humanitarian aid

• AFGHANISTAN: ‘Lack of dialogue and punishing sanctions are undermining the promotion of human rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan with Hadiya Afzal, programme coordinator of Unfreeze Afghanistan.. Unfreeze Afghanistan is a women-led civil society organisation (CSO) formed by women from Afghanistan and the USA. It advocates for the release of Afghan assets frozen following the Taliban takeover to enable the state to pay salaries owed to public sector workers, including teachers and doctors, and tackle the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

  Why is civil society calling for the release of frozen assets of the Afghan state?

  When over US$9 billion of Afghanistan’s Central Bank reserves were frozen in August 2021, it had a devastating impact on the economy. Central Bank assets are the people’s money, used to hold currency auctions in the country, safeguard against inflation and control price stability. Afghanistan needs its Central Bank reserves back to stabilise its economy and perform centralised banking functions again.

  The assets frozen also included private monies, that is, accounts held by private individuals, companies and CSOs. People were unable to withdraw their own money from banks for months, with many still unable to do so due to lack of cash. Many Afghans sold off anything they owned to afford essential goods, the prices of which skyrocketed.

  Over the past year, leading CSOs, humanitarian organisations and more than 70 economists, including Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, have advocated through meetings, protests, letters and media appearances for the return of Afghanistan’s money to get its economy back on its feet, independently of whatever global aid funding is provided. United Nations (UN) experts have also called for the USA to unblock Afghanistan’s frozen assets to ease the humanitarian situation.

  What kind of safeguards should be put in place if the frozen assets are returned?

  The USA has signalled that funds could be returned to Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the country’s central bank, as long as three conditions are met: the establishment of independent monitoring mechanisms, the implementation of credible anti-money laundering regulations and controls to combat the financing of terrorism and DAB’s insulation from political interference – which meant replacing its top leadership, in the hands of Taliban officials, one of whom is under US and UN sanctions, with professionals.

  DAB has already agreed on independent monitoring conditions, and experts have set out how pre-existing independent monitoring and electronic auditing could be restored. US claims that the new Afghan government lacks expertise and that capacity building is needed for the state to be able to perform central bank functions could be addressed by assistance from the international community. The law that outlines DAB’s function as a technocratic institution charged with responsibilities such as currency auctions and oversight of banks is still in place. DAB continues to have the same audit oversight committee, with the same members it had under the previous government. And the chair of the audit committee has been an outspoken advocate for the return of DAB’s reserves.

  The Afghan government should ensure that the DAB law remains in place and that the institution will function separate from political considerations. Advocacy experts highlighted that the USA does not apply audit conditions as strictly to other countries as it does to Afghanistan. It does not seize their foreign assets due to limited monitoring capabilities.

  What else should the international community do to contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan?

  The international community should focus on supporting a strong, independent Afghan economy that can run on its own, the first step in which should be to return the full assets of the Afghan people to its central bank.

  Another measure the international community can take is to provide global aid raised by the UN and other international bodies. Human Rights Watch alerted that without sustained humanitarian aid donations, Afghanistan’s upcoming winter could be even worse than the last one.

  Last year, UN emergency funding staved off experts’ worst fears of a devastating winter, but the people of Afghanistan cannot continue to depend on global kindness after a year marked by war, the pandemic and rising inflation. Afghanistan’s assets must be returned to its central bank to bring stability to the lives of ordinary Afghans, and the international community should invest in the infrastructure necessary to ensure its success.

  What alternative measures, other than financial sanctions, can the international community implement to promote human rights, and specifically women’s rights, and support civil society in Afghanistan?

  Sanctions have had a devastating impact on Afghanistan, and the resulting humanitarian crisis has disproportionately affected the average Afghan. The Center for Economic and Policy Research stated that financial sanctions on Afghanistan amount to a form of ‘collective punishment’ of the Afghan people for the actions of a government they did not choose.

  The sanctions are not helping. In the words of Jamila Afghani, founder and president of the Afghan chapter of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, ‘we are not supporting Afghan women by starving them’.

  In fact, sanctions are only making things worse. The cultural practice of forced marriages and what effectively amounts to the sale of girls is reinforced by socio-economic factors. Even under the previous government more than 70 per cent of marriages were forced. These are expected to increase as a result of the humanitarian crisis.

  Meanwhile, Islamic scholars such as Daisy Khan have highlighted Quranic evidence supporting women’s independence, education and liberation. The promotion of human rights and specifically women’s rights is best fostered in a stable economic environment with sustained international diplomacy and interfaith dialogue.

  Lack of dialogue between the international community and the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan compounded by punishing sanctions is undermining the promotion of human rights. Human rights can only be promoted through constructive dialogue while addressing the drivers of wellbeing – rebuilding financial stability, economic independence and global cooperation.

  ---

  Civic space in Afghanistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Unfreeze Afghanistan through its website or Facebook page, and follow @UnfreezeAfghan on Twitter.

• AFGHANISTAN: ‘The seizure of sovereign assets will worsen the world’s worst humanitarian disaster’

  CIVICUS speaks with Arash Azizzada, co-founder and co-director of Afghans for a Better Tomorrow, about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Afghans for A Better Tomorrow is a grassroots civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated tobringing about transformative change for Afghans in the USA and beyond. It has recently advocated for the release of Afghanistan’s frozen assets.

  Why is civil society calling for the return of Afghanistan’s frozen assets?

  Before August 2021, when the USA froze Afghanistan’s assets, Afghanistan’s western-backed government was heavily reliant on foreign aid and was spending most of its revenue on the conflict with the Taliban. Since the Taliban took over, the entire country has essentially found itself sanctioned economically and Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), its central bank, had all its assets frozen.

  Since the DAB serves as collateral insurance for private banks to be able to operate, the entire banking system has been paralysed as of August 2021. The same goes for the whole Afghan economy: businesses and people cannot access their own hard-earned money to buy food at the market down the street. Philanthropic foundations have trouble sending funds into Afghanistan. This has contributed to soaring inflation, worsened by the rise in food and commodity prices caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a record-breaking drought.

  As a result, Afghanistan has become ‘hell on Earth’, as the director of the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme put it. Over 21 million Afghans don’t know where their next meal will come from. Every women-led Afghan household currently faces poverty and hunger as the country’s healthcare system teeters on the brink of collapse.

  The consensus among Afghan civil society, both within and outside the country, is that the seizure of sovereign assets that belong to the Afghan people is a violation of international norms and will worsen the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Through grassroots organising, high-level advocacy and litigation, the Afghan American community has stepped up to bring the frozen assets back to their rightful owner: the Afghan people.

  At the same time, following the blocking of Afghan assets, a group of families in the USA who had secured rulings against the Taliban connected to its role in the 9/11 attacks filed a civil case in a federal court to enforce those rulings using the frozen DAB funds. In February 2022, President Joe Biden signed an executive order allocating half of the more than US$7 billion that the previous government of Afghanistan had placed in the New York Federal Reserve for humanitarian relief in Afghanistan and leaving half subject to litigation brought by some of the 9/11 families.

  As part of a broad coalition of Afghan-American groups representing the community, we filed an amicus – friend of the court – brief stating that the court should oppose this for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the Taliban are not recognised as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan by its people or the international community. The money belongs to the Afghan people, not the Taliban. And although 9/11 families deserve compensation, doing it this way would harm Afghans and not the Taliban.

  What kind of safeguards should be put in place if the frozen assets are returned?

  While the Taliban might be the de facto rulers of most of Afghanistan, they remain untrustworthy and illegitimate. But the DAB continues to be function as a technocratic body, so frozen funds should be returned as long as there is proper ring-fencing and enhanced safeguards such as electronic auditing records to ensure the reserves are not interfered with by the Taliban.

  Our proposed plan recommends an initial trust-building process in which a conditional amount of US$150-200 million a month is released so that the DAB is allowed to perform its core functions. The funds ought to be used to regulate the Afghan currency and run US dollar auctions to inject liquidity into the struggling economy and ease the pain of the Afghan population. Not one cent of these funds should be used for humanitarian aid purposes.

  What should the international community do to contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan?

  International philanthropy and the international community should support a fledging Afghan civil society, and especially the women’s groups that remain operational within the country, by ensuring wide-ranging sanctions relief.

  As it stands, the entire Afghan population is on the receiving end of collective punishment due to the sanctions imposed on the Afghan state. As the world has become hostile to doing business in the country, the World Bank and other international institutions should continue to focus on funding economic development projects and ensure the healthcare system remains functional.

