independence
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HORN OF AFRICA: ‘De-escalation must be the primary objective’
CIVICUS speaks with Mengistu Assefa, Program Manager at the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), about a port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the possibility of it escalating into an armed conflict with Somalia.CARD is an Ethiopian civil society organisation that advocates for democracy and human rights through citizen empowerment.
What’s the relevance of the recent port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland?
Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked nation, placed in a challenging position for international trade. Since then, Djibouti has emerged as its primary access point to the sea, handling over 95 per cent of its trade volume. This dependence comes at a cost, with Ethiopia paying more than US$1 billion annually in fees to Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure. With its estimated population of 126 million, the second largest in Africa, Ethiopia views sea access as critical for its economic, political and demographic future.
To achieve this, on 1 January 2024 the Ethiopian federal government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on commercial port access with Somaliland, a self-proclaimed autonomous territory that is internationally recognised as part of Somalia.
While this MoU is not a legally binding agreement, it carries significant implications for the region because it walks a tightrope between cooperation and recognition. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a potential step towards international recognition of its de facto autonomy. Although the agreement’s full details remain undisclosed, it also reportedly grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast, potentially including a military base. Ethiopian authorities have not been explicit about Somaliland’s recognition, saying the MoU allows for an ‘in-depth assessment’ of Somaliland’s quest for recognition.
Somalia vehemently rejects the MoU, viewing it as a violation of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. It is actively mobilising diplomatic pressure against the deal. Somali president Hassan Sheik Mohamed has visited Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-standing competitors, seeking support. Additionally, the Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has denounced the MoU. Egypt’s leader, already locked in negotiations with Ethiopia over a Nile dam project, has assured Somalia of potential support if requested, further escalating regional tensions.
What’s the political status of Somaliland?
Somaliland, with an estimated population of five million, broke away from Somalia and declared its independence in 1991 after 30 years of civil war. It fought for its independence based on the argument that it had a distinct historical heritage. Somaliland was a UK protectorate, while Somalia was under Italian control. For Somalilanders, this is enough argument to prove they are different territories. Moreover, in June 1960 Somaliland was briefly recognised as an independent state by around 35 nations for a span of five days, before it relinquished its sovereignty to reunite with the Somali Republic.
Somaliland declared its independence more than three decades ago but Somalia has never recognised it. Neither has any international organisation. Even so, Somaliland has managed to become a stable, functional state. It established its own army and democratic institutions and has held six elections with peaceful transitions of power.
In late 2022 and early 2023, a local armed movement, the Dhulbahante militias, rose against Somaliland’s government, declaring its intention to rejoin Somalia. This uprising posed significant political and security challenges to the Somaliland government, partly contributing to the postponement of 2023 elections. It cast a shadow of instability over Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, which hinges on its ability to demonstrate long-term stability and democratic institutions.
Could the port deal lead to international recognition of Somaliland’s independence?
Somaliland has made clear that a binding legal agreement could only be signed once it is officially recognised as an independent nation state. But the Ethiopian side of the story is quite different. Ethiopia hasn’t ruled out the possibility of that happening but hasn’t explicitly said it would take a stance on the recognition of Somaliland. The signing of a binding legal international agreement with Somaliland would however result in Ethiopia’s de facto recognition of its independence.
Looking at the bigger picture, this deal could affect the regional security architecture, particularly when it comes to fighting Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group based in Somalia and allied with Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is perceived as a global security threat and has explicitly targeted Ethiopia. Consequently, Ethiopia is engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia alongside the Somali army. If Ethiopia recognises Somaliland, Somalia will likely force Ethiopia to pull out its troops. However, as Somalia cannot take charge of its security on its own, Ethiopia could use it as leverage to force Somalia to back down from a strong reaction.
Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland carries significant implications. Located in a strategically crucial area along the Gulf of Eden, where Houthis and pirates constantly attack international ships, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline attracts interest from various countries seeking a potential military base. Ethiopia’s explicit recognition of Somaliland could trigger a domino effect, with other countries following suit, although recognition would likely face significant hurdles at the African Union (AU).
