votes. Bien qu'il n'ait pas beaucoup d'expérience en tant que politicien, Bobi est une personnalité très charismatique et a réussi à attirer non seulement des jeunes mais aussi de nombreux politiciens des partis traditionnels dans son mouvement de masse.

  Longtemps connu comme le « président du ghetto », Bobi Wine a utilisé son appel en tant que star de la musique populaire pour produire des chansons politiques et mobiliser les gens. Ses racines dans le ghetto l'ont également rendu plus attractif dans les zones urbaines. On pense que cela a motivé de nombreux jeunes à s'inscrire pour voter, il est donc possible que l'apathie des jeunes électeurs diminue par rapport aux élections précédentes.

  Face à la lutte acharnée actuelle pour les votes des jeunes, il n'est pas étonnant que l'appareil de sécurité se soit violemment attaqué aux jeunes, dans une tentative évidente de contenir la pression qu'ils exercent. De nombreux activistes politiques liés au Pouvoir Populaire ont été harcelés et, dans certains cas, tués. Plusieurs dirigeants politiques du Pouvoir Populaire ont été détenus intermittemment et poursuivis devant les tribunaux, ou auraient été enlevés et torturés dans des lieux clandestins. Dans une tentative évidente d'attirer les jeunes du ghetto, le président Yoweri Museveni a nommé trois personnes du ghetto comme conseillers présidentiels. Cela ouvre la possibilité que les gangs du ghetto et la violence jouent un rôle dans les prochaines élections présidentielles. 

   

  Lors des élections précédentes, la liberté d'expression et l'utilisation d'Internet ont été restreintes. Peut-on s’attendre à voir des tendances similaires cette fois ?

  Nous les voyons déjà. La préoccupation concernant la restriction de la liberté d'expression et d'information est valable non seulement rétrospectivement, mais aussi en raison de plusieurs événements récents. Par exemple, le 7 septembre 2020, la Commission ougandaise des communications (CCU) a publié un avis public indiquant que toute personne souhaitant publier des informations sur Internet doit demander et obtenir une licence de la CCU avant le 5 octobre 2020. Cela affectera principalement les internautes, tels que les blogueurs, qui sont payés pour le contenu qu'ils publient. De toute évidence, cela tente de supprimer les activités politiques des jeunes sur Internet. Et c'est aussi particulièrement inquiétant car, étant donné que les réunions et assemblées publiques sont limitées en raison des mesures de prévention de la COVID-19, les médias numériques seront la seule méthode autorisée de campagne pour les élections de 2021.

  La surveillance électronique a également augmenté, et la possibilité d'un arrêt des plateformes de médias sociaux à la veille des élections n'est pas écartée.

  Comment la pandémie de COVID-19 a-t-elle affecté la société civile et sa capacité à répondre aux restrictions d'espace civique ?

  La pandémie de COVID-19 et les mesures prises en réponse ont exacerbé l'état déjà précaire des OSC. Par exemple, la capacité de la société civile d'organiser des rassemblements publics et des manifestations pacifiques en faveur des droits et libertés fondamentaux, ou de protester contre leur violation, a été limitée par la manière dont les procédures opérationnelles standard (POS) ont été appliquées pour faire face à la COVID-19. Cela a entraîné des violations et des attaques contre l'espace civique. Par exemple, le 17 octobre 2020, les forces de police ougandaises et les unités de défense locales ont effectué une effraction conjointe lors d'une réunion de prière de Thanksgiving qui se tenait dans le district de Mityana et ont gazé gratuitement la congrégation, qui comprenait des enfants, des femmes, des hommes, des personnes âgées et des chefs religieux ; la raison alléguée était que les personnes rassemblées avaient désobéi aux POS pour la COVID-19.

  Dès que la mise en œuvre des POS pour la COVID-19 entre en contact avec la pression électorale, il est possible que la répression des libertés de réunion pacifique et d'association s'aggrave. Malheureusement, les OSC sont déjà fortement restreintes.

