transition
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COP28: ‘To truly end the fossil fuel era, bold visions must now turn into historical action on the ground’
CIVICUS speaks with Kaisa Kosonen, Senior Policy Advisor at Greenpeace Nordic, about the outcomes of theCOP28 climate summit and the vital role played by civil society in setting the agenda for fossil fuel phase-out. Kaisa was Greenpeace International delegation’s lead at COP28.What were the opportunities for civil society to influence the negotiations at COP28?
I think the biggest influence civil society made was in agenda setting. Fossil fuel phase-out was never an official agenda item at this COP, but we managed to make it the number one topic for the global stocktake, and the main benchmark for success.
Within the United Nations (UN) space at COP28 civil society was guaranteed a certain level of participation and access. However, areas dedicated to civil society, such as side event and press conference rooms and pavilions for civil society organisations, were noticeably separated from negotiation areas, government press conferences and media zones.
On top of this, a unique aspect of COP28 was the record number of fossil fuel lobbyists who participated, securing more passes than all delegates from the 10 most climate-vulnerable nations combined. This influx of lobbyists introduced a different dimension of economic influence to the summit.
Were climate activists, both local and international, able to exercise their right to protest?
Greenpeace chose to focus its activities exclusively within the UN area, known as the blue zone. Within this area, protests were allowed if prior permission had been sought and granted. However, we encountered increased constraints and a lot of back-and-forth this time, with some unfounded wordsmithing on banner texts. Other groups also mentioned that their protests were redirected to less relevant locations and some activists experienced an atmosphere of intimidation.
It is crucial that the UN Secretariat and security safeguard civil society spaces in COPs. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly should not be subject to negotiation with the host country’s presidency.
What’s your assessment of the COP28 final declaration?
The COP28 outcome delivered a long-awaited signal on ending the fossil fuel era, along with a call to massively scale up renewables and energy efficiency this decade. But it fell short in some aspects, containing potentially dangerous distractions and loopholes. The lack of sufficient means to achieve the proposed goals raises questions about the practical implementation of the commitments. Real progress will be determined by actions taken on the ground.
Civil society played a crucial role setting the agenda at COP28, successfully steering the focus of world governments towards the urgent need for a fossil fuel phase-out aligned with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees warming limit. This shift in attention, sustained for almost two weeks, marked an unprecedented achievement during a UN climate summit. There’s no way back now.
Despite its weak language, the declaration sent a clear signal that the fossil fuel era will come to an end. The practical requirement for ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’ to achieve ‘net zero by 2050’, if implemented sustainably, would mean a near-complete phase-out of fossil fuels within the next three decades. To truly end the fossil fuel era, bold visions must now turn into historical action on the ground.
The call for countries to contribute to the phase-out in a ‘just, orderly, and equitable manner’ emphasises the responsibility of wealthy states to take the lead and support global south countries in their transition.
The operationalisation and initial capitalisation of the loss and damage fund also mark a turning point for global climate action – but only if it is built on.
In the year ahead, the fund must be set up so that funding can start flowing to those who need it. Permanent, predictable funds must be established to meet the growing needs, flowing from the countries and corporations that have contributed most to the climate crisis towards those that have contributed less but are disproportionately impacted on by its effects. We must prevent further losses and damages through a fast and fair fossil fuel phase-out.
What further steps need to be taken for the COP28 outcomes to have a tangible and positive impact?
With this COP28 outcome we now have new global benchmarks for aligning action with the Paris Agreement 1.5 degrees limit and climate justice. This crucial roadmap includes accelerating global emission cuts, increasing reliance on renewables and energy efficiency, expediting the transition away from fossil fuels, putting an end to deforestation and fostering the growth of climate finance. Focus must now shift to real action on the ground.
Over the next year, states face a critical period where they must formulate new national climate targets and plans to deliver their fair contributions to all these global goals. Simultaneously, countries need to collaboratively design the future landscape of international climate finance, moving beyond existing commitments to fill the growing gaps.
What are your thoughts on the choice of Azerbaijan as COP29 host?
The choice of Azerbaijan as the host for COP29 raises many concerns, given its economy’s very high reliance on oil and gas exports, and poor track record on human rights. The upcoming COP should primarily focus on delivering climate finance to those made vulnerable and lacking capacity, and on redirecting financial flows away from problems and towards solutions. Key to this is holding the fossil fuel industry and major polluters accountable for the damage they have caused, which won’t be easy with a host that’s highly invested in fossil fuels.
That said, as the history of this process shows, when a determined group of progressive countries come together to drive change, and they are supported by the global climate movement, breakthroughs can happen. So the priority now is to ensure that by COP29 next year, countries will have taken key steps to accelerate the fair and swift transition away from fossil fuels on the ground, and that they’re ready to take the bull by the horns and make polluters pay.
Get in touch with Greenpeace through itswebsite,Instagram andFacebook accounts, and follow@Greenpeace and@kaisakosonen on Twitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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HAÏTI : « Les gangs contrôlent le pays en lieu et place des autorités »
CIVICUS échange sur l’augmentation de la violence des gangs et la situation politique en Haïti avec Nancy Roc, journaliste indépendante.Avec 38 ans d’expérience, Nancy est une journaliste originaire d’Haïti, reconnue pour son travail en faveur de la liberté de la presse. Elle est récipiendaire de nombreux prix, dont le prix Jean Dominique pour la liberté de la presse décerné par l’UNESCO, entre autres.
Quelle est la situation actuelle d’Haïti en matière de sécurité ?
La situation est intenable, pour reprendre le terme exact du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies (ONU) aux droits de l’homme, Volker Türk. Malgré l’état d’urgence et la succession de couvre-feu déclarés par le gouvernement depuis le 4 mars pour regagner le contrôle de la capitale, Port-au-Prince, il n’y a pas une semaine qui ne s’écoule sans que des kidnappings aient lieu. La violence est quotidienne.
La population est cloitrée chez elle, la plupart des écoles sont fermées et les activités économiques sont gravement affectées. Il en est de même sur les routes où depuis plus de trois mois les gangs imposent leur loi et de nombreux chauffeurs sont au chômage. Pratiquement toutes les infrastructures de la capitale ont été ou détruites ou gravement affectées par les attaques des gangs.
L’attaque du Pénitencier national, le 2 mars, a été un grand choc pour les Haïtiens, même s’ils sont habitués à vivre sous la menace constante de la violence. Plus de 4.500 détenus se seraient évadés, parmi lesquels des membres éminents de gangs et des personnes arrêtées dans le cadre de l’assassinat du Président Jovenel Moïse en juillet 2021. Les pillages et les attaques ont été nombreux, notamment contre la Bibliothèque nationale, qui a été prise d’assaut le 3 avril.
