regional institutions

• CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY: ‘Solidarity is essential because we face very powerful interests’

  CIVICUS discusses civil society’s advocacy for the European Union’sCorporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) with Brad Adams, Executive Director and founder of Climate Rights International (CRI). CRI is a civil society organisation that focuses on the connections between climate change and human rights, putting pressure on governments and corporations to take action to end abuses. Along with many other organisations, it played a key behind-the-scenes role in the final approval of the CSDDD.

  The CSDDD aims to protect human rights and the environment while tackling climate change. It empowers European courts to hold large companies accountable for practices such as child or forced labour in their supply chains and production, and requires companies to align their business strategies with the Paris Agreement climate goals. It also seeks to improve access to justice and provide remedies for victims, ensuring companies are held accountable for their actions or failures to act.

  What’s the CSDDD and what difference should it make?

  The CSDDD is potentially the most important piece of environmental and climate change legislation in the world. The European Union (EU) is the world’s largest economic bloc, bigger than the USA and China, and when it legislates or issues regulations, it has the power to set global standards. For example, when the EU required Apple to stop changing iPhone chargers every few years, Apple eventuallychanged its global policy to comply with the EU standard and avoid heavy fines.

  The strength of the CSDDD is that it requires companies to adopt and implement climate transition plans in line with theParis Agreement. A key global problem is that companies often claim to be Paris Agreement-compliant but continue business as usual. This directive imposes legally binding human rights and environmental due diligence obligations on large companies, requiring them to identify, mitigate and remediate the environmental and human rights harms they cause in their operations and supply chains. This is a major step forward.

  In addition, the CSDDD establishes financial liability for violations, creating a strong incentive for compliance. Under some conditions, civil society organisations (CSOs) and trade unions will be able to bring claims and hold companies to account. This underlines the crucial role of civil society, as governments often fail to enforce laws, even those they have passed themselves.

  A notable weakness of the directive, however, is its limited scope. It only applies to large companies with over a thousand employees and an annual turnover of more than €450 million (approx. US$480 million). This was meant to exclude small and medium-sized enterprises that say they don’t have the capacity to meet the requirements. As a result, an estimated 65 per cent of companies that could be covered are not.

  Nevertheless, the directive still covers around 50 to 60 per cent of all business activity. Over time, we expect the size of companies covered to be reduced, extending the directive’s reach.

  We hope the CSDDD will lead to better environmental and climate standards worldwide. This directive will require large companies doing business with the EU to meet basic environmental standards in their supply chains and production. If companies must meet these standards to do business with the EU, we expect these internal standards to become global standards, influencing their operations wherever they do business. 

  What role did civil society play in the adoption of the directive?

  Civil society played a crucial role. The directive wouldn’t have been adopted without the persistent efforts of many CSOs to put pressure on states.

  It took many years to get to this point. When the directive began to unravel because of theobjections of the German Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the support of climate sceptic governments such asItaly’s, civil society stepped in. We worked with the Belgian EU presidency, Green parties and supportive states to keep the directive on track and get it adopted.

  Civil society also engaged with large companies that were in favour of the directive, encouraging them to intervene. These companies recognised that while the directive might impose short-term costs, it would ultimately benefit them by raising global standards. They wanted to ensure a level playing field by holding companies from countries with lower standards, such as China and Vietnam, to the same high standards they’d have to comply with. If this works it will be a welcome change from the typical corporate race to the bottom.

  Civil society rescued and advanced this critical piece of legislation by successfully linking supportive companies and governments.

  What concessions were made to get the directive adopted?

  For legislation to be adopted in the EU, it must first be approved by the European Commission and then by the European Parliament. The final step is approval by the European Council of Ministers, an intergovernmental body that under its complicated rules in this case only needed a qualified majority of its 27 members.

  The Council had given its provisional approval, but at the final stage the FDP withdrew its support. This is a small economically neoliberal party that is a minor part of theGermancoalition government but may have thought it could use its stance to gain an electoral advantage. Without telling the main coalition parties it apparently contacted parties in other member states and urged them to withdraw their support. Enough did so to raise doubts about whether the required qualified majority could still be achieved. So the CSDDD was temporarily withdrawn to avoid defeat. With the help of other European CSOs and the Belgian presidency, we worked to reassemble a group large enough to achieve the qualified majority.

