nationalism

• ARMENIA: ‘As people leave their homes in search of safety, humanitarian organisations must support their basic needs’

  CIVICUS speaks about the civil society humanitarian response to the Azerbaijani blockade and military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh – the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians – withShushanik Nersesyan,Media and Communication Manager at People in Need (PIN) Armenia.

  Founded in 1992 bya group of journalists involved in the 1989 Czechoslovak ‘Velvet Revolution’, PIN is a civil society organisation (CSO) working in the fields of humanitarian aid, human rights, education and social work. Since it was established in 2003, its permanent office in Armenia has worked to strengthen Armenian people’s abilities to improve their lives and the communities they live in.

  How did the Azerbaijani blockade affect people in Nagorno-Karabakh?

  It all started in December 2022, when Azerbaijani civilians identifying themselves as environmental activists began obstructing the Lachin corridor, which links Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In April 2023 Azerbaijan set up an official checkpoint that largely cut off the passage of people and goods between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Once it was under Azeri control, it was possible to use the corridor only in exceptionally urgent cases, through the intermediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or Russian peacekeepers.

  On 29 July Azerbaijani authorities abducted V Khachatryan, a 68-year-old Nagorno-Karabakh resident who was being evacuated by the ICRC for urgent medical treatment through the Lachin corridor. Khachatryan remains in captivity. Another incident occurred in late August when three Nagorno-Karabakh students were captured by Azerbaijani border guards while travelling to Armenia via the corridor. They were only released 10 days later. Free movement of people to Armenia became impossible.

  The prolonged blockade led to a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of essential goods – including electricity, fuel and water – and the closure of basic services. People in Need, along with Action Against Hunger and Médecins du Monde France, condemned it but, regrettably, our efforts to open to road for the trucks with food to Nagorno-Karabakh were thwarted.

  The situation changed with the shelling that caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent people on 19 and 20 September. Since 24 September, over 100,000 people have fled Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian regions, where they are also facing an emergency situation due to food and hygiene needs, plus longer-term issues of housing, education and jobs.

  How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?

  CSOs including PIN deployed humanitarian projects to help blockade-affected people. CSOs conducted visits and issued statements. In Kornidzor, on the border, representatives from dozens of Armenian CSOs gathered during the blockade, urging the international community to uphold human rights and ensure the passage of humanitarian aid for civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The unimpeded delivery of essential goods, including food, hygiene items, medicine and fuel, as well as the unrestricted movement of people, including critically ill patients, are fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law.

  What work is PIN doing in this context?

  Since 1992, as a newly established organisation, PIN has been there to help people affected by the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from February 1988 to May 1994. We have actively contributed to the growth of Armenian civil society, which has remained resilient throughout this crisis. We coordinate our efforts with the government and local authorities to closely monitor the situation on the ground and carry out numerous humanitarian projects.

  We continue assisting the most vulnerable populations. Since September 2020, we have provided essential humanitarian aid and long-term efforts for the social and economic integration of thousands of people.

  As a humanitarian organisation, we advocate for rights and a peaceful resolution of conflicts in adherence with international law. Along with our partners, we have expressed our concerns, called for measures to prevent the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe and continuously raised internal and donor funds to help people in need.

  When people started fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh, we immediately mobilised PIN funds to support the first recipient centre in the Syunik border region to deliver aid such as food, clothes and blankets to forcibly displaced people and create a special space for children’s activities while their parents dealt with registration and searching for accommodation. Additionally, we launched the SOS Armenia appeal and new humanitarian assistance projects funded by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, the Netherlands Refugee Foundation, Start Network and USAID.

  As people continue to leave their homes in search of safety without being able to take their belongings, humanitarian organisations must continue providing assistance to support their basic needs.

  Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with People in Need Armenia through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@PIN_Armenia on Twitter.

• ARMENIA: ‘Lack of compelling international action allowed the attack on Nagorno-Karabakh to occur’

  CIVICUS speaks about the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh– the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians –withLida Minasyan, a feminist peace activist and Resource Mobilisation Consultant at theCentral Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central and North Asia (CEECCNA) Collaborative Fund.

  Founded in 2022, the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund is a feminist fund that mobilises sustainable resources for social justice movements across the CEECCNA region.

  What is the current security and human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh?

  The ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was forcibly displaced within days of the Azerbaijani government launching a full-scale attack on 19 September. A week later, 100,632 people had arrived in Armenia, having left behind their homes, their belongings and the lives they had built.

  Several actions deliberately targeted against civilians occurred before the start of the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, leaving the 120,000 Armenians who lived there completely isolated. People endured nine months of severe food insecurity, fuel shortages, electricity outages, communications breakdowns and medical supply shortages. This resulted in a humanitarian crisis that put people, particularly those with vulnerabilities, at risk. Many pregnant women had miscarriages and stillbirths, people with chronic illnesses couldn’t receive their medication and treatment, and risk of infection increased due to the lack of hygiene products. These were just a few of the severe challenges people faced during the blockade.

  The Lachin road was reopened several days after the Azerbaijani offensive, when people, already traumatised and starving, experienced a direct threat to their lives. They had no choice but to leave their homes in search of safety in Armenia.

  Why did Azerbaijan initiate the blockade and military offensive?

  The nine-month blockade and the offensive were meant to achieve the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. The intentional deprivation of essential resources for survival followed by the direct attack to take over Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the creation of conditions for the Armenian population to leave, indicate that Azerbaijan is not contemplating any peaceful end to the conflict or human rights guarantees for Armenian people to feel safe in their homes and continue living in Nagorno-Karabakh.

  By leveraging additional threats against Armenians and Armenian sovereign territories, demonstrating its military power, and consistently introducing new conditions in the negotiation process with Armenia, Azerbaijan intends to assert its dominance. This approach reinforces a policy of hatred towards Armenians spanning decades and undermines the peacebuilding process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

  How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?

  Displaced people endured a journey of over 20 hours to reach Armenia, during which they had no access to food, water or sanitation facilities. As a result, most of them arrived thirsty, hungry and in need of medical attention. When they began arriving, local organisations, activists and volunteers were among the first to give them food, hygiene products and assistance to register for the state support system.

  Local civil society organisations engage in continuous needs assessments of displaced people, using dynamic data collection approaches, as the situation is changing rapidly. In addition to the immediate provision of goods, there are medium and long-term needs to address. Displaced people need psychological assistance to overcome trauma, sustainable medical support, permanent housing, access to education and employment and services to prevent and address gender-based violence.

  As part of the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund, we provide timely updates about the situation to our international partners and mobilise and direct resources to local organisations. Due to limited resources, Armenian civil society activists worked under a lot of pressure because they had to initiate fundraising efforts while simultaneously providing emergency response.