  Comment la société civile internationale peut-elle aider la société civile ougandaise ?

  La situation de la société civile ougandaise est telle qu’elle nécessite l’appui et la réponse urgents de la communauté internationale. Vous devez prêter attention à ce qui se passe en Ouganda et vous exprimer d'une manière qui amplifie les voix d'une société civile locale de plus en plus étouffée. Plus spécifiquement, les OSC ougandaises devraient être soutenues afin qu'elles puissent mieux répondre aux violations flagrantes des libertés, atténuer les risques impliqués dans leur travail et améliorer leur résilience dans le contexte actuel.

  L'espace civique en Ouganda est classé comme « répressif » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
  Contactez Justice Access Point via leursite Web ou leur pageFacebook, et suivez@JusticessP sur Twitter.

• PAKISTAN: ‘Democratic forces have become weak due to prolonged military regimes’

  As part of our 2018 report on the theme ofreimagining democracy, we are interviewing civil society activists and leaders about their work to promote democratic practices and principles, the challenges they encounter and the victories they score. CIVICUS speaks to Peter Jacob, the Executive Director of the Centre for Social Justice in Pakistan, a civil society organisation (CSO) engaging in research and advocacy on human rights, the democratic development and social justice. He has been an activist, researcher and freelance journalist for over 30 years.

  In Pakistan’s July 2018 elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, a party led by Imran Khan,emerged as the largest party in parliament, breaking the decades-long dominance of the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The election wasovershadowed by hundreds of political arrests, a massive crackdown on the media and allegations that the powerful military covertly backed Imran Khan.

  What do you see as the key components of a functioning democracy, and how do you assess the quality of democracy in Pakistan against those standards?

  Just as anywhere else, a functioning democracy should have democratic norms, including constitutions and traditions, democratic institutions, including parliament and an opposition, basic freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression, and a robust civil society that advocates for exercising these freedoms. Pakistan is struggling to become an inclusive and vibrant democracy after transitioning from a military-led government, even though direct military rule ended 10 years ago.

  Pakistan faces an inherent challenge on account of having a constitution that provides for both a theocracy and a democracy, or a mix of religion and politics, posing specific risks to the rights of religious minorities.

  How would you assess the conduct of the July 2018 elections? To what extent do you feel they were free and fair? What were the key challenges encountered and lessons learned?

  The elections were held at a time when the previous government was facing trials on corruption and other charges, so there was a lot of speculation and allegations of gerrymandering. The government and the opposition have agreed to form a parliamentary commission to probe into these allegations. Whatever the outcome, one expects that it will help bring maturity and stability into the politics and governance of the country.

  Until recently Pakistan has faced enormous challenges such as terrorism and lawlessness, low economic performance and an expanding population. It is understandable that the government system is weak and recovery is expected to be incremental. Additionally, the electoral system is not strong enough to have full transparency of the electoral process.

  Nevertheless, one can say that there was wide participation by citizens in the recent elections and therefore the continuation of the democratic process presents hopes for building a fuller democracy. The decision of the opposition to become part of parliament has at least ensured that there isn’t a political crisis in the immediate post-election phase.

  How did conditions for civil society change in the run-up to the elections?

  A section of government has been always sceptical of CSOs; therefore, action against both international and domestic CSOs started back in 2015, largely through registration laws that were used to curtail their operations or their role in the social and public spheres. A smear campaign has also been going on, particularly against rights-based groups, which has pushed them to justify and maintain their own existence. CSOs also became victims of terrorism, and even though terrorist attacks have gradually decreased since 2015, a recovery from that situation has not come about. Therefore, the July 2018 elections did not do much to change the conditions for the civil society for the better.

  To what extent was civil society able to mobilise around the elections?

  Owing to these existential threats, during the recent elections, there were few organisations that could participate or even prepare to mobilise opinion around the elections.

  However, due to popular human rights campaigns in the past and present, all political parties were obliged to incorporate a section on human rights in their election manifestos, which provides space for CSOs engagement in the future.