La veille, dans la soirée du 2 avril, des bandits lourdement armés ont pillé des dizaines de maisons et emporté plusieurs véhicules privés aux villages Tecina et Théodat, dans la municipalité de Tabarre, au nord-est de Port-au-Prince. La grande majorité de la population, qui vivait déjà dans une misère extrême, est aujourd’hui plongée dans un véritable enfer et laissée pour compte.
Quant à la police, malgré certains efforts, elle n’est pas outillée ni assez nombreuse pour faire face à une telle situation de guérilla urbaine face à des gangs surarmés. Actuellement, environ 23 gangs opèrent dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, divisés en deux grandes coalitions : le G-Pèp, dirigé par Gabriel Jean Pierre, dit Ti Gabriel, et le G9 Famille et Alliés, dirigé par Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. Mais les experts de l’ONU estiment qu’il y en a entre 150 et 200 dans l’ensemble du pays.
Selon l’ONU, depuis le début de l’année, 1.193 personnes ont été tuées et 692 blessées à cause de la violence des gangs. Le système de santé est au bord de l’effondrement et les hôpitaux n’ont souvent pas la capacité de traiter les personnes blessées. L’économie est asphyxiée car les gangs imposent des restrictions aux mouvements de la population. Le principal fournisseur d’eau potable a cessé ses livraisons. Cette situation a entraîné une crise alimentaire majeure : près de la moitié des 11 millions d’habitants d’Haïti ont besoin d’une forme d’assistance alimentaire.
Comment les gangs sont-ils devenus si puissants ?
Les gangs disposent de puissants financeurs au sein du gouvernement et du secteur privé. Sous l’ancien premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry, qui a démissionné en mars, le gouvernement finançait 30% des membres du G9. Il ne serait pas étonnant que certaines personnalités tant du secteur privé que d’anciens hauts dignitaires de l’État continuent à les financer, en particulier ceux qui ont été sanctionnés par la communauté internationale.
Un rapport d’experts de l’ONU publié en 2023 a également pointé du doigt l’ancien président Michel Martelly, au pouvoir entre 2011 et 2016, ainsi que plusieurs hommes d’affaires et législateurs de premier plan, comme fournissant des ressources aux gangs armés, que ce soit en nature ou en espèces.
La prolifération des gangs a commencé sous Martelly et s’est accentuée après l’assassinat de Moïse. Déjà en 2019, environ 162 groupes armés avaient été répertoriés sur le territoire national dont plus de la moitié opérait dans l’aire métropolitaine. Au total, ils auraient un potentiel supérieur à 3.000 soldats armés d’armes à feu, dont des adolescents et même des enfants.
Sous Moïse, de nombreux massacres ont eu lieu, tels que le massacre de La Saline en 2018, le massacre du Bel Air en 2019 et le massacre de Cité Soleil en 2020. Tous ont eu lieu dans des quartiers à fort poids électoral et où résidaient des membres de l’opposition, et ces crimes sont tous restés impunis.
En 2020, la situation s’est aggravée lorsque Chérizier, ancien policier, a fédéré les gangs avec la « famille G9 » alliée aux neuf bandes les plus puissantes de la région. Cela lui a permis de contrôler une bonne partie de la capitale – tout en étant financé en sous-main par de hauts fonctionnaires de l’appareil d’État.
La fédération des gangs a même été saluée par la Représentante spécial du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU en Haïti, qui a affirmé que fédérer les gangs avait fait baisser le nombre d’homicides de 12% en trois mois. Cela a provoqué un tel scandale qu’elle a dû revenir sur ses propos en les qualifiant de « mésinterprétation ».
Un an après l’assassinat du président Moïse, alors que la situation s’aggravait, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU a adopté, à l’unanimité, une résolution établissant un régime de sanctions qui ciblait les chefs de gangs et ceux qui les finançaient. Chérizier était le seul chef de gang dont le nom figurait dans une annexe de la résolution mais, à ce jour, aucune mesure n’a été prise à son encontre.
Le 29 février 2024, la situation dans la capitale a pris un tournant décisif et pour le pire lorsque Chérizier a annoncé, à travers une vidéo sur les réseaux sociaux, la reconstitution de la coalition des groupes armés dénommée « Viv Ansanm » (Vivre ensemble). Il y revendiquait la responsabilité des tensions qui ont secoué Port-au-Prince et a déclaré que l’objectif premier des gangs était de renverser le gouvernement. Il a précisé aussi qu’une chasse aux ministres, au directeur général de la Police Nationale, était désormais ouverte. Il voulait les arrêter et empêcher Ariel Henry, qui se trouvait à Porto Rico, de rentrer au pays. Des policiers ont été tués, des commissariats attaqués, plusieurs vols annulés suite à un assaut des gangs à l’aéroport international Toussaint Louverture qui, depuis, est fermé.
Chérizier prétend lancer une révolution afin de libérer le peuple haïtien des autorités et des oligarques pourtant, ces gangs ont ciblé toutes les couches de la société, autant que les quartiers pauvres de la capitale et de nombreuses structures étatiques qui servaient aux pauvres comme le principal hôpital public. La destruction est telle que l’ONU parle d’Haïti comme « un État au bord de l’effondrement ».
En décembre 2023 plus de 310.000 personnes étaient déplacées à l’intérieur du pays. Selon l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations, plus de 50.000 personnes ont quitté la capitale en trois semaines au mois de mars 2024. L’ampleur du désastre est stupéfiante et tous les pays qui avaient promis une aide policière ou militaire sont absents. Haïti est abandonnée à son triste sort et les gangs contrôlent le pays en lieu et place des autorités.
Pourquoi le gouvernement n’a-t-il pas réagi à la menace croissante des gangs ?
Il y a quatre ans, la Police Nationale d’Haïti disposait officiellement d’une force de 15.498 officiers de police (dont seulement 1.711 femmes), bien que le nombre d’officiers effectifs était estimé à beaucoup moins. En outre, le programme humanitaire mis en place par l’administration Biden-Harris pour faciliter le séjour des Haïtiens aux États-Unis a fait courir à la police le risque de perdre jusqu’à un tiers de ses effectifs en raison de l’émigration.
Dans un tel contexte, le chaos et la violence ont atteint un niveau sans précédent. Depuis l’assassinat du président Moïse, le gouvernement a été incapable d’instaurer l’ordre avec la police, et l’armée ne comptait qu’environ 2.000 soldats. De plus, aucune élection législative ou générale n’a été organisée depuis 2016. Il n’y a donc plus d’élus, le mandat des précédents étant expiré. Les critiques d’Henry, très impopulaire, considéraient son règne comme illégitime.
