monitoring

• ANGOLA: ‘Much effort was put into excluding people from the electoral process’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent Angolan election and its aftermath with Catarina Antunes Gomes and Cesaltina Abreu from the Social Sciences and Humanities Laboratory of the Catholic University of Angola (LAB). LAB works closely with Civic Movement Mudei (‘I changed’ in Portuguese), a movement of multiple civil society organisations (CSOs) that advocate for democratic change in Angola. It campaigns for voting rights and fair conditions of electoral competition, including transparent funding, equitable media coverage and citizen monitoring of election processes.

  

   What kinds of civic space restrictions did Angolan civil society encounter during the election?

  Civil society has faced many constraints before, during and after the election. Prior to the election, there was a partial review of the constitution that was done without any consultation and did not follow the recommendations of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The organic law on general elections was also amended without the participation of civil society or the political opposition, and it resulted in reduced electoral transparency. Key stakeholders were denied a platform to be part of the process.

  A few months before the election, the government also decided to change Angola’s political and administrative division, with potential impact on the drawing of electoral districts. Although it did not follow through with this reform, this caused great confusion and gave rise to suspicions about the intentions of the ruling party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the credibility of the election.

  In 2021 President João Lourenço appointed Laurinda Cardoso, a member of the MPLA’s political bureau, as chief judge of the Constitutional Court. Civil society also raised concerns about the appointment and swearing in of Manuel Pereira da Silva as the new president of the National Electoral Commission. But our voices have been overlooked during the whole process.

  The media situation has also been very precarious. Since the start of the electoral process, state intervention has increased, even in private media. Mudei monitored the media coverage of various parties and candidates from May until July and found that both public and private media had become instruments of propaganda, undermining the right to freedom of information and free choice.

  On 6 July, just as the electoral campaign was about to begin, a new law was proposed to prohibit surveys and posts revealing voting choices. Instead of ensuring people were fully included in the electoral process, much effort was put into excluding them.

  As a result, the level of transparency and fairness of the 24 August election has been dubious to say the least. It has been questioned by civil society through many public statements. The organisations we work with, Mudei and LAB, have produced a statementindicating they do not consider the elections to have been transparent, fair and free.

  What do you think contributed to low voter turnout?

  There were probably many reasons why fewer than half of registered voters went to the polls, but we believe major ones were disorganisation, fear and lack of trust.

  The whole process was badly organised. In September 2021 there was an ‘unofficial electoral registration’ period, which is really a process of connecting databases to determine who is eligible to vote, but it was not made clear to people what this was about. Most people were confused about what the law said on residency and voting. The process was marked by lack of clarity and irregularities. Everything seemed too complicated so many lost interest. Many people were excluded as a result.

  People were also afraid. The electoral campaign should be a time when candidates share their ideas with us, debate their parties’ proposals and tell us their thoughts about Angola’s future. But this was not what happened. The ruling party had a strong negative discourse, treating the other parties as enemies rather than adversaries. They didn’t present any ideas on how to make the country progress and what they published as their political programme was of very low quality.

  Staying away from the polls can also be interpreted as a form of protest. We have done a lot of comparative electoral analysis and found that protest voting has increased in Angola through the years. This is the result of people’s complete lack of faith in political institutions, given their limited democratic character and lack of transparency. This year the protest vote rose even further.

  How has the Angolan government reacted to civil society’s criticisms of electoral irregularities?

  The government has responded with repression. There are two situations that we would like to share with CIVICUS and other international allies so they can help us by providing visibility, pressuring human rights international bodies and offering support in the form of capacity-building and funding for human rights activists and social movements in Angola.

  The first situation concerns Pascoal Baptistiny, executive director of MBAKITA, a CSO that promotes the rights of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities in the province of Cuando Cubango in southern Angola. Pascoal has expressed concerns about the election, including in an interview with CIVICUS last year. This made him a target. He was put under surveillance and has recently requested our help to evacuate his family to Luanda, Angola’s capital, because he has been threatened and is afraid for their safety.

  The second situation concerns several members of Mudei, including its coordinator, who has been threatened repeatedly. Another of our colleagues, who was an independent candidate, has been mentioned in aggressive articles and social media posts along with an official from the European Union delegation in Luanda. They are attacked as part of a supposed subversive conspiracy involving powerful international interests aiming at destabilising Angola.

  The feeling of oppression has been increasing. The Angolan army has been put on high alert, allegedly to prevent attacks. But how would unarmed civilians be able to attack them? That is clearly an excuse; their presence is threatening and intimidating. We urge the international community to publicly denounce what our government is doing to people and act to protect civil society activists who continue to work regardless and face threats and violence as a result.

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  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Mudei through itsFacebook page,and follow@MovCivicoMudei on Twitter.

• ANGOLA: ‘The new NGO Law is just a way of legalising the government’s arrogance and excesses’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on the work of Angolan civil society with Godinho Cristóvão, a jurist, human rights defender and executive director of the association Movimento de Defensores de Direitos Humanos de Angola (Movement of Human Rights Defenders of Angola, KUTAKESA).

  KUTAKESA is a civil society organisation (CSO) working for the rights and protection of human rights defenders (HRDs) in Angola, particularly those active in more vulnerable areas, working on more sensitive issues and from historically excluded groups.

  What are the current conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Angolan CSOs work in a climate of suspicion and uncertainty, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Angola enshrines a catalogue of citizens’ fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees.

  The Angolan authorities should have aligned themselves with the democratic rule of law and respected the work of CSOs and HRDs. Instead, there has been an increase in threats, harassment and illegal arrests of HRDs who denounce or hold peaceful demonstrations against acts of bad governance and violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. There have been clear setbacks with regard to the guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution, as well as the rights set out in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other human rights treaties Angola has ratified.

  How is the government targeting civil society with restrictive legislation?

  The attacks on civil society are totally uncalled for. On 25 May, the Angolan National Assembly passed a draft NGO Statute, despite severe criticism from CSOs, which have stated that it limits freedom of association and gives the state excessive powers to interfere with CSO activities.

  The government targets civil society with legislation that is meant for terrorists and money launderers, though it has never been proven in any court that a CSO has committed an act of terrorism in Angola. On the contrary, the rationale of this legislation constitutes institutional terrorism, the target of which are CSOs.

  In Angola we all know who the corrupt are, and which party feeds corruption and money laundering. And as far as we know, CSOs are not part of that group. Funders of Angolan CSOs are all clearly identified, and the transfer of funds goes through national banking institutions and a rigorous compliance process. It is also worth remembering that many CSO funders are the same ones that fund government projects.

  How does the new restrictive law compare with the 2015 decree that was declared unconstitutional?

  In general, the content and spirit of Presidential Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs are the same as those of the new NGO Statute Law. By way of example, the rights and duties chapter of the previous regulation, later declared unconstitutional, was retained with only minimal changes in wording that in no way alter its content and its controlling and repressive spirit.

  Additionally, the decree that was found unconstitutional provided for an administrative body under the tutelage of the Angolan executive – called IMPROCAC – with the power to monitor and control CSO actions. The recently approved draft NGO Statute Law provides for a similar body with the same attributions as the old IMPROCAC.

  In other words, this is a new attempt to impose similar restrictions, but it is more serious since its instrument is no longer a presidential decree but a law. This means that it is no longer only the executive that is attacking the principles of autonomy and freedom of association provided for in article 48 of the constitution, but Congress as well, in which the president’s party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), has a majority. It is worth remembering that it was the MPLA majority that approved the 2010 constitution which it is now violating by passing the NGO Statute Law.

  How is civil society, including KUTAKESA, reacting to the proposed law?

  CSOs, at least the most active ones, are not looking favourably on the approval of this law, given the threats it represents in terms of closing off civic space in Angola.

  We are taking joint action to prevent the final approval of this law and its entry into force. From the point of view of legal certainty and security, the courts should be aligned with the principle of jurisprudential precedent. Since they submitted the presidential decree to a review of unconstitutionality and declared it unconstitutional, they should now follow suit, given that the new law contains the same irregularities.

  All national organisations took a joint position to call on parliament to take off the agenda the law now approved. This was done through information exchange meetings with opposition parties represented in parliament. At the same time we made public statements alerting the public about the dangers for freedom of association if the law was approved, and we made urgent appeals to the special rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations (UN) who have a mandate on freedom of association and HRDs to alert the Angolan government about the consequences the law will have on respect for human rights.