  The Armenian government has provided displaced people with one-time financial support, essential products and access to temporary accommodation. For all its good intentions, however, the government also lacks resources and capacity to provide adequate long-term assistance to displaced people.

  Has the international community’s response been adequate?

  The response has been slow and inadequate. A few months into the blockade, the international community refused to call the situation a humanitarian crisis and many turned a blind eye to the deteriorating conditions of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population.

  After numerous appeals and demands from civil society, some international agencies began releasing statements urging the Azerbaijani government to open the Lachin corridor. They mainly referred to the International Court of Justice’s orders of 22 February and 6 July 2023, which unequivocally mandated Azerbaijan to ensure unrestricted movement of people, vehicles and cargo along the corridor in both directions.

  Despite these decisions, the road remained blocked. A group of four United Nations experts also expressed their concern about the continued closure of the Lachin corridor and called on the Azerbaijani authorities to promptly reinstate unimpeded and safe movement along the road, as stipulated by the November 2020 ceasefire agreement.

  The lack of more compelling action by the international community created an unhindered environment for the attack to occur. Many organisations are currently responding by issuing new alerts and appeals, along with providing much-needed humanitarian support. However, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia require sustainable peace and human security, which will only be achievable through a negotiation that is inclusive of the voices of those most profoundly affected by the conflict. We advocate specifically for the inclusion of women in formal negotiations, in order to pave the way to sustainable peace.

  The international community’s crisis-response support is highly appreciated, but it should be complemented by long-term funding for dialogue, peacebuilding and the reestablishment of human security. Armenian civil society working to alert about potential risks of conflict escalation on the borders of Armenia could also benefit from their support.

  Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Learn more aboutCEECCNA Collaborative Fund in thisblog.

• AUSTRIA: ‘A new civil society coalition is emerging to defend democracy against extremism’

  CIVICUS speaks about the growth of the far right in Austria withGabriela Greilinger, PhD Student at the University of Georgia, USA and co-founder and director Quo Vademus,a grassroots think tank publishing analysis by young writers and encouraging young people to engage with politics and current affairs.

  What are the main far-right groups in Austria, and how concerning is their recent growth?

  The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is the main far-right political party, but there are other groups outside the party system that are also ideologically far right and are considered very close to the FPÖ, such as Identitarian Movement Austria. Freiheitliche Jugend (Freedom Party Youth of Austria), the youth wing of the FPÖ, also maintains close links to the Identitarian Movement. There are also right-wing extremist fraternities, such as Olympia, which are similarly closely connected to the FPÖ.

  The FPÖ’s recent rise in the polls is not really a novelty but rather a recurrence. Since its founding after the Second World War, it has been included as a coalition partner in government several times and has risen and fallen in popularity over the years. It plummeted in the polls following the 2019 Ibiza scandal – in which FPÖ politicians were filmed appearing to offer business contracts in return for support – and other corruption allegations, and the breakup of the far-right coalition government led by Sebastian Kurz, which included the right-wing conservative, Christian-democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) along with the FPÖ. After that, the Austrian Freedom Party went through several leadership changes.

  Several factors jointly account for the FPÖ’s most recent surge in the polls. First came the COVID-19 pandemic, during which it positioned itself as a strong opposition to the public health measures put in place by the ÖVP-Greens coalition government, including mandatory testing and vaccinations. It openly supported anti-lockdown demonstrations, bringing together people from both right and left.

  Then, in 2021, corruption allegations around then-ÖVP chancellor Kurz emerged, which played into the hands of the FPÖ, helping it regain its popularity. This was followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which led to an energy crisis and soaring prices in Austria, a country traditionally highly dependent on Russian gas.

  As a result, inflation surged further and exacerbated economic anxieties, which have remained largely unaddressed by the current government. All of this has helped the FPÖ regain its popularity, so much so that in November 2022 it surpassed the Social Democrats in the polls and has polled around 30 per cent since. Forecasts predict that it will come in first in this year’s elections and, if so, it would for the first time in history be able to appoint the chancellor.

  What public concerns is the FPÖ tapping into?

  Immigration is certainly one of the main issues the FPÖ keeps coming back to, but not the only one.  The FPÖ also engages in ‘culture war’ politics, taking on issues such as gender-inclusive language and LGBTQI+ rights.

  Over the past couple of years, in the context of rising inflation following the pandemic and during the war in Ukraine, it has also increasingly tapped into people’s financial anxieties.

  Overall, though, it doesn’t present any viable solutions to people’s concerns but rather attacks and smears political opponents, trying to present itself as the clean alternative to what it calls the ‘system parties’ – a term formerly used by Nazis. Social media, specifically Facebook, is one of the main platforms it uses to spread their messages.

  How have Austrian civil society and public opinion reacted to this rise of the far right?

  The far right has long been mainstreamed and normalised in Austria, among other reasons because of its repeated inclusion in government. That means its rise, while concerning, is not necessarily surprising or shocking to most people. We’ve seen it happen before. Still, time and again there have been protests against the far right – in 2017, for instance, people mobilised against the inclusion of the FPÖ in the right-wing Kurz government.

  However, civil society and its leaders have again become more outspoken in recent weeks, after the German investigative outlet Correctiv reported on a secretive meeting known as the Lehnitzsee Conference that took place last November in Germany, in which right-wing extremists, businesspeople and even some members of the mainstream conservative Christian Democratic Union discussed plans to expel millions of people deemed not sufficiently ‘assimilated’ to the majority society. A notorious Austrian extremist, Martin Sellner, took part in the event, implicating the Austrian extreme-right scene.

  This far-right meeting triggered large-scale anti-far-right demonstrations in Germany, which inspired Austrians to organise protests in Vienna and other cities across the country. Although the protests were fewer and smaller in size than Germany’s, many people mobilised.

  We have also seen the emergence of a new civil society coalition to defend democracy against extremism. In response to the revelations about the Lehnitzsee Conference, several civil society organisations formed the Coalition for Human Rights and Democracy (Bündnis für Menschenrechte und Demokratie) to ‘create a firewall’ against right-wing extremism. It then also organised a demonstration in defence of democracy in the city of Graz.

  How has the government reacted to the rise of the far right?

  As of today, we’ve seen little reaction or attempts by the government to curtail the far right. It’s been rather the opposite: the ÖVP has long adopted the messages of the far right on immigration and largely appropriated the FPÖ’s depiction of immigrants. And although the current chancellor, Karl Nehammer, had said he would not enter a coalition that includes FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl, a hardliner, he has not completely ruled it out after this year’s election.

