Burkina Faso

• Benin and Burkina Faso: Reverse the suspension of media outlets

  

  CIVICUS, the global alliance of civil society organisations, condemns the decision by the governments of Benin and Burkina Faso to suspend media outlets over their coverage of the recent coup in Niger. On 8 August 2023, La Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication (HAAC), a commission responsible for the management and development of public information and communication in Benin, suspended Gulf Media Group , a private media house that owns  Golfe Fm, Golfe TV, and the weekly Gazette du Golfe.  Their digital channels have also been suspended from airing any information. The Media Group was suspended following their reports on the political situation in Niger after the coup that overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum.

• BURKINA FASO : ‘Pour une grande partie de la société civile, la sécurité est une préoccupation plus urgente que la démocratie’

  CIVICUS échange sur lecoup d’État militaire récent au Burkina Faso avec Kop’ep Dabugat, coordinateur du Réseau de Solidarité pour la Démocratie en Afrique de l’Ouest (WADEMOS).

  WADEMOS est une coalition d’organisations de la société civile (OSC) d’Afrique de l’Ouest qui mobilise la société civile afin de défendre la démocratie et de promouvoir des normes démocratiques dans la région.

  Qu’est-ce qui a conduit aucoup d’État récent au Burkina Faso, et que faut-il faire pour que la démocratie soit restaurée ?

  Le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré,actuel chef de la junte militaire au pouvoir au Burkina Faso, a invoqué la dégradation continue de la situation sécuritaire pour justifier la prise de pouvoir par les militaires, tout comme l'avait fait son prédécesseur, le lieutenant-colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Or il semblerait que les attaques de groupes armés ont fortement augmenté dans les mois qui ont suivile premier coup d’État mené par Damiba, en janvier 2022. Les analystes affirment que le Burkina Faso constitue le nouvel épicentre du conflit au Sahel. Depuis 2015, les violences perpétrées par des insurgés djihadistes liés à Al-Qaïda et à l’État islamique ont entraîné la mort de milliers de personnes et déplacé deux millions d’autres.

  Le coup d’État a également révélé la présence d’un schisme au sein de la junte dirigée par Damiba. Le nouveau coup a été orchestré en partie par les mêmes officiers militaires qui avaient participé au coup d’État pour porter Damiba à la tête de l’État. Désormais, ces officiers affirment queDamiba n’a pas cherché à réorganiser l’armée pour mieux faire face aux menaces sécuritaires comme ils s’y attendaient. Au lieu de cela, il est resté fidèle à la structure militaire qui a conduit à la chute du gouvernement du président Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, et a commencé à révéler des ambitions politiques.

  La question de la sécurité reste le premier défi à relever pour faire du Burkina Faso un État démocratique. La fonction principale d’un Etat, et plus encore d’un Etat démocratique, est de garantir la sécurité de ses citoyens. Une armée burkinabè unie sera nécessaire pour atteindre cet objectif.

  Il reste aussi à mener à bien l’actuel programme de transition accepté par la nouvelle junte, qui vise à mettre en place un régime civil d’ici juillet 2024.

  Au-delà de la transition, la nécessité de construire un État et des institutions politiques solides doit être soulignée. Il convient de s’attaquer sérieusement aux problèmes de corruption et de marginalisation économique. La nécessité de renforcer les institutions n’est pas propre au Burkina Faso : elle est essentielle pour toute la région, et en particulier pour les pays qui ont récemment été soumis à un régime militaire, notammentla Guinée etle Mali.

  Quelle a été la réaction de la société civile face à ce dernier coup d’État militaire ?

  À l’image de la désunion qui caractérise la société civile au Burkina Faso, la réaction de la société civile au coup d’État a été mitigée. Mais une partie notable de la société civile a semblé accueillir favorablement le dernier coup d’État parce qu’elle considérait la junte dirigée parDamiba non seulement comme autoritaire mais aussi comme s'alignant avec les politiciens du régime du président au pouvoir de 1987 à 2014, Blaise Compaoré. Ils craignaient ainsi que ces politiciens reprennent le pouvoir et ferment toutes les portes à la justice pour les victimes du régime Compaoré, ce qui constituait bien entendu un scénario plausible.