  What are your key hopes and fears for the new administration that has come to power following the elections, and what should its priorities be?

  The new government presents hope as it has come up with a rather holistic version of a development agenda, so besides a capitalist or neoliberal agenda they have laid an emphasis on environmental conservation, austerity and fighting corruption. Pakistanis, including the opposition, want this agenda to succeed as much as the government does. But Imran Khan has assumed power for the first time at the federal level and is therefore prone to mistakes. The biggest fear is that this team might land themselves in a trouble politically or take on a challenge bigger than they can handle. For example, the government made high claims about reducing its dependence on foreign lending yet it was obliged to approach the International Monetary Fund for a bailout. This indicates some miscalculations or poor assessment of the challenges in the economy and the way forward.        

  Some delicate issues may serve as on-the-job training for the government. For instance if the government can handle religious extremism where they have shown some tendency to perform - as in the well-known case of Asia Bibi, a victim of blasphemy laws - there is a pretty good chance that they will take the country forward.

  Besides focusing on economic challenges, the government should also pay attention to the quality of education and cultural rights. At the moment, public education is mere indoctrination, and cultural and creative expressions are suffocated by censorship of various kinds, so they need to be unshackled.

  Are there other key challenges for civil society’s fundamental rights and democratic freedoms in Pakistan?

  The country is still passing through multiple transitions, such as in its external relations and the economy, which for too long have depended on US military aid and the World Bank’s financial assistance. The country needs to free itself economically and politically. Democratic forces were weakened by prolonged military regimes. The government is inclined to learn from the Chinese model, which is not a democratic one.

  The media is facing curbs on its freedoms and CSOs are facing severe restrictions including a clampdown on receiving foreign funding, although CSOs are fighting back. Given its tradition of struggle against autocratic regimes, civil society might still make a comeback; however, there is currently a lot of confusion as to how civil society space will be reclaimed. But since Pakistan is setting up human rights institutions for women’s, children’s and human rights more generally, these institutions may help to disseminate a stronger discourse and bring attention to fundamental standards of freedoms and rights.

  What support does Pakistani civil society need from the international community and international CSOs to help build greater respect for human rights and democratic freedoms?

  Human rights are all about internationalism and multilateralism, and countries must give and receive support from international actors, including international civil society, in their struggle for freedoms, which we strongly believe are interrelated. I would therefore like to encourage the international community and international CSOs to visit Pakistan, take stock of the ongoing developments and engage with the Pakistani people as well as the government.

  Civic space in Pakistan is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor

  Get in touch with the Centre for Social Justice on Pakistan through theirwebsite

• PAKISTAN: ‘It doesn’t matter who casts the vote as much as who counts the vote’

  CIVICUS speaks about Pakistan’s upcoming election with Muhammad Mudassar, Chief Executive Officer at the Society for Human Rights and Prisoners’ Aid (SHARP-Pakistan).

  Founded in 1999, SHARP is a human rights civil society organisation working for the rights and wellbeing of vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced people, and working on issues related to people trafficking and smuggling of migrants, including through advocacy at the national and international levels, capacity development, community services and emergency response.

  What’s the political climate in Pakistan ahead of the election?

  Post-COVID-19, like many global south countries Pakistan grapples with security concerns, political instability and economic challenges that affect both its citizens and government. This means that uncertainty loomed over the upcoming election, but the situation is much clearer now and the country is all set to vote for the new parliament. It would be unconstitutional to extend the mandate of the existing caretaker government. The Chief Justice of Pakistan has confirmed that it is set in stone that the general election should be held on time.

  To what extent are conditions conducive to a free and fair election?

  As had always been the case, there’s controversy around the election, which many observers feel lacks conditions for fair competition. While some political parties are free to conduct their activities, others claim to face restrictions in submitting nomination papers and campaigning, and their members are subjected to arrests.

  Over the past 75 years, no prime minister of Pakistan has completed a full five-year term, and they have often ended up in jail. This trend started with Zulficar Ali Bhutto, deposed during martial law in 1977, followed by his daughter Benazir Bhutto, who was dismissed twice. A similar fate befell recent former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan.

  Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) has had ample space for campaigning, even though Sharif, a three-time former prime minister, was ousted for alleged corruption in 2017 and sentenced to 10 years in prison. In October 2023, he returned to Pakistan from exile in the UK, where he had travelled on bail for medical treatment in 2018. Sharif’s corruption conviction and his lifetime ban from politics were overturned by the Supreme Court in early January. Now most political commentators are predicting that the PML-N will win the election.

  In comparison, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party is complaining that it has been all but barred from participating in the election. The Electoral Commission of Pakistan disqualified Khan due to one conviction out of around 200 cases against him and barred the party from using its famous cricket bat symbol on ballot papers. Khan has also recently received 10 and 14-year sentences  on charges of leaking state secrets and corruption. Nomination papers of most national and provincial PTI leaders were rejected by District Returning Officers but appellate tribunals of higher judiciary subsequently accepted most and allowed them to context elections.

  Further, there’s no democracy within political parties due to nepotism and dynastic leadership. Most political parties function as family dynasties, which drives independent leaders away. It has rarely been about people’s choices. It doesn’t matter who casts the vote as much as who counts the vote.

  How have civic space conditions changed over the past years?

  The media and civil society are divided and, human rights activists comment, there is an atmosphere of discontent that somewhat hinders the freedom of speech. Further, unemployment and other pressing issues continue to prompt many people to leave Pakistan.

  Still, at SHARP-Pakistan we remain hopeful and keep analysing problems to try to offer solutions. As part of Pakistani civil society, we aspire to forge connections, work alongside and learn from international partners to be able to better promote human rights and democracy at home. We need free and fair elections so that results truly reflect the will of the people.

  How are you and other civil society groups engaging with the election?

  The role of civil society in the election takes the form of support for the institutional processes of a democratic vote well as the more substantive development of a democratic electorate. Civil society is also playing its due role in reducing election-related conflict dynamics and promoting a peaceful electoral environment.

  ---

  Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• Pakistan:‘International support to civil society must come with understanding of our political & societal context’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about the political situation in Pakistan since the removal of its Prime Minister Imran Khan with journalist and researcher Rabia Mehmood.

  Rabia Mehmoodis the co-founder of a bi-lingual multimedia news outlet Naya Daur TV and a web-show host covering human rights and social justice stories. She is the former South Asia Researcher for Amnesty International. Her work focuses on state repression, impunity and persecution of religious minorities.

  What led to the ousting of Imran Khan as prime minister through a no-confidence vote?

  Khan was ousted from power in April through a constitutional vote of no confidence brought about by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a parliamentary coalition of multiple parties. The coalition secured 174 votes in the 342-member house in support of the no-confidence motion.

  That was the tipping point after weeks of political upheaval. Khan’s administration was criticised by the opposition for failures in governance, soaring inflation and for plunging the country into a diplomatic crisis as his foreign policy distanced Pakistan from the USA.

  To try to block the vote, Khan dissolved the lower house of parliament, but the Supreme Court declared the dissolution unconstitutional. Following the parliamentary vote, Shehbaz Sharif, former Chief Minister of Punjab from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) and brother of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, was appointed the new Prime Minister. Sharif is a long-time rival of Khan.

  Since the July 2018 election, the opposition claimed that Khan’s ascent to power was enabled by political engineering by the country’s military establishment. His administration was termed a ‘hybrid regime’, in which Khan was the civilian face of the generals. The key reason behind Khan’s removal is believed to be his falling out with powerful forces within the military, often referred to as the ‘deep state’.

  Regarding the involvement of the military in Pakistan’s political unrest, it is important to note that the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is considered by many to be the most powerful position in Pakistan. The current COAS, Qamar Bajwa, appointed by Nawaz Sharif in 2016, is finally due to retire in November after six years.