The AU adheres to the principle of respecting colonial borders and has expressed concerns about setting a precedent for secessionist movements in other African states, including Morocco and Nigeria. Ethiopia will likely weigh this carefully before explicitly recognising Somaliland’s independence. However, the rapidly shifting landscape of international interests suggests that it’s not an impossibility. This possibility is further amplified by the growing involvement of great and emerging powers in the Red Sea region, driven by economic and security interests.
Could tensions escalate into a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia?
Ethiopia and Somalia have had difficult relations in the past. In 1964, they clashed in a three-month border conflict. This initial skirmish foreshadowed a larger and bloodier conflict that erupted between 1977 and 1978. During this period, Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the intent of annexing the Ogaden region, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The conflict quickly became a proxy war for the contenders of the Cold War, with the western bloc supporting Somalia and the Soviet Union backing Ethiopia. Ultimately, Ethiopia repelled the Somali army.
In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group aiming to unite all Somalis across Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland under Islamic rule, gained control of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. This development raised concerns in Ethiopia, which perceived it as a threat to its national security and regional stability. Supported by the USA in the context of the ‘war on terror’, Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia and removed the ICU from power.
Several years later, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a bilateral agreement aimed at stabilising the region. This agreement facilitated the deployment of Ethiopian security forces to assist the Somali National Army in its fight against Al-Shabaab and support the ongoing Somali transition process. It’s important to note that these Ethiopian troops are currently integrated into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, a peacekeeping mission.
Since October 2023, Ethiopia has declared its intention to gain access to the sea by peaceful means. In exchange for access Ethiopia has offered Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia land-swaps and stakes in a successful state-owned business such as Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s biggest and most successful airline, and even in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. But none of these countries accepted Ethiopia’s offer, leaving Somaliland as a seemingly more amenable option.
Somalia viewed Ethiopia’s signing of the port deal with Somaliland as betrayal. It reacted strongly and aggressively because it considers it an encroachment on its territory and an act against its sovereignty.
Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence could open a Pandora’s box. In fear that it could lead to regional and global recognition, Somalia said that if Ethiopia moved forward in implementing the agreement, consequences would follow.
This all brings us to the final and crucial point: where will this take the region? While the possibility of conflict cannot be entirely dismissed, it’s important to consider various factors and perspectives to assess its likelihood.
First, military capabilities and intentions play a role. While Somalia’s military power is not comparable to Ethiopia’s, the potential for escalation and regional instability cannot be ignored. Additionally, Ethiopia’s stated commitment to peaceful resolutions needs to be weighed against its historical engagements and potential strategic calculations.
Second, the international community’s role matters. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region are already grappling with complex conflicts and any further instability would have significant repercussions. International pressure and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and promote dialogue will be crucial in preventing conflict.
Further, Somalia’s response to the MoU adds another layer of complexity. Its seeking of support from Ethiopia’s historical competitors, such as Egypt and Eritrea, as well as regional entities such as the Arab League, could potentially lead to increased diplomatic pressure against Ethiopia. This, in turn, could further strain relations between the two countries for the foreseeable future.
Finally, the MoU is likely to ignite discussions about the status of Somaliland, both within the AU and at the United Nations Security Council.
What should the international community do to address this potential crisis?
The international community plays a crucial role in navigating the complex situation surrounding Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access and its MoU with Somaliland. It is essential to engage with all stakeholders, particularly the Somali government and Somaliland’s authorities. It should be a top priority to facilitate negotiations to find a lasting solution that ensures both peaceful coexistence and normalised relations, as people in the Horn of Africa are ultimately bearing the brunt of this disagreement.
Regardless of the outcome, be it Somaliland’s reunification with Somalia or its international recognition as a separate state, the two countries must establish a mutually agreeable arrangement for peaceful coexistence. The international community can play the role of facilitating a genuine conversation between the two. This is of course easier said than done, given the historical complexities of their relationship and the vested interests of various states and organisations, including western nations and other international players, who prioritise their security and economic interests in the region.
International involvement should also aim to support Ethiopia and Somalia in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. This requires careful diplomacy to avoid exacerbating existing tensions or creating new problems. It’s also essential to urge those with vested interests in the region to avoid exploiting this situation for their agendas. De-escalation must be the primary objective.
Civic space in bothEthiopia andSomalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CARD through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CARDEthiopia and@mengistu_dadi on Twitter.
