justice

• MALAWI: ‘The tactics used by the current administration are the same used by its predecessors’

  CIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Malawi with Michael Kaiyatsa, Executive Director of the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR).

  CHRR is civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at supporting and promoting democracy and human rights in Malawi. Its mission is to contribute towards the protection, promotion and consolidation of good governance by empowering rural and urban communities to exercise their rights. Founded in 1995 by former student exiles who returned home to the promise of a new democracy, it operates through two core programmes: Community Mobilisation and Empowerment and Human Rights Monitoring and Training.

  How has the situation in Malawi evolved since the 2020 elections?

  Malawi held a presidential election in June 2020 because the 2019 election was annulled on the basis that there were massive irregularities and the court ordered a rerun. The 2020 election was won by the opposition candidate, Lazarus Chakwera.

  During the campaign, Chakwera said that if elected, he would address some key issues, including corruption in the public sector. It was the perception of public opinion that corruption was on the rise and the previous administration had not done much to tackle the problem. Chakwera promised to introduce reforms to seal all loopholes allowing for corruption and to improve the judicial system so corruption cases would not be ignored.

  However, once in power it didn’t look like these changes were effectively being implemented. As usual, the first year people gave the new administration some time. The president kept on making the same promises but made very little actual progress. 

  The second year continued in the same way and Malawians started to lose patience. People started to take their discontent out to the streets. The economic situation in Malawi also kept getting worse, with costs of living skyrocketing every day and a rise in unemployment. People looked back at campaign promises and compared them to their reality, and frustration arose.

  I wouldn’t say all campaign commitments were just empty promises and lies, because there were issues the government attempted to address, but progress has been slow. For instance, they promised to increase funding for the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) and ensure its independence. Funding for the ACB increased significantly, and a new law was eventually passed to amend the Corrupt Practices Act, removing the requirement of the ACB director to seek consent to prosecute corruption cases. They promised to set up special courts to prosecute corruption cases, and finally submitted a bill to amend the Court’s Act and make a provision for special courts.

  But they also promised to work to recover stolen assets and are moving at an extremely slow pace in this regard. And they also said they would create a million jobs for young people, which has never happened.

  What’s behind recent protests against the judiciary?

  Last year we started seeing lots of protests against corruption and impunity. There have been numerous cases involving government officials – including from the current administration – that have not been prosecuted. Investigations take years, and those involving senior government officials take the longest and rarely end in conviction. Recent ACB reports show that only 30 per cent of such cases have been concluded, and most of these date back to 2015.

  In sum, the wheels of justice are barely moving, and people have concluded that the government is pursuing selective justice. In a recent case, for instance, an 18-year-old man arrested for cannabis possession was prosecuted and given a sentence of eight years in prison, while people accused of serious crimes involving corruption are given three and four-year sentences, if anything at all. Ironically, before this case, a powerful business leader was accused of the same crime, marijuana possession, and was just asked to pay a fine. Such arbitrariness is pushing people to the streets.

  While selective justice is nothing new, this time around people want to hold the government accountable for the promises made on the campaign trail. As a result, pressure is also coming from the opposition to hold the government to account. When the current ruling party was in the opposition, they were the ones raising these issues. Now people are realising it is not any different from its predecessors.

  How have the authorities responded to the protests?

  The government has often tried to stop protests with the use of excessive force. Just recently, over 80 activists were detained and arrested. They were charged with holding an illegal assembly, although the constitution guarantees the freedom of assembly. Hours before these demonstrations started, some Malawians claiming to be from the business community requested the court issue an injunction to stop them. The injunction was granted late in the afternoon, so people gathered the next morning without knowing about it, and the police came in and started firing teargas, beating up people and arresting everyone they could.

  The tactics used by the current administration are the same ones used by its predecessors. The habit of getting last-minute injunctions isn’t new at all: this is what happened in July 2011, when the government got a last-minute injunction, people assembled without any knowledge of it and over 20 were killed by the police in the ensuing repression.

  What shocks me the most is the court’s interpretation of the meaning of the right to the freedom of assembly. The Police Act is very clear about what needs to be done if people stage a protest. It all starts with a notification to the authorities, but this is usually interpreted as people needing to obtain permission from the police, which is against what the law actually says.

  In the recent protest against the judiciary, we were told the demonstration would not proceed until the organisers provided a list with the protesters’ names, to be held liable if the demonstration resulted in damage to property. This is strange, as you cannot be sure who is going to attend a protest and how they will conduct themselves. It is not just the police but also the courts that are now asking for a registry of attendees, something that cannot be found anywhere in the law.

  How could the international community support Malawian civil society?

  Over the past two or three years, new civil society groups have emerged to defend human rights and economic justice, and are mobilising mostly through social media platforms and community radio, particularly in rural areas, issuing statements and calling people to the streets.

  Malawian civil society needs international protection. We need to be able to express ourselves and feel safe while doing it, so we need our international partners to send a message to the president, reminding him of his commitments and his obligations under the constitution. 

