Multilateralism

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘We must reaffirm the relationship between the rule of law and human rights’

  CIVICUS speaks with Francesca Restifo, Senior Human Rights Lawyer and UN Representative of the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

  Established in 1947, the International Bar Association is the world’s leading organisation of international legal practitioners, bar associations and law societies. With a membership of over 80,000 lawyers and 190 bar associations and law societies spanning all continents, it influences the development of international law and helps shape the future of the legal profession throughout the world. The IBAHRI was created in 1995 to provide human rights training and technical assistance for legal practitioners and institutions, strengthening their capacity to promote and protect human rights effectively under a just rule of law.

  What does the IBAHRI do, and how does it interact with international human rights organisations?

  A leading institution in international fact-finding, the IBAHRI produces expert reports with key recommendations, delivering timely and reliable information on human rights and the legal profession. It supports lawyers and judges who are arbitrarily harassed, intimidated or arrested through advocacy at the United Nations (UN) and domestic levels and provides training and trial monitoring. We advocate for the advancement of human rights in the administration of justice, focusing on UN human rights mechanisms and pushing onto the UN’s agenda justice issues such as judicial independence and protection for all legal professions as essential building blocks to sustaining or reinstating the rule of law.

  To achieve this, the IBAHRI also trains lawyers, judges and bar associations to promote and protect human rights at the domestic level and engage with UN human rights mechanisms. For example, the IBAHRI is working with Afghan lawyers and judges in exile, and particularly with women, to denounce the ongoing gender persecution in Afghanistan. The IBAHRI works with lawyers and academics to promote jurisprudence to punish the specific crime of gender-based apartheid.

  We are also supporting Ukrainian lawyers on issues of accountability for war crimes, including via domestic jurisdiction and training them on international fair trail standards.

  To what extent do current global governance institutions protect the rule of law around the world?

  In January 2023, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that ‘We are at grave risk of the Rule of Lawlessness’. Today, adherence to the rule of law is more important than ever. As Guterres pointed out, from the smallest village to the global stage, the rule of law is all that stands between peace and brutal conflict or repression.

  In Palestine, Sudan and Ukraine, we are witnessing systematic war crimes committed by states. We are witnessing increasing violations of the UN Charter with the annexation, resulting from the threat or use of force, of a state’s territory by another state.

  The ongoing devastating conflicts in Syria and Yemen have resulted in atrocities, thousands of deaths and incommensurable suffering. Unconstitutional changes in government are deplorably back in fashion. The collapse of the rule of law in Myanmar has led to a cycle of violence, repression and severe human rights violations. In Afghanistan and Iran, systematic attacks against women’s and girls’ rights that amount to gender persecution are creating an unprecedented regime of gender-based apartheid. In Belarus, Russia, Venezuela and many other places, authoritarian regimes are silencing the opposition and cracking down on civil society and civic space, repressing peaceful protests with excessive force and violence. In Haiti we see a severe institutional crisis coupled with an almost non-existent rule of law, leading to widespread human rights abuses and the escalation of crime rates.

  At a time plagued with conflicts, division, crackdown and mistrust, states continue to contravene international law with impunity. Created to anchor the protection of rights, the multilateral system is in deep crisis. In the aftermath of the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we must reaffirm the strong and mutually reinforcing relationship between the rule of law, accountability and human rights.

  Do you view these failures as linked to structural flaws in the global governance system?

  The collapse of the rule of law, coupled with failures by the UN system to establish just and effective responses and address global challenges, has undermined trust in leaders and institutions. These challenges are interconnected and can only be addressed by interconnected responses, through a reinvigorated multilateralism, placing the UN, its Charter and its values at the centre of joint efforts.

  We are facing a crisis of trust, a disconnect between people and the institutions that are supposed to serve and protect them, with many people left behind and no longer confident that the system works for them. We need to rethink ways to ensure effective responses.

  In his Our Common Agenda report, the UN Secretary-General emphasised the need for the UN to support states, communities and people in rebuilding the social contract as a foundation for sustaining peace, stressing that justice is an essential dimension of the social contract.

  However, we witness ever-increasing justice gaps, with many justice systems delivering only for the few. It has been estimated that 1.5 billion people have unmet justice needs. In many places around the world, women effectively enjoy only three quarters of the legal rights of men. Legal disempowerment prevents women, vulnerable groups and victims from using the law to protect and defend themselves.

  When states fail, the UN should mobilise against impunity and hold perpetrators to account through fair, independent judicial proceedings.

  What are the most needed reforms in the area of global governance?

  First, it is time to rethink, renew and rebuild trust in international institutions and support governments to rebuild the social contract with their people and within societies. UN institutions must start by rebuilding, restoring and sustaining the rule of law, both internationally and domestically, by supporting victims and survivors and providing access to justice, remedy and reparation. To do so, a more inclusive, effective and principled multilateral system is urgently needed.

  Communities need to see results reflected in their daily lives. People need to see their rights realised and need to know they can seek justice if their rights are violated.

  Means are within reach, but they need to be better used and reformed to ensure their effectiveness. From the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to the UN Human Rights Council, with its accountability mechanisms including fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry, there are institutions and mechanisms to promote and reinforce the rule of law. But they need to be enabled to provide effective solutions. For instance, if the Human Rights Council’s commissions of inquiry collect, analyse and preserve evidence of atrocity crimes, there must be states willing to use that evidence to bring cases before the ICJ.

  The International Criminal Court is the central institution of the international criminal justice system, but the veto power enshrined in article 27(3) of the UN Charter systematically impedes the prosecution of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute. All states have a responsibility to prevent genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and ensure that such crimes are ended and punished when they occur, as per the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international law. However, we have recently seen the excessive use of the veto preventing the UN Security Council (UNSC) from exercising its function to address the most severe threats to international peace and security. Permanent UNSC members have a particular responsibility in this regard, given the powers vested in the Council to adopt effective measures to restore international peace and security and prevent or end such crimes. A reform of the UN system is needed to limit the veto, and in the meantime, we need to think of creative ways to overcome it.

  We need to empower justice systems to better and more effectively use the principle of universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes under international law and hold perpetrators to account. Through international cooperation, states should support domestic trials. For example, UN member states must be more proactive in supporting Ukraine’s justice system to conduct effective investigations and prosecute international crimes with fair trial guarantees.

  Some interesting developments that may help address accountability gaps deserve some attention. Although international law is largely concerned with states’ rather than individuals’ obligations, the so-called Global Magnitsky Acts and the system of individual sanctions represent an interesting paradigm shift in the field of accountability for violations of international human rights law, including regarding corruption.

  The Global Magnitsky Acts have been considered one of the most promising ways to address serious human rights violations and corruption in the future. They were established in response to the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in a Moscow jail cell in 2009, following which his client and US-born financier Bill Browder led a 10-year fight to strengthen national legal frameworks and responses to alleged gross violations of human rights. This led to a legal revolution in several countries across regions, including Canada, the USA and the European Union and its member states.

  How is civil society in general, and the IBAHRI specifically, advocating for reforms?

  Lawyers are at the forefront of the struggle for the protection of human rights. Without an independent, competent legal profession, victims of human rights violations are unable to exercise their right to redress. Lawyers, judges and bar associations have a vital role to play in promoting accountability, ending impunity and ensuring remedy for victims and survivors.

  As part of the world’s leading organisation of international legal practitioners, bar associations and law societies, the IBAHRI is ideally placed to engage the global legal profession with such mechanisms and to advocate for the advancement of human rights and the independence of the legal profession.

  We work with the legal professions at large to sustain the rule of law, ensure implementation of international human rights standards, enhance judicial independence and fair trial guarantees and encourage an effective and gender-responsive administration of justice. The IBAHRI supports the work of lawyers and legal professionals to bring about accountability for war and atrocity crimes, provide legal defence to those arbitrarily and unjustly detained, improve legal frameworks, promote the common acceptance of legal rules and encourage greater engagement with the UN system.

  Get in touch with the IBAHRI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@IBAHRI on Twitter.

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  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘When there is political will, states are able to uphold their responsibility to protect’

  CIVICUS speaks with Elisabeth Pramendorfer, Geneva Representative, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

  The GCR2P is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to uphold the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, which the United Nations (UN) adopted in 2005. This principle seeks to ensure that the international community mobilises to prevent and stop the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

  What is the Responsibility to Protect?

  The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing – often referred to as mass atrocity crimes. R2P was conceptualised as a political and operational response to the failures of the international community to prevent and respond to the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was unanimously adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit. 

  R2P is a political commitment and call to action. It means that sovereignty does not provide a state with carte blanche to commit crimes against its own population. It stipulates that every state has the primary responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes and that the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist them in meeting that responsibility. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its population, the international community must take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.

  In practice, this means that states have a responsibility to build and strengthen an atrocity prevention architecture by ensuring human rights protection, guaranteeing equal access to justice and a strong rule of law, and memorialising and acknowledging past atrocities, among other measures.

  A variety of measures may be involved in assisting other states in upholding R2P, such as providing technical assistance and capacity strengthening or supporting military and police training. In situations where atrocity crimes are imminent or ongoing, the toolbox of action may include the use of good offices, mediation, negotiation or other forms of preventive diplomacy; the imposition of arms embargoes and targeted sanctions against identified perpetrators; the establishment of UN-mandated investigative mechanisms to document and report on atrocity crimes; and the deployment of peacekeeping missions.

  It is key for the response to any given situation to be context-specific, based on the unique drivers, motivations and risk factors of violence, the enabling and mitigating factors that are in place, and an in-depth understanding of who is targeted and why – all of which, even within the same crisis, may change over time and pose different risks to different groups. This is what we call ‘atrocity prevention’.

  How well are existing global governance institutions fulfilling this responsibility?

  Since 2005, we have seen remarkable institutional progress in advancing R2P as a political norm. There have been more than 90 resolutions by the UN Security Council and over 75 by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that refer to R2P, including for situations in the Central African Republic, North Korea, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Many governments around the world have committed to the advancement and implementation of R2P, including by becoming members of inter-governmental networks such as the UN Group of Friends of R2P and the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, which also includes regional organisations such as the European Union and the Organization of American States.

  The UN General Assembly meets annually to exchange on best practices and lessons learned in upholding our individual and shared R2P. The UN has an office, the Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P, fully dedicated to advancing R2P. Longstanding efforts to mainstream atrocity prevention on a national, regional and multilateral level have helped us better understand how to identify risk factors of atrocity crimes and develop early warning models.

  Yet the international community continues to fail to uphold universal human rights and prevent atrocity crimes – in China, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Sudan and Syria, among many others. It also struggles in ensuring accountability and ending impunity.

  While R2P is the most effective principle around which the international community can coalesce when vulnerable populations face the threat of atrocity crimes, it does not have independent agency. As with so many other protection agendas, implementing R2P and making atrocity prevention a living reality rests largely with governments as political actors. And more often than not, political leaders fail to implement principles and institutions fail to uphold mandates.