  Par conséquent, ce dernier coup d'État n'est en aucun cas perçu unanimement par la société civile comme constituant un pas en arrière pour l’agenda de la transition démocratique. De plus, pour une grande partie de la société civile, la sécurité semble être une préoccupation plus urgente et prioritaire que la démocratie, de sorte que l’élément qui a prévalu est l’incapacité apparente de la junte dirigée par Damiba à faire face à la situation sécuritaire.

  L’effort des groupes traditionnels et religieux qui ont négocié un accord à sept conditions entre les factions militaires de Damiba et de Traoré, mettant fin à la violence et prévenant le carnage, mérite toutefois d’être salué. Cet effort semble avoir créé une base pour l'engagement constructif entre la junte dirigée par Traoré et la société civile, qui s'est poursuivi avec la participation notable de la société civile à la Conférence nationale du 14 octobre 2022. Celle-ci a approuvé une nouvelle Charte de transition pour le Burkina Faso et a officiellement nommé Traoré comme président de transition.

  Quelle est la situation des OSC de défense des droits humains ?

  Les OSC burkinabè actives dans le domaine des droits humains et civils sont de plus en plus préoccupées par les représailles contre les politiciens et les civils perçus comme étant pro-français, ainsi que par la recrudescence marquée des groupes pro-russes qui demandent que la France et tous ses intérêts soient chassés du pays.

  De plus, les OSC de défense des droits humains et des droits civils s'inquiètent de la stigmatisation et des représailles contre la communité peule, ce qui vient s'ajouter aux préoccupations concernant l’insurrection djihadiste qui sévit dans le pays. Cette stigmatisation découle du fait que de nombreux groupes terroristes recrutent des combattants burkinabés d’origine peule. Des arrestations arbitraires et des exécutions extrajudiciaires de Peuls en raison de présomptions sur leur complicité dans des actes de violence terroriste ont été signalées. En dehors de ceux-là, aucun autre cas notable de violation des droits humains menaçant les civils n’a été identifié. Par conséquent, même si on n'est qu'au début du mandat de Traoré, on peut du moins déjà affirmer qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une situation d’augmentation des violations systématiques des droits humains.

  Comment la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) a-t-elle réagi au coup d’État militaire ?

  Conformément à son Protocole additionnel de 2001 sur la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance, la réponse initiale de la CEDEAO a été de condamner fermement et sans réserve le coup d’État, le trouvant inopportun à un moment où des progrès avaient été réalisés par la junte dirigée par Damiba pour préparer le terrain aux élections et à la démocratie. La CEDEAO a également demandé à la junte de garantir les droits humains et d’assurer la stabilité.

  Malgré les sanctions en cours contre le pays, à la suite de sa rencontre avec M. Traoré, Mahamadou Issoufou, ancien président du Niger et médiateur envoyé au Burkina Faso par la CEDEAO, s’est déclaré satisfait et a déclaré que la CEDEAO resterait aux côtés du peuple burkinabé. La CEDEAO, comme elle a tendance à le faire, travaillera en étroite collaboration avec la junte militaire pour rétablir l’ordre démocratique. Le calendrier est maintenu et l’échéance reste juillet 2024.

  Comment les autres institutions internationales ont-elles réagi, et que devraient-elles faire pour soutenir la société civile au Burkina Faso ?

  Les autres institutions internationales ont réagi de la même manière que la CEDEAO. L’Union africaine a condamné le coup d’Etat, le considérant un pas en arrière suite aux progrès déjà réalisés vers la restauration de la démocratie. Le coup d’Etat a également été condamné par les Nations Unies et le Parlement européen.

  Si la communauté internationale veut aider les OSC au Burkina Faso, elle doit avant tout soutenir les efforts de la junte pour éradiquer l’insurrection djihadiste qui continue de sévir dans le pays. Elle doit également aider les autorités à faire face non seulement à la crise actuelle des réfugiés, accentuée par les défis liés au changement climatique, mais aussi justement à la crise climatique qui contribue à la propagation de la violence terroriste.

  La communauté internationale doit également continuer à faire pression sur la junte pour qu’elle tienne son engagement et qu'elle adhère aux accords conclus par l’ancienne junte avec la CEDEAO, afin de mettre fin à la répression des personnes en raison de leur appartenance politique et ethnique et de libérer toute personne emprisonnée pour des motifs politiques.