  We continue to experience the same challenges as in the past, despite the administration being a beneficiary of civil society mobilisation. In 2019 and 2020, when organisations like ours were protesting against electoral irregularities, the current authorities were by our side and supported our protest for democracy. But they are now doing exactly what they criticised when they were in the opposition, including by passing laws that restrict civil society, such as the recent NGO Amendment Act.

  Civil society also needs resources, including for legal representation. There are currently over 80 civil society activists under arrest, most of whom don’t have legal representation. As a result, they remain in custody awaiting trial. There’s no fair access to justice and they could be held indefinitely.

  Civic space in Malawi is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CHRRMalawi on Twitter.

• SÉNÉGAL : « La situation devient plus tendue au fur et mesure qu’on s’approche des élections de 2024 »

  CIVICUS échange sur la dégradation de l’espace civique à l’approche des élections sénégalaises de l'année prochaine avec Sadikh Niass, Secrétaire Général de laRencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme(RADDHO), etIba Sarr, Directeur des Programmes de la RADDHO.

  La RADDHO est une organisation de la société civile (OSC) nationale basée à Dakar, Sénégal. Elle travaille pour la protection et la promotion des droits humains au niveau national, régional et international par le biais de la recherche, de l’analyse et du plaidoyer afin de fournir des alertes d’urgence et de prévenir les conflits.

  Quelles sont les conditions pour la société civile au Sénégal ?

  La société civile sénégalaise reste très active mais est confrontée à plusieurs difficultés liées à la restriction de l’espace civique. Elle subit beaucoup d’attaques verbales de la part de certaines lobbies proches du pouvoir qui les considèrent comme des opposants ou faisant la promotion de « contre valeurs » comme l’homosexualité. Elle est aussi confrontée aux restrictions de libertés de manifestations. La société civile travaille dans des conditions difficiles avec peu de moyens financiers et matériels. En effet les organisations de défense des droits humains ne reçoivent aucun soutien financier de l’Etat.

  La situation devient plus tendue au fur et mesure qu’on s’approche des élections de février 2024. Depuis mars 2021, l’opposition la plus radicale et le gouvernement ont tous opté pour la confrontation. Le gouvernement tente d’affaiblir l’opposition en la réduisant au minimum. Il s’attaque particulièrement à l’opposition la plus dynamique, la coalition Yewi Askan Wi (« Libérer le peuple »), dont le principal leader, Ousmane Sonko, est aujourd’hui en détention.

  Toutes les manifestations de l’opposition sont systématiquement interdites. Les manifestations spontanées sont violemment réprimées et se soldent par des arrestations. Le judiciaire est instrumentalisé pour empêcher la candidature du principal opposant au régime, Sonko, et les principaux dirigeants de son parti sont arrêtés.

  Nous avons également assisté ces dernières années à une recrudescence des menaces verbales, physiques et judiciaires envers les journalistes, ce qui constitue un vrai recul du droit à l’information.

  Quels seront les enjeux de l’élection présidentielle de 2024 ?

  Avec la découverte du pétrole et du gaz, le Sénégal devient une destination attrayante pour les investisseurs. La gestion transparente de ces ressources reste un défi dans un contexte marqué par la recrudescence des actes terroristes. Les populations confrontées à la pauvreté voient en cette découverte un moyen d’améliorer leur niveau de vie. Avec la percée de l’opposition lors des élections locales et législatives de 2022 on sent que l’électorat exprime de plus en plus fortement son désir de transparence, de justice et d’amélioration des conditions socio-économiques.

  Le 3 juillet 2023 le président sortant a déclaré qu’il ne participera pas aux prochaines élections. Cette déclaration pourrait constituer une lueur d’espoir d’une élection libre et transparente. Mais le fait que l’État soit tenté d’empêcher certains ténors de l’opposition d’y prendre part constitue un grand risque de voir le pays sombrer dans des turbulences.

  La société civile reste alerte et veille à ce que l’élection de 2024 soit une élection inclusive, libre et transparente. A cet effet elle a beaucoup multiplié des actions en faveur du dialogue entre les acteurs politiques. Également les OSC s’activent à travers plusieurs plateformes pour accompagner les autorités dans l’organisation des élections apaisées par la supervision du processus avant, pendant et après le scrutin.

  Qu’est-ce qui a déclenché les récentes manifestations ? Quelles sont les revendications des manifestants et comment le gouvernement a-t-il réagi ?

  Les récentes manifestations ont été déclenchées par la condamnation de Sonko à deux ans de prison le 1er juin 2023. Ce jour-là, un tribunal s’est prononcé sur l’affaire dite « Sweet Beauty », dans laquelle une jeune femme employée dans un salon de massage accusait Sonko de l’avoir violée et d’avoir proféré des menaces de mort à son encontre. Sonko a été acquitté des menaces de mort, mais les accusations de viol ont été requalifiées en accusations de « corruption de la jeunesse ».

  Est venu se greffer à cette condamnation l’arrestation de Sonko le 31 juillet 2023 et la dissolution de son parti politique, le PASTEF (Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité).