  It is a sad reality of our job that politics and governments’ strategic interests often come in the way of meaningful action and that some serious country situations simply don’t receive the attention they should. Western governments’ extraordinary solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s illegal act of aggression shows how rapidly the international community can respond, including by establishing investigations at the UNHRC, imposing an expansive sanctions regime, opening an investigation at the International Criminal Court and obtaining provisional measures by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These much-needed actions show that when there is political will states are able to uphold their responsibility to protect populations at risk and turn condemnation into action. At the same time, it has raised valid and long-overdue questions of why we have not seen a similar response to crises in Ethiopia, Myanmar or Sudan.

  Do you think this failure to respond is linked to structural flaws in the global governance system? 

  The international community has all the tools and measures to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes effectively – and any other human rights violations and abuses, for that matter. Implementing R2P means nothing other than implementing existing obligations under international law, including the Geneva Conventions and the Refugee Convention. But states continuously fail to make consistent use of this remarkable protection regime, both in an individual and collective capacity.

  We are witnessing a hierarchy of victimhood and an arbitrariness in compassion and condemnation. Mounting evidence of atrocity crimes in Gaza has revealed blatant double standards in our response to crisis situations, particularly by states that pride themselves as champions of human rights, justice and international law. So I don’t think it is structural flaws in the existing global governance system that explain our failure to protect people everywhere and at all times – it is the lack of states making principled and consistent use of it regardless of where atrocities are imminent or ongoing.

  As we have commemorated 75 years of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention, we must remember that legal and political protection instruments – including R2P – only have meaning and value if we as an international community and as individual stakeholders are committed to respecting and upholding them anywhere and at all times. Failure to do so will seriously harm our credibility and legitimacy when we do take action and call for respect for those norms and values.

  At the same time, we must ensure that affected communities, human rights defenders and victim and survivor groups are systematically included in policy discussions and decision-making processes. For a crisis response to be effective, it needs to be transformative, rooted in the needs of affected communities and tied to long-term efforts to further peace, development and human rights.

  How is civil society in general, and the GCR2P in particular, advocating for R2P?

  Although R2P as a political commitment rests with states, most times it is CSOs that are the driving force behind pressuring governments to adhere to it. Our work and that of countless civil society activists around the world is fundamental in reminding states that they not only have a responsibility to protect their own populations but also mustn’t look away when rights are violated elsewhere.

  Through advocacy with UN member states, regional organisations and the multilateral system, we provide strategic guidance to governments, UN officials and other key stakeholders on what needs to be done – by whom, how and when – to prevent mass atrocities. We wouldn’t be able to do this if it weren’t for the civil society colleagues around the world who are at the forefront of documenting violations and abuses, holding their government and others to account and providing support and assistance to victims, survivors and affected communities, often at great personal danger. Our job is to amplify their voices, expertise, demands and calls to action in the arenas we operate in.

  One aspect of our work I would like to highlight is the fight against impunity. Ensuring accountability for mass atrocity crimes – which may include truth-telling, reparations, criminal investigations and transitional justice processes – is not only an end in itself but can help deter future mass atrocity crimes. We have worked hand in hand with human rights defenders and affected communities around the world to advance accountability efforts, including by leading campaigns for the establishment of UN investigations into atrocity crimes in Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan, Sudan, Venezuela and Yemen, as well as the establishment of an Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria, and contributing to efforts so that The Gambia filed a case against Myanmar before the ICJ for violations of provisions of the Genocide Convention.

  I would like to pay tribute to all our colleagues around the world who tirelessly fight to ensure ongoing attention on injustice, violence and suffering for even the most forgotten crisis. Every small success – be it advocating for special sessions to discuss an emerging crisis at the UNHRC, the opening of a universal jurisdiction case against perpetrators, or a government’s decision to re-engage with the international system and commit to genuine reform – is a step in the right direction. Every time the international community puts the spotlight on atrocity perpetrators somewhere, it sends a signal to those committing similar abuses elsewhere.

  Get in touch with the GCR2P through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@GCR2P and@ElisabethGCR2P on Twitter.

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  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• GLOBAL: ‘Only through adherence to humanitarian principles and the rule of law can we shift away from armed conflict’

  CIVICUS speaks with Neshan Gunasekera, an international lawyer from Sri Lanka, about the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of the case brought by South Africa against Israel under the 1948 Genocide Convention.

  Neshan is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lead Counsel on Peace, Justice and Governance at the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, Council member at the World Future Council and director of the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms.

  What’s the ICJ and why is it important?

  The ICJ is the main judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) and its role is to help peacefully settle disputes between member states and provide advice on matters relating to international law. Its creation was the result of a long journey to find peaceful ways to solve international disputes.

  In 2024, we will be commemorating 125 years since the founding of the ICJ’s earliest predecessor, the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This was one of the biggest achievements of the 1899 Peace Conference held at The Hague in the Netherlands. The extensive bloodshed that marked the 19th century prompted world leaders to gather and discuss how to transition from the outdated notion of war as a way to resolve disputes and towards preventive diplomacy, and the result was the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a forum for member states to bring their cases for resolution rather than resorting to armed conflict, violence or aggression as tools of diplomacy.

  World leaders at The Hague also discussed how armed conflict should be conducted, and how it could be limited. The outcomes of these discussions are referred to as the Hague Law and, taken together with the Geneva Law, resulting from the Geneva Conference of 1864, are collectively known as the 1949 Geneva Conventions that are the basis of international humanitarian law.

  Unfortunately, these notions took a backseat as the First World War erupted in 1914, and only resurged with the founding of the League of Nations in 1919. Three years later, the closest predecessor to the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), was formed. While it heard some interesting cases, the PCIJ was also short-lived, as the League of Nations shut down as the world prepared for another world war.

  In 1945, when the UN was founded, the ICJ assumed its position as the highest judicial institution within the system and the Statute of the International Court of Justice became an integral part of the Charter of the UN. As it took forward PCIJ precedents, the ICJ has now accumulated over 100 years of jurisprudence.

  The ICJ is one of the most important tools ever established for peacefully resolving disputes between states. Its 15 judges are meant to represent all UN geographic regions, civilisations and legal systems worldwide, including Indigenous and traditional legal systems. This entails a huge responsibility, particularly when it comes to representing voices that are still marginalised or underrepresented, such as those of Indigenous peoples.

  The ICJ is now more relevant than ever because we are a critical time in history when we need urgently to correct our course. The danger of nuclear weapons going off becomes more real every day. And this is no longer the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: today’s nuclear arsenal can obliterate life as we know it.

  Why has South Africa brought a case against Israel before the ICJ?

  This case is intriguing because South Africa didn’t appear to be in direct conflict with Israel. But it didn’t need to: South Africa came to the Court alleging that Israel was violating the Genocide Convention, a treaty signed by most UN member states, including both Israel and South Africa. This convention grants all its signatories the right to bring a case before the ICJ against another if it’s suspected of committing, inciting or continuing to commit genocide.

  The ICJ has jurisdiction to hear contentious cases, including those where parties have entered into an agreement and to provide advisory opinions on matters pertaining to international law. It also has compulsory jurisdiction, although this is limited to states that accept it, and authority to provide interpretations of international treaties This means it can make binding rulings in legal disputes submitted to it by states and give advisory opinions on legal questions at the request of UN bodies, specialised agencies or member states. The South Africa v. Israel case is a contentious case, which means it will eventually produce a binding court ruling.

  What are the challenges of bringing genocide cases before the ICJ?

  Genocide is possibly one of the worst crimes recognised as such by the international community. The Genocide Convention was the very first human rights convention the UN agreed on in the aftermath of the Second World War.

  While there is considerable consensus on what constitutes genocide, it often takes decades to gather the necessary evidence to prove that genocide has been committed. Following the Second World War, a wealth of documentation was submitted as evidence of genocide, but the burden of proof was quite high to demonstrate the systematic and intentional engagement of individuals and states in genocidal practices. For individuals, this was dealt with under international criminal law and for states under international law.

  However, in recent years several cases of genocide have been presented before the Court and the burden of proof has been increasingly scrutinised.

  In 2019 The Gambia, also a state not directly involved in the conflict, brought a case against the state of Myanmar, alleging that Myanmar’s military and other security forces perpetrated genocide against its Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine province. It could do so because both were signatories of the Genocide Convention. In 2022, the ICJ decided it had jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention to hear the application filed by The Gambia.

  The case is ongoing, and in November 2023 several additional states joined The Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar. This was subsequent to the provisional measures the ICJ issued in January 2020 requesting Myanmar to prevent genocidal acts against Rohingya people while the case continued, and to report regularly on its implementation of the order. Developments in this case, as well as earlier cases relating to genocide, are most relevant to current proceedings.

  Notably, unlike Myanmar, Israel did not contest South Africa’s jurisdiction to bring the case before the court; that seemed like a settled issue. Still, proving genocide can be a long and arduous process, particularly when people are afraid to bring evidence before the Court, although in this age of information and technology there’s a lot of video evidence to support these cases. But when it comes to genocide cases, what’s most challenging is proving criminal intent.

  Why’s it so hard to prove genocidal intent?

  The ICJ faces the daunting task of proving the deliberate attempt to eradicate an ethnic, political or religious group. This isn’t only about the amount of violence or the number of deaths, but about the intent to eliminate a specific group, including through means other than murder, such as taking away children.

  This is why the interim measures requested by South Africa are so crucial. South Africa requested the immediate suspension of all hostilities by the Israeli military and for entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza to be allowed. While it did not order Israel to cease hostilities as had been requested, the ICJ’s interim measures requested Israel to take all necessary steps to prevent the commission of any acts of genocide. Further, it requested it take all necessary measures to prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide of Palestinians in Gaza, an order on which the respected judge appointed by Israel also agreed with the majority decision.

  This is key because in international relations statements made by prime ministers, presidents and other high officials, including military officers, are interpreted as reflections of a state’s intentions. What they say is weighed against their actions and could serve as a way of proving intent.

  What are the consequences of the ICJ’s interim measures?

  All ICJ rulings and orders are binding, so the interim measures impose an obligation on Israel to comply. Additionally, when the ICJ issues a judgment, opinion or interim measure on a topic, its application extends beyond the specific case that originated it. This is why we are starting to see a wider impact of the case South Africa brought to the ICJ.

  For instance, in the Netherlands, civil society groups have filed several cases against their government to prevent it entering into military agreements that could incite or support the violation of human rights and humanitarian law in Gaza.

  In other words, the ICJ case is enabling deeper discussions on how member states should respond to armed conflicts and how citizens can hold their governments accountable and ensure that tax money is not used to fuel armed conflict.

  The case also underscores the ICJ’s vital role and its accumulated work over the years. States are increasingly resorting to the ICJ. Between 1947 and 2000, the ICJ issued interim measures on nine to 10 instances, while from 2001 to 2023 it has done so almost a dozen times, and most of these measures have been complied with. Overall, between 1947 and 2023, the ICJ has heard close to 200 cases and its opinions have been mostly respected. As of October 2023, there were 20 cases before the ICJ, including 18 contentious cases and two requests for advisory opinions. The two cases seeking advisory opinions are important: one is about the  ‘Legal consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’, filed by 53 UN member states with proceedings currently underway at the Hague. The other one is about the obligations of states regarding climate change, with a deadline of 22 March 2024 for UN member states to submit written statements.