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   L’espace civique au Burkina Faso est classé « obstrué » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

  Entrez en contact avec WADEMOS via sonsite web ou sa pageFacebook, et suivez@WADEMOSnetwork sur Twitter.

• Burkina Faso at UN Human Rights Council: Adoption of Universal Periodic Review Report

  Coalition Burkinabé des Défenseurs des Droits Humains, the West Africa Human Rights Defenders Network and CIVICUS welcome the government of Burkina Faso's engagement with the UPR process. We also welcome passing of a new law on the protection of human rights defenders in June 2017, making Burkina Faso only the second African country to do so.

  However, in our joint UPR Submission, we documented that since its last review, Burkina Faso only partially implemented the one civic space recommendation received during its 2nd Cycle review. Despite several positive developments since the popular uprising of 2014, such as the decriminalisation of defamation and the adoption of a law on the protection of human right defenders, restrictions on the freedom of expression including suspensions of media outlets by the national media regulator and attacks and threats against journalists continue.

  A new law on freedom of association, passed in 2015, allows authorities to delay the granting of legal personality in order to conduct a “morality” test on the applicant if deemed necessary. Civil society in Burkina Faso are further concerned about article 56 of the law which establishes a mediation commission, the members of which are not guaranteed to be independent of government.

  Despite the new HRD law, in recent years journalists and civil society activists, in particular those critical of the government, have continued to experience threats, intimidation and physical attacks. Freedom of expression has been undermined in recent years, including through the forced closure of some media outlets. 

  Serious violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, including the killing of at least 14 unarmed protestors, took place during a coup d’etat in September 2015.

  Mr President, we call on the Government of Burkina Faso to take proactive measures to address these concerns and implement recommendations to create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling environment for civil society.

• BURKINA FASO: ‘For a major segment of civil society security is a more urgent concern than democracy’

  CIVICUS speaks about therecent military coup in Burkina Faso with Kop'ep Dabugat, Network Coordinator of the West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network (WADEMOS).

  WADEMOS is a coalition of West African civil society organisations (CSOs) that mobilises civil society around the defence of democracy and the promotion of democratic norms in the region.

  What led to the recent coup in Burkina Faso, and what needs to be done for democracy to be restored?

  The current head of Burkina Faso’s ruling junta, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, cited persistent insecurity as a reason for the military takeover – as did his predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Attacks by armed groups are said to have greatly increased in the months following the first coup led by Damiba, in January 2022. According to analysts, Burkina Faso is the new epicentre of conflict in the Sahel. Since 2015, jihadist violence by insurgents with links to al-Qaeda and Islamic State has resulted in the death of thousands of people and displaced a further two million.

  The coup also revealed the presence of a schism in the Damiba-led junta. It was orchestrated by military officers who were part of the coup that installed Damiba as head of state, but who now claimed that Damiba did not focus on reorganising the army to better face security threats, as they had expected. Instead, he stuck with the military structure that led to the fall of the government under President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, and began to display political ambitions.

  The security question remains the first challenge that needs to be addressed to make Burkina Faso a democratic state. The foremost role of a state, and more so of a democratic one, is to guarantee the safety of its citizens. A united Burkina Faso army will be necessary to achieve this.

  The other thing that must be done is to see through the existing transition programme for the country to return to civilian rule by July 2024, to which the new junta has agreed.

  Beyond the transition, the need to build a strong state and political institutions cannot be overemphasised. The challenges of corruption and economic marginalisation should be tackled in earnest. The need for stronger institutions is not peculiar to Burkina Faso: it is familiar to all the region, and particularly to those countries that have recently come under military rule, notably Guinea and Mali.

  What was civil society’s reaction to the recent military coup?

  In line with the disunity that characterises civil society in Burkina Faso, the civil society response to the coup has been mixed. But a notable section of civil society seemed to welcome the most recent coup because they saw the Damiba-led junta not only as authoritarian but also as aligned with politicians from the regime of President Blaise Compaoré, in power from 1987 to 2014. They saw the real possibility that those politicians could regain power and shut all doors on victims of the Compaoré regime ever seeing justice.

