military coup

• ASEAN: ‘There is a lack of a consistent approach and political will to address the Myanmar crisis’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mary Aileen Diez-Bacalso, a globally recognised human rights advocate and the new Executive Director of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), on the state of civic space in the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the regional body’s response to the human rights situation in Myanmar.

  In March 2023, Myanmar’s civic space was downgraded by theCIVICUS Monitor to the worst category, closed, in response to developments including the detention of thousands of activists and protesters, many of them convicted by secret military tribunals in unfair trials and given harsh sentences including thedeath penalty. Some have been tortured or killed. The ruling military junta has also systematically targeted journalists andforced civil society organisations (CSOs) to shut down and their leaders to go into hiding or flee the country. The junta has committed war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, including unlawful attacks, killing and injuring civilians through the use of extrajudicial executions, artillery shelling and banned landmines and cluster munitions.

  What is the state of civic freedoms in ASEAN member states?

  In recent years, there has been a discernible trend in ASEAN toward democratic regression and shrinking civic space.

  In Cambodia, as an election draws near, there is an ongoing assault on civic space and an increasingly violent campaign of repression and harassment against union activists, environmental campaigners, opposition politicians and media workers.

  In Myanmar, the path toward democracy, which began in 2011, was dismantled and civic space has closed. The junta’s nationwide crackdown has spread beyond cities into rural and ethnic minority areas, where resistance has grown. There is a climate of fear and insecurity, characterised by extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence and other atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity. But ASEAN leaders have been unable to respond uniformly, and the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) they reached in April 2021 has miserably failed to address Myanmar’s crisis.

  In Singapore, civil liberties are curbed through the prosecution of journalists, protesters and harassment of activists. Civil space has been further limited by repressive laws such as the 2019 Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act and the 2021 Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, which include vague provisions that allow for executive discretion in interpretation and implementation.

  Overall, civic space in ASEAN countries has deteriorated. But in the midst of this darkness, the results of recent elections have cast a ray of hope that could have an impact at the regional level. Election results in Malaysia in November 2022 and Thailand in May 2023 have brought hope and a breath of fresh air after years of regression of fundamental freedoms. ASEAN’s youngest member state, Timor-Leste, is unique in that it has committed to consolidating democracy and held a free, fair and transparent election on 21 May 2023, allowing voters to cast their ballots peacefully, thus making their voices heard.

  As the current ASEAN chair, has Indonesia made any efforts to engage with civil society and protect human rights?

  Indonesia became ASEAN chair amid a lot of expectations regarding its potentials to address the Myanmar crisis, following the lack of progress under its two predecessors, Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia – and possibly on the assumption that no further progress will happen under its successor, Laos.

  Led by Indonesia, ASEAN managed to adopt several Leaders’ Declarations related to human rights, including one on combating trafficking in persons caused by the abuse of technology and one on the protection of migrant workers and family members in crisis situations, adopted at the 42nd ASEAN Summit in May 2023. These represented a crucial step toward protecting rights. However, questions of implementation and domestication have long plagued the ASEAN region.

  Progress made at the regional level is not necessarily reflected by domestic developments. For example, ahead of the 2023 ASEAN summit, held in Labuhan Bajo, the Indonesian police summoned two residents, Viktor Frumentius and Dominikus Safio, over a planned protest regarding compensation for houses and land clearing for a road project. The criminalisation attempt happened a few days after the police issued a warning letter for local people not to conduct actions that could ‘create incitement’ during the summit. This incident came on top of ongoing attacks on civil liberties in Indonesia.

  Regarding engagement with civil society, unfortunately the Indonesian government failed to respond to civil society’s request to conduct an interface meeting during the summit. Taken together, this and the attempted criminalisation of protesters reveal the government’s exclusionary approach to critical voices.

  Did the summit’s outcomes include any commitment on human rights?

  The summit’s outcome document highlighted the commitment to strengthen efforts to combat human trafficking and protect migrant workers. Human trafficking is indeed a serious and systemic violation of human rights in Southeast Asia, with the pandemic exacerbating the already precarious situation of marginalised people who might end up in hands of human traffickers.

  Regarding Myanmar, however, disappointment continues. On 11 May, despite expressing concerns over the continuing violence in Myanmar, specifically in light of the recent attack against a convoy carrying ASEAN diplomats in Myanmar on the eve of the summit, Indonesia released a statement that said that ‘the 5PC remains our main reference’. It basically ignored the calls from civil society groups and the wider international community to move beyond the 5PC.

  Unfortunately the issue of shrinking civic space was not discussed at the summit, which reveals continued neglect by ASEAN member states and a lack of consensus about the importance of the fact that civic space is deteriorating across the region.

  Has there been progress in strengthening the role of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)?

  Since its inception, the AICHR has been criticised as nothing more than a front for ASEAN member states to comply with their duty to put human rights on the regional agenda. It is not surprising that ASEAN finds it difficult to promote human rights at the regional level, given that its membership includes several authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies.

  Civil society groups have done what we could to strengthen the AICHR, leading to incremental progress in its institutional strength and its relations with civil society. In 2019, FORUM-ASIA and its partners called for a review of the AICHR’s Terms of Reference to make it more independent and give it a protection mandate, among other things. ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to this, but the process hasn’t kicked off. Still, other positive changes happened, such as the inclusion of civil society in various AICHR activities and growing opportunities for the AICHR to meet with civil society in a variety of settings.

  For example, recently and for the first time ever, FORUM-ASIA and other CSOs with AICHR consultative status were invited to meet with AICHR representatives at the 37th AICHR Meeting. The question remains whether this practice can be sustained and institutionalised. The AICHR has also recently demonstrated increased engagement with national human rights institutions, its natural national partners. This also needs to be maintained and strengthened.

  Additionally, the current AICHR mechanism for handling human rights complaints needs to be assessed for it to become more transparent and responsive to rapidly deteriorating civic space conditions. But because the issue of shrinking civic space has not been met with consensus among AICHR member states, progress has been minimal. However, FORUM-ASIA keeps engaging with the AICHR in the knowledge that it will take years of effort to build a mechanism that lives up to our aspiration of holding states accountable for human rights violations. We are willing to engage in discussions with the AICHR about how to strengthen its complaint mechanism to contribute to enforcing states’ human rights obligations at the national level.

  Why hasn’t there been any progress in implementing the 5PC to address the situation in Myanmar?

  The 5PC has failed due to the fact that ASEAN has engaged with the military junta – the perpetrator of grave human rights violations with no commitment whatsoever to human rights – rather than with the legitimate representatives of Myanmar’s people, the civilian National Unity Government (NUG).

  As of today, the junta has not only failed to implement any of the plan’s provisions but has also increased its brutality against the civilian population. The deadly airstrike conducted in April was a glaring manifestation of the junta’s refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue and cooperation.

  Another issue is ASEAN members’ lack of a consistent approach and political will to address the Myanmar crisis. Only a few ASEAN countries openly condemned the junta’s human rights violations, while others, such as Cambodia, the ASEAN chair in 2022, even met with the junta chief and allowed the international community to interpret this approach to the crisis as recognition of the military regime.

  Finally, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference has been a major obstacle to effectively addressing the Myanmar crisis. ASEAN has moved away from this principle by becoming more assertive in certain cases, such as on economic and humanitarian cooperation, but this has not been mainstreamed. 

  How has civil society responded to ASEAN’s failure to address the situation in Myanmar?

  Despite numerous challenges, civil society has remained active. It is working to ensure that Myanmar does not fall off the radar or is forgotten as a result of conflicts and emergencies erupting in other parts of the world.

  Along with reputable Myanmar CSOs and other regional and international organisations, FORUM-ASIA recently released a position paper calling for a review and reframing of the 5PC. This paper provides five counterpoints of action that ASEAN leaders must immediately take to prove the bloc’s commitment and capability to resolve the Myanmar crisis effectively.

  The first point calls for the immediate adoption of an action plan for civilian protection and cessation of violence. The second emphasises the need to convene inclusive and meaningful consultations with legitimate Myanmar stakeholders, including the NUG, its advisory body the National Unity Consultative Council, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – a group of ousted parliamentarians – and ethnic resistance organisations. The third stresses the need to amend the mandate of the ASEAN Special Envoy’s term to three years with authority, independence and resources to take effective action. The fourth calls for the provision of direct support to frontline humanitarian responders in Myanmar and along ethnic borderlands, including Myanmar’s western borders. And the fifth point calls on the Special Envoy to immediately open formal communications and engage with civil society and other key stakeholders from Myanmar’s Spring Revolution.

  What should the international community do to push ASEAN to protect human rights and address the situation in Myanmar?

  International civil society and the international community must push ASEAN to immediately move away from the 5PC and embrace more robust and tangible actions to stop the military junta’s violence and atrocity crimes. They must refrain from legitimising the junta and must recognise the NUG as the democratically elected government and enter into dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, cut bilateral ties, including economic ties, and impose a full arms embargo on the Myanmar armed forces, and call for suspension of the export and transport of aviation fuel to Myanmar.