  This demonstrates the growing influence of the ICJ in interpreting international law and its adherence across the world. It also underscores the significance of international law. It is only through adherence to humanitarian principles and the rule of law that we can shift away from armed conflict. It is our collective responsibility to prevent future generations experiencing prolonged cycles of violence in which human rights and basic humanity are compromised. It is our collective duty towards all species on our planet.

  What challenges does the ICJ face?

  The ICJ is an integral component of the UN Charter, and its rulings should guide the actions of every member state. Unfortunately, out of the 196 UN members, only 74 have so far accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. To address this issue, a broad global civil society coalition supported by a group of likeminded UN member states has started the ‘LAW not War’ campaign to encourage other states to sign up and agree to its compulsory jurisdiction, so as to commit to go before the ICJ before resorting to the use of force.

  It’s also important to highlight that the ICJ does not operate in isolation. It is part of a broader network of international tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Criminal Court, as well as regional institutions like the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Further, national-level courts and tribunals also play a role. Understanding the interconnectedness of these systems is essential in assessing the international system of adjudication and to achieving an international rules-based order.

  In terms of impact on foreign and domestic policies, there is a discrepancy between what countries sign up to in the international arena and what they end up implementing domestically. The primary reason for this gap is that, although the ICJ’s rulings are binding, the Court lacks its own enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance and depends on principles of international law such as good faith and respecting promises made through treaties, also referred to as the ‘pacta sunt servanda’ principle. As a result, universal human rights principles are unevenly implemented at the domestic level.

  There is still clearly much to be achieved and we must come together, urgently and with agency, to work towards a peaceful and sustainable planet, based on the principles of international law.

  Get in touch with Neshan through LinkedIn.

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  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or any of the institutions the interviewee is a member of. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• Right-Wing nationalism threatens democratic norms, human rights & press freedom

  By Thalif Deen, Director & Senior Editor, UN Bureau, Inter Press Service interview  with Lysa John, CIVICUS Secretary General 

  The steady decline in multilateralism—accompanied by a rise in unilateralism– is beginning to threaten democratic norms, including press freedom, global governance, civic participation and human rights across Asia, Africa, South America and the Middle East. 
   

  Read on: Inter Press Service

• SDGs: ‘Radical policy changes are our only hope of ending global poverty’

  CIVICUS speaks with Andy Sumner about the prospects for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the underlying dysfunctions of the current global governance system.

  Andy is Professor of International Development at King’s College London, president of the European Association of Development Research and Teaching Institutes and Senior Fellow of the United Nations (UN) University World Institute for Development Economics Research.

  Why are the SDGs important?

  The SDGs are a set of global objectives that are for all states to pursue collectively, as part of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. They provide a framing for developing policy and a basis for developing strategy by setting goals and targets on poverty, nutrition, education, health and many other aspects of human wellbeing and sustainability. They are the most comprehensive blueprint so far for eliminating global poverty, reducing inequality and protecting the planet.

  The SDGs were agreed in 2015 and are to be achieved by 2030. They were approved by all states at the UN, which at least in principle gave them political legitimacy around the world. They are therefore a useful tool for civil society advocacy. They allow you to say to any government, ‘you said you would do this’, and chances are most governments will at least want to be seen to be trying and that means allocations of public spending and other public policies.

  Of course, the SDGs have their critics too, because there are a lot of indicators and some of the targets aren’t well defined and not easily measured. Some also say it’s a very top-down agenda developed by governments rather than bubbling up from the grassroots. Nevertheless, it does provide a set of key indicators of development that have been embedded in UN global agreements from many years. And in principle, governments can be held accountable for at least making some attempt to meet the SDGs.

  Are the SDGs going to be met on schedule?

  The world is currently far behind on the SDGs, at least regarding a range of global poverty-related SDGs. In a recent UN University brief and working paper I published alongside three colleagues from the SDG Centre, Indonesia at Padjadjaran University, we made projections for the SDGs on extreme monetary poverty, undernutrition, stunting, child mortality, maternal mortality and access to clean water and basic sanitation. Our projections indicate that economic growth alone will not be sufficient to end global poverty, and the global poverty-related SDGs will not be met by a considerable distance.

  Unfortunately, I think we are looking another lost decade for global development, not only due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit the SDGs hard, but also due to the enormous debt overhang from the pandemic and the price shocks that have come from the war in Ukraine.

  Looking ahead, there is a strong case for urgent debt relief. There is a debt crisis underway, in the sense that across the global south, and particularly in many of the world’s poorest countries, social, health and education spending is being squeezed simply to pay debt servicing. So this is a crisis not for financial markets but a crisis for real people.

  Much of the debt is owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, so they could do something about this. Of course, there’s also some debt owed to China and private capital markets, which is potentially more complicated. Still, the IMF and World Bank could be more proactive. There are signs already that the situation is being recognised, but not enough urgency as the worry is driven by concern over debt defaults rather than the ongoing austerity crisis.

  Do you think failure to meet the SDGs is linked to structural flaws in the global governance system?

  I think it is possible to link the catastrophic failure on the SDGs to a failing global governance system. The measures that would be needed to meet the SDGs, notably debt relief and expanded funding, would require a deep reform of the international financing architecture.

  Right now, it doesn’t make any sense. The global south may receive official development assistance and other financial flows, but a substantial share kind of evaporates in that debt servicing is sent back to the north, notably via debt service to the IMF and World Bank. Then we can consider all the global south loses, in for example, profit shifting by global companies, illicit flows to and from tax havens, payments for intellectual property for use of technology and so forth. We do see major signs that climate change and exclusion from western vaccines may be among the issues leading to a new assertiveness by global south governments. Take for just one example the recent UN vote on a global convention on tax cooperation championed by the global south.

  Urgent reform of the governance of IMF and World Bank is needed that would lead to a change in their strategies around, for example, austerity conditionalities. For example, most of the agreements that more than 100 governments signed with the IMF during the pandemic included a range of austerity measures. This is totally inappropriate, especially if the goal is to meet the SDGs.

  A new financing deal is also needed to address loss and damage, not only in relation to climate change – for which a fund has already been agreed, although against the wishes of the global south, it is within the World Bank for now – but also in relation to colonialism and slavery, regarding which demands for reparations remain unaddressed.

  How can civil society best advocate for the SDGs?

  The SDGs are very often embedded in civil society campaigning because they offer a way to hold governments to account. They require that spending is redirected towards social spending, public education and public health and other priority sectors. As a result, they require that inequalities across income, education and health are addressed.

  Civil society should advocate for radical policy changes, because these are the world’s only hope of meeting the SDGs. What is needed is urgent debt relief, which would release funds for social and productive investments across developing countries, and a new focus on redistribution with growth both at the global and national levels.

  To change course, we need urgent policy action on two fronts.

  First, a stronger focus on inclusive growth and productive capacities. Specifically, new international financing needs to be made available through debt relief or other forms of finance to expand fiscal space across countries of the global south to allow a stronger focus on SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth. This financing should seek the expansion rather than contraction of social and productive spending.

  Second, that focus should entail redistribution alongside growth, through policies that build productive capacities, introduce, or expand income transfers to meet the extreme poverty target, and ensure sufficient public investment to meet the health, water and sanitation SDGs.

  In short, today’s trajectory demands a forceful, seismic shift towards redistribution, both globally and nationally. This is the pathway to follow if the world is to have any hope of achieving poverty-related SDGs.

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  Get in touch with Andy throughLinkedIn and follow@andypsumner on Twitter.

  This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

• SRI LANKA: ‘We’ve held Pride celebrations since 2004; we’re very proud of what we have achieved’

  CIVICUS speaks about the status of LGBTQI+ rights and progress being made towards decriminalising homosexuality in Sri Lanka with Rosanna Flamer-Caldera, founder and Executive Director of EQUAL GROUND.

  Founded in 2004, EQUAL GROUND is the oldest LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) in Sri Lanka. It fights for the recognition and realisation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and focuses on empowerment, wellbeing and access to health, education, housing and legal protection services for Sri Lanka’s LGBTQI+ people.

  How has the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Sri Lanka recently changed?

  We still have laws inherited from British colonial times that date back to 1883. These are articles 365 and 365A of the Penal Code, which criminalise ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ and ‘acts of gross indecency’. Both of these target LGBTQI+ people.

  Sri Lanka is among over 40 former British colonies that also criminalise same-sex sexual relationships between women. In 2018, I filed a complaint with the United Nations (UN) Committee for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In its decision, finally taken in February 2022, the Committee requested that the Sri Lankan government decriminalise homosexuality in general and between consenting same-sex women specifically.

  Soon after, in August 2022, a private member’s bill to decriminalise homosexuality was put forward in parliament. In February 2023, in response to Sri Lanka’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council, where most LGBTQI+ organisations requested the repeal this legislation, the Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Sri Lanka would follow this recommendation, while making clear it would not legalise same-sex marriage. We understand that’s a fight for another day.

  In the meantime, the bill reached the attorney general of Sri Lanka, who released an order that both articles of the Penal Code were to be repealed rather than amended, which made us very happy. But as soon as the bill started being discussed in parliament, a petition was filed claiming it was unconstitutional. There were more than 12 intervening petitions filed to counter this petition, and in response the Supreme Court issued a ground-breaking decision stating that the bill amending the Penal Code to decriminalise consensual same-sex behaviour does not violate the Constitution of Sri Lanka. The case specifically touched upon the concepts of human dignity and privacy underlying equal rights for all, because the preamble of our constitution recognises the value of dignity. The Supreme Court of India used a similar argument in a 2018 case on the right to equality, saying that ‘life without dignity is like a sound that is not heard. Dignity speaks, it has its sound, it is natural and human’.

  Now, the bill is up for a parliamentary vote, and all it needs to pass is a simple majority. While the government has said it will decriminalise homosexuality, there are still homophobes in the government. But we hope that the vote will turn out positively. 

  What role has civil society played in the case?

  EQUAL GROUND was among the organisations that submitted petitions in the case that was filed with the Supreme Court. Not only LGBTQI+ organisations, but many other CSOs and individuals also took part in the process. Petitions were also filed by a former UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and by professors, lawyers, activists and people from all walks of life. The was a lot of positive media coverage, on top of civil society work to create awareness and take to the media to promote the issue.

  Of course, there has also been backlash, with some members of parliament attacking the bill and others reconsidering support following a recent Pride march that many thought was not appropriate to Sri Lankan culture due to partial nudity and problematic messaging.

  How would you describe relations between Sri Lanka’s LGBTQI+ people and state authorities?

  The police have played a huge role in subjugating LGBTQI+ people in Sri Lanka. Not coincidentally, the first event at Colombo Pride 2023 will be devoted to discussing the more than 200 human rights violations against LGBTQI+ people that have been recently recorded in Sri Lanka. In most cases the perpetrator has been linked to the police.

