europe
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EUROPEAN MEDIA FREEDOM ACT: ‘National security cannot justify the use of spyware on journalists’
CIVICUS speaks about the role of civil society in the drafting process of the European Media Freedom Act with Jordan Higgins, Press and Policy Officer at the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF).
Founded in 2015, ECPMF is a civil society organisation that seeks to promote, preserve and defend media freedom by monitoring violations,providing practical support and engaging diverse stakeholders across Europe.
Why was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) needed?
The EMFA aims to support media freedom and promote media pluralism in the European Union (EU). While media-related matters have traditionally fallen under the competence of member states, EU-wide action has become necessary due to the severity of the threats media freedom faces across Europe.
The EMFA was introduced in September 2022 and underwent successive rounds of negotiations, culminating in a political agreement reached on 15 December 2023. It is comprehensive and seeks to address critical threats to media freedom, including the independence of public service broadcasters, concentration of media ownership and the capture of media through the allocation of state advertising, among other issues.
It safeguards the right of audiences to access pluralistic media sources and establishes a European Board for Media Services, composed of national media authorities that will advise the European Commission on the consistent application of key provisions of the Act in all member states. It also focuses on ensuring the safety of journalists, protecting them and their sources from surveillance and the use of spyware.
In sum, the EMFA is a crucial tool to address some of the major threats faced by journalists and protect the editorial and market independence of media.
What did civil society bring to negotiations?
This initiative aimed to strengthen press freedom in Europe and was widely welcomed by civil society, including us at ECPMF.
From the early stages, media freedom organisations proposed critical amendments to specific aspects of the EMFA that did not comply with the highest media freedom standards. In particular, we pushed for greater transparency in media ownership, comprehensive rules regulating financial relations between the state and media, including the allocation of state advertising, and full protection of journalists from all forms of surveillance, including spyware. We also advocated for the independence of national media regulators and the European Board for Media Services.
The process incorporated the perspectives of media freedom experts and journalists and culminated in the final trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, Council and Commission. One of the key areas of interest for media freedom advocates during these negotiations was EMFA Article 4 on the protection of journalistic sources. In particular, we hoped to see the removal of provisions – promoted by Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Malta and Sweden – that included ‘threats to national security’ as justification for the use of spyware on journalists.
To what extent did the final text address civil society concerns?
Civil society, particularly media freedom organisations, advocated for a robust version of the EMFA that considered the needs of those most affected by it. Throughout the negotiation process, we voiced our objections to concerns from publishers’ groups and regarding proposed amendments to Article 4, which could have removed legal safeguards that shield journalists from the deployment of spyware under the pretext of national security. Fortunately, the final version no longer cites ‘national security’ as a justification for using spyware on journalists.
Now our work will shift towards ensuring the effective implementation of the EMFA through active monitoring, particularly in EU member states where press freedom is under the greatest threat.
Get in touch with ECPMF through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ECPMF on Twitter.
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FRANCE : « L’inscription du droit à l’avortement dans la Constitution est une véritable victoire féministe »
CIVICUS échange avec Floriane Volt, Directrice des Affaires Publiques et Juridiques de la Fondation des Femmes, sur les récentes modifications apportées à la Constitution française pour y inclure le droit à l'avortement.
La Fondation des Femmes est une organisation de référence en France pour la liberté et les droits des femmes et contre les violences sexistes.
D’où vient l’initiative d’inscrire le droit à l’avortement dans la Constitution française ?
Le droit des femmes à disposer de leur corps constitue la condition essentielle de la liberté des femmes et d’une égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. L’inscription du droit à l’interruption volontaire de grossesse (IVG) dans la Constitution était donc à la fois une nécessité et une consécration des droits des femmes et de l’égalité.
Il est bien du rôle de la Constitution – texte fondateur de notre société, protégeant les droits fondamentaux des citoyennes et citoyens – de venir sécuriser le droit à disposer de son corps. C’est une garantie supplémentaire pour toutes les femmes. Sa remise en cause s’avèrera également plus complexe puisqu’elle relève d’une réforme constitutionnelle, un processus plus complexe qu’une simple suppression dans un texte de loi.
Cela faisait longtemps que les associations féministes demandaient d’inscrire l’IVG dans la Constitution. C’était notamment parmi les propositions programmatiques portées par la Fondation des Femmes et le secteur associatif féministe lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2022. Déjà en 2017, une sénatrice Laurence Cohen avait porté une proposition de loi pour constitutionnaliser ce droit.
La décision de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis en juin 2022 de revenir sur la protection de l’IVG a agi comme une déflagration sur la scène politique française et de nombreuses voix se sont élevées pour demander cette constitutionnalisation.
Il a fallu deux ans de travail de mobilisation d’associations comme la Fondation des Femmes, le Planning Familial et le collectif Avortement Europe, appuyées par des parlementaires engagés, pour y parvenir. Cette véritable victoire féministe a été obtenue grâce à l’union solide des féministes.
C’est aussi la victoire de toutes les Françaises et Français qui étaient massivement en faveur de cette réforme et qui ont été quasiment 110.000 à se mobilier en trois semaines pour demander au Sénat de l’approuver, dans le cadre d’un appel de la Fondation des Femmes sur Change.org.
Comment l’opinion publique a-t-elle réagi à cette demande ?
Plus de 86% des Français.es étaient favorables à l’entrée du droit à l’avortement dans la Constitution.
Il n’y avait qu’à voir les milliers de personnes qui se sont réunies dans l’après-midi du 4 mars pour célébrer l’entrée de l’IVG dans la Constitution sur le parvis des Libertés et des Droits de l’homme au Trocadéro, un lieu hautement symbolique choisi par la Fondation des Femmes pour diffuser le vote, à la hauteur de la gravité historique du moment.
Ce fort soutien de l’opinion publique, associé au combat sans relâche des associations féministes, est venu à bout des résistances de la droite sénatoriale, qui plaidait l’absence de réelle menace sur l’avortement en France.
Au-delà de la France, c’est une victoire et un signal très fort pour toutes les femmes et féministes du monde entier qui se battent pour l’accès à ce droit. Il y a de grandes chances que cette initiative soit reprise par d’autres États membres de l’Union européenne (UE). C’est en tout cas un des objectifs de toute cette mobilisation, qu’elle serve d’exemple.
Une Initiative Citoyenne Européenne a été soumise à la Commission européenne pour que l’UE finance l’avortement pour toute personne en Europe qui n’y a pas accès.
Quelles stratégies recommanderiez-vous aux activistes des droits génésiques dans d’autres pays d’Europe et au-delà ?
Ce qui a fonctionné en France, c’est une union solide des associations qui luttent pour les droits des femmes et de la société civile soutenue par des relais politiques – notamment des sénatrices et députées qui ont su porter ce projet commun dans les institutions.
Cette union a été le fruit d’un long travail de coordination et de création de liens entre les associations féministes pour se mettre toutes d’accord sur un projet commun.
Par ailleurs, il nous a semblé indispensable de pouvoir nous appuyer sur des données et des études fiables et pertinentes au sujet du droit à l’avortement. Par exemple, pour construire le plaidoyer nous avons pu nous appuyer sur un sondage montrant que cette révision constitutionnelle était soutenue par la majorité des Français.es, que la Fondation des Femmes et le Planning Familial avaient fait réaliser dès février 2021.
Plusieurs rapports sur l’organisation et la menace que représentent les mouvements anti-choix ont également démontré l’utilité de la constitutionnalisation du droit à l’avortement. Parmi eux, un rapport du Forum parlementaire européen pour les droits sexuels et reproductifs sur les financements massifs des mouvements anti-choix en Europe et un rapport de la Fondation et de l’Institut pour le dialogue stratégique (ISD) sur la menace que représente la présence des mouvements anti-avortement sur les réseaux sociaux.
Quels sont les prochains enjeux de l’agenda des droits des femmes en France ?
Dans le sillage de #MeToo,les organisations féministes qui alertent depuis des décennies sur l’ampleur et la gravité des violences sexistes et sexuelles, ont enfin trouvé un réel écho. La société prend graduellement conscience de ce phénomène massif.
Or, les chiffres de la justice disent toujours l’insupportable impunité des auteurs de violences sexuelles : alors que 94.000 femmes majeures sont victimes de viols ou tentatives de viols chaque année en France, moins d’un agresseur sur trois fait l’objet de poursuites. Nombre de #MeToo restent à faire pour résoudre le paradoxe d’une société convaincue d’avoir pris conscience de l’ampleur des violences sexuelles, mais qui n’en tire aucune conséquence pour ceux qui en sont les responsables.
Nous faisons face à un manque d’action politique. À la Fondation des Femmes, nous militons depuis toujours pour une réponse politique à la hauteur de l’enjeu, qui passerait notamment par une hausse du budget alloué. Face aux sollicitations de victimes toujours plus nombreuses, nous avons revu son chiffre à la hausse. Dans unrapport publié en septembre 2023, nous estimons désormais les besoins entre 2,3 et 3,2 milliards d’euros par an.
Or, la tendance est toujours à la rigueur budgétaire. Le Ministre d’Économie annonçait début mars 2024 faire l’économie de 7 millions d’euros dans le cadre de la mission égalité femmes-hommes du budget 2024. Cette coupe budgétaire représente une diminution de 10% du budget de 77 millions d’euros, voté en décembre, alors qu’il y a urgence à donner davantage de moyens aux associations qui assurent la prise en charge des femmes victimes de violences.
L’espace civique en France est classé « rétréci » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
Contactez la Fondation des femmes sur sonsite web, son compte d’Instagram ou sa pageFacebook, suivez@Fondationfemmes et@FVolt sur Twitter, et contactez Floriane Volt surLinkedIn.
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FRANCE: ‘The inclusion of the right to abortion in the Constitution is a true feminist victory’
CIVICUS speaks with Floriane Volt, Director of Public and Legal Affairs at the Women’s Foundation (Fondation des Femmes), about recent changes to the French Constitution to include the right to abortion.
The Women’s Foundation is a leading French organisation working for women’s rights and freedoms and against gender-based violence.
Where did the initiative to enshrine the right to abortion in the French Constitution come from?
Women’s right to control their own bodies is an essential condition for women’s freedom and equality between women and men. So enshrining the right to abortion in the constitution was both a necessity and a consecration of women’s rights and equality.
It is the role of the constitution – the founding text of our society, which protects the fundamental rights of all citizens – to safeguard the right to control one’s own body. It is an additional guarantee for all women. It will now also prove more difficult to challenge it as it will require constitutional reform, a more complex process than simply deleting it from a piece of legislation.
Feminist organisations have long called for abortion to be enshrined in the constitution. It was one of the programmatic proposals put forward by the Women’s Foundation and other feminist organisations during the 2022 presidential election. Back in 2017, a female senator, Laurence Cohen, tabled a bill to include this right in the constitution.
The US Supreme Court’s June 2022 ruling reversing its decision to protect abortion sent shockwaves through the French political scene, and many people called for the right to abortion to be enshrined in the constitution.
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French Separatism Bill threatens fundamental freedoms, warn civil society organisations
The proposed French "separatism" bill («Projet de loi confortant le respect des principes de la République») could threaten rights and civil liberties, according to French and European civil society organisations including CIVICUS, the European Civic Forum (ECF), Le Mouvement Associatif (LMA) and la Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH). French civil society organisations and trade unions have scheduled public demonstrations against the bill on 12 June 2021.
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GEORGIA: ‘The foreign agents law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of civil society’
CIVICUS speaks with Nino Samkharadze, policy analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics, about thecontroversial ‘foreign agents’ law just passed in Georgia.
The Georgian Institute of Politics is a Tbilisi-based non-profit, non-partisan research and analysis organisation dedicated to fortifying the foundations of democratic institutions and effective governance in Georgia.
What’s the purpose of Georgia’s law on foreign agents?
According to the government, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which has just been passed by parliament, aims to increase the transparency of civil society’s operations by requiring civil society organisations (CSOs) to disclose their sources of funding and provide details about the nature of their activities.
In its transition from the post-Soviet era, Georgia faces economic and political challenges. Its evolving democracy is characterised by weak institutions and it’s heavily dependent on support from international sources, including financial grants from the European Union (EU), European states and the USA. The introduction of this law may have been a response to concerns about foreign influence, but it has sparked debate in Georgian society. It poses a threat to the independence and security of CSOs. Its vague language and broad room for interpretation provide the government with opportunities to influence and control civil society, potentially stifling dissenting voices and undermining the positive contributions of CSOs to democratic governance.
Why did the government reintroduce the bill after failing to pass it last year?
The process began with the introduction of a first version of the bill in February 2023. It wasn’t proposed directly by the ruling Georgian Dream party but by People’s Power, a splinter political group closely linked to Georgian Dream and espousing even more radical anti-western narratives. But it was met with considerable domestic and international opposition. Protests erupted in Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital, and criticism came from European institutions and the US government. In response, Georgian Dream announced it would vote against the bill, which ultimately led to its rejection by parliament. Following this failure, Georgian Dream underwent a period of reflection and intensified its propaganda. It softened the bill’s language and tone to make it appear less radical and reintroduced it in April 2024. Soon after, on 14 May, it was passed by parliament.
Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 and is now in an unprecedented third term in office. Since it began its third term in 2020, it has increasingly shown anti-democratic tendencies. With a general election scheduled for October 2024, it’s under increasing pressure as polls indicate a decline in public support. If it doesn’t maintain its majority, it will have to seek cooperation from opposition parties. In this context, the government may see the passage of this law as a way to defuse opposition and strengthen its grip on power.
How do you think the law would affect civil society?
The impacts of the law on civil society are expected to be significant and multifaceted, affecting various dimensions of its functioning and autonomy.
CSOs are likely to be negatively labelled as serving the interests of foreign powers, undermining public confidence in their activities and missions. This labelling could easily lead to stigmatisation and marginalisation, reducing the effectiveness of advocacy efforts and diminishing their influence in the public sphere.
The law’s provisions for extensive monitoring also pose a threat to the autonomy of CSOs and the privacy of their staff. The government’s ability to access and publish personal data, including correspondence and communications, could hamper CSOs’ ability to operate freely and investigate cases of corruption and human rights abuses.
Further, the ambiguity of the law leaves room for interpretation and potential abuse by the government. Similar to the situation in Russia, where laws targeting ‘foreign agents’ have been used to restrict civil society activities, the vague language of the law could allow for further restrictions on CSOs and their ability to operate independently.
The law may also lead to a withdrawal of funding from international foundations and donors. Given the increased risks and restrictions on civil society activities, donors may be reluctant to continue supporting organisations in Georgia, further limiting the resources available for democracy and state-building efforts.
Overall, the draft law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of Georgian civil society. It undermines the essential role CSOs play in promoting democratic values, defending human rights and holding the government to account. It could have far-reaching consequences for Georgia’s democratic development and its relationship with the international community.
How has civil society reacted?
Georgian civil society has vehemently opposed the bill, seeing it as a dangerous step towards authoritarianism. This law poses a threat to critical voices and raises fears of further concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite, as has happened in Belarus and Russia.
No wonder the bill is also often referred to as the ‘Russian law’ – it’s seen as a precursor to outcomes similar to those seen in Russia. It’s feared that dissenting voices will be marginalised or silenced under this law, mirroring the situation in Russia where government critics often face persecution or exile. Given the consolidation of the ruling party and the erosion of democratic principles in Russia, there are concerns in Georgia that the ruling party is also seeking to consolidate power and stifle dissent. Despite some differences between both legal texts, the broader implications for democracy and civil liberties are deeply worrying.