  As it stands, the FPÖ is set to win the election and a relaunch of another ÖVP-FPÖ coalition seems to be the most likely option. All in all, I see the government making very little effort to avert the far-right danger. If anything, the ÖVP is trying to take the wind out of the FPÖ’s sails by co-opting its agenda and programme. This is not weakening the far right but rather mainstreaming its policy points and making it part of the ‘normal’ public debate – which it shouldn’t be.

  What forms of international support does Austrian civil society need to sustain its efforts?

  I believe that there could and should be more international cooperation between civil society organisations that are addressing right-wing extremism and racism. Further, more positive media coverage is needed of civil society efforts to mobilise in defence of democracy to divert the focus from the far right. While it is true that the far right has once again made significant advances, the media continues to focus disproportionately on far-right successes, potential future successes, positions and discourse, simply giving it too much airtime. In contrast, there is much less focus on the forces standing up for democracy and civil society’s efforts to respond to extremism.

  At the end of the day, as the slogan used in the German protests goes, ‘Wir sind mehr’ (We are more). We are the majority, even if at times a silent one – and not the far-right supporters and sympathisers.

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  Civic space in Austria is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Quo Vademus through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow @ggreilinger @quovademusorg on Twitter.

• GERMANY: ‘Our response to internationally networked far-right groups must also be globally interconnected’

  CIVICUS speaks about the rise of the far right in Germany with Peter Anhalt, director of the right-wing extremism department, and Maximilian Ruf, director of the research department, at Violence Prevention Network.

  Founded in 2004, Violence Prevention Network is one of Europe’s largest civil society organisations (CSOs)working to prevent and counter violent extremism.

  What are the main far-right groups in Germany, and what’s their agenda?

  There are diverse far-right groups that converge on social media platforms such as Telegram and gaming platforms while also networking offline in various ways. For example, the pan-European, anti-Islam, far-right political movement Pegida – Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West – and its offshoots regularly assemble for rallies and demonstrations.

  Alongside Germany’s biggest far-right political party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), there are several small parties on the far-right and right-wing extremist spectrum at the national level, including III. Weg (The Third Way), Die Heimat (The Homeland) and Die Rechte (The Right), and at the regional level, such as Freie Sachsen (Free Saxons).

  Additionally, there are right-wing extremist groups in organised crime milieus, often well-connected with local biker scenes and kickboxing or martial arts communities, as well as with conventional communal structures.

  Representatives of the so-called New Right, such as Götz Kubitschek’s Institute for State Policy and the Identitarian Movement led by Martin Sellner, have provided right-wing extremism with a seemingly intellectual and modern facade, even though there is little novelty in their ideology. Terms like ‘ethnopluralism’, ‘New World Order’ and ‘remigration’ simply give a new look to racist, antisemitic and misanthropic ways of thinking.

  Organisations such as the Hammerskins, the Brotherhood Thuringia (Turonen), NSU 2.0 and the Patriotic Union continue to pose a significant threat. The Patriotic Union, uncovered by the authorities in late 2022, is an eclectic personal and ideological mix of right-wing extremism, esotericism, conspiracy ideologies and sovereignist thinking tied to the so-called Reichsbürger scene (Citizens of the Empire). The suspected members of this organisation are currently on trial, accused of membership of a terrorist organisation and a violent plot to overthrow the German state, among other charges.

  All these far-right groups hold an exclusionary, discriminatory and racist view of humanity combined with antisemitism and misogyny. Despite having diverging positions on some issues, they’re all united in their rejection of and opposition to the basic liberal order and democratic institutions.

  Why has support for AfD grown so much in recent years?

  AfD serves as a bridge for bringing into parliament ideas that delegitimise democracy. At a time of uncertainty and crisis, party members provide supposedly simple solutions, stir up resentment and appeal to people who might be open to authoritarian responses. What’s noteworthy about AfD is that, unlike most other far-right parties in Europe, it has grown in popularity while at the same time becoming increasingly and openly radicalised. Rather than this deterring voters, the party has grown in popularity.

  As with any divisive political movement, AfD and other far-right groups exploit uncertainties around pressing issues. At the core of their agenda is restricting the rights of migrants and refugees, ignoring the fact that Germany needs more immigration to stabilise its economy and ensure future prosperity.

  The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent anti-pandemic measures also became a central rallying point for conspiratorial groups, many of which aligned with far-right authoritarian ideologies that, after a first moment of uncertainty, further fuelled AfD.

  AfD, in line with other far-right groups, also deny the human-caused nature of climate change and the need to address it, often portraying environmental efforts as ‘attacks on regular people’ who prefer to drive petrol cars and cannot afford to live in ‘ivory towers’. They also resist other progressive causes such as gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights, smearing LGBTQI+ people as a threat to children while framing any steps towards further antidiscrimination and equality measures as attacks on traditional families and their way of life.

  Recently, farmers’ protests against agricultural subsidy cuts have inadvertently attracted far-right support. In some regions, a combination of farmers and far-right protesters has resulted in threatening actions, such as gallows parades and symbolic executions of members of the governing coalition. Their narratives have blended farmers’ grievances with other issues aimed at channelling hate against the current government.

  It is important to note that most of the farmers very credibly distanced themselves from such co-option attempts. However, this shows how AfD and related far-right groups continuously try to hijack existing grievances and concerns by a variety of societal groups that can be framed as ‘the regular people’ in an attempt to pit them against existing democratic institutions.

  What triggered recent protests against AfD?

  Recent mass protests were triggered by an investigative report by independent media organisation Correctiv about a meeting held in a hotel near Potsdam in November 2023, where high-ranking AfD members were present alongside neo-Nazis and businesspeople sympathetic to the cause of mass deportation of people viewed by them as non-ethnic Germans. Martin Sellner, among others, spoke about a proposal for so-called ‘remigration’, which would effectively mean the forced expulsion of millions of people with migratory backgrounds currently living in Germany, including German citizens.

  The article, published in German on 10 January, was a wake-up call. It sparked relatively spontaneous mass protests against AfD and right-wing extremism across Germany. Even though there was nothing new about the ideas discussed there, including ‘remigration’, and AfD’s support for them, the way the report presented the meeting as a ‘secret plan against Germany’ prompted broader sections of German society to recognise the real threat posed by right-wing extremism to a pluralistic society and liberal democracy.

  How has the government reacted to this?

  Most democratic parties, including the governing coalition, have long sought to reduce support for the far right by attempting to address the concerns it raises. This has led to, for example, a more stringent stance on migration. However, the adoption of far-right narratives to diminish the appeal of the original proponents never works out. People usually stick with the original message-bearers, as evidenced by the rising poll numbers for AfD in Germany.