  As a result, the view of the recent coup as a significant setback for the democratic transition agenda is not unanimously held among civil society. Additionally, for a major segment of civil society security appears to be a more urgent and priority concern than democracy, so the element that prevailed was the seeming incapacity of the Damiba-led junta to address the security situation.

  The effort of the traditional and religious groups that negotiated a seven-point agreement between the Damiba and Traoré factions of the military, ending violence and forestalling further bloodshed, however, deserves commendation. That effort seems to have established a baseline of engagement between the Traoré-led junta and civil society. Such constructive engagement with the new government seems to have continued, with the notable participation of civil society in the 14 October 2022 National Conference that approved a new Transitional Charter for Burkina Faso and officially appointed Traoré as transitional president.

  What is the situation of human right CSOs?

  Burkinabe CSOs in the human and civil rights space have grown increasingly concerned about the victimisation of politicians and members of the public perceived to be pro-France as well as by the marked upsurge of pro-Russian groups demanding that France and all its interests be kicked out of the country.

  On top of their concern about the raging jihadist insurgency, human and civil rights CSOs are also concerned about the stigmatisation and victimisation of citizens of Fulani ethnicity. This victimisation stems from the fact that many terrorist cells recruit Burkinabe people of Fulani extraction. There have been reports of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of Fulani people due to their alleged complicity in terrorist violence. Besides these two, no other notable cases of human rights abuses threatening civilians have been identified besides the ones already mentioned. Hence, even though it is still early in the Traoré-led government, it may be safe to rule out any consistent pattern of heightened human rights abuses under its watch.

  How has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the military coup?

  In accordance with the letter of its 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the initial response of ECOWAS was to condemn the coup strongly and unequivocally, calling it an unfortunate and retrogressive development, especially in light of the progress made with the Damiba-led junta in preparing the ground for elections and democracy. ECOWAS also called for the junta to guarantee human rights and ensure stability.

  Despite the ongoing sanctions against the country, following his meeting with Traoré, Mahamadou Issoufou, the former president of Niger and mediator sent to Burkina Faso by ECOWAS, said he was satisfied and that ECOWAS would remain by the side of the people of Burkina Faso. In what is the ECOWAS way to respond to military governments, ECOWAS will work closely with the junta to restore democratic order. The timeline stands and the deadline remains July 2024.

  How have other international institutions reacted, and what should they do to support civil society in Burkina Faso?

  Other international institutions have reacted similarly to ECOWAS. The African Union condemned the coup and said it was unfortunate in light of the progress already made towards the restoration of democracy. The coup was similarly condemned by the United Nations and the European Parliament.

  If the international community wants to assist CSOs in Burkina Faso, what it first and foremost needs to do is support the junta’s efforts to stamp out the jihadist insurgency that continues to hold the country hostage. It should also assist the authorities in tackling not only the current refugee crisis but also the challenge of climate change, which is a contributing factor not just to the refugee crisis but also to the spread of terrorist violence.

  The international community must also continue to mount pressure on the junta to deliver on its promise to adhere to the agreements the former junta reached with ECOWAS, to put an end to the victimisation of people on account of their political affiliations and ethnicity, and to set free anyone who has been imprisoned for political reasons.

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  Civic space inBurkina Faso is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch withWADEMOS through itswebsite or its Facebook page, and follow @WADEMOSnetwork on Twitter.

• Civil and political rights are backsliding in West Africa ahead of elections

  There has been a rapid decline in civic freedoms and democratic norms in Francophone West Africa with ruling presidents evading term limits and muzzling their opposition and pro-democracy groups, CIVICUS said ahead of presidential elections in Guinea (18 October) and Côte d’Ivoire (31 October).

  Over the next six months a series of elections will take place across Francophone West Africa. Voting kicks off in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire later this month, followed by elections in Burkina Faso (November), Niger (December-January) and Benin (April). Togo already had a contested presidential election in February 2020.

  In Togo, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, violence and political tensions are being fuelled by presidents refusing to step down. In Benin, recent changes in eligibility requirements mean that members of the opposition may not be able to run for presidency, while Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Burkina Faso are confronting or emerging from violent armed conflicts which are being used to justify repressive laws and policies. In addition, the restrictions introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and armed groups spilling over from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea are making the political situations more volatile.