En octobre 2022, Henry a fait appel à la communauté internationale, sollicitant l’intervention d’une force étrangère. Vu son impopularité, cela a suscité la méfiance parmi la population qui redoutait que cette intervention vienne renforcer un gouvernement illégitime et accusé de connivence avec les gangs. De plus, la composition de cette mission a viré au casse-tête.
Près d’un an plus tard, le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU a adopté une résolution autorisant le recours à la force par une mission internationale d’assistance à la sécurité en Haïti. Ni le Canada ni les États-Unis n’ont voulu intervenir directement en Haïti, soulignant que la solution devait venir des Haïtiens. Mais ces derniers n’ont jamais pu s’entendre et, de plus, ils redoutent une intervention étrangère, compte tenu des interventions catastrophiques de l’ONU, depuis 2004. Le Canada, qui avait été sollicité par Washington pour prendre le leadership de l’intervention, s’est retiré en mars 2023, pour laisser la direction au Kenya.
Le déploiement de la force d’intervention multinationale devait commencer le 1er janvier 2024. En juillet dernier, le Kenya avait proposé de diriger la mission avec un millier de policiers. Antigua et Barbuda, les Bahamas et la Jamaïque s’étaient engagés à envoyer du personnel de sécurité, et plus récemment le Belize et la Guyane. Le Canada s’était également engagé à participer à la mission. Pour sa part, le gouvernement américain s’était engagé à financer la mission à hauteur d’au moins 100 millions de dollars.
Alors que les gangs étendaient leur emprise sur Port-au-Prince et formaient une alliance dans le but déclaré de renverser le Premier ministre, Henry prévoyait de se rendre au Kenya pour signer un accord de réciprocité. Pendant son absence, les bandes criminelles de Chérizier ont attaqué des commissariats de police, l’aéroport de la capitale et des prisons. Ils ont brandi la menace d’une guerre civile si Henry revenait en Haïti. Il a démissionné le 11 mars 2024. Le lendemain, le Kenya a suspendu l’envoi de ses policiers en Haïti.
Qui est aux commandes aujourd’hui, et quelles sont les chances que la démocratie soit rétablie ?
Dans la foulée de la démission d’Henry, le gouvernement a déclaré l’état d’urgence. Le même jour, la formation d’un Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT) chargé de rétablir l’ordre a été annoncée. Le conseil est constitué de neuf membres, soit sept votants et deux observateurs. Il intègre des représentants des principaux partis politiques, ainsi que du secteur privé et de la société civile. Son mandat de 22 mois prendra fin le 7 février 2026 après avoir organisé des « élections démocratiques, libres et crédibles ».
De nombreux obstacles se dressent déjà pour atteindre cette finalité. En premier lieu, comment rétablir la sécurité alors que les gangs continuent de recevoir des armes des États-Unis ? Dernier coup de théâtre : lorsque Ariel Henry a sorti le décret annonçant la formation du CPT, aucun nom des membres n’y figurait. Depuis, les organisations des représentants désignés du CPT ont exprimé leur désaccord avec le décret du Gouvernement publié dans le journal officiel le 12 avril 2024. Finalement, l’arrêté officialisant la nomination des membres du CPT a été publié le 16 avril.
De plus, le Conseil souhaite prêter serment au Palais National devant la nation alors même que le Palais a été la cible des gangs à plusieurs reprises. Qui assurera sa sécurité ? Comment rétablir la paix en Haïti dans un contexte d’incertitude politique et de fragilité économique ? Est-ce que les membres du Conseil, dont certains sont des frères ennemis, pourront dépasser leurs propres intérêts au profit de la nation ? D’autre part, qui reconstruira le pays après le départ de tant de jeunes ? Le pays fera-t-il enfin appel à sa diaspora ?
Par ailleurs, la possibilité d’une famine se dessine à l’horizon et le Programme Alimentaire Mondial craint que ses stocks alimentaires ne s’épuisent d’ici la fin du mois d’avril.
Enfin, comment convaincre les gangs de déposer leurs armes alors qu’ils accumulent des millions à travers les kidnappings et la vente des armes ? Il s’agit d’une activité très lucrative, tant pour les gangs que pour de simples citoyens qui font face à une grande pauvreté.
Comment aussi rétablir la justice et punir les criminels qui ont commis tant de crimes contre l’humanité ? L’adage ne dit-il pas qu’il n’y a pas de paix sans justice ? Enfin, que dire des ambitions politiques des gangs ? Le 11 mars, Chérizier a déclaré qu’il serait « l’alliance Viv Ansanm, avec le peuple haïtien, qui élira celui qui dirigera le pays ». Le CPT devra-t-il négocier avec les gangs ?
Les défis qui se dressent devant le CPT ne sont donc pas des moindres et l’un des plus ardus sera de trouver le moyen d’articuler une demande d’aide externe sans perdre la souveraineté d’Haïti.
L’espace civique en Haïti est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
Contactez Nancy Roc sur sa pageFacebook et suivez@TheNancyRoc sur Twitter.
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HAÏTI : « Si la mission a du succès, les autorités n’auront pas à se tourner à nouveau vers la communauté internationale pour maintenir la paix »
CIVICUS échange avec l’avocate haïtienne Rosy Auguste Ducéna sur la situation en Haïti et les perspectives d’une mission internationale nouvellement déployée.Rosy est responsable de programmes du Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), une organisation de la société civile qui œuvre pour l’instauration d’un État de droit en Haïti.
Suite à la démission du premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry en avril, un Conseil présidentiel de transition a été nommé pour tenter d’entamer le processus de rétablissement de la paix dans un pays assiégé par les gangs. En proie à des divisions internes, il a fallu attendre le mois de juin pour que le conseil nomme un nouveau premier ministre, l’universitaire et praticien du développement Garry Conille. Le même mois, le premier contingent de la Mission multinationale de soutien à la sécurité des Nations unies, dirigée par le Kenya et longtemps retardée, a commencé à arriver. Compte tenu de la longue histoire d’échecs des interventions internationales en Haïti, la société civile est sceptique et exige que la mission soit fortement axée sur les droits humains.
Qu’est-ce qui a changé depuis la démission du premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry ?
Après l’avoir soutenu tout au long de son gouvernement, la communauté internationale a finalement retiré son soutien à Henry, qui a démissionné dans la honte. Il était un prédateur des droits humains et nous étions donc heureux de le voir partir, même si ce n’était pas de la manière dont nous l’aurions souhaité.