Georgian society, known for its pro-European and pro-democracy stance, has taken to the streets to protest against this threat. International partners, including the EU and the USA, have also criticised the law and stressed the importance of upholding democratic values.
How has the government responded to the protests?
The government’s response to the mass protests has been one of dismissal, demonisation and repression.
The government has tried to discredit the protesters, particularly younger people, by suggesting they are uninformed about the law and are being manipulated. However, this is contradicted by the fact that many of the protesters, many of whom are students, are well educated and have a clear understanding of the issues at stake.
The government has also resorted to tactics of repression and intimidation, with reports of regular arrests, beatings and pressure on people associated with the protests. Civil servants, including teachers and academics, have been threatened with the loss of their jobs if they are found to be involved in the protests. This has a chilling effect and discourages dissent.
CSOs have been targeted with demonisation campaigns that portray them as enemies of the country. While there has been no immediate closure or direct pressure on these organisations, the hostile rhetoric and stigmatisation contribute to an environment of fear and intimidation.
This authoritarian approach reflects a concerted effort to stifle dissent and maintain control, even at the expense of democratic principles and human rights. It threatens to further undermine confidence in institutions and exacerbate social and political tensions.
How can the international community best support Georgian civil society?
The international community can play a crucial role in supporting Georgian civil society at this difficult time.
High-level visits and engagement by representatives of the EU and the USA are essential. We hope they’ll lead to tangible measures to hold accountable those members of Georgian Dream who supported this law. This could include the introduction of targeted sanctions against people responsible for undermining democratic principles. In addition, the EU should use Georgia’s official status as a candidate for EU membership to impose conditions of adherence to democratic norms and respect for human rights. Sanctions or other forms of pressure could be imposed if these principles are violated.
It’s also crucial that the EU and the USA continue to demonstrate their unwavering support for Georgia and its pro-European aspirations. Financial assistance and political support are essential to strengthen civil society and maintain momentum in the struggle for democracy. Without this support, civil society risks being further marginalised and weakened by the government.
A combination of diplomatic pressure, conditionality and unwavering support from the international community is needed to support Georgian civil society in its struggle for democracy and human rights.
Civic space in Georgia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Georgian Institute of Politics through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@GIP_ge and@nincavar10 on Twitter.
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GERMANY: ‘Our street blockades hurt society the least and put no one’s life in danger’
CIVICUS speaks with Zoe Ruge of Last Generation about climate activism and its criminalisation in Germany.
Last Generation is an international network of climate activists using civil disobedience to urge governments to address the climate emergency, enabling citizen participation and financially supporting the global south as a primary victim of climate change that it hasn’t caused.
What forms of protest has Last Generation deployed in Germany?
Last Generation has come to dominate the climate movement in Germany, so its tactics have become the prevailing tactics. The most common form of climate protest in Germany is currently street blockades, and blockades of public infrastructure more generally, because they are efficient at creating a certain level of disruption. A small number of people protesting peacefully is all it takes to generate a wide public reach. Additionally, street blockades are a platform to have talks with politicians and citizens about the climate crisis, do media work and underline our demands.
Alongside disrupting everyday traffic, we draw attention to the major responsibility of the richest one- to-10 per cent of the population. To target them specifically, we block airports, spray-paint private jets, disrupt big events and bring protests into museums and other public spaces.
Our street blockades hurt society the least and put no one’s life in danger. We take adequate security measures, for instance to make sure no emergency vehicle gets stuck in traffic. In case of an emergency, we are ready to open the blockade and clear the street.
We know the kind of civil disobedience tactics we use face criticism, and we constantly reflect on our practices and take all feedback into consideration. We have aimed to choose a protest form that effectively rises awareness and is the least disruptive for people, and we think the street blockade is one such form. It may cause people to get to work half an hour late one day, but it provides a much-needed opportunity to stop people’s everyday routine and encourage them reflect on what we’re doing and where it’s leading us.
What have been your biggest achievements?
More people are realising the seriousness of the crisis we’re facing. Street blockades allow us to talk to people who would normally not get involved but are forced to listen and ask questions about our reasons to be there and our demands. Through disruption, we’ve been able to bring a lot of climate-related topics into public discourse, not only through media coverage but also thanks to local, face-to-face conversations. We are seeing rising awareness, which is necessary to deal with the consequences of the climate crisis.
In terms of policies, one of our demands during the first protest wave was a law similar to the one France has, to save food from going to waste in supermarkets. One third of all food is lost in the production chain, which equates to a lot of preventable CO2 emissions. Such a law is currently being discussed in several federal states.
In terms of public awareness, when street blockades began about a year ago they attracted 25 to 30 people, and now they bring thousands to the streets in Berlin. Churches are standing behind us and civil society groups are also voicing demands for climate action.
Overall, we are receiving increasing support from the whole society. We get invitations to discuss the climate crisis with politicians, artists, at schools and with other parts of civil society. In response to the criminalisation we are facing, which has included the freezing of some of our assets, we have also seen a rise in donations from the public.
What are your demands to the German government?
What Last Generation demands are pretty simple things that must be done to tackle the consequences of the climate crisis and prevent it escalating. We demand a speed limit of 100 kilometres per hour in Germany, which would bring a reduction of more than 6.7 million tons of CO2 emissions a year, and a permanent €9 (US$9.90) monthly ticket to make public transportation affordable. This was tested last year and was a huge success, as many people shifted from using cars to using public transport – but now it’s quite expensive again.
Our third demand is the establishment of a citizen assembly as a long-term mechanism for us to deal with the climate crisis as a society and end the use of fossil fuels in a socially just manner by 2030. Since our politicians are not even able or willing to implement a speed limit, we need citizens to be able to help tackle the climate crisis through more direct democratic tools.
As part of a global movement, Last Generation works in close cooperation with Debt For Climate, a grassroots global south-driven initiative connecting social justice and climate justice struggles with the aim of freeing impoverished countries from a debt burden that is often used as a tool for further natural resource extraction. We support their demand for financial support because they are the primary victims of climate change that they haven’t caused. German politicians tend to argue that the climate catastrophe isn’t happening in Germany, although it is indeed taking place, maybe to a lesser extent. But in other parts of the world people are already dying because of it while more developed countries continue benefiting from their resources.
How have German authorities reacted to your demands?
Reactions have varied at different government levels. We’ve had very productive talks with local politicians who have shown openness and understanding. But at the federal level we’ve faced a harsh and criminalising public discourse. Last Generation is being called a criminal group and increasingly treated as such.
We face accusations that we are hurting the cause of climate protection because our tactics are scaring people away. But it’s not true. The government is just trying to shift the focus from the substance of our demands to the form of our actions and avoiding our questions of why we still don’t have a speed limit and why we still don’t have proper affordable public transportation even though we have the resources for it.
The fact that our government isn’t willing to act as the climate emergency demands and is instead turning against us is the main challenge that we as climate activists currently face.
How is the government criminalising climate activism?
There are between 3,000 and 4,000 cases coming to court soon, mainly connected to street blockades. In Germany, this kind of spontaneous demonstration is protected by law, but once the police intervene and tell you to leave, it’s not so clear whether the assembly continues to be legally protected. There are also accusations of vandalism on the basis that people have damaged walls by spray-painting them.
A serious accusation being used against climate activists is that of being part of a criminal group. Based on section 129A of the German Criminal Code, when the police start an investigation on these grounds they can listen to your phone calls, read your messages and search your homes. This is weird because Last Generation is so transparent that anything the government would like to know about us – our structures, our funding, our planned protests – is publicly accessible. We have nothing to hide.
This June, some of us experienced searches of our homes, our website was taken down, our bank accounts were frozen and we had work materials confiscated. Activists are struggling because it’s scary to feel that the police could force their way in, search your entire home and take away whatever they want.
A friend of mine, Simon Lachner, was recently taken from his home to the police station and kept there for the entire day, just because he had publicly announced a protest scheduled for that afternoon. In Bavaria, people have been repeatedly taken into preventive custody for long periods of time to keep them from protesting. This form of preventing protests is becoming more common.
What kind of support are you receiving, and what further support would you need to continue your work?
The criminalisation of peaceful protests organised by people who aren’t trying to hurt anyone but who want to protect lives elicits instant solidarity. Thousands of people have joined Last Generation’s protest marches. Frozen funds have been almost fully replaced by donations pouring in. People contact us to ask how they can play their part in climate activism.
We’re also part of the A22 international network of climate movements that use civil disobedience tactics, and this also supports us, especially in the face of criminalisation. Other organisations from all around the world are reaching out to us and offering help such as legal support.
What we need is for everybody to consider their potential role in building a more resilient society. One of the most efficient ways to fulfil our collective responsibility is by exercising our right to protest within a democratic system.
Civic space in Germany is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Last Generation through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@AufstandLastGen onTwitter.
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GERMANY: ‘The far right is instrumentalising protests triggered by completely legitimate concerns’
CIVICUS speaks about the rise of the far right in Germany with Jakob Guhl, Senior Manager, Policy and Research at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD).
Founded in 2006, ISD is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to safeguard human rights and reverse the rising tide of polarisation, extremism and disinformation worldwide.
What are the major far-right groups in Germany?
Currently, the major far-right political party is Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has just achieved its highest-ever results in national polls, standing at around 22 per cent. In some East German states with elections coming later this year, AfD leads polls with over 30 per cent.
There are also more traditional neo-Nazi parties such as The Homeland (NPD). Although it is still quite active, it isn’t very relevant anymore. It’s considered an anti-constitutional extremist party and for this reason, the Constitutional Court recently ruled that the government is allowed to withhold federal funding from it.
Additionally, there is a broad network of loose groups known as the ‘new right’ that includes the Identitarian Movement, which the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has designated as a right-wing extremist threat. The ‘new right’ is essentially made up of ethno-nationalists who assert that the German identity is an ethnic identity. They extensively use social media to bring their ideas into the mainstream and shift public discourse on topics like immigration and integration.
In terms of narratives and policies, AfD is becoming increasingly indistinguishable from these ethno-nationalist groups, as evidenced by its recent secret meeting to discuss plans for mass deportation of people living in Germany, including German citizens, whom they view as ethnically non-German.
How do far-right groups spread their messages?
There are significant interactions among ethno-nationalist groups on a personal level. They engage with each other by attending conferences, participating in podcasts and writing prefaces for each other’s books. Some even work as assistants for AfD members of parliament.
Both the ‘new right’ and AfD have been aptly using social media for many years. According to a comparative analysis we did in 2019, AfD significantly outperformed major political parties for views, likes and engagement. This trend continues today, and they also leverage YouTube or newer platforms like TikTok, which attract many young people, so they are able to reach even larger audiences.
Their messages focus on highly emotive issues, such as ‘migrant crimes’ and ‘threats to German traditions’, which tap into cultural elements that provoke strong reactions and anger. For instance, they portray the Greens, an environmental political party, as detached elites comfortably situated in central Berlin, pushing their green policies without understanding the reality of ordinary people. This populist communication style has proved effective, and it’s further amplified by the dynamics of social media algorithms that reward outrage, sensationalism and emotional content.
What public concerns has AfD tapped into?
When AfD was established in 2013, its main focus was opposition to European Union (EU) and German policies in response to the financial crisis. It was born as an anti-EU and anti-Euro party that advocated against providing financial support to Greece and other countries particularly affected by the crisis, and against the EU collective debt mechanism.
Starting in 2015, with the beginning of the so-called migration crisis, AfD shifted towards an anti-refugee and anti-Muslim discourse, depicting Islam and Muslims as alien to Germany. AfD politicians openly cooperated with the pan-European, anti-Islam, far-right political movement Pegida – an acronym for ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West’. AfD members frequently appear as speakers at their events.
During the mass protests that took place against measures to curb the spread of COVID-19, AfD was part of a broad coalition promoting COVID-19 denial and anti-lockdown narratives. The coalition included ‘new right’ groups, Holocaust deniers and conspiracy theorists, among others.
Recently, AfD and other far-right groups have tried to hijack and instrumentalise farmers’ protests over subsidy cuts, seeing them as an opportunity to undermine the government. While far-right symbols and AfD speakers have been present in these protests, the official associations of farmers have clearly distanced themselves from the far right. It is important not to stigmatise the farmers’ movement as a whole as being infiltrated by the far right, as they have completely legitimate concerns about agricultural subsidy cuts, while at the same time being alert to far-right attempts to hijack these protests.
What accounts for AfD’s growing popularity?
The popularity of the AfD stagnated during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 federal elections. However, starting in early 2023, it has gained momentum. The AfD often diverges from the positions of major established parties on critical issues. For instance, it has opposed German military support for Ukraine, questioned scientific consensus on climate change and rejected green policies. Their most recent surge in popularity can be in part be attributed to people’s heightened concerns about immigration, which is visible in surveys from mid-2023.
At the same time, AfD has radicalised, partially due to its relationship with ethno-nationalist groups, which has led to its monitoring by BfV as a potential threat to the constitution. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied by a trend of increasing normalisation and popularisation of AfD among the public. This tension is at the heart of today’s German politics.
Has AfD encountered any progressive resistance?
As it has grown in popularity, AfD has also encountered resistance, as attested by the ongoing protests against AfD’s mass deportation plans in numerous cities and towns. Protesters form a broad coalition comprising political parties, churches, unions, local initiatives supporting refugees, left-wing and anti-fascist groups and climate change activists like Fridays for Future.
This diverse protest movement also has internal contradictions. In a Munich rally, some speakers criticised the government for its migration policies, which they attributed to an attempt to win back voters from AfD by taking a hardline approach. Left-leaning activists argue that such policies will only pave the way for even more extreme anti-migrant measures. Despite these tensions, however, the coalition remains broad and maintains significant popular support.
How is ISD working to address extremist threats in Germany?
One of the things our Berlin office focuses on is digital literacy and media competencies initiatives. In the age of social media, it’s crucial for people to critically assess credible sources of information, be aware of manipulation tactics and understand how disinformation spreads and coordinated networks amplify specific narratives. Our goal is not to tell people what to think but to provide them with tools for critical evaluation of information sources, narratives, communication tactics and rhetorical styles.
For example, the Berlin office is actively involved in the Business Council for Democracy project, collaborating with digital literacy experts to educate adults. Many similar initiatives primarily target young people, who are often digital natives, but the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories online can affect people of all ages. We engage employers, which many people still trust, unlike political parties and media.
What forms of support do you receive, and what further support do you need?
Our cooperation with the government encompasses a wide range of initiatives. Various German federal ministries have provided funding for our research on antisemitism and far-right extremism and funded projects related to political education.
One major recent issue is the budgetary crisis and disagreement within the governing coalition on how to address it. The same budget cuts that have affected subsidies for farmers also impact on agencies dedicated to political education and projects on democracy promotion and the prevention of radicalisation. Unfortunately, this funding reduction comes at an inopportune time, coinciding with the rise of the far right and the normalisation of extremist ideas.
Compared to other countries, the German state used to extensively support civil society initiatives. It’s a double-edged sword: while it’s positive that the government invests in civil society, it has also made German CSOs somewhat dependent on the state. The budgetary crisis has disrupted the financial sustainability of many organisations, which are now unsure whether they will be able to continue their work as effectively and on the same scale.
While German CSOs could benefit from international donor support, it’s also crucial to facilitate greater knowledge exchange among activists and networks from different parts of the world. Despite variations in intensity, many countries face similar challenges of the mainstreaming of far-right ideas through social media, harassment of activists and elected officials, and local-level political violence.
Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with ISD through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ISDglobal onTwitter.
