economy

• AFGHANISTAN: ‘Lack of dialogue and punishing sanctions are undermining the promotion of human rights’

  CIVICUS speaks about the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan with Hadiya Afzal, programme coordinator of Unfreeze Afghanistan.. Unfreeze Afghanistan is a women-led civil society organisation (CSO) formed by women from Afghanistan and the USA. It advocates for the release of Afghan assets frozen following the Taliban takeover to enable the state to pay salaries owed to public sector workers, including teachers and doctors, and tackle the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

  Why is civil society calling for the release of frozen assets of the Afghan state?

  When over US$9 billion of Afghanistan’s Central Bank reserves were frozen in August 2021, it had a devastating impact on the economy. Central Bank assets are the people’s money, used to hold currency auctions in the country, safeguard against inflation and control price stability. Afghanistan needs its Central Bank reserves back to stabilise its economy and perform centralised banking functions again.

  The assets frozen also included private monies, that is, accounts held by private individuals, companies and CSOs. People were unable to withdraw their own money from banks for months, with many still unable to do so due to lack of cash. Many Afghans sold off anything they owned to afford essential goods, the prices of which skyrocketed.

  Over the past year, leading CSOs, humanitarian organisations and more than 70 economists, including Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, have advocated through meetings, protests, letters and media appearances for the return of Afghanistan’s money to get its economy back on its feet, independently of whatever global aid funding is provided. United Nations (UN) experts have also called for the USA to unblock Afghanistan’s frozen assets to ease the humanitarian situation.

  What kind of safeguards should be put in place if the frozen assets are returned?

  The USA has signalled that funds could be returned to Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the country’s central bank, as long as three conditions are met: the establishment of independent monitoring mechanisms, the implementation of credible anti-money laundering regulations and controls to combat the financing of terrorism and DAB’s insulation from political interference – which meant replacing its top leadership, in the hands of Taliban officials, one of whom is under US and UN sanctions, with professionals.

  DAB has already agreed on independent monitoring conditions, and experts have set out how pre-existing independent monitoring and electronic auditing could be restored. US claims that the new Afghan government lacks expertise and that capacity building is needed for the state to be able to perform central bank functions could be addressed by assistance from the international community. The law that outlines DAB’s function as a technocratic institution charged with responsibilities such as currency auctions and oversight of banks is still in place. DAB continues to have the same audit oversight committee, with the same members it had under the previous government. And the chair of the audit committee has been an outspoken advocate for the return of DAB’s reserves.

  The Afghan government should ensure that the DAB law remains in place and that the institution will function separate from political considerations. Advocacy experts highlighted that the USA does not apply audit conditions as strictly to other countries as it does to Afghanistan. It does not seize their foreign assets due to limited monitoring capabilities.

  What else should the international community do to contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan?

  The international community should focus on supporting a strong, independent Afghan economy that can run on its own, the first step in which should be to return the full assets of the Afghan people to its central bank.

  Another measure the international community can take is to provide global aid raised by the UN and other international bodies. Human Rights Watch alerted that without sustained humanitarian aid donations, Afghanistan’s upcoming winter could be even worse than the last one.

  Last year, UN emergency funding staved off experts’ worst fears of a devastating winter, but the people of Afghanistan cannot continue to depend on global kindness after a year marked by war, the pandemic and rising inflation. Afghanistan’s assets must be returned to its central bank to bring stability to the lives of ordinary Afghans, and the international community should invest in the infrastructure necessary to ensure its success.

  What alternative measures, other than financial sanctions, can the international community implement to promote human rights, and specifically women’s rights, and support civil society in Afghanistan?

  Sanctions have had a devastating impact on Afghanistan, and the resulting humanitarian crisis has disproportionately affected the average Afghan. The Center for Economic and Policy Research stated that financial sanctions on Afghanistan amount to a form of ‘collective punishment’ of the Afghan people for the actions of a government they did not choose.

  The sanctions are not helping. In the words of Jamila Afghani, founder and president of the Afghan chapter of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, ‘we are not supporting Afghan women by starving them’.

  In fact, sanctions are only making things worse. The cultural practice of forced marriages and what effectively amounts to the sale of girls is reinforced by socio-economic factors. Even under the previous government more than 70 per cent of marriages were forced. These are expected to increase as a result of the humanitarian crisis.

  Meanwhile, Islamic scholars such as Daisy Khan have highlighted Quranic evidence supporting women’s independence, education and liberation. The promotion of human rights and specifically women’s rights is best fostered in a stable economic environment with sustained international diplomacy and interfaith dialogue.

  Lack of dialogue between the international community and the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan compounded by punishing sanctions is undermining the promotion of human rights. Human rights can only be promoted through constructive dialogue while addressing the drivers of wellbeing – rebuilding financial stability, economic independence and global cooperation.

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  Civic space in Afghanistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Unfreeze Afghanistan through its website or Facebook page, and follow @UnfreezeAfghan on Twitter.

• AFGHANISTAN: ‘The seizure of sovereign assets will worsen the world’s worst humanitarian disaster’

  CIVICUS speaks with Arash Azizzada, co-founder and co-director of Afghans for a Better Tomorrow, about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Afghans for A Better Tomorrow is a grassroots civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated tobringing about transformative change for Afghans in the USA and beyond. It has recently advocated for the release of Afghanistan’s frozen assets.

  Why is civil society calling for the return of Afghanistan’s frozen assets?

  Before August 2021, when the USA froze Afghanistan’s assets, Afghanistan’s western-backed government was heavily reliant on foreign aid and was spending most of its revenue on the conflict with the Taliban. Since the Taliban took over, the entire country has essentially found itself sanctioned economically and Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), its central bank, had all its assets frozen.

  Since the DAB serves as collateral insurance for private banks to be able to operate, the entire banking system has been paralysed as of August 2021. The same goes for the whole Afghan economy: businesses and people cannot access their own hard-earned money to buy food at the market down the street. Philanthropic foundations have trouble sending funds into Afghanistan. This has contributed to soaring inflation, worsened by the rise in food and commodity prices caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a record-breaking drought.

  As a result, Afghanistan has become ‘hell on Earth’, as the director of the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme put it. Over 21 million Afghans don’t know where their next meal will come from. Every women-led Afghan household currently faces poverty and hunger as the country’s healthcare system teeters on the brink of collapse.

  The consensus among Afghan civil society, both within and outside the country, is that the seizure of sovereign assets that belong to the Afghan people is a violation of international norms and will worsen the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Through grassroots organising, high-level advocacy and litigation, the Afghan American community has stepped up to bring the frozen assets back to their rightful owner: the Afghan people.

  At the same time, following the blocking of Afghan assets, a group of families in the USA who had secured rulings against the Taliban connected to its role in the 9/11 attacks filed a civil case in a federal court to enforce those rulings using the frozen DAB funds. In February 2022, President Joe Biden signed an executive order allocating half of the more than US$7 billion that the previous government of Afghanistan had placed in the New York Federal Reserve for humanitarian relief in Afghanistan and leaving half subject to litigation brought by some of the 9/11 families.

  As part of a broad coalition of Afghan-American groups representing the community, we filed an amicus – friend of the court – brief stating that the court should oppose this for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the Taliban are not recognised as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan by its people or the international community. The money belongs to the Afghan people, not the Taliban. And although 9/11 families deserve compensation, doing it this way would harm Afghans and not the Taliban.

  What kind of safeguards should be put in place if the frozen assets are returned?

  While the Taliban might be the de facto rulers of most of Afghanistan, they remain untrustworthy and illegitimate. But the DAB continues to be function as a technocratic body, so frozen funds should be returned as long as there is proper ring-fencing and enhanced safeguards such as electronic auditing records to ensure the reserves are not interfered with by the Taliban.

  Our proposed plan recommends an initial trust-building process in which a conditional amount of US$150-200 million a month is released so that the DAB is allowed to perform its core functions. The funds ought to be used to regulate the Afghan currency and run US dollar auctions to inject liquidity into the struggling economy and ease the pain of the Afghan population. Not one cent of these funds should be used for humanitarian aid purposes.

  What should the international community do to contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan?

  International philanthropy and the international community should support a fledging Afghan civil society, and especially the women’s groups that remain operational within the country, by ensuring wide-ranging sanctions relief.

  As it stands, the entire Afghan population is on the receiving end of collective punishment due to the sanctions imposed on the Afghan state. As the world has become hostile to doing business in the country, the World Bank and other international institutions should continue to focus on funding economic development projects and ensure the healthcare system remains functional.

  The international community should work hard to differentiate between targeted sanctions that focus on individuals within the Taliban and projects that ensure Afghans have a chance at survival. As one example, direct cash assistance to the Afghan population remains a much more effective and equitable method of assistance than trying to truck in food for a population of over 21 million people and helping circumvent Taliban attempts at interfering with aid.

  The UN appeal for humanitarian aid for Afghanistan still remains US$2 billion short of its target. There is a strong need for donor countries to fill that gap. Much of it should be filled by the NATO member countries that occupied Afghanistan for 20 years.

   

  What alternative measures, other than financial sanctions, can the international community implement to promote human rights and support civil society in Afghanistan?

  A core demand remains the non-recognition of the Taliban government, which is deepening its repression and remains unrepresentative of the Afghan population. It is important that the international community listens to the voices of Afghan civil society, and specifically those of Afghan women leaders and the minority Hazara and Shia communities.

  The most vital thing at this moment is a strengthened mandate by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to document and monitor human rights violations as well as support accurate and free media in the country. Significant UN presence on the ground will be key as Afghanistan faces a deteriorating human and women’s rights situation.

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  Civic space in Afghanistan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Afghans for a Better Tomorrow through itswebsite orFacebook page,and follow@AfghansTomorrow on Twitter.

• ANGOLA: ‘Much effort was put into excluding people from the electoral process’

  PORTUGUESE

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent Angolan election and its aftermath with Catarina Antunes Gomes and Cesaltina Abreu from the Social Sciences and Humanities Laboratory of the Catholic University of Angola (LAB). LAB works closely with Civic Movement Mudei (‘I changed’ in Portuguese), a movement of multiple civil society organisations (CSOs) that advocate for democratic change in Angola. It campaigns for voting rights and fair conditions of electoral competition, including transparent funding, equitable media coverage and citizen monitoring of election processes.

  

   What kinds of civic space restrictions did Angolan civil society encounter during the election?

  Civil society has faced many constraints before, during and after the election. Prior to the election, there was a partial review of the constitution that was done without any consultation and did not follow the recommendations of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The organic law on general elections was also amended without the participation of civil society or the political opposition, and it resulted in reduced electoral transparency. Key stakeholders were denied a platform to be part of the process.

  A few months before the election, the government also decided to change Angola’s political and administrative division, with potential impact on the drawing of electoral districts. Although it did not follow through with this reform, this caused great confusion and gave rise to suspicions about the intentions of the ruling party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the credibility of the election.

  In 2021 President João Lourenço appointed Laurinda Cardoso, a member of the MPLA’s political bureau, as chief judge of the Constitutional Court. Civil society also raised concerns about the appointment and swearing in of Manuel Pereira da Silva as the new president of the National Electoral Commission. But our voices have been overlooked during the whole process.

  The media situation has also been very precarious. Since the start of the electoral process, state intervention has increased, even in private media. Mudei monitored the media coverage of various parties and candidates from May until July and found that both public and private media had become instruments of propaganda, undermining the right to freedom of information and free choice.

  On 6 July, just as the electoral campaign was about to begin, a new law was proposed to prohibit surveys and posts revealing voting choices. Instead of ensuring people were fully included in the electoral process, much effort was put into excluding them.

  As a result, the level of transparency and fairness of the 24 August election has been dubious to say the least. It has been questioned by civil society through many public statements. The organisations we work with, Mudei and LAB, have produced a statementindicating they do not consider the elections to have been transparent, fair and free.

  What do you think contributed to low voter turnout?

  There were probably many reasons why fewer than half of registered voters went to the polls, but we believe major ones were disorganisation, fear and lack of trust.

  The whole process was badly organised. In September 2021 there was an ‘unofficial electoral registration’ period, which is really a process of connecting databases to determine who is eligible to vote, but it was not made clear to people what this was about. Most people were confused about what the law said on residency and voting. The process was marked by lack of clarity and irregularities. Everything seemed too complicated so many lost interest. Many people were excluded as a result.

  People were also afraid. The electoral campaign should be a time when candidates share their ideas with us, debate their parties’ proposals and tell us their thoughts about Angola’s future. But this was not what happened. The ruling party had a strong negative discourse, treating the other parties as enemies rather than adversaries. They didn’t present any ideas on how to make the country progress and what they published as their political programme was of very low quality.

  Staying away from the polls can also be interpreted as a form of protest. We have done a lot of comparative electoral analysis and found that protest voting has increased in Angola through the years. This is the result of people’s complete lack of faith in political institutions, given their limited democratic character and lack of transparency. This year the protest vote rose even further.