  Les manifestations sont animées par le sentiment que leur leader fait l’objet de persécutions et que les affaires pour lesquelles il a été condamné ne servent qu’à l’empêcher de participer aux prochaines élections. La principale revendication des manifestant est la libération de leur leader et des personnes illégalement détenus.

  Face aux manifestations le gouvernement a opté pour la répression. En effet les autorités considèrent qu’elles font face à des actes de défiance de l’Etat et ont appelé les forces de sécurité à faire usage de la force.

  La répression s’est soldée par la mort de plus de 30 personnes et de plus 600 blessés depuis mars 2021, quand les premières repressions ont commencé. En plus de ces pertes en vies humaines et de blessés on dénombre aujourd’hui plus de 700 personnes arrêtées et croupissent dans les prisons du Sénégal. Nous avons aussi noté l’arrestation de journalistes mais aussi de coupure de signal de chaines de télévisions et de restriction de certaines d’internet.

  Comment la société civile sénégalaise, y compris la RADDHO, travaille-t-elle à la défense des droits humains ?

  La RADDHO travaille au niveau national en aidant les victimes de violations de droits humains, et mène des activités de sensibilisation, d’éducation aux droits humains et de renforcement de capacités.

  La RADDHO collabore avec les mécanismes régionaux et internationaux, notamment la Commission africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, le Comité Africain des Experts sur les Droits et le Bien-être de l’Enfant, la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples et le Conseil des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies. A cet effet elle mène plusieurs activités de vulgarisations des Instruments juridiques de protection et de promotion des droits humains. En tant que membre observateur de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, elle participe régulièrement aux forums de la société civile lors des sessions de celle-ci. Également la RADDHO coordonne la coalition des OSC pour le suivi et la mise en œuvre des recommandations de l’Examen Périodique Universel des Nations unies pour le Sénégal.

  Quel soutien international la société civile sénégalaise reçoit-elle et de quel soutien supplémentaire aurait-elle besoin ?

  Dans le cadre de leurs missions, les OSC sénégalaise reçoivent des appuis de la part d’institutions internationales telles que l’Union Européenne, les agences de coopération bilatérale des États-Unis et de la Suède, USAID et SIDA, et des organisations et fondations tels qu’Oxfam NOVIB des Pays Bays, le NED des États-Unis, la NID de l’Inde et la Fondation Ford, entre autres. Cependant, du fait que le Sénégal a longtemps été considéré comme un pays stable, l’appui reste insuffisant.

  Compte tenu des restrictions de l’espace civique constatées depuis quelques années et de la crise politique, la société civile a besoin d’être soutenue pour mieux assister les victimes de violations de droits humains, pour contribuer à l’avènement d’une véritable culture des droits humains, et pour travailler à l’élargissement de l’espace civique et le renforcement de l’Etat de droit, de la démocratie et de la bonne gouvernance.

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  L’espace civique au Sénégal est classé « entravé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contactez la RADDHOsur sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@Raddho_Africa sur Twitter.

• SENEGAL: ‘The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the 2024 elections’

  CIVICUS speaks about the deterioration of civic space in the run-up to next year’s elections in Senegal with Sadikh Niass, Secretary General of the African Meeting for the Defence of Human Rights (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme,RADDHO), andIba Sarr, Director of Programmes at RADDHO.

  RADDHO is a national civil society organisation (CSO) based in Dakar, Senegal. It works for the protection and promotion of human rights at the national, regional and international levels through research, analysis and advocacy aimed at providing early warning and preventing conflict.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Senegal?

  Senegalese civil society remains very active but faces a number of difficulties linked to the restriction of civic space. It is subjected to many verbal attacks by lobbies close to the government, which consider them to be opponents or promoters of ‘counter-values’ such as homosexuality. It is also confronted with restrictions on freedom of assembly. Civil society works in difficult conditions with few financial and material resources. Human rights organisations receive no financial support from the state.

  The situation is becoming more tense as we approach the February 2024 elections. Since March 2021, the most radical opposition and the government have opted for confrontation. The government is trying to weaken the opposition by reducing it to a minimum. It is particularly targeting the most dynamic opposition group, the Yewi Askan Wi (‘Liberate the People’) coalition, whose main leader, Ousmane Sonko, is currently in detention.

  All opposition demonstrations are systematically banned. Spontaneous demonstrations are violently repressed and result in arrests. The judiciary was instrumentalised to prevent the candidacy of the main opponent to the regime, Sonko, and the main leaders of his party have been arrested.

  In recent years, we have also seen an upsurge in verbal, physical and legal threats against journalists, which is a real setback for the right to freedom of information.

  What will be at stake in the 2024 presidential election?

  With the discovery of oil and gas, Senegal is becoming an attractive destination for investors. Transparent management of these resources remains a challenge in a context marked by an upsurge in terrorist acts. Poverty-stricken populations see this discovery as a means of improving their standard of living. With the breakthrough of the opposition in the 2022 local and legislative elections, we sense that the electorate is increasingly expressing its desire for transparency, justice and improved socio-economic conditions.