  Sharif was disqualified in 2017 and put behind bars following a corruption scandal. But after Khan won the election in 2018, he granted Bajwa an extension in August 2019. Bajwa was at the time known to be a great believer in the Khan project, along with the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief General Faiz Hameed, now Commander of Peshawar Corps. But Bajwa, it appears, has now withdrawn support from Khan.

  Hameed is known to have a different relationship with Khan, and Khan was reliant on him. He was deeply involved in the Khan administration’s repression, in addition to engineering unrest on the streets by an alt-right Islamist group in 2017, which led to further disruption of Sharif’s party.

  It remains to be seen whether Bajwa is seeking yet another extension in November or a safe and comfortable exit, which would pave the way for a new COAS. Analysts estimate that Khan had to be got rid of due to these possible changes in November, and it was an easy task for the military to replace Khan because of his administration’s unsatisfactory governance and economic performance.

  The military has repeatedly claimed to be a ‘neutral umpire’ during this political fiasco. In the run-up to Khan’s ousting and afterwards, Khan’s tactics, of slamming the armed forces and the current ISI chief, show his dissatisfaction with the military institution’s neutrality.

  How has Khan responded?

  In response to the vote of no confidence, Khan also accused the US government of orchestrating regime change in Pakistan. This allegation is based on a diplomatic cable that he claimed was ‘evidence’. When Khan dissolved the assembly ahead of the vote, he had resolved to present the diplomatic cable as evidence of foreign intervention.

  It was later reported that the military explained to parliament’s National Security Committee in March that it had found no evidence of US involvement in regime change, something the White House concurred with.

  In April, as soon as Khan was ousted, he and his party leaders began using terms like ‘American conspiracy’ and ‘international conspiracy’, online and offline. Khan called his opponents ‘thieves’ and ‘traitors’, and one of his close aides called in a public rally for the execution of the ‘traitor opposition’. During his public and press addresses, Khan has called for mutiny, incited his party supporters to commit civil disobedience and encouraged them to retaliate physically.

  Since then Khan has held multiple public rallies across Pakistan and in July his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), swept by-elections in Punjab, the country’s most populous province, and traditionally a PMLN stronghold. Now the already weak incumbent central government in the centre is facing further hostility from Punjab.

  Khan has been calling for general elections. His narrative has a strong following in the country, and his support base appears to be in resurgence.

  What is the current political and economic situation?

  Pakistan is stuck in limbo due to a worsening political, legal and economic crisis. The leadership is divided between the Sharif-led coalition government and federal ministries led by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), such as the ministry of foreign affairs. Provinces are also split between different parties, with Khan’s PTI leading in the two provinces.

  The coalition government is weak and uncertainty over its immediate future looms large. Analysts assume that the ‘deep state’ will not allow for a strong civilian central government, and that a divided parliament is what it seeks to achieve.

  The new government has taken over a fragile economy. Pakistan entered the International Monetary Fund programme in 2019, and the most recent funding was due in February, but fuel and power tariff caps imposed by the Khan administration halted the next cycle. The new government has now managed to negotiate and get clearance for another payment, but this has come at the price of tough economic decisions, with the burden impacting on the working masses and the salaried class.

  Fuel prices have increased exponentially, which are causing a rise in commodity prices and exacerbating food inflation. Meanwhile, political and economic uncertainty is also causing the currency to depreciate quickly. In the budget for the current fiscal year, the government increased tax and hiked fuel prices. Pakistan’s foreign debt is US$6.4 billion, but at least the immediate risk of bankruptcy has reduced for now.

  Access to basic services, free healthcare and education and adequate housing is increasingly out of reach of most of Pakistan’s 220 million people. Pakistan is essentially a poor country with some very rich families and an army with a massive budget. Instability is having severe repercussions for citizens in terms of their rights and the rule of law.

  Civilian and military rulers have been too reliant on seeking bailout packages instead of focusing on long-term solutions such as taxing the rich and the corporate sector, or developing agriculture and increasing industrial exports. Economic stagnation, however, is not the fault of just one government.