  Although the German government has funded prevention and counter-extremism initiatives over the past two decades, only recently did it increase funding for measures explicitly targeted against right-wing extremism, following a period in which the focus was on Islamist extremism. Several new cabinet and ministerial action plans against right-wing extremism have now been initiated, but it will take time for progress to be made.

  We hope for a continuous and comprehensive strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism of any type, avoiding fluctuations in funds based on attention waves. This would enable us to remain vigilant against all threats to democracy. A potential new law for the promotion of democracy may serve as the basis for this.

  How is your organisation working to address extremist threats?

  In Germany, many CSOs working to respond to extremist threats, including Violence Prevention Network, are substantially funded by the federal government and local authorities. This allows us to implement comprehensive measures to promote democracy, prevent extremism, deradicalise young people and provide support for people to disengage.

  For instance, we hold intercultural and interreligious workshops in schools. These focus on strengthening young people’s self-esteem, fostering an appreciation of diversity and promoting respectful behaviour. We provide training for professionals who work with young people, equipping them to identify and counter extremist arguments early on. These courses also offer strategies for building a trusting relationship with young people at risk of radicalisation and preventing radicalisation. Further, we operate mobile counselling and intervention teams that help deradicalise young people, including within the prison system. We work to identify people at risk of extremism and facilitate disengagement processes with the involvement of their friends and families.

  In addition, we carry out a lot of work online and focus on providing young people with information and opportunities for support in disengaging from the extremist scene. We aim to reintegrate those at risk into the democratic community to prevent incidents where they cause harm to themselves or others.

  What additional support does German civil society need to sustain these efforts?

  Over the past two decades, western states have invested billions in the global south to foster democracy, facilitate peacebuilding and deter violence that poses a threat to western interests. However, the largest current threat is posed by right-wing extremist movements operating within western countries. Security and development spending hasn’t adapted to this evolving trend and hasn’t been sufficiently allocated to countries like Germany, where the far-right movements are based, operate and are growing in popularity. This situation requires an urgent shift in approach. If conventional funding sources cannot be adjusted, it is essential to collaboratively explore alternative funding methods.

  Given the internationally networked character of violent far-right groups, our response must also be globally interconnected. The strengthening of German civil society initiatives focused on advancing rights and pluralism through exchanging knowledge, building partnerships, promoting innovative approaches and channelling appropriate funding will contribute to a more robust global response to the shared challenge of right-wing extremism.

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  Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Violence Prevention Network through itswebsite and follow it on LinkedIn.

• GERMANY: ‘The far right is instrumentalising protests triggered by completely legitimate concerns’

  CIVICUS speaks about the rise of the far right in Germany with Jakob Guhl, Senior Manager, Policy and Research at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD).

  Founded in 2006, ISD is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to safeguard human rights and reverse the rising tide of polarisation, extremism and disinformation worldwide.

  What are the major far-right groups in Germany?

  Currently, the major far-right political party is Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has just achieved its highest-ever results in national polls, standing at around 22 per cent. In some East German states with elections coming later this year, AfD leads polls with over 30 per cent.

  There are also more traditional neo-Nazi parties such as The Homeland (NPD). Although it is still quite active, it isn’t very relevant anymore. It’s considered an anti-constitutional extremist party and for this reason, the Constitutional Court recently ruled that the government is allowed to withhold federal funding from it.

  Additionally, there is a broad network of loose groups known as the ‘new right’ that includes the Identitarian Movement, which the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has designated as a right-wing extremist threat. The ‘new right’ is essentially made up of ethno-nationalists who assert that the German identity is an ethnic identity. They extensively use social media to bring their ideas into the mainstream and shift public discourse on topics like immigration and integration.

  In terms of narratives and policies, AfD is becoming increasingly indistinguishable from these ethno-nationalist groups, as evidenced by its recent secret meeting to discuss plans for mass deportation of people living in Germany, including German citizens, whom they view as ethnically non-German.

  How do far-right groups spread their messages?

  There are significant interactions among ethno-nationalist groups on a personal level. They engage with each other by attending conferences, participating in podcasts and writing prefaces for each other’s books. Some even work as assistants for AfD members of parliament.

  Both the ‘new right’ and AfD have been aptly using social media for many years. According to a comparative analysis we did in 2019, AfD significantly outperformed major political parties for views, likes and engagement. This trend continues today, and they also leverage YouTube or newer platforms like TikTok, which attract many young people, so they are able to reach even larger audiences.

  Their messages focus on highly emotive issues, such as ‘migrant crimes’ and ‘threats to German traditions’, which tap into cultural elements that provoke strong reactions and anger. For instance, they portray the Greens, an environmental political party, as detached elites comfortably situated in central Berlin, pushing their green policies without understanding the reality of ordinary people. This populist communication style has proved effective, and it’s further amplified by the dynamics of social media algorithms that reward outrage, sensationalism and emotional content.

  What public concerns has AfD tapped into?

  When AfD was established in 2013, its main focus was opposition to European Union (EU) and German policies in response to the financial crisis. It was born as an anti-EU and anti-Euro party that advocated against providing financial support to Greece and other countries particularly affected by the crisis, and against the EU collective debt mechanism.

  Starting in 2015, with the beginning of the so-called migration crisis, AfD shifted towards an anti-refugee and anti-Muslim discourse, depicting Islam and Muslims as alien to Germany. AfD politicians openly cooperated with the pan-European, anti-Islam, far-right political movement Pegida – an acronym for ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West’. AfD members frequently appear as speakers at their events.

  During the mass protests that took place against measures to curb the spread of COVID-19, AfD was part of a broad coalition promoting COVID-19 denial and anti-lockdown narratives. The coalition included ‘new right’ groups, Holocaust deniers and conspiracy theorists, among others.

  Recently, AfD and other far-right groups have tried to hijack and instrumentalise farmers’ protests over subsidy cuts, seeing them as an opportunity to undermine the government. While far-right symbols and AfD speakers have been present in these protests, the official associations of farmers have clearly distanced themselves from the far right. It is important not to stigmatise the farmers’ movement as a whole as being infiltrated by the far right, as they have completely legitimate concerns about agricultural subsidy cuts, while at the same time being alert to far-right attempts to hijack these protests.

  What accounts for AfD’s growing popularity?

  The popularity of the AfD stagnated during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 federal elections. However, starting in early 2023, it has gained momentum. The AfD often diverges from the positions of major established parties on critical issues. For instance, it has opposed German military support for Ukraine, questioned scientific consensus on climate change and rejected green policies. Their most recent surge in popularity can be in part be attributed to people’s heightened concerns about immigration, which is visible in surveys from mid-2023.