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GERMANY: ‘The rise of the far right will make things more difficult, but the EU will remain functional – for now’
CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Müller, Executive Director of Democracy International, about the European Parliament elections and his expectations for the results in Germany.
Democracy International is a German civil society organisation working to strengthen civic participation and direct democracy. Its goals are to give people a direct say in political decision-making and to make governments more accountable.
What’s at stake in the European Parliament elections?
In 2024, more people around the world will participate in elections than ever before, setting the political course for years to come. At the same time, we are experiencing the biggest global crisis of security and democracy in decades. The number of democracies worldwide has reached a new low since 1985 and authoritarian regimes are on the rise. The human rights situation in many countries is appalling. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s threats against Taiwan also threaten global peace and security.
In this context, the 2024 European Parliamentelections are of particular importance. The European Union (EU) is facing immense challenges as a peace project. The security challenge of Russia’s war on Ukraine influences the thematic focus of the elections. The rise of nationalist, right-wing parties in many European countries and accusations that the EU is too bureaucratic, undemocratic and out of touch with people are putting the EU under great pressure.
Right-wing nationalist parties are exploiting these challenges by offering populist, seemingly simple solutions to these complex crises and fuelling the narrative that the EU is the cause of these problems. Debates aboutrising inflation and economic insecurity, globalisation, immigration and asylum policy are deliberately confused through disinformation in all channels, leading to uncertainty about the EU’s ability to act. As a result, right-wing parties that are critical and hostile of the EU are likely to secure close to a quarter of European Parliament seats.
This is paradoxical, given that these challenges can only be met with a functioning EU. Strong, progressive legislation is needed to address climate, security and democracy crises. However, the expected rise of right-wing, nationalist parties is likely to lead to more blockages and delays, threatening the functioning of European democracy and the rule of law.
The main task of all democratic parties in the European Parliament in the next legislative period will be to counter this development. Large civil society alliances and parties are urging people to vote against this trend. Following the reversal of the negative trend in voter turnout in 2019, efforts are being made to achieve at least 50 per cent turnout across the EU.
What are the likely outcomes in Germany?
In Germany, voter turnout has risen from a low of just 43 per cent in 2004 to 61.4 per cent in 2019, back to 1994 levels. This trend is expected to continue, particularly given that, for the first time, people between 16 and 18 will be able to vote, and two-thirds of them have said they intend to do so.
However, higher turnout alone will not prevent the rise of right-wing parties. Predictions are that the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) could come second or third in Germany. Only the conservative Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria are far ahead in the polls. The governing parties of thetraffic-light coalition – the Social Democratic Party, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party – are expected to lose votes compared to the previous European Parliament election in 2019.
Still, there is reason for hope: since the beginning of the year, the AfD has lost significant support in the polls. While it received 23 per cent in January 2024, it is now getting only 15 per cent. The reasons for this include a series ofscandals involving the party’s top candidate and other officials, which led to the party’sexclusion from the right-wing Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament.
Overall, the democratic centre in Germany remains clearly in the majority in this EU election, albeit with a loss of votes compared to the AfD.
What are the main issues likely to influence the outcome?
The main issues in this election are Germany’s role in relation to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the question of arms supplies. The threat to security and peace is at the centre of most political debates. The second most important issue is social and economic security, often discussed in connection with immigration and asylum policy, a theme particularly fuelled by the AfD. These two issues regularly alternate in first and second place in the polls. Climate and environmental issues have lost prominence compared to 2019.
The expected increase in voter turnout suggests a growing interest among German voters. Overall, voters’ understanding of global issues and crises and of the role of the EU has increased. However, domestic issues and opinions on national government policies remain the decisive factors accounting for voting decisions. In Germany, the outcome of the EU election is a mood indicator for national politics. Specific European issues tend to play a subordinate role.
Are there significant differences between young and older voters, and between men and women?
Like German society as a whole, the younger generation is not homogeneous. However, young people tend to be more supportive of the EU than older generations. Around 78 per cent of young people support the continuation of the European project, compared with 65 per cent of older people. But, according to the latest polls, young people are not expected to vote in higher numbers than older people.
Young voters differ from older ones on several issues. While both age groups share concerns about peace and security and the impact of Russian aggression, young people are more likely to be concerned about human and civil rights and climate change. On social and economic issues, young people are particularly concerned about affordable housing, equal opportunities and protection against poverty in old age. Migration and asylum issues are less important to them.
When it comes to gender, there is a noticeable gap in voting decisions. In Germany, women generally vote more left-progressive, while men tend to vote more conservative. This trend has intensified in recent years. The gender gap is most significant among young people. According topolls, 18 per cent of young men intend to vote for the AfD, compared to eight per cent of young women.
What would be the consequences of the rise of the far right in the European Parliament?
A rise of right-wing, nationalist parties in the European Parliament means the legislative body would have to deal with obstructionism and anti-EU behaviour. However, all polls predict a continued strong democratic majority for the political centre. So while the growth of the right wing will make political work more difficult and uncomfortable, the EU will remain functional, at least for the time being. Whether mainstream parties can counter the nationalist narrative remains to be seen. It will be crucial to tackle the security crises of coming years and ensure social and economic security.
For Germany, the election is a bellwether for upcoming national elections, particularly next year’s parliamentary election. The AfD’s decline in the polls is also noticeable at the national and state levels, although less so than in the EU elections, and the reasons for this are mainly attributable to the AfD itself. At the moment, all democratic parties have ruled out cooperation with the AfD, so the risk of right-wing populists entering government remains low.
Examples fromHungary,Italy andthe Netherlands show this is a European trend that’s been going on for a long time. All these examples have already had consequences for the rule of law, democratic freedoms, human rights and overall societal interaction.
Germany is not immune to this, and the pressure from right-wing populist and nationalist parties and opinions is very real here as well. Political discourse is increasingly shifting towards the right. If the AfD keeps gaining ground, it will get worse.
Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Democracy International through itswebsite orFacebook andYouTube pages, and follow@democracy_intl and@AndreasM_CGN on Twitter.
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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ‘Every person on the planet should have an equal opportunity to participate in decision-making’
CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Bummel, co-founder and Executive Director of Democracy Without Borders (DWB) and the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, about the deficits of the current global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.
Founded in 2017, DWB is an international civil society organisation with national chapters and associates across the world, aimed at promoting global governance, global democracy and global citizenship.
What’s wrong with existing global governance institutions?
Global governance has rightly been described as a spaghetti bowl, and that’s because there is too much fragmentation, overlap, incoherence and opacity, with many parallel and siloed processes going on at the same time, involving who knows how many institutions, initiatives and projects.
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Global Letter in solidarity with Belarusian civil society
‘You can cut all the flowers, but you cannot keep the Spring from coming’
Pablo Neruda161 human rights organisations demand an end to the repression against the Human Rights Center Viasna and all other human rights defenders in Belarus. We condemn the systematic arbitrary arrests, beatings and acts of torture they are subjected to. Despite all-out repression by the Belarusian authorities, human rights defenders in Belarus continue to strive to protect human rights. Inspired by their courage, we will not stop fighting until they are all released and able to continue their human rights work freely and unhindered.
Over the past few days, we have witnessed another wave of raids and detentions against Belarusian human rights defenders and activists. This repression is a blatant retaliation for their work denouncing and documenting human rights violations ongoing since the brutal crackdown against peaceful protesters in the wake of the August 2020 election. Since August 2020, more than 35,000 Belarusians were arrested for participating in peaceful protests, around 3,000 politically motivated criminal cases were initiated, at least 2,500 cases of torture of Belarusian citizens were documented. We believe these systematic and widespread human rights violations may amount to crimes against humanity. As of July 19, 561 persons in Belarus are considered political prisoners.
Between July 14 and 16, 2021, more than 60 searches were conducted at the homes and offices of Belarusian human rights organisations and their staff, including the Human Rights Centre ‘Viasna’, two member organisations of the International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus, Human Constanta and Legal Initiative, as well as the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, the Belarusian Association of Journalists, the Legal Transformation Center LawTrend, Ecodom and many others. Documents and IT equipment, including laptops, mobile phones and computers were seized during the searches.
During these latest raids, more than 30 people were interrogated. 13 of them were detained for a 72-hour period, reportedly in connection to an investigation into public order violations and tax evasion. Most of them were subsequently released, namely, Mikalai Sharakh, Siarhei Matskievich, and Viasna members Andrei Paluda, Alena Laptsionak, Yauheniya Babaeva, Siarhei Sys, Viktar Sazonau, Ales Kaputski and Andrei Medvedev. Several of them, however, remain under travel ban and face criminal charges. Notably, Ales Bialiatsky, Viasna Chairperson Valiantsin Stefanovic, Viasna Deputy Head and Vice-President of the FIDH, and Uladzimir Labkovich, a lawyer and Viasna member, remain detained. On July 17, all four were transferred to a pre-trial detention center “Valadarskaha”. Four other Viasna members Leanid Sudalenka, Tatsiana Lasitsa, Marfa Rabkova and Andrey Chapyuk, as well as Aleh Hrableuski of the Office for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, remain in pre-trial detention since late 2020 or early 2021.
Viasna, one of the country’s top human rights organisations, and a member of the OMCT and FIDH networks, has been targeted by the Belarusian government for over two decades. In August 2011, its chairperson Ales Bialiatsky was sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment on trumped-up charges, and released in June 2014 after spending 1,052 days in arbitrary detention in appalling conditions. In retaliation for Viasna’s courageous work and unwavering stance for human rights, the Belarusian authorities are trying to destroy the organisation by putting seven of its members behind bars.
The raids started only one day after the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the situation of human rights in Belarus, demanding the release of all persons arbitrarily detained and an investigation into allegations of torture and other human rights violations.
On July 8-9 and July 16, 2021, the authorities also raided the homes and premises of various independent media outlets and their staff, including ‘Nasha Niva’, one of country’s oldest independent newspaper, and detained three of its journalists. The offices of RFE/Radio Liberty and Belsat, the largest independent TV channel covering Belarus, were also searched, and several of their journalists were detained. As of now, over 30 media workers and dozens of bloggers remain in detention.
We, the undersigned civil society organisations, condemn the massive human rights violations perpetrated by the Belarusian authorities, which we fear may trigger more violence. This latest wave of repression, together with the brutal crackdown over the last months, demonstrates that the authorities aim at having every human rights defender either detained or exiled.
We stand in solidarity with our colleagues and friends who are detained, harassed, and persecuted for their brave work. We regard their struggle with great concern and sorrow, and we are inspired by their commitment and resilience.
We urge the Belarusian authorities to stop the harassment and intimidation of critical voices, and to free all unjustly detained human rights defenders, journalists and activists.
We call on the international community to take a strong stance in support of the Belarusian human rights community, and to speak out for the release of all those who are still behind bars, and whose only crime is to demand a society based on justice instead of fear.
Signatories
1. Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran - Iran
2. ACAT Belgique - Belgium
3. ACAT Burundi - Burundi
4. ACAT España-Catalunya (Acción de los Cristianos para la Abolición de la Tortura) - Spain
5. ACAT Germany (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture) - Germany
6. ACAT Italia - Italy
7. ACAT République Centrafricaine - Central African Republic
8. ACAT République Démocratique du Congo - Democratic Republic of Congo
9. ACAT Suisse - Switzerland
10. ACAT Tchad - Tchad
11. ACAT Togo - Togo
12. Action Against Violence and Exploitation (ACTVE) - Philippines
13. Action des Chrétiens Activistes des Droits de l’Homme à Shabunda (ACADHOSHA) - Democratic Republic of Congo
14. Advocacy Forum – Nepal - Nepal
15. Agir ensemble pour les droits humains - France
16. Albanian Human Rights Group
17. ALTSEAN-Burma - Myanmar
18. Anti Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN) - Malaysia/Asia-Pacific
19. Anti-Discrimination Centre Memorial - Belgium
20. ARTICLE 19
21. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights - Indonesia
22. Asia Pacific Solidarity Coalition (APSOC) - Philippines
23. Asociación para una Ciudadanía Participativa (ACI PARTICIPA) - Honduras
24. Asociación pro derechos humanos (Aprodeh) - Peru
25. Association Mauritanienne des droits de l'homme (AMDH-Mauritanieuri) - Mauritania
26. Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) - India
27. Association Tchadienne pour la promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (ATPDH) - Tchad
28. Association tunisienne des femmes démocrates - Tunisia
29. Avocats Sans Frontières France (ASF France) - France
30. Banglar Manabadhikar Suraksha Mancha (MASUM) - India
31. Belarusian-Swiss Association RAZAM.CH - Switzerland
32. Bulgarian Helsinki Committee - Bulgaria
33. Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) - Cambodia
34. Capital Punishment Justice Project (CPJP) - Australia
35. Center for Civil Liberties - Ukraine
36. Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) - United States of America
37. Centre for Applied Human Rights (CAHR), University of York - United Kingdom
38. Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (CDDHR) - Russia
39. Centro de Derechos humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas A.c. (Frayba) - Mexico
40. Centro de Derechos Humanos Paso del Norte - Mexico
41. Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH) - Honduras
42. Centro de Prevención, Tratamiento y Rehabilitación de Victimas de la Tortura y sus familiares (CPTRT) - Honduras
43. Centro de Salud Mental y Derechos Humanos (CINTRAS) - Chile
44. Changement Social Bénin (CSB) - Benin
45. CIVICUS
46. Civil Rights Defenders (CRD) - Sweden
47. Comision Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH-RD) - Dominican Republic
48. Coalition Burkinabé des Défenseurs des Droits Humains (CBDDH) - Burkina Faso
49. Coalition Marocaine contre la Peine de Mort - Morocco
50. Coalition Tunisienne Contre la Peine de Mort - Tunisia
51. Collectif des Associations Contre l'Impunité au Togo (CACIT) - Togo
52. Comisión de derechos humanos – COMISEDH - Peru
53. Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras (COFADEH) - Honduras
54. Comité de solidaridad con los presos políticos (FCSPP) - Colombia
55. Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) - Northern Ireland (UK)
56. Crude Accountability - United States of America
57. Czech League of Human Rights Czech Republic
58. Death Penalty Focus (DPF) - United States of America
59. Defenders of human rights centre - Iran
60. DEMAS - Association for Democracy Assistance and Human Rights - Czech Republic
61. DITSHWANELO - The Botswana Centre for Human Rights - Botswana
62. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) - Belgium
63. Eleos Justice, Monash University - Australia
64. Enfants Solidaires d'Afrique et du Monde (ESAM) - Benin
65. Federal Association of Vietnam-Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany - Germany
66. FIDU - Italian Federation for Human Rights - Italy
67. Finnish League for Human Rights - Finland
68. Free Press Unlimited - The Netherlands
69. Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humanos (INREDH) - Ecuador
70. GABRIELA Alliance of Filipino Women - Philippines
71. German Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (GCADP) - Germany
72. Greek Helsinki Monitor Greece
73. Helsinki Citizens' Assembly – Vanadzor - Armenia
74. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights - Poland
75. Citizens' Watch Russia
76. Human Rights Alert - India
77. Human Rights Association (İHD) - Turkey
78. Human Rights Center (HRC) - Georgia
79. Human Rights Center (HRC) "Memorial" - Russia
80. Human Rights House Foundation
81. Human Rights in China (HRIC) - USA
82. Human Rights Monitoring Institute (HRMI) - Lithuania
83. Human Rights Mouvement “Bir Duino-Kyrgyzstan” - Kyrgyzstan
84. Human Rights Organization of Nepal - Nepal
85. Humanist Union of Greece (HUG) - Greece
86. Hungarian Helsinki Committee - Hungary
87. IDP Women Association "Consent" - Georgia
88. Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) - Kenya
89. Instituto de Estudios Legales y Sociales del Uruguay (IELSUR) - Uruguay
90. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) - Kenyan Section - Kenya
91. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) - France
92. International Legal Initiative - Kazakhstan
93. International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) - Belgium
94. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) - Switzerland
95. Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society - India
96. JANANEETHI - India
97. Justice for Iran (JFI) - United Kingdom
98. Justícia i Pau - Spain
99. Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law - Kazakhstan
100. Kharkiv Regional Foundation "Public Alternative" - Ukraine
101. La Strada International - The Netherlands
102. La Voix des Sans Voix pour les Droits de l'Homme (VSV) - Democratic Republic of Congo
103. Latvian Human Rights Committee (LHRC) - Latvia
104. Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights YUCOM - Serbia
105. League for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran (LDDHI) - Iran
106. Legal Policy Research Centre (LPRC) - Kazakhstan
107. Libereco Partnership of Human Rights - Germany/ Switzerland
108. LICADHO - Cambodia
109. Lifespark - Switzerland
110. Liga Portuguesa dos Direitos Humanos - Civitas (LPDHC) - Portugal
111. Liga voor de Rechten van de Mens (LvRM) (Dutch League for Human Rights) - The Netherlands
112. Ligue des droits de l'Homme (LDH) - France
113. Ligue Tchadienne des droits de l'Homme - Tchad
114. Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN) - Maldives
115. Martin Ennals Foundation - Switzerland
116. Minority Rights Group - Greece
117. Mouvance des Abolitionnistes du Congo Brazzaville - Congo Brazzaville
118. Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains (MIDH) - Côte d'Ivoire
119. Mouvement Lao pour les Droits de l'Homme - Laos
120. Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos (MNDH) - Brazil
121. Netherlands Helsinki Committee - The Netherlands
122. Norwegian Helsinki Committee - Norway
123. Observatoire du système pénal et des droits humains (OSPDH) - Spain
124. Observatoire Marocain des prisons - Morocco
125. Odhikar - Bangladesh
126. OPEN ASIA|Armanshahr - France
127. Organisation contre la torture en Tunisie (OCTT) - Tunisie
128. Organisation Guineenne de Defense des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (OGDH) - Guinea
129. Österreichische Liga für Menschenrechte ÖLFMR - Austria
130. Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) - Palestine
131. Pax Christi Uvira - Democratic Republic of Congo
132. People's Watch India
133. Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos (Provea) - Venezuela
134. Promo LEX Association - Republic of Moldova
135. Protection International (PI)
136. Public Association "Dignity" - Kazakhstan
137. Public Association Spravedlivost Human Rights Organization - Kyrgyzstan
138. Public Verdict Foundation - Russia
139. Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme RADDHO - Senegal
140. Repecap Academics - Spain
141. Réseau des Defenseurs des Droits Humains en Afrique Centrale (REDHAC) - Cameroon
142. Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) - Haïti
143. Rights Realization Centre - UK
144. Rural People's Sangam - India
145. Salam for Democracy and Human Rights - UK, Lebanon, Bahrain
146. Social-Strategic Researches and Analytical Investigations Public Union (SSRAIPU) - Azerbaijan
147. SOHRAM-CASRA - Centre Action Sociale Réhabilitation et Réadaptation pour les Victimes de la Torture, de la guerre et de la violence - Turquie
148. SOS-Torture/Burundi - Burundi
149. SUARAM - Malaysia
150. Syndicat national des agents de la formation et de l'education du Niger (SYNAFEN NIGER) - Niger
151. Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) - Philippines
152. Thai Action Committee for Democaracy in Burma (TACDB) - Thailand
153. The Advocates for Human Rights - United States of America
154. The Barys Zvozskau Belarusian Human Rights House (BHRH) - Lithuania
155. The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS) - Indonesia
156. The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT)
157. Urgent Action Fund for Women's Human Rights United States of America
158. Vietnam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR) - France
159. World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP) - France
160. World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) - Switzerland
161. Xumek asociación para la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos - ArgentinaCivic space in Belarus is rated as Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor
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GLOBAL SECURITY: ‘NATO remains as relevant today as it was when it was established in 1949’
CIVICUS discusses the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit with Jamie Shea, former NATO official and current Professor of Strategy and Security at the University of Exeter, UK and Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at the think tank Friends of Europe.