  Concessions made to secure this majority included raising the employee and turnover thresholds that companies had to meet to be covered by the directive. This helped overcome the objections of those concerned about potential impacts on small and medium-sized enterprises.

  While the final text wasn’t exactly what we’d hoped for, it was still a significant victory. For the first time, it sets out basic principles and standards covering virtually all major multinational companies involved in global trade. Almost every global trading company you can think of will be covered by the CSDDD.

  We expect these companies to put pressure on the EU to amend the law to include those not currently covered by the CSDDD, creating a business consensus to extend its reach so companies won’t be able to compete with lower prices simply because they aren’t held to the same standards.

  Overall, it’s not enough of what’s needed, but it’s a big step in the right direction.

  What are the next steps?

  The provisions of the CSDDD will be implemented gradually, giving companies time to adjust their operations.

  We’ll have to wait and see what happens with thenew European Parliament and how supportive it is of climate policy. Although the Greens lost many seats, there’s still a majority of political parties that recognise the seriousness of climate change. The key question is whether they believe it requires urgent action and whether they will move quickly to implement it.

  We’ll continue to campaign for this directive alongside partner CSOs. We’ll engage in discussions with the Commission and members of parliament to explore ways to strengthen this legislation over time. However, it’s likely to be several years before the EU considers amending and improving this directive. In the meantime, our primary focus will be on ensuring companies comply with the requirements of the new law.

  How else is CRI working to hold corporations accountable?

  We’ve been working on Mexico’s avocado industry, which is responsible for deforestation, water theft from local communities and intimidation and violence against Indigenous communities and civil society activists. Given that 80 per cent of avocados grown in Mexico are exported to the USA, we felt a responsibility to address this issue.

  Thanks to the cooperation of many local organisations and activists who remained anonymous for security reasons, we published ourreport last November. We also approached Mexican and US companies with our findings and pressed the Mexican and US governments to create a mandatory deforestation-free certification process for the sale of avocados. We spoke to federal agencies in both countries. We worked with journalists at the New York Times, which published a key full-pagestory, and with members of the US Senate, who sent a key letter to the US government. We held webinars with civil society in Mexico. In February, as a result of our pressure, both governmentsannounced a ban on the sale of avocados grown in illegally deforested areas. Indigenous communities had been complaining about this for years, and we were finally able to make their voices heard.

  Solidarity was essential because we faced very powerful interests, including big companies with huge investments and drug cartels laundering money through the avocado industry. But we were still able to reach an agreement to end these harmful practices.

  Get in touch with CRI through itswebsite orFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@ClimateRights on Twitter. And get in touch with Brad Adams throughLinkedIn.

• EUROPEAN MEDIA FREEDOM ACT: ‘It will be crucial for EU member states to take this legal framework seriously’

  CIVICUS speaks with Renate Schroeder, Director of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), about theEuropean Media Freedom Act, the first integrated legislation that protects freedom of expression and media independence and pluralism in the European Union.

  The EFJ is the largest organisation of journalists in Europe, fighting for decent working conditions and defending the right to freedom of expression.

  Why was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) needed?

  The European Commission (EC) produced the draft EMFA in September 2022, in a context of growing disinformation and threats to media independence and journalists’ safety across Europe. The Vice President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, understood the dangers of media capture and political manipulation. With her help and a lot of research by European institutions, we were able to show media freedom was declining in the European Union (EU), despite the bloc’s historical commitment to this principle.

  That’s why the EC came up with a proposal to ensure the right of all citizens to receive plural and editorially independent information. This had never been formally addressed before. The EMFA is rooted in the need to create clear rules to level the playing field across the EU, addressing issues such as media capture, the independence of public service media, editorial independence, transparency in media ownership and state advertisement.

  What regulations does the EMFA introduce?

  The EMFA seeks to safeguard media freedom and integrity. It includes provisions to protect journalistic sources, ensuring confidentiality. This is particularly crucial for investigative journalism given the growing use of spyware to target journalists’ sources, as seen in countries such as Greece and Hungary.