  At the same time, AfD has radicalised, partially due to its relationship with ethno-nationalist groups, which has led to its monitoring by BfV as a potential threat to the constitution. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied by a trend of increasing normalisation and popularisation of AfD among the public. This tension is at the heart of today’s German politics.

  Has AfD encountered any progressive resistance?

  As it has grown in popularity, AfD has also encountered resistance, as attested by the ongoing protests against AfD’s mass deportation plans in numerous cities and towns. Protesters form a broad coalition comprising political parties, churches, unions, local initiatives supporting refugees, left-wing and anti-fascist groups and climate change activists like Fridays for Future.

  This diverse protest movement also has internal contradictions. In a Munich rally, some speakers criticised the government for its migration policies, which they attributed to an attempt to win back voters from AfD by taking a hardline approach. Left-leaning activists argue that such policies will only pave the way for even more extreme anti-migrant measures. Despite these tensions, however, the coalition remains broad and maintains significant popular support.

  How is ISD working to address extremist threats in Germany?

  One of the things our Berlin office focuses on is digital literacy and media competencies initiatives. In the age of social media, it’s crucial for people to critically assess credible sources of information, be aware of manipulation tactics and understand how disinformation spreads and coordinated networks amplify specific narratives. Our goal is not to tell people what to think but to provide them with tools for critical evaluation of information sources, narratives, communication tactics and rhetorical styles.

  For example, the Berlin office is actively involved in the Business Council for Democracy project, collaborating with digital literacy experts to educate adults. Many similar initiatives primarily target young people, who are often digital natives, but the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories online can affect people of all ages. We engage employers, which many people still trust, unlike political parties and media.

  What forms of support do you receive, and what further support do you need?

  Our cooperation with the government encompasses a wide range of initiatives. Various German federal ministries have provided funding for our research on antisemitism and far-right extremism and funded projects related to political education.

  One major recent issue is the budgetary crisis and disagreement within the governing coalition on how to address it. The same budget cuts that have affected subsidies for farmers also impact on agencies dedicated to political education and projects on democracy promotion and the prevention of radicalisation. Unfortunately, this funding reduction comes at an inopportune time, coinciding with the rise of the far right and the normalisation of extremist ideas.

  Compared to other countries, the German state used to extensively support civil society initiatives. It’s a double-edged sword: while it’s positive that the government invests in civil society, it has also made German CSOs somewhat dependent on the state. The budgetary crisis has disrupted the financial sustainability of many organisations, which are now unsure whether they will be able to continue their work as effectively and on the same scale.

  While German CSOs could benefit from international donor support, it’s also crucial to facilitate greater knowledge exchange among activists and networks from different parts of the world. Despite variations in intensity, many countries face similar challenges of the mainstreaming of far-right ideas through social media, harassment of activists and elected officials, and local-level political violence.

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  Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with ISD through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ISDglobal onTwitter.

• INDIA: ‘The once-cosmopolitan state of Manipur is now divided into two rival communities’

  

  CIVICUS speaks about ethnic violence and a humanitarian crisis in the Indian state of Manipur withMangneo Lhungdim and Sulekha Thapa, Executive Director and Deputy Director of Oasis India.

  Founded in 1994, Oasis India is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to prevent human trafficking and other forms of violence against women and children and support people so they can flourish in their community. Oasis India has also been involved inemergency relief work in Manipur.

   

  What triggered ethnic violence in Manipur state?

  Manipur and a few other northeastern states of India endured severe ethnic violence until the mid-1990s and into the early 2000s. But over the past two decades rights-based reconciliation and development efforts gained momentum, including infrastructure development initiatives that ultimately benefited local communities.

  In this new context, the conflict between the majority Meitei people living in the Imphal Valley and the Kuki-Zo tribal community from the surrounding hills, now into its eighth month, could definitely have been prevented. As retired military and police officers have claimed, public order could and should have been restored within the first month of the conflict in May 2023. The state administration, supported by central security forces, had the capacity to contain the violence and prevent further displacement and killings.

  The conflict is believed to be a collateral outcome of valley Meitei people demanding inclusion on the Scheduled Tribes list under the Constitution of India, which tribal communities interpreted as an attempt to grab their land. On 3 May 2023, the tribals of Manipur, under the aegis of All Tribal Students Union Manipur, carried out a protest march in most hill districts, including Churachandpur. Violent incidents during the Churachandpur march spiralled and spread statewide, turning into senseless killings, arson and displacement.

  It’s difficult to identify particular reasons behind this outbreak of violence since the media coverage was initially limited and subsequent reports by independent journalists gave mixed messages and focused primarily on day-to-day events. Nevertheless, the government must fully acknowledge its responsibility and admit that it bears significant blame for such escalation of a latent ethnic conflict.

  The once-cosmopolitan state of Manipur is now divided into two rival communities and there’s no prospect of the conflict ending any time soon, as there are no substantial peacebuilding efforts by the state or national government. The only hope of restoring normality in life and livelihoods in Manipur comes from collaborative efforts undertaken by local CSOs and leaders.

  What’s the current situation on the ground?

  The situation is relatively more stable now than during the initial three to four months of the conflict, but it still remains challenging. The deployment of over 50,000 central security personnel has led to increased militarisation.

  The violence affects every aspect of the lives of people of all ages.

  Agriculture is the primary occupation in the region, but a majority of farmers missed the sowing and harvest seasons due to curfew regulations and lack of resources. This has deprived them of earnings to meet the basic needs of their families and resulted in shortages of staples.

  Over 60,000 people have been forcibly displaced and currently stay in camps where CSOs are the primary providers of humanitarian aid. Road communications from Manipur’s capital city, Imphal, to affected districts are severed, which complicates the delivery of relief and affects local businesses.

  The strict curfew forced schools to close, causing children to miss several months of education and delaying the start of the new academic year. Healthcare services have also been disrupted. Even burying the dead was impossible for a long period, though some improvement has been noted over the past few days, when the remains of 64 people were taken back to their homelands.

  The emotional impact on the residents of Manipur is profound. People have lived in fear and anxiety for a long time, and many have lost family members or their homes.

  How has Indian civil society, including Oasis, worked to address the humanitarian crisis?

  Several Indian CSOs have responded to the humanitarian needs in both the hills and valley districts of Manipur. In the hill districts, the primary providers have been local churches, national aid agencies, volunteers and philanthropic organisations. Many families continue to rely on supplies and assistance provided by civil society and the neighbouring states of Assam, Mizoram and Nagaland.