  On 3 July 2023, the incumbent president declared that he would not compete in the next elections. This declaration could offer a glimmer of hope for a free and transparent election. But the fact that the state is being tempted to prevent leading opposition figures from running poses a major risk of the country descending into turbulence.

  Civil society remains alert and is working to ensure that the 2024 elections are inclusive, free and transparent. To this end, it has stepped up its efforts to promote dialogue among political players. CSOs are also working through several platforms to support the authorities in organising peaceful elections by monitoring the process before, during and after the poll.

  What triggered the recent demonstrations? What are the protesters’ demands and how has the government responded?

  The recent protests were triggered by Sonko’s sentencing to two years in prison on 1 June 2023. On that day, a court ruled on the so-called ‘Sweet Beauty’ case, in which a young woman working in a massage parlour accused Sonko of raping her and making death threats against her. Sonko was acquitted of the death threats, but the rape charges were reclassified as ‘corruption of youth’.

  This conviction was compounded by Sonko’s arrest on 31 July 2023 and the dissolution of his political party, PASTEF – short for ‘Senegalese African patriots for work, ethics and fraternity’ in French.

  Protesters are driven by the feeling that their leader is being persecuted and that the cases for which he has been convicted only serve to prevent him taking part in the forthcoming elections. Their main demand is the release of their leader and those illegally detained.

  Faced with these demonstrations, the government has opted for repression. The authorities consider that they are facing acts of defiance towards the state and have called on the security forces to use force.

  Repression has resulted in the deaths of more than 30 people and more than 600 injured since March 2021, when the repression first began. In addition to the loss of life and injuries, more than 700 people have been arrested and are languishing in Senegal’s prisons. We have also noted the arrest of journalists, as well as the interruption of television signals and the restriction of some internet services.

  How is Senegalese civil society, including RADDHO, working to defend human rights?

  RADDHO works at the national level to help victims of human rights violations and carries out awareness-raising, human rights education and capacity-building activities.

  RADDHO collaborates with regional and international mechanisms, notably the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council. To this end, we carry out a number of activities to raise awareness of legal instruments for the protection and promotion of human rights. As an observer member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, we regularly participate in civil society forums during the Commission’s sessions. RADDHO also coordinates the CSO coalition for the follow-up and implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review for Senegal.

  What international support is Senegalese civil society receiving and what additional support would it need?

  To fulfil their missions, Senegalese CSOs receive support from international institutions such as the European Union, the bilateral cooperation agencies of the USA and Sweden, USAID and SIDA, and organisations and foundations such as Oxfam NOVIB in the Netherlands, NED in the United States, NID in India and the Ford Foundation, among others. However, because Senegal has long been considered a stable country, support remains insufficient.

  Given the growing restrictions on civic space of recent years and the political crisis, civil society needs support to better assist victims of human rights violations, to contribute to the emergence of a genuine human rights culture and to work towards widening civic space and strengthening the rule of law, democracy and good governance.

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  Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with RADDHOthrough itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Raddho_Africa on Twitter.

• Stop the war: Act for justice, climate & peace

  By Lysa John, Secretary-General of CIVICUS & Oli Henman, Global Coordinator for Action 4 Sustainable Development

   Russia’s war in Ukraine has left many communities facing catastrophe. In a world already wracked by multiple crises such as searing inequality and escalating climate change, this conflict is tearing through communities.

  Millions of people are directly affected. They face fragile circumstances, with immeasurable sadness caused by the death of loved ones, loss of livelihoods, displacement, destruction of homes, interruption of education, and more.

  The conflict has also placed huge new burdens on the multilateral system, putting a further break on progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals that has already been set back by the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

  Read on Indian Nation

• THE GAMBIA: ‘Civil society works to ensure Jammeh and other perpetrators of human rights violations face justice’

  CIVICUS speaks about the prospects of The Gambia’s former dictator Yahya Jammeh being put on trial with Adama Jallow, National Coordinator of the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations (Victim’s Center).

  Founded in 2017, the Victims Center is a civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks justice and reparations for victims of human rights violations under the dictatorship. It has successfully pressured the government to recognise the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC).

  What are the main conclusions of the TRRC report?

  After consulting with victims of Yahya Jammeh’s inhumane treatment, the TRRC’s report concluded that Jammeh should be brought to justice and victims must receive help and support to recover from the atrocious experience they endured under the former dictator’s rule. The government has released a white paper in which it accepts the recommendations made by the TRRC. We believe this is huge, considering the amount of work civil society put into advocating for the establishment of the TRRC.

  The TRRC report is a sort of roadmap we can use so that justice can be served in The Gambia. Out of the 265 recommendations made by the TRRC, the government rejected only two, while marking the rest for implementation. Many atrocities were committed under Jammeh’s dictatorship and were highlighted by both perpetrators and victims before the TRRC. These include sexual and gender-based violence, torture, enforced disappearances and killings, arbitrary detention and crimes in which the victims were accused of witchcraft.