Un Conseil présidentiel de transition a été mis sur pied avec la participation de la communauté internationale via la Communauté caribéenne (CARICOM), l’organisation régionale. Il compte en son sein des personnalités issues de secteurs qui n’inspirent pas confiance à la population haïtienne. La seule femme qui fait partie du Conseil a un rôle d’observateur et tous les candidats au poste de premier ministre auditionnés étaient des hommes.
Un mois après l’installation de ce conseil, avec le peuple haïtien dévasté par l’insécurité et les bandes armées, un premier ministre a enfin été élu : Garry Conille, lui aussi soutenu par la communauté internationale. La prochaine étape logique est la mise en place d’un gouvernement de transition.
Qu’attend la société civile du nouveau premier ministre ?
Nous attendons du nouveau Premier ministre qu’il tienne sa première promesse : celle d’établir un gouvernement dans lequel les femmes n’auront pas un rôle symbolique mais occuperont des postes de pouvoir. Et nous espérons que des femmes ayant un agenda de lutte pour les droits des femmes dans le contexte de la transition seront choisies. Il est important de respecter le quota minimal de 30% de femmes dans les organes de décision – sans pour autant s’y arrêter, puisque plus de la moitié de la population haïtienne sont des femmes –, mais il est également important que les femmes qui occupent ces postes s’impliquent dans la lutte contre les violences sexuelles et sexistes, les discriminations et les injustices sociales subies par les femmes.
Nous espérons aussi que les décisions qui seront prises par ce gouvernement à venir tiendront compte des priorités de la population : combattre l’insécurité, lutter contre l’impunité dont ont toujours bénéficié les bandits armés et mettre les victimes de l’insécurité au cœur des décisions, ainsi qu’organiser les élections.
Et, sachant que cette transition a une obligation de résultat, tout doit être mis en œuvre pour que la feuille de route du Conseil et du premier ministre soit réalisée.
Quelle est la situation en matière de sécurité et de droits humains ?
La situation des droits humains sur le terrain est très préoccupante : les vols, assassinats, viols, viols collectifs, massacres, attaques armées et enlèvements contre rançon, et les incendies des maisons et des véhicules de la population sont monnaie courante.
Deux grandes coalitions de gangs armés qui jadis se battaient entre elles, le « G-9 an Fanmi e Alye » dirigé par Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, et le « G-Pèp », dirigé par Gabriel Jean Pierre, alias Ti Gabriel ou Gabo, se sont regroupées autour d’une fédération et s’attaquent à la population civile pour asseoir leur pouvoir.
Les conséquences sur la vie et la sécurité de la population haïtienne sont énormes : les bandits armés contrôlent la circulation des biens et des services ainsi que les approvisionnements en carburant et en médicaments et sèment la terreur. Certaines zones se sont complètement vidées de leur population. Des victimes de l’insécurité vivent dans des camps d’accueil surpeuplés, dans la promiscuité et exposés à toutes sortes d’exactions et de maladies contagieuses.
Les écoles ne fonctionnent pas toutes. Des milliers d’enfants en âge d’être scolarisés et de jeunes qui devaient fréquenter l’université viennent de perdre une année académique. Des hôpitaux et centres de santé ont dû fermer leurs portes en raison de l’insécurité. Des alertes à la crise alimentaire aigüe ont été lancées : en Haïti, nous vivons une crise humanitaire sans précédent. Et, si aucune mesure n’est prise, elle s’aggravera.
Dans un pays appauvri, où le système éducatif n’était déjà pas inclusif et où les droits sociaux ont toujours été considérés comme des produits à se procurer, le fossé de l’accès à l’éducation et à des soins de santé de qualité se creuse. Les femmes, les enfants et les personnes vivant avec une déficience physique, sensorielle ou même cognitive, ont été les premiers touchés par les conséquences néfastes du chaos instauré par les bandits armés, avec la complicité de l’institution policière et des autorités au pouvoir dirigé par Henry.
Dans ce contexte de violation massive et continue des droits humains, le Conseil présidentiel de transition n’a pas encore prouvé qu’il comprend la nécessité d’agir vite.
Comment la nouvelle mission internationale a-t-elle été créée et en quoi diffère-t-elle de ses prédécesseurs ?
Le 6 octobre 2022, Henry avait sollicité l’envoi d’une « force robuste » en vue, selon ses dires, « de combattre l’insécurité, rétablir la paix et de réaliser les élections ». Près d’une année plus tard, le 2 octobre 2023, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a adopté une résolution autorisant le déploiement d’une force baptisée Mission Multinationale d’Appui à la Sécurité, après que le Kenya eut accepté d’en assurer le leadership.
La mission a mis du temps à se mettre en place. Elle est en train de commencer, mais nous restons sceptiques.
Elle sera la onzième mission depuis 1993. Toutes ses prédécesseuses ont été impliquées dans la commission de violations des droits humains à l’encontre de la population haïtienne : exécutions sommaires, bastonnades et atteintes à l’intégrité physique et psychique, marchandage sexuel, viols sur mineurs.es et sur femmes. Et la seule sanction à laquelle s’exposaient les auteurs de ces violations était le rapatriement.
L’Organisations des Nations Unis a apporté le choléra, dont la propagation a causé la mort de plus de 10.000 personnes, et n’a accepté ses responsabilités que du bout des lèvres. Les promesses de dédommagement n’ont jamais été tenues.
Les résultats des différentes missions en Haïti, qui ont coûté des millions de dollars, sont maigres. Les institutions policières et judiciaires, ainsi que l’organe électoral qu’on leur a toujours demandé de renforcer, n’ont jamais été aussi dysfonctionnels. Le calcul coût-bénéfice et leur implication dans les violations des droits humains suggèrent qu’elles sont contre-productives.
Il faut toutefois reconnaitre que la population, fatiguée de l’insécurité qui lui vole sa vie et son humanité et ayant perdu confiance dans le système pénal haïtien, place ses espoirs dans cette force internationale. Actuellement, la police ne traque pas les bandits notoires, les tribunaux ne les jugent pas, même par contumace, alors que plusieurs centaines de victimes de massacres, accompagnées par le RNDDH, ont porté plainte contre leurs agresseurs. Les rares fois où ils sont emprisonnés, ils s’évadent ou passent des années en détention, sans que les faits qui leur sont reprochés ne soient jamais élucidés et sans que les victimes ne reçoivent justice.
Comment la mission internationale doit-elle agir pour contribuer à une paix durable ?