NATO held its annual summit from 9 to 11 July. On the military alliance’s 75th anniversary, the leaders of its 32 member states gathered in Washington DC, where the treaty was first signed. Amid concerns about a possible second presidency for Donald Trump, who has suggested he won’t honour NATO’s cornerstone Article 5 on mutual defence, the agenda focused on maintaining unity, strengthening NATO’s European pillar and planning Ukraine’s integration.
How relevant is NATO today?
NATO is as relevant today as it was when it was founded in April 1949. It continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security of its members. Its ability to unite the USA and Canada with Europe around shared values and interests is vital.
Europe continues to face significant threats from an expansionist and aggressive Russia, as evidenced by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. NATO provides essential deterrence and defence, particularly for those Central and Eastern European member states that have a history of subjugation under Czarist and Soviet regimes and are most directly threatened by Russia’s actions.
NATO provides a standard of collective defence that individual member states could not achieve on their own. Smaller allies particularly value its consensus-based decision-making process and its political and military consultation mechanisms, which ensure that every member has a seat at the table and a voice in decisions. This inclusive approach to security represents a significant advance over Europe’s past security dynamics.
How has NATO evolved over time?
NATO started with 12 member states and has grown to 32, with Finland and Sweden joining in the last two years following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO shifted its focus to peacekeeping, with stabilisation missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo and Libya. It invoked Article 5 of its Charter – the collective defence clause – for the first time after the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001.
It has also addressed new security challenges, including counterterrorism, cyber defence, energy supply and the protection of critical infrastructure and space assets. It has recognised climate change as a security issue and established global partnerships that extend beyond Europe to regions such as Asia-Pacific, the Gulf, Latin America and North Africa.
More recently, however, deteriorating relations with Russia have led NATO to refocus on its core mission of collective defence. Supporting Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression has become a key priority. Given Russia’s continued aggression and its perception of NATO as an enemy, this focus is likely to dominate the alliance’s agenda for the next decade.
How much space for civil society participation does NATO offer in its structures and processes?
Addressing global challenges often requires the expertise of civil society organisations and think tanks that provide valuable scientific and technical analysis, insights and solutions.
For example, in preparing for NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, we consulted civil society experts to help us understand Afghan history, culture and traditions. This aimed to ensure that NATO forces would engage effectively with Afghan society, working with rather than against it, and emphasise the protection of women and children.
NATO has also worked with civil society to assess the impact of climate change and develop strategies for military responses to natural disasters and extreme weather events, and has established centres of excellence involving civil society to improve its understanding of issues such as cyberspace, disinformation, hybrid warfare and terrorism.
What were the key issues on the agenda at this year’s summit?
Assistance to Ukraine was the number one issue. NATO seeks to ensure a more consistent flow of advanced weapons and funding to help Ukraine counter the Russian offensive in the Donbass and near Kharkiv. Many allies announced further packages of assistance, including F16 aircraft, pilot training, Patriot anti-missile batteries, Leopard 2 tanks and 155mm artillery rounds. NATO will coordinate military supplies and train the Ukrainian army through a new Special Command based in Wiesbaden, Germany. This is expected to be operational by September. Additionally, NATO also announced that allies will maintain their current level of financial support by providing US$43 billion to Ukraine in 2025.
The other major focus was the Asia-Pacific region. NATO leaders met with their counterparts from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea to discuss increased cooperation on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, climate change, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity and proliferation. China was criticised for its role as a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and for its rapid, non-transparent conventional and nuclear modernisation programme.
What are the prospects of Ukraine joining NATO ?
NATO has a vital interest in Ukraine’s membership, which would strengthen the defence of Eastern Europe, but there are no immediate prospects for accession. The allies have said that Ukraine still has work to do to meet NATO standards, particularly in areas such as anti-corruption and judicial reform. It won’t be easy for Ukraine to do this while it’s still at war with Russia.
NATO is also unlikely to accept Ukraine as long as the war continues, as this would automatically draw member states into the conflict with Russia without the possibility of prior deterrence. But it’s gradually and progressively integrating it into its structures before taking a final decision on full membership, including the Article 5 security guarantee.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attended the summit and Ukraine was declared to be on an ‘irreversible’ path to NATO membership, with 23 allies and partners signing bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. NATO is also working to modernise Ukraine’s military structures and equipment to make its armed forces fully interoperable with NATO.
How are relations between Europe and NATO?
Relations between NATO and the European Union (EU) are now much smoother, especially as both are focusing on challenges on their immediate borders rather than on global issues. The EU has used the war in Ukraine to push ahead with its own defence cooperation, particularly in setting up the European Peace Facility to collectively buy ammunition and fund national arms transfers to Ukraine. It has also agreed a defence production strategy and a plan to boost industrial production of weapons, bringing critical defence supply chains and raw materials back to Europe.
NATO and the EU are cooperating more closely on critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, military mobility and space, agreeing on a rational division of labour to avoid costly duplication.
How would be the impact if Donald Trump’s returned to the US presidency?
Trump’s re-election could pose significant challenges for NATO allies because of his unpredictability. One day he could propose cutting off aid to Ukraine and the next he could reject Putin’s peace proposals. Similarly, his views on NATO have fluctuated from being critical to claiming credit for ‘saving NATO’ by pushing Europeans to increase their defence spending.
Trump has accused Europe of free riding on US power and financial generosity, which isn’t true. Europeans helped the USA after 9/11 by sending thousands of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, and without Europe’s solidarity it would be much harder for the USA to put serious pressure on China. And while the USA is helping to defend Europe, it is also serving its own strategic interests. An isolated USA, with Russia dominating Europe and China dominating Asia, would no longer be a global power.
European contributions to NATO and global security are now the highest in 30 years, with 23 out of 32 NATO allies meeting the two per cent of GDP defence spending target, up from five during the Trump administration. Any sensible US president would recognise that NATO is a good deal for the USA. When all budgets are counted, Europe has spent twice as much as the USA on aid to Ukraine and pays more to the United Nations and its agencies for international development and humanitarian aid.
Dealing with Trump if he returns to the White House will require constant and careful diplomacy. But Republicans in Congress who remain pro-NATO, along with the US defence industry and military establishment, can play a crucial role in helping Europe persuade Trump that weakening European security or undermining NATO would ultimately damage the USA’s status and hand China and Russia a significant geopolitical victory.
Get in touch with Friends of Europe through itswebsite orLinkedIn page, and follow@FriendsofEurope on Twitter. Get in touch with Jamie Shea throughLinkedIn.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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GLOBAL: ‘With a wealth tax on the biggest fortunes, extreme poverty can be eradicated’
CIVICUS speaks about climate change, global inequality and the need for redistribution with Adrien Fabre, a France-based climate economistand founder of Global Redistribution Advocates (GRA).
GRA is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes public debate about three global redistribution policies that enjoy wide public opinion support worldwide – a global wealth tax, a global climate plan and a global climate assembly – and advocates towards political parties in several countries to incorporate these into their agendas and programmes.
What inspired you to become a climate economist and found GRA?
I started my PhD in economics with the goal of understanding humanity’s problems and proposing solutions. I always wanted to give voice to every human, so I naturally specialised in running surveys. Then, in the context of the Yellow Vests protests that began in 2018, I surveyed French people about their attitudes towards climate policies. This sparked interest at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which called on me to conduct a similar survey in other countries. I seized the opportunity to ask people questions they had never been asked before, such as whether they supported a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries. I was amazed by the levels of support: more than 70 per cent in every country!
I ran complementary surveys in Europe and the USA. I tried asking questions differently and tested policies in which the respondents would lose money, but the results were the same: people in western countries were willing to lose a few dozen euros per month to end climate change and global poverty. Furthermore, the support is sincere: you can read this scientific article or my Twitter thread for details.
Now, if there is such strong support for global redistribution, why doesn’t anyone propose it or defend it in public debate? To advocate for global redistributive policies to transfer resources or power from high to low-income countries I launched GRA in April 2023.
What are your proposals?
We have three main proposals to promote wealth redistribution, environmental sustainability and global cooperation to address pressing global challenges. The first is a global wealth tax on individual wealth exceeding US$5 million, with half of the tax proceeds distributed to lower-income countries.
This tax would spare 99.9 per cent of the world’s population, who have wealth below US$5 million. And if the tax were just two per cent, it would collect one per cent of the world’s GDP, which is more than the GDP of all low-income countries, home to 700 million people, combined. Our proposed tax schedule is moderate: two per cent for fortunes above US$5 million, six per cent for those above US$100 million and 10 per cent for those above US$1 billion. A tax of two per cent is far lower than the interests, rents and dividends such a fortune generates.
Our second proposal is a global climate plan aimed at combatting climate change through a worldwide carbon emissions cap, implemented by a system of global emissions trading, and financing a global basic income.
This plan would enter into force as soon as signatory countries cover 60 per cent of global carbon emissions. Participating countries would enforce a cap on carbon emissions, decreasing each year and down to net zero emissions after three decades, in line with the temperature target. Each year, emissions permits would be auctioned to firms that extract fossil fuels or import them from non-participating countries, making polluters pay. To cover the cost of emissions permits, firms would increase fossil fuel prices, which would in turn encourage individuals and businesses to change their equipment or adjust their habits, eventually reducing carbon emissions. The revenues from carbon pricing would fund a global basic income estimated at US$50 per month for each person over 15.
This plan would bring a massive redistribution from countries with a carbon footprint higher than the global average – like OECD countries – to those with a lower-than-average carbon footprint, including most of Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Latin America. It includes mechanisms to encourage participation by all countries, such as a tariff on goods imported from non-participating countries in proportion to their carbon content, a provision allowing middle-income countries such as China to opt out from the mutualisation of revenues to guarantee that it would not lose from the plan while ensuring that it decarbonises with the same carbon price, and a provision facilitating the participation of subnational entities like California or the state of New York even if the federal level does not participate.
The wealth tax and the climate plan would each redistribute one per cent of the world’s GDP from high to low-income countries every year. Extreme poverty can be eradicated. The average income in a country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo would double following the transfers.
Our third proposition is that of a global climate assembly, comprised of representatives elected through proportional representation in participating nations, tasked with drafting a comprehensive treaty to address climate change globally. Before even the beginning of that experiment in democratic governance at the global scale, the assembly would bring a radical change, as the election campaign would foster a global public debate on climate justice.
Please check our website for details: each policy has its own advocacy campaign, with a fully-fledged policy proposal, a petition and a video.
Who are you targeting these proposals at, and how are you working to get the message across?
We are targeting our campaigns at policymakers, scholars, civil society and lay people. Many scholars have endorsed our proposals. GRA is a member of civil society networks in each of our policy domains, and we are hoping that key CSOs will endorse our proposals. We have already met with cabinet members of various governments, including Brazil, Colombia, France, Germany and South Africa, as well as many European Union (EU) politicians. And we are sending dozens of emails every day to get more meetings. Once we get a book on our climate plan and the scientific article finished and published, we will reach out to the public. We will publish an open letter in widely read newspapers, calling on world leaders to discuss global redistributive policies at the United Nations (UN), the G20 and climate summits.