  In this tense political environment, the new report “Civic space backsliding ahead of elections in Francophone West Africa” examines the tools of repression being used to undermine opposition groups, human rights defenders, activists and journalists. with a focus on Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger and Togo.

  It documents recent Internet disruptions, the arrest of hundreds of pro-democracy activists and journalists and the killing of dozens of peaceful protesters in demonstrations organised over the last three years. Governments are using restrictive laws, over-complicated registration processes, judicial harassment and excessive use of force to clampdown on civil society, particularly when dissent is expressed online or during protests.

  “Instead of working with civil society groups to create an enabling environment for free and fair elections, authorities across Francophone West Africa have resorted to muzzling human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists. In the hope of stamping out all opposition, they have created a climate of fear which fuels political violence, erodes the rule of law and undermines regional stability,” said François Patuel, senior researcher on West Africa and author of the report.

  In Guinea, where President Alpha Condé will run for a third term on 18 October 2020, over fifty people were killed since October 2019 in protests organised by the political opposition and pro-democracy group Front National de Défense de la Constitution (National Front for the Defence of the Constitution, FNDC). In March 2020, the constitutional referendum which opened the way to Alpha Condé running for a third term was marred with a social media shutdown and intercommunal clashes in the Guinea Forest region which left over 30 people dead. Dozens of FNDC supporters and journalists have been detained since the creation of the movement in April 2019.

  In Côte d’Ivoire, at least 12 people were killed in protests and clashes between political supporters following President Alassane Ouattara’s decision to run for a third term for the presidential election scheduled on 31 October 2020. Public protests have been banned since August 2020. The authorities have adopted laws criminalising false news and used them to target journalists, bloggers and politicians expressing dissent, including members of parliament such as Alain Lobognon who remains in detention since December 2019. In gross contempt to regional institutions, Côte d’Ivoire has been ignoring orders from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to release pro-Soro supporters and allow Guillaume Soro and Laurent Gbagbo to stand for elections.

  “Local human rights groups do not take up sensitive political cases for fear of reprisals. Even lawyers are scared.” --Woman human rights defender, Abidjan, 15 May 2020.

  “On paper, the right to freedom of expression is supposed to be protected. But in practice, journalists are intimidated when they write on sensitive topics such as land rights, police brutality and corruption.” -- Interview with a human rights defender, Lomé, 14 May 2020.

  With civic freedoms backsliding across West Africa Francophone, civil society organisations need support from regional and international partners to remain safe, to ensure their voice is heard in international and regional fora and to increase the pressure on national authorities for positive human rights change. ECOWAS and the African Union, in particular, must step-up their response to the authorities’ disregard for regional standards and instruments, including their efforts to undermine the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.

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  Interviews

  To arrange interviews, please contact: 
  François Patuel, Consultant & Senior Researcher on West Africa for CIVICUS, , +221 77 693 78 46

• Civil Society “Contested and Under Pressure”, says new report

  Read this press release in Arabic, French, Portuguese and Spanish

  Civil society around the globe is “contested and under pressure” according to a 22-country research findings report released by CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, and The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). The report, Contested and Under Pressure: A Snapshot of the Enabling Environment of Civil Society in 22 Countries, brings together insights from Enabling Environment National Assessments (EENA) conducted around the world between 2013 and 2016.

• Country recommendations on civic space for the UN´s Universal Periodic Review

  CIVICUS and its partners have submitted joint and stand-alone UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) submissions on 9 countries in advance of the 30th UPR session (May 2018). The submissions examine the state of civil society in each country, including the promotion and protection of the rights to freedom of association, assembly and expression and the environment for human rights defenders. We further provide an assessment of the States’ domestic implementation of civic space recommendations received during the 2^nd UPR cycle over 4 years ago and provide a number of targeted follow-up recommendations. Countries examined include: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, Cuba, Djibouti, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan:

  Bangladesh (Individual/Joint): In this UPR, CIVICUS draws attention to a range of legislative restrictions which have been strengthened and imposed to curtail the operation of independent civic groups in Bangladesh. Of particular concern, are new restrictions on groups seeking funds from abroad, as well the repeated use of the penal code to arrest HRDs and place blanket bans on meetings and assemblies. We further examine the spate of extrajudicial killings against secular bloggers and LGBTI activists which is illustrative of Bangladesh’s downward spiral with respect to civic freedoms and systemic failure to protect civil society.