  The international community should work hard to differentiate between targeted sanctions that focus on individuals within the Taliban and projects that ensure Afghans have a chance at survival. As one example, direct cash assistance to the Afghan population remains a much more effective and equitable method of assistance than trying to truck in food for a population of over 21 million people and helping circumvent Taliban attempts at interfering with aid.

  The UN appeal for humanitarian aid for Afghanistan still remains US$2 billion short of its target. There is a strong need for donor countries to fill that gap. Much of it should be filled by the NATO member countries that occupied Afghanistan for 20 years.

   

  What alternative measures, other than financial sanctions, can the international community implement to promote human rights and support civil society in Afghanistan?

  A core demand remains the non-recognition of the Taliban government, which is deepening its repression and remains unrepresentative of the Afghan population. It is important that the international community listens to the voices of Afghan civil society, and specifically those of Afghan women leaders and the minority Hazara and Shia communities.

  The most vital thing at this moment is a strengthened mandate by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to document and monitor human rights violations as well as support accurate and free media in the country. Significant UN presence on the ground will be key as Afghanistan faces a deteriorating human and women’s rights situation.

  ---

  Civic space in Afghanistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Afghans for a Better Tomorrow through itswebsite orFacebook page,and follow@AfghansTomorrow on Twitter.

• ARMENIA: ‘As people leave their homes in search of safety, humanitarian organisations must support their basic needs’

  CIVICUS speaks about the civil society humanitarian response to the Azerbaijani blockade and military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh – the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians – withShushanik Nersesyan,Media and Communication Manager at People in Need (PIN) Armenia.

  Founded in 1992 bya group of journalists involved in the 1989 Czechoslovak ‘Velvet Revolution’, PIN is a civil society organisation (CSO) working in the fields of humanitarian aid, human rights, education and social work. Since it was established in 2003, its permanent office in Armenia has worked to strengthen Armenian people’s abilities to improve their lives and the communities they live in.

  How did the Azerbaijani blockade affect people in Nagorno-Karabakh?

  It all started in December 2022, when Azerbaijani civilians identifying themselves as environmental activists began obstructing the Lachin corridor, which links Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In April 2023 Azerbaijan set up an official checkpoint that largely cut off the passage of people and goods between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Once it was under Azeri control, it was possible to use the corridor only in exceptionally urgent cases, through the intermediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or Russian peacekeepers.

  On 29 July Azerbaijani authorities abducted V Khachatryan, a 68-year-old Nagorno-Karabakh resident who was being evacuated by the ICRC for urgent medical treatment through the Lachin corridor. Khachatryan remains in captivity. Another incident occurred in late August when three Nagorno-Karabakh students were captured by Azerbaijani border guards while travelling to Armenia via the corridor. They were only released 10 days later. Free movement of people to Armenia became impossible.

  The prolonged blockade led to a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of essential goods – including electricity, fuel and water – and the closure of basic services. People in Need, along with Action Against Hunger and Médecins du Monde France, condemned it but, regrettably, our efforts to open to road for the trucks with food to Nagorno-Karabakh were thwarted.

  The situation changed with the shelling that caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent people on 19 and 20 September. Since 24 September, over 100,000 people have fled Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian regions, where they are also facing an emergency situation due to food and hygiene needs, plus longer-term issues of housing, education and jobs.

  How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?

  CSOs including PIN deployed humanitarian projects to help blockade-affected people. CSOs conducted visits and issued statements. In Kornidzor, on the border, representatives from dozens of Armenian CSOs gathered during the blockade, urging the international community to uphold human rights and ensure the passage of humanitarian aid for civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The unimpeded delivery of essential goods, including food, hygiene items, medicine and fuel, as well as the unrestricted movement of people, including critically ill patients, are fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law.

  What work is PIN doing in this context?

  Since 1992, as a newly established organisation, PIN has been there to help people affected by the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from February 1988 to May 1994. We have actively contributed to the growth of Armenian civil society, which has remained resilient throughout this crisis. We coordinate our efforts with the government and local authorities to closely monitor the situation on the ground and carry out numerous humanitarian projects.

  We continue assisting the most vulnerable populations. Since September 2020, we have provided essential humanitarian aid and long-term efforts for the social and economic integration of thousands of people.

  As a humanitarian organisation, we advocate for rights and a peaceful resolution of conflicts in adherence with international law. Along with our partners, we have expressed our concerns, called for measures to prevent the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe and continuously raised internal and donor funds to help people in need.

  When people started fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh, we immediately mobilised PIN funds to support the first recipient centre in the Syunik border region to deliver aid such as food, clothes and blankets to forcibly displaced people and create a special space for children’s activities while their parents dealt with registration and searching for accommodation. Additionally, we launched the SOS Armenia appeal and new humanitarian assistance projects funded by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, the Netherlands Refugee Foundation, Start Network and USAID.

  As people continue to leave their homes in search of safety without being able to take their belongings, humanitarian organisations must continue providing assistance to support their basic needs.

  Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with People in Need Armenia through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@PIN_Armenia on Twitter.

• CAMEROON: ‘The Anglophone discontent must be addressed through meaningful discussion with all parties’

  CIVICUS speaks with the Cameroonian writer and digital activist Dibussi Tande about the ongoing crisis in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions. The conflict emerged in 2016 out of a series of legal and educational grievances expressed by the country’s Anglophone population, which is a minority at the national level but a majority in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions.

  Dibussiis the author ofScribbles from the Den. Essays on Politics and Collective Memory in Cameroon. He also has a blog where he shares news and analyses of the situation in Cameroon.

  What have been the humanitarian consequences of the escalating conflict in Cameroon?

  The main humanitarian issue is the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the conflict. According to the United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency, by August 2021 there were 712,800 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Although some have since returned, there are still over half a million IDPs spread across Cameroon.

  The priority needs of IDPs and returnees today are housing and access to healthcare, food, water and education. However, help has not been readily available, which explains why this conflict has repeatedly been classified as one of the most neglected displacement crises since 2019.

  Let’s not forget that the UN Refugee Agency has an additional 82,000 Cameroonian refugees registered in Nigeria. Add the millions of people trapped in conflict zones and caught in the crossfire, and you have the recipe for a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions.

  What will it take to de-escalate the situation?

  It’s quite simple. First, the parties involved in the conflict must be willing to look beyond the military option, which so far has not resolved anything, and seek a peaceful resolution instead. There can be no real de-escalation until they give meaning to the now derided calls for an ‘all-inclusive dialogue’ that have become a platitude and an excuse for inaction. That said, I think the onus lies primarily with the government of Cameroon, which is the party with the resources to at least initiate real dialogue.

  Second, the international community needs to revise its approach to the conflict. All attempts thus far at international mediation – for example, the ‘Swiss Process’ in which the government of Switzerland convened talks – have either dragged on for years or simply failed. The international community must step up the pressure on all factions, including the threat of individual and collective sanctions for their continued obdurateness. Without this two-pronged approach, there will not be a de-escalation anytime soon.

  What kind of challenges does civil society face when advocating for peace?

  Civil society faces numerous challenges. For starters, civil society organisations (CSOs) have limited access to conflict zones. They must also walk a fine line between government and Ambazonian groups – those fighting for the independence of Ambazonia, a self-declared state in the Anglophone regions – who both routinely accuse them of supporting the other side. Even when civil society gains access to conflict zones, it operates with very limited financial and other resources.

  That said, the most serious challenge to their operations is government hostility. Local CSOs have routinely complained about intimidation and harassment by Cameroonian authorities as they try to work in conflict zones. In 2020, for example, the Minister of Territorial Administration accused local CSOs of colluding with international CSOs to fuel terrorism in Cameroon. He claimed that these ‘teleguided NGOs’ had received 5 billion CFA francs (approx. US$7.4 million) to whitewash the atrocities of separatist groups while publishing fake reports about alleged abuses by the Cameroonian military.

  International humanitarian groups such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF) have also faced the wrath of the government. In 2020, Cameroon suspended MSF from carrying out activities in the Northwest region after accusing it of having close relations with separatists. And in March 2022, MSF suspended its activities in the Southwest region after four of its workers were arrested for allegedly collaborating with separatists. MSF complained that the government confused neutral, independent and impartial humanitarian aid with collusion with separatist forces.

  What were the expectations of English-speaking Cameroonians for 1 October, proclaimed as ‘Independence Day’ in the Anglophone regions?

  English-speaking Cameroonians come in different shades of political ideology, so they had different expectations. For independentists, the goal is simple: independence for the former British Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons. As far as they are concerned, any negotiation with the government must be about how to end the union and not about whether the union should continue.