  The TRRC’s report states that The Gambia’s society and government institutions have a responsibility to prevent the reoccurrence of the crimes it documented. Its recommendations focus basically on the well-being of victims, who are expected to receive individual and collective reparations, and the prosecution of perpetrators. 

  We initially did not think the government would agree to implementing the TRRC’s recommendations. It came as a shock to us when the government agreed to it, because it is a new experience for civil society to be seen and heard by the government. It is a positive indication that our government is prepared to work together with us. The fact that only two of the recommendations were rejected surpassed our expectations. Now we will focus on pushing the government to implement the recommendations.

  What does the Victims Center do?

  The Victim’s Center was established in 2017, right after the regime change. Under Jammeh’s rule citizens lived in an oppressive state that restricted their rights and freedoms, and there was no freedom of association, assembly and expression. Many human rights violations and abuses occurred, including killings, torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, sexual violence and the indiscriminate and illegal use of force. Many civil society activists and organisations were arrested because of the work they did – basically for speaking up against the regime and pushing for democracy.

  When Jammeh was overthrown, and we got a new government, civil society and victims felt the need to seek justice and hold Jammeh accountable for the atrocities committed under his rule. We formed the Victims Center to offer a platform for victims to express their issues, seek support and assistance and advocate towards the government.

  Part of our mission is to advocate for the TRRC report. We have been fortunate enough to receive international support. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch have released letters in solidarity with the victims and to demand the government responds to our advocacy asks. We have also worked closely with other CSOs and victim-led organisations to ensure that the government takes its duty seriously, recognises victims and provides reparations. We want to make sure the government provides reparations to all victims, without discriminating against anyone.

  We have also seen a need to go out and sensitise people on transitional justice processes, victims’ rights and the cases submitted to the TRRC. The Victim’s Center has always been at the forefront of advocating and engaging with the Ministry of Justice and mobilising media to ensure victims are getting the help they need. Despite the challenges we have faced, such as intimidation and lack of capacity, we remain committed to helping victims get justice.

  How has civil society advocated for prosecution?

  The Gambia’s civil society has been very active throughout the process. We understood the importance of engaging with the government because it will play a key role in ensuring that justice is served. We had meetings with the Ministry of Justice staff to find out how they intend to support victims.

  We have also disseminated press releases demanding that justice take place at the societal level. We think it is important to inform victims, their families and society at large about the contents of the TRRC report and how The Gambia’s society will benefit from it, so we have held conferences. We have also formed partnerships with other local and international CSOs to reach a wider audience and to put additional pressure on our government.

  We know that our laws present obstacles. We were supposed to have a new constitution to replace the 1997 one, but the new text was rejected by the National Assembly. The legislation presently in place does not consider enforced disappearance or torture as crimes, which is something civil society advocates for. We now hope the National Assembly can adjust the old constitution to ensure the possibility of litigation in such cases. In the meantime, the Ministry of Justice has promised to form a body to handle cases involving crimes that are not codified in our legislation.

  In essence, civil society has engaged extensively to ensure that Jammeh and other perpetrators face justice.

  Do you foresee any challenges in the implementation of the report’s recommendations?

  We foresee several challenges, one of them being the Ministry of Justice’s lack of capacity to handle cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance and torture. We need experts to oversee these cases so that everyone who is prosecuted is brought to justice.

  Another challenge lies with our constitution, as neither the old nor the current draft recognises enforced disappearance and torture. These are some of the human rights violations victims experienced and we need them to be recognised so that victims can receive help and perpetrators can be tried.

  We are also concerned about whether Jammeh can be brought to trial outside The Gambia, given that he is not currently residing in the country. We are trying our best to see how we can work with other organisations to address this issue.

  But all these challenges have not discouraged us. We continue advocating with partners to ensure the TRRC’s recommendations are implemented. We are also putting pressure on the Ministry of Justice to come up with a realistic timeframe that will convince us that the government is really committed to implementing the recommendations. We encourage the government to work closely with CSOs and victim-led organisations to ensure they implement the white paper with an inclusive approach.

  What kind of support does civil society in The Gambia need from the international community?

  Local CSOs and victim-led organisations need funding to continue their advocacy work, build capacity and support victims. International CSOs should partner with us and advise us on a way forward in terms of what types of cases could be brought, and how they can be brought if the constitution is not changed or amended. We also need them to use their resources to put pressure on the Gambian government to make sure justice prevails.

  Civic space in The Gambia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations through itsFacebook, and follow@gambia_vc on Twitter. 

• The UN-Philippines Programme on human rights falls short of addressing systematic violations & ensuring accountability

  Statement at the 49th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

  Item10: General debate on technical assistance and capacity-building - General Debate

  Delivered by Ahmed Adam, On behalf of Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) and CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation

• UN member states must show their commitment to justice and accountability for the people of Myanmar

  Statement at the 54th Session of the UN Human Rights Council 

  Interactive Dialogue on the report of Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar

  Delivered by May Thiri Khin, Burma Human Rights Network

  We thank the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) for their recent report. The creation of the IIMM has been an important step by this Council to strengthen its efforts for justice and accountability.  