  On KUTAKESA’s part, urgent appeals were made to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Africa, Remy Ngoy Lumbu, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor.

  Do you see the new law as part of a wider trend to restrict civic space?

  Yes of course, but it is also important to note that the repression of peaceful and legal demonstrations predates the approval of this law. Government mismanagement and endemic corruption have been some of the main causes of the deteriorating social, economic and family conditions for the majority of the population, leading to growing protests and mass demonstrations, which have often been repressed. The approval of this law is just another means of repression and of legalising the arrogance and excesses of the government and its agents, particularly the national police.

  While the law is not necessarily intended as a response to the ongoing protests, given that the attempt to get it passed dates back to 2015, it is likely to be used as another tool to crack down on the protests.

  Now, if the government has good sense and makes a strategic reading of the current political and social context of Angola, it could stop the process of approval of the law or, if it is too late for that, the president could refuse to promulgate it, taking the appeals of civil society into consideration. The law’s approval would certainly increase the number of protests and demonstrations.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with KUTAKESA through theirwebsite.

• ANGOLA: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’

   PORTUGUESE

  

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and the new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Angola with Emilio José Manuel, focal point for Angola of the Lusophone Platform for Human Rights and founding member of the Working Group for Human Rights Monitoring in Angola (GTMDH).

  The GTMDH is a platform of civil society organisations (CSOs) that works to promote and defend human rights and strives for social justice within the framework of the Angolan constitution and other current laws, as well as international conventions and treaties.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Angola?

  Although there is currently no direct or indirect interference in the work of civil society in Angola, the authorities’ discourse is that, because they receive funding from international institutions, CSOs defend and represent foreign interests.

  Meanwhile there are many joint actions between public institutions and CSOs. For example, once a year the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights organises a forum with CSOs where the GTMDH presents its public position on human rights and provides information on the granting of registration certificates, the legal documents that the Angolan state gives to each CSO attesting that it is legally registered and can operate in the country.

  Why is the government targeting CSOs with legislation aimed at terrorists and money launderers?

  According to the report supporting the draft law, the president considers that he has ‘encountered constraints and difficulties in ensuring compliance with international obligations assumed by the Angolan Government in the area of money laundering and the financing of terrorism’. Hence the need to control the sources and destination of CSO funds.

  This narrative of the Angolan government is untrue and clearly demonstrates its aversion to the role of CSOs in monitoring and denouncing government malpractice. Financial support for the projects of CSOs and human rights defenders comes from well-identified organisations and goes through banking institutions with strict compliance rules – and some of these funders are the same ones that support government projects.

  On 26 May, the draft NGO Statute Law was passed in general by the Angolan National Assembly, ignoring severe criticism from civil society, which has made clear that it limits the right of association and gives the executive excessive powers to interfere in CSO activities.

  The situation is very alarming because the draft law imposes a 120-day period for existing CSOs to make their statutes conform with the law, otherwise they will be outlawed outright without a judicial decision. Article 2 of the draft law requires existing CSOs to conform with the new provisions, under penalty of having their statutes and registrations revoked. This is a violation of the principle of legality and access to justice guaranteed by the Angolan constitution. The principle of legality requires that the law should be clearly articulated and known in advance and should not be applied retroactively.

  How has civil society reacted to the draft law?

  Civil society analysed the draft law and reacted against it. In collaboration with the GTMDH coordinator, my role as legal officer was to prepare petitions, public position papers and communications with the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, and to engage with regional and international partners to amplify the voices of Angolan civil society.

  We requested a technical opinion from UN Special Rapporteur Clément Voule and drafted a public civil society position on the bill explaining why it violates freedoms of association, which we presented publicly at a press conference.

  We advocated with opposition parties represented in parliament and made contacts with the Angolan Bar Association to file, within the scope of our constitutional prerogatives, the appropriate action for an assessment of the unconstitutionality of the draft law. The day before the general approval of the draft law, we sent a public petition to the National Assembly demanding that it not approve it.

  Our next action will be to send a letter to the presidents of some key countries about the closure of civic space in Angola and increasing controls over CSOs, including international CSOs.

  Protests are also taking place against the proposed NGO Statute Law, which have converged with protests against measures that have increased fuel prices and a crackdown on street vendors.

  Do you see this bill as part of a wider trend of restricting civic space?

  The recent repression of demonstrations, arrests of activists and attacks on protesters, including women, is an indicator that civic space is being severely restricted. The use of force by the national police has resulted in deaths without any appropriate process to hold to account and punish police officers involved in cases of violence, torture and killings.

  Our country depends on importing food staples and other goods from abroad. Right now the prices of food, other goods and services have increased. Street vendors are a group that some CSOs work with, particularly those dedicated to empowering women to establish small businesses. Some organisations provide micro credits to street vendors. Although the street vendors’ movement has a life of its own, it is CSOs and their lawyers who have provided them with free legal aid.

  There is a current of national solidarity, taking into account that the law does not explicitly say it will regulate all initiatives by citizens who wish to create an association. My personal opinion is that everyone feels that control will go further. The draft NGO Statute Law lacks a clear definition of what a ‘non-governmental organisation’ is. It also includes vague provisions that need to be better fleshed out to enable the proper interpretation of the law. For example, it is difficult to understand the meaning and normative scope of article 19(1)(d), which imposes a ‘duty on NGOs to refrain from practices and actions that are subversive or liable to be confused with them’. The unanswered question here is how subversive actions are to be defined in the context of the law.

  How does the new draft law compare with the 2015 decree that was deemed unconstitutional?

  According to the analysis we’ve made, the arguments and contents are the same as in Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of NGOs. We have the new role of counselling judges in the Constitutional Court. The situation in the Supreme Court indicates that we have a crisis in the judiciary. So it is uncertain whether this time the judicial decision will be in favour of CSOs. The present draft law establishes rules to control, restrict, approve, authorise and suspend the activities of CSOs, including CSO extinction by an administrative entity to be determined by the president as holder of the executive power, which violates the principle of freedom of association as provided in article 48 of the constitution.

  Do you view the draft NGO Statute Law as part of a regional or global trend?

  After having participated in sessions of the NGO Forum and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, I noted a tendency to restrict civic space throughout Africa. As part of the civil society strategy, we held meetings with activists from Mozambique to share experiences and assemble regional, continental and international strategies. It is worth remembering that various activists, whether linked to CSOs or not, are directly involved in campaigns and waves of protest to try to ensure that the draft law is not given final approval by parliament and promulgated by the president.

  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contact GTMDH through itswebsite.

• BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: ‘Civil society has failed to spark people’s activist side’

  
  CIVICUS speaks about deteriorating civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) withAida Daguda and Dajana Cvjetkovic, director and programme manager atthe Centre for Civil Society Promotion (CPCD).

  Founded in 1996, CPCD is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to strengthen civil society and citizen participation in BiH and the Western Balkans through capacity development, advocacy and campaigning.

  What are civic space conditions like in BiH?

  In our nearly three decades working in civil society in BiH and the Western Balkans, we have never witnessed such a rapid deterioration of civic space. Our organisation, along with other CSOs, is deeply concerned about two new pieces of legislation introduced in Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities that make up BiH.

  The first bill, already adopted, reintroduced criminal defamation into the legal system. The second, currently under parliamentary debate, is a ‘foreign agents’ bill that would criminalise CSOs that receive foreign funding or assistance for ‘political activities’ and give state institutions the power to shut them down. This would be just another tool to further restrict civil society in the hands of government authorities, who already use the mechanisms in place to oversee the work of CSOs and exert pressure and threaten us. Over the past year there have been more inspections of CSOs than ever before, specifically targeting smaller and more vocal organisations.

  By silencing independent media and civil society, RS President Milorad Dodik seeks to eliminate public scrutiny and criticism in an entity marred by criminal activities and corruption and undergoing a difficult economic situation. The government is resisting democratic oversight and trying to eliminate all forms of critical thought among the public.

  Moreover, in April 2023 the Sarajevo local government proposed amendments to local public order laws that would penalise the spread of ‘fake news’ and criticism of state authorities. Although the draft bill was withdrawn in June due to the public outcry it caused, the authorities have expressed their commitment to reintroducing a modified version of the bill.