  But other segments of the population still believe in a bilingual Cameroon republic, albeit under new political arrangements. Federalists believe that Anglophone expectations will be met if the country returns to the federal system that existed between 1961 and 1972. This system gave the former British Southern Cameroons constitutional protections within a federal republic, including the right to its own state government, an elected legislature, an independent judiciary, a vibrant local government system and state control over the education system.

  The government of Cameroon has accommodated neither the radical demands of independentists nor the comparatively moderate demands of the federalists. Instead, it is forging ahead with a ‘decentralisation’ policy that gives nominal power to the regions but does not even begin to address the fundamentals of the so-called ‘Anglophone problem’.

  What should Cameroon’s government do to ensure the recognition of the rights of English-speaking Cameroonians?

  For starters, the government should abandon its stopgap and largely cosmetic approach to resolving the conflict, because it only adds to the existing resentment. This is the case, for example, with the much-maligned ‘special status’ accorded to the Northwest and Southwest regions, supposedly to recognise their ‘linguistic particularity and historic heritage’, but which does not give them the power to influence or determine policies in key areas such as education, justice and local government, where this ‘particularity’ needs the most protection.

  The historical and constitutional origins of the Anglophone discontent within the bilingual Cameroon republic are well documented. This discontent must be addressed with a holistic approach that includes meaningful discussions with all parties, from the federalists to the independentists. Dialogue is a journey, not a destination. And the time to start that journey is now, no matter how tortuous, frustrating and challenging, and despite the deep-seated distrust, resentment and animosity among the parties.

  How can the international community support Cameroonian civil society and help find a solution?

  Cameroonian civil society needs financial, material and other resources to adequately provide humanitarian and other assistance to displaced people and people living in conflict zones. This is where the international community comes in. However, international aid is a double-edged sword, given the Cameroon government’s suspicion and hostility towards local CSOs that have international partners, especially those that are critical of how the government has handled the conflict so far. Civil society also needs resources to accurately and adequately document what exactly is happening on the ground, including war crimes and violations of international human rights laws.

  To be able to play a pivotal role in the search for a solution to the conflict, CSOs will have to figure out a way to convince the government – and Ambazonian groups that are equally suspicious of their activities – that they are honest brokers rather than partisan actors or trojan horses working for one side or the other. This is a Herculean, if not virtually impossible, task at this juncture. So, for now, civil society will continue to walk a fine line between the government and the independentists, all the while promising more than it can deliver to the people affected by the conflict.

  As for international support to finding a solution, there has been a lot more international handwringing, from the African Union to the UN, than real action. The international community has so far adopted a largely reactive stance towards the conflict. It issues statements of distress after every atrocity, followed by hollow calls for inclusive dialogue. And then it goes silent until the next tragedy. Hence, the parties have little incentive for dialogue, especially when each believes, rightly or wrongly, that it is gaining the upper hand militarily.

  ---

  Civic space in Cameroon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Dibussi Tande through hiswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@dibussi on Twitter.

• CAMEROON: ‘The international community hasn’t helped address the root causes of the Anglophone conflict’

  CIVICUS speaks with Cameroonian feminist researcher and writer Monique Kwachou about the ongoing crisis in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions. The conflict emerged in 2016 out of a series of legal and education grievances expressed by the country’s Anglophone population, which is a minority at the national level but a majority in the Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions.

  Monique is the founder of Better Breed Cameroon, a civil society organisation (CSO) working on youth development and empowerment, and the national coordinator of the Cameroonian chapter of the Forum for African Women Educationalists.

  What have been the humanitarian consequences of the escalation of the conflict in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions?

  The crisis in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon has internally displaced close to 800,000 English-speaking people, according to monitoring by humanitarian organisations. Many people are also emigrating to other countries in search of safety. Unfortunately, civilians have been used as a weapon so the only way they are able to protect themselves is by fleeing to safer regions within the country or fleeing the country altogether.

  People are also becoming increasingly hopeless and are no longer investing in the Anglophone regions as they used to. As a clear indication of how unsafe it is right now in the Anglophone regions, before stepping out of my house I have to do a risk assessment and decide whether what I have to do is worth taking the risk.

  Unlawful killings and kidnappings are now rampant and somewhat normalised: they no longer shock us as they once did and there is a general trauma fatigue that breeds apathy, which is dangerous.

  As we speak, some are trying to get a hashtag trending for Catholic clergy and worshippers who were recently kidnapped in the Northwest region. The kidnappers are demanding a ransom of 30 million CFA francs (approx. US$45,000) but the church is hesitant to pay because they know if they do it once, more people will be kidnapped and they will have to continue paying. Yet most social media comments on the news encourage payment based on the idea that there is nothing else that can be done. Apathy is the result of having heard too many such stories.

  Given that the security forces have a reputation for violence and contributed to the development of the crisis with their burning down of whole villages earlier on, people don’t have faith in them either.

  As a teacher I think one of the saddest impacts of this crisis has been on education. I don’t think anyone is receiving quality education. Many people have migrated to other regions, particularly to Douala, Cameroon’s largest city, and Yaoundé, the capital. As a result, schools there have become overpopulated. The teacher-to-student ratio has gone up and the quality of education has dropped. In the crisis regions, the future of students is put on hold with each and every strike and lockdown and their psychological wellbeing could be affected.

  What will it take to de-escalate the situation?

  I think the government already knows what needs to be done for the situation to de-escalate. Edith Kahbang Walla, of the opposition Cameroon People’s Party, has outlined a step-by-step process of de-escalation and peaceful political transition. But the problem is that the ruling party does not want a transition. However, as it looks like their plan is to stay in power forever, it would be better for them if they made changes to benefit all regions of Cameroon.

  Extreme measures have been adopted to bring attention to the problems faced by English-speaking Cameroonians. The Anglophone regions continue to observe a ghost town ritual every Monday, taking the day off to protest against the authorities. On those days schools don’t operate and businesses remain closed. The original purpose was to show support for teachers and lawyers who were on strike but it is now having a negative impact on the lives of residents of the Anglophone regions.

  If the government could consider a better strategy to negotiate with secessionists, the situation could be dealt with effectively. Unfortunately, the government has made negotiation impossible since the crisis began, as it arrested those who took part in the protests. Who is the government going to have a dialogue with now? They claim they won’t negotiate with terrorists while forgetting that they created the monster. They should acknowledge the root causes of the problem or otherwise they won’t be able to fix it.

  What challenges does civil society face while advocating for peace?

  Civil society is a victim of both sides of the ongoing conflict. CSO activities geared towards development have been greatly affected by the crisis, as CSO work is now geared mostly toward humanitarian action.

  On one hand, the government is undermining Anglophone activism through arrests and restrictions on online and offline freedom of speech. Anyone who speaks up against the government and what the military are doing in the Anglophone regions may be in danger. For example, journalist Mimi Mefo was arrested for reporting on military activity and had to leave Cameroon because her life was threatened.

  On the other hand, peace activists advocating for children to go back to school are also being attacked by secessionist groups who think their activities are being instrumentalised by the government. Hospitals have been attacked by both the military and secessionist armed groups because they helped one or the other.

  Aside from the challenge of danger that CSO members face in the course of their work, there is also the challenge of articulating messages for peace and the resolution of the crisis without being branded as pro-government nor pro-secessionists, particularly as the media tries to paint the conflict as a simply black-or-white issue. This has not been an easy task. Limited resources also make it difficult to carry out peacebuilding work.

  How can the international community support Cameroonian civil society?

  Humanitarian organisations started becoming visible in the Anglophone regions during the crisis. They are giving humanitarian aid, but it is like a plaster on a still-festering wound, because it happens after the damage has been done: it is in no way addressing the crisis.

  I have not seen the international community help Cameroon address the root causes of the conflict. It could help, for instance, by tracing the sale of arms to both sides of the conflict. Our main international partners could also use their influence to pressure the government to move towards actual inclusive dialogue and ensure the adoption of effective solutions to the crisis.

  ---

  Civic space in Cameroon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor

  Get in touch withMonique Kwachou through herwebsite and follow @montrelz on Twitter.

• CHAD: ‘The government, local groups and society at large have all joined efforts to help refugees’

  CIVICUS speaks with Monim Haroon, Emergency Communications Manager at the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), about the situation of Sudanese migrants in Chad’s refugee camps and civil society’s work to support them.

  Formally established in 1902, HIAS is the world’s oldest refugee agency. Originally set up by Jewish people to assist fellow Jews, it has evolved into a global humanitarian and advocacy group that helps hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced people in more than 20 countries around the world. Monim, himself a Darfur refugee, is currently deployed in Eastern Chad.