  The Burma Human Rights Network is a civil society organisation working to document crimes against Muslim minorities and others in Myanmar while CIVICUS has been tracking attacks on civic space including the torture, sexual violence and killings of political and human rights activists in detention, as also documented by the IIMM. 

  We welcome the engagement of the IIMM with civil society and survivors. We recommend the IIMM ensure more regular and transparent communication and coordination with affected communities and civil society in Myanmar and Bangladesh through more dedicated IIMM outreach focal points who can speak Burmese and other ethnic languages. We also request the IIMM to translate its updates into more ethnic languages.

  We encourage the IIMM to continue to investigate crimes against Muslim and other ethnic minorities throughout the country. We also urge the IIMM to better support Myanmar human rights organisations on investigative standards, tools, and techniques. Such trainings will allow them to better support the mechanism’s mandate by submitting evidence collected according to best practices and international standards.  

  We encourage all UN member states to show theircommitment to justice and accountability for the people of Myanmar byincreasing their support to civil society groupsandactivists documenting serious crimes,continuing to fund the IIMM and to support ongoing international justice mechanisms.

  We thank you.

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  Civic space in Myanmar is rated as Closed by the CIVICUS Monitor

• VENEZUELA: ‘The government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment to try to hold on to power’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mariano de Alba, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group, about the recent referendum called by the Venezuelan government on the status of the Essequibo territory, disputed with neighbouring Guyana, and its possible implications for democracy in Venezuela and peace in the region.

  The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that works to prevent wars and design policies to build a more peaceful world.

   

  Why did the Venezuelan government decide to submit the Essequibo issue to a referendum?

  The announcement of the referendum came first as a reaction by the Venezuelan government to the recent oil bidding rounds conducted by Guyana in maritime areas that Venezuela considers as pending delimitation. As the referendum was being organised, it became clear that the Venezuelan government was attaching additional value to it as a tool to test its capacity for electoral mobilisation a few months in advance of the presidential election due to take place later this year.

  In addition, by placing the dispute with Guyana on the public agenda, the Venezuelan government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment in the Venezuelan population, and most particularly among the armed forces, a key group in its strategy to retain power.

  What’s the legal value of the referendum?

  According to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela’s highest judicial body, consultative referendums, a mechanism established in the Venezuelan constitution, are not binding. This view was publicly ratified by the chief lawyer who was appointed by the government to prepare the referendum questions.

  But for political reasons, since before the referendum and particularly in view of its results, the government has insisted that it does have a binding character in order to justify a series of actions it has announced in relation to the territory in dispute. These, however, have been no more than symbolic announcements, since Venezuelan armed forces have not effectively entered the disputed territory, which has been under Guyanese administration for many, many years.

  How did the opposition react to the referendum, and how will this impact on the 2024 elections?

  There were differences among various opposition groups on how to position themselves in relation to the referendum. First of all, it should be noted that on 17 October, when the government and the opposition met in Barbados to sign an agreement on the conditions to hold elections, they also signed another agreement in which they committed themselves to ‘ratify the historical rights’ of Venezuela and to ‘uphold the full validity of the 1966 Geneva Agreement’, the treaty that reignited the dispute, in which Guyana, Venezuela and the UK agreed to seek a solution to the conflict. As a result, at least part of the opposition leadership found it difficult to oppose the referendum.

  However, María Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, elected as a unity candidate in primaries held in late October 2023, did criticise the referendum, arguing that ‘sovereignty must be exercised, submitted to consultation’. The most important difference within the opposition is that some opposition leaders believe that one should participate in all electoral processes, regardless of the conditions, while others do not. Some voted in the referendum, while others didn’t.

  Ahead of the presidential elections, a key element of the government’s strategy is to foster division among the opposition, so that one part ends up calling for non-participation due to lack of sufficient guarantees and another part decides to participate. In the face of a divided opposition the government has a real chance of winning the election, since under the current electoral system whoever gets the most votes, even if short of 50 per cent, is elected. The election will take place in an authoritarian context in which the conditions for the competition will be poor and there is a high risk of government repression.

  What has been Guyana’s reaction?

  Guyana is focused on seeking a favourable decision at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where in 2018 it filed a lawsuit seeking ratification of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award that gave it the territory it now controls and administers, and which Venezuela ignores, arguing that the award was the product of procedural fraud.

  However, recent tensions complicate the picture for Guyana. First, because, at least on paper, the Venezuelan armed forces have substantially superior capabilities compared to Guyana’s. Hence Guyana’s intention to seek to strengthen its military alliances and obtain guarantees from allied states. Second, the uncertainty resulting from these tensions could affect the remarkable recent economic growth of Guyana, a country with a small population but high income due to the recent discovery and exploitation of oil resources. Already in mid-December 2023, London’s Lloyd’s insurance market rated the Guyanese exclusive economic zone as risky, which could increase the cost of shipping oil from there.

  What are the risks of an escalation into armed conflict?