  How has the Angolan government reacted to civil society’s criticisms of electoral irregularities?

  The government has responded with repression. There are two situations that we would like to share with CIVICUS and other international allies so they can help us by providing visibility, pressuring human rights international bodies and offering support in the form of capacity-building and funding for human rights activists and social movements in Angola.

  The first situation concerns Pascoal Baptistiny, executive director of MBAKITA, a CSO that promotes the rights of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities in the province of Cuando Cubango in southern Angola. Pascoal has expressed concerns about the election, including in an interview with CIVICUS last year. This made him a target. He was put under surveillance and has recently requested our help to evacuate his family to Luanda, Angola’s capital, because he has been threatened and is afraid for their safety.

  The second situation concerns several members of Mudei, including its coordinator, who has been threatened repeatedly. Another of our colleagues, who was an independent candidate, has been mentioned in aggressive articles and social media posts along with an official from the European Union delegation in Luanda. They are attacked as part of a supposed subversive conspiracy involving powerful international interests aiming at destabilising Angola.

  The feeling of oppression has been increasing. The Angolan army has been put on high alert, allegedly to prevent attacks. But how would unarmed civilians be able to attack them? That is clearly an excuse; their presence is threatening and intimidating. We urge the international community to publicly denounce what our government is doing to people and act to protect civil society activists who continue to work regardless and face threats and violence as a result.

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  Civic space in Angola is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Mudei through itsFacebook page,and follow@MovCivicoMudei on Twitter.

• ARGENTINA: ‘Milei’s victory expresses the rejection of the previous governments’

  CIVICUS speaks with Yanina Welp, researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, about the results of Argentina’s runoff presidential election, won by a far-right outsider.

  How do you explain the victory of Javier Milei, an outsider with no party structure?

  Milei’s victory, like that of any other candidate, cannot be explained by a single reason. There are at least three main explanations for his victory.

  First, there’s the economic situation. On top of a high level of poverty – 40 per cent and growing – Argentina has very high inflation, and the economy hasn’t grown for many years. And the same goes for formal employment. There are a lot of informal workers and many people experience high levels of uncertainty.

  Second is the inability of the political class to respond to these demands. Most recently, those in power have acted arrogantly. Insecurity, corruption scandals and the passivity of the authorities in the face of all these have increased. Milei’s leadership came to embody people’s rejection of the situation. Many people voted for him because he expresses well the rejection of recent administrations, and not necessarily because they approve of or adhere to the policies he has proposed to implement.

  Third, there’s the role of political leadership, and specifically of the incumbent, for doing nothing in the face of this threat and even encouraging Milei’s candidacy with the aim of dividing the opposition’s vote and therefore having a better chance at winning. This was done first by Peronists, in the run-up to the first round, and by former president Mauricio Macri ahead of the runoff, which put his Together for Change coalition in crisis.

  Do you think the electorate has leaned to the right?

  Unlike almost all the other candidates, who only had vague and general proposals, Milei ran on a strongly ideological platform, which he kept putting forward throughout the campaign.

  However, when analysing people’s attitudes, there are contradictions, first and foremost because there is no universal notion of what is supposed to be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. For instance, polls show growing concern about rising insecurity, and it would be very elitist to think that having this concern makes you right-wing. The rise in crime shows that it is a real concern.

  It is true that in this election campaign positive perceptions of the private sector have increased compared to perceptions of the public administration, possibly as a result of Milei’s discourse but also because the image of the state has deteriorated considerably under recent administrations. In this sense, it could be said that voters have indeed moved towards the right. But Milei’s victory with almost 56 per cent of the vote shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that more than half of the electorate have ideologically leaned rightwards, or even embraced the radical right, because many voted for him because he embodies the reaction to the status quo rather than because of his ideological proposals.

  During the campaign it was argued that democracy was at stake. Is Argentina’s democracy in danger?

  Democracy is not in imminent danger, as was the case with military coups, which wiped democracy away overnight. There are signs of democratic erosion – but these have been there for years. There has been both progress and setbacks, including attempts to co-opt the judiciary, the misuse of state resources and clientelistic practices.

  Generally speaking, Argentina’s democratic institutions work. Despite the opposition’s complaints about the electoral system, the elections took place normally and the results were out very quickly.

  However, we have seen a huge setback in terms of public debate. Intolerance and verbal violence have increased. Supporters of different parties can hardly talk to each other. There is a lot of aggression on social media. These are all medium-intensity warning signs that, if not addressed, will only pave the way for more violence and authoritarianism.

  How will Argentina’s political scene change following this election?

  Since 2003, with Néstor Kirchner’s election to the presidency, a system of two broad coalitions formed, which since 2007, under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has been maintained by the introduction of open, simultaneous and compulsory primary elections. These served to avoid party fragmentation but had the negative effect of eroding programmatic or ideological differences. The two coalitions that formed as a result included their own right and left wings, blurring the ideological debate and replacing it with a divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This ended up encouraging affective polarisation with very watertight alignments where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground.

  The fact that the presidential elections were won by a party that until a couple of years ago did not exist will force the two big coalitions of recent decades, the Peronist ruling party and the opposition Together for Change, to profoundly reconfigure themselves.

  Within Peronism, former president and current vice-president Cristina Kirchner was the big loser of this election. In recent times she has been absent from the political scene, leaving Peronism without clear leadership. Peronism has strong roots in trade unions and social organisations that are highly dependent on the state. These organisations have incentives to negotiate, should the new government open up that space. However, Milei’s initial discourse has pointed in a completely different direction, insisting that he will take shock measures.

  What are the main challenges the new government will face?

  The new government should tackle three major challenges. The first is to stabilise the economy by stopping inflation and putting the exchange rate in order. The second is to introduce reforms to increase productivity and solve the crisis in formal employment. And the third is governance. Argentina has very strong social organisations, which has both positive and negative aspects, but in any case, it is a strongly organised society that is very predisposed to conflict.

  These three challenges must be tackled in a coordinated and consistent way, which is quite difficult.

  Do you think Milei’s government will be able to tackle them?

  I have serious doubts that the new government will be able to meet these challenges, not only in the area of stabilisation and structural reforms, but also and above all in the area of governance. Many of the proposed measures, such as adopting the US dollar as the currency, could be found unconstitutional. Other measures require legislative majorities that the new government won’t have. Its only prospect of obtaining substantial legislative support was through Together for Change, but the division of the opposition coalition leaves Milei without even a congressional quorum.

  Milei has not one provincial governorship and almost no mayorships. However, Argentina’s sub-national powerholders have always been accommodating and pragmatic. Still, some key measures would go directly against the interests of the provinces, such as the elimination of co-participation, the system through which the federal state distributes public resources from national taxes to the provinces. And then there is the potential confrontation with the province of Buenos Aires.

  Milei could try to rule by decree, but this would cause an instant crisis, and in case of an impeachment trial the vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, would take over. This would not ensure any positive change but would rather imply some additional negative elements.

  Milei was elected with a very large majority, so he has great popular legitimacy. But this majority could be inflated, as is often the case in runoffs, and is compounded by the volatility and impatience of a large part of Argentina’s electorate. If he succeeds in implementing his ultra-liberal programme, a global rarity, the social costs will be extremely high. And if he fails to do so, people’s disenchantment with politics could increase and their support for democracy could be called into question.

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   Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Yanina Welp via herwebsite and follow@Welpita on Twitter.

• COLOMBIA: ‘Civil society is an important pillar in work with the migrant population’

  CIVICUS speaks with Carmen Aida Faria, director of Fundación Manitas Amarillas (Little Yellow Hands Foundation), about the difficulties faced by Venezuelan migrants in Colombia and the work being done by civil society to facilitate their access to rights.

  Manitas Amarillas is a Colombian civil society organisation (CSO) formed in 2018, in the context of mass Venezuelan migration to Colombia, to provide humanitarian assistance, access to health services and counselling to migrants and refugees.

  How has the situation of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia changed in recent years?

  Migration flows into Colombia have changed over time. The 2015 wave of Venezuelan migration was very important, but the number of migrants increased over the following years, peaking in 2017. Compared to the previous wave, this one included a lot more people in vulnerable situation.

  The new arrivals needed immediate healthcare and access to other fundamental rights that the system could not provide. Colombia did not have the infrastructure or the financial resources to respond, particularly in border areas, where local populations also experience deficits in access to education and healthcare, among other rights.

  Migrants in vulnerable situations were also unable to receive monetary aid through the Colombian government’s social assistance programmes or enter the subsidised health system. To access social programmes, people must have a regular migration status.

  In addition to a permanent migrant population, there is also the population in border areas that constantly crosses the border back and forth to access certain services. For instance, many children who live in Venezuela go to school in Colombia and are not included in school food programmes. There are organisations working specifically to ensure these children have access to food, as they arrive with significant nutritional problems.

  These processes created a demand for the community, but above all for the Colombian state, to respond to. And the country began to operate under a logic of solidarity and gratitude: Colombians remember that in the past it was Venezuela that received Colombian migrants. Thus, the government began to grant special residence permits to regularise this population in some way. But the definite milestone was the Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPMV), approved in 2021 under an essentially humanitarian logic.

  What did the implementation of this new policy entail?

  The ETPMV implied temporary regularisation so that Venezuelans could benefit from the same rights and have the same duties as Colombian nationals. Upon receiving an identity document called a Temporary Protection Permit, migrants have the possibility of accessing the health system and the labour market, among other rights.

  Theoretically, the mechanism is well thought out. However, putting it into practice has been hard. Many people have been left out: more than 2.4 million migrants have registered in the Single Registry for Venezuelan Migrants, but there are still more than a million who, having completed the full process, have not received their permit.

  Some people applied for the permit in September 2021, more than a year ago, and have consulted Migración Colombia, the authority for migration control and monitoring, but still do not know what has happened to their application. Some have not received their permits due to logistical problems: this is a highly mobile population and when they change addresses it is often not possible to locate them to deliver the documentation.

  But it is also the case that difficulties continue once the permit has been obtained. This is an indication of deeper problems. When Venezuelans go with their permit to open a bank account or register with the health system, they are often rejected. The Temporary Protection Permit is a new document and many institutions, both public and private, are not yet familiar with it. A lot of education is needed to make these rights effectively accessible.

  The ETPMV was supposed to prioritise the most vulnerable population groups. The first to receive their permits were supposed to be people in need of immediate medical attention and children and adolescents who needed them to enter the education system due to lack of identity papers. This ultimately did not happen, to such an extent that legal appeals have had to be filed to ensure access to healthcare for people with chronic illnesses or other conditions in need of immediate attention.

  How is Colombian civil society supporting Venezuelan migrants?

  Since the last big wave of migration in 2017, many CSOs have emerged. It was the migrant community itself that first began to get together to help other migrants. We started giving food out on the street and providing humanitarian assistance to walkers, as we call the people moving on foot through Colombian territory, who did not have basic information or even warm enough clothing to withstand Colombia’s climate.

  CSOs have become an important pillar in work with the migrant population, because we are on the ground and we know the problems migrants have.

  Currently, many CSOs are working together in coordination with the Mayor’s Office of Bogotá and promoting several joint initiatives. We have launched public campaigns and signed a symbolic pact to promote integration, because Venezuelan migrants in Colombia continue to suffer from xenophobia and discrimination as a result of their poverty. We have asked the media to stop mentioning the nationality of crime perpetrators, because they only do so when the person involved is a foreigner, thus overstating the problem and contributing to discrimination against Venezuelans.

  We are also participating, in collaboration with the Colombian government and international cooperation agencies, in the first ‘Entregatón’, a massive permit delivery operation aimed at distributing 40,000 permits in five days. Migración Colombia has sent messages via mobile phone to migrants whose documents are ready, notifying them of the date and place where they can pick them up.

  But in addition to handing out the documents, as part of the operation, enrolment and biometric registration services are being provided for those who have not yet completed these stages of the process. People who have already received their permits are also offered vaccination services, access to healthcare providers, registration with the social assistance system, legal support and information on various other issues, from the transportation system to school access to programmes targeted at migrant women.

  There is so much work and CSOs are contributing enormously. The government and international cooperation agencies should take us into account not only as sources of diagnoses of migration issues, but also as partners when it comes to jointly implementing public policies arising from those diagnoses.

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  Civic space in Colombia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Manitas Amarillas through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@MANITASAMARI on Twitter.

• COLOMBIA: ‘Lack of regular migration status imposes barriers to accessing rights’

  CIVICUS speaks with Jessica Corredor Villamil and Lina Arroyave about the situation of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia. Jessica is the director of and Lina a researcher in Dejusticia’s international team.

  Dejusticia is a centre for legal and social studies based in Bogotá, Colombia, dedicated to promoting human rights in Colombia and the global south. It promotes social change through action-research, developing public policy proposals, advocacy campaigns and strategic litigation.

  How has Colombia changed its legal framework to accommodate Venezuelan migration?