• COLOMBIA: ‘Civil society is an important pillar in work with the migrant population’

  CIVICUS speaks with Carmen Aida Faria, director of Fundación Manitas Amarillas (Little Yellow Hands Foundation), about the difficulties faced by Venezuelan migrants in Colombia and the work being done by civil society to facilitate their access to rights.

  Manitas Amarillas is a Colombian civil society organisation (CSO) formed in 2018, in the context of mass Venezuelan migration to Colombia, to provide humanitarian assistance, access to health services and counselling to migrants and refugees.

  How has the situation of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia changed in recent years?

  Migration flows into Colombia have changed over time. The 2015 wave of Venezuelan migration was very important, but the number of migrants increased over the following years, peaking in 2017. Compared to the previous wave, this one included a lot more people in vulnerable situation.

  The new arrivals needed immediate healthcare and access to other fundamental rights that the system could not provide. Colombia did not have the infrastructure or the financial resources to respond, particularly in border areas, where local populations also experience deficits in access to education and healthcare, among other rights.

  Migrants in vulnerable situations were also unable to receive monetary aid through the Colombian government’s social assistance programmes or enter the subsidised health system. To access social programmes, people must have a regular migration status.

  In addition to a permanent migrant population, there is also the population in border areas that constantly crosses the border back and forth to access certain services. For instance, many children who live in Venezuela go to school in Colombia and are not included in school food programmes. There are organisations working specifically to ensure these children have access to food, as they arrive with significant nutritional problems.

  These processes created a demand for the community, but above all for the Colombian state, to respond to. And the country began to operate under a logic of solidarity and gratitude: Colombians remember that in the past it was Venezuela that received Colombian migrants. Thus, the government began to grant special residence permits to regularise this population in some way. But the definite milestone was the Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPMV), approved in 2021 under an essentially humanitarian logic.

  What did the implementation of this new policy entail?

  The ETPMV implied temporary regularisation so that Venezuelans could benefit from the same rights and have the same duties as Colombian nationals. Upon receiving an identity document called a Temporary Protection Permit, migrants have the possibility of accessing the health system and the labour market, among other rights.

  Theoretically, the mechanism is well thought out. However, putting it into practice has been hard. Many people have been left out: more than 2.4 million migrants have registered in the Single Registry for Venezuelan Migrants, but there are still more than a million who, having completed the full process, have not received their permit.

  Some people applied for the permit in September 2021, more than a year ago, and have consulted Migración Colombia, the authority for migration control and monitoring, but still do not know what has happened to their application. Some have not received their permits due to logistical problems: this is a highly mobile population and when they change addresses it is often not possible to locate them to deliver the documentation.

  But it is also the case that difficulties continue once the permit has been obtained. This is an indication of deeper problems. When Venezuelans go with their permit to open a bank account or register with the health system, they are often rejected. The Temporary Protection Permit is a new document and many institutions, both public and private, are not yet familiar with it. A lot of education is needed to make these rights effectively accessible.

  The ETPMV was supposed to prioritise the most vulnerable population groups. The first to receive their permits were supposed to be people in need of immediate medical attention and children and adolescents who needed them to enter the education system due to lack of identity papers. This ultimately did not happen, to such an extent that legal appeals have had to be filed to ensure access to healthcare for people with chronic illnesses or other conditions in need of immediate attention.

  How is Colombian civil society supporting Venezuelan migrants?

  Since the last big wave of migration in 2017, many CSOs have emerged. It was the migrant community itself that first began to get together to help other migrants. We started giving food out on the street and providing humanitarian assistance to walkers, as we call the people moving on foot through Colombian territory, who did not have basic information or even warm enough clothing to withstand Colombia’s climate.

  CSOs have become an important pillar in work with the migrant population, because we are on the ground and we know the problems migrants have.

  Currently, many CSOs are working together in coordination with the Mayor’s Office of Bogotá and promoting several joint initiatives. We have launched public campaigns and signed a symbolic pact to promote integration, because Venezuelan migrants in Colombia continue to suffer from xenophobia and discrimination as a result of their poverty. We have asked the media to stop mentioning the nationality of crime perpetrators, because they only do so when the person involved is a foreigner, thus overstating the problem and contributing to discrimination against Venezuelans.

  We are also participating, in collaboration with the Colombian government and international cooperation agencies, in the first ‘Entregatón’, a massive permit delivery operation aimed at distributing 40,000 permits in five days. Migración Colombia has sent messages via mobile phone to migrants whose documents are ready, notifying them of the date and place where they can pick them up.

  But in addition to handing out the documents, as part of the operation, enrolment and biometric registration services are being provided for those who have not yet completed these stages of the process. People who have already received their permits are also offered vaccination services, access to healthcare providers, registration with the social assistance system, legal support and information on various other issues, from the transportation system to school access to programmes targeted at migrant women.

  There is so much work and CSOs are contributing enormously. The government and international cooperation agencies should take us into account not only as sources of diagnoses of migration issues, but also as partners when it comes to jointly implementing public policies arising from those diagnoses.

  ---

  Civic space in Colombia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Manitas Amarillas through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@MANITASAMARI on Twitter.

• COLOMBIA: ‘Lack of regular migration status imposes barriers to accessing rights’

  CIVICUS speaks with Jessica Corredor Villamil and Lina Arroyave about the situation of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia. Jessica is the director of and Lina a researcher in Dejusticia’s international team.

  Dejusticia is a centre for legal and social studies based in Bogotá, Colombia, dedicated to promoting human rights in Colombia and the global south. It promotes social change through action-research, developing public policy proposals, advocacy campaigns and strategic litigation.

  How has Colombia changed its legal framework to accommodate Venezuelan migration?

  There are currently three ways in which Venezuelan nationals can obtain the status that allows them to stay in Colombia for extended periods: visas, refugee status and the Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPMV).

  The ETPMV was established in 2021 to address the situation of mass migration from Venezuela. It has two main objectives: to identify the Venezuelan migrant population and regularise their migratory situation. To this end, two mechanisms are envisaged. The first is the Single Registry of Venezuelan Migrants, which collects personal and socio-economic data of those who register, administered by Migración Colombia, the authority in charge of migration control and surveillance. The second is the Temporary Protection Permit, which authorises its holders to stay in Colombia for 10 years and allows them to access the health, social security, education and financial systems, validate their diplomas, work and leave and re-enter the country.

  Those in Colombia who have regular status, who have requested refuge but have not yet received a response, who entered the country irregularly before 31 January 2021, who have entered the country regularly after May 2021, or do so before late May 2023 are all eligible for temporary protected status. After that cut-off date, it will only be available to children and adolescents.

  Even so, people are not guaranteed temporary protected status if they meet all the requirements, since it is granted at the discretion of Migración Colombia.

  How has the ETPMV system worked during its first year?

  The process has takenlonger than expected, falling short of the goal set by the previous government of delivering 1.8 million identification documents by 2022.

  According to data from Migración Colombia, as of November 2022 about 2.5 million people have entered their data in the Single Registry for Venezuelan Migrants and 1.6 million permits have been approved.

  This gap is worrying because lack of regular migration status imposes barriers to accessing fundamental rights and hinders the socio-economic integration of migrants.

  In addition, many people did not register because they were unable to regularise their migration status. The ETPMV was only available to those in an irregular situation who had entered Colombia before 31 January 2021. This time limitation ignores the fact that irregular migration continues, largely because of the impossibility of obtaining official documents in Venezuela. Irregular status is assumed to be the result of individual decisions, when it is usually results from the impossibility of complying with the requirements imposed.

  What integration barriers do Venezuelan migrants face in Colombia?

  In a recentreport we identified multiple barriers to accessing and remaining in the formal labour market, as well as for setting up a business.

  The main legal barrier is lack of regular migration status. The thousands of people who continue to enter Colombia through informal border crossings are denied access to temporary protected status. This has an impact on both formalising their employment and access to entrepreneurship support funds, particularly from the state, but also from the private sector. A majority of self-employed migrant workers work in the informal sector.

  Widespread ignorance among employers of migration legislation imposes additional barriers. For instance, many are unaware that the validation of university degrees is only required for professions that involve high social risk, such as medicine, or that are regulated by the state, such as architecture or law, for which all applicants must follow a process to validate their diplomas and have professional cards issued. This procedure requires an official certificate that must be obtained in Venezuela, and those who are already in Colombia face immense difficulties in securing this.

  There are also social and cultural factors that can affect the employment situation. Negative perceptions of the Venezuelan migrant population affect recruitment processes. Xenophobia and discrimination deepen in situations of insecurity, although there is no evidence of links between migration and increased crime.

  Lack of social capital – such as well-placed contacts and job references – is also a problem for migrants.