  Civil society is working to improve the lives of internally displaced people sheltered in relief camps. Those in Churachandpur, for instance, receive vocational training, including tailoring and computer courses. Those who already have specific skills are provided with craft materials such as wool and weaving sets, to knit sweaters and woollen caps, while others have received bamboo wood and plastic knitting wire to make stools. This has become a source of income for many people, making a huge difference in their lives.

   

  What challenges have you faced in doing your work?

  For Oasis India and various aid agencies, the primary challenge has been delivering relief to the valley areas of Manipur, as the national highway was cut off, making it impossible to transport essential supplies without a security convoy. Food and hygiene kits were mainly sourced from neighbouring Mizoram and Nagaland, incurring high costs and taking 15 to 17 hours on a rough road to deliver supplies to tribal districts.

  Over time, Oasis started to assist people in relief camps but could only help displaced people from the Kuki-Zo tribes. Despite efforts by our senior management to overcome obstacles, there have continued to be security challenges in reaching out to the Meitei community.

  Yet another significant problem lies in mobilising resources for relief from national and international donors. The conflict’s nature as being between ethnic communities, which has been projected as having a political colour, has caused many funders to shy away.

  What should be done to resolve the conflict, and how should the international community help?

  International aid is insufficient. Since May 2023, neither the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department nor the United Nations Children's Fund have stepped in to provide humanitarian assistance to Manipur. The same is true for the Prime Minister National Relief Fund and the Prime Minister's Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund. The international community must collaborate with local CSOs that continue taking the lead in providing aid.

  For a genuine resolution to the conflict, both the Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities must come to the table, engage in dialogue and avoid any hate speech, and collaborate to establish peaceful coexistence. To facilitate this, a ceasefire should be agreed at all buffer zones. Given the loss of trust in the state government by the tribal Kuki-Zo people, an independent empowered authority could potentially broker a ceasefire between the two warring communities. There are enough sensible people and peace-loving activists in both communities who can play critical roles in bringing about reconciliation and peace.

  To put an end to the violence and prevent its repetition, perpetrators, regardless of ethnicity, should be held accountable. The Supreme Court has ordered the formation of at least 42 special investigation teams to prosecute conflict-related crimes, so at least there’s hope in this regard.

   

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  Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Oasis India through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Oasisatindia on Twitter.

  The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

• NORTHERN CYPRUS: ‘Civil society is not involved in decision-making and is considered a nuisance’

  CIVICUS speaks with DeryaBeyatlı, Director of the Human Rights Platform,about the space for civil society in Northern Cyprus and the prospects for reunification in the context of the 2023 Cyprus and Turkish presidential elections.

  Established in 2021, theHuman Rights Platform isa Turkish-Cypriot civil society umbrella organisation bringing together seven human rights organisations guided by the vision of an egalitarian, democratic and inclusive society where human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected and accessible for everyone.

  What do you make of the results of the Cyprus presidential election?

  In the latest presidential election, held in February 2023, we saw a rise of nationalist and racist rhetoric. In response to losing ground, the left-wing Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) supported a candidate who was more nationalistic than the party itself, but was still defeated in the runoff by Nicos Christodoulides, who was backed by centrists and right-wing parties.

  It is clear to me that over the past few years Cyprus has been affected by the same shift towards radical right-wing politics that we’ve seen elsewhere in Europe.

  What does the Human Rights Platform work on?

  One of the main objectives of the Human Rights Platform is to document human rights violations committed by the government of Northern Cyprus, which is largely controlled by the Turkish authorities. I have observed that both society and the local authorities are becoming more racist, largely in reaction to the inflow of Black students who are lured with the promise of a job in Europe and trafficked into the northern part of Cyprus. Only in 2020 was human trafficking recognised as a crime in Northern Cyprus, and yet more than two years later, there has been only one court verdict in a case involving this crime. The authorities are unwilling to deal with human trafficking crimes and other human rights violations and keep blaming the victims instead.

  What is the current state of reunification talks?

  Ever since 1974, Cyprus has been split along ethnic lines, with Greek and Turkish Cypriots living on either side of the Green Line, a buffer zone under United Nations (UN) control. Christodoulides assumed that reunification talks might resume due to Turkey’s rapprochement with the west in search of relief to address damage caused by recent earthquakes and right after being elected said that the reunification of Cyprus is his priority. However, I think neither him nor Ersin Tatar, the current president of Northern Cyprus, who has strongly advocated for a two-state solution for many years, nor the Turkish and Greek guarantors are actually interested in the reunification of Cyprus.

  The two-state formula currently advocated by Tatar was put on the table back in 2002 by Rauf Denktash, the founding president of Northern Cyprus, and was widely rejected by UN member states, with the exception of Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly expressed his support for the two-state solution, so I don´t think his re-election changes anything.

  Reunification talks are currently on hold and I’m afraid we’re headed towards permanent division. Neither Turkey nor the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) are eager to give up the power they exercise and share it with Turkish Cypriots. We are in a sandwich position, where Turkey interferes with the local matters of Northern Cyprus and the RoC discriminates against Turkish-speaking citizens of the island.

  One of the numerous human rights implications of the division of Cyprus is that there are around 30,000 children of mixed marriages who cannot get RoC citizenship and hence become European Union (EU) citizens. Despite Turkish language being an official language of the RoC, official documents and legislation are all in the Greek language, leaving Turkish Cypriots out. Turkish Cypriots cannot open a bank account or establish an association unless they live in government-controlled areas. And the list goes on.

  What obstacles does civil society face in Northern Cyprus?

  The division of the island creates challenging civic space conditions in Northern Cyprus, where the Human Rights Platform is registered. We face many obstacles due to the fact that we work in areas not under the effective control of the government of RoC. It’s very difficult to make our voices heard and get access to funding available to EU member states because we are not legally registered in a member state. Yet we cannot do so, since we do not reside in the government-controlled areas. Our only funding opportunity is the Financial Aid instrument of the European Commission (EC), which is highly competitive and offers limited funds to civil society.

  The local authorities of Northern Cyprus prefer directing EU funds towards infrastructure and economic development, and regard supporting civil society as unnecessary and therefore a complete waste of funds. Turkish Cypriot civil society organisations (CSOs) aren’t involved in decision-making mechanisms and are considered a nuisance. Meanwhile, local public funds are only available to government-sponsored non-governmental organisations, also known as GONGOs, that are under the effective control of the Turkish Embassy and the Turkish Cypriot political leadership.