  Burkina Faso (EN/FR): CIVICUS, the Burkinabé Coalition of Human Rights Defenders and the West African Human Right Defenders Network examine unwarranted limitations on freedom of expression and assembly. Despite several positive developments since the popular uprising of 2014, such as the decriminalisation of defamation and the adoption of a law on the protection of human right defenders, restrictions on the freedom of expression including suspensions of media outlets by the national media regulator and attacks and threats against journalists continue.

  Cameroon: CIVICUS, Réseau des Défenseurs Droits Humains en Afrique Centrale (REDHAC) and the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA) highlight Cameroon’s fulfilment of the right to association, assembly and expression and unwarranted persecution of human rights defenders since its previous UPR examination.  We assess the ongoing judicial persecution and detention of human rights defenders on trumped up charges, the use of anti-terrorism legislation to target journalists and excessive use of force against peaceful protesters.  

  Colombia(EN/SP): CIVICUS highlights the hostile environment for human rights defenders, social leaders and unions workers who are routinely subject to physical attacks, targeted assassinations, harassment and intimidation by state and non-state actors. CIVICUS examines the increased number of attacks against journalists as well as the government’s lack of effective implementation of protection mechanisms to safeguard the work of journalists and human rights defenders.

  Cuba (EN/SP): CIVICUS and the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) highlight the constitutional, legal and de facto obstacles to the exercise of the basic freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression. The submission discusses the situation of CSOs, HRDs, journalists and bloggers, who face harassment, criminalisation, arbitrary arrests, searches of their homes and offices and reprisals for interacting with UN and OAS human rights institutions. The submission further examines the multiple ways in which dissent is stifled both in the streets and in the media, offline and online. 

  Djibouti (EN/FR): CIVICUS, Defend Defenders and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) submission describes how the government of Djibouti has patently ignored the 14 recommendations made during the second UPR cycle related to the protection of the rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression. Instead, in the intervening period, authorities in Djibouti have continued their campaign against dissent, regularly detaining human rights defenders, journalists and trade union activists because of their criticism of the government or human rights activists.  

  Russia: CIVICUS and Citizens’ Watch address concerns regarding the adoption and application of several draconian laws that have resulted in the expulsion and closure of numerous CSOs and restrictions on the activities of countless others. The submission also lays out the increasing criminalisation and persecution of dissenting views by means of growing restrictions, in both law and practice, on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. 

  Turkmenistan: CIVICUS highlights restrictions to freedom of association in Turkmenistan including recent amendments to the 2014 Law on Public Associations which further limit CSOs’ ability to register, operate independently and receive funding from international sources. Additionally, we assess the use of the arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of human rights defenders as well as unwarranted limitations to online and offline freedom of expression.

  Uzbekistan: CIVICUS, The Association for Human Rights in Central Asia and the International Partnership for Human Rights assess the conditions of freedom of association, assembly and expression in Uzbekistan. We highlight the lack of progress made in implementing recommendations received during the 2^nd UPR cycle. It particular, we note that although there have been some notable improvements to the environment for civic space, the situation for human rights activists and journalists remains deeply constrained.

• Un nouveau rapport montre que les libertés civiles et politiques sont en recul en Afrique de l’Ouest à l’approche des élections présidentielles.

  Les libertés civiles et les normes démocratiques enregistrent un net recul en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone avec des présidents au pouvoir contournant les limites de mandat et muselant les militants pro-démocratie et les opposants, a déclaré CIVICUS, à l’approche les élections présidentielles en Guinée (18 octobre) et en Côte d’Ivoire (31 octobre).

  Au cours des six prochains mois, une série d’élections se tiendra dans plusieurs pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest francophone.  Les élections débuteront en Guinée et en Côte d’Ivoire en octobre, puis au Burkina Faso (novembre), au Niger (décembre-janvier) et au Bénin (avril).  Le Togo a déjà organisé une élection présidentielle contestée en février 2020.