  Has the removal of Khan had a positive influence on Pakistan’s repressed civic space?

  Pakistan’s track record on the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression has been murky for decades. Civil society groups and activists have long been labelled as foreign agents, funded by anti-Pakistan forces. It is one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a journalist in. Religious minorities are persecuted and discriminated against through institutions, draconian laws and violence. Ethnic minorities are brutalised for demanding basic rights and protections from the state. The military establishment and security agencies operate with impunity.

  In that context, the battle to defend civic space and media freedom is not new. But since the run-up to the July 2018 election, Pakistanis have been subjected to one of the most repressive eras of the country’s history. Press censorship has been widespread, curtailing any media attempts to question or report on significant issues such as Sharif’s disqualification, the role of the judiciary and military and reports of election rigging.

  Khan established his place as a populist leader, and was called a press predator by Reporters Without Borders. During the Khan administration, journalists, human rights defenders (HRDs) and dissenting citizens were targeted with trumped-up charges of sedition, cyber terrorism and defamation of national institutions, along with arbitrary arrests, raids, disappearances, surveillance and beatings. Journalists were arbitrarily arrested for questioning and reporting on the alleged involvement in corruption of Khan’s wife, Bushara Bibi. Mainstream cable news networks were only allowed to attack opposition parties and their leaders, and portray Khan as the supreme leader. Civil rights movements, such as the Pashtun Tahaffuz Mahaz, were subjected to a discriminatory crackdown. Their rights to freedoms of movement, peaceful assembly and expression, online and offline, have been continuously violated.

  To a degree, Khan’s ousting has given slight breathing space to Pakistan’s repressed HRDs, civil society and journalists. The difference could be that reprisals can be documented in the press, by domestic rights monitors and be televised, with less fear. But this is only relative, as red lines for both the media and civil society still exist.

  The threats and discrimination against ethnic, religious and sexual minorities continue. There are incidents of the use of force against peaceful protesting families of disappeared members of Baloch people, enforced disappearances and discriminatory harassment of Baloch students. A former journalist was arbitrarily detained over online criticism of the army chief. While peacefully protesting, civil society collectives, HRDs and families of the disappeared were shelled in the city of Quetta on 21 July.

  Severely partisan journalists who acted as agents of disinformation and supported the Khan administration by actively targeting minorities, critical media, HRDs and the opposition are now on the receiving end of hostility from security agencies, as they are questioning the military over its alleged role in Khan’s ousting and lack of support for him.

  What is the future of Pakistan’s democracy?

  It appears to be bleak. Pakistan’s democratic process has been undermined severely by decades of dictatorships, the military establishment’s concealed intervention in civilian rule, the dubious role of the judiciary and a short-sighted, craven approach by civilian political parties.

  Since its inception, Pakistan has been ruled by military dictators directly for 33 years, and they have controlled who gets to rule and how from behind the scenes. No civilian prime minister has ever completed their full five-year term. Real power lies in the hands of the generals, who set up hybrid regimes in collaboration with civilian leaders.

  General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the government of PPP’s charismatic Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a coup d’état in 1977. In 1979, Bhutto was executed by a severely partisan Supreme Court, while Zia became president. Over the decades, the capitulation of the civilian ruling elite and the role of the judiciary in sanctioning coups have also contributed to the derailing of the country’s ever-fragile democracy.

  For example, former Prime Minister Sharif’s disqualification was widely believed to have been a consequence of a ‘judicial coup’. The National Accountability Bureau chaired by a former Supreme Court judge was severely partisan and flawed, and used to victimise leaders of the PMLN and PPP.

  Decades of conflict in the north-western region, the military’s reliance on militant groups as its proxies and the current resurgence of militant outfits at the border all pose a threat to Pakistan’s stability and consequently its democracy. Sectarian outfits are enduring. Nationalist ethnicities in Sindh and elsewhere are treated with extreme suspicion, which causes the growth of their young people’s resentment towards the state.