  The Act also addresses state control over public service media. Rather than state broadcasters, what the ecosystem needs is independent, strong, public service media systems free of state influence or control over funding.

  In addition, the EMFA recognises readers’ right to know who’s behind what they read, so it includes an article on transparency in media ownership and another on editorial independence to prevent journalism being used for political or economic interests or propaganda. This is based on the acknowledgment there are people such as politicians or foreign business leaders who own media outlets and use them for their agendas. They don’t view journalism as a public good but as a tool for propaganda.

  Another issue the Act deals with is content moderation. Journalists are no longer the gatekeepers of information – platforms are. Recognising this, the EMFA requires platforms to consult media service providers and journalists before removing content.

  Finally, the Act establishes a board composed of independent regulatory authorities tasked with overseeing compliance with the EMFA and other related legislation such as the Audiovisual Media Service Directive.

  What were the main points of contention during the process?

  At the beginning, several stakeholders were against the EMFA. Germany raised one significant point of contention. It has a federal system where states have their own independent regulatory media systems, and they were concerned about potential interference from Brussels.

  Publishers also presented a challenge. They showed little interest in any transparency or editorial regulation and had concerns about a European board having a say on that.

  However, with the support of a group of media freedom organisations, digital rights advocates and other civil society groups, we overcame most of these obstacles. While the initial draft was not as good as we would have liked, the European Parliament emerged as our ally and helped strengthen transparency rules and reinforce provisions related to public media service and source protection.

  One particularly contentious issue during negotiations with both the European Parliament and European Council was the protection of sources and safeguards against spyware. Some states, such as France, argued for exemptions based on national security considerations. These risked compromising the protection of journalists’ sources and transforming the EMFA into a surveillance tool. Thanks to efforts of supportive countries such as Spain, these proposals were rejected, preserving the EMFA’s integrity.

  Does the final draft fully address civil society concerns?

  While the final draft addresses some concerns raised by civil society, there are areas where our partners feel it could have gone further.

  For instance, on the issue of transparency of media ownership, civil society groups wanted to establish a European database, but this provision didn’t go through. We also wanted to include a stronger article addressing concentration of media ownership and requiring a public interest test for mergers. The language in the final agreement is often too principled, which may cause problems when implemented at the national level.

  Even so, we understand that drafting regulations at the European level, where you deal with multiple and diverse states, is not easy. The current rise of right-wing governments is only making it harder. Even traditionally supportive states such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been cautious in their approaches.

  We knew it was now or never, so we are very happy the EMFA got adopted, even if some articles are not worded as strongly as we would have liked. With right-wing movements on the rise, there was a lot of pressure to agree a final text and have it passed right away, even if it wasn’t perfect, because the June European Parliament elections will likely result in a more right-wing Parliament.

  What happens next?

  The next step is for the European Parliament’s Plenary session in Strasbourg on 11 March to formally vote on the provision agreement, which the Council of the EU under the current Belgian presidency will officially adopt. The Act needs a three-fourths majority, and only Hungary is certain to vote against. It will enter into force a year afterwards, with some articles taking effect earlier, at six months, and others later, at 15 months. And then it will get implemented and have direct effects at the national level.

  There will likely be a testing period in which civil society and journalists’ organisations will play a vital role in ensuring effective implementation and taking legal action if necessary. For instance, if media providers fail to comply with transparency rules, civil society may need to challenge them in court.

  However, it is still unclear how this process will work. For instance, if a civil society organisation in Hungary believes there’s a lack of plural access to media and decides to take legal action, it may face challenges in Hungary’s judicial system and may need to escalate the issue to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, a process that could take several years.

  I am also worried about how the article on the protection of sources will be implemented. Even though safeguards are in place, this article may be misinterpreted. At the end of the day, national security issues are always defined at the national level. That’s a limitation of all EU treaties and some states may end up finding clever ways to circumvent these protections.

  Having this legal framework in place is a big step forward, but it will also be crucial for states to take it seriously.