  Additional obstacles make it difficult for migrant workers to remain in the formal economy. For example, many banks refuse to open savings accounts for Venezuelan migrants. They not only require them to prove their regular migration status but also demand an up-to-date passport, which they usually don’t have. Similar challenges come with some health insurers, pension funds and occupational risk insurance companies.

  As a result, to earn an income many migrants are forced into precarious jobs and exploitative working conditions, including extremely long working hours, sub-minimum wages, mistreatment and changes in agreed working conditions. In 2019, the average monthly income of a Venezuelan migrant was less than the legal minimum wage, and the wage gap compared to Colombian nationals was more than 30 percentage points.

  What is Dejusticia doing to promote migrants’ rights?

  As a civil society organisation, we carry out research on migrants’ access to rights that we use to influence decision-making processes on migration policy and formulate public policy recommendations. In the research process leading to ourreport on the labour inclusion of Venezuelan migrants, for example, we organised an event to which we invited various stakeholders, including government agencies, to work on recommendations. Also, when anew government took office in August 2022, we produced a series of recommendations, in partnership with other organisations.

  We also develop strategic litigation and communications campaigns, and work with other organisations, both nationally, regionally and in other regions of the global south, to address the migration phenomenon from a broader perspective.

  What support from the international community do organisations defending the rights of migrants in Colombia need?

  It is important for the international community to shed visibility on and support the processes that are taking place in relation to the rights of Venezuelan migrants. But it is also very important that the support of the international community covers other migratory flows and takes into account the problems happening on the Colombia-Panama border, crossed by migrants of various nationalities trying to head towards the USA.

  It is also important for the international community to remind the Colombian government of the commitments it has made by ratifying treaties and adopting international standards on migration and refugees.

  ---

  Civic space in Colombia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Dejusticia through itswebsite orFacebook page and follow@DeJusticia and@JessCorredorV on Twitter.

• COLOMBIA: “La carencia de estatus migratorio regular impone barreras de acceso a derechos”

  CIVICUS conversa con Jessica Corredor Villamil y Lina Arroyave sobre la situación de las personas migrantes y refugiadas venezolanas en Colombia. Jessica esdirectora y Lina es investigadora del área internacional de Dejusticia.

  Dejusticia es un centro de estudios jurídicos y sociales localizado en Bogotá, Colombia, y dedicado a promover los derechos humanos en Colombia y en el sur global. Promueve el cambio social a través de la investigación-acción, desarrollando propuestas de políticas públicas, campañas de incidencia y litigios estratégicos.

  ¿Cómo ha reformado Colombia su marco legal para acoger a la migración venezolana?

  Actualmente hay tres vías mediante las cuales las personas nacionales de Venezuela pueden obtener el estatus migratorio que les permite permanecer en Colombia por períodos prolongados: las visas, la solicitud de la condición de refugiado y el Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos(ETPMV). 

  Este último fue establecido en 2021 para atender la migración masiva procedente de Venezuela. Tiene dos grandes objetivos: identificar a la población migrante venezolana y regularizar su situación migratoria. Para esto prevé dos mecanismos. El primero es el Registro Único de Migrantes Venezolanos, que recoge los datos personales y socioeconómicos de quienes deciden registrarse y es administrado por Migración Colombia, la autoridad de vigilancia y control migratorio. El segundo es el Permiso por Protección Temporal, que autoriza a su portador a permanecer en Colombia por 10 años y le permite acceder a los sistemas de salud y seguridad social, educativo y financiero, convalidar títulos, trabajar y salir del país y reingresar.

  Pueden acogerse al ETPMV quienes se encuentren en Colombia de manera regular, quienes han solicitado refugio pero aún no han recibido respuesta, quienes ingresaron al país de manera irregular antes del 31 de enero de 2021, y quienes lo hicieron de manera regular desde finales de mayo de 2021 o lo hagan antes de finales de mayo de 2023. Luego de esa fecha, solo será una opción para niños, niñas y adolescentes.

  Aun así, el cumplir con todos los requisitos no es garantía de obtención del ETPMV, ya que su otorgamiento es facultad discrecional de Migración Colombia.

  ¿Cómo ha funcionado el ETPMV durante su primer año? 

  El proceso se hademorado más de lo previsto, lo cual impidió cumplir la meta del gobierno anterior de entregar 1.8 millones de documentos de identificación en 2022.

  Según datos de Migración Colombia, hasta noviembre de 2022 cerca de 2,5 millones de personas han ingresado sus datos en el Registro Único para Migrantes Venezolanos, y se han aprobado 1,6 millones de permisos.

  Esta brecha es preocupante porque la carencia de estatus migratorio regular impone barreras de acceso a derechos fundamentales y obstaculiza la integración socioeconómica de la población migrante.

  Además, muchas personas no se inscribieron en el registro por no haber podido regularizar su situación migratoria. El ETPMV solamente estaba disponible para las personas en situación irregular que hubieran ingresado a Colombia hasta el 31 de enero de 2021. Esta limitación temporal ignora el hecho de que la migración irregular continúa, en gran medida a causa de la imposibilidad de acceder a documentos oficiales en Venezuela. Se asume que la situación de irregularidad obedece a una decisión individual, cuando por lo general es el resultado de la imposibilidad de cumplir con los requisitos exigidos.

  ¿Qué barreras de integración enfrentan las personas migrantes venezolanas en Colombia?

  En un recienteinforme identificamos las múltiples barreras de acceso y permanencia en el mercado laboral formal, así como para el desarrollo de emprendimientos.

  La principal barrera legal es la carencia de estatus migratorio regular. Las miles de personas que continúan ingresando a Colombia por pasos fronterizos informales tienen vedado el acceso al ETPMV. Esto tiene impactos tanto para la formalización laboral como para el acceso a fondos de apoyo al emprendimiento, en particular estatales, pero también privados. La mayoría de los trabajadores migrantes independientes trabaja en el sector informal.

  El desconocimiento generalizado de la legislación migratoria por parte de los empleadores impone barreras adicionales. Por ejemplo, muchos desconocen que la convalidación de títulos universitarios solo es imprescindible para profesiones cuyo ejercicio implica altos riesgos sociales, como la medicina, o cuyo ejercicio es regulado por el Estado, como el derecho o la arquitectura, y exigen a todos los postulantes la realización del trámite de convalidación de títulos y expedición de tarjetas profesionales. Este trámite requiere de una apostilla que debe ser obtenida en Venezuela antes de migrar, y quienes ya se encuentran en Colombia enfrentan enormes dificultades para conseguirla.

  También existen factores sociales y culturales que pueden afectar la situación laboral. Las percepciones negativas de la población migrante venezolana afectan los procesos de selección de personal. La xenofobia y la discriminación se profundizan cuando ocurren hechos de inseguridad, pese a que no hay evidencia de vínculos entre el aumento de la criminalidad y el de la migración.

  La falta de capital social, es decir, de contactos bien posicionados y referencias laborales, también es un problema para las personas migrantes.

  Algunos obstáculos adicionales dificultan la permanencia en la economía formal. Por ejemplo, muchos bancos se niegan a abrir cuentas de ahorros a personas migrantes venezolanas ya que les exigen no solamente acreditar estatus migratorio regular sino también presentar su pasaporte actualizado, con el que habitualmente no cuentan. Algo similar ocurre con algunas aseguradoras de salud, fondos de pensiones y aseguradoras de riesgos de trabajo.

  De ahí que muchas personas migrantes con tal de conseguir algún ingreso acepten empleos precarios y se sometan a condiciones de explotación laboral que incluyen jornadas de trabajo extremadamente largas, salarios por debajo del mínimo, malos tratos y cambios en las condiciones laborales acordadas. En 2019, los ingresos mensuales promedio de una persona migrante venezolana fueron inferiores al salario mínimo legal vigente, y la brecha salarial frente a los nacionales colombianos fue de más de 30 puntos porcentuales.

  ¿Qué trabajo hace Dejusticia para promover los derechos de las personas migrantes? 

  En tanto que organización de la sociedad civil, hacemos investigaciones sobre el acceso a derechos de las personas migrantes para sobre esa base hacer incidencia en los procesos de toma de decisiones en materia de política migratoria y formular recomendaciones de política pública. En el proceso de investigación para nuestroinforme sobre la inclusión laboral de las y los migrantes venezolanos, por ejemplo, organizamos un evento al cual invitamos a los diferentes sectores involucrados, incluidas varias agencias gubernamentales, para trabajar en las recomendaciones. Asimismo, al iniciarse unnuevo gobierno en agosto de 2022 elaboramos un documento con recomendaciones, en alianza con otras organizaciones.