Hopefully, we will get media attention and the movement will grow. It will help if well-known personalities, including celebrities, endorse our proposals. But it will take a social movement to make change happen, perhaps a global demonstration. Our hope is that a large coalition of political parties, CSOs and labour unions throughout the world endorse some common policies towards a sustainable and fair future – ours, or similar ones. This will likely strengthen the parties of the coalition and help them win elections. Our research shows that progressive candidates would gain votes if they endorsed global redistributive policies.
What are the prospects of these proposals being implemented in the near future?
Our proposals are getting more and more endorsements every day. The African Union just called for a global carbon price and will defend this idea in international negotiations.
But our proposal that receives the largest support is the global wealth tax. The next European Parliament elections will be held in June 2024, and left-wing parties will campaign on a European wealth tax. We have proposed that one-third of this European wealth tax would be allocated to lower-income countries outside Europe, and there are good chances that some parties will take this forward. A petition in favour of a wealth tax has recently been signed by 130 members of the European Parliament, and politicians from all parties on the left and centre endorse our proposal. However, a majority in the European Parliament would not suffice, as this proposal would require unanimity at the Council of the EU, that is, the approval of each EU government.
However, three things can help. First, Brazil will chair the G20 in 2024, and we hope that President Lula, along with other leaders, will put pressure on global north states for global redistribution. Second, it would help if US President Joe Biden included wealth taxes on the agenda of his re-election campaign. Third, the campaign for the 2024 European Parliament elections could create momentum for some countries to move forward, even if the EU does not.
I am optimistic that wealth taxes will be implemented – perhaps not in 2024, but within the next decade. However, I fear negotiations might end up being overseen by the OECD, resulting in a disappointing agreement, as happened on international corporate taxation. Negotiations on international taxation must be hosted by the UN, not the OECD. And regarding the content of the negotiations, we should be vigilant of three elements: the exemption threshold, which should not exceed US$5 million; the tax rates, which should be progressive and not too low; and the distribution of revenues, a substantial part of which must go to low-income countries.
Civil society mobilisation will be key to promoting the global wealth tax, making it a central campaign issue and turning it into effective international policy. You can help by signing our petitions, donating, or volunteering for GRA. GRA is also hiring, so feel free to contact us!
What are your hopes and expectations regarding the upcoming COP28 climate summit?
COPs sometimes bring good surprises. Last year, high-income countries finally accepted the principle of a fund to compensate vulnerable countries for the loss and damage from climate change, after 30 years of demands from the developing world.
But I don’t expect any good news this year, as the upcoming COP28 in Dubai is chaired by the CEO of the United Arab Emirates’ state oil company. More generally, I do not expect much from COPs because its decisions are made by consensus, so countries like Saudi Arabia can block any meaningful proposal. This is what led to the current system of nationally determined contributions: while all countries supposedly share the common goal of limiting global warming to ‘well below 2°C’, there are no binding commitments, no harmonised policies, no agreement on burden-sharing, and the sum of countries’ voluntary pledges is inconsistent with the common goal.
To break the deadlock, states with ambitious climate goals should start negotiations in parallel with the UN framework. I think the EU and China should start bilateral negotiations. If they put forward something like the global climate plan that we propose, countries that would benefit from it would surely accept it, and more than 60 per cent of global emissions would be covered. This would put enormous pressure on other countries to join, and particularly other OECD countries such as the USA.
Get in touch with Global Redistribution Advocates through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@GlobalRedistrib and@adrien_fabre on Twitter.
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GRÈCE : « Nous avons besoin d’un changement à la fois dans les récits et dans les politiques de migration »
CIVICUS s’entretient sur la situation des migrants et des réfugiés en Grèce et sur le rôle de la société civile dans l’élaboration des politiques publiques avec Lefteris Papagiannakis, chargé de plaidoyer, de politique et de recherche àSolidarity Now (Solidarité Maintenant) et ancien adjoint au maire pour les affaires des migrants et des réfugiés du Conseil municipal d’Athènes. Solidarity Now est une organisation de la société civile (OSC) qui travaille avec des groupes vulnérables, et en particulier avec les communautés de migrants et de réfugiés en Grèce, pour s’assurer qu’ils soient traités avec dignité et aient accès à un avenir meilleur.
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GREECE: ‘The criminalisation of solidarity has had a chilling effect’
CIVICUS speaks with Melina Spathari, Director of Strategy and Programmes at HumanRights360 (HR360), about theprosecution of civil society activists working with migrants and refugees in Greece.
HR360 is a Greek human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks toprotect the rights of all people, empowering them to exercise their rights, with a focus on the most disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, including migrants and refugees.
What is the current situation for civil society activists and organisations helping migrants in Greece?
As the United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights defenders stated following her official visit to Greece in June 2022, ‘defenders in the country working to ensure the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are currently under severe pressure… At the tip of the spear are prosecutions, where acts of solidarity are reinterpreted as criminal activity, specifically the crime of people smuggling… The negative impact of such cases is multiplied by smear campaigns perpetuating this false image of defenders’.
Since 2010, Greek ruling parties have demonised CSOs, criticising their use of public funding, to delegitimise their criticism of pushbacks of migrants and their condemnation of the conditions in reception and identification centres and refugee camps. In most cases, the allegations against CSOs later proved to be unfounded. This phenomenon is part of a worrying trend that negatively affects CSOs around the globe, which is why civil society has increasingly organised and developed strategies to resist and respond to the attacks they face from governments.
Why is the Greek government criminalising solidarity with migrants and refugees?
In the case of Greece, the speed and impetus of the ongoing crackdown has been fuelled by current trends in both international and domestic politics, involving hostile relations with Turkey and imminent elections in both countries. Deploying a witch-hunt against CSOs kills many birds with one stone: it helps the government gain votes from the far-right side of the political spectrum and helps it manage the damage caused to its reputation by wrong political decisions and neglectful practices. Last but not least, by vilifying CSOs that are active and vocal in the field of human rights, the authorities aspire to manipulate and silence civil society as a whole.
And to some extent, it has worked. Criminalisation has had a chilling effect. There have been some attempts among civil society to gather, discuss, assess the situation and work on a joint strategy, but these actions didn’t flourish. CSOs are now afraid to raise their voice, and we understand them: they have good reason to be intimidated. Still, some acts of solidarity have taken place, especially when those targeted were respected veteran human rights defenders.
Has HR360 been targeted?
In November 2022, the authorities stepped up an attack against our organisation: they demonised HR360 for receiving foreign funding aimed at regranting and disclosed the personal financial situation of HR360’s founders. The public prosecutor began a preliminary investigation, which hasn’t yet produced any outcomes. No information has been revealed, nor has any criminal process been ordered. HR360 finds itself in limbo, facing huge administrative and financial consequences and experiencing severe impacts on staff morale.
But HR360 is not the only victim of this vile smear campaign. In late 2022, the Prosecutor’s Office criminally charged Panagiotis Dimitras, director of the Greek Helsinki Monitor, and Tommy Olsen, founder and director of Aegean Boat Report, a Norwegian CSO that monitors and shares data about the movement of people in the Aegean Sea, for ‘forming a criminal organisation with the purpose of receiving details of citizens of third countries, who attempt to enter Greece illegally, in order to facilitate their illegal entry and stay’. Following the same pattern applied to HR360, Dimitras has been accused of repeatedly conducting activities aimed at gaining illegal income.
What support does Greek civil society need to resist and continue doing its work?
Greek civil society needs more international support, which is currently quite limited and restricted to its advocacy work – that is, it can be used to help migrants and refugees, but not for CSOs and activists to protect themselves and therefore retain the capacity to continue doing their work.
Right now, what Greek activists and CSOs need the most is legal support, including funding to cover legal fees. And in terms of changing the situation in the long term, what’s also needed is a well-organised European awareness campaign highlighting both the vital work civil society is doing and the attacks the government is subjecting it to. This would be very helpful, since bad publicity at the European level is one of the things Greek authorities fear the most.
Civic space in Greece is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Its rating has recently beendowngraded.
Get in touch with HR360 through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@rights360 and@Melina_Spathari onTwitter.
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GREECE: ‘Together we can do more’
CIVICUS speaks about the state of civil society and civic space in Greece with Sotiris Petropoulos, director of Higher Incubator Giving Growth and Sustainability (HIGGS), an initiative that seeks to strengthen Greek civil society organisations (CSOs) through education and support programmes and activities. HIGGS’ purpose is to mobilise the ‘invisible’ forces of the CSO ecosystem, stimulating people and organisations to undertake new, innovative initiatives, and providing the right conditions for their incubation and acceleration.
What are the current conditions for civil society in Greece?
Greece is a democracy with a relatively open civic space. The 2010 socioeconomic crisis enhanced a trend towards increasingly active CSOs playing an important role in covering societal needs. Nevertheless, we are witnessing a regression in the freedoms enjoyed by organised civil society in the form of barriers, mostly of a legal nature, that make CSO work more difficult.
A first indication of this trend was seen when the government elected in July 2019 started gradually creating a more strict and formal oversight system of Greek CSOs, mainly through the introduction of new official registries under relevant ministries, such as a register of CSOs working with migrants and refugees, and so on.
Then in October 2021 draft legislation on CSOs proposed by the Ministry of Interior was put out for public consultation. The initiative was aimed at establishing a single registry of CSOs to replace the existing nine separate databases, so as to enhance transparency about their activities and fundraising activities.
At first, many CSOs welcomed this initiative as an opportunity to strengthen civil society, abolish complicated and bureaucratic procedures, unify all existing registries and ensure a safe and independent environment for CSOs to operate.
However, it soon became clear that the proposed legislation was aimed in a different direction: it would establish mechanisms to monitor rather than support CSOs, enhancing bureaucratic procedures, adding new limitations – such as a requirement for all CSO board members to have a clean criminal record – and increasing their overall operational costs. Moreover, it included some points that were quite problematic, especially for new or small organisations. For instance, to access the registry CSOs would need to have their accounts assessed by certified auditors, a rather costly service, especially for many small-to-medium CSOs with fluctuating budgets. But even those that could afford it probably wouldn’t prioritise this expense and would rather use the funds on their substantive work – say, for buying 1,000 meals to distribute among homeless people.
Another problematic point was the so-called ‘three-year limitation’, a provision that CSOs must have been legally established for at least three years to be eligible to enter the new registry, creating another barrier for some organisations. These points, among others, would widen the gap between big and small organisations and, overall, would create new obstacles for civil society work. In retrospect, the proposed legal framework mirrored the government’s view that only big organisations are and can be transparent and efficient, which in fact runs counter to existing evidence.
In addition, the government’s proposal seemed to be part of an overall ‘policing approach’ towards the segment of civil society it cannot understand or control – a continuation of a measure that had been introduced a year earlier, establishing an even more problematic registry exclusively for CSOs operating in the field of migration and refugees.
How did society respond to the proposed initiative?
The draft law was published in October 2021, just five weeks before the parliamentary vote on the proposal. The timeline for public consultation was short, but the civil society response was fast and massive.
Major CSO networks established a task force to coordinate a joint strategy to respond collectively with specific proposals to improve the draft law.
The first step was to inform all CSOs about the draft law. HIGGS sent emails, posted the proposal on social media and held online public events. In the meantime, we started to draft and share a joint public statement and called on all CSOs to support it by co-signing it and sharing it. This public statement collected 303 signatures, an impressive number by Greek standards. It was one of the biggest collective actions of Greek civil society ever recorded.
Taking advantage of this momentum, we made targeted calls for action to motivate all CSOs to work, both together and individually, to put pressure on members of parliament by calling them on the phone, sending them emails and sharing briefing papers with them.
During the public consultation process, HIGGS put together a policy proposal that contained improvements to the draft law, which was supported by over 45 organisations.
We encouraged all networks to be loud about the draft bill. We all communicated every single development through our media channels, published joint press releases and created social media campaigns.
What did the campaign achieve?
In response to all these actions, the Minister of Interior, Makis Voridis, invited some organisations to working meetings and eventually included some of our policy proposals in the final version of the law.
Law 4873/2021 was passed in December and introduced a new registration procedure for CSOs that seek to access government funding and receive various tax and economic privileges. The process is clear and has clear timeframe. In addition, in the area of volunteerism, specific provisions for emergency situations that were missing were added.
We value the sense of unity, solidarity and power of joint forces as the greatest legacy of this process. This approach is something that most CSOs agreed was missing in Greek civil society, and there is much space to work towards this direction in the future.
What about the restrictions targeting CSOs that work with migrants and refugees?
Over the past few years, several measures were implemented that were meant to discourage or restrict the work of CSOs working in the field of human rights and migration.
In September 2020, the government introduced a ministerial decision that established that Greek and foreign CSOs working in the field of migration, asylum, and social inclusion in Greece must fulfil an exhaustive list of formal and substantive requirements to register with the Ministry of Migration and Asylum. The required documentation targets both the organisation and its staff, members and volunteers, and non-registration would automatically lead to operations being ceased. Moreover, the Ministry of Migration and Asylum was granted complete discretion to accept or reject a CSO’s application.
Among a huge amount of bureaucratic documentation, these CSOs were required to submit audit reports for the previous two years, entailing costs that may be too much of a burden for small grassroots CSOs. For staff, members and volunteers, CSOs must provide criminal records and proof of permanent residence in Greece. If an individual does not meet the requirements, not just the individual concerned but also the CSO may be withdrawn from the registration process.
Concerns over the transparency of the registration process soon increased, as a former political group affiliated with the ruling party turned into a CSO working in the field of asylum: it was approved to receive over €5 million (approx. US$5.5 million) in funding within a week.
Another initiative – the Deportations and Returns Bill – that was submitted to parliament in August 2021 contained provisions to restrict the operation of CSOs through criminal and financial sanctions for individuals and institutions.
On top of the ongoing criminalisation of solidarity towards migrant and refugees, we observed the first effects of these laws and regulations, such as the rejection of Refugee Support Aegean’s application for registration with the Ministry of Immigration and Asylum.
What’s next for Greek civil society?
The task force of civil society networks that was formed in response to the draft bill on the CSO registry did not dissolve after the bill was passed. It remains active and continues monitoring the implementation of the new legislation, pushing for changes to those articles that are found to create obstacles to the exercise of the right to freedom to association, and keeping all CSOs informed of any new developments.
In HIGGS we believe in joint actions, teamwork, and cooperation within civil society. We encourage various forms of networking – one of our mottos is ‘together we can do more’. This is our philosophy and to live up to it. Our programmes offer a variety of perspectives and promote unity and solidarity within the diversity of Greek civil society. The ecosystem of Greek CSOs is gradually entering its mature age. We expect advocacy to become a more core activity of CSOs, and we are working on it.
We view our experience of collaboration in the face of potentially damaging legislation as the beginning of a new area for Greek civil society – one in which the culture of cooperation makes all of us stronger.
Civic space in Greece is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with HIGGS through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@HIGGS3HIGGS on Twitter. -
GREECE: ‘We fought until same-sex marriage stopped being impossible and became a necessary change’
CIVICUS speaks about Greece’s recent legalisation of same-sex marriage with Giorgos Keratsas, Communications Officer of Positive Voice-Greek Association of People Living with HIV.
Founded in 2009, Positive Voice is a civil society organisation focused on tackling the spread of HIV/AIDS, defending the rights of HIV-positive people and more broadly advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in Greece.
What was civil society’s role in achieving the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Greece?
Greek LGBTQI+ groups have advocated for marriage equality and the legal recognition of all families for many years. In 2015, civil partnership arrangements were made available to same-sex couples. This marked a historic victory for LGBTQI+ and human rights in Greece but left a large part of the LGBTQI+ community unsatisfied, because there were several important issues the law didn’t cover, including adoption rights. As a result, LGBTQI+ activism has continued to demand true equality in all laws and regulations concerning interpersonal relations.