Avec six autres organisations de la société civile haïtienne, nous avons réfléchi à cette question et formulé des recommandations. Celles-ci portent notamment sur la définition des objectifs de la mission et la prise en compte des préoccupations des organisations de défense des droits humains dans l’élaboration du cadre réglementaire et du plan stratégique de sécurité de la mission.
La résolution étant restée muette ou ayant utilisé des termes sibyllins sur certaines questions importantes, nous insistons sur la nécessité d’aborder les obligations des agents.es relatives à la gestion des eaux, aux normes déontologiques et de transparence, ainsi qu’aux mécanismes de monitoring et de suivi des comportements des agents.
Nous recommandons également l’établissement de mécanismes de prévention des actes de violations des droits humains et la mise en place d’un mécanisme de plaintes pour les éventuelles victimes. Il est essentiel que les pays pourvoyeurs d’agents.es s’engagent à tout mettre en œuvre pour que les exactions soient punies et que les garanties judiciaires des victimes soient protégées et respectées.
Plus que toute autre chose, nous espérons que la mission mènera ses opérations sur le terrain avec la participation des policiers.ères haïtiens, qui y gagneront en formation et en tactiques de lutte contre les bandes armées, afin qu’au départ de cette mission, les autorités haïtiennes n’aient pas à se tourner à nouveau vers la communauté internationale pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité.
L’espace civique en Haïti est classé « réprimé » par leCIVICUS Monitor.
Contactez le RNDDH sur sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, suivez@RnddhAyiti et@AugusteRosy sur Twitter, et contactez Rosy Auguste Ducéna sur son compte d’Instagram ou sa pageFacebook.
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HAITI: ‘Gangs control the country instead of the authorities’
CIVICUS speaks with freelance journalist Nancy Roc about the increase in gang violence and the political situation in Haiti.
With 38 years of experience, Nancy is a Haitian-born journalist renowned for her work for press freedom. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including UNESCO’s Jean Dominique Prize for Press Freedom.
What’s the current security situation in Haiti?
The situation is untenable, to use the exact words of Volker Türk, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite a state of emergency and a succession of curfews the government has declared since 4 March to try to regain control of the capital, Port-au-Prince, not a week goes by without kidnappings. Violence is a daily occurrence.
People are holed up in their homes, most schools are closed and economic activity is severely affected. The same goes for roads, where gangs have been imposing their law for more than three months and many drivers are out of work. Virtually all the capital’s infrastructure has been destroyed or seriously affected by gang attacks.
An attack on the National Penitentiary on 2 March came as a great shock to Haitians, even though they are used to living under the constant threat of violence. More than 4,500 inmates are believed to have escaped, including prominent gang members and people arrested in connection with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. There have been widespread looting and attacks, particularly against the National Library, which was stormed on 3 April.
On the evening of 2 April, heavily armed bandits looted dozens of homes and seized private vehicles in the villages of Tecina and Théodat, in Tabarre municipality, northeast of Port-au-Prince. The vast majority of the population, already living in extreme poverty, have now been plunged into hell and left to fend for themselves.
As for the police, despite some efforts, they are neither equipped nor numerous enough to deal with such a situation of urban guerrilla warfare against heavily armed gangs. There are currently around 23 gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, divided into two major coalitions: G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as Ti Gabriel, and G9 Family and Allies, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. However, UN experts estimate there are between 150 and 200 gangs throughout Haiti.
According to the UN, since the start of the year, 1,193 people have been killed and 692 injured as a result of gang violence. The health system is on the verge of collapse, and hospitals often lack the capacity to treat the injured. The economy is suffocating as the gangs impose restrictions on people’s movements. The main supplier of drinking water has stopped deliveries. The situation has led to a major food crisis: almost half of Haiti’s 11 million inhabitants need some form of food assistance.
How did the gangs become so powerful?
The gangs have powerful backers in government and the private sector. Under former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who resigned in March, the government funded 30 per cent of the members of the G9. It wouldn’t be surprising if some people, both in the private sector and former senior government officials, have continued to fund them, particularly those who have been sanctioned by the international community.
A UN expert report published in 2023 also singled out former president Michel Martelly, in power between 2011 and 2016, as well as several prominent business leaders and legislators, as providing resources to armed gangs, whether in kind or in cash.
The proliferation of gangs began under Martelly and intensified after Moïse’s assassination. By 2019, some 162 armed groups had been identified, more than half of them operating in the metropolitan area. In total, they are said to potentially have over 3,000 soldiers armed with firearms, including adolescents and children.
Under Moïse, numerous massacres took place, such as the La Saline massacre in 2018, the Bel Air massacre in 2019 and the Cité Soleil massacre in 2020. All took place in neighbourhoods with significant electoral power where members of the opposition lived, and these crimes all went unpunished.
In 2020, the situation worsened when Chérizier, a former police officer, federated the gangs with the G9 Family, allied to the nine most powerful gangs in the region. This enabled him to control a large part of Port-au-Prince – all while being covertly financed by high-ranking government officials.
The federation of gangs was even hailed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, who claimed that federating the gangs had reduced the number of homicides by 12 per cent in three months. This caused such a scandal that she was forced to retract her statement, describing it as a ‘misinterpretation‘.
A year after the assassination of Moïse, as the situation worsened, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a sanctions regime that targeted gang leaders and those who financed them. Chérizier was the only gang leader named in an annex to the resolution, but to date no action has been taken against him.
On 29 February 2024, the situation in the capital took a decisive turn for the worse when Chérizier announced, in a video posted on social media, the reconstitution of the coalition of armed groups known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together). In the video, he claimed responsibility for the tensions that have shaken Port-au-Prince and declared that the gangs’ primary objective was to overthrow the government. He also stated that a hunt was now on for ministers and the Director General of the National Police. He wanted to arrest them and prevent Henry, who was in Puerto Rico, returning to the country. Police officers were killed, police stations were attacked and several flights were cancelled following an assault by gangs at Toussaint Louverture international airport, which has since been closed.
Chérizier claims to be launching a revolution to liberate the Haitian people from the authorities and the oligarchs. But the gangs have targeted every stratum of society, as well as the poor districts of Port-au-Prince and many state structures that serve the poor, such as the main public hospital. The destruction is such that the UN refers to Haiti as ‘a state on the brink of collapse’.
By December 2023, more than 310,000 people had been displaced within Haiti. According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 50,000 people left Port-au-Prince in three weeks in March 2024. The scale of the disaster is staggering, and all the countries that had promised police or military aid are absent. Haiti has been abandoned to its sad fate and gangs are controlling the country instead of the authorities.