  For example, the armed insurgency in Balochistan province has its roots in a lack of trust in the military and the state’s discriminatory policies. The people of the mineral-rich province are poor and have been subjected to human rights abuses and violence for years. Meanwhile, barely any efforts to build trust among Baloch people have been made by state institutions. The militarisation of multiple regions and violence perpetrated on citizens are contrary to democratic norms.

  Unless the constitution and parliament are held supreme in the true sense of the word, and intervention by the powers-that-be isn’t kept in check, Pakistan’s democracy will not be able to address its many challenges and will remain at risk.

  How has civil society engaged with political developments? What kind of international support does Pakistani civil society need?

  Civil society and collectives of HRDs have responded to the political developments with caution but courage. Civil society and HRDs understand where the centre of power lies in Pakistan. Yet it has not stopped them from asking the right questions and leading human rights campaigns. Overall, from larger civil society organisations to smaller but critical collectives, civil society has stood in support of the primacy of parliament, the constitution and democratic processes.

  Years of demonisation of civil society and labelling of HRDs and journalists as anti-state and servers of foreign, western agendas have made it easy for propagandists and authoritarian sections of the state to put targets on the backs of people. International solidarity is essential for Pakistani civil society. But now with disinformation and propaganda smear campaigns on the rise, the support must come with an understanding of the political and societal context of Pakistan.

  Religious, ethnic, sexual and gender minorities, journalists, civil society workers and HRDs remain at risk, not only due to state reprisals but also the threat of violence from extremist groups.

  Relief and protection of at-risk communities are not possible without the support and alliance of regional and like-minded international civil society networks. Exchange among civil society networks across regions must also continue to come up with new ways of fighting systems of oppression.

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  Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Rabia Mehmood through her Twitter account@Rabail26.

• PARAGUAY: ‘Very tough years are ahead for civil society that promotes human rights’

  CIVICUS discusses Paraguay’s recent general election with Marta Ferrara, executive director of Seeds for Democracy (Semillas para la Democracia).

  Founded in 2006, Seeds for Democracy is a civil society organisation (CSO) whose main objective is to contribute to the improvement of the quality of democracy in Paraguay by promoting citizen participation, social equity and accountable governance.

  What are Paraguay’s main challenges, and to what extent could the results of the recent election contribute to solving them?

  Paraguay’s main problems are fundamentally economic, stemming from deep inequality. In recent years, Paraguay has had very good macroeconomic indicators, with high growth, but has remained very unequal, with high unemployment, large numbers of people in informal work and lack of access to health, education and opportunities. It is a country run by immensely wealthy cattle-ranching and agro-exporting elites who rule for their own benefit and to the detriment of a terribly unequal society. I believe this is the central characteristic of Paraguayan society and economy. It is a deep, structural problem, and this election has done nothing to solve it. The same people as always have won: the same sectors that have kept the country in this situation for more than 70 years.

  At stake in this election was the possibility of alternation in power. However, that would not necessarily have meant radical change, because the presidential candidate of Concertación, the opposition coalition, was also a conservative, albeit from the Liberal Party. His running mate was a woman, but he still represented a conservative sector of society. These were not disruptive candidacies representing a real change in the way politics is conducted, in the way power is exercised, in terms of public policies or representing different social sectors.

  How do you explain the comfortable win for the Colorado Party, despite the incumbent president’s very low approval rating?

  The results can be explained to a large extent by the effects, which we already anticipated, of the system of unblocked lists with preferential voting in the context of a divided opposition.

  A couple of years ago there was an electoral reform that replaced the closed and blocked party lists with unblocked lists with preferential voting. In these, the voter can select a candidate within the list of their choice, in order to vote for both a party and a candidate; then, according to the number of votes obtained by each candidate and their list, seats are distributed by the D’Hont system.

  This system was introduced in the last municipal elections and we already knew that it would have some negative effects. A big problem with unblocked lists is that generally the candidate with the most money is the one who gets ahead. They also cause strong competition of all against all within parties.