  They should also work closely with the United Nations, particularly the Security Council and Secretary-General, to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. They should set up a clear mandate for the Special Envoy, grounded in human rights principles, justice and accountability. The role must be full-time, lasting more than a year, and the appointed Special Envoy must engage with all relevant stakeholders, not just the military junta.

  ---

   Civic space inMyanmaris rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with FORUM-ASIA through itswebpage or itsFacebook page, and follow@forum_asia on Twitter.

• Benin and Burkina Faso: Reverse the suspension of media outlets

  

  CIVICUS, the global alliance of civil society organisations, condemns the decision by the governments of Benin and Burkina Faso to suspend media outlets over their coverage of the recent coup in Niger. On 8 August 2023, La Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC), a commission responsible for the management and development of public information and communication in Benin, suspended Gulf Media Group , a private media house that owns  Golfe Fm, Golfe TV, and the weekly Gazette du Golfe.  Their digital channels have also been suspended from airing any information. The Media Group was suspended following their reports on the political situation in Niger after the coup that overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum.

• Civil society groups demand Indonesia to implement cohesive policy and approach to not legitimise Myanmar junta in ASEAN

  On the 2^nd anniversary of Myanmar's attempted coup, we, the undersigned, call on Indonesia as the Chair of ASEAN to not legitimise the Myanmar junta at any cost. This shall include a commitment to disinvite junta representatives from ASEAN meetings at all levels.

• GABON: ‘Civic space and the conditions for the exercise of human rights were difficult under the former regime’

  CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Georges Mpaga, National Executive President of the Network of Free Civil Society Organisations of Gabon (ROLBG).

  Over the past decade, ROLBG has focused on enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention. It advocates to improve civic space in Gabon and Central Africa and campaigns on inhumane detention conditions.

  What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent elections and subsequent military coup?

  The 26 August elections were undoubtedly fraudulent, as were the previous ones. The regime led by predatory dictator Ali Bongo had banned international and domestic observer missions and international media. ROLBG was the only organisation that carried out citizen observation through the parallel vote tabulation system. Because of Bongo’s despotic will, the election was held under totally irregular conditions, in flagrant violation of international norms and standards. The vote count was held behind closed doors, in an opaque context that allowed for large-scale electoral fraud and falsified results.

  On 30 August 2023, the salutary intervention of the defence and security forces put an end to this aberration. For me, as someone from civil society, what has just happened in Gabon is by no means a military coup; it is quite simply a military intervention led by patriots within the army, under the leadership of General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, that put an end to a 56-year imposture, a predatory system and an infernal cycle of rigged elections often punctuated by massive human rights violations. This is our reading of the situation, and it is the general opinion of the Gabonese people, who have just been freed from a criminal dictatorship and oligarchy.

  Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

  The military intervention on 30 August was justified as a response to the desire shown by the Bongo clan and its Gabonese Democratic Party to remain in power by will or by force, through fraudulent elections and police repression orchestrated by the defence and security forces, which were instrumentalised and took orders from the former president.

  The Gabonese armed forces intervened to avert a bloodbath and replace the Bongo regime: an unrelenting regime that was ruthless towards the Gabonese people, tainted by clientelist relationships, shady business deals, predatory corruption and widespread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, all sanctioned by fraudulent elections.

  In this sense, the coup in Gabon is not part of a regional trend, but the result of a purely internal process resulting from 56 years of dictatorship and its corollary of human rights violations and the destruction of the country’s economic and social fabric. However, the events underway in Gabon obviously have repercussions in the Central African region, home to some of the worst of Africa’s dictatorships.

  What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

  Civil society welcomed the military intervention because it sounded the death knell for more than half a century of deceit and predation at the top of the state. Without this intervention, we would have witnessed an unprecedented tragedy.

  The Gabonese army, under the leadership of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), the military junta in power, allowed the country to escape a tragedy with incalculable consequences. Seen in this light, the military should be celebrated as heroes. As soon as he took power, General Oligui set about uniting a country that had been deeply divided and traumatised by such a long time of calamitous management by the Bongo family and the mafia interests around them.

  The attitude of the international community is unacceptable to civil society, human rights defenders and the people of Gabon, who have long paid a heavy price. In 2016, when Bongo planned and carried out an electoral coup followed by atrocities against civilians who opposed the electoral masquerade, the international community remained silent, leaving Gabon’s civilians to face their executioner. In view of this, we categorically reject the declarations of the international community, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union, two institutions that have encouraged the manipulation of constitutions and presidencies for life in Central Africa.

  What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance that the situation will now improve?

  Civic space and the conditions for exercising democratic freedoms and human rights were difficult under the former regime. The rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression were flouted. Many civil society activists and human rights defenders, including myself, spent time in prison or were deprived of their fundamental rights.

  With the establishment of the transitional regime, we are now seeing fundamental change towards an approach that is generally favourable to civil society. The new authorities are working in concert with all the nation’s driving forces, including civil society, which was received on 1 September by General Oligui and his CTRI peers, and I was the facilitator of that meeting. The transitional president, who was sworn in on 4 September, took to work to restore state institutions, human rights and democratic freedoms, and to respect Gabon’s national and international commitments. A strong signal was given on 5 September, with the gradual release of prisoners of conscience, including the leader of Gabon’s largest civil service union confederation, Jean Remi Yama, after 18 months of arbitrary detention.

  ---

  Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Georgesthrough hisFacebook page and follow@gmpaga on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• GABON: ‘Under the old regime civil society was not taken into account’

  CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Pepecy Ogouliguende, expert in human rights, governance, gender and peace mediation and founder and president of Malachie.

  Malachie is a Gabonese civil society organisation that combats poverty and promotes sustainable development and gender equality. It is active in a areas that include biodiversity protection, aid in the event of natural disasters, medical support, particularly for people living with HIV/AIDS, and human rights education, especially for the most vulnerable groups in society.

  What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent general election and subsequent military coup?

  At around 3am on 30 August 2023, the Gabonese Electoral Commission announced the results of the presidential election, with incumbent Ali Bongo as the winner. A few minutes later, the military announced they had seized power. It is important to stress that this was not a coup d’état, but a seizure of power by the military. This distinction is justified by the fact that it took place without bloodshed.

  The election was marred by irregularities and the announcement of the results would have led to protests, albeit legitimate, but which would have ended in violence. I would therefore like to salute the bravery of the defence and security forces.

  The military then dissolved all governing institutions and set up a Transition Committee for the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI).

  Was your organisation able to observe the election?

  No, my organisation was unable to observe the election for the simple reason that no international or national observers were admitted. The election was conducted in total secrecy. Like all Gabonese people, I saw that the announced results did not correspond with the results at the ballot box.

  The seizure of power by the defence and security forces in this particular context of public distrust of the authorities and deep suspicion of the election results is rather akin to a patriotic act.

  Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

  Our defence and security forces, along with the public, have observed numerous irregularities and dysfunctions in the state apparatus in recent years. They therefore decided to put an end to this regime, which no longer corresponded to the aspirations of the Gabonese people.

  The military saw an opportunity in the 26 August election to end the current system by assuming their responsibilities to save the nation and the rule of law. The aim of this seizure of power is to ‘restore the dignity of the Gabonese people’. As the CTRI spokesperson put it, ‘we are finally on the road to happiness’.

  What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

  The international community simply acted by the book without first analysing the context. Gabon’s is a very special case.

  Celebrations on the streets of Gabon’s main cities showed the extent to which the old regime was no longer wanted, just tolerated. These scenes of popular jubilation, which contrast with the international community’s condemnation, should be a wake-up call to the international community, inviting it to review its approach, which is more focused on safeguarding stability at all costs, often to the detriment of real social progress, development or economic growth – in short, at the expense of the wellbeing of the majority.

  All those in the international community who spoke up condemned the ‘coup d’état’ and assured us that they were following developments in Gabon with interest, while reiterating their attachment to respect for institutions. Reactions from international organisations were very strong: the United Nations condemned the coup and the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) suspended Gabon because they directly associated this ‘coup d’état’ with those that had previously taken place elsewhere in the region.

  The USA has distanced itself somewhat by stating that it will work with its partners and the people to support the democratic process underway. This is where we look to the rest of the international community to help us work towards building strong institutions.

  We salute those states that have clearly understood the need for this change. We condemn AU and ECCAS sanctions. The international community should support states in respecting their laws and constitutions and ensuring that democracy and human rights are respected.

  Do you think this coup is part of a regional trend?

  First and foremost, it should be reminded that in the case of Gabon, this was a military takeover and not a coup d’état in the strict sense of the term. It was in fact the result of bad governance and failure to take account of the needs of the population, particularly social needs, but also of the thirst for change. It can have regional impacts in the sense that most African populations are experiencing the same difficulties – youth unemployment, poverty, lack of access to healthcare – and aspire to major change. When people don’t feel taken into account by policymakers, they become frustrated.

  We don’t rule out the possibility that this will have an impact on our neighbours. It is not too late for the regimes in power in Central Africa to seize this opportunity to rethink the way they serve their people.