  There are currently three ways in which Venezuelan nationals can obtain the status that allows them to stay in Colombia for extended periods: visas, refugee status and the Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelan Migrants (ETPMV).

  The ETPMV was established in 2021 to address the situation of mass migration from Venezuela. It has two main objectives: to identify the Venezuelan migrant population and regularise their migratory situation. To this end, two mechanisms are envisaged. The first is the Single Registry of Venezuelan Migrants, which collects personal and socio-economic data of those who register, administered by Migración Colombia, the authority in charge of migration control and surveillance. The second is the Temporary Protection Permit, which authorises its holders to stay in Colombia for 10 years and allows them to access the health, social security, education and financial systems, validate their diplomas, work and leave and re-enter the country.

  Those in Colombia who have regular status, who have requested refuge but have not yet received a response, who entered the country irregularly before 31 January 2021, who have entered the country regularly after May 2021, or do so before late May 2023 are all eligible for temporary protected status. After that cut-off date, it will only be available to children and adolescents.

  Even so, people are not guaranteed temporary protected status if they meet all the requirements, since it is granted at the discretion of Migración Colombia.

  How has the ETPMV system worked during its first year?

  The process has takenlonger than expected, falling short of the goal set by the previous government of delivering 1.8 million identification documents by 2022.

  According to data from Migración Colombia, as of November 2022 about 2.5 million people have entered their data in the Single Registry for Venezuelan Migrants and 1.6 million permits have been approved.

  This gap is worrying because lack of regular migration status imposes barriers to accessing fundamental rights and hinders the socio-economic integration of migrants.

  In addition, many people did not register because they were unable to regularise their migration status. The ETPMV was only available to those in an irregular situation who had entered Colombia before 31 January 2021. This time limitation ignores the fact that irregular migration continues, largely because of the impossibility of obtaining official documents in Venezuela. Irregular status is assumed to be the result of individual decisions, when it is usually results from the impossibility of complying with the requirements imposed.

  What integration barriers do Venezuelan migrants face in Colombia?

  In a recentreport we identified multiple barriers to accessing and remaining in the formal labour market, as well as for setting up a business.

  The main legal barrier is lack of regular migration status. The thousands of people who continue to enter Colombia through informal border crossings are denied access to temporary protected status. This has an impact on both formalising their employment and access to entrepreneurship support funds, particularly from the state, but also from the private sector. A majority of self-employed migrant workers work in the informal sector.

  Widespread ignorance among employers of migration legislation imposes additional barriers. For instance, many are unaware that the validation of university degrees is only required for professions that involve high social risk, such as medicine, or that are regulated by the state, such as architecture or law, for which all applicants must follow a process to validate their diplomas and have professional cards issued. This procedure requires an official certificate that must be obtained in Venezuela, and those who are already in Colombia face immense difficulties in securing this.

  There are also social and cultural factors that can affect the employment situation. Negative perceptions of the Venezuelan migrant population affect recruitment processes. Xenophobia and discrimination deepen in situations of insecurity, although there is no evidence of links between migration and increased crime.

  Lack of social capital – such as well-placed contacts and job references – is also a problem for migrants.

  Additional obstacles make it difficult for migrant workers to remain in the formal economy. For example, many banks refuse to open savings accounts for Venezuelan migrants. They not only require them to prove their regular migration status but also demand an up-to-date passport, which they usually don’t have. Similar challenges come with some health insurers, pension funds and occupational risk insurance companies.

  As a result, to earn an income many migrants are forced into precarious jobs and exploitative working conditions, including extremely long working hours, sub-minimum wages, mistreatment and changes in agreed working conditions. In 2019, the average monthly income of a Venezuelan migrant was less than the legal minimum wage, and the wage gap compared to Colombian nationals was more than 30 percentage points.

  What is Dejusticia doing to promote migrants’ rights?

  As a civil society organisation, we carry out research on migrants’ access to rights that we use to influence decision-making processes on migration policy and formulate public policy recommendations. In the research process leading to ourreport on the labour inclusion of Venezuelan migrants, for example, we organised an event to which we invited various stakeholders, including government agencies, to work on recommendations. Also, when anew government took office in August 2022, we produced a series of recommendations, in partnership with other organisations.

  We also develop strategic litigation and communications campaigns, and work with other organisations, both nationally, regionally and in other regions of the global south, to address the migration phenomenon from a broader perspective.

  What support from the international community do organisations defending the rights of migrants in Colombia need?

  It is important for the international community to shed visibility on and support the processes that are taking place in relation to the rights of Venezuelan migrants. But it is also very important that the support of the international community covers other migratory flows and takes into account the problems happening on the Colombia-Panama border, crossed by migrants of various nationalities trying to head towards the USA.

  It is also important for the international community to remind the Colombian government of the commitments it has made by ratifying treaties and adopting international standards on migration and refugees.

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  Civic space in Colombia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Dejusticia through itswebsite orFacebook page and follow@DeJusticia and@JessCorredorV on Twitter.

• COLOMBIA: “La carencia de estatus migratorio regular impone barreras de acceso a derechos”

  CIVICUS conversa con Jessica Corredor Villamil y Lina Arroyave sobre la situación de las personas migrantes y refugiadas venezolanas en Colombia. Jessica esdirectora y Lina es investigadora del área internacional de Dejusticia.

  Dejusticia es un centro de estudios jurídicos y sociales localizado en Bogotá, Colombia, y dedicado a promover los derechos humanos en Colombia y en el sur global. Promueve el cambio social a través de la investigación-acción, desarrollando propuestas de políticas públicas, campañas de incidencia y litigios estratégicos.

  ¿Cómo ha reformado Colombia su marco legal para acoger a la migración venezolana?

  Actualmente hay tres vías mediante las cuales las personas nacionales de Venezuela pueden obtener el estatus migratorio que les permite permanecer en Colombia por períodos prolongados: las visas, la solicitud de la condición de refugiado y el Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos(ETPMV). 

  Este último fue establecido en 2021 para atender la migración masiva procedente de Venezuela. Tiene dos grandes objetivos: identificar a la población migrante venezolana y regularizar su situación migratoria. Para esto prevé dos mecanismos. El primero es el Registro Único de Migrantes Venezolanos, que recoge los datos personales y socioeconómicos de quienes deciden registrarse y es administrado por Migración Colombia, la autoridad de vigilancia y control migratorio. El segundo es el Permiso por Protección Temporal, que autoriza a su portador a permanecer en Colombia por 10 años y le permite acceder a los sistemas de salud y seguridad social, educativo y financiero, convalidar títulos, trabajar y salir del país y reingresar.

  Pueden acogerse al ETPMV quienes se encuentren en Colombia de manera regular, quienes han solicitado refugio pero aún no han recibido respuesta, quienes ingresaron al país de manera irregular antes del 31 de enero de 2021, y quienes lo hicieron de manera regular desde finales de mayo de 2021 o lo hagan antes de finales de mayo de 2023. Luego de esa fecha, solo será una opción para niños, niñas y adolescentes.

  Aun así, el cumplir con todos los requisitos no es garantía de obtención del ETPMV, ya que su otorgamiento es facultad discrecional de Migración Colombia.

  ¿Cómo ha funcionado el ETPMV durante su primer año? 

  El proceso se hademorado más de lo previsto, lo cual impidió cumplir la meta del gobierno anterior de entregar 1.8 millones de documentos de identificación en 2022.

  Según datos de Migración Colombia, hasta noviembre de 2022 cerca de 2,5 millones de personas han ingresado sus datos en el Registro Único para Migrantes Venezolanos, y se han aprobado 1,6 millones de permisos.

  Esta brecha es preocupante porque la carencia de estatus migratorio regular impone barreras de acceso a derechos fundamentales y obstaculiza la integración socioeconómica de la población migrante.

  Además, muchas personas no se inscribieron en el registro por no haber podido regularizar su situación migratoria. El ETPMV solamente estaba disponible para las personas en situación irregular que hubieran ingresado a Colombia hasta el 31 de enero de 2021. Esta limitación temporal ignora el hecho de que la migración irregular continúa, en gran medida a causa de la imposibilidad de acceder a documentos oficiales en Venezuela. Se asume que la situación de irregularidad obedece a una decisión individual, cuando por lo general es el resultado de la imposibilidad de cumplir con los requisitos exigidos.

  ¿Qué barreras de integración enfrentan las personas migrantes venezolanas en Colombia?

  En un recienteinforme identificamos las múltiples barreras de acceso y permanencia en el mercado laboral formal, así como para el desarrollo de emprendimientos.

  La principal barrera legal es la carencia de estatus migratorio regular. Las miles de personas que continúan ingresando a Colombia por pasos fronterizos informales tienen vedado el acceso al ETPMV. Esto tiene impactos tanto para la formalización laboral como para el acceso a fondos de apoyo al emprendimiento, en particular estatales, pero también privados. La mayoría de los trabajadores migrantes independientes trabaja en el sector informal.

  El desconocimiento generalizado de la legislación migratoria por parte de los empleadores impone barreras adicionales. Por ejemplo, muchos desconocen que la convalidación de títulos universitarios solo es imprescindible para profesiones cuyo ejercicio implica altos riesgos sociales, como la medicina, o cuyo ejercicio es regulado por el Estado, como el derecho o la arquitectura, y exigen a todos los postulantes la realización del trámite de convalidación de títulos y expedición de tarjetas profesionales. Este trámite requiere de una apostilla que debe ser obtenida en Venezuela antes de migrar, y quienes ya se encuentran en Colombia enfrentan enormes dificultades para conseguirla.

  También existen factores sociales y culturales que pueden afectar la situación laboral. Las percepciones negativas de la población migrante venezolana afectan los procesos de selección de personal. La xenofobia y la discriminación se profundizan cuando ocurren hechos de inseguridad, pese a que no hay evidencia de vínculos entre el aumento de la criminalidad y el de la migración.

  La falta de capital social, es decir, de contactos bien posicionados y referencias laborales, también es un problema para las personas migrantes.

  Algunos obstáculos adicionales dificultan la permanencia en la economía formal. Por ejemplo, muchos bancos se niegan a abrir cuentas de ahorros a personas migrantes venezolanas ya que les exigen no solamente acreditar estatus migratorio regular sino también presentar su pasaporte actualizado, con el que habitualmente no cuentan. Algo similar ocurre con algunas aseguradoras de salud, fondos de pensiones y aseguradoras de riesgos de trabajo.

  De ahí que muchas personas migrantes con tal de conseguir algún ingreso acepten empleos precarios y se sometan a condiciones de explotación laboral que incluyen jornadas de trabajo extremadamente largas, salarios por debajo del mínimo, malos tratos y cambios en las condiciones laborales acordadas. En 2019, los ingresos mensuales promedio de una persona migrante venezolana fueron inferiores al salario mínimo legal vigente, y la brecha salarial frente a los nacionales colombianos fue de más de 30 puntos porcentuales.

  ¿Qué trabajo hace Dejusticia para promover los derechos de las personas migrantes? 

  En tanto que organización de la sociedad civil, hacemos investigaciones sobre el acceso a derechos de las personas migrantes para sobre esa base hacer incidencia en los procesos de toma de decisiones en materia de política migratoria y formular recomendaciones de política pública. En el proceso de investigación para nuestroinforme sobre la inclusión laboral de las y los migrantes venezolanos, por ejemplo, organizamos un evento al cual invitamos a los diferentes sectores involucrados, incluidas varias agencias gubernamentales, para trabajar en las recomendaciones. Asimismo, al iniciarse unnuevo gobierno en agosto de 2022 elaboramos un documento con recomendaciones, en alianza con otras organizaciones.

  También desarrollamos litigios estratégicos y campañas de comunicación, y trabajamos con otras organizaciones, a nivel tanto nacional como regional y de otras regiones del sur global, para abordar el fenómeno de las migraciones desde una mirada más amplia.

  ¿Qué apoyo de la comunidad internacional necesitan las organizaciones que defienden los derechos de las personas migrantes en Colombia?

  Es importante que la comunidad internacional dé visibilidad y apoye los procesos que se están dando en relación con los derechos de las personas migrantes venezolanas. Pero también es muy importante que el apoyo de la comunidad internacional abarque otros flujos migratorios y dé cuenta de la problemática en la frontera colombo-panameña, paso obligado para personas migrantes de distintas nacionalidades que quieren llegar a los Estados Unidos.

  También es importante que la comunidad internacional le recuerde al gobierno de Colombia los compromisos que ha adquirido a partir de la ratificación de tratados y la adopción de estándares internacionales en materia de migración y refugio.

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  El espacio cívico en Colombia es calificado como ‘represivo’ por elCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contáctese con Dejusticia a través de susitio web o su página deFacebook y siga a@DeJusticia y a@JessCorredorV en Twitter.