  Au Togo, en Guinée et en Côte d’Ivoire, la violence et les tensions politiques sont alimentées par le refus des présidents de ne pas se retirer à la fin de leur mandat. Au Bénin, des changements récents dans les conditions d’éligibilité signifient que les membres de l’opposition pourraient ne pas être en mesure de se présenter à la prochaine présidentielle, tandis que la Côte d’Ivoire, le Niger et le Burkina Faso sont actuellement confrontés ou sont en train de sortir  de conflits armés violents qui sont utilisés pour justifier des lois  et politiques répressives. En outre, les restrictions introduites en réponse à la pandémie COVID-19 ainsi que l'avancée de groupes armés du Sahel vers le golfe de Guinée rendent la situation plus instable.

  Dans ce climat politique tendu, le nouveau rapport «L’espace civique en recul à l’approche des élections en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone» examine les outils de répression utilisés pour affaiblir les groupes d’opposition, saper le travail des défenseurs des droits humains, des militants et des journalistes, avec un accent sur le Bénin, la Côte d’Ivoire, la Guinée, le Niger et le Togo.

  Ce rapport documente les récentes perturbations d’Internet, l’arrestation de centaines de journalistes et d’activistes pro-démocratie ainsi que les homicides de dizaines de manifestants pacifiques lors des manifestations organisées au cours des trois dernières années. Les gouvernements utilisent des lois restrictives, des processus d’enregistrement trop complexes, le harcèlement judiciaire et un recours excessif à la force pour réprimer la société civile, en particulier lorsque la divergence d’opinion est exprimée en ligne ou lors de manifestations.

  «Plutôt que de travailler avec la société civile pour créer un environnement propice à des élections libres et équitables en Afrique de l'Ouest, les autorités répriment les défenseurs des droits humains et les militants pro-démocratie. Dans l’espoir d’éradiquer toute opposition, elles ont créé un climat de peur qui alimente la violence politique, érode l’état de droit et mine la stabilité régionale », a déclaré François Patuel, chercheur principal sur l’Afrique de l’Ouest et auteur du rapport.

  En Guinée, où le président Alpha Condé se présentera pour un troisième mandat le 18 octobre 2020, plus de cinquante personnes ont été tuées depuis octobre 2019 lors de manifestations organisées par l’opposition politique et le groupe pro-démocratie Front National de Défense de la Constitution (FNDC).  En mars 2020, le référendum constitutionnel qui a ouvert la voie à la candidature d’Alpha Condé pour un troisième mandat a été marqué par la fermeture des réseaux sociaux ainsi que par des affrontements intercommunautaires en Guinée forestière qui ont fait plus de 30 morts.  Des dizaines de sympathisants du FNDC et de journalistes ont été arrêtés depuis la création du mouvement en avril 2019.

  En Côte d’Ivoire, au moins 12 personnes ont été tuées lors de manifestations et d’affrontements entre militants politiques à la suite de la décision du président Alassane Ouattara de se présenter pour un troisième mandat à l’élection présidentielle prévue le 31 octobre 2020. Les manifestations publiques sont interdites depuis août 2020. Les autorités ont adopté des lois criminalisant les fausses nouvelles et les ont utilisées pour cibler des journalistes, des blogueurs et des politiciens exprimant leur divergence d’opinion, y compris des parlementaires comme Alain Lobognon qui est en détention depuis décembre 2019. Au mépris des institutions régionales, la Côte d’Ivoire a ignoré  les ordonnances de la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples exigeant la libération des sympatisants de Guillaume Soro et demandant aux autorités  de permettre à Guillaume Soro et Laurent Gbagbo de se présenter à la présidentielle.

  «Les groupes locaux de défense des droits humains ne prennent pas en charge les affaires politiques sensibles par peur de représailles.  Même les avocats ont peur. »  –Une femme défenseure des droits humains, Abidjan, 15 mai 2020.

  «Sur le papier, le droit à la liberté d’expression est censé être protégé. Mais dans la pratique, les journalistes sont intimidés lorsqu’ils écrivent sur des sujets sensibles tels que les droits fonciers, la brutalité policière et la corruption. »  - Entretien avec un défenseur des droits humains, Lomé, 14 mai 2020.
      