Why hasn’t the government reacted to the growing gang threat?
Four years ago, the Haitian National Police officially had a force of 15,498 police officers, among them only 1,711 women, although the actual number of officers was estimated to be much lower. Moreover, the humanitarian programme put in place by the Biden-Harris administration to make it easier for Haitians to live in the USA has put the police at risk of losing up to a third of its workforce to emigration.
Against this backdrop, chaos and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Since Moïse’s assassination, the government has been unable to establish order with the police, and the army has only had around 2,000 soldiers. No legislative or general elections have been held since 2016. As a result, there are no longer any elected representatives, as the terms in office of the previously elected ones have expired. Critics of Henry, who was very unpopular, considered his government illegitimate.
In October 2022, Henry appealed to the international community, requesting the intervention of a foreign force. Given his unpopularity, this aroused public mistrust, as people feared this intervention would strengthen an illegitimate government accused of colluding with gangs. What’s more, the composition of this mission turned into a headache.
Almost a year later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the use of force by an international security assistance mission in Haiti. Neither Canada nor the USA wanted to intervene directly, stressing that the solution had to come from Haitians themselves. But Haitians have been unable to reach agreement, and what’s more, they fear foreign intervention, given the catastrophic interventions led by the UN since 2004. Canada, which had been asked by the USA to take the lead in the intervention, withdrew in March 2023, passing the leadership on to Kenya.
Deployment of a multinational intervention force was due to begin on 1 January 2024. Last July, Kenya offered to lead the mission with a thousand police officers. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Jamaica had pledged to send security personnel, and more recently Belize and Guyana did as well. Canada has also pledged to participate in the mission. For its part, the US government pledged to fund the mission to the tune of at least US$100 million.
As the gangs extended their hold over Port-au-Prince and formed an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Henry, he planned to travel to Kenya to sign a reciprocity agreement. While he was away, Chérizier’s criminal gangs launched their attacks on police stations, the airport and prisons. They threatened civil war if Henry returned to Haiti. He resigned on 11 March 2024. The next day, Kenya suspended the dispatch of police to Haiti.
Who is in charge today, and what are the chances of democracy being restored?
In the wake of Henry’s resignation, the government declared a state of emergency. On the same day, it was announced that a Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) had been formed to restore order. The Council is made up of nine members: seven voting members and two observers. It includes representatives of the main political parties, civil society and the private sector. Its 22-month mandate is due to end on 7 February 2026 after it has organised ‘democratic, free and credible elections’.
There are already a number of obstacles to achieving this goal. First, how can security be re-established when the gangs are still receiving weapons from the USA? The latest twist is that when Henry issued the decree announcing the formation of the PTC, it didn’t include any of the members’ names. Since then, the organisations of the PTC’s appointed representatives have expressed their disagreement with the government decree published in the official gazette on 12 April 2024. Finally, the decree formalising the appointment of PTC members was published on 16 April.
In addition, the Council wishes to be sworn in at the National Palace before the nation, even though the Palace has been targeted by gangs on several occasions. Who will provide security? How can peace be restored to Haiti in a context of such political uncertainty and economic fragility? Will the members of the Council, some of whom are frenemies, be able to look beyond their own interests for the benefit of the nation? And who will rebuild the country after so many young people have left? Will the diaspora finally be called upon?
Further, the possibility of famine looms on the horizon and the World Food Programme fears that its food stocks will run out by the end of April.
Finally, how can gangs be persuaded to lay down their arms when they are making millions from kidnappings and arms sales? Crime is a very lucrative business for gangs and for citizens facing great poverty.
How can we restore justice and punish those who have committed so many crimes against humanity? As the saying goes, no justice, no peace. Finally, what about the gangs’ political ambitions? On 11 March, Chérizier declared that it would be ‘the Viv Ansanm alliance, along with the Haitian people, who will elect the person who will lead the country’. Will the PTC have to negotiate with the gangs?
The challenges facing the PTC are therefore significant, and one of the most arduous will be to find a way of articulating a request for external aid without losing Haiti’s sovereignty.
Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Nancy Roc on herFacebook page and follow@TheNancyRoc on Twitter.
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HAITI: ‘If the mission succeeds, the authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace’
CIVICUS speaks with Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna about the situation in Haiti and the prospects for a newly deployed international mission.
Rosy is Head of Programmes at the National Human Rights Defence Network (RNDDH), a civil society organisation working to support the establishment of the rule of law in Haiti.
Following the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry in April, a Transitional Presidential Council was appointed to try to start the process of restoring peace in gang-besieged Haiti. Riven by internal divisions, it took until June for the council to appoint a new prime minister, academic and development practitioner Garry Conille. In the same month, the first contingent of a long-delayed Kenya-led United Nations Multinational Security Support Mission began to arrive. Given the long history of failed international interventions in Haiti, civil society is sceptical, and demands that the mission has a strong human rights focus.
What has changed since the resignation of de facto prime minister Ariel Henry?
After supporting him throughout his government, the international community finally withdrew its support for Henry, who resigned in disgrace. He was a human rights predator, so we are glad to see him go, even if it wasn’t in the way we would have liked.
A Transitional Presidential Council was set up with the involvement of the international community through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the regional organisation. It’s made up of people who don’t inspire confidence among Haitian people. The only woman on the Council has an observer role, and all the candidates for prime minister it interviewed were men.
A month after the council was established, with Haitian people ravaged by insecurity and armed gangs, a prime minister was finally chosen: Garry Conille, backed by the international community. The next logical step is to set up a transitional government.
What does civil society expect from the new prime minister?
We expect the new prime minister to keep his first promise: to form a government where women don’t play a symbolic role but are in positions of power. And we hope women will be chosen with an agenda to fight for women’s rights in the context of the transition. It’s important to respect the minimum 30 per cent quota of women in decision-making bodies – without this being the ceiling, since over half of Haiti’s population is female – but it’s also important that the women who occupy these positions be involved in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence, discrimination and the social injustices suffered by women.
We hope the new government’s decisions will take people’s priorities into account’: fighting against insecurity and against the impunity that benefits armed bandits, putting the victims of insecurity at the centre of decision-making and organising elections.
And since this transition must produce results, everything must be done to ensure the roadmap drawn up by the Council and prime minister is implemented.
What’s the security and human rights situation like?
The human rights situation on the ground is very concerning: robberies, murders, rapes, gang rapes, massacres, armed attacks, kidnappings for ransom and the burning of people’s homes and vehicles are commonplace.