Our main argument concerns the discriminatory character of laws that exclude LGBTQI+ people, same-sex couples and diverse families from access to the rights that are afforded to cisgender straight people and heterosexual families. The fact that citizens don’t have the same rights and obligations is proof that we are not truly equal, and a state cannot be considered fully democratic when it has first-class and second-class citizens.
LGBTQI+ organisations have therefore urged legal change, pointing to the example of so many European countries that have recognised marriage equality. The road hasn’t been easy. It involved a lot of struggle, disappointments and persistence. We fought for many years until the change we demanded – initially viewed as impossible, and therefore ignored – was eventually deemed necessary. The recent passage of this law was a civil society victory that proves, once again, that when we take action together, change can happen.
How has Positive Voice contributed to the campaign?
Positive Voice was consistently dedicated for years to the sometimes frustrating work of increasing the visibility of LGBTQI+ people and educating the public on LGBTQI+ rights when the state wasn’t doing anything about it. On the basis of the recognition of the strong association of HIV with social vulnerability, we have focused on the social rather than purely medical side of things.
For over a decade, Positive Voice has been a staunch advocate of LGBTQI+ rights. We have continuously raised the urgent need for equality with government officials. We have been active participants of Pride festivals, consistently supported the demands of LGBTQI+ people, co-signed advocacy letters and statements, endorsed campaigns such as ‘Say Yes’ and hosted impactful exhibitions. A recent one was ‘Where Love is Illegal – Exhibition in a Box’, which shares real stories of LGBTQI+ people in countries where they are not allowed to be themselves or love freely.
We can proudly say that Positive Voice has been one of the strongest advocates for social change in Greece. The building that accommodates Athens Checkpoint, a sexual health and prevention centre that offers free rapid HIV and hepatitis B and C testing and is our project that’s made the biggest impact, is one of the very few in Athens flying the rainbow flag. The flag has stayed despite the fact that in 2019 the building suffered an arson attack motivated by homophobia and transphobia.
Have you encountered backlash?
Partly thanks to consistent civil society campaigning, in recent years public attitudes towards LGBTQI+ people have started to shift. However, homophobia, biphobia and transphobia remain very strong, and hate speech and violence against LGBTQI+ people, and transgender people in particular, are now on the rise, in a very alarming trend that unfortunately is not limited to Greece. Our recent legal victory is obviously a very positive step in the right direction, but we still have a lot of work to do until we are genuinely equal and fairly treated.
The far-right parties that have significantly grown in recent elections, as well as church representatives, have strongly opposed same-sex marriage. They contend that it infringes upon and destroys the concept of marriage and traditional family values and state that family is by definition the result of a union between a man and a woman. They also argue that the right to marriage should not be regarded as a human right, on the basis of which they claim that the LGBTQI+ community is not being deprived of any fundamental rights. Most importantly, they argue that children raised by same-sex parents will not have a healthy psychosocial development. From their perspective, it is children’s rights that would be violated.
Concerningly, in the months prior to the law being passed, LGBTQI+ people were exposed to incredible amounts of abusive public discourse, particularly on TV. In show after show, for weeks politicians, journalists, artists, influencers and others were asked whether they agreed with marriage equality, as if human rights were to be subjected to the verdict of public opinion. Hundreds of particularly abusive and discriminatory statements were given airspace and therefore heard and absorbed by millions of people. It is hard to even imagine the negative impact this rhetoric has possibly had on young queer kids across the country.
How do you connect with the regional and global LGBTQI+ movements?
We constantly follow their work, participate in events, undertake joint action and take advantage of just about any networking opportunity with other LGBTQI+ organisations. It is a fact that numerous European – and also several non-European – countries are more advanced in claiming respect for LGBTQI+ rights than we are, in terms of legislation and everyday practices and social attitudes. They set an example for the rest of us.
LGBTQI+ organisations worldwide are doing amazing work and they truly inspire us. And when any of us experiences blatant human rights violations, we all stand up for each other regardless of geography. What unites us is much more powerful than anything that could set us apart.
Civic space in Greece is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Positive Voice through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow it onTwitter andInstagram.
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GREECE: ‘We need a change in narratives as well as in policies towards migration’
CIVICUS speaks about the situation of migrants and refugees in Greece and the role of civil society in policymaking with Lefteris Papagiannakis, Head of Advocacy, Policy and Research atSolidarity Now and former Vice Mayor on Migrant and Refugee Affairs for the Municipality of Athens. Solidarity Now is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works with vulnerable groups, with a focus on migrants and refugee communities in Greece in order to help them achieve dignity and a better future.
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HATE SPEECH: ‘The fact that this is how online platforms are supposed to work is a big part of the problem’
As part of our 2019thematic report, we are interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about their experience of facing backlash by anti-rights groups. CIVICUS speaks with Brandi Geurkink, European campaigner at the Mozilla Foundation, a non-profit corporation based on the conviction that the internet is a global public resource that must remain open and accessible to all. The Mozilla Foundation seeks to fuel a movement for a healthy internet by supporting a diverse group offellows working on key internet issues, connecting open internet leaders at events such asMozFest, publishing critical research in theInternet Health Report and rallying citizens aroundadvocacy issues that connect the wellbeing of the internet directly to everyday life.
The regular internet user possibly identifies Mozilla with Firefox and doesn’t know that there is also a Mozilla Foundation. Can you tell us what the Mozilla Foundation is and what it does?
I get this question asked a lot. When I told my family I was working for Mozilla, they said, ‘wait, you are not a software professional, what are you doing there?’ What makes Mozilla different from other software developers is that it is a non-profit tech company. Mozilla is the creator of Firefox, which is a web browser, but an open source one. It also has users’ privacy at its core. And all of Mozilla’s work is guided by the Mozilla Manifesto, which provides a set of principles for an open, accessible and safe internet, viewed as a global public resource.
Profits that come from the Firefox browser are invested into the Mozilla Foundation, which is the Mozilla Corporation’s sole shareholder, and our mission is to build an open and healthy web. Mozilla creates and enables open-source technologies and communities that support the Manifesto’s principles; creates and delivers consumer products that represent the Manifesto’s principles; uses the Mozilla assets – intellectual property such as copyrights and trademarks, infrastructure, funds and reputation – to keep the internet an open platform; promotes models for creating economic value for the public benefit; and promotes the Mozilla Manifesto principles in public discourse and within the internet industry.
Mozilla promotes an open and healthy web through a variety of activities. For instance, we have a fellowships programme to empower and connect leaders from the internet health movement. This programme supports people doing all sorts of things, from informing debates on how user rights and privacy should be respected online to creating technologies that will enable greater user agency. Mozilla also produces an annual report, the Internet Health Report, and mobilises people in defence of a healthy internet. A lot of this work takes the form of campaigning for corporate accountability; we seek to influence the way in which tech companies are thinking about privacy and user agency within their products and to mobilise consumers so that they demand better behaviour and more control over their online lives.
How do you define a healthy internet?
A healthy internet is a place where people can safely and freely communicate and participate. For this to happen, the internet must truly be a global public resource rather than something that’s owned by a few giant tech companies, who are then in control of who participates and how they do it. Some key components of a healthy web are openness, privacy and security. We place a lot of emphasis on digital inclusion, which determines who has access; web literacy, which determines who can succeed online; and decentralisation, which focuses on who controls the web – ideally, many rather than just a few.
The internet is currently dominated by eight American and Chinese companies: Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Alibaba, Amazon, Apple, Baidu, Facebook, Microsoft and Tencent. These companies and their subsidiaries dominate all layers of the digital world, from search engines, browsers and social media services to core infrastructure like undersea cables and cloud computing. They built their empires by selling our attention to advertisers, creating new online marketplaces and designing hardware and software that we now cannot do without. Their influence is growing in both our private lives and public spaces.
What’s wrong about giant tech companies, and why it would be advisable to curb their power?
A lot of the problems that we see online are not ‘tech’ problems per se – they’re sociopolitical problems that are amplified, and in some cases incentivised, to spread like wildfire and reach more people than ever before. When it comes to disinformation, for instance, a big part of the problem is the business models that guide the major social media platforms that we communicate on. The most successful tech companies have grown the way they have because they have monetised our personal data. They cash in on our attention in the form of ad revenue. When you think about how we use platforms designed for viral advertising as our primary method of social and political discourse – and increasingly our consumption of news – you can start to see why disinformation thrives on platforms like Facebook and Google.
Another example of the ‘attention economy’ is YouTube, Google’s video platform, which recommends videos to users automatically, often leading us down ‘rabbit holes’ of increasingly more extreme content in order to keep us hooked and watching. When content recommendation algorithms are designed to maximise attention to drive profit, they end up fuelling radical beliefs and often spreading misinformation.
What can be done about people using the internet to disseminate extremist ideas, hate speech and false information?
I’m glad that you asked this because there is definitely a risk of censorship and regulation to fix this problem that actually results in violations of fundamental rights and freedoms. Worryingly, we’re seeing ‘fake news laws’ that use this problem as an excuse to limit freedom of speech and crack down on dissent, particularly in countries where civic space is shrinking and press freedom lacking. Mozilla fellow Renee di Resta puts this best when she says that freedom of reach is not the same as freedom of speech. Most of the big internet platforms have rules around what constitutes acceptable speech, which basically take the form of community guidelines. At the same time, platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter give people the ability to amplify their ideas to a huge number of people. This is the ‘freedom of reach’, and increasingly we’re seeing that used to spread ideas that are at odds with the values that underpin peaceful and democratic societies, like equality and human rights.
I think that it’s important to acknowledge that the business models of major technology platforms create the perfect storm for the manipulation of users. Disinformation and hate speech are content designed to appeal to emotions such as fear, anger and even humour. Combine this with the ability to target specific profiles of people in order to manipulate their ideas, and this becomes the perfect place for this sort of ideas to take hold. Once purveyors of disinformation have gained enough of a following, they can comfortably move offline and mobilise these newly-formed communities, which is something we’re seeing more and more of. It’s this freedom of reach problem that platforms have yet to grapple with, maybe because it’s at odds with the very way that they make money. The challenge is to come up with ideas that improve the mechanisms to eliminate, on one hand, the likelihood of amplification of anti-rights ideas and hate speech, and on the other, the danger of censorship and discrimination against certain types of legitimate discourse.
There has been a lot of controversy about how social media platforms are, or are not, dealing with misinformation. Do you think fact-checking is the way to go?
Responsible reporting and factual information are crucial for people to make informed choices, including about who should govern them; that is why fighting misinformation with care for free speech is key. Among the things that can be done about misinformation it is worth mentioning the verification of advertisers, as well as improved monitoring tools to detect bots and check facts. These are things that if implemented correctly would have an impact on these issues, and not just during the time of elections.
But the critical place where platforms are currently failing to live up to their commitments is around transparency. There must be greater transparency into how people use platforms like Facebook and Google to pay for ads that are intended to manipulate political discourse. At the same time, we must ensure that these companies are open about how content monitoring happens on platforms and that there are redress policies in place for people whose content has been wrongfully removed or deleted. Specific attention should be paid to the situation of fragile democracies, where disinformation can be more harmful because of the absence or limited presence of independent media.
There have been election campaigns plagued by disinformation tactics in many different places, from India to Brazil. In response to public pressure, Facebook expressed a commitment to provide better transparency around how their platform is used for political advertisement so that sophisticated disinformation campaigns can be detected and understood and ultimately prevented. But the transparency tools that the company has released are largely insufficient. This has been repeatedly verified by independent researchers. There is a big disconnect between what companies say in public regarding what they intend to do or have done to prevent disinformation and the actual tools they put out there to do the job. I think Facebook should focus on creating tools that can actually get the job done.
And besides what the companies running the social media platforms are or are not doing, there have been independent initiatives that seem to have worked. A tactic that disinformation campaigns use is the repurposing of content, for instance using a photo that was taken in a different place and time or sharing an old article out of context to spread the rumour that something new has just happened when it’s actually something else entirely that has been reported five years ago. In response to this, The Guardian came up with a brilliant solution: when someone shares on Twitter or Facebook an article of theirs that’s over 12 months old a yellow sign will automatically appear on the shared image stating that the article is over 12 months old. The notice also appears when you click on the article. This initiative was a proactive move from The Guardian to empower people to think more critically about what they are seeing. We need many more initiatives like this.
Are disinformation campaigns also plaguing European politics in the ways that we’ve seen in the USA and Brazil?
Most definitely, which is why in the lead up to the 2019 European elections four leading internet companies – Facebook, Google, Twitter and Mozilla – signed the European Commission’s Code of Practice on Disinformation pledging to take specific steps to prevent disinformation from manipulating citizens of the European Union. This was basically a voluntary code of conduct, and what we saw when monitoring its implementation ahead of the European elections was that the platforms did not deliver what they promised to the European Commission in terms of detecting and acting against disinformation.
Fortunately, ahead of the European Parliamentary elections we didn’t see election interference and political propaganda on the scale that has happened in the Philippines, for example, which is an excellent case study if you want to learn about disinformation tactics that were used very successfully. But we still have a big problem with ‘culture war debates’ that create an atmosphere of confusion, opening rifts and undermining trust in democratic processes and traditional institutions. Social media platforms have still not delivered on transparency commitments that are desperately needed to better understand what is happening.
Civil society identified a case in Poland where pro-government Facebook accounts posed as elderly people or pensioners to spread government propaganda. Before the European elections and following an independent investigation, Facebook took down 77 pages and 230 fake accounts from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK, which had been followed by an estimated 32 million people and generated 67 million interactions over the previous three months alone. These were mostly part of far-right disinformation networks. Among other things, they had spread a video that was seen by 10 million people, supposedly showing migrants in Italy destroying a police car, which was actually from an old movie, and a fake story about migrant taxi drivers raping white women in Poland. A UK-based disinformation network that was uncovered in March 2019 was dedicated to disseminating fake information on topics such as immigration, LGBTQI rights and religious beliefs.
Of course this is happening all the time, and not only during elections, although elections are moments of particular visibility when a lot more than usual is at stake, so there seems to be a spike in the use of misinformation tactics around elections. This also tends to happen around other, particularly stressful situations, for example a terror attack or more generally any current event that draws people’s attention.
Why do online dynamics favour the amplification of specific kinds of messages – i.e. messages of hate instead of a narrative of human rights?
Internet platforms are designed to amplify certain types of content that are created to appeal to deep emotions, because their aim is to keep you on the platform as long as possible and make you want to share that content with friends who will also be retained as long as possible on the platform. The higher the numbers of people online and the longer they stay, the higher the number of ads that will be delivered, and the higher the ad revenue will be. What will naturally happen once these platforms are up and running is that people will develop content with a political purpose, and the dynamics around this content will be exactly the same.
Some will say that users doing this are abusing internet platforms. I disagree: I think people doing this are using those platforms exactly how they were designed to be used, but for the purpose of spreading an extremist political discourse, and the fact that this is how platforms are supposed to work is indeed a big part of the problem. It does make a difference whether someone is trying to make money from users’ posts or the platform is just a space for people to exchange ideas. We need to understand that if we are not paying for the product, then we are the product. If nobody were trying to make money out of our online interactions, there would be a higher chance of online interactions being more similar to interactions happening anywhere else, with people exchanging ideas more naturally rather than trying to catch each other’s attention by trying to elicit the strongest possible reactions.