  What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance the situation will now improve?

  In Gabon, the operation of organisations and associations is governed by law 35/62, which guarantees freedom of association. That said, under the old regime civil society was not taken into account. It was only partly involved in the management of public affairs.

  Some leaders, particularly trade union leaders, could be arrested or intimidated if the regime felt they were being overzealous. Several Gabonese civil society leaders denounced arbitrary arrests linked to their opinions and positions.

  Like the Gabonese people, civil society is delighted at the change. Civil society as a whole is committed to taking an active part in the actions and reforms carried out by the authorities during the transition, to promote respect for human rights, equity and social justice, the preservation of peace and good governance.

  The CTRI has just authorised the release of some of Gabon’s leading trade unionists and prisoners of conscience. In view of the first decisions taken by the CTRI, the best is yet to come. I can safely say that the Gabon of tomorrow will be better. Today there is a glimmer of hope.

  Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Malachie through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• GUINEA: ‘The democratic future of the region is at stake in our country’

  CIVICUS speaks about the lack of progress in the transition to democracy in Guinea since its 2021 military coup with Abdoulaye Oumou Sow, head of communications for the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC).

  The FNDC is a coalition of Guinean civil society organisations and opposition parties founded in April 2019 to protest against former President Alpha Condé’s proposed constitutional change to seek a third term. The coalition continued to fight for a return to constitutional rule after the September 2021 military coup. On 8 August 2022, the transitional governmentdecreed its dissolution, accusing it of organising armed public demonstrations, using violence and inciting hatred.

  

  Why is there a delay in calling elections to restore constitutional order?

  The National Committee of Reconciliation and Development (CNRD), the junta in power since September 2021, is more interested in seizing power than organising elections. It is doing everything possible to restrict civic space and silence any dissenting voices that try to protest and remind them that the priority of a transition must be the return to constitutional order. It is imprisoning leaders and members of civil society and the political opposition for mobilising to demand elections, and has just ordered the dissolution of the FNDC under false accusations of organising armed demonstrations on the streets and acting as a combat group or private militia.

  What are the conditions set by the military and how has the democratic opposition reacted?

  In violation of Article 77 of the Transitional Charter, which provides for the duration of the transition to be determined by agreement between the CNRD and the country’s main social and political actors, the military junta has unilaterally set a duration of 36 months without listening to the opinion of social and political forces. The junta is currently set on not listening to anyone.

  The military are savagely repressing citizens who are mobilising for democracy and demanding the opening of a frank dialogue between the country’s social and political forces and the CNRD to agree on a reasonable timeframe for the return to constitutional order. Lacking the will to let go of power, the head of the junta is wallowing in arrogance and contempt. His attitude is reminiscent of the heyday of the dictatorship of the deposed regime of Alpha Condé.

  What has been the public reaction?

  Most socio-political forces currently feel excluded from the transition process and there have been demonstrations for the restoration of democracy.

  But the junta runs the country like a military camp. Starting on 13 May 2002, a CNRD communiqué has banned all demonstrations on public spaces. This decision is contrary to Article 8 of the Transitional Charter, which protects fundamental freedoms. Human rights violations have subsequently multiplied. Civic space is completely under lock and key. Activists are persecuted, some have been arrested and others are living in hiding. Despite the many appeals of human rights organisations, the junta multiplies its abuses against pro-democracy citizens.

  On 28 July 2022, at the call of the FNDC, pro-democracy citizens mobilised to protest against the junta’s seizure of power. But unfortunately, this mobilisation was prevented and repressed with bloody force. At least five people were shot dead, dozens were injured and hundreds were arrested. Others were deported to the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp, where they have been tortured by the military.

  Among those arrested and currently held in Conakry prison are the National Coordinator of the FNDC, Oumar Sylla Foniké Manguè, the FNDC’s head of operations, Ibrahima Diallo and the Secretary General of the Union of Republican Forces, Saikou Yaya Barry. They are accused of illegal assembly, destruction of public buildings and disturbances of public order.

  How can the international community, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in particular, give the pro-democracy movement the support it needs?

  Today it is more necessary than ever for the international community to accompany the people of Guinea who are under the thumb of a new military dictatorship.

  The democratic future of the region is at stake in our country. If the international community, and ECOWAS in particular, remains silent, it will set a dangerous precedent for the region. Because of its management of the previous crisis generated by the third mandate of Alpha Condé, Guinean citizens do not have much faith in the sub-regional institution. From now on, the force of change must come from within, through the determination of the people of Guinea to take their destiny in hand.

  Civic space in Guinea is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with the FNDC through itswebsite or itsFacebook page and follow@FNDC_Gn on Twitter.

• Letter to the UN Secretary-General on UN agencies engagement with the Myanmar junta

  Re: UN agencies, funds, programmes and other entities engagement with the military junta

  UN entities must stop legitimizing the Myanmar military junta and instead present letters of appointment, sign letters of agreement and MoUs with the legitimate government of Myanmar, the National Unity Government, and ethnic revolutionary organizations

  Your Excellency,

  We, the undersigned 638 civil society organizations (CSOs), condemn in the strongest terms the recent public signing of new agreements and presenting of letters of appointment to the illegitimate Myanmar military junta by UN agencies, funds, programmes and other entities working inside Myanmar. We urge you to intervene for a principled, coordinated UN response to the crisis in Myanmar. We call on you and all UN entities to immediately cease all forms of cooperation and engagement that lends legitimacy to the illegal murderous junta. Instead, letters of appointment and agreements must be presented to the legitimate government of Myanmar, the National Unity Government (NUG), and ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs).

  On 10 December 2021, 256 Myanmar CSOs urged UN entities to not engage with the junta in any way that lends them legitimacy. Despite these consistent calls from the people of Myanmar and CSOs, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) all signed new agreements with and presented credentials to the junta in August and September 2022. The public ceremonies, which were arranged with photographs, were used as propaganda by the military junta in its ongoing attempts to assert their legitimacy. The people of Myanmar have categorically rejected its attempts to seize power since its illegal attempted coup on 1 February 2021.

  For nearly a year and a half, the people of Myanmar have sacrificed their lives and livelihoods to defend democracy and their rights by engaging in political defiance and armed resistance – as a last resort. Their aim is to prevent the illegal military junta from taking over the country, as it is attempting to do through inflicting immense suffering on the people.

  The recent public actions by UN entities are direct interventions that clearly side with the military junta, undercutting the ongoing collective resistance efforts and sacrifices by the Myanmar people to end the Myanmar military’s tyranny and establish a federal democracy. This breaches the principles of democracy, human rights and humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence and “do no harm” outlined in the UNs’ Joint Operating Standards and frame work of engagement, for which UN entities must comply with and hold themselves accountable.

  Furthermore, in December 2021, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to endorse the recommendations of the UN Credential Committee that had rejected the credentials of the military junta and allowed the incumbent Ambassador, U Kyaw Moe Tun, who represents the National Unity Government (NUG) and thus represents Myanmar, to maintain his position at the UN General Assembly. UN entities, and agencies, funds and programmes in Myanmar should be guided by this decision and should be engaging publicly with the NUG and not the military junta.

  READ THE FULL LETTER

• MYANMAR: ‘If we fail to take appropriate action, the junta will commit more crimes’

  CIVICUS speaks with Kyaw Win, founder and Executive Director of theBurma Human Rights Network (BHRN), about the situation in Myanmar one year after the coup. As theCIVICUS Monitor has documented, activists and journalists continue to be criminalised and killed. Political prisoners have been tortured and ill-treated and the junta continues to block aid and imposes restrictions on humanitarian workers. 

  BHRN works for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in Myanmar. It has played a crucial role advocating for human rights and religious freedom with the international community and earned a reputation for providing credible and reliable analysis. It recently published reports oncrimes against humanity by the Myanmar military following the coup and on human rights violations and the situation inRohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. 

  What led you to found BHRN?

  I was born and brought up in a predominantly Muslim township in Yangon and lived there for 30 years. But in 2009 I had to leave the country and stayed at the Thailand-Myanmar border, temporarily leaving my family. Because I was not able to go back, I eventually moved to the UK and after one-and-a-half years I was reunited with my family.

  In 2012, when violence against Muslims erupted in Myanmar, I felt I needed to take action and founded BHRN, which was registered in the UK in 2015. Despite progress in the transition to democracy, we decided to keep BHRN underground. This surprised many, but we felt the situation could reverse easily. Unfortunately, this came true with the February 2021 military coup.

  BHRN tracks hate speech both online and offline. We believe hate speech is very dangerous and monitoring it helps us predict impending violence. As we are underground, we are able to collect data on the ground even if it’s very risky. We work in Myanmar and have staff there, including in Rakhine State, as well as in Bangladesh and Thailand. We see the need to expand because as a result of the coup there are restrictions on movement.

  We have experts on various themes, including on freedom of religion and Rohingya issues, and we produce monthly reports. We also undertake international advocacy to share our research with decision-makers such as United Nations (UN) representatives, European Union officials and staff of the US State Department, as well as decision-makers in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

  We also work with young people in Myanmar and build capacity around human rights, democracy and pluralism.