Two large coalitions of armed gangs, formerly at war with each other – G-9 an Fanmi e Alye, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, alias Ti Gabriel or Gabo – have joined forces and are attacking civilians as they seek to consolidate their power.
The consequences for the lives and security of Haitian people are enormous: armed bandits control the movement of goods and services, including fuel and medical supplies, and sow terror. Some areas have been completely emptied of their population. The victims of insecurity are living in overcrowded camps, in promiscuity, exposed to all kinds of abuse and contagious diseases.
Not all schools are functioning. Thousands of school-age children and young people who should be attending university have lost an academic year. Hospitals and health centres have been forced to close due to insecurity. Warnings of an acute food crisis have been issued. Haiti is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. And if nothing is done about it, it will only get worse.
In an impoverished country where the education system was already not inclusive and social rights have always been seen as commodities to be bought, the gap in access to education and quality healthcare is widening. Women, children and people with physical, sensory or cognitive disabilities have been the first to suffer the harmful consequences of the chaos created by armed bandits, with the complicity of the police and Henry’s government.
Against this backdrop of massive and continuing human rights violations, the Transitional Presidential Council has yet to demonstrate that it understands the need to act quickly.
How was the new international mission set up and how does it differ from its predecessors?
On 6 October 2022, Henry called for a ‘robust force’ to be sent, in his words, ‘to combat insecurity, restore peace and conduct elections’. Almost a year later, on 2 October 2023, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the deployment of a force called the Multinational Security Support Mission, after Kenya agreed to take the lead.
Setting up the mission has taken a long time. It is now up and running, but we remain sceptical.
This will be the 11th mission since 1993. All its predecessors have been implicated in human rights violations against the Haitian people, including summary executions, beatings and attacks on physical and mental integrity, sexual trafficking and rape of minors and women. The only punishment for these violations has been repatriation.
The United Nations brought cholera, the spread of which caused the deaths of over 10,000 people, and paid only lip service to its responsibility. Promises of reparations have never been fulfilled.
The results of the various missions to Haiti, which have cost millions of dollars, have been meagre. The police and judicial institutions, and the electoral body they were supposed to strengthen, have never been more dysfunctional. The cost-benefit calculation of these missions and their involvement in human rights abuses suggest they are counterproductive.
However, it must be acknowledged that many people, tired of the insecurity that robs them of their lives and their humanity, and having lost confidence in the Haitian criminal justice system, are pinning their hopes on this international force. At present, the police don’t pursue notorious bandits and the courts don’t try them, even in absentia, despite the fact that several hundred victims of massacres, supported by RNDDH, have filed complaints against their attackers. On the rare occasions they are arrested, they escape or spend years in prison without charges against them ever being cleared up and without their victims receiving justice.
How can the international mission contribute to sustainable peace?
Alongside six other Haitian civil society organisations, we have reflected on this question and come up with several recommendations. These include defining the mission’s objectives and ensuring the concerns of human rights organisations are taken into account in the development of the mission’s legal framework and strategic security plan.
As the United Nations’ resolution is silent or says little on some important issues, we stress the need to address the obligations of security agents in relation to water management, ethical standards and transparency, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and following up on their conduct.
We also recommend the establishment of mechanisms to prevent human rights abuses and a means for victims to have complaints heard. It is essential that countries that provide those coming to Haiti commit themselves to doing everything possible to ensure abuses are punished and the legal guarantees of victims are protected and respected.
Above all, we hope the mission will carry out its operations on the ground with the participation of Haitian police officers, who will benefit from training in tactics to fight armed gangs, so when the mission leaves, Haitian authorities won’t have to turn again to the international community to maintain peace and security.
Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with RNDDH through itswebsite orFacebook page, follow@RnddhAyiti and@AugusteRosy on Twitter, and contact Rosy Auguste Ducéna on herInstagram account orFacebook page.
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SUDAN: ‘We are back to the situation that preceded the revolution’
CIVICUS speaks about Sudan’s situation under military rule with Nazik Kabalo, a woman human rights defender (HRD) from Sudan. Nazik has worked in human rights advocacy, research and monitoring, with a focus on women’s rights, for the past 15 years.What happened to Sudan’s transition to democracy?
Sudan is now facing the consequences of the major problems of the deal made by the military and civilian leaders in August 2019. Following the revolution, this deal initiated a transitional government in Sudan, a partnership between civilians and the military council. But this partnership was never equal: the military and former regime forces – including paramilitaries, militias, tribal militias and the security apparatus – had more economic and political power. They had controlled the country for 30 years, after all.
On the other hand, for 30 years political parties and civil society had been under so much pressure that they only managed to stay together with the momentum of the revolution, to defeat the former regime. But the Sudanese democracy movement has too many internal divisions.
Ours is an unfinished political transition that is missing transitional justice and mechanisms to limit the power of military and other armed groups. All armed groups had been involved in very severe human rights violations and remained partners with civilians in the new government. To be honest, I think the military coup was bound to happen. The political deal achieved in 2019 gave the presidency to the military for almost one and a half years. The coup happened on 25 October 2021, only few weeks before the date the military was expected to hand over the Supreme Council presidency to civilian leaders. But we always knew civilians didn’t really have a chance to lead the country.
How has the situation evolved after the coup?
Following the coup, the amount of violence and human rights violations was quite overwhelming. Violence is to be expected from the Sudanese military; it has led civil wars for 50 years and killing people is basically all it knows.
Seven months after the coup, at least 102 people have been killed in peaceful protests, more than 4,000 have been injured, and over 5,000 have been detained. There have been attacks on the freedoms of association and expression. Journalists are being attacked: at least three female journalists have been prosecuted or arrested in the past couple of days. The military coup has completely destroyed the civic space and freedoms created after the revolution. Our military is learning from our neighbour, Egypt, to effectively crush the civic movement.
For the past seven months we have lived under a state of emergency that was only lifted three weeks ago. But the lifting of the state of emergency made no difference to military practices on the ground. The international community has put some pressure on the government and the military but has not been able to stop the violence and civic space and human rights violations.
An aspect to consider is that Sudan has three conflict areas: Blue Nile, Darfur and Nuba Mountains. As well as western and southern Sudan, there’s also inter-communal violence in eastern Sudan. The coup hasn’t been able to provide security, although this is always the main excuse for the military to take power. Violence in urban areas, including the capital, has increased, especially for women. Members of the security forces, including the Central Reserve Police (CRP), have perpetrated gang rapes and sexual assaults against women; for this reason, the CRP has been recently sanctioned by the USA. A peace agreement was signed in October 2020 with several armed groups but hasn’t been effectively implemented.