  These are all signals that the situation for civil society is rapidly worsening in RS and in BiH as a whole, with severe limitations being introduced on freedoms of association and expression.

  How has Bosnian civil society organised against the restrictive bills?

  A part of RS’s civil society is well organised and experienced in advocacy and campaigning. But overall, there are fewer than 10 CSOs that are strongly committed to their human rights mission and vision, while the rest maintain links with the government that make them less vocal against repressive laws. We provide support with expertise and funding to independent CSOs in RS, but we must be discreet because we are based in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other entity that composes BiH, and our help tends to be misunderstood by both politicians and the public in the RS.

  Unfortunately, many Bosnian CSOs remain silent due to fear. In RS in particular, people are afraid for their safety and that of their families. Unlike in Georgia, where people took to the streets to defend freedom of association, people in Bosnia aren’t motivated, partly due to media narratives portraying civil society as being paid by the international community to act against the government.

  We are using all available tools to raise awareness about repressive legislation within the country, at the European Union (EU) level and through communication with various civil society networks, including CIVICUS. The government argues that these laws are necessary to prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering, but we view these as excuses.

  We have informed opposition members of parliament about the potential negative consequences of the ‘foreign agents’ law but have made no impact. Our outreach to the public has been hindered by lack of media support.

  However, we remain hopeful that this crisis may turn into an opportunity for Bosnian civil society to revive the sense of solidarity that we’ve lost over the past decade. These days, we constantly think in terms of projects and donors and tend to see each other as competitors when we most desperately need to be united.

  How would you describe the current political climate in BiH?

  Our region has historically bordered with empires, and this location has come at a price. The threat of RS’s secession has risen in recent years, posing a security problem for the entire region. Due to BiH’s location and rich natural resources and potential for energy production, many fear that its fate depends on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the interests of major powers such as China, the EU, Russia, Turkey and the USA. The people of BiH are the ones with the least influence on the decisions that will affect them.

  While secession may not be imminent, the threat of it significantly impacts on people’s wellbeing. We experience a pervasive feeling of insecurity that contributes to an anxious atmosphere. This makes people easier to manipulate. Many people are considering leaving, mostly because of their sense of insecurity and the widespread corruption.

  Fear is our main currency. Past experiences of police surveillance leading to arrests of protesters have deterred people from participating in demonstrations. People are losing hope that things will improve. During the war we experienced between 1992 and 1995, we had a very strong feeling of hope that when the war ended we would recover a normal life and rebuild our country. Now we have peace but we don’t have hope anymore.

  How do you work to strengthen civil society in BiH, and what obstacles do you face?

  Our organisation was established right after the war, so it has existed for 27 years. We were the first ones to connect CSOs from different parts of the country and our network currently includes over 350 organisations.

  In 2004, we launched the first initiative of institutional cooperation between government and civil society. At that time, civil society was thriving. But over the past decade or so, the situation has steadily worsened. Civil society faces a shortage of human resources, and people hold rather negative views about civil society. We seek to change such perceptions by consistently communicating the purpose and results of our work to the public and beneficiaries of our services and activities.

  We also lack strong connections with the media, which should serve as a channel between us, the government, the international community and, most importantly, our society. To show what we’re doing and what we are trying to achieve, instead of just following donors’ visibility guidelines we have established our own portal in which we collect inspiring stories of civil society’s impact in improving people’s lives.

  But our biggest problem is lack of local ownership. For many years the international community did things for us, so we aren’t used to solving problems by ourselves. People aren’t used to activism; they complain and wait for others to resolve their problems. That’s one of the failures of civil society: we have implemented many projects, but never managed to spark people’s activist side.

  What challenges do you face in cooperating with international partners?

  International agencies implement large projects in BiH and many funds come from the international community, but we don’t see results. One of the reasons is that local civil society is pushed aside. When we inquire with donors about supporting local organisations or networks, they argue that small organisations lack the capacity to successfully implement large grants. It has become their mantra.

  This hampers the development of civil society as the true democratic force our country urgently needs. We must engage in dialogue with the government to devise solutions for the numerous problems we face. We need to move past the ‘projectisation’ of civil society and focus on the long term.

  This also applies to the government, which is also forced to work within the project framework, executing short-term tasks requested by the EU or other international institutions. For instance, the government, jointly with the European Commission, invested around €1 million (approx. US$1.06 million) to fulfil a request to establish a register for CSOs, but once international partners left the country, the register ceased to function. There was a failure to recognise that civil society could have created, managed and overseen the register, which could have been instrumental in developing a common civil society strategy.

  This year we established an informal group of donors who support local civil society in Bosnia. We hope the international community will consistently convey the message that they must prioritise local ownership and sustainability. We don’t want to see civil society becoming a mere service provider for larger international agencies. We need to organise around genuine shared interests rather than form networks to satisfy the criteria of calls for proposals. It is time for us to think strategically about who we are and what our role is.

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  Civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watchlist, which draws attention to countries where there is a serious and rapid decline in respect for civic space.

  Get in touch with CPCD through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@cpcdba on Twitter.

• GEORGIA: ‘Civil society must be ready for any further regressive move the government attempts’

  CIVICUS speaks about Georgian civil society’s successful campaign against the draft Agents of Foreign Influence Law with Nino Ugrekhelidze, co-founder of the CEECCNA (Central Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central and North Asia) Collaborative Fund, and Guram Imnadze, Director of the Democracy and Justice Programme of theSocial Justice Center.

  Founded in 2022, the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund is a feminist fund that moves sustainable resources for social justice movements across the CEECCNA region.

  The Social Justice Center is a progressive civil society organisation (CSO) working on human rights and social justice in Georgia. It seeks to identify the structural reasons for economic, social and political inequality, and share critical knowledge while contributing to change through democratic means.

  What was the draft Foreign Agents Law that was proposed in Georgia?

  On 20 February 2023, the ruling party presented a draft law on ‘Agents of Foreign Influence’. The initiative would affect any Georgian-language media and any CSO registered in Georgia that receive more than 20 per cent of their annual income from a ‘foreign power’, meaning a foundation or organisation registered outside Georgia. They would be forced to register on a ‘Foreign Influence Agents Registry’ and disclose foreign funding. If they failed to do          so, they would risk very high fines.

  But the need for more transparency is an excuse, because there are already numerous laws regulating the financial transactions and transparency of legal entities, CSOs included, such as the Law on Grants and the Law on Budgeting and Accounting. There have not been cases of CSOs not complying with the existing legal requirements. In fact, most large CSOs also use their media platforms to provide annual financial reports and list their donors.

  The draft law includes language that has negative connotations in Georgia due to our Soviet past. ‘Agent’ means ‘traitor’, especially if used together with the adjective ‘foreign’. It has the clear purpose of delegitimising independent CSOs and critical media by labelling us as enemies of the state, politically biased and aligned with the opposition.

  The government is doing everything it can to delegitimise CSOs as local actors voicing real local needs. They don’t want the public to listen to us when we criticise the government and provide information that is true and in the interest of the country – they want them to believe that we are the ones lying to them.

  This is part of a larger government stigmatising campaign against civil society and independent media, which gained momentum over the past few months.

  Who would be most affected if this law was passed?

  It is critical to highlight the role that CSOs have played in Georgia since we gained independence – civil society has played a key role in the democratic transition and in ensuring the provision of services the government could not provide, particularly to vulnerable groups. When the state could not fully perform its duties, it was civil society that stepped in and got the work done.

  If the law was passed, people with HIV and disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, women, children and LGBTQI+ people would be among the first to be directly impacted. Programmes targeted at these groups have been created and operated by Georgian CSOs, because the government is either not interested and therefore does not prioritise this work or does not have the money for it.

  Of course, as the government is not funding these programmes, Georgian CSOs operating them typically get their funding from outside the country. Domestically, there is very little interest in funding civil society; domestic funding is almost non-existent and CSOs are severely underfunded. Major civil society donors are various private and public foundations, and bilateral and multilateral institutions from the USA and the European Union, all of which maintain political neutrality. Many of them even fund the government agencies as well.

  If the law were adopted, given the difficulties in fundraising domestically, CSOs would be exposed to financial starvation. Numerous CSOs would have to shut down. And this would be no accident: it is part of a very intentional attack on the financial resilience of CSOs.

  How has civil society organised against the bill?