  A year on from the coup, what is the situation for activists and civil society in Myanmar, and how are human rights groups outside the country responding?

  The military has accused civil society activists of leading the resistance against the coup with backing and funding from the west. The military wants to destroy civil society, and many are being attacked and killed, so there is a lot of fear. Those in detention are in terrible conditions. Many have been tortured.

  Other activists who became aware that the coup was imminent were able to flee the country or leave the cities. They now operate from the outside, in Thailand and at the Thailand-Myanmar border, supporting those still in the country.

  We are calling for justice and the removal of the military from power. We have been calling for international sanctions since 2017, following the Rohingya genocide. However, at the time the international community was unwilling to take strong action, as they hoped that democratic reforms would be undertaken by the government of the National League for Democracy. There was only symbolic action but no targeting of the government at that time.

  Following the coup, we made clear to the international community that if we fail to take appropriate action, the junta would be emboldened to commit more crimes. Now, finally, targeted economic sanctions have been imposed and some companies, such as Chevron and Total, have decided to leave Myanmar. Some argue that economic sanctions will push Myanmar closer to China, but those people forget that in 2007, following sanctions after the Saffron Revolution, there was an internal revolt that led to the transition to a civilian government. The junta can’t survive long-term economic sanctions. The people of Myanmar know they may suffer due to sanctions, but many have told me they welcome them as long as they hit the military.

  We are also pushing for an arms embargo and to stop the sale of jet fuel to the junta, which they have used to bomb civilians. Another thing we request from the international community is humanitarian support.

  We are concerned about the UN’s position, which appears to view the military as a stakeholder in a potential power-sharing agreement. The UN Special Envoy recently expressed this position and we were very disappointed.

  We also have concerns with the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) formed in exile by those who had been democratically elected, because we have observed the exclusion of minorities. The NUG has no Muslim representation, so we don’t have a voice. This also affects the NUG’s credibility.

  How do you assess the response to the military coup by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)?

  In April 2021, a five-point consensus plan was agreed at an ASEAN summit. This included an immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar, constructive dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special ASEAN envoy to facilitate dialogue, the provision of humanitarian assistance and a visit by the envoy to Myanmar.

  However, ASEAN is not united on this. It includes three groupings that cannot agree on anything. For instance, Vietnam is close to Russia and would block any arms embargo. Thailand seems to support the military junta. Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a strong stand; we have engaged with them since day one and they have supported us. Singapore has also spoken up.

  It doesn’t help that the permanent members of the UN Security Council are toying with ASEAN, using this regional body as their proxy. They have passed the buck to ASEAN to resolve an issue that they have failed to tackle.

  We can’t expect more from ASEAN than it can deliver. We want the military to be removed from power and replaced with a civilian government, and this is something many ASEAN governments don’t understand. ASEAN’s five-point consensus plan has not been implemented. ASEAN has no weight on Myanmar unless China or the USA move. 

  We seem to have excessive expectations placed on ASEAN, while in fact there is not much it can do. The rest of the international community should step up and do more.

  What can international civil society do to support activists in Myanmar and hold the junta accountable?

  In the past we only focused on human rights investigations, but now we are also doing humanitarian work. We are renting and setting up safe houses to hide people and helping them leave the country. Costs have greatly increased but funding has remained the same.

  Those working in the country need the support of international civil society, and new ways to deliver support need to be devised because it has become dangerous to receive funds as the junta is monitoring bank accounts. There are also issues of accountability and transparency, as we cannot disclose the names of the people we are helping.

  However, I believe if we overcome this challenge, Myanmar’s civil society will emerge very strong. But we need more understanding and engagement with us.

  I believe nothing lasts forever and this too will pass. The junta will have to leave at some point. While the situation is quite bad, a good sign is that many military personnel have changed sides and now support the NUG. But we need to continue our struggle with a clear vision of the future that is centred on human rights and democracy. And we need support from the international community so those struggling on the ground will one day see their dreams come true.

  Civic space inMyanmar is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with BHRN through itswebsite and follow@kyawwin78 on Twitter. 

• MYANMAR: ‘The ruling military junta uses fear as a domination tool’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about the human rights situation and prospects for democracy in Myanmar with a civil society activist based in Myanmar, who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons.

  What is the current situation in Myanmar, a year and a half on from the military coup?

  Myanmar has been in turmoil since February 2021. The coup halted the fragile democratisation process. All branches of government – legislative, executive and judiciary – were concentrated in the hands of the junta and fundamental rights were suspended.

  The rule of law has been significantly degraded at every level. In the business sector, the junta’s inconsistent regulations make it impossible for investors to make decisions. Foreign investors are increasingly withdrawing from Myanmar, and the telecom sector fell into the hands of the junta’s cronies. The junta has questionable capacity to manage the economy, and inflation has pushed up the prices of essential commodities.

  The degradation of the rule of law puts people’s everyday life and livelihood at risk. Repression and fundamental rights violations make everyone feel unsafe and spread fear. The junta uses fear as a domination tool. Even once-peaceful villages in central Myanmar have become conflict zones where the junta’s troops have destroyed tens of thousands of people’s humble homes.

  What effects has the coup had on civil society?

  The post-coup setting is very challenging. The coup set back civil society, which had been slowly growing since the late 2000s, when young democracy and human rights activists who had survived the military dictatorship started getting together and organising to pursue common objectives.

  Our organisation came into existence in the early days of Myanmar’s political transition. There were limited freedoms and rights and limited space for civil society organisations. Our objective was to create a gathering space and provide support for political and civic activists. Within a decade, we adopted the broader objective of promoting civic space in Myanmar. We use technology to reach the right audiences and promote civic awareness, participation and engagement.

  Right now our work is severely restricted. A few organisations have relocated their offices to border areas or neighbouring countries, but we continue operating inside Myanmar. Since speaking out entails security risks, along with many other activists and organisations we have changed our approach, keeping a low profile. We are also conducting research as a tactical response to understand the challenges and find possible ways out.

  For some of Myanmar’s local civil society activists, life under a repressive regime is not a new experience: they operated under similar conditions before the 2010s. They continue to take numerous risks to serve their communities. Some organisations have also managed to channel international humanitarian assistance to conflict areas and vulnerable populations.

  What kind of work are pro-democracy groups doing and what backlash do they face?

  Restoring democracy is hard work. Pro-democracy groups are working to force a return of power to an elected government. They discuss things such as interim arrangements, political pacts for federalism and a transitional constitution. On the ground, they promote rights and freedoms and defend people from the junta’s repression.

  Having expressed their wish for democracy in the 2020 general election, the public supports pro-democracy groups in various ways, such as by taking part in peaceful demonstrations and campaigns for the suspension of tax payment, boycotting the junta’s products and brands, and joining in so-called ‘social punishment’, a form of protest that consists of doxing members of the junta and their family members – revealing information about their businesses and family connections. Many people inside Myanmar and in the diaspora also contribute financially to support the security of people in conflict areas and provide emergency humanitarian supplies.

  The vital goal of pro-democracy protests is to sustain awareness of fundamental rights and freedoms, provide encouragement and show determination to take action rather than be the junta’s victims. In the earlier days, the protests were joined by people from all walks of life, including young people, students, members of civil society and political parties, government staff and celebrities. Even as the junta used lethal force and arbitrary arrests and committed atrocities, they continued to demonstrate daily in some rural regions and hold occasional flash mobs in urban areas.

  The junta keeps trying to clear out pro-democracy groups and to get the endorsement of the international community. As it finds the latter quite hard, it increasingly focuses on the former. They apply the so-called ‘four cuts’: they try to cut off financial support, rations, information and recruitment by pro-democracy groups. They arrest high-profile businesspeople suspected of supporting them and strictly regulate financial transactions. They deploy police and troops at every crossroads, equip their supporters with weapons and train informants. They have banned numerous news agencies and publications that could counter their propaganda and torched villages that were believed to host pro-democracy groups.

  What will be the consequences of the recent executions of pro-democracy activists?

  In late July the military executed four pro-democracy activists. It was the first time the death penalty was imposed in Myanmar in decades.

  For the junta, this means there is no turning back. They meant it as a message to shock and paralyse people and comfort their hard-line supporters. But it backfired: it fuelled robust determination among pro-democracy groups.

  Internationally, the executions showed that the junta will not play by the rules to gain international recognition. In fact, it has continued to show muscle, using hostage diplomacy. A former British ambassador, recently jailed, became one of the victims of this.

  When they lose power, they will have to face justice. Any transition will have to contemplate transitional justice arrangements to hold everyone who committed crimes against humanity and war crimes accountable in domestic and international courts. They shall not enjoy impunity anymore.

  How can the international community help Myanmar’s civil society?

  Myanmar needs attention and practical coordination. The international community must listen to our people’s voices and reflect on their agendas by following up with quick and responsive actions. Paying attention to local concerns and voices and developing effective international assistance will make people feel more hopeful and maintain their resilience.