Does it make sense for us to keep trying to use the internet to have reasonable and civilised political conversations, or is it not going to happen?
I love the internet, and so I think it’s not an entirely hopeless situation. The fact that the attention economy, combined with the growing power of a handful of tech companies, drives the way that we use the internet is really problematic, but at the same time there is a lot of work being done to think through how alternative business models for the internet could look, and increasingly regulators and internet users are realising that the current model is really broken. A fundamental question worth asking is whether it is possible to balance a desire to maximise ad revenue, and therefore people’s time spent on social media, and social responsibility. I think that companies as big as Google or Facebook have a duty to invest in social responsibility even if it has a negative impact on their revenue or it requires a level of transparency and accountability that frightens them. Responsibility implies, among other things, getting people’s consent to use their data to determine what they see online, and provide users’ insights into when and how you’re making choices about what they see.
You may wonder, ‘why would they do that?’. Well, it’s interesting. The CEO of YouTube, Susan Wojcicki, recently published a blog post saying that the spread of harmful content on YouTube is more of a revenue risk for the company because it damages their reputation. I think that there is an element of reputational damage, but the much bigger risk that these companies face is policy-makers cracking down on these platforms and their ability to continue operating as usual without greater accountability. For instance, the European code of practice on disinformation was self-regulatory; we have seen at least in this case that the platforms that committed to the Code didn’t deliver tools that were sufficient to provide greater political ad transparency, and they are still not held accountable for this. Does this example mean that policy-makers will be under greater pressure to regulate the online space by mandating transparency instead of requesting it? These are the sort of conversations that should define new approaches to dealing with harmful content online in order to make sure it remains a positive force in our lives.
Get in touch with the Mozilla Foundation through itswebsite, andfollow@mozilla and@bgeurkink on Twitter.
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IRELAND: ‘The referendums failed because the government overlooked the need to engage affected communities’
CIVICUS speaks with Sinéad Murray, Communications, Membership and Information Officer at Treoir, about Ireland’s recent unsuccessful Family and Care Referendums.
Set up in 1976, Treoir, is a federation of Irish civil society organisations (CSOs) that promote the rights and best interests of unmarried parents and their children in order to achieve legal and societal equality.
What were the recent referendums held in Ireland about, and why were they important?
The two referendums held on 8 March were aimed at changing the constitution, which was drafted in 1937 and heavily influenced by traditional social values regarding women, religion and family. Several referendums were held in the past few years to remove outdated concepts and replace them with more inclusive ones that reflect the modernisation of our society, and these two referendums were part of this trend.
Although 40 per cent of families in Ireland are not based on marriage, article 41 of the Constitution of Ireland defines family on the basis of marriage. It only offers full protections to families based on traditional Catholic values, leaving out other family types, including single-parent or lone-parent families, cohabiting couples with or without children and kinship care families, in which the extended family steps in to take care of a child when a parent isn’t available.
The Family Amendment sought to rectify this by providing greater constitutional protections and societal recognition to diverse family types and promoting gender equality in caregiving roles. The Care Amendment aimed to address the sexist language in a clause of article 41 that is colloquially known as the ‘women’s place in the home’ clause. It implies that women who work outside the home are neglecting their domestic duties.
Although over time progress has been made in removing legislative discrimination against non-marital families, discrimination and inequality persist. For instance, lone-parent families face higher rates of poverty and housing insecurity. Further, since the 1930s, the government has regularly cited the constitutional definition of family to justify its discriminatory policies against non-marital families.
Feminists have long campaigned against these constitutional clauses because they have contributed to a considerable amount of legislation that prevented women’s equality. To add insult to injury, article 41 doesn’t even recognise rights or provide protection for women who stay in the home, including married women, lone mothers, stay-at-home mothers and female family carers.
Instead of simply deleting the article, the proposed amendment aimed to establish a positive, rights-based, gender-neutral, modern obligation of the state to protect caregiving, which is still overwhelmingly done by women.
Unfortunately, neither amendment was passed. Sixty-seven per cent of voters rejected the Family Amendment and 74 per cent voted against the Care Amendment.
What can the results be attributed to?
Opinion polls indicated that around 20 per cent of voters would reject the amendments regardless of how they were worded or what arguments they heard in the campaign. I would argue this corresponds roughly to the conservative and far-right electorate. Although conservative and traditional voters likely contributed to the referendums’ outcome, they were far from its primary drivers.
The numbers clearly indicate that many people who voted no in these two referendums had voted yes in the successful referendums on same-sex marriage in 2015 and on abortion in 2018. We need to understand why. Exit polls revealed the main reasons behind the two no votes in the 2024 referendums: a lack of clarity or information, a rushed process, lack of public consultation, a change perceived as insufficient and a general distrust in the current government.
It was the government’s misunderstanding of past referendum successes that led to the lack of clarity and structure in this process. They took the progressive vote for granted and underestimated the importance of the actual wording and public engagement.
The government published the wording for both referendums in December 2023, leaving a remarkably short window for campaign activities. It gave itself only six weeks to educate the public about the referendum process, communicate what was being voted on and try to persuade people to approve the changes. This limited timeframe posed logistical and political challenges.
Surprisingly, the chosen wording deviated from the terms proposed by the Citizen’s Assembly – a body made up of randomly selected citizens tasked with deliberating on key political issues – and the Joint Oireachtas (Ireland’s two houses in parliament) Committee on Gender Equality. The Care Referendum, for instance, focused solely on protecting family care instead of encompassing care provided in the broader community. The government’s commitment to ‘strive’ to support care rather than being mandated to do so also raised concerns. The formulation for the Family referendum included terms such as ‘durable relationships’ that were undefined and caused further confusion.
The rather abstract language used in both referendums also failed to afford enforceable new rights to the people concerned. If passed, the amendments wouldn’t have led to immediate, practical improvements in the lives of family carers or non-marital families – they would only have given them the right to challenge government decisions in court, which is a costly, intimidating and lengthy process. If the abortion referendum had only given women the right to go to court to demand an abortion, it likely wouldn’t have passed either.
This lack of tangible benefits left many uncertain whether to vote in favour, strengthening the campaign against and allowing for misinformation to proliferate, driven particularly by far-right groups.
Lack of trust in the current government exacerbated uncertainty. Public perceptions of the government’s failure to address pressing issues such as the housing and cost of living crises contributed to scepticism about the proposed changes.
In essence, results were driven by a combination of factors and underscored the importance of clear communication, grassroots engagement and addressing public concerns in referendum campaigns.
What should the government have learned from the successful referendums on abortion and same-sex marriage?
The most serious mistake was to think that because they were on the same line of progressive, inclusive and rights-expanding change, the new referendums would produce the same result as the referendums on abortion and same-sex marriage. The government shouldn’t have taken a yes vote for granted.
The government clearly misread the situation following the legalisation of same-sex marriage and abortion. In fact, the outcomes on abortion and same-sex marriage were far from preordained: they were the result of extensive, years-long grassroots mobilisation. Thousands of people advocated and protested for same-sex marriage and abortion for many years. Campaigns centred in the personal experiences of women and LGBTQI+ people affected by Ireland’s restrictive laws. Thousands of LGBTQI+ people spoke up about the stigma and discrimination they and their loved ones continued to face even after the passage of the 2011 civil partnership law. High profile cases such as that of Savita Halappanavar, who died after being refused an abortion, galvanised tens of thousands of women to speak out. The purpose was clear and the benefits of the referendums were obvious.
The promise of tangible rights also motivated supporters. They knew that even if removing the constitutional ban on abortion would not result in abortions becoming legal overnight, the government had published a clear legislative plan for if the referendum passed. During the referendum campaign, it also said it would push for the legalisation of abortion up to 12 weeks into pregnancy. This gave people certainty about what they were voting for. Similarly, it was clear that same-sex couples after the referendum campaign would have the same rights and responsibilities associated with marriage as opposite-sex couples.
The government didn’t see this, and so it overlooked the need to engage affected communities. Mobilising these groups is the most important asset in a referendum campaign and this was lost in the Family and Care referendums by the wording. The government also failed to clearly articulate the benefits of a yes vote. Unlike previous campaigns, the Family and Care referendums lacked a compelling narrative to rally public support. Legal or statistical arguments don’t persuade voters – personal stories do. But without the affected communities on board, those personal stories were hard to share. When those stories were shared, it was hard to definitely show how the referendum would adequately address the discrimination people faced. Lacking strong grassroots support, the Family and Care referendums faced great challenges in mobilising public opinion.
Who campaigned for, and who campaigned against the proposed changes?
Despite these shortcomings, most political parties supported a yes vote for both amendments, a common stance in Irish referendums. Although at Treoir we believed the government’s wording fell short, we still advocated for the change as we believed it was a step towards greater equality. Along with the National Women’s Council, One Family and Family Carers Ireland we led a campaign formed by 20 CSOs pushing for two yes votes.
Only two political parties – both of which hold a small number of seats in the Dáil, the lower house of parliament – opposed the changes: Aontú and Independent Ireland. Their campaign focused on the confusing wording chosen by the government, and used the regular slogan of campaigners against change in referendums – ‘Don't know? Vote no!’. For them, the referendum was a cover to push for increased immigration or the legalisation of polygamy in Ireland. They also argued that the ‘women’s place in the home’ clause was a positive element of the constitution and removing terms like ‘mother’ and ‘women’ was part of an agenda to eradicate the concept of biological women. This stance was also supported by the Catholic Bishops Conference and the Iona Institute, a Catholic pressure group.
Additionally, a third campaign emerged in support of a mixed vote, with the Free Legal Advice Centre among its supporters. They viewed the Family Amendment as an improvement but expressed reservations about the Care Amendment, arguing it would not provide any new rights and would perpetuate harmful stereotypes about women and people with disabilities. Equality Not Care, a group formed during the campaign, advocated for a no vote on the Care Amendment due to the impacts on people with disabilities, who would be considered as ‘subjects’ of care rather than independent rights-holders.
What’s next in the struggle for gender rights in Ireland?
The referendum campaign highlighted many of the issues that need to be urgently addressed, including the disproportionate number of lone-parent families, with 80 per cent of those headed by women facing poverty and housing insecurity. There’s also a need for a public childcare system, which would be essential for gender equality and hugely beneficial for lone parent families, along with real support for all types of carers, support for independent living for people with disabilities and family justice reform.
Following this defeat, another referendum on these articles is highly unlikely any time soon. However, changing the constitution wasn’t civil society’s primary focus to begin with. Moving forward, we should concentrate our efforts in pushing for legislative measures rather than constitutional amendments.
Civic space in Ireland is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Treoir through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, follow@treoir on Twitter, and contact Sinéad throughLinkedIn.
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ITALIE : « Le mouvement des Sardines cherche à susciter la confiance en soi dans le camp progressiste »
CIVICUS s'entretient avec Andrea Garreffa, l'un des fondateurs du mouvement des Sardines (Movimento delle Sardine), un mouvement politique populaire qui a débuté en novembre 2019 à Bologne, en Italie, pour protester contre la rhétorique haineuse du leader populiste de droite Matteo Salvini.
Qu'est-ce qui vous a inspiré pour démarrer ce mouvement ?
Le 26 janvier 2020, il y avait des élections régionales en Émilie-Romagne, notre région d'origine - et quand je dis la nôtre, je veux dire la mienne et celle des autres co-fondateurs du mouvement, Mattia Santori, Roberto Morotti et Giulia Trappoloni. À cette époque, il y avait une grande vague d’extrême droite, représentée par la Ligue et son leader, Matteo Salvini. Il y avait des signes très effrayants en rapport avec la situation politique générale en Italie, dont le manque de respect envers la survivante de l’Holocauste Liliana Segre, déportée à Auschwitz et seule survivante de toute sa famille. À partir des années 1990, Segre a commencé à parler publiquement de son expérience et en 2018, elle a été nommée sénatrice à vie. Elle a reçu tellement d’insultes et de menaces sur les réseaux sociaux qu’en novembre 2019, elle a été placée sous protection policière. La situation était terrifiante ; je n’ai pas honte d’admettre que je pleurais en lisant les nouvelles de ces épisodes dans le journal.
Comment s'est organisée la première manifestation des Sardines ?
À l’approche des élections, mes amis et moi avons commencé à réfléchir à un moyen de nous exprimer et d’avertir la Ligue que le match n’était pas encore terminé. Nous voulions que cela soit très clair, tant pour les partis d’extrême droite que pour tous les citoyens qui recherchaient un stimulant pour se responsabiliser. La Ligue venait de gagner en Ombrie et s’était également annoncée comme vainqueur en Émilie-Romagne ; elle comptait sur cette victoire pour déstabiliser le gouvernement de coalition et revenir au pouvoir. Nous voulions faire quelque chose pour freiner ce processus. Nous avons commencé à y réfléchir le 6 ou 7 novembre 2019, juste une semaine avant que Matteo Salvini, avec Lucia Borgonzoni, la candidate de la Ligue à la présidence du gouvernement régional, commencent leur campagne avec un événement au stade de Bologne. Nous étions très conscients que la dernière fois que Salvini était venu à Bologne, il avait dit que la Piazza Maggiore, la place principale de la ville, pouvait accueillir jusqu'à 100 000 personnes, en indiquant implicitement que c’était le nombre de personnes qui avaient assisté à son événement, ce qui est physiquement impossible, puisque la capacité maximale de la place est d’environ 30 000 personnes entassées. D’une certaine manière, nous voulions également attirer l’attention sur les informations diffusées par les médias et nous assurer qu’ils ne pouvaient pas tricher.
Bref, notre idée était d’organiser une démonstration de type flashmob sur la Piazza Maggiore de Bologne, le jour même où Salvini faisait son acte. Nous l’avons appelé « 6 000 sardines contre Salvini » car notre objectif était de rassembler environ 6 000 personnes et notre tactique était de montrer que nous étions nombreux ; nous avons donc utilisé l’image de foules entassées comme des sardines sur un banc de sable. Dans les quelques jours que nous avons eus pour nous organiser, nous avons établi le récit principal et préparé des modèles personnalisables afin que chaque participant ait la liberté de s’exprimer et d’utiliser sa créativité. Le nôtre était un message que tout le monde pouvait comprendre, et les actions requises étaient des choses que n’importe qui pouvait faire. Nous voulions nous débarrasser de tous les sentiments négatifs liés aux partis politiques existants, donc l’initiative était inclusive dès le départ. Elle n’était liée à aucun parti, mais ouverte à quiconque partageait les valeurs fondamentales de l’antifascisme et de l’antiracisme.
Nous avons envoyé une invitation, non seulement via Facebook, mais aussi, et surtout, en descendant dans la rue pour distribuer des dépliants et parler aux gens, afin que les gens puissent comprendre que l’événement était réel et que cela allait vraiment arriver. Nous avons été surpris de voir que deux jours seulement après le lancement de la campagne sur Facebook, nous distribuions des dépliants et les gens nous disaient qu’ils étaient déjà au courant de l’événement. Le bouche à oreille fonctionnait incroyablement bien ; à mon avis, cela reflétait un besoin très fort pour les gens de faire quelque chose pour que Matteo Salvini ne gagne pas à Bologne et en Émilie-Romagne. Les gens ont compris à quel point ce choix était important. Au cours de l'été, Salvini avait déstabilisé le gouvernement national en se « montrant » à Milano Marittima et en exigeant des pieni poteri - pleins pouvoirs, une expression que Mussolini utilisait d’habitude. Les citoyens ne pouvaient pas risquer qu’un tel spectacle se reproduise et ont vraiment ressenti l’appel à l’action lorsque la propagande d'extrême droite a commencé à diffuser des messages tels que « Liberiamo l’Emilia-Romagna » (Libérons l’Émilie-Romagne), comme si les gens avaient oublié leurs cours d’histoire : la région n’avait pas besoin d’être libérée car cela s’était déjà produit à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les gens ont estimé que leur intelligence n’était pas respectée et nous nous sommes levés pour la rendre visible et tangible. Les gens sont moins stupides que ce que les personnes au pouvoir ont tendance à penser.