  Over the last five years, the EC has made significant progress in regulating the information ecosystem, with initiatives such as the Digital Service Act, Digital Markets Act, Artificial Intelligence Act and now the EMFA. The main challenge will be the effective implementation of all these measures. We hope the EC will prioritise implementation and sanction states that fail to comply. We also hope the EMFA will receive sufficient funding for the board to deal with monitoring and implementing it. Without proper enforcement, no regulation will be of any help.

  What further reforms are needed?

  We are worried about the use of generative AI to promote disinformation and deep fakes. Voluntary guidelines are not enough. We need stronger measures that balance freedom of expression with human control over AI systems. While AI can be a great tool for journalists it can also be misused.

  The EU is at a crossroads. The European Parliament has always been on the side of media freedom, and for the first time we risk losing this support. Young voters will play a vital role in the upcoming elections. Their engagement, informed vote and understanding of the role of the EU and what is at stake may change the course of the elections. And for that facts are needed, and a healthy information ecosystem with limited disinformation circulating in social media.

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  Get in touch with the European Federation of Journalists through itswebsite orInstagram andFacebook pages, and follow@EFJEUROPE and@renatemargot on Twitter.

• GEORGIA: ‘The foreign agents law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks with Nino Samkharadze, policy analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics, about thecontroversial ‘foreign agents’ law just passed in Georgia.

  The Georgian Institute of Politics is a Tbilisi-based non-profit, non-partisan research and analysis organisation dedicated to fortifying the foundations of democratic institutions and effective governance in Georgia.

  What’s the purpose of Georgia’s law on foreign agents?

  According to the government, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which has just been passed by parliament, aims to increase the transparency of civil society’s operations by requiring civil society organisations (CSOs) to disclose their sources of funding and provide details about the nature of their activities.

  In its transition from the post-Soviet era, Georgia faces economic and political challenges. Its evolving democracy is characterised by weak institutions and it’s heavily dependent on support from international sources, including financial grants from the European Union (EU), European states and the USA. The introduction of this law may have been a response to concerns about foreign influence, but it has sparked debate in Georgian society. It poses a threat to the independence and security of CSOs. Its vague language and broad room for interpretation provide the government with opportunities to influence and control civil society, potentially stifling dissenting voices and undermining the positive contributions of CSOs to democratic governance.

  Why did the government reintroduce the bill after failing to pass it last year?

  The process began with the introduction of a first version of the bill in February 2023. It wasn’t proposed directly by the ruling Georgian Dream party but by People’s Power, a splinter political group closely linked to Georgian Dream and espousing even more radical anti-western narratives. But it was met with considerable domestic and international opposition. Protests erupted in Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital, and criticism came from European institutions and the US government. In response, Georgian Dream announced it would vote against the bill, which ultimately led to its rejection by parliament. Following this failure, Georgian Dream underwent a period of reflection and intensified its propaganda. It softened the bill’s language and tone to make it appear less radical and reintroduced it in April 2024. Soon after, on 14 May, it was passed by parliament.

  Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 and is now in an unprecedented third term in office. Since it began its third term in 2020, it has increasingly shown anti-democratic tendencies. With a general election scheduled for October 2024, it’s under increasing pressure as polls indicate a decline in public support. If it doesn’t maintain its majority, it will have to seek cooperation from opposition parties. In this context, the government may see the passage of this law as a way to defuse opposition and strengthen its grip on power.

  How do you think the law would affect civil society?

  The impacts of the law on civil society are expected to be significant and multifaceted, affecting various dimensions of its functioning and autonomy.

  CSOs are likely to be negatively labelled as serving the interests of foreign powers, undermining public confidence in their activities and missions. This labelling could easily lead to stigmatisation and marginalisation, reducing the effectiveness of advocacy efforts and diminishing their influence in the public sphere.

  The law’s provisions for extensive monitoring also pose a threat to the autonomy of CSOs and the privacy of their staff. The government’s ability to access and publish personal data, including correspondence and communications, could hamper CSOs’ ability to operate freely and investigate cases of corruption and human rights abuses.

  Further, the ambiguity of the law leaves room for interpretation and potential abuse by the government. Similar to the situation in Russia, where laws targeting ‘foreign agents’ have been used to restrict civil society activities, the vague language of the law could allow for further restrictions on CSOs and their ability to operate independently.