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NEW CALEDONIA: ‘The French parliamentary elections will have an impact on our future’
CIVICUS speaks with Nathalie Tehio, president of the Human Rights League, aboutrecent protests against electoral changes imposed by the French government in New Caledonia.In May 2024, protests broke out in New Caledonia after the French parliament passed a law that would have allowed more non-Indigenous people to vote. The French government presented the measure as a democratic reform, but many Indigenous Kanaks, who make up around 40 per cent of the population, saw the prospects of independence receding. When clashes between pro-independence protesters and police led to riots, the French authorities declared a state of emergency, deployed troops and banned TikTok. The French government suspended the electoral changes, but has recently detained some pro-independence leaders, and the situation remains tense.
What is New Caledonia’s political status and what how does this mean for its governance?
The 1988 Matignon-Oudinot Accords, the 1998 Nouméa Accords and the 1999 Organic Law gave New Caledonia special status within the French Republic, transferring many powers other than those of sovereignty – the army, the police, the judiciary and the currency – as part of a scheme of ‘shared sovereignty’. A title on ‘transitional provisions for New Caledonia’ was added to the French Constitution.
This title provided for the freezing of the electorate for three planned referendums on self-determination and provincial elections, which determine the composition of the Congress that elects the government of New Caledonia. To vote in provincial elections, you have to be born before 1998 and have lived in New Caledonia for 10 years. Other elections follow French national rules.
What led to recent protests?
The Nouméa Accord provided for a gradual transfer of sovereignty, with three referendums on self-determination to be held in 2018, 2020 and 2021. The pro-independence Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) had called for the third referendum but then rejected the proposed date because of the pandemic that hit New Caledonia late. In 2021, many families were in mourning and a campaign could not be properly conducted due to restrictions.
The French government maintained the date of the referendum, and the FLNKS called for a boycott. This call was widely followed by Kanak people, resulting in a turnout of only 43.90 per cent, compared to 85.64 per cent for the second referendum in 2020. In the Loyalty Islands, 95.46 per cent of voters, mainly Kanak people, abstained, and in the Northern Province 83.38 per cent did so. Despite this, the French government recognised the results and declared the Nouméa Accord null and void, urging local politicians to reach a new agreement, specifically on the composition of the electoral body.
In the absence of an agreement, the government decided to change the make-up of the electorate by amending the constitution, allowing anyone who has lived in New Caledonia for 10 years to vote in provincial elections. This caused tensions as Kanak people, already in a minority as a result of colonisation and the nickel boom of the 1970s, saw this as a threat to their representation in institutions and the conclusion of the decolonisation process.
After the 2021 referendum, the Caledonian Union, a FLNKS member, set up a mobilisation group, the Field Action Coordinating Cell (CCAT), which has organised protests against the electoral change. The French government ignored our warnings about the dangers of forcefully passing the amendment, and protests degenerated into blockades and fires in and around the capital, Nouméa, leading to the imposition of a curfew, a state of emergency and the blocking of TikTok. The army was deployed. There are reports of police abuse and people forming anti-Kanak militias.
How did Kanak leaders react?
Kanak leaders called for calm but were not listened to, nor were traditional leaders or the president of the government.
The FLNKS refused to talk to the three senior officials who accompanied French president Emmanuel Macron on a whirlwind visit and called for a political solution to the conflict.
The president of the Southern Province and a former deputy made fiery statements on the question of links with France. Another current in the loyalist – anti-independence – camp, represented by another ex-deputy and the mayor of Nouméa, is in favour of dialogue and the search for a new institutional agreement. Some independence supporters back dialogue with this faction of the Loyalist Party. The Oceanian Awakening party, which represents people from the Wallis and Futuna islands, considers the 2021 referendum to be ‘political nonsense’ and could play a role in dialogue if the French government adopts a position of neutrality, as promised in the preamble to the Nouméa Agreement.
How is civil society promoting peace in New Caledonia?
The Human Rights League was instrumental in the signing of the Matignon Accords at a time when civil war had claimed over 90 lives. But recently the Minister of the Interior criticised us and ignored our warnings. We hope the next government will listen to voices for peace.