  In 2021, EQUAL GROUND filed a case against the police for hiring a motivational speaker who propagated among officers a narrative connecting child abuse and homosexuality. We won the case and the police have been forced to distribute instructions to all police stations alerting officers to be very mindful of their treatment of LGBTQI+ people, particularly transgender people. This has made it clear that asking for sexual favours, blackmailing LGBTQI+ people and stopping them on the streets with no probable cause is against the law.

  With the aim of protecting LGBTQI+ people from police brutality, we reopened the case, and the police have recently promised to the court that they will change the terminology to make it inclusive of all LGBTQI+ people. Our strategy was to engage only three LGBTQI+ people along with several heterosexual people, to show the court this was an issue for everyone and not just LGBTQI+ people. Doing it with straight support also showed that not everyone shared anti-LGBTQI+ prejudice. The fact that we filed these cases and got some form of commitment from the authorities was ground-breaking.

  Our upcoming Pride march has been sanctioned by the police. We sought their permission, and we’re proud to say that we have been the first organisation to officially get it. Right now, we have a very good Inspector General of Police, he’s easy to talk to, but there’re rumours he will be replaced in three months. I would say there are mixed elements in the current relations between LGBTQI+ people and the authorities.

  How does EQUAL GROUND advocate for LGBTQI+ rights?

  Our fight, even after decriminalisation is achieved, will continue to aim to integrate LGBTQI+ people into our society. This is the cause we have been working on for the last 19 years.

  We’ve held sensitising and educational programmes around the country. We’ve run a lot of social media and mainstream media campaigns, produced research backing our claims regarding the number of people who identify as LGBTQI+ in Sri Lanka and the kind of challenges they face, and have created self-help books for families and allies of LGBTQI+ people. We have an ongoing campaign that has been running for over a year called ‘Live with Love‘, targeted at people who are not haters but are rather neutral or in-between, and could be swayed either way.

  All that’s happened over the last 19 years has given rise to many other LGBTQI+ organisations in Sri Lanka that have become involved in advocacy and the struggle for non-discrimination and decriminalisation. When we established our organisation back in 2004, we were the only ones fighting for all LGBTQI+ people, and we remained alone in this journey for a very long time. Only after 2015 did other organisations and people start coming out and getting involved. Until then we lived under a dictatorship and it was difficult to be open, but we have held Pride celebrations since 2004. Our Pride celebrations are turning 19 this year, and so is EQUAL GROUND. We’re very proud of what we have achieved so far.

  What forms of international support are Sri Lanka’sLGBTQI+ organisations receiving, and what further support would you need?

  We are quite underfunded due to inflation and the ever-rising cost of living, so we aren’t sure that we can retain good staff considering the scale of wages we’re able to pay. We’ve also lost funding due to the fluctuating exchange rate. The state of the economy is one of our major issues, so funding is always welcome.

  EQUAL GROUND has been constantly involved in various networks internationally that have opened up avenues of funding and learning, including the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) and ILGA Asia, Innovation for Change (I4C), and the Commonwealth Equality Network, a network of Commonwealth countries and their LGBTQI+ organisations.

  Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EQUAL GROUND through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@EQUALGROUND_ on Twitter.

• Submission: Key recommendations for the Summit of the Future

  CIVICUS is a global alliance of civil society organisations and activists dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world. Our vision is of a worldwide community of informed, inspired and committed citizens engaged in confronting the challenges facing humanity. Our mission is to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS seeks to engage the Summit of the Future as a key opportunity to shape global governance outcomes to enable the creation of peaceful, just, equal and sustainable societies.

• UN CYBERCRIME TREATY: ‘Civil society is fact-checking the arguments made by states’

  CIVICUS speaks with Ian Tennant about the importance of safeguarding human rights in the ongoing process to draft a United Nations (UN) Cybercrime Treaty.

  Ian isthe Chair of theAlliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, a broad network of civil society organisations (CSOs) advancing the crime prevention and criminal justice agenda through engagement with relevant UN programmes and processes. He’s the Head of the Vienna Multilateral Representation and Resilience Fund at theGlobal Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, a global CSO headquartered in Geneva, focused on research, analysis and engagement on all forms of organised crime and illicit markets. Both organisations participate as observers in negotiations for the UN Cybercrime Treaty.

  Why is there need for a UN treaty dealing with cybercrime?

  There is no consensus on the need for a UN treaty dealing with cybercrime. The consensus-based bodies dealing with cybercrime at the UN, primarily the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), could not agree on whether there was a need for the treaty since the issue was first raised officially at the UN Crime Congress in 2010, and in 2019 it was taken to a vote at the UN General Assembly. The resolution starting the process towards a treaty was passed with minority support, due to a high number of abstentions. Nevertheless, the process is now progressing and member states on all sides of the debate are participating.

  The polarisation of positions on the need for the treaty has translated into a polarisation of views of how broad the treaty should be – with those countries that were in favour of the treaty calling for a broad range of cyber-enabled crimes to be included, and those that were against the treaty calling for a narrowly focussed treaty on cyber-dependent crimes.

  What should be done to ensure the treaty isn’t used by repressive regimes to crack down on dissent?

  Balancing effective measures against cybercrime and human rights guarantees is the fundamental issue that needs to be resolved by this treaty negotiation process, and at the moment it is unclear how this will be accomplished. The most effective way to ensure the treaty is not used to crack down on dissent and other legitimate activities is to ensure a treaty focused on a clear set of cyber-dependent crimes with adequate and clear human rights safeguards present throughout the treaty.

  In the absence of a digital rights treaty, this treaty has to provide those guarantees and safeguards. If a broad cooperation regime without adequate safeguards is established, there is a real risk that the treaty could be used by some states as a tool of oppression and suppression of activism, journalism and other civil society activities that are vital in any effective crime response and prevention strategy.

  How much space is there for civil society to contribute to the negotiations process?

  The negotiations for the treaty have been opened for CSOs to contribute to the process through an approach that does not allow states to veto individual CSOs. There is space for CSOs to bring in their contributions under each agenda item, and through intersessional meetings where they can present and lead discussions with member states. This process is in some ways a model that other UN negotiations could follow as a best practice.

  CSOs, as well as the private sector, are bringing vital perspectives to the table on the potential impacts of proposals made in the treaty negotiations, on practical issues, on data protection and on human rights. Fundamentally, CSOs are providing fact-checking and evidence to back up or challenge the arguments made by member states as proposals are made and potential compromises are discussed.

  What progress has been made so far, and what have been the main obstacles in the negotiations?

  On paper, the Ad Hoc Committee has only two meetings left until the treaty is supposed to be adopted – one meeting will take place in August and the other in early 2024. The Committee has already held five meetings, during which the full range of issues and draft provisions to be included in the treaty have been discussed. The next stage will be for a draft treaty to be produced by the Chair, and then for that draft to be debated and negotiated in the next two meetings.

  The main obstacle has been the existence of quite fundamental differences in visions for the treaty – from a broad treaty allowing for criminalisation of and cooperation on a diverse range of offences to a narrow treaty focussed on cyber-dependent crimes. Those different objectives mean that the Committee has so far lacked a common vision, which is what negotiations need to discover in the coming months.

  What are the chances that the final version of the treaty will meet international human rights standards while fulfilling its purpose?

  It is up to the negotiators from all sides, and how far they are willing to move in order to achieve agreement, whether the treaty will have a meaningful impact on cybercrime while also staying true to international human rights standards and the general human rights ethos of the UN. This is the optimal outcome, but given the current political atmosphere and challenges, it will be hard to achieve.

  There is a chance the treaty could be adopted without adequate safeguards, and that consequently only a small number of countries ratify it, thereby diminishing its usefulness, but also directing the rights risks to only those countries who sign up. There is also a chance the treaty could have very high human rights standards, but again not many countries ratify it – limiting its usefulness for cooperation but neutering its human rights risks.

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  Get in touch with the Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice through itswebsite and follow@GI_TOC and@IanTennant9 on Twitter. 

• UN CYBERCRIME TREATY: ‘This is not about protecting states but about protecting people’

  CIVICUS speaks withStéphane Duguin aboutthe weaponisation of technology and progress being madetowards a United Nations (UN) Cybercrime Treaty.

  Stéphaneis an expert onthe use of disruptive technologies such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and online terrorism and theChief Executive Officer of the CyberPeace Institute,a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2019 to help humanitarian CSOs and vulnerable communitieslimit the harm of cyberattacks andpromote responsible behaviour in cyberspace. It conducts research and advocacy and provides legal and policy expertise in diplomatic negotiations, including theUN Ad Hoc Committee elaborating the Cybercrime Convention.

  Why is there need for a new UN treaty dealing with cybercrime?

  Several legal instruments dealing with cybercrime already exist, including the 2001 Council of Europe Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the first international treaty aimed at addressing cybercrimes and harmonising legislations to enhance cooperation in the area of cybersecurity, ratified by 68 states around the world as of April 2023. This was followed by regional tools such as the 2014 African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, among others.

  But the problem behind these instruments is that they aren’t enforced properly. The Budapest Convention has not even been ratified by most states, although it is open to all. And even when they’ve been signed and ratified, these instruments aren’t operationalised. This means that data is not accessible across borders, international cooperation is complicated to achieve and requests for extradition are not followed up on.

  There is urgent need to reshape cross-border cooperation to prevent and counter crimes, especially from a practical point of view. States with more experience fighting cybercrimes could help less resourced ones by providing technical assistance and helping build capacity.

  This is why the fact that the UN is currently negotiating a major global Cybercrime Convention is so important. In 2019, to coordinate the efforts of member states, CSOs, including CyberPeace Institute, academic institutions and other stakeholders, the UN General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a ‘Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purpose’ – a Cybercrime Convention in short. This will be the first international legally binding framework for cyberspace.

  The aims of the new treaty are to reduce the likelihood of attacks, and when these happen, to limit the harm and ensure victims have access to justice and redress. This is not about protecting states but about protecting people.

  What were the initial steps in negotiating the treaty?

  The first step was to take stock of what already existed and, most importantly, what was missing in the existing instruments in order to understand what needed to be done. It was also important to measure the efficacy of existing tools and determine whether they weren’t working due to their design or because they weren’t being properly implemented. Measuring the human harm of cybercrime was also key to define a baseline for the problem we’re trying to address with the new treaty.

  Another step, which interestingly has not been part of the discussion, would be an agreement among all state parties to stop engaging in cybercrimes themselves. It’s strange, to say the least, to be sitting at the table discussing definitions of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes with states that are conducting or facilitating cyberattacks. Spyware and targeted surveillance, for instance, are being mostly financed and deployed by states, which are also financing the private sector by buying these technologies with taxpayers’ money.

  What are the main challenges?

  The main challenge has been to define the scope of the new treaty, that is, the list of offences to be criminalised. Crimes committed with the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) generally belong to two distinct categories: cyber-dependent crimes and cyber-enabled crimes. States generally agree that the treaty should include cyber-dependent crimes: offences that can only be committed using computers and ICTs, such as illegally accessing computers, performing denial-of-service attacks and creating and spreading malware. If these crimes weren’t part of the treaty, there wouldn’t be a treaty to speak of.