  También desarrollamos litigios estratégicos y campañas de comunicación, y trabajamos con otras organizaciones, a nivel tanto nacional como regional y de otras regiones del sur global, para abordar el fenómeno de las migraciones desde una mirada más amplia.

  ¿Qué apoyo de la comunidad internacional necesitan las organizaciones que defienden los derechos de las personas migrantes en Colombia?

  Es importante que la comunidad internacional dé visibilidad y apoye los procesos que se están dando en relación con los derechos de las personas migrantes venezolanas. Pero también es muy importante que el apoyo de la comunidad internacional abarque otros flujos migratorios y dé cuenta de la problemática en la frontera colombo-panameña, paso obligado para personas migrantes de distintas nacionalidades que quieren llegar a los Estados Unidos.

  También es importante que la comunidad internacional le recuerde al gobierno de Colombia los compromisos que ha adquirido a partir de la ratificación de tratados y la adopción de estándares internacionales en materia de migración y refugio.

  ---

  El espacio cívico en Colombia es calificado como ‘represivo’ por elCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contáctese con Dejusticia a través de susitio web o su página deFacebook y siga a@DeJusticia y a@JessCorredorV en Twitter.

• GAZA: ‘The attacks and disinformation campaign against UNRWA are aimed at dismantling it’

  CIVICUS speaks with Jonathan Fowler of the United Nations Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), about the agency’s role in Gaza and the challenges it faces.

  Established after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, UNRWA is the UN agency tasked with supporting the welfare and human development of Palestine refugees. It’s funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions from UN member states.

  What’s UNRWA’s role?

  UNRWA was established by the UN General Assembly in 1949 to deal with the effects of the refugee crisis caused by the Arab-Israeli war. Its initial mandate was to meet immediate humanitarian needs, but over the years it evolved and expanded to include a wide range of services.

  We are a unique agency in the UN system. We are not an advisory agency – we are direct providers of education, healthcare, relief and social services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency relief.

  UNRWA employs some 30,000 staff, most of whom are Palestine refugees. We are the agency with the largest presence in Gaza, where 13,000 staff were engaged in pre-war operations, notably in education. Recently, the agency has suffered an unprecedented number of casualties among its staff, with 189 members losing their lives. There are still 3,500 to 4,000 people working heroically on the ground, while the rest have been forced to flee.

  UNRWA’s work extends beyond Gaza. We also work in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as well as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Each place has its own challenges.

  In the context of a dire humanitarian crisis such as the war in Gaza, we have shifted to a more traditional humanitarian role. Because of our size, we’re the backbone of humanitarian operations in Gaza. We are indispensable to other parts of the UN system that rely on our logistics on the ground.

  How has UNRWA responded to accusations of collaboration with Hamas?

  Over the years UNRWA has faced a number of allegations of breaches of neutrality by its staff. We work in a highly politicised environment, but we’re not here to reconcile different narratives about the conflict or the history of the region – we’re here to help Palestinian refugees. We believe in the need for a just and lasting solution to the refugee crisis, but our goal and mission are primarily humanitarian, not political.

  While staff are allowed to have their opinions, neutrality is essential for any UN official. But in a large organisation like ours, there will inevitably be occasional breaches of neutrality. When they occur, we conduct internal – and sometimes external – investigations.

  We strongly condemned the Hamas attacks on civilians on 7 October. They were abhorrent and unacceptable, and completely contrary to international humanitarian law.

  But at the end of January, we were faced with allegations that 12 of our staff were involved in the 7 October attacks. We acted swiftly in what we call ‘reverse due process’, which is something the executive authority of any UN agency can do in situations where it’s deemed essential to protect ongoing operations. Our Commissioner-General, Philippe Lazzarini, terminated the staff members’ contracts and referred the investigation to the UN’s top investigative body, the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

  These allegations were later expanded to involve 19 people. We are talking about a tiny percentage of the 30,000 people working for UNRWA. So, the real story here is that in an extremely high-pressure and politicised environment, the vast majority of our staff have remained neutral.

  However, these incidents were misconstrued by Israeli officials and media, leading to unfounded claims that Hamas has infiltrated UNRWA. Allegations against individual staff were turned into accusations against the whole agency. Supporters and social media amplified the claim. It was an attempt to smear our agency. Our detractors want to portray us as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

  How have these allegations affected your work?

  Unfortunately, the allegations gained enough traction to cause several UN member states, including major donors, to suspend funding to our organisation at a time when we’re dealing with the biggest humanitarian crisis in the region in decades.

  This became a huge problem for us. Underfunding constrains our operations and puts our staff at risk. Our facilities have been affected by the war and repeatedly targeted. More than 160 of our facilities have been hit in over 300 separate incidents. Hundreds of people seeking safety in shelters under the UN flag have been injured or killed.

  We have also been refused permission by the Israeli authorities to deliver aid to northern Gaza, exacerbating the ongoing humanitarian crisis. In the West Bank, our staff are routinely intimidated and denied access to our offices in East Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem, our office has been the target of regular protests, vandalism and, most recently, arson attacks.

  We believe in freedom of expression, but not in violence. Some people, including a deputy mayor of Jerusalem, have incited crowds. Their highly inflammatory language soon became real flames. We expected the deputy mayor to apologise, or at least acknowledge these weren’t the right means. But instead, he ramped up his aggressive rhetoric and singled out the next compounds to be attacked. We’re worried about what might come next and whether this campaign of intimidation and active violence might turn into something more serious.

  All in all, the attacks and the disinformation campaign are aimed at dismantling the agency. But we are committed to fulfilling our mandate. We believe passionately in what we do and why we do it. And we count on the invaluable support of UN member states that have publicly affirmed that UN entities have diplomatic privileges and immunities that protect us and our mission.

  What are you doing to rebuild trust among donors?

  In January, the Commissioner-General decided that because of the constant attacks on UNRWA’s reputation, we needed an independent review of our neutrality framework. A few days later, the allegations surfaced. As a result, many people portrayed the independent review as a response to the allegations, but that wasn’t the case.

  Nevertheless, some member states decided to suspend their funding and presented it as a response to the allegations. However, countries such as Australia, Canada and Sweden resumed their support shortly afterwards, either because we were able to reassure them or because they realised that such a decision couldn’t be taken without evidence.

  Last month the independent review was published. It was led by Catherine Colonna, the former French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, and conducted by some Nordic think tanks. This report confirmed that UNRWA has one of the most robust systems of neutrality among both UN and non-governmental organisations. Nevertheless, it made some 50 recommendations to improve our neutrality mechanisms and implementation, which we are implementing. As a result, other member states, such as Germany, decided to restore their funding.

  Different countries need different kinds of reassurance – not just from us, but also internally. We are currently working to bring back two major donors: the UK and the USA, our largest donor. Over the years, the USA has often been a strong supporter of UNRWA, although the level of funding has fluctuated from administration to administration. Unfortunately, the US Congress has blocked all funding for UNRWA until March 2025. To put this in perspective, US contributions make up almost 90 per cent of our US$260 million shortfall.

  We are dealing with a huge humanitarian crisis, and we need enormous amounts of money to alleviate its terrible effects. At the moment, we have enough funds to continue operations until the end of June.

  However, we have also seen a renewed outpouring of support as the suspensions have taken place. Some existing donors, such as Ireland, Norway, Portugal and Spain, have increased their donations. These are very important symbolic gestures, but also very significant contributions to our finances. We have also had new, non-traditional donors, such as Iraq with US$25 million and Algeria with US$15 million.

  Individual and private sector donors came to our aid, contributing more than US$115 million to date. A foundation in Singapore has raised US$5 million through individual and corporate donations, but the support has not only come from Islamic communities. We’ve seen all kind of examples, including an artwork auction organised by artists in Ireland that raised thousands of euros for us. This shows how strong grassroots solidarity for Palestinian refugees currently is.

  How do you see the future of UNRWA?

  Although UNRWA has a long history of financial challenges, we have never faced anything like this. To maintain the quality and level of our services to the Palestinian refugee community across the region, we must find ways to sustain our finances, or we’ll be forced to reduce or even cut our operations after June. This could mean reducing school days or clinic hours, which would be catastrophic.

  We shouldn’t be asked to do something and then not have the funds to do it. But unfortunately, this is quite common in the UN system.

  But there’s a silver lining. Because of this crisis, there is a greater awareness of what UNRWA does and why it’s important. Nobody else can do what we do on the scale that’s needed. If we were to disappear, there would still be a Palestinian refugee question that would need to be addressed. Someone would have to provide the services. The issue is who would replace us.