• EUROPE: ‘Governments are adopting measures that are beneficial for the climate but forget to include people’

  

  CIVICUS speaks with Karin Van Boxtel, Co Interim Director of Both ENDS, about the farmers’ protests happening across Europe.

  Both ENDS is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the Netherlands that works jointly with environmental groups in African, Asian and Latin American countries towards a sustainable, fair and inclusive world. It seeks to strengthen civil society globally so it can gain critical influence over decisions and activities that affect people’s rights and the environment.

  Why are farmers protesting in several European countries?

  First of all, it is essential to recognise the diversity within the farmers’ community, because they are not a homogeneous group. Some are frontrunners and champions of sustainability and others aspire to be but face systemic obstacles, including lack of access to funding and land, challenges posed by the trade system and competition from imports. And then there’s a smaller group of farmers who simply resist change, but their influence is huge. We should focus on supporting the first two groups – helping frontrunners maintain their status and facilitating the transition for those aspiring to be frontrunners.

  The reality for these farmers across Europe is similar to farmers globally: current policies do not adequately support them. Both ENDS works with pioneering civil society and farmer organisations that connect with other farmers to join their efforts on, for instance, agroecology and food forests. Policy efforts globally have historically centred on the third group of farmers, instead of the first two. This started to shift in recent years, but caused discontent and insecurity among farmers most resistant to change, as well as among companies invested in the current system.

  The existing system fails to reward the right behaviours and doesn’t offer any long-term security through a combination of misdirected finances and improper trade rules. In the EU these trade rules lead to competition from cheap imports coming from countries with lower production and labour standards. In African, Asian and Latin American countries, environmental damage is done with the production of fodder inputs or food for export to the EU. One example is the production of soy, which leads to deforestation and land rights violations in Brazil. This system has led to a rise in production costs in the EU while prices have remained stagnant or fallen, and environmental impacts elsewhere are not integrated in the prices.

  Farmers’ protests are therefore revealing a systemic problem. Farmers are battling a system that doesn’t provide the right incentives and doesn’t reward those who are pioneers in sustainability. They also feel they aren’t receiving the recognition they deserve.

  How are climate policies impacting on farmers?

  Farmers are being negatively affected because governments are adopting measures that are beneficial for the climate but forget to include people. A climate transition is not enough – what’s needed is a just climate transition. This means a just energy transition and, equally importantly, a just food transition.

  Achieving a just food transition requires an analysis of the food system on a global scale, because this is a system that operates globally. Take for instance the implementation of deforestation regulations, a key measure to combat climate change. In principle this is a commendable measure – however, it poses challenges for many farmers, particularly small-scale farmers in countries in Asia or Latin America. In these regions, only larger farmers can meet the requirements of deforestation laws, which reveals that this measure, while part of much-needed climate action, lacks justice.

  This is the core of the issue. When formulating trade policy or negotiating trade agreements, states tend to overlook the perspectives of the farmers who are not necessarily at the forefront of sustainable practices but aspire to be. This applies not only to the Netherlands and other European countries but also to Brazil or Indonesia, among many countries in the global south.

  When designing climate measures, it is crucial to listen to and consider the needs of frontrunner and aspiring frontrunner farmers. This is different from prioritising the interests of agricultural giants, such as companies producing animal feed or those engaged in trading agricultural products.

  How is the far right politicising these tensions, and with what results?

  The far right is exploiting farmers’ perceptions of current climate measures as unjust. It is capitalising on the gaps in solutions identified by civil society, transition thinkers and frontrunner farmers all over the world.

  We realise many climate measures are having unfair effects. The challenge lies in ensuring that money financing the climate transition reaches farmers, particularly frontrunners, rather than the same companies that have so greatly contributed to the problems those measures are trying to address.

  A key element of the far right’s appeal is that they offer false hope to those who are reluctant to transition and reject any change. They offer simplistic solutions that don’t address the issue at its root, and are therefore not real solutions.

  What’s civil society’s position?

  Regarding the protests, civil society’s standpoint has been that peaceful protests should be allowed. The context is of growing criminalisation, particularly in countries where the far right is in the government. This is not unique to Europe but is a global concern. In some countries governments tend to tolerate agricultural protests more due to the economic significance of agriculture and its impact on food security, but overall, civic freedoms are increasingly under threat, with protesters –particularly climate protesters – facing detention or restrictions.

  As for the substance of the issue, civil society believes that a real solution requires a power shift, a systemic change in the trade and financial systems. This idea unites farmers’ organisations currently protesting in Europe and worldwide. Notably, despite apparent differences in viewpoints, in the Netherlands Extinction Rebellion supported farmers’ protests. This is because they also recognise the need for a structural power shift.

  It's worth noting the ongoing collaboration between CSOs and partner organisations, both locally and globally. Last year in the Netherlands, civil society joined forces with CSOs globally, Dutch farmer organisations, academics and private sector to address the Dutch agricultural agreement under negotiation. It raised concerns about its impact on farmers and communities in the global south and called for an agreement that both benefits Dutch farmers and considers the perspectives of farmers globally. The manifesto highlighted the need to change the trade system, fostering the regionalisation of food systems, prioritising farmers over companies and ensuring funds reach frontrunners. This collaborative effort is a strategy to bring about systemic change.

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  Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Both ENDS through itswebsite or Facebook page, and follow it onTwitter andInstagram.

• GLOBAL CAMPAIGN: ‘The future of work requires a shift away from a focus on time’

  CIVICUS speaks about the proposal for a four-day working week with Hazel Gavigan, Global Campaigns and Activation Officer of 4 Day Week Global.

  4 Day Week Global is a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for a move towards a four-day working week to improve both workplace productivity and the wellbeing of employees.

  How would the proposed four-day week work, and why do you advocate for it?

  At 4 Day Week Global, it’s our ambition to make a four-day week the new default and reduced working time the new standard. The four-day week that we advocate for is very much a flexible model, not a rigid, ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ and is based on the general principle of the 100:80:100™ model – 100 per cent of the pay, for 80 per cent of the time and, crucially, in exchange for 100 per cent of the productivity or output.

  The disruption to societal and workplace norms by the COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the potential for very different models of work, for both workers and employers, and reinforced the need to rethink old, established patterns. We believe the future of work requires a shift away from a focus on time, as this is not an effective way to measure people’s contributions at work. Instead, we need to focus on measuring and rewarding collective outputs.

  The four-day week we are campaigning for has countless cross-society benefits in terms of gender equality, sustainability and general improvements to health and happiness. Where implemented, it allows for better distribution of caring responsibilities, as reduced working time enables men to carry out a greater portion of labour within the home. This, in turn, helps remove barriers to women achieving senior positions in work, taking on leadership roles and pursuing training opportunities.

  Research also suggests that moving to a four-day week will reduce carbon emissions by around a fifth, by cutting back on commuting time and energy use in buildings. In her recent TED talk, one of our research partners, Professor Juliet Schor, also makes the point that when people are time-stressed, they tend to choose faster and more polluting modes of travel and daily life activities. Whereas when we get time rather than money, we tend to have a lower carbon footprint.

  And crucially, with an extra free day in the week, workers report feeling happier and less stressed and are more productive. This alone is an excellent outcome, but it also has a positive impact on businesses. Employers find that productivity is maintained, or in some cases, increased and they also have less costs associated with employee sick leave due to stress and burnout, and recruitment and retraining, as workers are satisfied in their jobs and less likely to leave for elsewhere.

  How are you advocating for the four-day week?

  Previously, we established national campaigns to generate interest and conversation in a country and then built on that to run a pilot programme there. However, the pandemic has turbocharged an organic momentum and now our pilot programme is the main driver of the campaign.

  Up to now, most case studies on the four-day work week were conducted at an individual company level, with a few exceptions, such as Iceland. The purpose of our pilot programmes is to demonstrate that the positive outcomes achieved by individual businesses we’ve observed can be replicated on a much broader scale in a variety of countries and industries.

  If we can prove the positive impact of reduced-hour, productivity-focused working on business outcomes, employee wellbeing and society in general, those results will be the driver of change that will get more and more big corporations and governments interested.

  So currently, the data and evidence our pilots produce is central to our approach in influencing the policy agenda.

  4 Day Week Global is currently running coordinated six-month trials of the four-day working week in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the USA, with numerous others planned in the coming months.

  As part of this, we have developed a package of support for employers who agree to participate in the pilot, which provides those organisations with access to the expertise, tools and resources they need to run a smooth and successful trial.

  We offer a specialised training programme, designed and delivered by companies who already operate a four-day week. Companies receive mentorship and advice from a panel of experts and business leaders from around the world. There are networking opportunities with other companies participating in the trial and participants get access to world-class academic research and expert analysis.

  Leading scholars work with each participating company to define and establish their research baseline and relevant productivity metrics for the trial. The economic, social and ecological impact of the four-day week is also monitored throughout, assessing productivity, employee wellbeing and gender and environmental impacts, both through direct carbon emissions and indirect behavioural changes. Ultimately, the key to success is recognising that time invested in work actually matters less than the results produced.

  We also have hundreds of advocates who volunteer to help grow the movement, offering everything from starting a national campaign for a four-day week in their own country to simply sharing some content on social media. It’s through this network that we can sustain and expand our level of growth, so if anyone reading this article would like to join the cause, they can sign up here.

  How did you win support for the four-day work week trial currently happening in the UK? What do you hope to get out of it?

  There’s a 4 Day Week Campaign in the UK which has been active for a number of years and quite high profile in terms of commissioning research and engaging in debate in the public square. So that definitely played a role in priming the audience and generating interest and support for the trial that recently launched.

  This is also an idea whose time has come and the support seen for the four-day week in the UK is largely down to an exponential growth in the conversation about how we work.

  Business leaders are drawn to this for recruitment and competition purposes in the midst of the ‘great resignation’ – a time when many people are looking to switch jobs. Managers are more open-minded because they were forced to trust their workers during the pandemic and figure out how to measure actual output as opposed to how long employees were spending in the office. And workers now see that a four-day week is possible in a way that they previously didn’t.

  What kind of challenges have you faced?

  The biggest challenge is convincing business leaders that the four-day week can work for them. Many people like the concept but argue that it wouldn’t be possible in their organisation. However, almost all companies that move to a four-day week do three big things: radically shorten and reform meetings, use technology more thoughtfully and mindfully, and redesign the workday to build in distinct periods for focused work, meetings and social time.

  Studies show that the average worker loses between two and three hours each day to useless meetings, poor technology implementation and just plain old distraction. So, the four-day week is actually already here; we just can’t see it because it’s buried underneath these old and thoughtless practices.

  Sometimes when companies do commit to trialling a four-day week, they overthink it in the preparatory phase and try to come up with a solution to every potential problem, which is of course impossible. So, our advice in that situation is to trust your workers to solve issues as they arise. That’s what a trial is all about.

  Are you receiving support from other CSOs?

  Yes, we are. One good example of this is the 4 Day Week Ireland campaign, where a coalition of trade unions, businesses, environmentalists, women’s rights groups, other CSOs, academics and health practitioners all joined forces with 4 Day Week Global to start a national conversation about the widespread benefits of reduced-hour, productivity-focused working.

  The results of this saw widespread media coverage on the issue which, in turn, primed the public for the launch of the Irish four-day week pilot programme, which got underway earlier this year. The coalition was also afforded the opportunity to present to key political stakeholders in an enterprise, trade and employment context, the outcome of which resulted in a government-sponsored research tender seeking to better understand the social, economic and environmental implications of reduced working time.

  We’ve had great success up to this point with the rollout of our international pilot programmes. However, in order to secure widespread change, there are four areas which feed into the overall success of the movement: labour market competition, public demand, collective bargaining and government intervention. All four of these players have different degrees of influence depending on the sector, but we need collaboration from all parties if we’re to see a broad implementation of the shorter working week.

  Get in touch with 4 Day Week Global through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@4dayweek_global on Twitter.

• GLOBAL: ‘With a wealth tax on the biggest fortunes, extreme poverty can be eradicated’

  CIVICUS speaks about climate change, global inequality and the need for redistribution with Adrien Fabre, a France-based climate economistand founder of Global Redistribution Advocates (GRA).

  GRA is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes public debate about three global redistribution policies that enjoy wide public opinion support worldwide – a global wealth tax, a global climate plan and a global climate assembly – and advocates towards political parties in several countries to incorporate these into their agendas and programmes.

  What inspired you to become a climate economist and found GRA?

  I started my PhD in economics with the goal of understanding humanity’s problems and proposing solutions. I always wanted to give voice to every human, so I naturally specialised in running surveys. Then, in the context of the Yellow Vests protests that began in 2018, I surveyed French people about their attitudes towards climate policies. This sparked interest at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which called on me to conduct a similar survey in other countries. I seized the opportunity to ask people questions they had never been asked before, such as whether they supported a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries. I was amazed by the levels of support: more than 70 per cent in every country!