  Over 380 CSOs signed a statement explaining their strong opposition to the bill. Civil society and independent media worked hard to reach people with compelling messages, avoiding NGO jargon and explaining in simple terms why this bill is against the interests of the country and against democracy – why, in fact, this bill is a Russian import, part of a trend that is quickly gaining ground across the region.

  It took some effort to mobilise against the bill because civil society had been demonised for so long already, and many people did not want to support ‘foreign agents’. But our key message was that our government may have pro-Russian course, but our people do not, and we don’t intend to be part of the Russian Federation ever again. This connected with a widespread sentiment of Georgian people.

  This messaging dispelled the climate of resignation that things cannot change and helped mobilise people. On 7 March, parliament passed the draft law in the first reading, but just as the bill was being discussed, tens of thousands gathered outside parliament to protest in Tbilisi. There were protests day and night, for several days in a row. This was one of the largest demonstrations in Georgia’s modern history.

  The protests were repressed by riot police using rubber bullets, teargas and water cannon. At least one person lost an eye because of police brutality. Over 150 people were detained for ‘disobedience’ but later released following further pressure from protesters.

  As a result of the protests, the bill was recalled on 10 March. That day we realised that if we come together, things can change. There was a spirit of resistance, unity, dignity and solidarity in the protests. People who were not necessarily politicised became interested in politics. And it all started because civil society came together to stand up against a bill that posed an existential threat.

  Protesters connected in a very well-articulated way the situation in Georgia with the plight of Ukraine, and understood this as a fight against Russian political interests trying to absorb us as a country. That’s why they also showed solidarity with Ukraine, singing their anthem and displaying pro-Ukraine messages.

  The way young Georgians reacted gives us hope for the future. The way they came together, the way they protested, the messages they conveyed – it was so politically consistent and coherent. They protested, they resisted, and when the protest was over, they even cleaned the public space after themselves. They were truly amazing.

  Would you say danger has passed?

  Parliament is currently on its best behaviour because it had a moment of realisation that this might turn into a revolution. In pushing forward the bill, the government thought there was no limit to its power, but found such a limit in the protests. A sentiment started spreading among protesters that they could fire their representatives, send them home. But the government’s targeting of civil society is not over yet – it is only starting. Although the bill has been withdrawn, the prime minister has already said that they are going to continue pushing for it. He even doubled down as he mentioned that their step will be to tackle so-called ‘gay propaganda’, another Russian import that is part of the crackdown on progressive civil society.

  The government continues its campaign against civil society. Even if the law does not pass, the official narrative keeps labelling civil society and independent media as ‘foreign agents’, and the consequences of this will continue to be felt for a long time. In Kutaisi, for instance, a social justice activist saw their home vandalised, and someone marked it with a sign alerting that ‘an agent lives here’. It is to be expected that anti-rights forces will use this language as a weapon against civil society activists.

  And of course, the authorities continue to use other tools they have to obstruct civil society work. For instance, Georgia has a problematic administrative code that grants the police and the courts the right to use administrative sanctions such as fines and detentions without sufficient evidence and due process. Such measures are often used against civil society and human rights activists. Since 2016, administrative fines for most common administrative offences have quadrupled. This is a serious barrier for civil society work, as it is expensive for activists to pay the fines.

  What kind of international support does Georgian civil society currently need?

  Georgia is currently experiencing a rapidly shrinking civic space, and the government is sliding towards authoritarianism. International solidarity and conversations on the political situation in Georgia and the whole post-Soviet region are going to be critical.

  In post-Soviet countries, the influence of Russian politics is very strong. There is an actual war going on in Ukraine, and what is happening in Georgia is in a way war by different means. These are two fronts of the same fight against Russian imperialism. Understanding this is essential.

  Also, we need to talk more about where money comes from for anti-rights organisations. There are very clear mechanisms to track where money comes from when it comes to CSOs and independent media, but there are none to investigate where funding for anti-rights groups such as religious fundamentalist and far-right organisations comes from. One reason is that they often don’t register as CSOs – this means they wouldn’t even be under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Agents Law if it were passed. Lots of money for these organisations is coming from Russia without any conditionalities or reporting mechanisms in place.

  This is a way bigger problem than Georgia having a Foreign Agents Law. We need to make the connection to what is happening elsewhere. In Ukraine and Moldova there were also attempts to adopt a similar law and people pushed back. The logic of this law is already working in Mongolia, and it is effectively in place in Belarus.

  We need more complex conversations about what we are organising against, how this is impacting us, what tactics are being used and how human rights language and spaces are being co-opted. The obvious types of support needed are spaces for such conversations and funding, because ultimately, for us to resist, we need spaces to reflect, build strategies and develop our political imagination, and we need resources, given that we are already so underfunded across the region. We must be ready for any further regressive move the government attempts. We haven’t seen the last of it.

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  Civic space in Georgia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Social Justice Center through itswebsite andFacebook page, and follow@SjcCenter and@niiugre on Twitter.

• GREECE: ‘The criminalisation of solidarity has had a chilling effect’

  CIVICUS speaks with Melina Spathari, Director of Strategy and Programmes at HumanRights360 (HR360), about theprosecution of civil society activists working with migrants and refugees in Greece.

  HR360 is a Greek human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks toprotect the rights of all people, empowering them to exercise their rights, with a focus on the most disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, including migrants and refugees.

  What is the current situation for civil society activists and organisations helping migrants in Greece?

  As the United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights defenders stated following her official visit to Greece in June 2022, ‘defenders in the country working to ensure the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are currently under severe pressure… At the tip of the spear are prosecutions, where acts of solidarity are reinterpreted as criminal activity, specifically the crime of people smuggling… The negative impact of such cases is multiplied by smear campaigns perpetuating this false image of defenders’.

  Since 2010, Greek ruling parties have demonised CSOs, criticising their use of public funding, to delegitimise their criticism of pushbacks of migrants and their condemnation of the conditions in reception and identification centres and refugee camps. In most cases, the allegations against CSOs later proved to be unfounded. This phenomenon is part of a worrying trend that negatively affects CSOs around the globe, which is why civil society has increasingly organised and developed strategies to resist and respond to the attacks they face from governments.

  Why is the Greek government criminalising solidarity with migrants and refugees?

  In the case of Greece, the speed and impetus of the ongoing crackdown has been fuelled by current trends in both international and domestic politics, involving hostile relations with Turkey and imminent elections in both countries. Deploying a witch-hunt against CSOs kills many birds with one stone: it helps the government gain votes from the far-right side of the political spectrum and helps it manage the damage caused to its reputation by wrong political decisions and neglectful practices. Last but not least, by vilifying CSOs that are active and vocal in the field of human rights, the authorities aspire to manipulate and silence civil society as a whole.

  And to some extent, it has worked. Criminalisation has had a chilling effect. There have been some attempts among civil society to gather, discuss, assess the situation and work on a joint strategy, but these actions didn’t flourish. CSOs are now afraid to raise their voice, and we understand them: they have good reason to be intimidated. Still, some acts of solidarity have taken place, especially when those targeted were respected veteran human rights defenders.

  Has HR360 been targeted?

  In November 2022, the authorities stepped up an attack against our organisation: they demonised HR360 for receiving foreign funding aimed at regranting and disclosed the personal financial situation of HR360’s founders. The public prosecutor began a preliminary investigation, which hasn’t yet produced any outcomes. No information has been revealed, nor has any criminal process been ordered. HR360 finds itself in limbo, facing huge administrative and financial consequences and experiencing severe impacts on staff morale.

  But HR360 is not the only victim of this vile smear campaign. In late 2022, the Prosecutor’s Office criminally charged Panagiotis Dimitras, director of the Greek Helsinki Monitor, and Tommy Olsen, founder and director of Aegean Boat Report, a Norwegian CSO that monitors and shares data about the movement of people in the Aegean Sea, for ‘forming a criminal organisation with the purpose of receiving details of citizens of third countries, who attempt to enter Greece illegally, in order to facilitate their illegal entry and stay’. Following the same pattern applied to HR360, Dimitras has been accused of repeatedly conducting activities aimed at gaining illegal income.

  What support does Greek civil society need to resist and continue doing its work?

  Greek civil society needs more international support, which is currently quite limited and restricted to its advocacy work – that is, it can be used to help migrants and refugees, but not for CSOs and activists to protect themselves and therefore retain the capacity to continue doing their work.