  In addition, the old system was replaced by electronic ballot boxes without sufficient training, meaning that people were not well prepared to use the new system. This allowed the spread of so-called ‘assisted voting’, which is illegal, and which basically consists of having people at polling stations interfering with voting with the excuse of helping voters use the electronic system.

  All this benefited the Colorado Party, which has been at the helm of the state for a long time and is therefore the one with the most resources, and which has sufficient internal diversity to be able to provide replacement options for those who are dissatisfied with their government they lead.

  There were, however, some small improvements in women’s representation. For the first time two women have been elected governors and there are more women than before in both houses of Congress.

  But with the opposition divided, the Colorado Party won by the widest margin in Paraguay’s democratic history. In addition to winning the presidency, it won control of both houses of Congress and 15 of 17 governorships.

  The other defining feature of this election was the emergence of a third opposition political grouping with a populist-authoritarian and messianic style. Led by Paraguayo Cubas, it represents so-called ‘angry voters’, those dissatisfied with traditional parties and the way politics has been conducted for decades. This candidacy did not take votes away from the government but from the opposition, and unexpectedly came in a close third place, with more than 20 per cent.

  What is the basis for the allegations of fraud voiced by protesters?

  The followers of Paraguayo Cubas, joined by people from practically all sectors of the opposition, many of them young people disaffected with politics, have taken to the streets en masse across the country to denounce fraud, despite the fact that their candidate got a very good vote, which they did not expect. The fact that an anti-establishment group is mobilising protests on a scale not seen in a long time represents a major challenge for the future of democracy in Paraguay.

  This was a relatively peaceful election in which there was virtually no violence. What there was plenty of was disinformation, hate speech and social media attacks throughout the campaign. These aggressions strongly affected CSOs, including our own, Seeds for Democracy, and came mostly from the ruling party and the party and supporters of Paraguayo Cubas, although Concertación also launched similar attacks against its political opponents.

  What role did civil society play during the election?

  Civil society played a relatively important role, despite the restrictions it has faced. The Electoral Court initially did not authorise civil society election observation and instead issued a rather restrictive regulation. It finally accepted that the Sakã Consortium, a civil society coalition, would carry out observation and a parallel count, but with very many restrictions.

  Seeds for Democracy has been actively involved in denouncing the problems of political financing, an issue we have succeeded in placing on the agenda. The other major problem in Paraguay, along with enormous inequality, is corruption. Lack of control over money in politics has brought groups linked to organised crime to power, both in Congress and in governors’ offices.

  We will soon be working on political finance control. In Paraguay, campaign spending is controlled after elections. A month later, when the parties submit their statements, we begin to monitor them through the Electoral Court’s Citizen Observatory of Political Financing, cross-checking data on public contracts with the sworn statements published on public agencies’ websites. Paraguay’s freedom of information legislation is quite good and enables us to do this work.

  How do you see the future of democracy in Paraguay?

  In the medium to long term I see a very difficult situation. There are many things to be resolved in order to improve the quality of democracy. The emerging political group is violent, anti-rights, fundamentalist and messianic. Its inspiration is the popular authoritarian president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, and his way of ruling, so I think we are in for some very tough years ahead.

  The section of the Colorado Party that won the election is one whose leaders attack civil society. They are anti-rights: they define themselves as ‘pro-life’, they are against equal marriage and sexual and reproductive rights and they attack all issues related to gender rights. That’s why I think civil society is in for a very tough few years. The various segments of civil society, especially those working on rights issues, are going to have to make big efforts to join together and undertake collective action.

  At the moment, some organisations have some funding from international cooperation sources, and we hope that this support will increase and strengthen so that we can work together to face all these challenges. It will be a constant struggle, all the more difficult because we have already seen attacks against freedom of expression and press freedom.

  I do not expect much in the coming months. For the time being, we must stay vigilant to understand which way things are going. But what is certain is that very tough years are ahead for CSOs that promote human rights.

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  Civic space in Paraguay is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Seeds for Democracy through theirwebsite orFacebook page, and follow@semillaspy on Twitter.