  I ran complementary surveys in Europe and the USA. I tried asking questions differently and tested policies in which the respondents would lose money, but the results were the same: people in western countries were willing to lose a few dozen euros per month to end climate change and global poverty. Furthermore, the support is sincere: you can read this scientific article or my Twitter thread for details.

  Now, if there is such strong support for global redistribution, why doesn’t anyone propose it or defend it in public debate? To advocate for global redistributive policies to transfer resources or power from high to low-income countries I launched GRA in April 2023.

  What are your proposals?

  We have three main proposals to promote wealth redistribution, environmental sustainability and global cooperation to address pressing global challenges. The first is a global wealth tax on individual wealth exceeding US$5 million, with half of the tax proceeds distributed to lower-income countries.

  This tax would spare 99.9 per cent of the world’s population, who have wealth below US$5 million. And if the tax were just two per cent, it would collect one per cent of the world’s GDP, which is more than the GDP of all low-income countries, home to 700 million people, combined. Our proposed tax schedule is moderate: two per cent for fortunes above US$5 million, six per cent for those above US$100 million and 10 per cent for those above US$1 billion. A tax of two per cent is far lower than the interests, rents and dividends such a fortune generates.

  Our second proposal is a global climate plan aimed at combatting climate change through a worldwide carbon emissions cap, implemented by a system of global emissions trading, and financing a global basic income.

  This plan would enter into force as soon as signatory countries cover 60 per cent of global carbon emissions. Participating countries would enforce a cap on carbon emissions, decreasing each year and down to net zero emissions after three decades, in line with the temperature target. Each year, emissions permits would be auctioned to firms that extract fossil fuels or import them from non-participating countries, making polluters pay. To cover the cost of emissions permits, firms would increase fossil fuel prices, which would in turn encourage individuals and businesses to change their equipment or adjust their habits, eventually reducing carbon emissions. The revenues from carbon pricing would fund a global basic income estimated at US$50 per month for each person over 15.

  This plan would bring a massive redistribution from countries with a carbon footprint higher than the global average – like OECD countries – to those with a lower-than-average carbon footprint, including most of Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Latin America. It includes mechanisms to encourage participation by all countries, such as a tariff on goods imported from non-participating countries in proportion to their carbon content, a provision allowing middle-income countries such as China to opt out from the mutualisation of revenues to guarantee that it would not lose from the plan while ensuring that it decarbonises with the same carbon price, and a provision facilitating the participation of subnational entities like California or the state of New York even if the federal level does not participate.

  The wealth tax and the climate plan would each redistribute one per cent of the world’s GDP from high to low-income countries every year. Extreme poverty can be eradicated. The average income in a country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo would double following the transfers.

  Our third proposition is that of a global climate assembly, comprised of representatives elected through proportional representation in participating nations, tasked with drafting a comprehensive treaty to address climate change globally. Before even the beginning of that experiment in democratic governance at the global scale, the assembly would bring a radical change, as the election campaign would foster a global public debate on climate justice.

  Please check our website for details: each policy has its own advocacy campaign, with a fully-fledged policy proposal, a petition and a video.

  Who are you targeting these proposals at, and how are you working to get the message across?

  We are targeting our campaigns at policymakers, scholars, civil society and lay people. Many scholars have endorsed our proposals. GRA is a member of civil society networks in each of our policy domains, and we are hoping that key CSOs will endorse our proposals. We have already met with cabinet members of various governments, including Brazil, Colombia, France, Germany and South Africa, as well as many European Union (EU) politicians. And we are sending dozens of emails every day to get more meetings. Once we get a book on our climate plan and the scientific article finished and published, we will reach out to the public. We will publish an open letter in widely read newspapers, calling on world leaders to discuss global redistributive policies at the United Nations (UN), the G20 and climate summits.

  Hopefully, we will get media attention and the movement will grow. It will help if well-known personalities, including celebrities, endorse our proposals. But it will take a social movement to make change happen, perhaps a global demonstration. Our hope is that a large coalition of political parties, CSOs and labour unions throughout the world endorse some common policies towards a sustainable and fair future – ours, or similar ones. This will likely strengthen the parties of the coalition and help them win elections. Our research shows that progressive candidates would gain votes if they endorsed global redistributive policies.

  What are the prospects of these proposals being implemented in the near future?

  Our proposals are getting more and more endorsements every day. The African Union just called for a global carbon price and will defend this idea in international negotiations.

  But our proposal that receives the largest support is the global wealth tax. The next European Parliament elections will be held in June 2024, and left-wing parties will campaign on a European wealth tax. We have proposed that one-third of this European wealth tax would be allocated to lower-income countries outside Europe, and there are good chances that some parties will take this forward. A petition in favour of a wealth tax has recently been signed by 130 members of the European Parliament, and politicians from all parties on the left and centre endorse our proposal. However, a majority in the European Parliament would not suffice, as this proposal would require unanimity at the Council of the EU, that is, the approval of each EU government.

  However, three things can help. First, Brazil will chair the G20 in 2024, and we hope that President Lula, along with other leaders, will put pressure on global north states for global redistribution. Second, it would help if US President Joe Biden included wealth taxes on the agenda of his re-election campaign. Third, the campaign for the 2024 European Parliament elections could create momentum for some countries to move forward, even if the EU does not.

  I am optimistic that wealth taxes will be implemented – perhaps not in 2024, but within the next decade. However, I fear negotiations might end up being overseen by the OECD, resulting in a disappointing agreement, as happened on international corporate taxation. Negotiations on international taxation must be hosted by the UN, not the OECD. And regarding the content of the negotiations, we should be vigilant of three elements: the exemption threshold, which should not exceed US$5 million; the tax rates, which should be progressive and not too low; and the distribution of revenues, a substantial part of which must go to low-income countries.

  Civil society mobilisation will be key to promoting the global wealth tax, making it a central campaign issue and turning it into effective international policy. You can help by signing our petitions, donating, or volunteering for GRA. GRA is also hiring, so feel free to contact us!

  What are your hopes and expectations regarding the upcoming COP28 climate summit?

  COPs sometimes bring good surprises. Last year, high-income countries finally accepted the principle of a fund to compensate vulnerable countries for the loss and damage from climate change, after 30 years of demands from the developing world.

  But I don’t expect any good news this year, as the upcoming COP28 in Dubai is chaired by the CEO of the United Arab Emirates’ state oil company. More generally, I do not expect much from COPs because its decisions are made by consensus, so countries like Saudi Arabia can block any meaningful proposal. This is what led to the current system of nationally determined contributions: while all countries supposedly share the common goal of limiting global warming to ‘well below 2°C’, there are no binding commitments, no harmonised policies, no agreement on burden-sharing, and the sum of countries’ voluntary pledges is inconsistent with the common goal.

  To break the deadlock, states with ambitious climate goals should start negotiations in parallel with the UN framework. I think the EU and China should start bilateral negotiations. If they put forward something like the global climate plan that we propose, countries that would benefit from it would surely accept it, and more than 60 per cent of global emissions would be covered. This would put enormous pressure on other countries to join, and particularly other OECD countries such as the USA.

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  Get in touch with Global Redistribution Advocates through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@GlobalRedistrib and@adrien_fabre on Twitter.

• HORN OF AFRICA: ‘De-escalation must be the primary objective’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mengistu Assefa, Program Manager at the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), about a port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the possibility of it escalating into an armed conflict with Somalia.

  CARD is an Ethiopian civil society organisation that advocates for democracy and human rights through citizen empowerment.

  What’s the relevance of the recent port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland?

  Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked nation, placed in a challenging position for international trade. Since then, Djibouti has emerged as its primary access point to the sea, handling over 95 per cent of its trade volume. This dependence comes at a cost, with Ethiopia paying more than US$1 billion annually in fees to Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure. With its estimated population of 126 million, the second largest in Africa, Ethiopia views sea access as critical for its economic, political and demographic future.

  To achieve this, on 1 January 2024 the Ethiopian federal government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on commercial port access with Somaliland, a self-proclaimed autonomous territory that is internationally recognised as part of Somalia.

  While this MoU is not a legally binding agreement, it carries significant implications for the region because it walks a tightrope between cooperation and recognition. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a potential step towards international recognition of its de facto autonomy. Although the agreement’s full details remain undisclosed, it also reportedly grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast, potentially including a military base. Ethiopian authorities have not been explicit about Somaliland’s recognition, saying the MoU allows for an ‘in-depth assessment’ of Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

  Somalia vehemently rejects the MoU, viewing it as a violation of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. It is actively mobilising diplomatic pressure against the deal. Somali president Hassan Sheik Mohamed has visited Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-standing competitors, seeking support. Additionally, the Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has denounced the MoU. Egypt’s leader, already locked in negotiations with Ethiopia over a Nile dam project, has assured Somalia of potential support if requested, further escalating regional tensions.

  What’s the political status of Somaliland?

  Somaliland, with an estimated population of five million, broke away from Somalia and declared its independence in 1991 after 30 years of civil war. It fought for its independence based on the argument that it had a distinct historical heritage. Somaliland was a UK protectorate, while Somalia was under Italian control. For Somalilanders, this is enough argument to prove they are different territories. Moreover, in June 1960 Somaliland was briefly recognised as an independent state by around 35 nations for a span of five days, before it relinquished its sovereignty to reunite with the Somali Republic.

  Somaliland declared its independence more than three decades ago but Somalia has never recognised it. Neither has any international organisation. Even so, Somaliland has managed to become a stable, functional state. It established its own army and democratic institutions and has held six elections with peaceful transitions of power.

  In late 2022 and early 2023, a local armed movement, the Dhulbahante militias, rose against Somaliland’s government, declaring its intention to rejoin Somalia. This uprising posed significant political and security challenges to the Somaliland government, partly contributing to the postponement of 2023 elections. It cast a shadow of instability over Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, which hinges on its ability to demonstrate long-term stability and democratic institutions.

  Could the port deal lead to international recognition of Somaliland’s independence?

  Somaliland has made clear that a binding legal agreement could only be signed once it is officially recognised as an independent nation state. But the Ethiopian side of the story is quite different. Ethiopia hasn’t ruled out the possibility of that happening but hasn’t explicitly said it would take a stance on the recognition of Somaliland. The signing of a binding legal international agreement with Somaliland would however result in Ethiopia’s de facto recognition of its independence.

  Looking at the bigger picture, this deal could affect the regional security architecture, particularly when it comes to fighting Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group based in Somalia and allied with Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is perceived as a global security threat and has explicitly targeted Ethiopia. Consequently, Ethiopia is engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia alongside the Somali army. If Ethiopia recognises Somaliland, Somalia will likely force Ethiopia to pull out its troops. However, as Somalia cannot take charge of its security on its own, Ethiopia could use it as leverage to force Somalia to back down from a strong reaction.

  Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland carries significant implications. Located in a strategically crucial area along the Gulf of Eden, where Houthis and pirates constantly attack international ships, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline attracts interest from various countries seeking a potential military base. Ethiopia’s explicit recognition of Somaliland could trigger a domino effect, with other countries following suit, although recognition would likely face significant hurdles at the African Union (AU).

  The AU adheres to the principle of respecting colonial borders and has expressed concerns about setting a precedent for secessionist movements in other African states, including Morocco and Nigeria. Ethiopia will likely weigh this carefully before explicitly recognising Somaliland’s independence. However, the rapidly shifting landscape of international interests suggests that it’s not an impossibility. This possibility is further amplified by the growing involvement of great and emerging powers in the Red Sea region, driven by economic and security interests.

  Could tensions escalate into a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia?

  Ethiopia and Somalia have had difficult relations in the past. In 1964, they clashed in a three-month border conflict. This initial skirmish foreshadowed a larger and bloodier conflict that erupted between 1977 and 1978. During this period, Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the intent of annexing the Ogaden region, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The conflict quickly became a proxy war for the contenders of the Cold War, with the western bloc supporting Somalia and the Soviet Union backing Ethiopia. Ultimately, Ethiopia repelled the Somali army.

  In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group aiming to unite all Somalis across Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland under Islamic rule, gained control of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. This development raised concerns in Ethiopia, which perceived it as a threat to its national security and regional stability. Supported by the USA in the context of the ‘war on terror’, Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia and removed the ICU from power.

  Several years later, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a bilateral agreement aimed at stabilising the region. This agreement facilitated the deployment of Ethiopian security forces to assist the Somali National Army in its fight against Al-Shabaab and support the ongoing Somali transition process. It’s important to note that these Ethiopian troops are currently integrated into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, a peacekeeping mission.

  Since October 2023, Ethiopia has declared its intention to gain access to the sea by peaceful means. In exchange for access Ethiopia has offered Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia land-swaps and stakes in a successful state-owned business such as Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s biggest and most successful airline, and even in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. But none of these countries accepted Ethiopia’s offer, leaving Somaliland as a seemingly more amenable option.

  Somalia viewed Ethiopia’s signing of the port deal with Somaliland as betrayal. It reacted strongly and aggressively because it considers it an encroachment on its territory and an act against its sovereignty.

  Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence could open a Pandora’s box. In fear that it could lead to regional and global recognition, Somalia said that if Ethiopia moved forward in implementing the agreement, consequences would follow.

  This all brings us to the final and crucial point: where will this take the region? While the possibility of conflict cannot be entirely dismissed, it’s important to consider various factors and perspectives to assess its likelihood.

  First, military capabilities and intentions play a role. While Somalia’s military power is not comparable to Ethiopia’s, the potential for escalation and regional instability cannot be ignored. Additionally, Ethiopia’s stated commitment to peaceful resolutions needs to be weighed against its historical engagements and potential strategic calculations.

  Second, the international community’s role matters. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region are already grappling with complex conflicts and any further instability would have significant repercussions. International pressure and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and promote dialogue will be crucial in preventing conflict.

  Further, Somalia’s response to the MoU adds another layer of complexity. Its seeking of support from Ethiopia’s historical competitors, such as Egypt and Eritrea, as well as regional entities such as the Arab League, could potentially lead to increased diplomatic pressure against Ethiopia. This, in turn, could further strain relations between the two countries for the foreseeable future.

  Finally, the MoU is likely to ignite discussions about the status of Somaliland, both within the AU and at the United Nations Security Council.

  What should the international community do to address this potential crisis?

  The international community plays a crucial role in navigating the complex situation surrounding Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access and its MoU with Somaliland. It is essential to engage with all stakeholders, particularly the Somali government and Somaliland’s authorities. It should be a top priority to facilitate negotiations to find a lasting solution that ensures both peaceful coexistence and normalised relations, as people in the Horn of Africa are ultimately bearing the brunt of this disagreement.

  Regardless of the outcome, be it Somaliland’s reunification with Somalia or its international recognition as a separate state, the two countries must establish a mutually agreeable arrangement for peaceful coexistence. The international community can play the role of facilitating a genuine conversation between the two. This is of course easier said than done, given the historical complexities of their relationship and the vested interests of various states and organisations, including western nations and other international players, who prioritise their security and economic interests in the region.

  International involvement should also aim to support Ethiopia and Somalia in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. This requires careful diplomacy to avoid exacerbating existing tensions or creating new problems. It’s also essential to urge those with vested interests in the region to avoid exploiting this situation for their agendas. De-escalation must be the primary objective.

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  Civic space in bothEthiopia andSomalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CARD through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CARDEthiopia and@mengistu_dadi on Twitter.

• INDONESIA: ‘Communities have the right to have their opinions heard and considered’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent protests triggered by rising fuel prices in Indonesia with Kahar S Cahyono, vice president of communications of Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia (KSPI), a trade union organisation that promotes social justice and the welfare of workers.

  What triggered recent protests in Indonesia?

  Workers’ protests were triggered by several government policies deemed to be detrimental for workers. The most recent was the increase in fuel prices, which lead to the increase of prices of basic necessities.

  Previously, to determine the minimum wage for 2022, the government had used the regulations of a very problematic law, the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. As a result, the wage increase was at the minimum level. For workers in many areas there was no increase at all. The national average wage rise was roughly one per cent, while the inflation rate in September 2022 reached almost six per cent. In other words, wage increases could not accommodate the sudden increase of prices. The situation worsened due to the increase in fuel prices.

  In this context, the government announced it would continue to use the same mechanism provided by the Omnibus Law on Job Creation to calculate the wage increase for 2023. On top of that, the government recognised that in 2023 there will be a global recession. When this happens, workers will likely be the main victims, not least because there will be massive layoffs.

  In sum, the purchasing power of workers’ salaries, which already declined because the wage increase has been lower than inflation, will plunge further due to the fuel price rise. The situation will worsen even more because next year’s wage increase will also be the minimum, and will also likely be overcome by inflation. On top of all this, workers will also be haunted by the fear of losing their jobs due to a global recession. 

  What are your demands, and what tactics are you employing to put them forward?

  KSPI has made four demands: cancellation of the increase in the fuel price, repeal of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, a 13 per cent increase in the minimum wage for 2023 and measures to avoid job losses in a context of global recession.

  On top of these four, KSPI has conveyed two additional demands: the implementation of agrarian reform and the adoption of the draft Law on the Protection of Domestic Workers.

  Agrarian reform is important to achieve food sovereignty. If Indonesia is able to satisfy its food demand without depending on imported goods, it could avoid the worst impacts of a global recession. The draft Law on the Protection of Domestic Workers is key because domestic workers are typically employed in the informal sector and lack any protection.

  KSPI employs a ‘CLAP’ strategy, which stands for concept, lobby, action and politics. Concept refers to developing thought and arguments regarding the issues, through discussion, seminars and other exchanges. Lobbying refers to conducting meetings with relevant officials to convey our position on each issue.

  Action is conducted both through litigation – for example, we submitted a petition for judicial review to the Constitutional Court on the Law on Job Creation, as well as a petition to the Administrative Court on the determination of the minimum wage – and peaceful protest at both local and national levels – for instance, by demonstrating outside parliament or the office of the mayor or governor.

  Finally, politics refers to campaigning so that people will not vote for a political party that supports measures that hurt workers, such as the Omnibus Law or the increase in fuel prices. This is in addition to establishing a political party representing workers, that is, the Labour Party as a tool for class struggle.

  KSPI uses all these tactics jointly with organisations of farmers, fishers, young people, students, women, people living in urban poverty and academics.

  Have protesters experienced any human rights violations?

  Major human rights violations were recorded during theprotests against the Omnibus Law on Job Creation in 2020. An investigation byAmnesty International Indonesia documented at least 402 victims of police violence in 15 provinces and at least 6,658 individuals arrested in 21 provinces. People who protested online were also intimidated. Between 7 and 20 October 2020, at least 18 people in seven provinces were criminalised for allegedly violating the Information and Electronic Transactions Law. 

  As for workers, when KSPI urged a nationwide strike against the Omnibus Law, security force officers came to several factories, even entering production areas, to prevent workers joining the protest. Buses rented by workers to join the protest in Jakarta were suddenly cancelled for no reason, possibly as a result of intimidation or prohibition.

  Rather than with repression, the government should respond to labour action by implementing mechanisms for meaningful participation, enacting the right of the community to have their opinions heard and considered and to receive reasoned responses to the opinions provided.

  How did KSPI react to the football stadium disaster on 1 October?

  More than 130 people died and more than 300 were injured on 1 October as a result of the violence that erupted at Kanjuruhan stadium in Malang during an Indonesian league soccer match when supporters from the losing team invaded the pitch and police fired teargas, provoking a stampede. 

  When this happened, we conveyed our deepest condolences to the victims’ families and to those who were injured. We also examined the facts and concluded there were procedural failures in handling the crowd, and condemned the unprofessional behaviour that led to the tragedy.

  KSPI published a media release with a series of calls. First, we urged the head of Indonesian Police to strip the police head of Malang from his position due to his failure to police the incident adequately.

  Second, we called for this case to be handled by the Indonesian Police Headquarters so that it is thoroughly investigated and those found responsible are punished through either criminal or administrative proceedings, according to laws and regulations.

  Third, we urged the Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI) to suspend league matches until after the conclusion of the investigation of the tragedy. The PSSI should also ensure this won’t happen again by tightening its security protocol for football matches.

  Fourth, we urged the public to raise the Indonesian flag at half-mast in their homes as a symbol to express condolences. And finally, we urged society to promote a healthier, more peaceful sports culture.

  At KSPI we thought it was important for us to convey our position on this issue, not only because many football supporters are also workers, but also because we realise that the use of excessive force by the security forces is very easily directed against workers. Security forces also often use teargas to dissolve workers’ protests. We hope incidents such as this will not be repeated either inside or outside stadiums, in any mass protest attended by thousands of people.

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  Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagrampages.

• KENYA: ‘People are discouraged from voting when they think that voices do not matter’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in Kenya with Ken Ogembo, programme manager of Siasa Place.

  Siasa Place is a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2015 with the aim of promoting youth participation in politics. It educates people about the importance of voting and how the government can be held accountable.

  Did you observe an increase in civic space restrictions around the 9 August election?

  We observed several civic space restrictions during the election. The media did not provide fair coverage to all candidates, and the most popular candidates had a clear advantage because everything they did was widely covered and they got a lot of propaganda. Media are powerful tools that can be used to influence the views of people and in this case were used to promote some parties and bring down others. Social media was also used to spread misinformation that influenced many people’s voting decisions.

  Further, there was violence in some counties, which we believe was organised to spark fear. As a result, people no longer felt comfortable attending campaigns for some candidates because of fear they could be attacked. 

  There were also cases of candidates being attacked. Some female politicians were attacked and assaulted; unfortunately not much was done to protect them or follow up on their cases. William Ruto, announced as the winner of the election, was also attacked in Kisumu. His vehicles were destroyed but fortunately he was not hurt. 

  There was also a situation in Kakamega county between the two main coalitions, Kenya Kwanza and Azimio la Umoja: they were fighting over access to a stadium and a number of people got hurt in the process.

  However, I do not believe violence was serious or widespread to the point that we could say it was what marked the electoral process.

  Why was there such low voter turnout?

  There are a number of factors that could have possibly contributed to it, but I think it is first and foremost about people being demotivated from voting because they do not see any change happening as a result of elections. Government corruption is pervasive no matter who is in the government, and economic performance is consistently poor. Public services are of very low quality: there are not enough healthcare facilities, doctors are often going on strike, markets are dirty. Youth unemployment continues to be very high, and most people don’t think this will change, so many do not see any reason for voting.

  We also need to look at how candidates are nominated. Presidential candidate Raila Odinga’s party, Azimio la Umoja, did not conduct democratic internal processes in most of its strongholds and often nominated people who had long been in power and had performed dismally. People are discouraged from voting when they think their voices do not matter.

  I would also say it is also ignorance that drives young people away from the polls. They should understand that regardless of whether they get out to vote, a government will get elected and will rule over them. The fact that they did not vote takes away their moral authority to question those in power. Of course they still have a constitutional right to do so, but their questioning will lack substance and they will not have any alternative to offer.

  Through our engagement with young people, we have noticed they lack confidence in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IBEC), the institution that manages elections, which many consider unable to deliver free and fair elections. They view it as pointless to go out and vote if the IBEC can’t ensure their votes will count.

  This is probably a mistake, because there have been improvements in the electoral process, including by making it clear that the results received from voting stations are final. However, the IBEC still has a lot of work to do make people trust the electoral process.

  Finally, I think the government played a huge role by not providing any civic education. It only started doing the basics when it was already too late, as most people who didn’t vote had already made up their minds not to. And when the government did, the content was not of the right kind, in the sense that would make people understand why voting is important and how to play their role as citizens.

  Has civil society been able to play its role in the electoral process?

  Civil society’s role has been somewhat restricted. Many CSOs would need more support and resources to play their full range of roles during elections. During this election we saw many CSOs unable to provide civic education programmes because of lack of funding and government support.

  Our job as civil society is to advocate on people’s behalf, inform them about the process and raise awareness of their rights. But most of us were denied the right to do our work due to lack of resources. My organisation, Siasa Place, played a key role in the previous election because it received the required resources in time. But this year the support we needed came about two months before the elections, which is rather late for us to start doing our work at the community level. This affected our role, but we hope things will improve in the coming years. We need government and civil society to work together to inform people around elections so they know what they are doing.

  There were also cases of CSOs being instrumentalised by political parties to influence voters. That defeats the whole purpose of having an active civil society. We urge the concerned CSOs to remember their original goals and mission and refocus on them. We should be the voice of marginalised people and communities, not of political parties. It is our duty to hold political parties accountable, not root for them at elections.

  Given the very close result, do you think there could be a recount or even an election re-run?

  If the defeated candidate can convince the court that there have been irregularities so gross that they have affected the outcome, then the court could nullify the results. But if votes are recounted and the result comes out the same, there won’t be a need for a rerun.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Siasa Place through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@siasaplace on Twitter. 

• LEBANON: ‘The main culprits of the current crisis are bank owners and their greed for profit’

  CIVICUS speaks about Lebanon’s ongoing financial crisis and the situation of depositors who are unable to access their savings with Alaa Khorchid, head of Depositors’ Outcry Association. 

  Depositors’ Outcry Association is a citizens’ group that formed in 2019 to support depositors’ attempts to withdraw their savings from Lebanese banks after their accounts were frozen in response to the financial crisis.

  Who is to blame for the situation Lebanese depositors are currently in?

  Lebanese depositors are desperate because their savings have been frozen, so they cannot withdraw them from banks. The way they are being mistreated is outrageous. If a depositor simply complains loudly, bank staff call the police on them. Even if they have a million dollars in the bank, depositors are unable to get medical treatment or pay for their kids’ university fees. Banks are only allowing them to withdraw US$140 a month, and are told if they have an issue with that limit, they can go ahead and file a lawsuit.