  Right now, what Greek activists and CSOs need the most is legal support, including funding to cover legal fees. And in terms of changing the situation in the long term, what’s also needed is a well-organised European awareness campaign highlighting both the vital work civil society is doing and the attacks the government is subjecting it to. This would be very helpful, since bad publicity at the European level is one of the things Greek authorities fear the most.

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  Civic space in Greece is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Its rating has recently beendowngraded.

  Get in touch with HR360 through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@rights360 and@Melina_Spathari onTwitter.

• INDIA: ‘Civil society efforts will be crucial to the quality of the elections’

  CIVICUS speaks with Anjali Bhardwaj, founding member of the Society for Citizen Vigilance Initiatives (Satark Nagrik Sangathan, SNS), about recent electoral reforms and civil society efforts to ensure the quality of India’s upcoming election.

  Established in 2003, SNS is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote government transparency and accountability and foster active citizen participation.

  What recent changes have been made to rules on campaign financing?

  On 15 February, the Supreme Court ruled the electoral bond system currently used to finance election campaigns unconstitutional. This is a positive change, with a potential to bring transparency to campaign financing.

  Introduced in 2018, the electoral bond scheme allowed people and organisations to buy designated bank bonds ranging from 1,000 to 10 million rupees (approx. US$12 to US$120,000) to donate to political campaigns in a completely anonymous way. When it introduced this system, the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) presented it as a measure to combat corruption and increase transparency in political financing.

  Before the bond system was introduced, political parties could receive funds in cash or through the banking system, but large corporate donations were often made in cash. All cash donations below 20,000 rupees (approx. US$240) were anonymous under the Income Tax Act. So to hoodwink the system, parties often reported large cash donations as multiple donations of amounts smaller than 20,000 rupees.

  The electoral bond scheme was presented as a measure to increase transparency but the anonymity it ensured had the opposite effects. The opacity it enabled allowed single donors to provide unlimited funding. It hasn’t allowed people, CSOs, opposition political parties or even the Election Commission of India to track the flow of money in politics. It has compromised the public’s right to information, as voters are unable to discern the extent or sources of funding political parties receive. This limited people’s democratic right to make informed voting decisions.

  What was the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision?

  The Supreme Court first addressed this issue as early as 2019, acknowledging the bond system’s potential harm to democracy but allowing it to continue while it analysed the substance of the case. But even back then, it emphasised the deepened information imbalance created by a system that allowed the ruling party to access information about donors and donations through the government-controlled bank while leaving opposition parties and the public in the dark.

  In its recent ruling, the Supreme Court stressed that electoral bonds infringe article 19 of the constitution because without the right to information in electoral matters, the rights to free speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 cannot be fully realised.

  Voters in India predominantly support parties, rather than individual candidates. When large corporations contribute generous funds to political parties, there is the presumption that they do so in the expectation of receiving favours in return once parties become part of governments. When favours are returned, policy is guided not by promises made to voters or by people’s needs but by the interests of funders. This is why funding transparency is crucial for informed voting. Without this information, voters cannot know what to expect when parties access government.

  Electoral bonds exacerbated corruption through anonymous funding that gave free rein to large corporations to influence policy. They also made the playing field even more uneven, as the BJP consistently received a substantial share of electoral bonds.

  The Supreme Court judgment declared the scheme and associated amendments unconstitutional, emphasising the importance of the right to information. The court prohibited further transactions and mandated disclosure of past transactions, marking a significant move towards restoring transparency and fairness in India’s electoral process.

  How has civic space evolved under Prime Minister Narendra Modi?

  Regrettably, since the beginning of the Modi government in 2014 we have seen a significant contraction of civic space, due to systematic attacks on the crucial right to dissent, a cornerstone of any democracy.

  The essence of democracy lies in people’s right to question those in power. But in India, this right has been under attack in three primary ways.

  First, those who express dissent, criticise government policies or challenge legislation are labelled as anti-national. The governments files legal cases against them, leveraging draconian laws, terror-related legislation and money laundering statutes to silence them.

  Second, the government has deliberately weakened the laws that empower citizens. The Indian Right to Information Act, lauded as one of the world’s most progressive, has been amended twice in the last five years. Regressive amendments have severely affected people’s right to access information and question the authorities. Similarly regressive amendments to other laws, such as the Representation of People Act and the Income Tax Act, along with the electoral bonds, have further curtailed people’s right to access vital information to hold the authorities to account.

  The government has also undermined the independence of institutions responsible for upholding fundamental rights, including the right to free expression and protest. This has eroded the constitutional protection people should enjoy when expressing dissent. Protesting and questioning the government have therefore become increasingly difficult.

  The cumulative effect of these developments has dealt a severe blow to civic space in India.

  Are there enough guarantees for a free and fair election?

  India has needed electoral reform long before the current administration. For decades civil society has advocated for changes to strengthen the electoral process. While India takes pride in conducting relatively free and fair elections, concerns over the quality of elections have increased over time.

  Civil society has repeatedly expressed alarm over issues including the influence of money over elections, the security and reliability of electronic voting machines and manipulation of the voter roll.

  Regarding the undue influence of money over elections and consequently over policymaking, electoral bonds have long been a matter of major concern. Civil society has also expressed apprehension about glitches in and tampering with electronic voting systems, prompting debate and ongoing legal challenges in the Supreme Court. Alarms were also sounded by recent elections that saw arbitrary deletions and additions to voter lists.

  Civil society continues to bring attention to these issues, urging authorities to find solutions. The resolution of these challenges is essential for India to genuinely claim it conducts free and fair elections.

  Who are the major contenders in the 2024 election, and what are the main issues the winner will need to tackle?

  India has numerous political parties that actively participate in elections. The BJP and its allies have successfully formed a government twice and are currently strong contenders to secure a third term in office. The opposition landscape includes the Indian National Congress, historically prevalent prior to the BJP’s rise. But there are many other national and regional parties that contribute to the diversity of the political spectrum.

  As a developing country, India, faces multifaceted challenges. Among the most significant are deep-seated socio-economic inequality and high incidence of poverty, with a small number of families holding a substantial portion of the country’s wealth and a substantial percentage of the population living below the poverty line. There is much need for policies to uplift those on the margins of society and reforms to the structures that perpetuate inequality.

  Equally crucial is the protection of civic freedoms, particularly for those who criticise the government, including through peaceful protests. Those who express dissent and demand accountability must be protected rather than criminalised.

  The next government should prioritise these issues, addressing inequalities and working to create an environment where citizens can freely express themselves and participate fully in the democratic process.

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  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the SCVI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @sns_india on Twitter.

• LESOTHO: ‘We must work hand in hand to promote democracy and hold our leaders accountable’

  CIVICUS speaks about the 7 October election in Lesotho with Libakiso Matlho, executive director of Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust-Lesotho (WLSA). 

  WLSA is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Southern Africa and working to promote women’s leadership and eradicate gender-based violence. It contributed to the recent election process by providing voter education. 

  How would you assess the recent election   in  Lesotho in terms of its   transparency   and fairness?

  Looking at the overall proceedings I would say they were transparent and fair. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) did a good job. All candidates were given a  platform to share their manifestos as well as their campaigning approaches at different  levels, including through the media  and public gatherings. Independent candidates did not face any threats. Nobody experienced any restrictions in terms of the exercise of their right to reach out to members of the community and potential voters. Voters were free to attend candidates’ forums and political party rallies.

  There were two major challenges, however. One concerned voter civic education, which started a bit later than normal and therefore lasted only about three or four weeks, so it was not as broad as should have been.

   The other challenge had to do with the dynamics of the campaign, which was affected by conflict among candidates during public forums. Some participants invited to take part in the discussions also caused chaos. This  unfortunately led to a few discussions being cancelled before all the candidates could present their manifestos in some areas, especially those that were marked as hotspots.

  Do you foresee any election-related conflict?

  It is hard to predict, but this election seems to have been a bit different from others in the past, which makes me wonder.

  Around 65 political parties and 2,560 candidates competed in the 7 October election. For a small country with a population of two million, that is a huge number of people. And many might find it difficult to accept the outcome if things do not happen according to their expectations. 