  Legally, Israel, as the occupying state, must provide for the welfare of the population under occupation. So even if it doesn’t like us, it needs us. We’re just not replaceable. So we need sustainable funding to continue to do the work we’re mandated to do. It’s up to the international community to ensure this budgetary consistency. We hope all donors will return soon.

  What else needs to be done to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza?

  First, we need an immediate ceasefire. We’ve been campaigning for one since the beginning of this war, but it has to happen immediately. There is no other way to ensure people’s wellbeing. We also need a steady, sustained and predictable flow of humanitarian aid to keep people alive. Many people are on the brink of famine. They need food and water, as well as healthcare and shelter.

  The next phase is recovery. People need to be able to return to their homes, which means clearing the huge amount of unexploded ordnance and rebuilding housing.

  After that, we need to restore economic activity, which is the only way to get a society back on its feet. And we need to help people heal psychologically from the horrors and traumatic stress they have experienced. We need to rebuild the health sector and get children back to school.

  All of this must be done, and quickly. But the first step is to secure a ceasefire now, and then we’ll be able to take the next steps.

  ---

  Civic space in Palestine is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Civic space in Israel is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with UNRWA through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@UNRWA and@UN_JWFOWLER on Twitter.

• INDIA: ‘The once-cosmopolitan state of Manipur is now divided into two rival communities’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about ethnic violence and a humanitarian crisis in the Indian state of Manipur withMangneo Lhungdim and Sulekha Thapa, Executive Director and Deputy Director of Oasis India.

  Founded in 1994, Oasis India is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to prevent human trafficking and other forms of violence against women and children and support people so they can flourish in their community. Oasis India has also been involved inemergency relief work in Manipur.

   

  What triggered ethnic violence in Manipur state?

  Manipur and a few other northeastern states of India endured severe ethnic violence until the mid-1990s and into the early 2000s. But over the past two decades rights-based reconciliation and development efforts gained momentum, including infrastructure development initiatives that ultimately benefited local communities.

  In this new context, the conflict between the majority Meitei people living in the Imphal Valley and the Kuki-Zo tribal community from the surrounding hills, now into its eighth month, could definitely have been prevented. As retired military and police officers have claimed, public order could and should have been restored within the first month of the conflict in May 2023. The state administration, supported by central security forces, had the capacity to contain the violence and prevent further displacement and killings.

  The conflict is believed to be a collateral outcome of valley Meitei people demanding inclusion on the Scheduled Tribes list under the Constitution of India, which tribal communities interpreted as an attempt to grab their land. On 3 May 2023, the tribals of Manipur, under the aegis of All Tribal Students Union Manipur, carried out a protest march in most hill districts, including Churachandpur. Violent incidents during the Churachandpur march spiralled and spread statewide, turning into senseless killings, arson and displacement.

  It’s difficult to identify particular reasons behind this outbreak of violence since the media coverage was initially limited and subsequent reports by independent journalists gave mixed messages and focused primarily on day-to-day events. Nevertheless, the government must fully acknowledge its responsibility and admit that it bears significant blame for such escalation of a latent ethnic conflict.

  The once-cosmopolitan state of Manipur is now divided into two rival communities and there’s no prospect of the conflict ending any time soon, as there are no substantial peacebuilding efforts by the state or national government. The only hope of restoring normality in life and livelihoods in Manipur comes from collaborative efforts undertaken by local CSOs and leaders.

  What’s the current situation on the ground?

  The situation is relatively more stable now than during the initial three to four months of the conflict, but it still remains challenging. The deployment of over 50,000 central security personnel has led to increased militarisation.

  The violence affects every aspect of the lives of people of all ages.

  Agriculture is the primary occupation in the region, but a majority of farmers missed the sowing and harvest seasons due to curfew regulations and lack of resources. This has deprived them of earnings to meet the basic needs of their families and resulted in shortages of staples.

  Over 60,000 people have been forcibly displaced and currently stay in camps where CSOs are the primary providers of humanitarian aid. Road communications from Manipur’s capital city, Imphal, to affected districts are severed, which complicates the delivery of relief and affects local businesses.

  The strict curfew forced schools to close, causing children to miss several months of education and delaying the start of the new academic year. Healthcare services have also been disrupted. Even burying the dead was impossible for a long period, though some improvement has been noted over the past few days, when the remains of 64 people were taken back to their homelands.

  The emotional impact on the residents of Manipur is profound. People have lived in fear and anxiety for a long time, and many have lost family members or their homes.

  How has Indian civil society, including Oasis, worked to address the humanitarian crisis?

  Several Indian CSOs have responded to the humanitarian needs in both the hills and valley districts of Manipur. In the hill districts, the primary providers have been local churches, national aid agencies, volunteers and philanthropic organisations. Many families continue to rely on supplies and assistance provided by civil society and the neighbouring states of Assam, Mizoram and Nagaland.

  Civil society is working to improve the lives of internally displaced people sheltered in relief camps. Those in Churachandpur, for instance, receive vocational training, including tailoring and computer courses. Those who already have specific skills are provided with craft materials such as wool and weaving sets, to knit sweaters and woollen caps, while others have received bamboo wood and plastic knitting wire to make stools. This has become a source of income for many people, making a huge difference in their lives.

   

  What challenges have you faced in doing your work?

  For Oasis India and various aid agencies, the primary challenge has been delivering relief to the valley areas of Manipur, as the national highway was cut off, making it impossible to transport essential supplies without a security convoy. Food and hygiene kits were mainly sourced from neighbouring Mizoram and Nagaland, incurring high costs and taking 15 to 17 hours on a rough road to deliver supplies to tribal districts.

  Over time, Oasis started to assist people in relief camps but could only help displaced people from the Kuki-Zo tribes. Despite efforts by our senior management to overcome obstacles, there have continued to be security challenges in reaching out to the Meitei community.

  Yet another significant problem lies in mobilising resources for relief from national and international donors. The conflict’s nature as being between ethnic communities, which has been projected as having a political colour, has caused many funders to shy away.

  What should be done to resolve the conflict, and how should the international community help?

  International aid is insufficient. Since May 2023, neither the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department nor the United Nations Children's Fund have stepped in to provide humanitarian assistance to Manipur. The same is true for the Prime Minister National Relief Fund and the Prime Minister's Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund. The international community must collaborate with local CSOs that continue taking the lead in providing aid.

  For a genuine resolution to the conflict, both the Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities must come to the table, engage in dialogue and avoid any hate speech, and collaborate to establish peaceful coexistence. To facilitate this, a ceasefire should be agreed at all buffer zones. Given the loss of trust in the state government by the tribal Kuki-Zo people, an independent empowered authority could potentially broker a ceasefire between the two warring communities. There are enough sensible people and peace-loving activists in both communities who can play critical roles in bringing about reconciliation and peace.

  To put an end to the violence and prevent its repetition, perpetrators, regardless of ethnicity, should be held accountable. The Supreme Court has ordered the formation of at least 42 special investigation teams to prosecute conflict-related crimes, so at least there’s hope in this regard.

   

  ---

  Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Oasis India through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Oasisatindia on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• MOROCCO: ‘Support those who were there before the earthquake hit and will stay when the cameras are gone’

  CIVICUS speaks about the role of civil society in the response to the recent earthquake in Morocco with Victoria Vrana, Chief Executive Officer at GlobalGiving.

  Founded in 2002, GlobalGiving is a nonprofit organisation working to accelerate community-led change. When a crisis happens, GlobalGiving works to quickly deliver funds to vetted organisations that are best suited to lead immediate and long-term relief and recovery.

  What can governments do to reduce the damage caused by natural disasters?

  Governments play a critical role in disaster response, and there is a global need for enhanced disaster preparedness and risk reduction efforts. Even thoughevery US$1 invested in disaster risk reduction saves US$6 in damages, the currentglobal spending on disaster response is five times higher than the spending on risk reduction. Prioritising disaster-resilient homes and businesses, early warning systems and risk mapping saves lives. Still, relatively little attention is being paid to these essential activities worldwide, leaving the most vulnerable communities, including children, women and low-income families, underprepared when disaster inevitably strikes.

  How does civil society help address disasters?

  When governments impose aid restrictions or, in the chaotic aftermath of a disaster, block roads or runways, circumventing red tape becomes crucial for delivering aid directly to those in need. During earthquakes, friends, families and neighbours emerge as the true first responders, standing on the frontlines alongside local organisations. The goal of GlobalGiving is to deliver aid into their handsas quickly as possible. We rapidly mobilise resources and make disbursements within a few days after a disaster strikes. 

  What work is GlobalGiving doing in Morocco? 