  Meanwhile, the junta is trying to boost its legitimacy by holding a controversial election. Elections under its iron fist will never be free and fair. The international community must be clever enough not to recognise such elections, which are a rotten trick the military have used for decades. Endorsing the junta as a legitimate ruler will only prolong the crisis.

  So we ask the international community: please listen to and amplify Myanmar people’s voices!

  ---

  Civic space inMyanmar is rated ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• MYANMAR: ASEAN must move beyond consensus in facilitating cross-border humanitarian aid

  In the lead up to the high-level meeting on ASEAN humanitarian assistance to Myanmar, civil society organisations voiced their grave concerns in a webinar titled ‘Beyond ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus: Humanitarian Assistance in Myanmar’ held last Thursday, 5 May.

• Myanmar: Execution of four democracy activists highlights junta’s brutality

  We, the undersigned, strongly condemn the execution carried out by the military junta against four pro-democracy activists in Myanmar. We call on the international community, including ASEAN states, to publicly denounce these grave violations committed by the junta and to hold them accountable for their crimes.

• Myanmar: the junta’s efforts to erase religious minorities must be stopped

  Statement at the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council 

  Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner on Myanmar

  Delivered by Kyaw Win, Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) 

  Thank you, Mr. President.

  While religious oppression has been a longstanding issue in Burma, the coup emboldened the junta to further persecute, marginalise and incite violence against religious minorities. The junta perpetuates its efforts to erase the identity of all six Muslim minority groups through the denial of their citizenship. Rohingya Muslims are coerced to accept National Verification Cards, which do not provide a predictable or accessible pathway to citizenship, nor does it increase access to rights, including freedom of movement. Nonetheless, some UN agencies and embassies continue to endorse  National Verification Cards (NVCs) as a pragmatic solution to end statelessness. Due to their lack of citizenship, Muslims who have been forced to flee Myanmar are faced with statelessness.

  Divisive and hateful rhetoric targeting non-Buddhist religious groups is used to divide the resistance and divert attention from the coup, Since the coup, BHRN has documented cases of looting, burning, and destruction of properties, shops, and places of worship of Muslim communities. Since the coup, over 20 Islamic religious buildings were attacked by the military and more than 770 houses in Muslim villages have been burned down in Sagaing region. There has also been an increasing number of cases of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and killing of Muslims.

  The UN and the international community have not done enough. The longer the international community waits to act, the more emboldened the junta becomes as it continues to commit atrocities. We ask the High Commissioner what the international community should do to ensure accountability for serious human rights violations committed by the junta, to cut revenue streams to the junta, to support Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar and those fleeing to neighbouring countries.

  We thank you.

  ---

  Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor

   

• NIGER: ‘France and the USA have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa’

  CIVICUS speaks about Niger’s recent decision to suspend military cooperation with the USA with Dr Boubacar N’Diaye, Emeritus Professor of Pan-African Studies and Political Science at the College of Wooster, international consultant on security sector governance and former chair of the African Security Sector Network, a pan-African think tank focused on security governance issues in the continent, and particularly in West Africa.

  How would you describe Niger’s security situation?

  Niger is located in a very strategic position in the continent – it’s at the heart of West Africa and the Sahel, and shares borders with Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali and Nigeria. This makes it an ideal location for geopolitical powers to have a presence.

  Until recently, Niger was a key security partner of France and the USA. There were French troops in the country, and in 2012, the government signed an agreement with the USA to establish a drone base to conduct surveillance and military operations against terrorism. Between 1,000 to 1,500 US soldiers were deployed under this agreement.

  But despite promises to assist Niger in fighting terrorism, little was done in this regard. Instead, the USA utilised this alliance to carry out surveillance operations in the region in support of its global geopolitical strategy.

  On 26 July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, with the junta claiming the president’s response to the dire security situation was inadequate. The country has confronted terrorist attacks on military and civilians for quite some time. Yet the crisis extends beyond security to encompass political and social dimensions.

  Following the coup, the junta demanded France and its soldiers leave the country. France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions on Niger, resulting in power cuts and border closures. No goods or medical supplies were allowed in or out across ECOWAS borders, while terrorist attacks persisted, claiming the lives of Nigerien military personnel. Sanctions were subsequently lifted, but the crisis persisted.

  Why did Niger suspend military cooperation with the USA?

  While France maintained a firm stance against military coups in the region, the USA took a more conciliatory approach. For that, one would have expected General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the junta’s leader, to be more accommodating with the USA.

  While the military leaders were quite grateful for this, they were also irked by the arrival of a US delegation of high-ranking State Department officials who, with a typical imperial attitude, lectured them on democracy and demanded they cut all links with the Russian government. They also accused them of having secret deals with Iran to sell uranium.

  The fact that the USA belittled and showed no respect to Niger led the military junta to revoke the 2012 agreement, which it highlighted was a secret document not endorsed by the public that granted the USA carte blanche to operate in Niger as they pleased.

  In requesting the USA lo leave the country, Niger asserted its rights as a free and sovereign nation. As such, Niger is free to make deals with whichever country it chooses, with neither the USA nor France having the authority to dictate any decision.

  This decision significantly affects the USA’s geostrategic position, as Niger is the only country in West Africa where it has a military presence. If compelled to withdraw entirely, the USA would lose its surveillance capabilities and ability to project power. If the USA wants to stay and seek a new agreement with the junta, it will need to tone down its demands. But if it keeps pressing Niger to cut ties with Russia, it is unlikely to be able to reach a deal.

  Do you see Niger’s decision as part of a broader regional trend?

  Over the past few years, people in other countries in the region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, have shown a desire to reaffirm sovereignty and reject the influence of imperial powers.

  France, as the former colonial power and on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the west, has particularly had a lot of influence in the region. It has conducted military operations, done business and even imposed the CFA franc, the regional currency and a relic of French colonialism in Africa.

  France, and to a lesser extent the USA, have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa. They have completely disregarded their national sovereignty and ignored their need for dignity. They aim to dictate to their people the type of government they should have, the decisions they should make and who they should partner with. This imperial mentality must stop.

  The public, guided by a very active civil society, is happy to see France and the USA being told to leave. They are happy to see Niger behave as a sovereign country that rejects foreign influence, particularly when both countries have done little to nothing to help resolve the insecurity dilemma Niger has faced for a decade.

  How do you understand the growing power of Russia in this context?

  Russia, and to a lesser extent China, are the default partners in the region. Despite their substantial presence and technological capabilities, France, the USA and even the United Nations have not achieved the same level of success as Russia in nations such as the Central African Republic (CAR) or Mali. Russia has been able to stabilise the security situation in the CAR, at least to some extent, and recapture major strategic cities in Mali that have been under rebel control for the last 10 years.

  Countries in the region see an alternative in Russia. This is not rooted in a Cold War mentality but rather in Russia’s longstanding presence in the region, its support for many nations during the early years of independence and its demonstrated effectiveness in combating terrorism.

  What international support does Niger’s civil society need?

  Nigerien civil society needs the solidarity of civil society across the world. Civil society organisations have suffered a lot. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world and has faced months of a severe embargo, sanctions, electricity cuts and medicine shortages. While these measures have been lifted, so has financial assistance from the EU and France, which has exacerbated socioeconomic hardships and security issues.

  The country hasn’t collapsed – as some had hoped – but is undergoing serious socioeconomic hardship and security challenges. The military coup is not to be applauded – it’s a clear sign of political failure. But considering the context, it can be understood. People have accepted that the military are in charge, and now they need all the help and solidarity they can receive.

  The international community should adopt a more empathetic stance towards Niger, supporting the country and its authorities. They should avoid punitive measures such as sanctions, which only harm the public, and refrain from imposing decisions and norms upon the nation.

  Instead, the international community should find a formula to help Nigerien authorities navigate through this complicated context and transition back to a constitutional order, with the active involvement of local civil society.

  ---

  Civic space in Niger is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the African Security Sector Network through itswebsite orFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@ASSN_Africa on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• NIGER: ‘Threats don’t solve problems; the international response must emphasise dialogue and negotiation’

  CIVICUS discusses the recentmilitary coup in Niger with Clément Kocou Gbedey, Niger’s National Coordinator of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP).

  WANEP is a regional organisation founded in 1998 in response to the civil wars that ravaged West Africa in the 1990s. With over 700 member organisations, it includes national networks in every member state of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Taking a collaborative approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, it works with civil society, governments, intergovernmental bodies and other partners to establish platforms for dialogue, experience sharing and learning. In 2002, it entered into a partnership with ECOWAS to implement a regional early warning and crisis response system.

  What were the causes of the recent military coup, and what’s the state of public opinion?

  The coup was triggered by the continuing deterioration in the security situation, poor economic and social governance, and corruption and misgovernment. Thousands of people took to the streets of Niger’s capital, Niamey, in a peaceful demonstration supporting the coup and criticising other West African countries for imposing financial and trade sanctions on Niger.