  The election itself was peaceful, but political tension mounted as votes were counted over the following days. The results were announced on 11 October: the opposition Revolution for Prosperity party came first but was short of a majority, with 56 of 120 seats, while the incumbent All Basotho Convention party (ABC) came second. It is not clear whether ABC will contest the results and its supporters will take to the streets in protest. If this happens, clashes with rival parties might occur and security force repression could follow.

  I would not rule conflict out but rather consider it as likely to happen as not.

  Do you think the failure to pass constitutional reforms had an impact on the election results?

  I think the failure to pass the Omnibus Constitutional Bill, which had been years in the making, probably had a strong impact on the electoral process, and will definitely have an impact on what happens next.

  The bill sought to amend key provisions regarding political parties, candidate selection, floor-crossing in parliament, the appointment of senior officials and the role of the prime minister, whose removal would require a two-thirds majority. In May, all major parties in parliament committed to pass the bill by the end of June, but disagreements held it up much longer.

  One of the key issues of contention concerned the electoral law, which only allows party leaders to submit a proportional representation party list. With the current system, 80 members of parliament are elected in constituencies and 40 are elected through a proportional division of votes. Small parties are negatively affected because to get some proportional representation seats, they are forced to come together into a list with larger parties, and if they are unable to merge with other parties they are left out.

  Another key issue wasthe politicisation of the security sector, which contributes to political instability. The reforms proposed a way to deal with this.

  The reforms were eventually passed as parliament was reconvened for an urgent session but, following a series of legal challenges, the Constitutional Court declared them null and void at the last minute before the election.

  The failure to pass the reforms will also contribute to continuing difficulties in maintaining coalition governments. Lesotho has had coalition governments since 2012 that have never served a full five-year term due to conflicts that led to their dissolution. In 2017 ABC formed a six-party coalition government, but because of internal conflict Prime Minister Tom Thabane was forced to resign in 2020 and was replaced by Moeketsi Majoro.

  Coalitions have not made for stable and effective governments. The coalition-forming process also confuses voters because ideologies are not a big factor when putting them together. This makes voters a bit sceptical that their parties will remain faithful to their mandate.

  These were some of the issues the reform was meant to address, but unfortunately they remain unaddressed to this day.

  What did voters expect from the election?

  One of the expectations voters place on political parties is that they will work on improving service delivery. This includes fixing infrastructure and providing access to water and electricity, among other things. Lesotho also has high rates of unemployment and widespread problems of gender-based violence and femicides, as well as high crime rates that people hope will be addressed by the new government.

  Basotho people are not happy with the way the public sector has been managed over the years. Employment is mostly driven by nepotism and political affinities. People are uneasy because political parties on the campaign trail are quick to promise they will fix these things but once in power they fail to deliver.

  We have also seen a lot of instability in a key industry, the textile industry, with COVID-19 only making things worse. People were already dealing with bad working conditions and when the pandemic hit many were fired unfairly. This led to worker strikes and has negatively affected foreign investment. Elected leaders need to find means of retaining foreign investment while ensuring good work conditions.

  How can the international community support civil society’s work to strengthen democracy in Lesotho?

  During the election, civil society faced the challenge that almost all funding for civic education came from the IEC, that is, from the government budget. This could potentially compromise civil society’s watchdog role. Additionally, these funds are never sufficient to allow civil society to conduct its work thoroughly.

  The international community should support capacity building so that civil society can conduct robust advocacy during and after the election period. Collaboration between international and local CSOs is also important. For the recent election local CSOs took on voter education alone, without any involvement by international CSOs. We must work hand in hand to promote democracy in our countries and hold our leaders accountable.

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  Civic space in Lesotho is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with WLSA through itswebsite orFacebook page.

• MOZAMBIQUE: ‘The new NGO Law will be the death of the civic movement’

  

  Portuguese

  CIVICUS discusses the state of civic space and new restrictions being imposed on civil society in Mozambique with Paula Monjane, Executive Director of the Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building Centre (CESC).

  CESC is a non-partisan, non-profit civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2009 with the mission of strengthening the capacity of citizens and communities to participate actively in socio-economic and political development processes, investing in knowledge sharing, learning tools, monitoring and advocacy for public policies that respond to people’s needs.

  What are the current conditions for civil society in Mozambique?

  The legal, political, institutional and practical conditions under which civil society operates in Mozambique have deteriorated over time. Over the past 10 to 15 years, despite having a constitution and laws that safeguard and recognise fundamental universal rights, we have witnessed increasing curtailment of freedoms of expression and information, press freedom and freedoms of assembly and public participation. This curtailment has been practised in violation of both the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique and the global and African human rights instruments Mozambique has signed. Currently, legislation is being proposed to silence dissenting voices and people fighting for better governance of public affairs and the protection of human rights.

  Freedom of the press and expression has been marked by intimidation, kidnappings and disappearances of journalists, illegal detentions and physical violence, including killings perpetrated with impunity, mainly by police officers and other security forces. In 2021 alone, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) recorded 23 cases of violations.

  In addition to these actions, there have been legislative onslaughts to limit press freedoms. In 2018, Decree 40/2018 introduced inexplicably high taxes for the licensing and registration of media companies and the accreditation of national and foreign press correspondents. In 2020 the decree was repealed due to pressure by MISA and the fact that the Constitutional Council declared it unconstitutional. But in December 2021, the government introduced a bill on media and broadcasting that would further restrict the exercise of press freedoms.

  Attempts to deny permission for peaceful protests and control and suppress them have also increased. In 2022, several peaceful protests organised by feminist activists that had been notified to the relevant institutions were interfered with. In many cases activists were rounded up at police stations for no clear reason. People defending human rights have suffered reprisals, ranging from verbal and bodily threats to murder.

  Elections, which have never been free or fair, have been the scene of systematic fraud, with violence committed before, during and after voting, and impunity for the state agents involved in it.

  Spaces for people’s participation, which became popular in the 2000s, have been losing steam in the face of an increasingly closed political regime. People’s participation in state planning has become dependent on the will of the state official who oversees the area and the locality in question. In addition, we are witnessing a rise in controls imposed on CSOs that scrutinise the government in the areas of democracy, governance and human rights and threats they will be ‘blacklisted’.

  Other restrictive measures have included changes introduced in the Criminal Code in 2014, defining defamation of senior state officials as a crime against state security and the approval of the 2022 Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act, which overregulates CSOs.

  Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, yet another proposal that restricts a fundamental right, that of freedom of association, was approved by the Council of Ministers in September 2022 and sent to the Assembly of the Republic, Mozambique’s parliament, for approval in October.

  How will this new law affect CSOs in Mozambique?

  The draft law establishes a legal regime for the creation, organisation and functioning of CSOs and contains several norms that violate freedom of association, despite this right being safeguarded by the constitution and international human rights treaties. It gives the government absolute and discretionary powers to ‘create’, control the functioning of, suspend and extinguish CSOs.

  If the bill is approved, it will legitimise already existing practices restricting civic space, allowing the persecution of dissenting voices and organisations critical of the government, up to banning them from continuing to operate. It will be the death of the civic movement, as only organisations aligned to the ruling party will survive. Party leagues affiliated with opposition political parties and opposition political parties themselves may be at risk of extinction.

  Among other things, if passed, the new law would require that statutory changes that involve changes in objectives, activities or even the name of a CSO be approved by the regulatory body, without imposing any deadline for it to issue a decision. It would impose a single template for the bylaws of all CSOs, including details on authorities, mandates, forms of operation, reporting and members’ rights, easily allowing for the criminalisation of their leaders. It would reverse the burden of proof: CSOs will have to prove they are fulfilling their objectives and functioning properly through an annual report submitted every first quarter, and will risk suspension or termination if they fail to submit two reports. This law is intrusive in an area regulated by private law as established by the constitution and also ignores the variety of associations that exist in Mozambique. In addition, it gives the government the authority to conduct monitoring visits, audit accounts, visit implementation sites, demand periodic reports and request additional documentation whenever it sees fit.

  Under the guise of preventing money laundering and terrorism financing, the draft law treats CSOs as criminals from the get-go. It is also unclear how these excessive controls could actually result in greater success in the fight against terrorism financing.

  Why is the Mozambican government regulating CSOs as part of the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing?

  The argument that this law aims to combat money laundering does not hold up, first of all because another law was passed in July 2022, law 11/2022, which deals specifically with money laundering and terrorism financing. CSOs must comply with it and it contains a specific article dedicated to them.