  The main culprits of the current crisis are bank owners, whose greed for profit got us to this point. What they did was a scam. They sent representatives abroad to convince Lebanese expatriates and foreigners to invest their money in Lebanese banks even though they knew we were heading into a crisis, while they smuggled their own money to France, the USA or the Gulf countries, where their investments amount to billions.

  Also responsible are state authorities, starting with Riad Salameh, governor of the Banque du Liban (BdL), Lebanon’s central bank. He should have regulated banks and held them accountable three years ago, but he didn’t.

  The government is responsible for not applying the laws on banks owners. They should have forced them to return depositors’ money out of their own pockets, but instead allowed them to smuggle their money abroad.

  The courts also have their share of responsibility, as they have thousands of cases pending, years after they’ve been filed. When cases filed by depositors in Lebanon reach a certain point they are shelved, while in France and the UK depositors managed to win their cases and get their money back.

  How have people organised to get their money back?

  People got together to fight collectively through organisations such asDepositors’ Outcry Association, which formed in 2019. Asan association, we have filed lawsuits against the BdL governor as well as the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL) and one bank, the Société Générale de Banque au Liban (SGBL), that smuggled US$1.2 billion out of the country. All these lawsuits have been pending for years because most of the judiciary has been bribed by the banks. 

  We also support depositors by mediating between them and the banks. For example, we have a list of cancer patients that we shared with the banks to try and convince them to release some of their funds to enable people to pay for treatment. Some banks, but not all, have responded positively.

  Some depositors have gone the banks to get their money by whatever means. One of them was Sali Hafiz, whom we supported. Hafiz asked for our help; a lawyer and members of the association went inside the bank with her and over 100 members were outside the bank to cheer for her and ensure her safety. We also helped a retired serviceman in Chtoura retrieve some of his savings from the bank. The association’s lawyer follows up with depositors, and when a depositor enters a bank to try to get some of their money back, we spread the word among our supporters so people gather outside in support and make it harder for others to enter the bank or for security to kick them out.

  It is worth noting that not all the organisations out there are supporting depositors. There are several organisations funded by ABL or SGBL, which obviously always side with the banks. The same applies to local media, which continues to accept money from the banks in the form of advertising. Depositors have had their accounts blocked for three years on the grounds that there is no money to give them back, but the banks still find money to pay for advertising.

  What needs to change so the situation can be resolved?

  We don’t have a functioning governance system. Banks have retained people’s savings for three years and the BdL has allowed this to continue, while the judiciary has protected the banks by withholding thousands of cases without reaching a conclusion. Many judges have a financial incentive to behave this way: they got bank loans worth millions of US dollars, which they are now repaying in Lebanese lira at a ridiculous exchange rate – they will end up paying 10 per cent of the original amount. This is a real scandal.

  The first change needed is to replace the BdL governor. He is the one behind the financial policies issued in 2017 and 2018. He brought cash in from correspondent banks and loaned it to the state without any guarantees. He spent US$100 billion without ever being held accountable. He considers himself above the law: he faces multiple lawsuits but he simply refuses to show up in court. 

  What are the implications of the recently passed Banking Secrecy Law?

  Parliament passed an amended Banking Secrecy Law that will lift secrecy on the bank accounts belonging to public officials and major bankers. We find the new law acceptable, although we hoped it would apply retroactively. As we told the head of the Parliament’s Finance and Budget Committee, we want to clarify what happened to the funds the political and financial elite transferred abroad after 17 October 2019, estimated at between US$13 and 15 billion. We want to understand who smuggled them and where to. But the new law won’t solve all the issues as there is no trust in the banking system.

  Another bill, the Capital Control Law, is set to be discussed in parliament, but there is still no final draft to comment on. Unfortunately, it is a bit too late to discuss capital controls, once capital has been massively smuggled abroad. Capital controls should have come a week, even a month into the crisis, but not after three years. Banks have smuggled the funds of the elite abroad because there were no legal impediments. The latest update we heard regarding the capital control law is that there will be no separate capital control law and it will be part of a larger recovery roadmap consisting of many changes in addition to capital control. We consider the potential recovery roadmap as a death sentence to depositors.

  What do you think about the conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for approving a US$3 billion loan?

  According to the government, one of the IMF’s main conditions is to write off US$70 billion of depositors’ funds. If that is what the IMF wants in exchange for giving the state a US$3 billion loan, then of course we are against it. The IMF can’t ask the state and BdL to write off as much funds to ensure they get repaid for their loan. Some members of parliament promised us they would refuse to pass any legislation to that effect.

  But a reform requested by the IMF that is most important to us, and which ABL rejects, is the restructuring of banks. We hope that banks will be restructured and a timeline for repaying depositors will be released.

  At the beginning of the crisis, BdL had US$34 billion. Today, it has US$8 billion. Those billions are gone due to governance failures. If the same policies remain in place, nothing will work, regardless of whether the IMF gives the state a loan of US$3 or 10 billion. The first step to get out of this crisis should be to guarantee deposits, because the crisis wasn’t the depositors’ fault.

  In the past 15 years banks made over US$35 billion in profit, which was transferred abroad. We demand a forensic audit of each bank to find out which had profits, and how much. There are 40 banks in Lebanon. Why are they being treated as one? We should examine each separately. 

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   Civic space in Lebanon is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Depositors’ Outcry Association through itsFacebook page.

• LESOTHO: ‘We must work hand in hand to promote democracy and hold our leaders accountable’

  CIVICUS speaks about the 7 October election in Lesotho with Libakiso Matlho, executive director of Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust-Lesotho (WLSA). 

  WLSA is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in Southern Africa and working to promote women’s leadership and eradicate gender-based violence. It contributed to the recent election process by providing voter education. 

  How would you assess the recent election   in  Lesotho in terms of its   transparency   and fairness?

  Looking at the overall proceedings I would say they were transparent and fair. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) did a good job. All candidates were given a  platform to share their manifestos as well as their campaigning approaches at different  levels, including through the media  and public gatherings. Independent candidates did not face any threats. Nobody experienced any restrictions in terms of the exercise of their right to reach out to members of the community and potential voters. Voters were free to attend candidates’ forums and political party rallies.

  There were two major challenges, however. One concerned voter civic education, which started a bit later than normal and therefore lasted only about three or four weeks, so it was not as broad as should have been.

   The other challenge had to do with the dynamics of the campaign, which was affected by conflict among candidates during public forums. Some participants invited to take part in the discussions also caused chaos. This  unfortunately led to a few discussions being cancelled before all the candidates could present their manifestos in some areas, especially those that were marked as hotspots.

  Do you foresee any election-related conflict?

  It is hard to predict, but this election seems to have been a bit different from others in the past, which makes me wonder.

  Around 65 political parties and 2,560 candidates competed in the 7 October election. For a small country with a population of two million, that is a huge number of people. And many might find it difficult to accept the outcome if things do not happen according to their expectations. 

  The election itself was peaceful, but political tension mounted as votes were counted over the following days. The results were announced on 11 October: the opposition Revolution for Prosperity party came first but was short of a majority, with 56 of 120 seats, while the incumbent All Basotho Convention party (ABC) came second. It is not clear whether ABC will contest the results and its supporters will take to the streets in protest. If this happens, clashes with rival parties might occur and security force repression could follow.

  I would not rule conflict out but rather consider it as likely to happen as not.

  Do you think the failure to pass constitutional reforms had an impact on the election results?

  I think the failure to pass the Omnibus Constitutional Bill, which had been years in the making, probably had a strong impact on the electoral process, and will definitely have an impact on what happens next.

  The bill sought to amend key provisions regarding political parties, candidate selection, floor-crossing in parliament, the appointment of senior officials and the role of the prime minister, whose removal would require a two-thirds majority. In May, all major parties in parliament committed to pass the bill by the end of June, but disagreements held it up much longer.

  One of the key issues of contention concerned the electoral law, which only allows party leaders to submit a proportional representation party list. With the current system, 80 members of parliament are elected in constituencies and 40 are elected through a proportional division of votes. Small parties are negatively affected because to get some proportional representation seats, they are forced to come together into a list with larger parties, and if they are unable to merge with other parties they are left out.

  Another key issue wasthe politicisation of the security sector, which contributes to political instability. The reforms proposed a way to deal with this.

  The reforms were eventually passed as parliament was reconvened for an urgent session but, following a series of legal challenges, the Constitutional Court declared them null and void at the last minute before the election.

  The failure to pass the reforms will also contribute to continuing difficulties in maintaining coalition governments. Lesotho has had coalition governments since 2012 that have never served a full five-year term due to conflicts that led to their dissolution. In 2017 ABC formed a six-party coalition government, but because of internal conflict Prime Minister Tom Thabane was forced to resign in 2020 and was replaced by Moeketsi Majoro.

  Coalitions have not made for stable and effective governments. The coalition-forming process also confuses voters because ideologies are not a big factor when putting them together. This makes voters a bit sceptical that their parties will remain faithful to their mandate.

  These were some of the issues the reform was meant to address, but unfortunately they remain unaddressed to this day.

  What did voters expect from the election?

  One of the expectations voters place on political parties is that they will work on improving service delivery. This includes fixing infrastructure and providing access to water and electricity, among other things. Lesotho also has high rates of unemployment and widespread problems of gender-based violence and femicides, as well as high crime rates that people hope will be addressed by the new government.

  Basotho people are not happy with the way the public sector has been managed over the years. Employment is mostly driven by nepotism and political affinities. People are uneasy because political parties on the campaign trail are quick to promise they will fix these things but once in power they fail to deliver.

  We have also seen a lot of instability in a key industry, the textile industry, with COVID-19 only making things worse. People were already dealing with bad working conditions and when the pandemic hit many were fired unfairly. This led to worker strikes and has negatively affected foreign investment. Elected leaders need to find means of retaining foreign investment while ensuring good work conditions.

  How can the international community support civil society’s work to strengthen democracy in Lesotho?

  During the election, civil society faced the challenge that almost all funding for civic education came from the IEC, that is, from the government budget. This could potentially compromise civil society’s watchdog role. Additionally, these funds are never sufficient to allow civil society to conduct its work thoroughly.

  The international community should support capacity building so that civil society can conduct robust advocacy during and after the election period. Collaboration between international and local CSOs is also important. For the recent election local CSOs took on voter education alone, without any involvement by international CSOs. We must work hand in hand to promote democracy in our countries and hold our leaders accountable.

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  Civic space in Lesotho is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with WLSA through itswebsite orFacebook page.

• SIERRA LEONE: ‘Civil society plays a crucial role in ensuring free and fair elections’

  CIVICUS speaks about Sierra Leone’s 24 June general election with John Caulker, founder and executive director of Fambul Tok.

  Founded in 2007, Fambul Tok (‘Family Talk’ in Krio language) is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes peace, restorative justice and community building in post-civil war Sierra Leone.

  What’s at stake in the 2023 general election?

  For many Sierra-Leonean voters, the most pressing concerns revolve around the economy. In his first term in office, President Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People’s Party, who has just won re-election, allocated 21 per cent of the government budget to support education, positioning himself as a champion of human capital investment. In his second presidential campaign, Bio expressed a commitment to overhaul Sierra Leone’s agricultural sector, believing it will lead to an economic turnaround.

  Bio’s supporters believe that the global economic crisis is the main reason for the current financial predicament in Sierra Leone. But Sierra Leone’s economic instability started a lot earlier, with the outbreak of Ebola in 2014, and subsequently deteriorated further with the decline in iron ore mine prices on the global market, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine. Inflation is in double digits, its highest level in almost two decades.

  The main opposition party, All People Congress, nominated the same candidate, Samura Kamara, who previously lost the presidential election in 2018. Kamara, who is an economist, pledged to revive Sierra Leone’s struggling economy and promote national unity.

  Both President Bio and Samura Kamara have significant support throughout Sierra Leone, while other candidates hoped that public dissatisfaction with the economy would turn votes against the two major parties.

  In addition to selecting a president, voters also elected new lawmakers, mayors and councillors.

  What changes have been introduced to the electoral law?

  As a result of a 2022 electoral reform, Sierra Leone now uses a proportional system for allocating parliamentary seats. The president decided to adopt this system to avoid by-elections and increase women’s representation, which can be done through legislative quotas when using party lists. The change was judicially challenged, leading to a landmark Supreme Court ruling that upheld the proportional representation system.

  Some people believe that by adopting party lists and using multi-member districts, the proportional system takes away their right to choose representatives directly and hands that power over to political parties. Chernor Maju Bah, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, expressed concerns regarding the limited timeframe for educating the public about the intricacies of the new system and argued that more time was necessary to ensure a smooth transition.

  Have fundamental civic and democratic freedoms been respected during the election process?