  The inclusion of cyber-enabled crimes, however, is more controversial. These are offences that are carried out online but could be committed without ICTs, such as banking fraud and data theft. There’s no internationally agreed definition of cyber-enabled crimes. Some states consider offences related to online content, such as disinformation, incitement to extremism and terrorism, as cyber-enabled crimes. These are speech-based offences, the criminalisation of which can lead to the criminalisation of online speech or expression, with negative impacts on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

  Many states that are likely to be future signatories to the treaty use this kind of language to strike down dissent. However, there is general support for the inclusion of limited exceptions on cyber-enabled crimes, such as online child sexual exploitation and abuse, and computer-related fraud.

  There is no way we can reach a wide definition of cyber-enabled crimes unless it’s accompanied with very strict human rights safeguards. In the absence of safeguards, the treaty should encompass a limited scope of crimes. But there’s no agreement on a definition of safeguards and how to put them in place, particularly when it comes to personal data protection.

  For victims as well as perpetrators, there’s absolutely no difference between cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes. If you are a victim, you are a victim of both. A lot of criminal groups – and state actors – are using the same tools, infrastructure and processes to perform both types of attacks.

  Even though there’s a need to include more cyber-enabled crimes, the way it’s being done is wrong, as there are no safeguards or clear definitions. Most states that are pushing for this have abundantly demonstrated that they don’t respect or protect human rights, and some – including China, Egypt, India, Iran, Russia and Syria – have even proposed to delete all references to international human rights obligations.

  Another challenge is the lack of agreement on how international cooperation mechanisms should follow up to guarantee the practical implementation of the treaty. The ways in which states are going to cooperate and the types of activities they will perform together to combat these crimes remain unclear.

  To prevent misuse of the treaty by repressive regimes we should focus both on the scope of criminalisation and the conditions for international cooperation. For instance, provisions on extradition should include the principle of dual criminality, which means an act should not be extraditable unless it constitutes a crime in both the countries making and receiving the request. This is crucial to prevent its use by authoritarian states to persecute dissent and commit other human rights violations.

  What is civil society bringing to the negotiations?

  The drafting of the treaty should be a collective effort aimed at preventing and decreasing the amount of cyberattacks. As independent bodies, CSOs are contributing to it by providing knowledge on the human rights impacts and potential threats and advocating for guarantees for fundamental rights.

  For example, the CyberPeace Institute has been analysing disruptive cyberattacks against healthcare institutions amid COVID-19 for two years. We found at least 500 cyberattacks leading to the theft of data of more than 20 million patients. And this is just the tip of the iceberg.

  The CyberPeace Institute also submits recommendations to the Committee based on a victim-centric approach, involving preventive measures, evidence-led accountability for perpetrators, access to justice and redress for victims and prevention of re-victimisation.

  We also advocate for a human-rights-by-design approach, which would ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms through robust protections and safeguards. The language of the Convention should refer to specific human rights frameworks such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is important that the fight against cybercrime should not pit national security against human rights.

  This framing is especially significant because governments have long exploited anti-cybercrime measures to expand state control, broaden surveillance powers, restrict or criminalise freedoms of expression and assembly and target human rights defenders, journalists and political opposition in the name of national security or fighting terrorism.

  In sum, the goal of civil society is to demonstrate the human impact of cybercrimes and make sure states take this into consideration when negotiating the framework and the regulations – which must be created to protect citizens. We bring in the voices of victims, the most vulnerable ones, whose daily cybersecurity is not properly protected by the current international framework. And, as far as the CyberPeace Institute is concerned, we advocate for the inclusion of a limited scope of cybercrimes with clear and narrow definitions to prevent the criminalisation of behaviours that constitute the exercise of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

  At what point in the treaty process are we now?

  A consolidated negotiating document was the basis for the second reading done in the fourth and fifth sessions held in January and April 2023. The next step is to release a zero draft in late June, which will be negotiated in the sixth session that will take place in New York between August and September 2023.

  The process normally culminates with a consolidation by states, which is going to be difficult since there’s a lot of divergence and a tight deadline: the treaty should be taken to a vote at the 78^th UN General Assembly session in September 2024.

  There’s a bloc of states looking for a treaty with the widest possible scope, and another bloc leaning towards a convention with a very limited scope and strong safeguards. But even within this bloc there is still disagreement when it comes to data protection, the approach to security and the ethics of specific technologies such as artificial intelligence.

  What are the chances that the final version of the treaty will meet international human rights standards while fulfilling its purpose?

  Considering how the process has been going so far, I’m not very optimistic, especially on the issue of upholding human rights standards, because of the crucial lack of definition of human rights safeguards. We shouldn’t forget negotiations are happening in a context of tense geopolitical confrontation. The CyberPeace Institute has been tracing the attacks deployed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We’ve witnessed over 1,500 campaigns of attacks with close to 100 actors involved, many of them states, and impacts on more than 45 countries. This geopolitical reality further complicates the negotiations.

  By looking at the text that’s on the table right now, it is falling short of its potential to improve the lives of victims in cyberspace. This is why the CyberPeace Institute remains committed to the drafting process – to inform and sensitise the discussions toward a more positive outcome.

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  Get in touch with the CyberPeace Institute through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CyberpeaceInst and@DuguinStephane on Twitter.

  
  

   

• UN PLASTICS TREATY: ‘Human health and the environment must come first’

  CIVICUS speaks about the progress being made towards a United Nations (UN) Treaty on Plastic Pollution with Vito Buonsante, an environmental health lawyer and technical and policy advisor at the International Pollutants Elimination Network (IPEN).

  IPEN is a global network of civil society organisations (CSOs) seeking to improve chemical policies and raise public awareness to ensure that hazardous substances are no longer produced, used or disposed of in ways that harm human health and the environment.

  Most people don’t know there is a UN Treaty on Plastic Pollution in development. When and how did the process start?

  In March 2022, the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA), the world's highest-level decision-making body on the environment, approved a broad mandate to start talks on an international treaty to address the growing threats from plastic pollution. The scope of the Plastics Treaty is meant to include all impacts from plastics throughout their lifecycle, including effects from the toxic chemicals in plastics on human health and the environment. It should help move the world towards a toxic-free future.

  In IPEN’s analysis, based on UNEA’s mandate, the final agreement must address the health impacts of plastics and their chemicals in four ways. First, it must address the use, release of and harms from toxic chemicals from plastics in all of their lifecycle, from production to consumption and waste management. Second, as the mandate emphasises the importance of promoting sustainable design, the treaty must ensure that hazardous chemicals are eliminated from plastic production and plastics with hazardous chemicals are not recycled.

  Third, the UNEA resolution noted the importance of preventing threats to human health and the environment from toxic plastics and calls for coordination with the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, the 1998 Rotterdam Convention concerning the importation of hazardous chemicals, the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management, a global policy framework adopted in 2006. The treaty must therefore address the health and environmental impacts due to exposure to hazardous chemicals and toxic emissions throughout the plastics lifecycle.

  Fourth, there’s the issue of microplastics, which the UNEA resolution recognises as included in plastic pollution. This means the treaty must also address the chemical health and environmental hazards from microplastics, including their potential to be vectors for chemical contamination.

  What progress was made in the first session of negotiations?

  The first session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, took place in Punta del Este, Uruguay, from 28 November to 2 December 2022.

  In this first meeting states had the opportunity to express their intentions for the treaty that they envision. On one side, we have seen a large group of states, working under the umbrella of the High Ambition Coalition to end plastic pollution, that have expressed their desire for a treaty that makes a difference in how plastics are made and tackles the root causes of plastic pollution. On the other side, there is a group of states fighting for a treaty that makes no difference to the status quo. Worryingly, these countries include Japan, Saudi Arabia and the USA, all of which want to see a treaty focused only on waste management rather than the entire lifecycle of plastics, and built on the basis of voluntarily agreed national commitments rather than binding obligations across the board.

  The second session will take place in late May and early June in Paris, France. Negotiations should be completed by the end of 2024, and it should be possible to make the deadline. Global measures can be agreed. The science is very clear: it would be delusional to think that recycling the growing amounts of plastics that are being produced is the solution to the plastic pollution crisis, after 40 years of failing to recycle even a small amount of the plastic waste. It is too early to understand in which direction the talks will go, but it should be possible to agree on a number of global standards, even at the risk of some states not immediately ratifying the treaty.

  What would an ambitious treaty look like?

  The most important measure an effective treaty should include is the reduction of the total production of plastics. If production doesn’t slow down, over the next 20 years the amount of plastic will double and it will become truly impossible to control.

  A second key measure concerns the design of plastics. Here there is a need to remove all toxic chemical additives, such as bisphenols, PFAS and flame retardants, and all toxic polymers such as PVC and polystyrene. These chemicals are known to cause adverse health impacts, disrupting hormonal functions, fertility and children’s brain functions, among others. Removing them from plastics will create safer material cycles. It is also very important to improve transparency about both plastics ingredients and the quantities and types of plastics produced. Without a clear picture of what is produced and where, it will be difficult to beat plastic pollution.

  Ambition should also extend to implementation. There must be a commitment from developed countries to create a fund to implement the treaty. No matter how stringent the provisions of the treaty are, without considerable investment in implementation, impact will be limited. Commitments have recently been adopted for funds for climate and biodiversity, but there is not yet a fund established to tackle plastic pollution and other chemicals and waste-related actions.

  What are environmental CSOs bringing to the negotiating table?

  CSOs hold a wide range of expertise and experiences that are very valuable for treaty negotiators. IPEN, for instance, has advocated for the recognition of the impacts of the toxic chemicals in plastics for over two decades, clearly showing through many scientific reports and testing of plastics and plastic products how plastics products are exposing communities and vulnerable populations to toxic chemicals.

  We are optimistic that the need to solve this planetary crisis will prevail. The international community has been failing on climate change and cannot fail on plastics as well. The Plastics Treaty could be a way to show that international cooperation is the best way to solve global problems and that human health and the environment can and must be put ahead of national interests and business interests.

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  Get in touch with IPEN through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ToxicsFree and@VitoABuonsante on Twitter.

  
  

   

• UN PLASTICS TREATY: ‘It is up to civil society to speak up for the public when their governments won’t’

  CIVICUS speaks about the progress being made towards aUnited Nations (UN) Treaty on Plastic Pollution with Aidan Charron, End of Plastics and Canopy Project Coordinator with EARTHDAY.ORG.

  Growing out of the first Earth Day in 1970, EARTHDAY.ORG is the world’s largest recruiter to the environmental movement, working with more than 150,000 partners in over 192 countries to diversify, educate and activate the environmental movement worldwide.

• UN TAX CONVENTION: ‘People power is the major weapon we bring to the fight against inequality’

  CIVICUS speaks about civil society’s work to tackle inequality from the ground up and discusses the prospects of a United Nations (UN) tax convention with Jenny Ricks, Global Convenor of Fight Inequality Alliance.

  Fight Inequality Alliance is a growing global coalition bringing together a wide range of social movements, grassroots and community-based organisations, civil society organisations, trade unions, artists and individual activists organising and mobilising from the ground up to find and push for solutions for the structural causes of inequality in order to rebalance power and wealth in our societies.

  Is there a global consensus that inequality is wrong and needs to be addressed?