  Perceived by local authorities as a threat, Turkish Cypriot civil society is silenced and sometimes attacked on mainstream media. Public TV, radio and news agencies are almost inaccessible for us. CSOs working to protect human rights and safeguard democracy in Northern Cyprus are systematically marginalised. Since we maintain relationships with the EC, EU member states and the USA, we are often regarded as ‘foreign agents’ and threatened and blackmailed, sometimes openly but mostly discreetly. A widely used tactic is the use of fake social media accounts promoting extremely nationalistic content and blaming Turkish Cypriot civil society activists for trading the country to the Greeks or to imperialistic powers.

  What international support do Turkish Cypriot human rights CSOs need?

  Most international intergovernmental organisations and their agencies prefer to ignore our presence. Since we are in a place the existence of which they don’t recognise, they refuse to even meet with us, let alone hear us out. We need both political and financial support in order to get stronger and become more effective in our struggle to uphold democracy and human rights in Northern Cyprus.

  ---

  Civic space in Cyprus is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with the Human Rights Platform through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@ihp_hrp and@DBeyatli on Twitter.

• SERBIA: ‘People are concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable is being taken away’

  CIVICUS speaks about the results of Serbia’s recent elections and subsequent protests with Raša Nedeljkov, Programme Director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

  Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation that works to develop a democratic culture and promote civic activism through civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the development of public policy proposals.

   

  What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

  The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

  Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

  Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

  The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

  How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

  On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

  Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

  Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

  How have people reacted to election irregularities?

  Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

  Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

  How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

  The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

  The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

  Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

  What should the international community do?

  We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

  Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship

  What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

  The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

  Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

  Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

  The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

  How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

  On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

  Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

  Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

  How have people reacted to election irregularities?

  Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

  Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

  How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

  The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

  The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

  Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

  What should the international community do?

  We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

  Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship.

  ---

  Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@CRTArs and@rasaned onTwitter.

• SERBIA: ‘The government is allergic to pluralism and keeps discrediting dissenting voices’

  CIVICUS speaks about Serbia’s upcoming parliamentary elections and civic space conditions withVukosava Crnjanski, founder and director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

  Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote civic activism and develop a democratic culture through advocacy, civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the production of public policy proposals.

  What are the conditions for civil society in Serbia?

  The quality of civic space is worsening. In essence, the government is allergic to pluralism and keeps discrediting dissenting voices. Serbian CSOs face great pressure from pro-government media, particularly popular newspapers, which brand them as ‘mercenaries’ and ‘traitors’.

  On top of this chronic situation, the situation has at times greatly escalated. In acute phases, the oppression of civil society intensifies because the government seeks to divert public attention from pressing issues that it wants to conceal. For instance, in the summer of 2020 the Ministry of Finance initiated a campaign against several CSOs, independent journalists’ associations and activists. Harassment took the form of financial scrutiny, imposed under unfounded allegations of their involvement in money laundering and connections with terrorism. A year later, the targeted people and organisations asked that the ministry disclose the results of this inquiry to dispel those accusations – but of course, the results were never made public.

  What prompted the decision to call early elections?

  President Aleksandar Vučić has called early parliamentary elections, to be held on 17 December. He attempted to present this as a response to the opposition’s call for snap elections, a demand that arose when none of the requests of protests held under the motto ‘Serbia Against the Violence‘ were addressed. This movement has been going on for months throughout the country, following two mass shootings in early May that left 17 people dead and 21 injured.

  Vučić thrives in the campaigning phase of politics and in a political environment in which the normal functioning of institutions remains on hold. This has often happened following elections: in the past 11 years, a total of two years, four months and four days have been wasted between calls for elections and the approval of new governments. The president systematically benefits from situations of instability in which he is perceived as the sole stabilising factor.

  What are the main campaign issues?

  The ruling party’s key campaign message is that ‘Serbia Must Not Stop’, implying that any change would halt the country’s development. For over a decade, Vučić’s propaganda has pushed a narrative of Serbia’s alleged economic growth. It’s supported by an enormous media machinery that uses manipulative tactics and constantly calls Serbia ‘the Balkans’ tiger’, repeatedly mentioning ‘new jobs’, ‘foreign investments’ and having the ‘biggest’ infrastructure projects. This blurs the vision of some people, although most can definitely see the emptiness of their wallets.

  The pro-European opposition aims to articulate the rejection of structural violence into an electoral agenda, pledging to free the state from the dominance of a single party. Meanwhile, right-wing nationalist parties commit to ‘save Kosovo’ and strengthen ties with Russia. The new slogan of the Serbian Radical Party, of which Vučić was a prominent official in the 1990s, is ‘Our Fatherland Is Serbia, Our Mother Is Russia’.

  Relations with Kosovo and the imposition of sanctions on Russia stand out as critical issues and their significance is likely to grow. Yet there’s no substantive debate on these matters, which is confusing. The government tries to monopolise these topics, strictly controlling their discussion in the public sphere and labelling anyone else raising them as traitors. It aims to keep these matters opaque to the public, treating them as exclusive realms of backroom politics.

  I assume that the ideologically diverse pro-European opposition will try to avoid these topics out of fear that discussing them will make them an easy target. This decision may also be influenced by opinion polls that indicate that voters are a lot more interested in other topics, namely the economy and corruption.

  How is Serbian civil society, including CRTA, involved in the electoral process?

  As usual, CRTA is actively engaged in the electoral process. Our observation mission is already active across Serbia, monitoring media reporting and campaign activities on the ground and reviewing the work of the electoral institution. We are paying special attention to the problem of pressure on voters. As research we have been conducting for over a year now shows, a large number of people are captured in a network of clientelism and electoral corruption. People from socially vulnerable groups and public sector employees are continuously pressured to give their support to a political party. 

  In addition to monitoring the snap parliamentary elections, we are also observing the municipal elections in the capital, Belgrade.

  The quality of Serbian electoral processes has been deteriorating for years and there is little reason to believe that issues such as biased media, the abuse of public resources and the misuse of public office will magically disappear. However, we are actively working to motivate citizens to vote, and many other CSOs are also about to launch their ‘Get Out the Vote’ campaigns. Whatever problems the electoral process has, increased participation will make things better.

  We hope that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will deploy an election observation mission in a full capacity, as recommended by a prior needs assessment mission. This kind of international support is crucial not only on election day but also to boost our advocacy to achieve improvements in the electoral process.

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  Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@CRTArs andVukosava Crnjanski onTwitter.

• SERBIA: ‘We live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism, with a government hostile to critical voices’

  CIVICUS discusses recent local elections in Serbia with Tamara Branković, deputy program director at the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA). CRTA is an independent, non-partisan civil society organisation working to develop democratic culture and civic activism in Serbia.