  The law may also lead to a withdrawal of funding from international foundations and donors. Given the increased risks and restrictions on civil society activities, donors may be reluctant to continue supporting organisations in Georgia, further limiting the resources available for democracy and state-building efforts.

  Overall, the draft law poses a threat to the vibrancy and autonomy of Georgian civil society. It undermines the essential role CSOs play in promoting democratic values, defending human rights and holding the government to account. It could have far-reaching consequences for Georgia’s democratic development and its relationship with the international community.

  How has civil society reacted?

  Georgian civil society has vehemently opposed the bill, seeing it as a dangerous step towards authoritarianism. This law poses a threat to critical voices and raises fears of further concentration of power in the hands of the ruling elite, as has happened in Belarus and Russia.

  No wonder the bill is also often referred to as the ‘Russian law’ – it’s seen as a precursor to outcomes similar to those seen in Russia. It’s feared that dissenting voices will be marginalised or silenced under this law, mirroring the situation in Russia where government critics often face persecution or exile. Given the consolidation of the ruling party and the erosion of democratic principles in Russia, there are concerns in Georgia that the ruling party is also seeking to consolidate power and stifle dissent. Despite some differences between both legal texts, the broader implications for democracy and civil liberties are deeply worrying.

  Georgian society, known for its pro-European and pro-democracy stance, has taken to the streets to protest against this threat. International partners, including the EU and the USA, have also criticised the law and stressed the importance of upholding democratic values.

  How has the government responded to the protests?

  The government’s response to the mass protests has been one of dismissal, demonisation and repression.

  The government has tried to discredit the protesters, particularly younger people, by suggesting they are uninformed about the law and are being manipulated. However, this is contradicted by the fact that many of the protesters, many of whom are students, are well educated and have a clear understanding of the issues at stake.

  The government has also resorted to tactics of repression and intimidation, with reports of regular arrests, beatings and pressure on people associated with the protests. Civil servants, including teachers and academics, have been threatened with the loss of their jobs if they are found to be involved in the protests. This has a chilling effect and discourages dissent.

  CSOs have been targeted with demonisation campaigns that portray them as enemies of the country. While there has been no immediate closure or direct pressure on these organisations, the hostile rhetoric and stigmatisation contribute to an environment of fear and intimidation.

  This authoritarian approach reflects a concerted effort to stifle dissent and maintain control, even at the expense of democratic principles and human rights. It threatens to further undermine confidence in institutions and exacerbate social and political tensions.

  How can the international community best support Georgian civil society?

  The international community can play a crucial role in supporting Georgian civil society at this difficult time.

  High-level visits and engagement by representatives of the EU and the USA are essential. We hope they’ll lead to tangible measures to hold accountable those members of Georgian Dream who supported this law. This could include the introduction of targeted sanctions against people responsible for undermining democratic principles. In addition, the EU should use Georgia’s official status as a candidate for EU membership to impose conditions of adherence to democratic norms and respect for human rights. Sanctions or other forms of pressure could be imposed if these principles are violated.

  It’s also crucial that the EU and the USA continue to demonstrate their unwavering support for Georgia and its pro-European aspirations. Financial assistance and political support are essential to strengthen civil society and maintain momentum in the struggle for democracy. Without this support, civil society risks being further marginalised and weakened by the government.

  A combination of diplomatic pressure, conditionality and unwavering support from the international community is needed to support Georgian civil society in its struggle for democracy and human rights.

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  Civic space in Georgia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Georgian Institute of Politics through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@GIP_ge and@nincavar10 on Twitter.

• GERMANY: ‘The rise of the far right will make things more difficult, but the EU will remain functional – for now’

  CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Müller, Executive Director of Democracy International, about the European Parliament elections and his expectations for the results in Germany.

  Democracy International is a German civil society organisation working to strengthen civic participation and direct democracy. Its goals are to give people a direct say in political decision-making and to make governments more accountable.

  What’s at stake in the European Parliament elections? 