  Out of the 40 recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for states to adopt in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, only one – recommendation 8 – pertains to CSOs, and focuses on the possible need to adapt the legal framework based on risk assessment, in order to identify the sub-sector at risk, understand possible risks and develop adequate measures for mitigation and supervision based on and proportional to risk.

  Additionally, the FATF has attached an extensive interpretative note to recommendation 8 and has produced a report on best practices, which mentions the need to respect international human rights law, indicates that measures should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities and notes that actions taken against non-profit organisations suspected of engaging in terrorism financing should minimise the negative impact on the innocent and legitimate beneficiaries of their services.

  In October 2022, Mozambique was put on the FATF grey list, but the only action it needed to take in relation to CSOs was to conduct a terrorism financing risk assessment in line with FATF standards and use this as the basis for developing a disclosure plan. These recommendations are also in line with the assessment conducted in 2021 by the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, the FATF’s regional partner organisation for East and Southern Africa. But instead, the Mozambican government has presented parliament with a bill to restrict the work of CSOs. The question then is, what are its real intentions?

  The Mozambican government is not alone in attempting to pass an anti-civic space law. Several African states are using FATF recommendations and international pressure as an excuse to legitimise breaches of international and regional human rights instruments and their constitutions, relying on the indifference and sometimes even the protection of some bodies that should be defending these rights.

  Over the past two decades, in a context of democratic regression and a growing prevalence of authoritarian governments, the African continent has seen many laws and measures passed or proposed that restrict universal rights and civic space. According to Freedom House’s 2022 report, 24 African countries have attempted to pass anti-civil society measures and laws. Twelve have succeeded in passing them, six have failed or given up and six have initiatives pending, including Mozambique.

  How is civil society responding?

  Soon after the surprise approval of the draft NGO law, national, provincial and district CSOs came together in what is now a movement fighting for the right to freedom of association. Aware that this process is not merely technical, but mainly political, we embraced multiple tactics, from lobbying and advocacy with decision makers in government, parliament and national and international human rights institutions to campaigns to deepen people’s understanding of the implications of this law’s approval.

  We also conducted several technical analyses and promoted national and international debates. After many efforts and difficulties, we were able to hold a two-day meeting with relevant parliamentary working committees in November 2022. This resulted in the important decision that there was need for a broad consultation with citizens and social organisations at the national level, as universal and fundamental rights are at stake. Consultations were held in all 10 provinces between 6 and 16 February 2023, organised by the Assembly of the Republic alongside the Movement of CSOs In Defence of the Right and Freedom of Association, and included the participation of over 600 CSOs that were unanimous in rejecting the draft law.

  Despite these important steps, we remain concerned about the link made between the urgency to approve the law and Mozambique’s removal from the FATF grey list. This means that even if it does not correspond to what is required of Mozambique, parliament will approve the law as soon as it resumes work next March. Given the defects of the draft law, we think the time is too short for a proper revision that ensures it doesn’t violate the fundamental and universal right to freedom of association.

  If it is passed, we will push for it to be declared unconstitutional. We also expect more visible action from international and regional bodies, including CSOs. Given the dimension of the problem, in Mozambique as in the continent, and because it falls under their mandates, we expect urgent condemnation from the African Union, through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and from the United Nations, through the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights.

  On behalf of CSOs fighting for human rights and democracy, we hope that the solidarity already shown will continue and that we will join efforts to push back against anti-civic space initiatives such as this.

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  Civic space in Mozambique is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CESC through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CescMoz on Twitter.

• THAILAND: ‘People understood election monitoring was important to ensure checks and balances’

  CIVICUS speaks about the 14 Mayelection in Thailand with Yingcheep Atchanont, executive director ofInternet Law Reform Dialogue (iLaw).

  Founded in 2009, iLaw is a civil society organisation (CSO) that campaigns for democracy, freedom of expression and a fair and accountable justice system in Thailand. Alongside Amnesty International Thailand, in 2020 iLaw developed the websiteMob Data Thailand that compiles protest data and jointly with other groups it exposed the use ofPegasus spyware against prominent leaders of Thailand’s pro-democracy protests.

• UNITED STATES: ‘Every country should do their part to welcome people in need’

  CIVICUS speaks about new US immigration regulations withAaron Nodjomian-Escajeda, policy analyst on asylum and human trafficking at the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI).

  Founded in 1911, USCRI is a non-governmental, not-for-profit international organisation committed to working on behalf of refugees and immigrants and their transition to a dignified life.

  What are Title 8 and Title 42 regulations?

  Title 8 and Title 42 are sections of the US Code that includes all permanent federal laws. Simply put, Title 8 governs immigration law and Title 42 governs public health law.

  Title 42 was never meant to be used as an immigration tool. It was applied in March 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, as a basis to provide public health services across the USA, but it also allowed border officials to rapidly expel asylum seekers and migrants to Mexico or their home countries without due process. As this was considered an ‘expulsion’ rather than a ‘deportation’, those subject to it were not given the right to seek asylum. Furthermore, no records were kept of an expulsion, which provided an incentive for people to attempt to enter the USA, via dangerous land routes, over and over.

  Even though thousands of public health experts denounced the use of Title 42 as ineffective for stopping the spread of COVID-19, the Biden administration increased the use of this authority to turn people away more than 2.3 million times. The Title 42 public health order was finally lifted on 11 May 2023.

  Title 8 contains the current laws and regulations pertaining to immigration and naturalisation, and outlines the processing of non-citizens at the border.

  What is the new so-called ‘asylum ban’, and how is it being applied?

  Now that the use of Title 42 has ended, the processing of migrants and asylum seekers has returned to Title 8 authority. Additionally, a new rule from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice is in effect. This rule, also referred to as an ‘asylum ban’, went into effect right after the Title 42 public health order was lifted, supposedly to address the expected surge in migration and further discourage irregular migration.

  The end of the use of Title 42 to expel migrants and asylum seekers is a good thing, but the new asylum ban is not.

  The asylum ban applies to anyone who presents at a port of entry at the US-Mexico border without a visa or pre-scheduled appointment, who enters without inspection between ports of entry, or who is apprehended in contiguous waters. The rule presumes all of them are ineligible for asylum unless they were granted prior permission to travel to the USA pursuant to a DHS-approved parole process, or were able to make an appointment to present themselves at the border using the smartphone app CBP (Customs and Border Protection) One, or have previously sought asylum and were denied in a country or countries through which they travelled. Unaccompanied children are exempt from this rule.

  The presumption of asylum ineligibility will apply in expedited removal proceedings, as well as to asylum applications affirmatively filed with the Asylum Office or filed in immigration court proceedings as a defence against removal.

  What are the lawful pathways of entry to the USA?

  ‘Lawful pathways’ include entering the USA through regular channels, such as tourist visas, humanitarian parole, or existing family reunification pipelines.

  The Biden administration also points to recently created pathways, including the parole process for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguansand Venezuelans, new family reunification parole processes for Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the opening of regional processing centres in Colombia and Guatemala, expanded access to the CBP One app, and an increase of the number of appointments available at each port of entry for individuals from all countries from 750 to 1,000 daily.

  People who enter the USA via an established pathway will not be subject to the asylum ban.

  What are the reasons migrants and asylum seekers don’t to use lawful pathways of entry?

  This parole framework for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans is only available for those who have a US-based sponsor, unexpired passports and the financial resources to travel to a US port of entry by commercial air travel. Many advocates see this as a type of means test, since many people fleeing harm do not have the luxury of a passport or resources to reach the USA via plane.

  There are additional access and equity issues with the CBP One app. Many migrants do not have smartphones. And even if they have one, they may lack adequate wi-fi or a data plan. Asylum seekers can be exempted from the rule if they prove it was impossible for them to access or use the CBP One app due to a language barrier, illiteracy, significant technical failure or other persistent and serious obstacle. However, in most cases proving a language barrier or illiteracy is not enough, and asylum seekers must show that they have asked someone for assistance to use the app and were still not successful, which puts them at risk of exploitation.

  What are the exceptional circumstances in which unlawful entry isn’t supposed to be penalised, and how is it implemented in practice?

  People can rebut the presumption of asylum ineligibility if they demonstrate that, at the time of entry, they or a member of their family with whom they were traveling faced an acute medical emergency or an extreme and imminent threat to their life or safety, or were a victim of a severe form of trafficking.