  Why did this happen? Because Nigeriens have the impression that Western countries, especially France, are in the business of exploiting all the country’s riches, such as uranium, oil and gold. And Niger still ranks poorly in terms of human development. The deposed authorities are said to have issued contracts for France to exploit mining and energy resources that are vital fuel for nuclear power. And the benefits of these contracts are only shared at the top, without people ever having any right to anything.

  What restrictions have been imposed on civic space in the wake of the coup, and how has civil society reacted?

  The coup led to further restrictions on civic space, including the suspension of political party activities and censorship of the international media outlets RFI and France 24, along with the closure of airspace. These measures are designed to prevent any challenge to military power and to guard against any external intervention.

  The coup has had major impacts on civil society in Niger. Some civil society groups have expressed their support for General Abdourahamane Tchiani, who arrested President Mohamed Bazoum, and his men, who they see as saviours in the face of the terrorist threat and President Bazoum’s poor governance. But others have denounced the coup as an attack on democracy and the rule of law, and have called for the reinstatement of the elected president.

  How long does the junta intend to stay in power?

  The junta has set itself a number of long-term objectives and, although it has not yet given any indication of how long it intends to stay in power, it does not appear to be planning to leave in the near future. Its stated objectives are to correct the inconsistencies and inefficiencies of the ousted government’s security management, to review the country’s security approach and protect it against terrorism, to renew relations with neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso and Mali, to improve the education and health situation and to combat the misappropriation of public funds. In doing all this, it claims to be putting Niger’s interests first.

  The biggest challenge facing the military regime is the very tough sanctions imposed by ECOWAS, designed to isolate Niger economically, politically and diplomatically.

  What have been the results of the foreign military presence in Niger so far?

  French presence in Niger has focused on fighting terrorism, training and equipping the Nigerien security forces and promoting stability in the region. France has operated in Niger as part of its Operation Barkhane, aimed at supporting the countries of the Sahel in their fight against armed jihadist groups.

  For some time now, however, French presence has been controversial among some parts of civil society, which consider it ineffective, neocolonial and contrary to our national interests. As of late, anti-French sentiment has evolved.

  For the time being there is no Russian presence in Niger, but since the coup a pro-Russian sentiment has gained ground in people’s minds The public thinks that ECOWAS and international institutions have remained insensitive to the cries of the civilian population and are ready to turn to another power that might perhaps be able to help them.

  Do you think the international community has reacted adequately to the coup?

  The international community has condemned the coup, but the deposed president wants more: he has urged the USA and ‘the entire international community’ to help ‘restore constitutional order’.

  But how? Sanctions have only aggravated the situation. ECOWAS, which claims to be aligned with people’s aspirations, was quick off the mark in imposing sanctions on Niger. The sanctions should be escalating, but this has not been the case and the situation has become untenable. With borders closed, sanctions are having serious consequences for the people of Niger, who were already suffering from poverty, food insecurity and a health crisis. Power cuts, fuel shortages, rising prices of basic necessities and the paralysis of commercial activities are just some of the difficulties affecting the daily lives of the people of Niger.

  Intervention by ECOWAS would further complicate the situation in Niger and other neighbouring countries and could even lead to a subregional conflagration. We believe that what the international response needs to do is continue to emphasise dialogue and negotiation, because threats don’t solve problems.

  What international support is Niger’s civil society receiving, and what support does it need?

  Right now we’re not receiving any support, because everything is shut down by the unjust sanctions imposed on Niger. However, Niger’s civil society would need additional support to ensure its protection, sustainability and independence in the face of the threats and pressure it is facing as a result of the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and international institutions. It would also need support to strengthen dialogue with public authorities and international actors and among CSOs, in order to build a common and concerted vision of Niger’s development.

  ---

  Civic space in Niger is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with WANEP through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@WANEP_Regional on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• One Year after the Illegitimate Military Coup in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar

  Joint LGBTIQ+ Civil Society Statement

  We will never forget. It has been a year since the violent and illegitimate occupation of the democratically elected government by Myanmar's military junta on 1 February 2021. This was at a period when the people were at their most vulnerable, amid the COVID-19 pandemic. It was and still is a grave and utter betrayal of the public will and trust and a sheer disregard of democratic institutions and values.

  In the past 365 days, we have been witnessing accounts of serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, criminalisation, arbitrary detentions, illegal arrests, torture, violent reprisals, and sexual and gender-based violence committed against pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders.

  This junta has fueled a humanitarian crisis that continues to impose fear, escalating violence, and destroy innocent lives throughout the country. Bombings of villages identified as centres of the opposition had resulted in killings of civilians and humanitarian workers and triggered gross internal displacement of communities. The crisis continues to escalate and has spilt across its borders as thousands have fled and sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

  We are appalled by the junta's disregard of socio-economic and health emergencies caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as curtailing supplies of oxygen and medicines, arresting doctors and medical personnel, and leaving thousands to die without medical help.

  We will always remember. The sheer tenacity, bravery and courage of LGBTIQ+ persons who were and are at the frontlines fighting for democracy, dignity, and freedom will forever be commemorated and ingrained in our collective memory. Despite repressive conditions, our LGBTIQ+ siblings have tirelessly campaigned both online and offline in pursuit of reclaiming democracy and urging for a global action to condemn military-led atrocities. We are deeply moved by various forms of creative resistance such as flash mobs, the waving of rainbow flags, the march of drag artists that had become symbols of peoples' solidarity and strength.

  This military junta and their supporters have blood on their hands. We deeply regret that many have been separated from their loved ones and have lost their lives amid the struggle. Data reported by Myanmar's National Unity Government (NUG) in June 2021 revealed that at least 12 LGBTIQ+ people were shot to death, while hundreds more were detained, arrested, and severely tortured based on their SOGIESC. Many are currently in hiding to escape retaliation.

  We stand firmly in solidarity.As long as Myanmar is unfree, democracy in Southeast Asia will never move forward. We commit our continuous support for efforts to reclaim and fortify human rights, freedoms, peace and democracy in Myanmar. Human rights and freedoms, particularly of LGBTIQ+ peoples, can flourish only if the people are recognised and respected as the rightful sovereign of the country. As such, we strongly deplore the military junta as an illegitimate force that is unworthy of any recognition.

  We urge the UN to step up and impose necessary sanctions and actions against the junta. Min Aung Hlaing, the rest of the military leadership, their political allies, and their families should be made accountable for the atrocities they committed.

  We urge all governments, the UN, and the entire international community to recognise Myanmar's National Unity Government (NUG) immediately and assure urgent unified response to provide unified assistance for putting Myanmar back on the path to democracy, the restoration of fundamental freedoms such as on information and expression, and guarantee the prevalence of peace and prosperity. While Myanmar is in crisis, we urge the international community to open up its borders, facilitate safe passage, and create domestic conditions to guarantee safety and dignity for all Myanmar persons seeking refuge.

  We urge ASEAN, especially the government of Cambodia in its capacity as the Chair of the regional bloc, to fully implement its Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar: an immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue with all stakeholders especially marginalised and ethnic groups who are excluded from political processes, provision of humanitarian assistance, and the appointment and unhindered visits of an ASEAN Special Envoy to facilitate constructive dialogues with all stakeholders.

  To our Myanmar LGBTIQ+ queerblings both in the country and abroad, you are not alone in this struggle. We are with you until and after democracy is fully regained in your beloved country.

   

  In solidarity: List of Organizational Signatories

  Regional Organisations

  APCOM Foundation

  ASEAN SOGIE Caucus

  Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact

  Asia Pacific Transgender Network (APTN)

  Equal Asia Foundation

  ILGA Asia

  Initiatives for International Dialogue

  International Women's Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW AP)

  Intersex Asia

  Pan Africa ILGA

  RFSL

  SHAPE-SEA

  Youth Voices Count

  Cambodia

  CamASEAN Youth's Future (CamASEAN)

  Indonesia

  Arus Pelangi

  Cangkang Queer

  CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

  ESBISQUET

  Komunitas Sehati Makassar

  GAYa Nusantara Foundation

  Malaysia

  JEJAKA Malaysia

  Justice for Sisters

  People Like Us Support Ourselves (PLUsos)

  People Like Us Hang Out! (PLUHO)

  SEED

  Nepal

  Blue Diamond Society

  Netherlands

  Filipino LGBT Europe

  Pakistan

  National Forum of Women With Disabilities (NFWWD)

  Philippines

  Asexual Support Philippines

  Bisdak Pride

  Camp Queer

  Care for Queers

  Galang Philippines

  Iloilo Pride Team

  Intersex Philippines

  Kapederasyon LGBT Organization

  LakanBini Advocates Pilipinas

  Lakapati Laguna

  LGBT Bus

  LGBTQ Plus Partylist

  LGBTS Christian Churches

  Metro Manila Pride

  Mindanao Pride

  MUJER-LGBT Organization, Inc.