  In recent years there has been quite a consensus that inequality has reached new extremes and is damaging for everybody in society as well as for the environment. We are at a time when it’s not just people on the frontlines who are most affected by inequality saying it’s wrong and grotesque and it needs to change, but even organisations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are saying it’s a problem. The Pope is saying it’s a problem. Governments have signed up to reducing inequality through one of the Sustainable Development Goals.

  There is this broad consensus on the surface: it seems like everybody thinks concentration of power and wealth at the top of societies has gone too far and the gap is too extreme and affects people’s daily lives and livelihoods as a matter of life and death. And not only that: it also corrodes democracies. When oligarchs control the media, buy elections, crack down on human rights defenders and civic space and trash the environment, it affects everybody.

  But underneath that superficial consensus, I think there’s still deep disagreement about what fighting inequality really means. We at the Fight Inequality Alliance are interested in dismantling the systems of oppression that drive inequality, including neoliberalism, patriarchy, racism and the legacy of colonialism. These are the deep structural roots of the inequalities that are the reason billions of people struggled to survive under a global pandemic while the richest people in the world continued to have a great time. So we have an agenda of transformation of the nature of our economies and our societies, and not just tinkering with the status quo, making minor tweaks to stop people rioting.

  How can structural inequality be tackled?

  When we started forming the Fight Inequality Alliance, we were clear that the problem was not a matter of lack of policy solutions. We know what the policy solutions are to fight inequality, such as the measures needed to tackle climate change, the redistributive tax policies needed or the policies required to ensure decent work.

  The problem was that the overwhelming concentration of power and wealth at the top wasn’t matched by a countervailing force from below. The richest and most powerful are organised and well-funded. They are pursuing their interests and their greed aggressively and successfully. What we have is people power. But across civil society and beyond, groups were very fragmented, very siloed and focused on their individual agendas and absorbed by the issues their constituencies most need them to respond to. There was not enough connection across struggles.

  0rganising around inequality is a good way for people to understand how their struggles are interconnected: underneath the day-to-day struggles there are common roots, and therefore there are also common solutions to be fought for. That’s where we saw our role lay, and also in shifting the narratives we have about inequality. We need to change what we envisage as being necessary and possible in our societies, and build power behind the alternative visions we are striving for. When we are limited by what popular narratives deem as natural or normal, such as the false idea that billionaires are hardworking geniuses so deserve unlimited wealth, it limits our energies and our organising capacities for structural change.

  People at the grassroots know their problems and their solutions. Inequality isn’t an issue for economists and technocrats to solve: it is primarily a fight that needs to be fought by people. And the voices of people living at the sharp end of these inequalities needs to be heard. They are the real experts in this struggle. So people power is the biggest weapon that we bring to the fight. Governments and international institutions want to take these debates to the technical arenas of policy-making bodies and conference hall settings, wrapping them in technical language that intentionally makes them inaccessible to most people. Many issues that require structural changes, and certainly inequality, are seen as things to be measured, reported on and talked about in economic circles.

  But inequality is a human tragedy, not a technical matter. It is about power. And solutions need to be owned by the people whose lives are most affected by it. We need to shift the balance of power, in our societies and in the global arena, not wrangle over the wording of a technical paper discussed behind closed doors, and that’s done by organising on a large scale. This people power is the major weapon we bring to the fight against inequality.

  Why is taxation important in the struggle against inequality?

  Fighting inequality requires us to redistribute power and wealth, and taxation is a major redistribution tool.

  Over the last decade or two civil society has done a lot of work to try and challenge the fact that the richest people and the biggest corporations across the world are not paying their fair share of tax. The economic model is exploitative, unjust and unsustainable, based on resource extraction, primarily from the global south, abusive labour practices, underpaid workers and great environmental damage.

  But everyone can relate to this issue nationally too – when it comes to national or local budgets, governments often increase indirect taxes such as value-added tax, which is the most regressive kind of tax because it applies to anything people buy, including essentials, instead of taxing rich people or multinationals more, and they have set up whole global industry and schemes to avoid and evade tax on a massive scale.

  Redistribution is happening as we speak, but it is based on extracting from the poorest and distributing towards the wealthiest people in the world – billionaires, corporate shareholders and the like. That is what we are fighting to reverse, at a local level as well as globally.

  How could a UN convention on taxation help?

  The current level of wealth concentration is so grotesque that it requires solutions and action at all levels. We need to fight on the local front where people are struggling while we push for systemic change in places like the UN. The discussion of global tax rules feels quite distant from the day-to-day struggles that most people, within our alliance and beyond, are campaigning for. But decisions made about them have repercussions for those struggles.

  Rules on taxation have so far been set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental organisation with 38 member states – a rich countries’ club. How can decisions over global taxation rules that affect everybody sit anywhere but the UN, which for all its faults and failings is the only multilateral body where every state has a seat at the table?

  Even so, as we have seen with climate negotiations, there is a huge power struggle that needs to be fought at the UN. It will still be a titanic struggle to get the kind of global tax rules we want. But if global tax rules are made within the OECD, the majority of the world doesn’t even stand a chance. Asking rich countries to please behave better is not going to yield the kind of transformation we want.

  So in November 2022 we saw a first positive step as the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for more inclusive and effective international tax cooperation and urging member states to kick off negotiations on a global tax treaty. The resolution echoed a call made by the Group of 77 (G77), the largest bloc of developing countries in the UN, as well as the Africa Group, and gave the UN a mandate to monitor, evaluate and determine global tax rules and support the establishment of a global tax body.

  A global tax convention would put global south states on an equal footing with global north states, so the proposal faced pushback. Global power dynamics were clearly at play. This was to be expected: this is bound to be a long-term process, and an open-ended one. There is no guarantee it will result in the strong global framework that we need. But it’s still a fight worth fighting, and the UN is the right arena for it, simply because there’s no other space to have these negotiations. Where else could the G77 or the Africa Group renegotiate global tax rules?

  How are you campaigning in the light of the resolution?

  We are not directly campaigning for the UN Tax Convention as much as we are trying to bring people into this agenda in a different way. We’ve been campaigning a lot on taxing the rich and abolishing billionaires, which is a more appealing way to present the issue and mobilise people around it. We can’t imagine hundreds of thousands of people taking to the street for the UN Tax Convention at this point. So instead we’ve been organising around the need to tax the rich, domestically and globally, both individuals and corporations.

  This call has a lot of popular resonance because people find it easier to link it to their primary struggles, for jobs, healthcare spending, better public services or basic income, or against austerity measures, regressive tax rises or subsidy cuts. It’s become part of the campaigns of a lot more movements across the world through our organising over the last few years. This has been the way into the tax agenda for a lot of grassroots movements in the global south. It has potential to bring people’s attention to the broader tax justice agenda. You can’t start by holding a community meeting about the UN Tax Convention. You need to start from the daily inequalities people are facing.

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  Get in touch with Fight Inequality Alliance through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@jenny_ricks and@FightInequality on Twitter.

• UN75: ‘Civil society needs to be the conscience of the global community’

  To mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN), CIVICUS is having conversations with civil society activists, advocates and practitioners about the roles the UN has played so far, the successes it has achieved and the challenges ahead. CIVICUS speaks to Keith Best, Interim Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM/IGP), a non-profit, nonpartisan organisation committed to the realisation of global peace and justice through the development of democratic institutions and the application of international law. Founded in 1947, WFM/IGP works to protect civilians from the threat of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; facilitate transparency in governance; increase access to justice; and promote the application of the rule of law.

  

  What kind of relationship has civil society maintained with the UN over its 75-year history?

  The relationship of civil society towards the UN has been mostly that of a critical friend throughout its history and WFM/IGP’s experience mirrors that. Often, the feeling has been mutual. I recall vividly when Boutros Boutros-Ghali was UN Secretary-General (UNSG) that in a meeting with civil society organisations (CSOs) he publicly appealed to us all to help him secure the outstanding dues from the USA – which were promptly paid when the US needed support for the Gulf War! Former Executive Director of WFM/IGP, Bill Pace, also wrote that “Kofi Annan was a very important Secretary-General, whom I was fortunate enough to develop both a professional and personal relationship with. Though his legacy is still being debated I think he was committed to standing up against to the big powers and corruption of the principles set out in the charter.” It was through Kofi Annan that the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect was unanimously adopted.

  In which ways has the UN made a positive difference? 

  There is a tendency to think of the UN only in its peacekeeping role and more visible efforts in seeking to maintain world peace while neglecting the less heralded but sometimes more effective work of its agencies. I shall mention only three. Despite the recent controversy over COVID-19, where the main issue may have been its lack of powers and coordination, the World Health Organization (WHO) has achieved lasting success. It was officially established on 7 April 1948 to achieve “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health,” with health being not just the absence of illness or infirmity but the complete physical, mental and social wellbeing of the individual. Its greatest triumph was the eradication of smallpox in 1977; the global efforts that it has led to end polio are now in their final stages. In the past few years, the WHO has also coordinated battles against viral epidemics of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zika in Brazil. It will be a disaster if the USA withdraws from it instead of helping it assert a better warning mechanism and distribution of medicines following a pandemic of which, assuredly, there will be more.

  Another unsung hero is the Food and Agriculture Organization, which has done much to enhance the lot of small farmers, conservation and improvement in agricultural methods and report on biotechnologies, among other things. Also the UN Development Programme, founded in 1965, promotes technical and investment cooperation among nations and advocates for change and connects countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life for themselves; it provides expert advice, training and grants support to developing countries, with increasing emphasis on assistance to the least developed countries. Some of these agencies have been criticised not so much for the work that they do but for the manner and actions of some of their officials. The way in which some are selected is unfinished business for WFM/IGP.

  Largely though the work of the UN we now have the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Responsibility to Protect – both major advances. The ICC, building on the recommendations of the International Law Commission and the Nuremberg, Tokyo, Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals, has enshrined for the first time in history the individual accountability of heads of state and others for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide and, more recently, the crime of aggression. In the colder light of reflective history this will be seen as a major development in global responsibility which, hitherto, had attached only to states but not to individuals. The concept of Responsibility to Protect, endorsed overwhelmingly in 2005 at the UN World Summit – the largest gathering of heads of state and government in history – turned on its head centuries of obligation of the citizen to the state – an obligation not just to pay taxes but, ultimately, to give one’s life – by reversing that responsibility onto the state to protect its citizens. Its potential is to end 400 years of the inviolability of the state to answer to its peers as enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia, while the concept of non-intervention has not survived the last century.

  What things are currently not working and would need to change, and how is civil society working to make it happen?

  The disappointment, of course, has been the inability of the UN to reform itself effectively from within and, mostly through the major powers having vested interests in maintaining the status quo, rendering itself unfit for purpose in the modern world, exemplified particularly by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the use or threatened use of the veto. The P5, its five permanent members, still represent the victors of the Second World War, with the People’s Republic of China substituted for Taiwan/Republic of China in 1971, and, until Brexit, two seats held by member states of the European Union. Neither the world’s most numerous democracy, India, nor the third-largest economy, Japan, are there. In recent years the use or threat of use of the veto have made the UN unable to prevent conflict in many situations. In a recent book, Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes, Jennifer Trahan explains that this abuse of power is, in fact, contrary to the spirit and letter of the UN Charter. There is mounting pressure from other states to curtail such abuse, and we hope that a civil society campaign can bring such change to fruition.