Sudan’s economy has been in a freefall since the coup. We expected to have our debt cancelled by this year, but because of the coup, the Paris Club, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank decided not to move forward. Instead, the IMF, the World Bank and international donors have frozen over two billion dollars in economic aid, which is directly affecting the general humanitarian situation. Recent reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimate at least half of Sudanese people will need humanitarian aid this year.
Another impact of the coup was the internet shutdown. For at least seven weeks, HRDs lived under a complete communications shutdown. This has now been partially lifted, but internet and phone communications continue to be cut off on every day of protest – which means it has happened every single day for several weeks. Internet access is under very harsh surveillance, so no Sudanese activist feels safe to use the phone for work. Sudan has one of the worst cybercrime laws in the world: you can be prosecuted, tried and sentenced to five years in jail just for posting something on Facebook. A couple of months ago, a female HRD who reported the sexual violence that took place during protests was sent to jail, accused of posting ‘fake news’. She may be punished with up to 20 years in prison. The military have used this law to threaten activists both inside and outside Sudan.
We are back to the situation that preceded the revolution. We feel that the old regime is back; in fact, the military has started appointing people from the former regime everywhere, from national television to the Humanitarian Commission, which is responsible for managing the work of civil society organisations (CSOs) inside Sudan. So CSOs are back to needing to request authorisation to hold meetings at venues outside our offices and are under constant surveillance. Activists, journalists and lawyers are being silenced because power went back to the military.
What are protesters’ demands?
Following the revolution, the deal reached between the military and civilians never satisfied the protest movement, which includes a high proportion of young people and women. They have never stopped protesting, not even during the transitional period, from August 2019 to October 2021. There have been at least 20 killings of HRDs since the transition began, but this hasn’t stopped them. So when the coup happened, people were instantly in the streets, even before an official announcement of the coup was made.
Since 2018, protesters have demanded real democracy and civilian rule. We have had military governments 90 per cent of the time since we became independent: 59 years out of 64. After the regime fell on 11 April 2019, people started a sit-in in front of the military’s headquarters. This continued for two months and ended with the Khartoum Massacre on 3 June 2019, with attacks perpetrated by militias and security forces. Two hundred people were killed and at least 60 women were gang-raped. In August a deal was reached with the military, despite the massacre that literally happened outside their headquarters! This was a stab in the heart for many democracy groups.
Right now, the protest movement wants to make sure civilians are the ones ruling the country. Military leaders should go back to guarding the borders and shouldn’t have anything to do with running the government anymore. The 2019 deal didn’t work, which means our only option is demanding radical change that puts power in people’s hands. Resistance committees have a slogan of ‘three nos’: no partnership, no negotiation or compromise, and no legitimacy. A process of dialogue and negotiations led by some political parties is currently taking place, but resistance committees refuse to engage. Unfortunately, this has not been welcomed by some international actors, but it comes as a direct result of recent Sudanese experience.
Who are the people on the streets?
Protesters have built an amazing grassroots movement; resistance committees have formed in every neighbourhood, even every block. Those who participate in them are ordinary people who have nothing to lose, so unlike the civilian elites, they are willing to continue the struggle until the end. They organise street protests every single day and are creating new ways of protesting, such as strikes, stand-ups, music, movies and poems. They use every tool available, including recreating Sudanese traditions and bringing our cultural heritage to the streets.
Women and feminist movements are doing an amazing job, breaking so many norms. During the revolution, many young women were on the frontlines. The Angry, a protest group that stays on the frontlines of every protest, protecting other people and leading clashes with the police, includes lots of young women.
Women are also working to provide medical care and trauma support. After 50 years of civil war, you will definitely be a traumatised country, but this has intensified following the past five years of revolt. Before, one was able to distinguish between people from war zones and people from cities. Right now, the whole country is a war zone. There are machine guns everywhere, firing bullets into neighbourhoods, and children are dying inside their own homes because bullets go through their roofs.
Diaspora activism has also been key. Activists from the diaspora have been super effective in spreading the word, and during the internet shutdown they were online 24/7 to get information out to the world, not only sharing it on social media but also connecting people inside Sudan, who could receive international calls but not domestic ones.
What kind of work are pro-democracy groups doing?
The pro-democracy camp is very diverse. There are longstanding CSOs that have always promoted and advocated for human rights and continue to document violations, advocate, engage and build capacity inside the democracy movements. There are also new grassroots groups, the resistance committees, thar right now are the key movement leaders: other CSOs will follow their lead since they express the majority view. Professional organisations and trade unions are also a major group; they are key in organising mobilisations in urban areas. Doctors, lawyers, engineers and similar roles play an important role in putting pressure through strikes and civil disobedience.
Unfortunately, for the time being there’s not a single unified network or body that can represent the democracy movement in Sudan. This is the movement’s main weakness. Resistance committees are trying to produce a unified political declaration and how to unify this movement while including all of Sudan, even conflict areas, is being discussed.
What international support do Sudanese HRDs need?
Our country must not be forgotten. The international community must take action and support the democracy movement’s demands for fundamental change. International human rights bodies must put make Sudan a priority. Sudanese civil society is fighting to get Sudan on top of their agenda, especially since the war started in Ukraine and most attention is going that way.
Neglecting building democracy in Sudan and leaving power in the hands of the military would be a big mistake. What’s going on here isn’t disconnected from what’s going on in Ukraine. Reports indicate the involvement of the Sudanese military and militias in smuggling gold that supports the Russian economy during this conflict. Moreover, many reports have exposed the strong relations of Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leaders with Russian leadership; they were in Russia the week the war started to ensure the flow of gold. RSF militias have relations with other African countries like Chad and the Central Africa Republic, which are sources of blood gold and blood diamonds entering Russia through Sudan.
Sanctions would be an important tool. A couple of days ago, the International Bar Association called on the UK to apply Magnitsky sanctions in Sudan. International CSOs should move ahead with similar actions.
It’s understandably hard for the international community to deal with the people in the absence of an actual government or elite they could deal with. But young university students are the democracy movement’s leaders, and they represent us. Protests have continued for eight months now and will probably continue for many more, and activists need a lot of help.
Because of persecution and violence, many CSOs and local groups have had to move their operations outside Sudan, and activists have had to relocate. Those working inside Sudan are having a very low-profile and using all the digital and physical security strategies available. Access to funding has also been increasingly challenging. The military wants to find out where funding for the democracy movement is coming from and has therefore increased surveillance, which makes it very risky to receive funds inside Sudan. Organisations working at grassroots levels and in conflict areas are suffering the most.
Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Follow@nazik_kabalo on Twitter.