The unrest has so far mostly been confined to Nouméa and the surrounding communes, leaving the islands and northern provinces largely untouched. This shows that the peace process has forged links between communities. In 2022, a statue symbolising the handshake between loyalist politician Jacques Lafleur and pro-independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou was unveiled in the Place de la Paix (Koo We Joka). Women called for a peace rally on that square.
New Caledonian civil society, which is deeply attached to this country, can still work towards a common destiny if France respects its commitment to the decolonisation process as set out in the Nouméa Accord.
France must carry out impartial investigations to restore peace through legal channels. Both pro-independence and loyalist politicians must commit themselves to rebuilding a common destiny and fighting the social inequalities at the root of the revolt of young Kanaks.
Civil society must influence elected representatives to work towards this goal and demand impartial justice. The decision to transfer CCAT leaders to provisional detention in France, more than 17,000 km away, to the detriment of their private and family lives and their rights to defence, was followed by new riots, this time in the north and on one of the Loyalty Islands.
The French parliamentary elections will have an impact on the future of New Caledonia, and it’s vital to encourage and seek dialogue and agreement on a common destiny.
Get in touch with the Human Rights League through itswebsite and follow@LDH_Fr and@nathalietehio on Twitter.
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NOUVELLE-CALÉDONIE : « Les élections législatives en France auront un impact sur notre avenir »
CIVICUS discute avec Nathalie Tehio, présidente de la Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, desrécentes manifestations contre les changements électoraux imposés par le gouvernement français en Nouvelle-Calédonie.
En mai 2024, des manifestations ont éclaté en Nouvelle-Calédonie après l’adoption par le Parlement français d’une loi qui aurait permis à un plus grand nombre d’allochtones de voter. Le gouvernement français a présenté cette mesure comme une réforme démocratique, mais de nombreux Kanaks, qui représentent environ 40% de la population, ont vu s’éloigner les perspectives d’indépendance. Lorsque des affrontements entre manifestants indépendantistes et forces de l’ordre ont débouché sur des émeutes, les autorités françaises ont déclaré l’état d’urgence, déployé des troupes et interdit TikTok. Le gouvernement français a suspendu les changements électoraux, mais a récemment arrêté certains dirigeants indépendantistes, et la situation reste tendue.
Quel est le statut politique de la Nouvelle-Calédonie et comment cela affecte-t-il sa gouvernance ?
Les Accords de Matignon-Oudinot de 1988, l’Accord de Nouméa de 1998, et la loi organique de 1999 ont conféré à la Nouvelle-Calédonie un statut particulier au sein de la République française, transférant de nombreuses compétences à l’exception des compétences régaliennes -l’armée, la police, la justice et la monnaie- dans le cadre d’une « souveraineté partagée ». Un titre a été ajouté à la Constitution française concernant les « dispositions transitoires relatives à la Nouvelle-Calédonie ».
Ce titre prévoyait un gel du corps électoral pour les trois référendums d’autodétermination et les élections provinciales, ces dernières déterminant la composition du Congrès qui élit le gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie. Pour voter aux élections provinciales, il fallait être né avant 1998 et justifier de dix ans de résidence en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Les autres élections suivent les règles nationales françaises.
Qu’est-ce qui a déclenché les récentes manifestations ?
L’accord de Nouméa prévoyait un transfert progressif de souveraineté, ainsi que trois référendums d’autodétermination organisés en 2018, 2020 et 2021. La coalition indépendantiste, le Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS), avait demandé le troisième référendum, mais a ensuite refusé la date en raison de la pandémie, qui a touché tardivement la Nouvelle-Calédonie. En 2021, de nombreuses familles étaient en deuil et la campagne électorale ne pouvait pas se tenir correctement en raison des restrictions.
Le gouvernement français a maintenu la date du référendum, que le FLNKS a appelé à boycotter. Cet appel a été largement suivi par les Kanaks, ce qui s’est traduit par un taux de participation de seulement 43,90%, contre 85,64% lors du deuxième référendum en 2020. Dans les îles Loyauté, la population, essentiellement kanake, s’est abstenue à 95,46%, et dans la province nord à 83,38%. Malgré cela, le gouvernement français a reconnu les résultats et a déclaré l’Accord de Nouméa caduc, incitant les responsables politiques locaux à trouver un nouvel accord, notamment sur le corps électoral.