  Another thing that needs to change is the way in which the UNSG has been appointed, which in the past has been secretive and arguably failed to canvass all suitable candidates. But thanks to the 1 for 7 Billion Campaign, in which WFM/IGP was active alongside many others, including governments, the process by which the UNSG is selected has arguably changed forever, as the previous arrangements conducted by the major powers were wrested away from the UNSC to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The present UNSG, António Guterres, has frequently praised and supported the new process by which he was selected. This was the result of a number of organisations led by an informal steering committee of Avaaz, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York, United Nations Association-UK and WFM/IGP, supported by over 750 CSOs with an estimated reach of over 170 million people, coming together. Many of them are now hoping to breathe new life into a renewed campaign to consolidate and improve on the gains so far. One of the delicate issues is that the original campaign favoured a lengthier single term for UNSGs rather than two potential terms, and this will remain an objective but, hopefully, without the current incumbent thinking it a threat to his own position.

  Many are now calling for a review conference under article 109 of the UN Charter, but we should be careful what we wish for. In the current climate dominated by narrow nationalism and populism we might well end up with a watered-down version of the current Charter. Far better to encourage evolutionary and incremental change which is likely to be more long-lasting.

  Do you think it is both necessary and possible to make the UN more democratic?

  Indeed. The main weaknesses in the UN system are not only the much-needed reform of the UNSC so that its permanent members – and many argue that there should be none or at least no new permanent members – more accurately reflect the economic and diplomatic power in the world but also its often lack of transparency and accountability and the absence of a democratic element, hence the 1 for 7 Billion campaign.

  For the foreseeable future the UN is likely to be based on the nation state – the equality of which in the UNGA is one of its more endearing features – but increasingly there is a call for greater democracy to give effect to “we the peoples of the united nations” as opposed to just the governments. Hence the call for the establishment of a UN parliamentary assembly, perhaps created under article 22, which would start not as a legislative body but a scrutineer of the UN and its agencies, given that any attribution of legislative powers would ensure its failure through states’ opposition at the outset. When so many international organisations and treaties have a parliamentary assembly – with varying powers – attached to them, there should be no reason, other than electoral mechanics, why it should not happen at the global level.

  What lessons for international cooperation can be drawn from the COVID-19 pandemic? What should change in the aftermath of this crisis?

  Undoubtedly, the COVID-19 pandemic has concentrated minds, but it remains to be seen whether it is sufficiently cataclysmic to become a main driver for change, of which the stimulus in the past has been world wars. The pandemic has emphasised that we are ‘all in this together’, that an animal-human crossover or the development of a new virus in a remote part of the world can soon translate everywhere, and no national borders will stop it. It has highlighted that the most affected are the already most vulnerable, poorest, most ill-prepared and most medically ill-equipped societies. It is telling that the pharmaceutical companies are teaching ethics to the politicians in the way of equitable distribution of remedies and ensuring that it is not wealth that should determine availability. That is a lesson that has a wider application. It has highlighted the need for enforceable global decisions in the interests of humanity as a whole – a message, again, that has wider relevance in the environmental and climate change context.

  Much of the idealism of the 1960s and 1970s, which were exciting times for those of us involved, has been translated into a realism of the current era. There is no harm in that as these matters need to stand up to adverse scrutiny and a hard-nosed approach. Technology has brought home the fact that wars are now fought against civilians and not uniformed soldiers and that cyber attacks on energy and water supplies are more likely to achieve the incapacity of a foe than armaments, which are now so expensive as to be both limited in their sustainability and only useful to those states that can afford them. The world has indeed shrunk to a situation in which we are more likely to know what is happening on the far side than in our neighbour’s home. Through digital means the voices of the people are ever more articulate and widespread and the people want their voices to be heard. Satellite technology enables not only precision take-out of individuals but also the observation of actions down to that level: there are now no places to hide. If used in an accountable way in the furtherance of international justice according to universally accepted norms, such modern technology can be a force for good – but if misused, it can also lead us to destruction.

  The challenge of multilateralism today is to spread these messages of interdependence and make clear that, increasingly, to achieve their desires and the aspirations of their citizens states have to work in combination, partnership and common understanding. That realisation in itself will lead inevitably to the need for enforceable mechanisms of managing our climate and our behaviour, in the knowledge that my action will have a reaction elsewhere which is likely to haunt us. Whether it is the destruction of the Amazonian rainforest or the impoverishment of a people through rapacity and failed autocracy, these will impact on the rest of humanity. Poverty destroys markets for manufacturing nations, which then creates instability, resulting in increased expenditure on conflict prevention or resolution. The answer to migratory flows is not encirclement and strengthened borders but addressing the causes of migration in the first place.

  We live in the fastest-moving age in history in which still recent certainties become questioned and outmoded. That is disruptive but can also open new opportunities and ways of doing things. In such a political climate the capacity of WFM/IGP and civil society to be the conscience of the global community and to point to a better federalist form of governance, giving voice to the people at the basic level, is greater than ever.

  Get in touch with the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy through itswebpage orFacebook profile, and follow@worldfederalist on Twitter.

• UNITED NATIONS: ‘Outstanding issues on the binding treaty on business and human rights are mainly political’

  CIVICUS speaks with Fernanda Hopenhaym, chair of the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Business and Human Rights, about the process to develop a binding international treaty on business and human rights.

  Why is a binding treaty on business and human rights so important?

  The process to develop this treaty stems from the conviction that a legally binding instrument is needed to regulate the obligations of private companies and, above all, to facilitate access to justice for victims of their abuses. Its aim is to incorporate human rights protections in the context of business activity.

  An international treaty would transcend the jurisdictional limitations of states. Transnational capital operates across borders. Huge numbers of companies in most sectors operate global supply chains. When abuses occur somewhere in these chains, it is very difficult for victims to access justice, as there are no justice mechanisms that transcend borders. Corporate operations are transnational but justice is not.

  Of course, states must take measures at the domestic level, strengthen their regulations, improve their laws and develop public policy and action plans to ensure effective protection of human rights. And companies must also make commitments to improve their practices. The treaty under negotiation would be part of a package of measures that are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

  The treaty process began in June 2014, when the UN Human Rights Council established an open-endedintergovernmental working group mandated to negotiate and agree on an international legally binding instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises under international human rights law.

  What role is the Working Group on Business and Human Rights playing?

  TheWorking Group on Business and Human Rights is a UN special procedure, established by a 2011resolution of the Human Rights Council, with a mandate to promote, disseminate and implement theGuiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, exchange and promote good practices and lessons learned from the implementation of the Guiding Principles, and assess and make recommendations on these. Its mandate has been successively renewed in 2014, 2017 and 2020. It is composed of five independent experts, mostly academics, and has balanced geographical representation. I have been a member of the Working Group since 2021. The other four current members are from Australia, Nigeria, Poland and Thailand. Three of the five of us are women.

  While it does not have any decision-making authority over the Treaty, the Working Group plays an important role. We participate in almost all negotiating sessions through roundtables and discussions and we provide technical opinions. We have commented on the draft articles and we encourage the proactive participation of states from different regions of the world.

  One of the premises of the Guiding Principles is the development of measures that can be combined in order to address the problems that exist in relation to the protection of human rights in the context of business activity. A legally binding instrument is just one of those necessary measures.

  The Working Group has been very clear in sending out a message favourable to the treaty negotiation process.

  What progress has been made in negotiating the treaty?

  In the previousinterview we had in 2018, the process had been going on for four years. At that time the fourth session of negotiations, based on the ‘zero draft’, was about to start in Geneva. And I was not yet part of the Working Group. Four more years have passed, and at the eighth session held in October 2022, the third draft, which emerged in advance of the 2021 negotiations, was discussed.

  The pandemic affected the negotiation processes, partly because face-to-face contact was not possible for a long time. Representatives and delegates in Geneva, for example, were unable to meet in person for more than a year, so the possibilities for exchanges were severely limited. In turn, the pandemic affected the participation of civil society and other stakeholders in the discussions. Processes slowed down and therefore were extended.

  Currently, the third draft is still being discussed, and Ecuador, which chairs the Intergovernmental Working Group, has apparently said that it will not bring yet another new draft to the table, but that changes, modifications and additions will continue to be made to this third draft. Eventually, all these adjustments will lead to a final draft.

  The current draft has come a long way on issues such as acknowledging vulnerable groups, women, children and Indigenous peoples. Its scope, which was a very tough issue to negotiate, has also been clarified. In general, civil society’s position is to prioritise transnational corporations, while the current draft proposes that all companies should be under the umbrella of the treaty. The current draft reflects the position shared by our Working Group. A number of issues have been untangled, although there are still many things to be resolved.

  What are the unresolved issues?

  There are many discussions that are more political than technical. Some states and the private sector have said that the text is too prescriptive and rigid. Civil society has expressed that it wants more clarification and specificity on some issues such as the definition of the courts where cases covered by the treaty would be adjudicated and the consideration of the victims’ perspective, as the burden of proof remains a contentious issue. On this point the Working Group has been very clear: states have an obligation to facilitate access to justice and to remove barriers and obstacles for victims to access justice.

  While the European Union (EU) and the USA participate in this process, they lack conviction on the direction of the text. The EU is very active, but I see divergent positions among its member states. Many countries, such as France, support it, but the EU as a whole maintains reservations.

  One of the great triumphs of the early process was that China did not block it, but rather abstained. The same was true of India. This was partly because the treaty was supposed to be about transnational corporations. China has not approved of the extension of the treaty’s scope to all companies and has lately taken a more negative position.

  African states have participated very little in the last two rounds of negotiations. We believe that South Africa, which was co-leader with Ecuador when the resolution that initiated the process was negotiated, is also unhappy with the expanded focus beyond transnational corporations. Ecuador has recently called for the formation of a ‘friends of theChair‘ group and Africa is the only region without participating members.

  Latin America in comparison is participating quite proactively, although the region has experienced many political changes, including in Ecuador itself, which are likely to influence negotiating positions.

  In sum, there are ongoing technical discussions on the draft articles, but most of the outstanding issues are mainly political discussions. For this reason, I think the process will take several more years.

  Do you think that the final version of the treaty will meet civil society expectations?

  My hope is that we will not be left with a treaty that sets out good intentions without establishing clear rules. As is the case in all negotiations of this nature, some of the issues civil society is calling for will probably be left pending. There is a lot to accommodate: the perspectives of states, the expectations of business and the private sector in general, and the demands of civil society and all rights holders.

  I would expect a pretty good text, which in some ways reflects the character of the process, which has included a very strong civil society and social movements. From my perspective, the process has been sustained not only by the commitment of states to negotiate, but also by the impetus of civil society and dialogue among all involved.

  My expectations are intermediate. With some caution as to the scope of the articles, I think the treaty will contain some elements that satisfy civil society, and particularly victims.

  What work will need to be done once the treaty is adopted?