  If one family unit member establishes an exception or rebuts the presumption, the presumption will not apply to the entire family unit. All family members, including children, will be interviewed prior to determining whether the presumption of ineligibility applies.

  In theory, people should not be turned back at the border. Even under the asylum ban, people should be able to present themselves at the border without a CBP One appointment or having been denied asylum in their country of origin. However, if they are unable to prove they can overcome the rebuttable presumption, they will only be eligible for the lesser protections of statutory withholding of removal and protection under the regulations implementing US obligations under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In practice, there have been reports that the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance and CBP officials have turned individuals away at the border even when they have cited fear of return.

  Is the new regulation compliant with international standards on refugee protection?

  Advocates believe that the asylum ban violates the principle of non-refoulment, which means that a person should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom, cemented in international standards outlined by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

  The rule is already facing challenges in court. The American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies and the National Immigrant Justice Center have amended their complaint in the East Bay Covenant Sanctuary v. Biden lawsuit to include claims that the rule is unlawful. USCRI, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and many other advocates, has denounced this rule and continues to call on the administration to rescind it immediately. It does nothing to protect the most vulnerable and creates additional inequities in an already difficult system.

  What impact has the regulation change had so far?

  USCRI was at the border the day after Title 42 ended to observe the immediate impact of the change. The administration and many others warned about a ‘surge’ of migrants rushing to border as soon as Title 42 ended. However, this was not the case; the situation at the border remained calm. There were reports that people were trying to enter the USA before the cruel new asylum policy took effect. In fact, border crossings have decreased more than 70 per cent since the implementation of the asylum ban on 11 May. The administration touts this as a result of its ‘comprehensive plan to manage the border’. However, to me, it shows that many people trying to reach safety are not able to access life-saving protection via the asylum system.

  What obstacles does US civil society helping migrants and refugees face?

  The greatest limiting factors are that people seeking asylum in the USA or in removal proceedings do not have access to federal benefits, including housing. Right now, there is a housing crisis and some civil society organisations have limited resources from emergency food and shelter funds, while many volunteers are offering shelter in churches or in their own homes.

  Another major barrier is the difficulty in providing legal counsel to immigrants in asylum hearings in CBP custody. In alignment with the asylum ban, the administration increased the use of expedited asylum screenings and brought back the harmful practice of conducting ‘credible fear interviews’ in CBP facilities. The goal is to conduct these within as little as 24 hours, which does not give people time to prepare their asylum case or access legal help. USCRI led a letter that was signed by over 90 organisations and sent to the administration outlining concerns about this practice. A more recent letter, which USCRI supported, went to the administration outlining how those concerns have in fact materialised. We continue to advocate through letters and engagement sessions. However, the administration has decided to fully embrace enforcement and pushback policies.

  What international support does US civil society working with migrants and refugees need?

  Everyone in this field needs funding, but the USA is one of the most financially able countries in the world, hence support should not come from the international community. The administration should do a better job of funding civil society initiatives and allowing the American people to continue welcoming individuals in need, as they are ready and willing to do so.

  As international factors such as armed conflict and climate disasters continue to push people from their homes, it is important that every country does their part to welcome them. One country cannot do it all but if everyone comes together, we can empower hope. World Refugee Day is a good rallying point for doing so.

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  Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with USCRI through itswebsite orFacebook page and follow@USCRIdc on Twitter.

• USA: ‘We should shift away from overreliance on policing and promote community-based solutions’

  CIVICUS speaks about police violence in the USA with Abdul Nasser Rad, Managing Director of Research and Data at Campaign Zero (CZ).

  Launched in 2015, CZ is an activist-led and research-driven civil society organisation that works to end police violence and promote public safety beyond policing.

  What factors affect the level of police brutality in the USA?

  Police violence remains a threat in some parts of the country, and particularly to some communities. In 2022, US law enforcement officers killed 1,251 people. While this number is the highest to date since our data tracking began in 2013, it’s crucial to note that trends vary across regions. Some cities have witnessed an increase in such incidents, while others have seen improvements.

  Several factors help explain variations in police violence and use of force across the USA. Racial segregation and socio-economic neighbourhood indicators, for instance, have been found to predict police violence, along with individual-level demographic factors such as the race of the officer involved.

  A combination of historical disinvestment and a societal tendency to respond to social issues with enforcement and prison-related measures rather than restorative or human-centred solutions are leading drivers of the disproportionate impact police violence has on communities of colour. A book by Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness, provides a comprehensive analysis of the myth of Black criminality and the use of the carceral state in perpetuating the second-class treatment of Black people in the USA.

  How are you working to end police violence?

  Our approach is to work both on immediate harm reduction and long-term transformational change, aiming to reshape the way society approaches public safety.

  CZ provides robust, accurate and up-to-date data on police violence in the USA, which is critical given the absence of such efforts by the federal government. We develop comprehensive datasets that help identify where harm is being caused and pilot solutions to remove the harm. We prioritise transparency and make all our work public. The campaigns we develop are meant to be accessible so other organisations and activists can take the lead in implementing similar initiatives.

  We align with the transformational change perspective. We recognise that the current system is deeply flawed and requires radical rethinking. At the same time, we see the value in harm reduction as a necessary parallel strategy in the short term.

  Our efforts are concentrated in two main areas. First, we engage in harm reduction initiatives through several campaigns. For example, ‘8 Can't Wait’ focuses on reducing police killings by advocating for the adoption of eight policies that restrict the use of force. Since the launch of the campaign in June 2020, over 340 cities have restricted the use of force and 19 states have changed their policies. Some changes include the banning of chokeholds, implementing a duty to intervene, requiring de-escalation and exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force.

  A campaign aimed at reducing unnecessary police deployment, ‘Cancel ShotSpotter’, achieved the cancellation of contracts or the prevention of the expansion of contracts in several large metropolitan centres. ShotSpotter’s technology often mistakes loud noises for gunshots, leading to more police encounters with civilians, sometimes resulting in fatal outcomes. Another campaign, ‘End All No Knocks’, was launched after the tragic police killing of Breonna Taylor, and seeks the cessation of no-knock warrants. It has resulted in six states restricting their use.

  While running these campaigns, we also actively work towards systemic change, consisting of the dismantling and transformation of the policing system. Beyond harm reduction, our goal is to fundamentally transform public safety strategies. We advocate for a shift away from overreliance on policing and instead promote holistic, community-based solutions that prioritise safety and wellbeing for everyone.

  What challenges have you faced in doing your work?

  A common challenge relates to data inconsistencies, lack of data transparency and ensuring the accuracy of our data platforms and analyses.

  But one of the most severe challenges lies not in the data but in the ways it can promote harm rather than foster more thoughtful approaches. For example, when the crime rate increases, the system responds with enforcement and incarceration rather than human and restorative solutions. It’s devastating to see the same punitive strategies over and over again. Combating fear and punitive social responses deters us from our long-term work of dismantling oppressive systems, creating frustration and a sense of moving backward.

  At its core, the problem is that society doesn’t treat or view every individual as a human being of equal value. If it did, it wouldn’t support punitive responses to people experiencing crises. It can be frustrating to work towards dismantling this system while simultaneously mitigating harm from the same system we’re trying to dismantle.

  We confront challenges and failures daily, often facing more obstacles than successes. This is the nature of social justice and liberation work. So building resilience is critical. It’s vital to maintain faith and keep engaging in restorative practices. The commitment and joy in the work endure as long as hope is kept alive and a vibrant community surrounds you.

  How do you collaborate with other local and international stakeholders?

  Our work is with and for communities most impacted on by the US carceral system. Domestically, we collaborate with any stakeholder willing to advance solutions aligned with our values. Direct engagement with stakeholders of diverse ideologies is necessary for policy change. As noted by the intersectional feminist writer Audre Lorde, it is not our differences that divide us, but our inability to recognise, accept and celebrate those differences.

  We are just beginning to build international relationships. Over the past year, we’ve engaged with the international community through sharing our research and expertise in building robust data systems and contributed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ efforts to develop best practices on fatality counts and in-custody deaths.

  To achieve our mission, we need to keep building trust, and we do this by making our work as transparent, robust and easily accessible as possible. Partnerships will help us secure resources to sustain the work and gather the feedback we need to continuously improve.

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  Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Campaign Zero through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CampaignZero on Twitter.