  Pioneer Filipino Transgender Men Movement (PFTM)

  Side B Philippines

  Society of Trans Women of the Philippines (STRAP)

  Transmasculine Philippines

  UPLB Babaylan

  Youth for Change

  Youth for YOUth Organization

  Singapore

  My Queer Story SG

  Thailand

  Free Gender TH

  Manushya Foundation

  Mokeluang Rimnam

  Sangsan Anakot Yawachon Development Project

  School of Feminist, Thailand

  Sexuality and Gender Acceptance (SAGA) Thailand

  TaiPride

  The LinQ

  V-Day Thailand

  Timor Leste

  ARCOIRIS Timor Leste

   

  This statement was also signed by 4 organisations from Myanmar who opted not to be identified due to security reasons.

  Individual Signatories

  50 Individual Activists from the following countries: Australia, Cambodia, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, Turkey, and United Kingdom.

   

   

   

• Open call to all international actors: Do more to stop internet shutdowns shrouding torchings and killings in Myanmar

  Content note: this statement contains references to violence, murder, and potential war crimes.

• SUDAN: ‘The government and the international community must engage more with civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the prospects for democracy and civilian rule in Sudan with Abdel-Rahman El Mahdi, founder and director of the Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA). SUDIA is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works toward stability, development and good governance in Sudan. With 25 years of experience in international development, Abdel-Rahman specialises in organisational management and programming, with a thematic expertise extending to peacebuilding and human security, and civic engagement and democratic transformation.

   

  What was civil society’s reaction when Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok returned to power in November?

  After being ousted by a coup in October 2021, Prime Minister Hamdok managed to return to power in November as a result of a deal he reached with the military, which was signed on 21 November 2021. Reactions to this varied, because Sudanese civil society is very diverse.

  Since the December 2018 revolution, Sudanese civil society is in three distinct segments. The first contains what can be called revolutionary civil society movements and groups such as neighbourhood resistance committees, the Sudan Professional Association and other alliances and networks that sprang up during or in the aftermath of the revolution. Second, there is the segment that includes formal state-regulated CSOs, which are usually registered under various laws and have a licence to operate. Third, there are informal or traditional forms of civil society that existed from before independence, including the traditional or native administrative system and tribal leaders, and faith-based groups such as various Sufi groups.

  In terms of the size of their constituencies and their representation of the public, the biggest segment is that of informal and traditional forms of civil society, followed by revolutionary civil society movements and groups, with formal and state-regulated CSOs being the smallest. 

  Each part of civil society has had a different reaction to the Hamdok’s agreement with the military. On one end of the spectrum, traditional or native administrative structures and tribal leaders welcomed the agreement and were even represented at the signing ceremony. At the other, revolutionary civil society movements and groups completely opposed the agreement, which they saw as treason to the values and aspirations of the revolution. As for the third group – that of formal and state-regulated CSOs – reactions were mixed, with a majority seeing the agreement as the most viable way forward and the best possible outcome given the situation.

  Divisions and polarisation regarding the issue of military versus civilian rule and governance in the transition period are evident among both citizens and their representative institutions – including civil society and political parties – as well as among democracy movements in Sudan.

  How significant is the recent resignation of Prime Minister Hamdok? Has anything changed as a result?

  Prime Minister Hamdok’s resignation in early January 2022 is a significant development in the trajectory of Sudan’s transition. Hamdok was the only candidate viewed as acceptable by all the main parties that have shaped the transitional period over the past two years, namely the military, the Forces of Freedom and Change - a political coalition made up of civilian, political and armed groups and signatories to the constitutional declaration of 2019 -, revolutionary groups and the international community. His departure has only complicated the political crisis, because now agreement needs to be reached not just on how to proceed with the governance of the transitional period moving forward, but also on who will lead and represent the civilian element in future governance arrangements – and someone needs to be identified who might be acceptable to all parties involved.

  Representatives of the international community, the European Union and the Troika (Norway, the UK and the USA) issued a statement on 4 January 2022 in which they warned against any unilateral move by the military to appoint a new prime minister and called for a Sudanese-led and all-inclusive process to address this and other transitional issues. Meanwhile the situation on the ground continues to worsen, with protests in the capital, Khartoum, and in other cities continuing unabated.

  How has civil society organised since the coup?

  Organising and responses to the military takeover of 25 October differ from one kind of civil society group to the other. Revolutionary civil society movements and groups, along with some political parties, have been organising mass protests in Khartoum and other cities and states to express their rejection of the 21 November political agreement and call for a civilian leadership for the transitional period.

  Beyond welcoming the agreement and military takeover, traditional native administrative structures and tribal leaders have thus far been absent from the scene, taking no visible actions or positions. Meanwhile, formal, state-regulated CSOs have been slow to mobilise a coordinated response but are gravitating towards facilitating dialogue between stakeholders and are beginning to take concrete actions towards that end.

  What factors led to the coup and what needs to happen for Sudan to get on the path to democracy?

  Several factors led to the coup and military takeover on 25 October 2021, but the most important in my opinion was the lack of a robust dispute resolution mechanism that should have been agreed to and put in place by the key parties leading the transitional period. Such a mechanism would have helped resolve differences among civilian elements and between the civilian and military elements of the transition.

  The transitional constitutional decree was a rushed fix to a complex and rapidly deteriorating situation and has many shortcomings, such as vague language allowing for different interpretations. The political milestones and issues to be tackled during the transitional period – including elections, constitution-making processes and to a great extent security sector reform and transitional justice – can be extremely divisive and are likely to be sharply contested by the key parties leading the transition. 

  To overcome these potentially divisive issues and improve the chances of a successful transition to a democratic, peaceful and just Sudan, it will require that such a dispute resolution mechanism is established in any future arrangement put in place to govern the remaining period of the transition.

  What role are international institutions playing, and what should they be doing?

  The role of international institutions, including the United Nations (UN) and African regional institutions, has been one of damage control rather than damage prevention. The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was deployed to Sudan in 2020 but throughout the months prior to the coup and the escalating tensions and differences between the parties leading the transitional period it remained totally absent. Its mediation role only materialised at a later stage, following the unfortunate events of 25 October and after the axe had already fallen, so to speak.

  Regional institutions such as the African Union and the Arab League have played a marginal role, with the former only issuing statements threatening suspension of Sudan’s membership, and the latter sending a delegation to help with negotiations in the wake of the coup.

  More recently, on 8 January 2022, UNITAMS issued a statement announcing it was ‘formally launching a UN-facilitated intra-Sudanese political process which is aimed at supporting Sudanese stakeholders in agreeing on a way out of the current political crisis and agree on a sustainable path forward towards democracy and peace’.

  While this step by UNITAMS is to be applauded, it is important for UNITAMS as well as the international community supporting UNITAMS to consider carefully the details of the process. Rather than taking a head-on approach or focusing on a single objective of just simply resolving the current political crisis, the process should include embedded elements that ensure ownership and transparency and help build visions for common ground amongst the stakeholders involved, for the transitional period and beyond. 

  The process should also ensure the elaboration of a dispute resolution mechanism for when differences arise. UNITAMS will have only one shot at this and if it fails, it will lose credibility and the continued presence of the mission in Sudan will come into question.

  Moreover, beyond the immediate challenge of surpassing the immediate political crisis, the UN and other international institutions need to step up their act and stay one step ahead of the transition game in Sudan. Transitions in countries such as Sudan, which is emerging from conflict and years of authoritarian rule, require greater agility, heightened levels of coordination and collaboration and more strategic responses on the part of the UN system and international institutions more generally. To achieve this, they need the help of Sudanese civil society, so they will also need to adopt a more structured and strategic approach in engaging with them, instead of the current ad hoc and largely symbolic form of engagement.

  What are the main challenges Sudanese civil society faces, and what support does civil society need?

  Three of the top-most challenges facing Sudanese CSOs are, in order of priority, the restrictive and disabling environment in which they operate, their limited financial viability and access to funding, and their limited organisational capacity. These are interconnected and have a knock-on effect on each other. They have thus far prevented civil society from playing the promising role that is expected of it in the context of the transition. 

  The 30-plus years of authoritarian rule in Sudan have had a devastating effect on the development of civil society and it will take years to reverse it. Both civil society and those investing in it need to factor this into their expectations and aspirations and adopt both short-term and long-term approaches to improving civil society’s contributions to the calls of the revolution: freedom, peace and justice. 

  Once the current political crisis is overcome and the path to the democratic transition is resumed, there must be greater investment in and commitment to civil society on the part of both the government and the international community. Support will be needed for efforts to improve civic space and create a more enabling environment for civil society. Support should also be geared towards facilitating dialogue across the various groups that make up the non-political civic scape in Sudan and strengthening their ability to act and speak as one on critical national issues and future challenges.

  Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with SUDIA through itswebsite or itsFacebook orLinkedIn pages, and follow@FollowSUDIA on Twitter. 

• SUDAN: ‘We are back to the situation that preceded the revolution’

  CIVICUS speaks about Sudan’s situation under military rule with Nazik Kabalo, a woman human rights defender (HRD) from Sudan. Nazik has worked in human rights advocacy, research and monitoring, with a focus on women’s rights, for the past 15 years.

  What happened to Sudan’s transition to democracy?