  To begin with, I think there is a long way to go before this treaty is adopted. It may still take several more years. There is a long way to go in the negotiations and regarding the content of the text.

  Once the treaty is adopted, ratification will have to be pushed through. Let us remember that international treaties only enter into force when a certain number of states ratify them, and only those states that ratify them are bound by them. This is where I see a huge challenge ahead. Hopefully, once we get to produce a good, comprehensive text, the process of ratification will not be so slow and cumbersome.

  For this to happen, we will need a strong civil society to push states to ratify the treaty so it enters into force and becomes binding on the signatory parties. Again, I would expect this process to be long and arduous, as the issue of human rights protection in the context of business is a thorny one, given that there are many interests at stake. What lies ahead will be a big challenge for all involved.

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   Follow@fernanda_ho and@WGBizHRs on Twitter.

   

• VENEZUELA: ‘We need a multilateral, flexible and creative approach from the international community’

  CIVICUS speaks with Feliciano Reyna, founder and president of Acción Solidaria, a Venezuelan civil society organisation (CSO) established in 1995 with the mission to contribute to reducing the social impact of the HIV epidemic. As a result of the multiple crises facing Venezuela, Acción Solidaria has expanded its scope of action and provides medicines and medical supplies to wider vulnerable populations.

  

  How has the current crisis come about in Venezuela?

  A process of dismantling the rule of law has taken place over several years and is still ongoing. The judiciary has long ceased to be independent and now operates according to the interests of the government. Added to this is a high level of corruption. Many documents and reports, such as a recent one by the United Nations (UN) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, describe how a non-independent justice structure was put in place, taking advantage of the opacity of public data and discretionary state management.

  As a result, many people, acting in their own interest, destroyed the economic and productive apparatus. Nowadays the Venezuelan economy is 20 per cent of the size it was in 2013. This has impacted on poverty levels, the quality of public services and the resulting lack of protection.

  An initial period of enormous income, lasting many years, allowed for a great waste of wealth, with resources reaching the major groups that supported Hugo Chávez’s government, from 2005 to 2013. But money was just spent on individual benefits, not invested in public services. Thus, little by little, the public sector was left in a state of total abandonment: hospitals, roads, lighting, electrical system, water distribution. Everything is pretty much destroyed. There are about four million people who cook with firewood or charcoal because they don’t receive gas. Where I live, we get water once a week for 24 hours, and sometimes we don’t get water for two or three weeks.

  There was a major shift in the global economy, with a sharp drop in oil prices coinciding with Chávez’s last days in office. When Nicolás Maduro took power in 2013, the fragility of a regime largely based on Chávez’s personality was exposed. Maduro’s victory triggered political protests because his mandate was questioned, and very harsh repressive practices were adopted in response. The situation has deteriorated ever since, leading to the current human rights crisis. CSOs have documented arbitrary detentions, torture and cruel treatment under detention. There has been a sustained attack on dissent and political opponents. Anyone in a position of power who is viewed as a political threat is taken out of play.

  The years between 2014 and 2016 were terrible. In addition to human rights violations, there was widespread harm caused to the population in terms of health, nutrition, access to water, education and other rights. As the economy deteriorated, there began to be many social protests, not for political reasons but regarding income, lack of resources, power cuts, lack of transportation and public services, and so on. With two major exceptions – the 2017 and 2019 protest waves, in which people expressed political grievances – the vast majority of protests have been social protests, not ideological ones, through which many people who ultimately supported and voted for the government expressed their discontent.

  While the attack on opposition and dissent has driven many into exile, economic shortages have led to a massive emigration wave. More than four million Venezuelans have emigrated, including many professionals, teachers and doctors, further weakening service delivery systems.

  What is the context in which civil society works?

  There state has been greatly weakened and is unable to control all the territory under its jurisdiction, so it has handed over control to other groups. Power is increasingly in the hands of local parastate actors who enjoy small bubbles of well-being within the context of immense poverty in which the vast majority of the population lives.

  Because of the weakening of the state and the deterioration of the oil industry, which has always been the main source of national income, the government has opened some spaces for a freer economy. That means that in order to serve the populations we work with, we have been able to import medicines and supplies thanks to international cooperation. Our international donors send us supplies or pay for transportation so that we can receive them, using a door-to-door delivery system.

  Since 2017 Acción Solidaria has brought in almost 240 tons of aid. We have grown from nine staff in 2016 to 40 in 2021. Every week about 120 people come to the offices of Acción Solidaria to seek medicine. Most of them are women and people with very little resources, over 55 years old. The things they need may be available in the parallel economy, but at prices they can’t afford.

  But the environment for civil society remains a high-risk one. Last year we experienced a raid by the Special Action Forces, the most fearsome command of the Bolivarian National Police. What they did to us was not an official operation but a criminal action. CSOs doing human rights advocacy are criminalised, and CSOs conducting humanitarian action face serious problems of access and are subject to extortion by these autonomised groups and paramilitary actors. We have become targets not because we are opponents or dissidents, but because we have coveted resources.

  One colleague of ours was imprisoned 160 days ago and five comrades from an organisation that works alongside the UN Refugee Agency were imprisoned for a month in a military facility.

  As the electoral process was underway, the government’s information networks among the population seemed to have become aware that government programmes – which transfer the equivalent of about US$4 a month to their beneficiaries – could not compete with the nearly US$60 that humanitarian organisations were transferring to people in their target populations, without demanding anything in return, simply as part of the humanitarian response. So they immediately stepped in and suspended the 38 humanitarian aid programmes that were making cash transfers.

  Following the elections, the transfer ecosystem has started to begin again, but so far only transfers from the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNICEF have been reactivated.

  How much popular support does the Maduro government have left? Did it have enough to win the November regional elections, or did it resort to fraud?

  In November 2021, regional elections were held to renew all executive and legislative seats in the country’s 23 federal entities and 335 municipalities. The official turnout was just over 40 per cent, and the government won 19 governorships, compared to four won by the opposition. The government also won 213 mayorships, but various opposition groups won 121, a not insignificant number.

  The conditions of electoral competition were set up well before the selection of candidates, the campaigns and the voting took place, as new members to the National Electoral Council (CNE) were appointed. The CSO Foro Cívico had proposed names of independent candidates for the CNE: people with a strong electoral background who could build a bridge of dialogue with the people in government who wanted a less authoritarian rule. This resulted in a more balanced CNE, with one independent rector and one from the opposition among the five full members, and three out of five alternates proposed by civil society. This allowed us to expect an election with greater legitimacy than previous ones.

  The electoral process was very tense. While there was no fraud in the sense that voting figures were changed, there was a lot of pressure and obstacles to prevent opposition supporters from voting. Leading opposition politicians were disqualified and unable to stand as candidates. The conditions in voting centres, including schedules, were altered for the government’s benefit, and many people were brought out to vote, despite the fact that the government no longer has the same mobilisation capacity as in previous elections. Turnout was low for several reasons: because millions of people have emigrated, and because many popular opposition figures were not taking part in the election.

  The opposition also bore a great deal of responsibility for this, because it viewed the elections with a lot of suspicion. Many of its key spokespeople were opposed to participating, and it did not reach the kind of broad agreements that would have allowed it to win as many as 10 or 12 governorships. In part, its growth was limited not just by the obstacles imposed by the government, but also by its own inability to reach an agreement.

  Still, it is important to emphasise that the playing field was not level. The opposition could have won more governorships than it did, but there was a clear limit to this. This was seen in Hugo Chávez’s home state of Barinas, which the government could not afford to lose to the opposition. An opposition candidate clearly won there, so after the fact the Supreme Court ruled that the winning candidate did not actually meet the conditions to be eligible to compete, and ordered a rerun.

  Faced with these limitations, which were foreseeable, there was a part of the opposition that from the beginning opposed participating in the elections and left the way open for many pro-government victories that might not otherwise have taken place.

  How consolidated is the Maduro regime, and what are the chances that a democratic transition can take place?

  A democratic transition does not seem to be an option in the short term. The opposition is very diverse and is dispersed both programmatically and in terms of its institutional approach, so it is questionable whether it would be able to govern if it had the opportunity right now.

  What lies ahead of us is a long trek through the desert. The government suffers from many weaknesses, but it has the support of China, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and a lot of political support from Cuba and other countries in the region, as is apparent in the UN Human Rights Council. Maduro’s government has adopted a deft approach in the image of these supportive states: despite corruption and lack of transparency, it has allowed an opening in the economy while keeping its repressive behaviour intact.

  The international support that the government receives is important and has been systematically underestimated, while the support received by the interim government led by Juan Guaidó has been overestimated. It has been said that he has the USA and 60 other countries on his side, but those who support him with real actions are in fact much fewer.

  For many in the opposition, the interim government has itself been a big problem, partly because it became associated with the Donald Trump administration, and partly because since the interim government was established what it did became the only thing that mattered, and the space of the National Assembly, which had enjoyed broad popular support, was abandoned.

  The interim government was prompted on the basis of Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution. Since by virtue of his fraudulent re-election in 2018 Maduro was not recognised by the opposition as a legitimate president, the opposition-dominated National Assembly proclaimed its president, who at the time was Juan Guaidó, as interim president of Venezuela. I think that the opposition should have continued to work through the National Assembly, an elected and legitimate body whose presidency alternated between the parties with the most votes. Evidence of corruption could have been collected and mechanisms sought to protect the country’s assets with the help of the international community.

  Instead, the opposition named itself as a legitimate government without having any control over internal processes. And when it took over, it set out expedited conditions and deadlines, demanding that Maduro should first leave office so that the interim government could constitute itself as a transitional government and organise free elections.

  The choice of the opposition to proclaim an interim government was the result of it underestimating the government’s forces and overestimating its own. When expectations were not met, as was bound to happen, disaffection with the interim government began to grow. There is still an enormous desire for change, because things remain bad for the vast majority of the population, but the hope that this change would be achieved through the interim government has faded.

  What kind of support should the international community provide to facilitate a democratic transition?

  What we would like to see from the international community is a multilateral, flexible and creative approach. The change of administration in the USA has been extremely important because the approach of the Trump administration was unilateral and overbearing. Fortunately, the Biden administration appears to adhere to a multilateral approach and to include Europe, Canada and other countries in our region.

  Regarding Europe, it was very important that the European Union sent an election observation mission for the 21 November elections, as it was for the UN and the Carter Center to send their election experts. The UN also has essential contributions to make in humanitarian and human rights matters, both in terms of mobilising resources to address the humanitarian emergency in the country and to support migrants and refugees across the region, as well as with regard to the human rights violations that continue to occur.

  The international community must listen to civil society and pay attention to the grievances of the people who are directly affected by the measures that external actors take in relation to Venezuela. Many of the sanctions that have been imposed on the government, such as the US secondary sanction that penalises the exchange of oil for diesel, end up not affecting the government, which has alternative courses of action, and instead harm users and consumers, ordinary people whose already complicated lives are complicated even further.

  If this part of Venezuelan society were listened to, it would be possible to think of alternative policies to generate spaces for negotiation and agreements that would allow us to return to the path of democracy and human rights in a non-violent manner.

  Civic space in Venezuela is rated as ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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