  In 2024, more people around the world will participate in elections than ever before, setting the political course for years to come. At the same time, we are experiencing the biggest global crisis of security and democracy in decades. The number of democracies worldwide has reached a new low since 1985 and authoritarian regimes are on the rise. The human rights situation in many countries is appalling. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s threats against Taiwan also threaten global peace and security.

  In this context, the 2024 European Parliamentelections are of particular importance. The European Union (EU) is facing immense challenges as a peace project. The security challenge of Russia’s war on Ukraine influences the thematic focus of the elections. The rise of nationalist, right-wing parties in many European countries and accusations that the EU is too bureaucratic, undemocratic and out of touch with people are putting the EU under great pressure.

  Right-wing nationalist parties are exploiting these challenges by offering populist, seemingly simple solutions to these complex crises and fuelling the narrative that the EU is the cause of these problems. Debates aboutrising inflation and economic insecurity, globalisation, immigration and asylum policy are deliberately confused through disinformation in all channels, leading to uncertainty about the EU’s ability to act. As a result, right-wing parties that are critical and hostile of the EU are likely to secure close to a quarter of European Parliament seats.

  This is paradoxical, given that these challenges can only be met with a functioning EU. Strong, progressive legislation is needed to address climate, security and democracy crises. However, the expected rise of right-wing, nationalist parties is likely to lead to more blockages and delays, threatening the functioning of European democracy and the rule of law.

  The main task of all democratic parties in the European Parliament in the next legislative period will be to counter this development. Large civil society alliances and parties are urging people to vote against this trend. Following the reversal of the negative trend in voter turnout in 2019, efforts are being made to achieve at least 50 per cent turnout across the EU.

  What are the likely outcomes in Germany?

  In Germany, voter turnout has risen from a low of just 43 per cent in 2004 to 61.4 per cent in 2019, back to 1994 levels. This trend is expected to continue, particularly given that, for the first time, people between 16 and 18 will be able to vote, and two-thirds of them have said they intend to do so.

  However, higher turnout alone will not prevent the rise of right-wing parties. Predictions are that the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) could come second or third in Germany. Only the conservative Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria are far ahead in the polls. The governing parties of thetraffic-light coalition – the Social Democratic Party, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party – are expected to lose votes compared to the previous European Parliament election in 2019.

  Still, there is reason for hope: since the beginning of the year, the AfD has lost significant support in the polls. While it received 23 per cent in January 2024, it is now getting only 15 per cent. The reasons for this include a series ofscandals involving the party’s top candidate and other officials, which led to the party’sexclusion from the right-wing Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament.

  Overall, the democratic centre in Germany remains clearly in the majority in this EU election, albeit with a loss of votes compared to the AfD.

  What are the main issues likely to influence the outcome?

  The main issues in this election are Germany’s role in relation to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the question of arms supplies. The threat to security and peace is at the centre of most political debates. The second most important issue is social and economic security, often discussed in connection with immigration and asylum policy, a theme particularly fuelled by the AfD. These two issues regularly alternate in first and second place in the polls. Climate and environmental issues have lost prominence compared to 2019.

  The expected increase in voter turnout suggests a growing interest among German voters. Overall, voters’ understanding of global issues and crises and of the role of the EU has increased. However, domestic issues and opinions on national government policies remain the decisive factors accounting for voting decisions. In Germany, the outcome of the EU election is a mood indicator for national politics. Specific European issues tend to play a subordinate role.

  Are there significant differences between young and older voters, and between men and women?

  Like German society as a whole, the younger generation is not homogeneous. However, young people tend to be more supportive of the EU than older generations. Around 78 per cent of young people support the continuation of the European project, compared with 65 per cent of older people. But, according to the latest polls, young people are not expected to vote in higher numbers than older people.

  Young voters differ from older ones on several issues. While both age groups share concerns about peace and security and the impact of Russian aggression, young people are more likely to be concerned about human and civil rights and climate change. On social and economic issues, young people are particularly concerned about affordable housing, equal opportunities and protection against poverty in old age. Migration and asylum issues are less important to them.