  The referendum has substantially increased tensions between Guyana and Venezuela. Guyana saw the referendum and the subsequent actions of the Venezuelan government as a threat. But Guyana has also taken advantage of the tensions to try to strengthen its diplomatic and military alliances with states such as the UK and the USA.

  In the short to medium term, the risk of these tensions escalating into armed conflict is low, partly because the international reaction would be so critical of it. Moreover, while the Venezuelan government has announced and gone through with actions such as appointing an authority for the territory in dispute, it has been careful to ensure that the implementation of these actions has remained on Venezuelan territory for the time being.

  But escalation is not out of the question. Tension could lead to a limited confrontation, following which it could become difficult for one or both of the countries to de-escalate.

  From the Venezuelan perspective, escalation is a risky gamble because it could generate greater discontent among the Venezuelan armed forces, which would have to risk their lives, particularly if Guyana receives the support of a key ally such as the USA. Moreover, the Venezuelan government is striving to reintegrate itself into the international community, and initiating a conflict with Guyana would derail those efforts.

  On the Guyanese side, it is uncertain whether military support would actually come in the event of a substantial military conflict. Such a conflict could also make it very risky for some companies operating in Guyana to continue doing business there. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, barring any surprises, attempts to keep tensions on the public agenda will predominate, but without resulting in any real escalation.

  At the end of the day, both countries, as the neighbours they are, will be obliged to try to negotiate. Even if Guyana obtains a favourable ICJ decision, that will hardly be the end of it, as without Venezuela’s cooperation it will be very difficult to enforce the judgment. Moreover, the maritime area will still be pending delimitation, so sooner or later negotiations will have to take place in any case.

  What is the status of diplomatic negotiations?

  Serious diplomatic efforts have been undertaken by various countries to try to convince both governments of the importance of lowering tensions and avoiding armed conflict. These efforts resulted in an agreement signed in St Vincent and the Grenadines on 14 December. There, it was agreed to de-escalate tensions and hold a new meeting in Brazil before the end of March.

  However, distrust between the two governments remains deep. The visit of a British warship to Guyana in late December, which Venezuela interpreted as a threat to which it responded by conducting military exercises on its territory, did not help a bit.

  The outlook is complicated by the fact that both governments believe they can make political gains out of these tensions, Venezuela for predominantly domestic political reasons, and Guyana first and foremost to strengthen its military alliances, and secondarily because, if it manages the situation well, the ruling party’s prospects could improve ahead of elections in 2025.

  Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue because in the face of the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, the idea prevails that there is no international space for another armed conflict, and even less so in Latin America and the Caribbean, which for so many years has been a zone of peace, at least as far as inter-state conflicts are concerned.

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  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the International Crisis Group through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram accounts, and follow@CrisisGroup and@marianodealba on Twitter.

• VENEZUELA: ‘With the new NGO law, the government aims to take control of the entire associational fabric’

  CIVICUS speaks with Rigoberto Lobo Puentes, founder of Promotion, Education and Defence of Human Rights (Promoción, Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM), about Venezuela’s NGO bill which, if passed, will further hinder civil society’s work.

  PROMEDEHUM brings together people whose common goal is education about and the promotion and defence of human rights.

  How has civic space in Venezuela changed recently?

  Civic space has experienced tensions for more than a decade. In 2010 the government implemented the Law of National Sovereignty and Self-Determination to restrict access to funding by human rights organisations, citing alleged external threats against the Venezuelan government. This law was only the first step. Starting in 2016, when the ruling party lost control of the National Assembly, the government began to issue emergency decrees granting powers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to audit any agreement signed with international bodies by organisations or individuals to implement projects in Venezuela. This was part of a strategy to suffocate human rights organisations financially until they were forced to shut down.

  In 2020 the government body that regulates the banking system ordered banks to monitor the financial operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), supposedly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Following criticism from international human rights protection bodies, in 2021 the provisions of the National Office against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in relation to CSOs were slightly amended. However, they continue to violate international human rights standards. Among other things, they provided for the creation of a new body in charge of authorising the registration and operation of CSOs and obliged CSOs to provide sensitive information.

  This attack caused fissures in civil society, as many thought that since the focus was on human rights organisations, other CSOs, including humanitarian organisations, were out of harm’s way, even if they also in one way or another defended human rights. Many CSOs said they had no problem with the obligation to register. The situation was very confusing. It was never clear where the registry was or would be, and in each city, organisations were given different information.

  In 2021, the ruling party-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved a national legislative plan that included a Law on International Cooperation, which also established a mandatory registry for CSOs. The aim again was to limit access to funding for CSOs.

  In 2022, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force refuted the idea that all these regulations were needed. Its assessment of Venezuela concluded that there was no evidence the proposed or implemented CSO registries could prevent potential abuses linked to terrorism financing.

  Finally, in January 2024 the National Assembly approved in first reading of the draft Law on Control, Regularisation, Operations and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations, better known as the NGO law. If passed, this law will allow the government to further restrict the functioning of civil society, as it broadly prohibits ‘political activities’ without clearly defining what this refers to, and could result in the imposition of sanctions or the closure of CSOs deemed to be engaging in ‘political activities’. In the session where the bill was approved, more than 60 CSOs were singled out as enemies and traitors to the homeland.