Comment saviez-vous que les gens y assisteraient ?
Nous n’avions aucune idée. Dans la nuit du 14 novembre, nous nous sommes retrouvés entourés d’une foule incroyable - les médias ont rapporté qu’il y avait 15 000 personnes - et nous ne pouvions pas le croire.
Nous nous attendions à ce que quelques personnes soient présentes ; nous avons commencé à croire au succès de l’initiative lorsque nous avons vu que dès le premier jour, nous atteignions chacun des objectifs que nous nous étions fixés. Par exemple, nous avons mis en place la page Facebook avec l’objectif initial d’atteindre un millier de personnes, et le lendemain il y en avait déjà plus de trois ou quatre mille. C’était principalement pour deux raisons : premièrement, parce que c'était le bon moment, car évidemment les gens étaient prêts pour une initiative comme celle-ci ; et deuxièmement, par le fait que nous vivons nous-mêmes à Bologne, nous connaissons beaucoup de monde et pouvions donc facilement diffuser le message.
Mais le 14 novembre, personne ne savait ce qui allait se passer. Nous avions dit aux gens qu’il y aurait une surprise et nous l’avons gardée secrète jusqu'à ce que tout le monde se soit réuni, et à 20h30 nous avons joué une chanson de Lucio Dalla, Com'è profondo il mare, qui se traduit par « combien la mer est profonde ». Dans une partie de la chanson, les paroles disent que nous sommes nombreux, que nous descendons tous du poisson et que vous ne pouvez pas arrêter le poisson parce que vous ne pouvez pas bloquer l’océan, vous ne pouvez pas l’encercler. Cela a généré beaucoup d’émotion et les gens ont même pleuré parce que c’était un sentiment très puissant ; beaucoup de gens ne pouvaient pas croire que cela se produisait vraiment. Les personnes âgées se sentaient à nouveau jeunes, éprouvant des émotions qu’elles croyaient perdues à jamais dans les années 70. Les jeunes enfants ont eu l’occasion de participer à une fête massive et joyeuse, ce qui les a amenés à remettre en question l’idée que la politique est ennuyeuse et sans émotion. Je pense que toute la vague qui a suivi a été générée cette première nuit ; elle est née de cette émotion initiale. Nous n’étions pas 6 000 mais bien plus, et nous avons envoyé le message que le match était loin d'être terminé et que, par conséquent, Salvini ne pouvait pas encore être considéré comme le vainqueur. C’est la clé : quel que soit le sport que vous pratiquez, si vous entrez sur le court en pensant que vous allez perdre, vous perdrez. C’était l’ambiance qui prévalait parmi les partis de gauche et les citoyens progressistes. Nous avons fait ce que nous avons pu pour faire croire à « notre équipe » en elle-même et en ses chances de victoire. On pourrait dire que ce que cherche le mouvement des Sardines, c’est de susciter la confiance en soi dans le camp progressiste.
Qui a organisé toutes les manifestations suivantes ?
L’excitation de la première manifestation s’est propagée grâce à une impressionnante photographie prise du toit du bâtiment municipal, montrant une fourgonnette rouge entourée de milliers de personnes. L’image s’est répandue sur internet et les réseaux sociaux. Elle a aidé à concentrer l’attention sur les élections régionales. Tous les médias internationaux étaient là, alors on leur a offert l’image et ainsi tout a commencé. L’image reflétait le fait que quelque chose d’important se passait, alors quand des gens dans d’autres villes et même d’autres pays ont commencé à nous contacter, nous avons créé une adresse e-mail pour que n’importe qui puisse nous contacter.
Nous avons partagé notre expérience et expliqué à ceux qui nous ont contactés comment nous avions tout mis en place en seulement six jours : comment nous avions demandé des permis pour la manifestation et pour jouer de la musique, comment nous prenions soin des gens, ce genre de choses. Nous avons ensuite organisé toutes les informations afin qu’elles puissent être partagées avec toute personne souhaitant faire quelque chose de similaire ailleurs. Nous avons également enregistré le nom de l’initiative, non pas parce que nous voulions la posséder, mais pour empêcher son utilisation abusive et protéger ses valeurs sous-jacentes. Nous avons passé des heures et des jours à parler au téléphone avec des gens de toute l’Émilie-Romagne, puis d’autres régions, jusqu’à ce que le mouvement soit devenu si grand que nous avons été en mesure d’annoncer une manifestation massive qui se tiendrait à Rome en décembre.
Pour l’événement de Rome, nous n’avons même pas eu grand-chose à faire, car il y avait déjà des gens à Rome qui organisaient eux-mêmes la manifestation et ils nous ont invités comme orateurs. C’était en effet un aspect positif, car il ne s’agissait plus de gens de Bologne qui organisaient un événement pour Rome, mais de gens de Rome s’organisant, mobilisant leurs amis et voisins et invitant les gens à se joindre à eux.
Juste avant les élections, le 19 janvier, nous avons organisé un grand concert à Bologne, dans le but d’encourager la participation électorale. Nous ne voulions pas faire pression sur les gens pour qu’ils votent pour tel ou tel parti, mais pour encourager leur participation. Lors des précédentes élections régionales, l’indifférence avait prévalu : seuls 37 % des électeurs ont exercé leur droit. Le taux de participation le plus élevé que nous avons atteint cette fois, lorsque 69 % ont voté, était en soi une victoire pour la démocratie.
Vous avez mentionné que le mouvement s’est répandu à l’échelle nationale et internationale. Avez-vous également établi des liens avec d’autres mouvements pour la justice dans d’autres pays ?
Le mouvement s’est développé à l’échelle internationale depuis le début, grâce aux Italiens vivant à l’étranger qui ont lu l’actualité, compris ce qui se passait et nous ont contactés. Nous communiquons avec des personnes dans des dizaines de grandes villes de nombreux pays du monde entier, notamment en Australie, aux États-Unis et aux Pays-Bas.
Ce fut le premier pas vers le niveau international, et aussi la raison pour laquelle nous avons ensuite été invités à participer au Forum Culturel Européen, qui a eu lieu à Amsterdam en septembre 2020. Nous avons assisté au festival et là nous avons eu l’occasion de rencontrer des représentants d’Extinction Rebellion du Royaume-Uni, des gilets jaunes français, d’Un Million de Moments pour la Démocratie, une organisation de protestation de la République tchèque, Demosisto de Hong Kong et Queer & Trans Black Resistance, une organisation LGBTQI+ des Pays-Bas. Nous nous sommes connectés à d’autres réalités et avons rencontré d’autres mouvements. Nous avons commencé à parler et à rêver d’un événement qui rassemblerait une grande variété de mouvements de protestation dans les mois ou années à venir, suite à la fin de la pandémie du COVID-19. Maintenant, nous sommes ouverts et curieux de savoir ce que font les autres, tout en restant indépendants. Nous avons notre projet, ils ont le leur et nous collaborons lorsque nous en avons l’occasion.
La page Facebook « 6 000 Sardines » contient de nombreuses expressions de solidarité avec le mouvement pro-démocratie au Bélarus, #EndSARS au Nigéria et Black Lives Matter aux États-Unis. Travaillez-vous en solidarité avec eux ?
Ce que nous avons fait, c’est entrer en contact avec ces mouvements, si possible, et leur faire savoir que nous allons envoyer une communication de solidarité, mais c’est tout. Nous sommes trop occupés à essayer de créer notre propre organisation pour investir de l’énergie en essayant de suivre et de comprendre tout ce que les autres font pour construire leurs propres mouvements.
Nous partageons également l’idée que le mouvement est bien plus que la page Facebook. Pour nous, Facebook est un canal de communication et un moyen utile de diffuser des messages, mais ce n’est pas le cœur du mouvement. Parfois, cela fonctionne plus comme un panneau d'affichage où les gens partagent des informations et échangent des messages, et tout ce qui y apparaît n’est pas le résultat d’une décision commune au niveau de l’organisation. Pour être honnête, parfois j’ouvre notre page Facebook et je ne suis pas forcément d’accord avec tout ce que j’y trouve. Cela se produit en raison de la délégation des tâches et de l’ouverture à la participation.
Quels sont les objectifs actuels du mouvement et comment ont-ils évolué ?
Nous y avons beaucoup réfléchi car tout a commencé très spontanément et avec un événement fortement lié aux élections, mais ensuite il a continué à se développer. Par conséquent, nous nous sentons responsables de gérer toute cette énergie que nous avons générée. Nous avons fait de notre mieux pour diffuser les bons messages sans alimenter l’illusion. Nous sommes toujours les mêmes que nous étions l’année dernière, quelles que soient les expériences que nous avons vécues ; cependant, nous n’étions pas préparés à tout cela. Jour après jour, nous apprenons à gérer l’attention, les médias et tout ce qui va avec. Nous nous concentrons sur la nécessité de fixer des objectifs et une vision.
Nous y étions lorsque la pandémie de COVID-19 nous a frappés. D'une part, cela nous a affectés négativement parce que nous n’avons pas pu continuer à nous mobiliser ; d’un autre côté, cependant, il s’est avéré avoir un effet étrangement positif, car il nous a obligés à ralentir. Nous avons profité du confinement pour faire la seule chose que nous pouvions faire : s’asseoir et réfléchir. Nous avons ainsi réussi à construire notre manifeste, qui a été le résultat de multiples débats au sein de notre cercle intime.
Le manifeste a marqué un jalon, et nos prochaines étapes ont consisté à travailler pour rendre chacun de ses composants visible et tangible dans la vie réelle. C’est ce sur quoi nous nous concentrons actuellement. Suivant la métaphore de la mer, après la marée haute est venue la marée basse, qui est plus gérable, et nous essayons de nourrir le mouvement pour qu’il pousse à partir des racines, plus lent mais moins chaotique et instable. Nous essayons d’être un point de référence pour quiconque recherche des idées progressistes, sans être un parti mais en montrant le chemin.
Je voudrais souligner le fait que nous avons lancé ce mouvement avec l’idée que nous ne devrions pas simplement blâmer les politiciens ou les partis, mais plutôt nous demander ce que nous faisons nous-mêmes pour apporter au monde le changement que nous voulons voir. Cela signifie que nous n’excluons pas les approches centrées sur de petites choses, comme prendre soin de son quartier. Nous incluons ce type d’approche, ainsi que d’autres plus ambitieuses, telles que la mise en place d’un cap pour les partis progressistes de gauche. Nous considérons que les deux approches sont également valides.
Nous n’excluons pas non plus un discours qui converge avec le nôtre et défend nos valeurs fondamentales. Par exemple, en ce moment, on parle beaucoup de la progressivité du pape ; nous avons donc invité certaines personnes à en parler, non pas parce que nous sommes un mouvement religieux, mais pour diffuser le genre de message positif qui est actuellement assez difficile à trouver dans l’arène politique.
Il y a quelques mois, nous avons organisé notre première École de Politique, Justice et Paix. Nous l’avons fait dans une petite ville, Supino, parce que cela correspond mieux au modèle d’auto-organisation locale que nous voulons promouvoir. Nous avons invité des acteurs politiques à interagir avec des militants d’une vingtaine d’années. L’idée était de fusionner ces mondes pour créer ce type de communication qui est si rare sur les plateformes de réseaux sociaux. Nous voulons créer des opportunités pour que les personnes d’idées progressistes puissent se rencontrer et discuter, pas nécessairement pour trouver la solution à un problème spécifique, mais pour établir un lien entre des personnes ayant un pouvoir de décision et des personnes intéressées à participer et à changer les choses mais qui ne savent pas vraiment comment le faire.
Comment le mouvement est-il resté en vie pendant le confinement lié à la pandémie du COVID-19 ?
Nous avons invité des gens de toute l’Italie à se concentrer sur le niveau local, car c’était la seule chose qu’ils pouvaient faire de toute façon. Et pour être crédibles, nous avons donné l’exemple. À Bologne, de nombreuses personnes ont mis leur énergie au service des autres, par exemple en faisant les courses pour ceux qui ne pouvaient pas quitter leur maison et en s’impliquant dans d’innombrables initiatives, mouvements et associations locaux. Nous avons encouragé cette implication car nous n’avons jamais eu l’intention de remplacer les organisations existantes, mais plutôt de revitaliser l’activisme et la participation aux affaires publiques.
Mais nous avons demandé aux gens de rester en contact, et nous organisions régulièrement des conversations et des événements spécifiques. Par exemple, pour le 25 avril, Jour de la Libération, nous avons lancé une initiative à travers laquelle nous avons partagé des clips vidéo illustrant la résistance au fascisme et au nazisme pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et nous avons invité les gens à les projeter de ses fenêtres sur les murs des bâtiments voisins, et à filmer l’événement. Nous avons récolté les enregistrements et les avons rassemblés dans une vidéo que nous avons diffusée sur les réseaux sociaux. Notre message central était que nous pouvions tous être présents même lorsque nous ne pouvions pas sortir physiquement.
Début mai, nous avons également organisé un flashmob symbolique sur la Piazza Maggiore à Bologne : au lieu de personnes, nous avons mis en place environ 6 000 plantes, que nous avons ensuite vendues en ligne. Nos bénévoles les ont livrés à vélo, et tous les fonds que nous avons collectés sont allés à la municipalité locale, qui s’était engagée à les doubler avec une contribution de ses propres fonds et à investir le montant total pour soutenir des événements culturels pendant l’été. Avant de remettre les plantes, nous avons réalisé une performance artistique sur la place ; puis nous avons déplacé les plantes pour tracer avec elles la silhouette d’un vélo au sol. À la suite de cette initiative, nous avons non seulement marqué notre présence dans l’espace public, mais nous avons également canalisé environ 60 000 euros (environ 69 800 dollars) vers des événements culturels. Plus tard, de nombreuses personnes dans d’autres régions d’Italie ont reproduit l’initiative ou nous ont fait part de leur intérêt à le faire ; cependant, certains n’ont pas pu le faire car elle présentait des complexités logistiques.
Et puis un jour, la municipalité nous a dit qu’elle avait des parcelles de terrain inutilisées qui pourraient être transformées en jardins urbains et elle nous les a offertes. Nous avons organisé des volontaires qui voulaient y travailler, de sorte qu’ils sont maintenant devenus des espaces avec des jardins où l’on cultive des légumes. Ceux qui décident d’investir leur temps et leurs efforts dans ces jardins conservent la moitié des produits qu’ils cultivent et livrent l’autre moitié aux cuisines communautaires qui aident ceux qui n’ont pas assez de ressources pour acheter de la nourriture.
Même pendant le confinement nous avons pensé à Bologne comme un laboratoire où nous pourrions mettre en œuvre et tester nos idées et encourager d’autres personnes à faire de même, soit en reproduisant nos initiatives, soit en essayant quelque chose de différent pour voir ce qui se passe. Si vous testez des initiatives potentiellement reproductibles et faciles à mettre en œuvre, et que de nombreuses personnes emboîtent le pas, vous pouvez réaliser des changements à une échelle considérable.
L’espace civique en Italie est classé comme « limité » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
Entrez en contact avec le mouvement des Sardines via leursite internet ou leur pageFacebook.