  When it comes to gender, there is a noticeable gap in voting decisions. In Germany, women generally vote more left-progressive, while men tend to vote more conservative. This trend has intensified in recent years. The gender gap is most significant among young people. According topolls, 18 per cent of young men intend to vote for the AfD, compared to eight per cent of young women.

  What would be the consequences of the rise of the far right in the European Parliament?

  A rise of right-wing, nationalist parties in the European Parliament means the legislative body would have to deal with obstructionism and anti-EU behaviour. However, all polls predict a continued strong democratic majority for the political centre. So while the growth of the right wing will make political work more difficult and uncomfortable, the EU will remain functional, at least for the time being. Whether mainstream parties can counter the nationalist narrative remains to be seen. It will be crucial to tackle the security crises of coming years and ensure social and economic security.

  For Germany, the election is a bellwether for upcoming national elections, particularly next year’s parliamentary election. The AfD’s decline in the polls is also noticeable at the national and state levels, although less so than in the EU elections, and the reasons for this are mainly attributable to the AfD itself. At the moment, all democratic parties have ruled out cooperation with the AfD, so the risk of right-wing populists entering government remains low.

  Examples fromHungary,Italy andthe Netherlands show this is a European trend that’s been going on for a long time. All these examples have already had consequences for the rule of law, democratic freedoms, human rights and overall societal interaction.

  Germany is not immune to this, and the pressure from right-wing populist and nationalist parties and opinions is very real here as well. Political discourse is increasingly shifting towards the right. If the AfD keeps gaining ground, it will get worse.

  Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Democracy International through itswebsite orFacebook andYouTube pages, and follow@democracy_intl and@AndreasM_CGN on Twitter.

• TANZANIA: ‘The new administration is committed to ending discriminatory policies that undermine girls’ rights’

  CIVICUS speaks with Prudence Mutiso, Legal Adviser at the Center for Reproductive Rights-Africa about the Tanzanian government’s policy on pregnant and married girls in schools.

  Founded in 1992, the Center for Reproductive Rights is a global human rights organisation of lawyers and advocates seeking to ensure the protection of reproductive rights as basic human rights fundamental to the dignity, equality, health and wellbeing of every person.

  The Center works across five continents and has played a critical role in securing legal victories on reproductive rights issues, including access to life-saving obstetrics care, contraception, maternal health and safe abortion services, as well as the prevention of forced sterilisation and child marriage, in national courts, United Nations’ committees and regional human rights bodies.

• TURKEY: ‘The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own’

  CIVICUS speaks with lawyer Eren Keskin, chair of the Human Rights Association (IHD), about the Turkish government’s attacks on critical media and the state of press freedoms in the context of Turkey’s current elections.

  Founded in 1986, IHD is one of Turkey’s oldest and largest human rights civil society organisations. It documents human rights violations and campaigns for the protection of human rights and civic freedoms in Turkey.

  What are the conditions for journalism in Turkey?

  Problems in the area of freedom of expression have existed in Turkey since the foundation of the republic. From the very beginning there were issues that the republic’s official ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis prohibited speaking about. Issues such as the Kurdish conflict, the 1915 Armenian Genocide and, later on, Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus, have long been forbidden topics.

  What’s changed under the present government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party is that the opposition’s freedom of expression has been severely restricted across the board. As a result, obstacles have mounted for opposition journalists to express their views.

  The government does not tolerate opinions different from its own. It recklessly issues arrest warrants for articles, speeches and social media messages if they express diverging opinions. The state of Turkey recognises freedom of expression in its domestic legislation and is bound to respect it as a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it continues to violate its own laws and the international conventions and covenants it has signed.

  What tactics does the government use against independent media and how have you been affected?

  Because it does not tolerate any kind of diverging opinion, the government is extremely aggressive towards independent media and the free press, the majority of which are Kurdish media outlets.

  Dissident journalists are commonly charged with making propaganda for an illegal organisation. Particularly with news reports on the Kurdish war, most lawsuits are filed on charges of making propaganda for the Kurdish political movement or Kurdish armed forces. Apart from this, a large number of cases are filed on charges of insulting the president, insulting the forces of the state and inciting the public to hatred and enmity.

  Many journalists are under arrest or subject to international travel bans merely for expressing their thoughts in writing. There is almost no journalist who is not being subjected to judicial control.