En l’absence d’accord, le gouvernement a décidé de modifier le corps électoral par une réforme constitutionnelle, permettant à toute personne ayant dix ans de résidence en Nouvelle-Calédonie de voter aux élections provinciales. Cela a déclenché des tensions car le peuple Kanak, déjà minoritaire en raison de la colonisation et du boom du nickel des années 1970, voit cela comme une menace de dilution de leur représentativité dans les institutions et la fin du processus de décolonisation.
Depuis le référendum de 2021, l’Union calédonienne, membre du FLNKS, a créé la Cellule de coordination des actions de terrain (CCAT), qui a organisé des manifestations contre cette réforme électorale. Le gouvernement français a ignoré nos alertes en cas de passage en force, et les manifestations ont dégénéré en barrages et en incendies à Nouméa, la capitale, et aux alentours, conduisant à un couvre-feu, l’état d’urgence, et le blocage de TikTok. L’armée a été déployée Des témoignages font état d’exactions des forces de l’ordre et de la formation de milices anti-kanaks.
Comment les dirigeants autochtones kanak ont-ils réagi ?
Les dirigeants kanaks ont appelé au calme, mais n’ont pas été écoutés, ni les coutumiers ou le président du gouvernement.
Le FLNKS a refusé de dialoguer avec les trois hauts fonctionnaires accompagnant le président français Emmanuel Macron lors de sa visite éclair, réclamant une résolution politique du conflit.
La présidente de la province Sud et l’un des ex-députés tiennent des propos enflammés sur le rattachement à la France. Un autre courant loyaliste, incarné par le second ex-député et la maire de Nouméa, prône le dialogue et la recherche d’un nouvel accord institutionnel. Certains indépendantistes sont favorables à un dialogue avec ce courant du parti loyaliste. Le parti Éveil océanien, représentant la communauté wallisienne et futunienne, juge le référendum de 2021 comme un « non-sens politique » et pourrait jouer un rôle dans une mission de dialogue si le gouvernement français adopte une position de neutralité, comme promis dans le préambule de l’Accord de Nouméa.
Comment la société civile promeut-elle la paix et la réconciliation en Nouvelle-Calédonie ?
La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme a contribué à la signature des Accords de Matignon, à un moment où la guerre civile avait fait plus de 90 morts. Toutefois, récemment, le ministre de l’Intérieur nous a critiqués et a ignoré nos avertissements. On espère que le prochain gouvernement écoutera les voix œuvrant pour la paix.
Jusqu’à présent, les troubles se sont essentiellement limités à Nouméa et aux communes avoisinantes, les provinces des Îles et du Nord étant peu affectées. Cela montre que le processus de paix a tissé des liens entre les communautés. En 2022, une statue symbolisant la poignée de main entre Jacques Lafleur (loyaliste) et Jean-Marie Tjibaou (indépendantiste) a été inaugurée sur la place de la Paix (Koo We Joka). Des femmes ont appelé à un rassemblement pour la paix sur cette place.
La société civile calédonienne, profondément attachée à ce pays, peut encore œuvrer à un destin commun si la France respecte ses engagements dans le processus de décolonisation acté par l’Accord de Nouméa.
La France doit mener des enquêtes impartiales pour rétablir la paix par des voies légales. Les responsables politiques indépendantistes et loyalistes doivent s’engager à reconstruire un destin commun et à lutter contre les inégalités sociales, causes profondes de la révolte des jeunes Kanaks.
La société civile doit influencer les élus pour œuvrer en ce sens et exiger une justice impartiale. La décision de transfert en détention provisoire des dirigeants de la CCAT en France, à plus de 17.000 km, au détriment de leur vie privée et familiale et des droits de la défense, a été suivie de nouvelles émeutes, y compris cette fois dans le Nord et dans une des îles Loyauté.
Les élections législatives en France auront un impact sur l’avenir de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, et il est crucial que le dialogue et un accord pour un destin commun soient soutenus et recherchés.
Entrez en contact avec la Ligue des Droits de l’Homme via sonsite web et suivez@LDH_Fr et@nathalietehio sur Twitter.