  The continued threats to and vilification and persecution of CSOs and human rights defenders, and restrictions and attacks on media and journalists, raids on offices and jailing of humanitarian workers, have created a climate of great fear. Many CSOs have lost members, some have closed, and many human rights defenders have migrated for various reasons, including because they have been persecuted or fear persecution in the near future. Some organisations, including media outlets, have adopted self-censorship or changed the nature of their activities to prevent reprisals.

  What impacts would the NGO law have in this context?

  The NGO law seeks to limit citizen participation and human rights advocacy. It would turn the freedom of association into a matter of public order, exposing organisations to surveillance and police control. Organisations that fail to register or disclose their sources of funding could face fines, deregistration and criminal prosecution. They could be criminalised under charges of terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.

  Although the draft law may appear to target only human rights organisations, its impacts will be much broader, as it aims to take control of the entire associational fabric. All organisational forms, including political parties and education and academic organisations, are potential targets. Victims of human rights violations could lose all legal support. People affected by Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency could lose access to civil society humanitarian programmes, which could be replaced by government programmes with restrictive access conditions.

  In short, the government seeks a tailor-made civil society. It has an interest in the continuity of humanitarian organisations, as they relieve it of a burden and help it maintain an image of openness with the international community. But it wants humanitarian organisations to play a purely welfare role, with no connection to human rights, and to refrain from publishing any information that might project a negative image of Venezuela.

  The government has already made progress in this area. To some extent it already controls the activities of humanitarian organisations and obtains constant information on their activities throughout Venezuela.

  Why has the NGO law been revived after it was put on hold last year?

  The government has moved forward with this law as prospects increase of an election in the near future. The law can be used not just against human rights CSOs. It can be used against any organisational form that is considered a space for critical thought or dissent. This particularly applies to CSOs working on civil and political rights issues, demanding electoral transparency, monitoring campaigns and observing elections.

  From the government’s perspective, civil society jeopardises its prospects of staying in power. Under fair electoral conditions, civil society’s monitoring, documentation and denunciation of human rights violations perpetrated by an already unpopular government could harm its electoral standing. For years the government has sought to subdue, suffocate or nullify CSOs, and this will intensify as it faces the need to ensure its continuity in power.

  The NGO law had been suspended but not forgotten. The government simply waited for the right time to resume its attacks. Recently, there have been accusations against and arrests of members of the military, political parties and journalists in connection with an alleged assassination plot that has been classed as terrorism. This is part of a situation created by the government to justify actions to neutralise those who might become obstacles in the face of an election. In this context, the possibility of the NGO law being passed should not be ruled out.

  How have civil society and the public reacted to these attacks?

  Despite the seriousness of the law, there is a lot of misinformation and a high level of ignorance among Venezuelan citizens. Even some CSOs are unaware of its existence or its importance.

  However, civil society has issued numerous criticisms. Between 2022 and 2024, national and international CSOs have published at least 15 statements and analyses of the NGO law and the law on international cooperation. Numerous forums, talks and awareness campaigns have been held, inside and outside Venezuela.

  Many organisations and human rights defenders have participated in interactive sessions at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and in side events at the UN, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and have submitted reports to human rights bodies. As a result of this advocacy, between 2021 and 2023, 11 statements and reports about these laws were published by international bodies.

  Those of us outside Venezuela have also advocated with the governments of our host countries. In Argentina, where I am at the moment, politicians and civil society have publicly condemned the NGO law.

  The Venezuelan government doubled down and on 12 January launched a public consultation on the law, without making the official text of the draft law public or inviting human rights CSOs to participate. According to the information that has come to light, most of the participants in the consultation have been state officials, including police officers. From what we have been able to observe in consultation events, which take place relatively spontaneously in various places and without an established format, and in the discussions on the issue in the National Assembly, the prevailing discourse has delegitimised CSOs, which are referred to as enemies of the state.

  What guarantees does Venezuelan civil society need to keep doing its work?

  To continue our advocacy work in defence of civic space we need more international organisations and people to come on board to help report on the deteriorating situation. CSOs need access to more accurate and reliable information to help build alliances more quickly and effectively.

  Venezuelan CSOs continue to work to communicate any changes that occur and to raise the alarm when attacks on rights take place. We continue to advocate with other states, especially when there are changes of government that could affect international policies of states. One imminent risk is of the non-renewal of the mandate of the International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019. This would be a serious blow to Venezuelan civil society.

  Venezuelan organisations should also evaluate and rethink strategies in terms of the impact of the information we produce. We should better showcase the strengths of the Venezuelan human rights movement. Perhaps proactive transparency, to the extent that it does not put organisations and their members at greater risk, could serve to influence both the international community and the public. It is crucial that people in Venezuela understand the dimensions of the losses that the deterioration of civic space and the extinction of CSOs pose to our country.

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  Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with PROMEDEHUM through itswebsite orFacebook account, and follow it onInstagram and Twitter.