  I was once the volunteer editor-in-chief of the daily Özgür Gündem, one of the newspapers that has faced the most repression, and have stood trial in 143 cases just because my name appeared on the newspaper as volunteer editor-in-chief.

  I’ve been sentenced to a total of 26 years and nine months in prison for alleged crimes such as membership of an illegal organisation, making propaganda for an illegal organisation and insulting the president, even for articles I did not write. These sentences are pending a decision of the Court of Cassation. As soon as they are final, I may go to prison. I have also been unable to travel abroad for six years now because of an international travel ban.

  Has the intensification of repression affected the popularity of the president in any way?

  Considering that the ruling regime is the main culprit for all the rights violations currently taking place in Turkey, and that power is concentrated in the hands of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it must be admitted that the main perpetrator of rights violations is the president himself. The judiciary is completely dependent on the president. Judges and prosecutors render compliant decisions out of fear. Where judges and prosecutors are afraid, it is unthinkable for the judiciary to be independent.

  The president’s attitude towards the press, especially the opposition press, and the language of hatred and violence he uses, does not detract from his popularity but is instead a major reason his followers support him. However, we think that a large part of society, hopefully a growing part, is also disturbed by his blatant violations of freedom of expression.

  What do you make of the results of the 14 May general election?

  The AKP had relative success in the presidential and parliamentary elections held on 14 May. The president did better than expected, considering the economic situation and the criticism he’s faced over the response to the earthquakes in February. His party has maintained control of parliament. But he didn’t win re-election outright: he received 49.5 per cent of the vote while his opposition challenger, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) received almost 45 per cent. Now there’s going to be a runoff on 28 May.

  None of this should come as a surprise. Society has become extremely polarised, especially as a result of Erdoğan’s rhetoric of fear, hatred and violence. We also witnessed many practices that violated the constitution and electoral laws, such as government ministers becoming parliamentary candidates without resigning and therefore using state resources for campaigning. The ruling party monopolises a large part of the media and used it exclusively on its own behalf. The elections were therefore held under extremely unequal conditions.

  It’s hard to predict what the outcome of the runoff will be. The election may end in favour of Erdoğan or Kılıçdaroğlu. Much will depend on the practices that develop during the election.

  How will the situation of vulnerable minorities in Turkey be affected by the election results?

  Erdoğan uses language that is completely against human rights and the AKP has retained its parliamentary majority by coalescing with an extremist party. The situation will become dangerous if Erdoğan wins once again, especially for women, LGBTQI+ people and Kurdish people.

  Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence – has already affected the feminist movement a lot. Now Law No. 6,284 on violence against women is being questioned. This poses a great danger for women and LGBTQI+ people.

  Similarly, if Erdoğan wins again, pro-security approaches to the Kurdish issue will continue to dominate, preventing progress towards peace.

  As for Syrian asylum-seekers, the AKP presents itself as having provided a good environment for them, but it is not really the case. Asylum-seekers in Turkey do not qualify as refugees because of the state’s reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. They are subjected to racist attacks. They work as cheap labour in extremely difficult conditions. Women and girls live under permanent risk of violence. An AKP win will not give them a chance.

  But it must be noted that the CHP’s proposal regarding refugees is not any more democratic or inclusive, and its discourse also has racist overtones. Therefore, first and foremost, the discriminatory, double-standard approach to the Refugee Convention should be questioned.

  What kinds of domestic or international support do Turkish independent media and journalists currently receive, and what more would you need?

  Journalists working in independent media in Turkey, and especially in Kurdistan, are clearly not receiving sufficient international support. The Republic of Turkey is a state party to many international conventions that guarantee freedoms of expression and the press. The state has committed to respecting them on paper, but it violates them in practice. All these conventions have monitoring mechanisms, but unfortunately, they are not being properly implemented for Turkey. In this sense, the European Union has left Turkey alone.

  We believe that Turkey should be questioned more, especially by western media organisations and by Turkey’s co-signatory states of international rights conventions, to contribute to the lifting of repressive measures against the dissident press.

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  Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Association through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihd_genelmerkez on Twitter.