  In recent years Sierra Leone has made progress towards safeguarding and upholding freedoms of expression and association in line with its constitution and international human rights standards. However, the situation has varied over time and challenges have arisen in some instances. For example, ahead of the election the Political Parties Regulation Commission imposed a ban on all street rallies organised by political parties. Many viewed this as an infringement of their right to peaceful assembly. However, political parties were still able to gather peacefully in public spaces such as stadiums, large fields and town halls. The use of social media is also subject to limitations and regulations outlined in the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act of 2021. Some arrests have been made for violations of this law.

  Sierra Leone has also made significant steps to improve its electoral processes and ensure a transparent, democratic and inclusive political system. Civil society plays a crucial role in ensuring free and fair elections by promoting voter education, monitoring the electoral process and advocating for electoral reforms. Both the government and civil society have made considerable investments to ensure that citizens are well-informed about their rights, the electoral process and the importance of participating in elections, thereby creating a more knowledgeable and engaged electorate.

  Sierra Leone has also welcomed international election observers from various organisations and institutions, who provided an impartial assessment and promoted transparency. Moreover, political parties have collectively agreed to abide by a Code of Conduct setting out guidelines for ethical campaigning and peaceful behaviour during elections, encouraging parties to uphold democratic principles and discouraging any form of violence or intimidation.

  How has civil society, including Fambul Tok, engaged in the election process?

  CSOs have been vigilant and expressed concern over increasing ethnic-based campaigns, hate speech and unrest. These are viewed by civil society as early warning signs of conflict and election-related violence.

  Although Sierra Leone has made progress in holding generally peaceful and credible elections, there have been isolated incidents of violence during this election period, including clashes between supporters of different political parties and between opposition supporters and the police, and instances of property destruction such as arson. The opposition also called for public demonstrations following the resignation of the electoral commissioner.

  As a peacebuilding organisation, Fambul Tok is focused on promoting nonviolence and voter education through our community structures and is advocating for a culture of political tolerance. Fambul Tok facilitates stakeholders’ meetings to promote peace and national cohesion and avoid malice and violence despite political differences. This has promoted peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, raised awareness about electoral misconduct and ensured that appropriate measures are in place to prevent and address electoral violence, intimidation and any other actions that undermine the integrity of the process.

  What international support is Sierra Leone’s civil society receiving, and what other forms of support would you need?

  International support plays a crucial role in assisting Sierra Leone’s civil society in both the pre-election and post-election phases. Even though funding support for civil society has diminished during these elections, CSOs continue to collaborate with international institutions to uphold the values and principles of democracy.

  International organisations, in partnership with the CSO National Elections Watch, have provided capacity-building training and financial resources to strengthen the skills and knowledge of local CSOs in election monitoring, advocacy, voter education and human rights promotion. This support enhances the effectiveness of civil society in promoting free and fair elections and safeguarding human rights. However, there is also a need for technical resources such as communication tools, data analysis software and logistical support to further enhance the capabilities of civil society.

  In 2018 there was post-election violence throughout society. The international community should support CSOs to engage in post-election peace and cohesion campaigns. This involves encouraging communities to accept the outcome of the electoral process and respect the rights of individuals. Diplomatic missions and human rights organisations should remain engaged in the process and keep advocating for a conducive environment for free and fair elections. They can do this by applying diplomatic pressure, issuing public statements and engaging with national authorities to address concerns related to civic space, human rights and electoral integrity.

  It is crucial that international support is tailored to the specific needs and priorities of Sierra Leone’s civil society, in close consultation and collaboration with local groups. This approach ensures that support is context-specific, sustainable and responsive to challenges on the ground.

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  Civic space in Sierra Leone is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Fambul Tok through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@fambultok onTwitter.

• ZIMBABWE: ‘Election violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes’

  CIVICUS speaks about the general election in Zimbabwe and the role of civil society with Wellington Mbofana, former director ofthe Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), a civil society organisation (CSO) that recently shut down due to lack of funding, and a former board member of several Zimbabwean CSOs.

  What was at stake in this election?

  It’s difficult to pinpoint a single crucial issue that was at stake. Over a considerable period, Zimbabwean elections, much like those in other parts of Africa, have ceased to revolve around substantive issues and have instead become centred on political parties and personalities. This trend is evident in this election, in which major political parties failed to present their manifestos in a timely manner. The main opposition party, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), unveiled its programme merely two weeks prior to voting, while the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) didn’t even bother.

  Given the crumbling state of the economy, reflected in record-breaking unemployment, pervasive economic informality, escalating poverty, the world’s second-highest inflation rate and a sense of hopelessness, economic strife remained the most prominent concern for voters. Ideally, the competition should have revolved around two or three contrasting strategies for addressing these economic woes. However, what we observed was a cloud of obfuscation. The ruling party advanced a narrative that conditions are improving and investors are flocking to the country, but progress would be even greater if it weren’t for sanctions imposed by Western states. The opposition pledged to outperform ZANU-PF across all fronts. But neither specified how they would fund their proposed initiatives.

  To deal with Zimbabwe’s predicament effectively the government would need to confront a range of issues, including land reform and productivity, water shortages, electricity generation, infrastructure development and urbanisation and, most importantly, guarantee the required funding.

  It should have been important to ensure the meaningfulness of this election because when elections fail, civil unrest and coups ensue, a truth that Africa has repeatedly witnessed.

  Was there any election-related violence?

  The prevalence of violence in all its manifestations – physical, structural and cultural – remains an unfortunate hallmark of Zimbabwean elections. Lives have been lost, injuries endured and property destroyed as a result.

  It is also important to note that because of its fractured politics, the country is in a perpetual election mode. Over the past five years, we have had multiple recalls from parliament and local authorities, leading to by-elections. Instances of intra-party violence have also occurred during parliamentary and primary elections. The culture upholding the idea that wielding the strongest fist is the key to ascending to power must change. Violence is a cover for ideological ambivalence and lack of substantive programmes. Who needs a manifesto when you can use force?

  What tactics did the government use to stifle dissent in the run-up to the election?

  The ruling party stands accused of engaging in lawfare, a tactic that uses laws to constrain the opposition and human rights defenders. These efforts are facilitated by an allegedly captured judiciary. A prominent CCC legislator, Job Sikhala, along with other political activists and human rights defenders, languish in remand prisons on spurious allegations after being denied bail.

  The government introduced controversial laws aimed at silencing dissent. The Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Amendment Act, commonly called the Patriotic Bill, are clearly designed to deal with critics of the government.

  The Patriotic Bill came into force on 14 July 2023. With this bill, the government created a new crime of ‘wilfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe’.  The scope and definition of this offence is vague. There are valid concerns that law enforcement agencies will interpret the law broadly and use it to stifle and penalise the work of independent civil society.

  Citizens and permanent residents of Zimbabwe will be found guilty if they participate in meetings aimed at discussing or plotting armed intervention in Zimbabwe, subverting or overthrowing its government and implementing or extending sanctions or trade boycotts against Zimbabwe. A meeting encompasses any form of communication involving two or more people, regardless of whether it takes place offline or online.

  Participating in discussions about armed intervention can result in life imprisonment or the death penalty if the meeting involves planning such an intervention. Discussing subversion or overthrow of the government is punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Taking part in meetings discussing sanctions or trade boycotts can lead to a fine of up to US$12,000 or up to 10 years in prison, or both. Aggravated offences may lead to consequences such as the termination of citizenship for those who are not citizens by birth or descent, cancellation of residence permits for non-citizens and disqualification from voting or holding public office for five to 15 years.

  In the hands of overzealous and partisan law enforcement agents, this punitive law is very dangerous. It seems to target not only the opposition and civil society but also factions within the fractured ruling party and the military. It likely seeks to prevent a recurrence of a military-assisted transition, which brought the current government to power in 2017. That coup was willingly accepted by powerful global players, including the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which inadvertently endorsed the idea of military change of power.

  How did Zimbabwean civil society engage with the electoral process?

  Civil society was actively involved in electoral activities throughout the electoral cycle. CSOs play a pivotal role in providing voter education, observing elections, advocating for electoral reforms, safeguarding human rights and offering legal, medical and psycho-social assistance to victims of human rights violations.

  Both local and international observers were generally allowed and accredited. However, there were isolated cases, such as the denial of accreditation to Musa Kika, allegedly due to security risks, while some local citizens encountered intimidation, harassment and threats from unidentified people after engaging with international observers.

  But unfortunately, the last couple of years have been very difficult for Zimbabwean. Several CSOs have shut down. CIVNET, a major organisation providing civic education, closed its doors this year due to lack of funding.

  The Zimbabwean economy is too fragile to support a strong civil society, which heavily relies on international donors and solidarity. Further international support should be rendered to all groups promoting development, good governance, human rights, justice and the rule of law. The international community should also amplify local voices and exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to act in accordance with international human rights and democratic standards.

  What did CIVNET work on?

  CIVNET operated through three main programmes: the Citizen Participation Programme, including two projects on constitutionalism and voter education, the Leadership Development Programme and the Peace Building Programme.

  The Citizen Participation Programme encouraged citizen engagement in governance and development, fostering collaboration between communities and local authorities through participatory workshops and development projects. The Constitution and Constitutionalism Project aimed to raise awareness about the significance of the new constitution and share information on how to use it to exercise human rights and honour obligations as citizens.

  The Leadership Development Programme enhanced leadership skills of people engaged in community projects. Our graduates now lead various Zimbabwean CSOs and work in local authorities and parliament. CIVNET contributed to the formation and development of CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, the Zimbabwe Peace Project and the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe. It was also a key member of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum.

  The Peace Building Programme helped people and communities divided by conflict to reach out to each other and mend broken relations. This was done through creatively designed workshops that provided security and safety to both victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts. Mediators were also trained to address local disputes, resulting in transformed relationships and improved dialogue within previously divided communities.

  To what extent could the election be called free and fair?

  The concept of free and fair elections involves political freedoms and fair processes prior to elections, culminating in the casting of votes by well-informed eligible voters able to vote freely for candidates and parties of their choice. A transparent tally of all valid votes, accurate result announcements and universal acceptance of the election outcomes by all parties are integral components of this concept.

  Past elections in Zimbabwe have been contested at courts and other institutions. For Zimbabwe to uphold its position within the international community, this election would have to gain universal recognition as credible, legitimate and conducted in a free and fair manner. It would be key to ensure the acceptance of its outcome and secure peace and stability to attract investors.

  The 2023 election was disputed in the legal arena even before a single ballot was cast. This may be a harbinger of future developments. On 12 July, the Electoral Court disqualified a presidential candidate, Savior Kasukuwere, whose participation had been previously permitted by the Nomination Court. Then the High Court disqualified 12 CCC parliamentary candidates, ostensibly for late filings, although the Nomination Court had accepted their submissions. Both decisions favoured the ruling party. However, following an appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s verdict on the 12 CCC candidates, leading to their reinstatement on the ballot. On 19 July the electoral court ruled in favour of a leader of the opposition United Zimbabwe Alliance party, Elizabeth Valerio, whose candidacy had been initially rejected by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), also for alleged untimely filing.

  Declaring the election to be free and fair would be unreasonable given the political environment characterised by violence, intimidation and voter suppression, non-transparent processes with the electoral roll and ballot paper printing, pre-voting by security personnel, biased media coverage, opposition rallies barred by the police, vote buying through handouts, influence from traditional and religious leaders on voters, misuse of government resources for party campaigns and indications that some parties will reject any outcome other than their own victory, implying that the ruling party wouldn’t have handed over power if it had lost. Indeed, SADC decided to abandon the term ‘free and fair’ regarding Zimbabwean elections, instead referring to them as ‘legitimate’.

  What electoral reforms are needed?

  Adherence to rule of law and impartial management of elections is essential. The ZEC should enforce the Electoral Code of Conduct, safeguarding the right for all to express their political views and campaign freely. It must also ensure fairness by curbing the misuse of state resources, preventing intimidation, harassment and destruction of campaign materials and improving voter education.

  The police should fulfil their constitutional duties impartially, without bias, fear, or favour. Political parties should adhere to the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates. This entails refraining from violence, misuse of public resources for partisan ends, coercion and intimidation of the electorate and inciting violence through hate speech and derogatory language.

  Were there any issues with people being prevented from voting, and what do you expect to happen next?

  A high turnout was to be expected given the high stakes. The economy has done its own campaign, motivating people to participate. The ruling party also mobilised people, especially in rural areas, by any means necessary.

  However, many voters might not have been able to locate their names on the register. The polling station-based system is such that people living in a specific neighbourhood can only vote at a certain polling station. In the 2018 election, a lot of people found their names had been removed from their usual stations without a change having been requested, while others who requested changes after moving to other districts saw those changes unimplemented. Following the election, many constituencies and councils had elected representatives recalled by political parties in power. Since there are no guarantees that this won’t happen again, some people may have been discouraged from voting.

  Based on experience, disputes around results and their resolution by the courts are to be expected. Given that the judiciary is perceived to be captured and judges were given significant ‘housing loans’ before the election, judgements against the opposition are also rightly likely to be perceived as unfair.

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  Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.