  There is an ongoing disaster response with many stakeholders involved. GlobalGiving collaborates with over two dozen vetted nonprofit partners, actively involved in earthquake-affected areas. Many of them are registered and based in Morocco and others have decades of experience working in the country. We focus on empowering those local, community-led organisationsto make a lasting impact by providing them with the necessary tools and resources for pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis situations.

  GlobalGiving is a safe and trusted organisation with over 20 years of experience accredited by theBBB Wise Giving Alliance andhighly rated onCharity Navigator. All donations to theGlobalGiving Morocco Earthquake Relief Fund contribute to relief and recovery efforts in Morocco.

  Initially, the fund has been instrumental in addressing survivors’ immediate needs in food, fuel, clean water, medicine and shelter. As time passes, our fund will shift its focus to support recovery efforts. The most significant challenge isrebuildinglives and communities following disaster. Our partners will be working to meet the most pressing needs over the coming months, but the rebuilding process will likely take years, leaving many people without permanent homes in the meantime.

  What international support does Morocco currently need, and how can people help?

  Some of the greatest needs include food, water, emergency medical supplies and temporary relief and emergency supplies for displaced families. Our partners are also providing mental health and psychosocial support for affected communities, including frontline workers. You can contribute to all these efforts by donating to theGlobalGiving Morocco Earthquake Relief Fund.

  History demonstrates that attention shifts elsewhere over the next few weeks after a disaster takes place, but affected communities are left grappling with the impacts for years to come. In the case of Morocco, we’ve already observed a decline in news coverage, leading to diminishing international support. Astartling 70 to 80 per cent of disaster funding is directed at short-term relief, with the majority allocated within the first two months of a disaster. Therefore, continuous support to local groups and those with contextual knowledge is of paramount importance.

  At GlobalGiving, we advocate for planned donations that help survivors in the long run. So we encourage people to consider making a smaller immediate donation, followed by further contributions over time or, even better, to set up a monthly recurring donation to provide a steady source of income to help communities meet their long-term needs.

  When you donate locally in the aftermath of an earthquake or another natural disaster, your contribution goes to organisations that have been living and working in the affected area and are better able to find context-specific solutions. Those people were there before the earthquake hit and will stay long after the news cameras are gone. 

  Civic space in Morocco is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with GlobalGiving through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@GlobalGiving and@vicvrana on Twitter.

• SUDAN: ‘Sudan is experiencing the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, but remains largely ignored by the international community’

  CIVICUS discusses Sudan’s humanitarian crisis with a Sudanese women’s rights activist with extensive experience in peacebuilding. She has asked to stay anonymous for security reasons.

  Sudan has been home to a civil war since April 2023. The country is now facing a severe famine affecting millions of people. A cholera outbreak has worsened the situation, further straining a health system already on the brink of collapse, and recent floods have displaced thousands. Women and girls are disproportionately affected by the conflict and humanitarian crisis. With aid access severely restricted and relief efforts hampered, the crisis continues to deepen.

  Read more

• SUDAN: ‘The only way out of this mess is through civilian rule’

  CIVICUS speaks about thewar in Sudan and its repercussions for women and civil society with Reem Abbas, a Sudanese feminist activist, writer and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP).

  Founded in 2013, TIMEP is a civil society organisation that works to centre advocates and experts from and in the Middle East and North Africa in policy discourse to foster more fair and democratic societies.

  What’s the current humanitarian situation in Sudan?

  Active conflict persists in around 60 per cent of Sudan’s territory. The continuous fighting entails targeting of civilians and mass displacement. In some states, much of the civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets, schools and universities, has been damaged. In Khartoum and West Darfur states, about 70 per cent of hospitals have been damaged or partially destroyed.

  Civilians and civil society activists are unsafe. The situation greatly restricts people’s freedom of movement, their ability to sustain a livelihood and their capacity to express their opinions freely. There are pockets of relative security in Eastern and Northern Sudan, but even in areas deemed secure displacement persists and schools remain closed because internally displaced people are living in them and other public buildings.

  Many livelihoods have totally collapsed, leaving people increasingly dependent on aid. We are already witnessing cases of famine, particularly affecting children, resulting in deaths.

  How has the conflict impacted on women and girls?

  Women have always been targeted in conflicts in Sudan. Political violence, rife in Sudan given its volatile political history, has also often taken aim at women. There’s rarely any accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the militias that are fighting against the army – are abducting women and selling them as sexual slaves in markets or holding them captive for extended periods. Families are left in distress, unsure of the whereabouts of their daughters, and are sometimes embezzled for money.

  This is a war on women. Part of it stems from structural factors that place women in subordinate positions, but there’s also a punitive element directed at women for their pivotal role in the 2019 revolution that overthrew dictator Omar al-Bashir. During the revolution, women were out there, highly visible on the frontlines, and now it feels like they’re being punished for it.

  The targeting of women is tearing the social fabric apart. As public spaces become unsafe for women, fewer women are participating in public life, including in economic activities and activism. This will have long-term consequences.

  What roles is civil society playing in this context, and what challenges does it face?

  It’s important to recognise that civil society in Sudan isn’t a monolithic entity, but rather a complex mix of different layers. Some were heavily involved during the transitional period that followed the revolution, getting deeply integrated with government structures at the time. Then there are women’s groups, each with their own focus and agenda. Alongside them, there are more formal organisations such as non-governmental organisations and trade unions. And let’s not overlook the revolutionary elements, such as the resistance committees and emergency responserooms, decentralised and horizontal structures working to shelter displaced people, support hospitals and secure food and water supplies.

  The more formal parts of civil society are currently heavily involved in politics, while its revolutionary segments are deeply engaged in grassroots humanitarian efforts. They’re essentially functioning as local governments in areas where official governance structures are absent.

  Despite its crucial role, civil society faces numerous challenges. The organic growth of grassroots movements is stunted by conflict and dictatorship. The polarising effects of war have led to divisions along political, ethnic and regional lines, further fragmenting civil society. Activists are increasingly targeted by the RSF or the army, threatening their ability to operate.

  In an environment where conformity to mainstream opinions is increasingly enforced, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain dissenting voices. This situation underscores the urgent need to safeguard the diversity and autonomy of civil society in Sudan.

  However, attention and funding often gravitate towards already well-funded organisations, leaving grassroots initiatives to rely solely on community support. While funding alone doesn’t create a functional organisation, it’s important for organisations and groups to grow in an organic way and be able to garner support from the community.

  How is civil society advocating for peace and democracy?

  Right now, the conversation is all about security and getting things back to normal. People are doubting whether we can even think about democracy after all this chaos. The situation’s tough, with militarisation and conflict everywhere. But the only way out of this mess is through civilian rule. We need to figure out how to link the peace process to a long-term political solution that puts us back on track for democracy.

  Unfortunately, the focus of the political elite appears to be more on preserving its positions rather than addressing urgent issues. There are concerns that the largest political coalition has developed close ties with the militia, causing unease among those involved in the revolution. Without a bigger political group that really listens to people and leads responsibly, we’re going to be stuck with military rule for ages. Right now, it should be all about finding common ground and putting the focus on the people who’ve suffered most from this war – not about politicians trying to claw back power or siding with the military.

  There’s a lot of talk about how the transitional government messed up and led to the coup and the war. People are sceptical about civilian rule and whether it can fix things. It’s easier to sell the idea of a military-run government when people are feeling scared and vulnerable. Even though it’s militarisation that got us into this mess in the first place, it’s understandable because people just want to feel safe again.

  What should the international community do to address Sudan’s dire security and humanitarian situation?

  It’s time for the international community to stop sticking to one side of the story and start listening to everyone involved. They’re pumping all their funds into one camp and ignoring a whole bunch of other perspectives. We need more humanitarian aid, particularly considering the famine situation. Millions of people are at risk, with nowhere to turn and nothing to support themselves with.

  Investment in basic infrastructure like hospitals and water plants is crucial too. People need services, and they need them now. Some areas haven’t had clean water for months because water plants are getting caught in the crossfire.

  The international community must also demonstrate political determination. People’s lives are on the line. We need clear plans and urgent action to stop this war.

  I want to emphasise the significance of civil society solidarity. This is crucial when our governments show ambivalence towards our concerns. In such situations, we must become each other’s voices and amplify our collective message. We must seek ways to connect, demonstrate solidarity and collaborate effectively.

  It’s important to learn from one another and work together towards shared objectives. Collaboration with civil society groups and networks across the world is greatly appreciated. It’s through such partnerships that we can make a meaningful impact and bring about positive change.

  ---

  Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with TIMEP through itswebsite or itsFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@TimepDC and@ReemWrites on Twitter.