  Avec le recul des libertés civiques dans toute l’Afrique de l’Ouest francophone, les organisations de la société civile ont besoin du soutien des partenaires régionaux et internationaux pour rester en sécurité, pour s’assurer que leur voix est entendue dans les forums internationaux et régionaux et pour augmenter la pression sur les autorités nationales pour un changement positif en matière de droits humains.  La CEDEAO et l’Union africaine, en particulier, doivent affermir leur réponse face au mépris des autorités pour les normes et instruments régionaux, y compris les efforts de ces dernières visant à affaiblir la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples.

  ---

  ENTREVUES
  Pour organiser des entretiens, veuillez contacter:
  François Patuel, consultant et chercheur senior sur l’Afrique de l’Ouest pour CIVICUS, , +221 77693 78 46

• Widespread arrests, attacks and legal restrictions facing LGBTQI+ activists across Africa finds new report

  

  Widespread arrests, attacks and legal restrictions facing LGBTQI+ activists across Africa finds new report

  Johannesburg | 4 July, 2023

  • Same-sex relations criminalised in at least 27 countries south of the Sahara
  • Organisations shut down and offices raided for their work on LGBTQI+ rights
  • Widespread bans on the publication of information on gay rights
  • Anti-LGBTQI+ laws and practices disproportionately impact other excluded groups including women, children and victims of abuse 

  From Uganda to Cameroon, LGBTQI+ activists face significant restrictions due to the prevailing social, cultural and legal attitudes towards homosexuality and gender identity. A new report by CIVICUS, Challenging Barriers: Investigating Civic Space Limitations on LGBTQI+ Rights in Africa, looks at some common challenges faced by activists and civil society groups in countries south of the Sahara.

  Many African countries have laws that criminalise same sex activity. The laws, often remnants of colonial era legislation, can be used to target and prosecute LGBTQI+ individuals, including activists. Penalties range from fines, imprisonment to even the death penalty in some countries. 

  Limited legal protection in many African countries offers little or no protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. This lack of protection makes it difficult for activists and civil society groups to advocate for equal rights or seek justice when they face human rights abuses. The offices and activities of civil society organisations advocating for LGBTQI+ rights have been either raided or shutdown in Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Cameroon.

  Attacks against people who identify as LGBTQI+ are common in countries such as Benin, Cameroon and Kenya. In Cameroon since 2022 there have been over 30 recorded cases of violence and abuse against LGBTQI+ people, while in Kenya sexual minority groups face escalating homophobic attacks. In January 2023, following a series of killings in 2022, unknown assailants murdered and dumped the body of LGBTQI+ activist Edwin Chiloba. Chiloba’s death, which many linked to his sexual orientation sparked public outrage, with civil society groups and members of the public denouncing the murder and calling on the authorities to bring those involved to justice.

  “With the escalating hostility towards the LGBTQ+ community in Africa, this report sheds light on the grave reality faced by many, and compels us to challenge prejudice, and advocate for equality - especially for the most marginalised. Governments must ensure equal protection for all people in accordance with their obligations on non-discrimination under international human rights law. We implore governments to take robust measures to safeguard the rights and well-being of all people, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity,” said Sylvia Mbataru, CIVICUS’ Civic Space Researcher for Eastern & Southern Africa.

  Censorship and restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly have contributed to a deteriorating environment for activists. In several countries, the publication and dissemination of material on LGBTQI+ issues face strict editorial controls and bans. CIVICUS also documents how protests are being suppressed, including the use of various laws to deny permits for public demonstrations, specifically targeting LGBTQI gatherings.

  Despite the hostile environment in many countries, civil society groups continue to advocate for LGBTQI+ rights and score important victories. The report also documents  a number of positive developments including the decriminalization of same sex relations in Botswana and Gabon, as well as a recent Supreme Court decision in Namibia to recognise same-sex marriages concluded abroad between citizens and foreign spouses.

  The report concludes by demonstrating the impact of civic space restrictions against LGBTQI+ groups, and shows how the ramifications of these restrictions also affect other excluded groups including women and children.

  DOWNLOAD REPORT