  Sudan is now facing the consequences of the major problems of the deal made by the military and civilian leaders in August 2019. Following the revolution, this deal initiated a transitional government in Sudan, a partnership between civilians and the military council. But this partnership was never equal: the military and former regime forces – including paramilitaries, militias, tribal militias and the security apparatus – had more economic and political power. They had controlled the country for 30 years, after all.

  On the other hand, for 30 years political parties and civil society had been under so much pressure that they only managed to stay together with the momentum of the revolution, to defeat the former regime. But the Sudanese democracy movement has too many internal divisions.

  Ours is an unfinished political transition that is missing transitional justice and mechanisms to limit the power of military and other armed groups. All armed groups had been involved in very severe human rights violations and remained partners with civilians in the new government. To be honest, I think the military coup was bound to happen. The political deal achieved in 2019 gave the presidency to the military for almost one and a half years. The coup happened on 25 October 2021, only few weeks before the date the military was expected to hand over the Supreme Council presidency to civilian leaders. But we always knew civilians didn’t really have a chance to lead the country.

  How has the situation evolved after the coup?

  Following the coup, the amount of violence and human rights violations was quite overwhelming. Violence is to be expected from the Sudanese military; it has led civil wars for 50 years and killing people is basically all it knows.

  Seven months after the coup, at least 102 people have been killed in peaceful protests, more than 4,000 have been injured, and over 5,000 have been detained. There have been attacks on the freedoms of association and expression. Journalists are being attacked: at least three female journalists have been prosecuted or arrested in the past couple of days. The military coup has completely destroyed the civic space and freedoms created after the revolution. Our military is learning from our neighbour, Egypt, to effectively crush the civic movement.

  For the past seven months we have lived under a state of emergency that was only lifted three weeks ago. But the lifting of the state of emergency made no difference to military practices on the ground. The international community has put some pressure on the government and the military but has not been able to stop the violence and civic space and human rights violations.

  An aspect to consider is that Sudan has three conflict areas: Blue Nile, Darfur and Nuba Mountains. As well as western and southern Sudan, there’s also inter-communal violence in eastern Sudan. The coup hasn’t been able to provide security, although this is always the main excuse for the military to take power. Violence in urban areas, including the capital, has increased, especially for women. Members of the security forces, including the Central Reserve Police (CRP), have perpetrated gang rapes and sexual assaults against women; for this reason, the CRP has been recently sanctioned by the USA. A peace agreement was signed in October 2020 with several armed groups but hasn’t been effectively implemented. 

  Sudan’s economy has been in a freefall since the coup. We expected to have our debt cancelled by this year, but because of the coup, the Paris Club, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank decided not to move forward. Instead, the IMF, the World Bank and international donors have frozen over two billion dollars in economic aid, which is directly affecting the general humanitarian situation. Recent reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimate at least half of Sudanese people will need humanitarian aid this year.

  Another impact of the coup was the internet shutdown. For at least seven weeks, HRDs lived under a complete communications shutdown. This has now been partially lifted, but internet and phone communications continue to be cut off on every day of protest – which means it has happened every single day for several weeks. Internet access is under very harsh surveillance, so no Sudanese activist feels safe to use the phone for work. Sudan has one of the worst cybercrime laws in the world: you can be prosecuted, tried and sentenced to five years in jail just for posting something on Facebook. A couple of months ago, a female HRD who reported the sexual violence that took place during protests was sent to jail, accused of posting ‘fake news’. She may be punished with up to 20 years in prison. The military have used this law to threaten activists both inside and outside Sudan.

  We are back to the situation that preceded the revolution. We feel that the old regime is back; in fact, the military has started appointing people from the former regime everywhere, from national television to the Humanitarian Commission, which is responsible for managing the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) inside Sudan. So CSOs are back to needing to request authorisation to hold meetings at venues outside our offices and are under constant surveillance. Activists, journalists and lawyers are being silenced because power went back to the military.

  What are protesters’ demands?

  Following the revolution, the deal reached between the military and civilians never satisfied the protest movement, which includes a high proportion of young people and women. They have never stopped protesting, not even during the transitional period, from August 2019 to October 2021. There have been at least 20 killings of HRDs since the transition began, but this hasn’t stopped them. So when the coup happened, people were instantly in the streets, even before an official announcement of the coup was made.

  Since 2018, protesters have demanded real democracy and civilian rule. We have had military governments 90 per cent of the time since we became independent: 59 years out of 64. After the regime fell on 11 April 2019, people started a sit-in in front of the military’s headquarters. This continued for two months and ended with the Khartoum Massacre on 3 June 2019, with attacks perpetrated by militias and security forces. Two hundred people were killed and at least 60 women were gang-raped. In August a deal was reached with the military, despite the massacre that literally happened outside their headquarters! This was a stab in the heart for many democracy groups.

  Right now, the protest movement wants to make sure civilians are the ones ruling the country. Military leaders should go back to guarding the borders and shouldn’t have anything to do with running the government anymore. The 2019 deal didn’t work, which means our only option is demanding radical change that puts power in people’s hands. Resistance committees have a slogan of ‘three nos’: no partnership, no negotiation or compromise, and no legitimacy. A process of dialogue and negotiations led by some political parties is currently taking place, but resistance committees refuse to engage. Unfortunately, this has not been welcomed by some international actors, but it comes as a direct result of recent Sudanese experience.

  Who are the people on the streets?

  Protesters have built an amazing grassroots movement; resistance committees have formed in every neighbourhood, even every block. Those who participate in them are ordinary people who have nothing to lose, so unlike the civilian elites, they are willing to continue the struggle until the end. They organise street protests every single day and are creating new ways of protesting, such as strikes, stand-ups, music, movies and poems. They use every tool available, including recreating Sudanese traditions and bringing our cultural heritage to the streets.

  Women and feminist movements are doing an amazing job, breaking so many norms. During the revolution, many young women were on the frontlines. The Angry, a protest group that stays on the frontlines of every protest, protecting other people and leading clashes with the police, includes lots of young women.

  Women are also working to provide medical care and trauma support. After 50 years of civil war, you will definitely be a traumatised country, but this has intensified following the past five years of revolt. Before, one was able to distinguish between people from war zones and people from cities. Right now, the whole country is a war zone. There are machine guns everywhere, firing bullets into neighbourhoods, and children are dying inside their own homes because bullets go through their roofs.

  Diaspora activism has also been key. Activists from the diaspora have been super effective in spreading the word, and during the internet shutdown they were online 24/7 to get information out to the world, not only sharing it on social media but also connecting people inside Sudan, who could receive international calls but not domestic ones.

   What kind of work are pro-democracy groups doing?

  The pro-democracy camp is very diverse. There are longstanding CSOs that have always promoted and advocated for human rights and continue to document violations, advocate, engage and build capacity inside the democracy movements. There are also new grassroots groups, the resistance committees, thar right now are the key movement leaders: other CSOs will follow their lead since they express the majority view. Professional organisations and trade unions are also a major group; they are key in organising mobilisations in urban areas. Doctors, lawyers, engineers and similar roles play an important role in putting pressure through strikes and civil disobedience. 

  Unfortunately, for the time being there’s not a single unified network or body that can represent the democracy movement in Sudan. This is the movement’s main weakness. Resistance committees are trying to produce a unified political declaration and how to unify this movement while including all of Sudan, even conflict areas, is being discussed.

  What international support do Sudanese HRDs need?

  Our country must not be forgotten. The international community must take action and support the democracy movement’s demands for fundamental change. International human rights bodies must put make Sudan a priority. Sudanese civil society is fighting to get Sudan on top of their agenda, especially since the war started in Ukraine and most attention is going that way.

  Neglecting building democracy in Sudan and leaving power in the hands of the military would be a big mistake. What’s going on here isn’t disconnected from what’s going on in Ukraine. Reports indicate the involvement of the Sudanese military and militias in smuggling gold that supports the Russian economy during this conflict. Moreover, many reports have exposed the strong relations of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leaders with Russian leadership; they were in Russia the week the war started to ensure the flow of gold. RSF militias have relations with other African countries like Chad and the Central Africa Republic, which are sources of blood gold and blood diamonds entering Russia through Sudan. 

  Sanctions would be an important tool. A couple of days ago, the International Bar Association called on the UK to apply Magnitsky sanctions in Sudan. International CSOs should move ahead with similar actions.

  It’s understandably hard for the international community to deal with the people in the absence of an actual government or elite they could deal with. But young university students are the democracy movement’s leaders, and they represent us. Protests have continued for eight months now and will probably continue for many more, and activists need a lot of help.

  Because of persecution and violence, many CSOs and local groups have had to move their operations outside Sudan, and activists have had to relocate. Those working inside Sudan are having a very low-profile and using all the digital and physical security strategies available. Access to funding has also been increasingly challenging. The military wants to find out where funding for the democracy movement is coming from and has therefore increased surveillance, which makes it very risky to receive funds inside Sudan. Organisations working at grassroots levels and in conflict areas are suffering the most.

  Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Follow@nazik_kabalo on Twitter.