  In Serbia’s 2 June local elections, the coalition led by President AleksandarVučić’snationalistSerbian Progressive Party won in the two largest cities, including the capital, Belgrade, where the polls were a rerun of a December election found by international observers to have serious irregularities, and which sparked months of protests. In Belgrade’s rerun, a new centre-right group came second and the left-wing greens third. This time, the elections appeared to be cleaner, but competitiveness was limited as the ruling party misused state resources to favour its candidates.

  Why did the ruling coalition win in the local elections?

  We only observed the elections for the Assembly of the City of Belgrade, but I believe our conclusion also applies to other local elections that took place on 2 June.

  It should be noted that the election in Belgrade was a rerun of last December’s election, which, as CRTA proved, was severely compromised by illegal and illegitimate electoral engineering, mainly through organised voter migration. The June election was the second, less bad half of an extremely dirty match.

  The campaign didn’t feel like a campaign for local elections but rather for national elections. The dominant political force, with President Aleksandar Vučić at its head, placed what it called issues of ‘national survival’ at the top of the agenda, charging the atmosphere with hardcore nationalist sentiments.

  This was further fuelled by a vote just a few days before the election in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on a resolution on genocide in Srebrenica. It drove an unparalleled propaganda surge, presented as a dignified national defence against a hostile west allegedly attempting to put a label of collective guilt on Serbian people.

  When I refer to the dominant political force, I mean not only the ruling Serbian Progressive Party but also state officials, because the line between the ruling party and the state has increasingly blurred, which is a key explanation of the election results. Political clientelism and pressures on voters contributed significantly to the ruling party’s victory.

  What role did civil society play in the elections, and what challenges did you face?

  Our role was to try to rescue what could be saved of the integrity of the electoral process. We tried to inform and educate citizens about their electoral rights and the ways those rights were being manipulated and abused. We sought to mobilise citizens to report any violations they saw to our observation mission. And most importantly, we tried to recruit and train enough citizen observers so we could get a full picture of the quality of elections. It was a large operation that lasted from April to June, involving 1,500 people.

  But we live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism. Our government is hostile to critical voices, so the space for civil society is constantly shrinking. We need our international friends to be aware of this and spread the word that democracy in Serbia is in danger.

  What other concerning trends did you see?

  Unfortunately, we’ve seen a growth of several negative trends. We witnessed a record number of cases of vote buying and numerous tense situations that approached or crossed the line into violence. All the chronic problems that have devalued elections for many years continued to grow, from people’s distrust of the voters’ register and extremely unequal media access for candidates, to abuse of state institutions and public resources, unscrupulous pressure on voters and deteriorating conditions for election observation.

  Since the December 2023 elections, a number of international voices have spoken out about the situation in Serbia. The UN Human Rights Committee issued a strong rebuke, criticising the Serbian authorities for their opaque handling of election violations. Various UN human rights experts reported serious state attacks on election observers, civil society and the media and asked for clarifications from the Serbian government, but barely received a response.

  These problems remain unresolved because of state capture. State institutions are subordinated to party interests, and the party in power shows no political will to change this situation.

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   Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite, and follow@CRTArs and@nemaperspektive on Twitter.

• SWITZERLAND: ‘Right-wing populists pose a true threat when other parties meet their demands’

  CIVICUS speaks withLea Schlenker, board member of Operation Libero,about the rise of right-wing populism in Switzerland’s recent elections.

  Founded in 2014, Operation Libero is a Swiss civil society organisation working to preserve and advance liberal democracy by campaigning against populist initiatives and advocating for an open, progressive and just society.

  How concerning are the results of the 22 October Swiss federal election?

  On 22 October, the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) came first, securing 62 out of 200 parliamentary seats, nine more than it previously had. The SVP is becoming increasingly extremist, and its election victory shouldn’t lead us to trivialise the racism and hatred they stoked during the campaign. We shouldn’t normalise the fact that they called queer people ‘sick’ and let far-right extremists manage their campaign accounts on social media. We shouldn’t endorse them by posing in photos at the Federal Palace with the leader of Switzerland’s largest party.

  The outcome of this election leaves us deeply concerned about issues such as climate change and asylum policies and the treatment of refugees.

  The trend of the rising far right is not exclusive to Switzerland – it is being observed globally. Right-wing parties instrumentalise legitimate citizen concerns, such as inflation or the ongoing war in Europe, to spread misinformation and target minorities. Under the guise of what they call a ‘culture war’, right-wing populists stoke unfounded fears of ‘cancel culture’ and ‘foreign infiltration’. This is very worrying. As a political movement that defends fundamental rights and combats right-wing populism from a liberal perspective, we believe our work is now more necessary than ever.

  How did Operation Libero engage with the election?

  We launched a campaign called ‘Du hast die Wahl’ (‘It’s your Choice’). Our goal was to persuade as many progressive people as possible to participate in the elections and stand up for their values by emphasising the importance of their voice. The SVP is attacking our liberal achievements, including the freedom of religion, the right to abortion, women’s bodily autonomy and equal rights. Some SVP members deny climate change, while others flirt with autocrats like Vladimir Putin. It is our mission to thwart these attacks on democratic values.

  During the campaign, we distributed stickers and used billboards across Switzerland. The design incorporated a white background on the left side and a black background on the right side, symbolising a clear choice. The design, resembling voting ballots, visually reinforced the choice people faced in the election: equal rights or sexism, populism or democracy, isolation or openness, SVP or the future. We deliberately wrote ‘future’ in white lettering on a black background, sparking a lot of public debate and challenging either black or white stereotypes. Our campaign was funded exclusively by donations from members and supporters.

  

  Another important element of our campaign was the petition ‘Wahlen ohne Hass’ (‘Elections without Hate’), which we ran in collaboration with the National Coalition Building Institute. We advocated for elections free from hate speech targeting any minority group. This petition was primarily a response to the racist and xenophobic rhetoric employed by right-wing populists during the campaign. The SVP manipulated police reports to refer to isolated incidents as widespread trends. The impact of our petition was further amplified by the Federal Commission against Racism, which described the SVP campaign as ‘racist, xenophobic, and inflammatory’.

  On election day, we rented a truck and drove it to the capital, Bern. The truck displayed the message we wanted to convey to the public: that we reject the normalisation of the SVP’s discourse and its effect of shifting the whole political spectrum rightwards.

  

  What can be done to prevent further advances of the Swiss far right?

  Right-wing populists pose a true threat when other parties meet their demands, a trend already observed in countries such as Germany. It would be a great mistake for conservative parties to respond to the election results by aligning even more closely with the SVP. The SVP must be treated as a radical outsider so that it remains a minority – albeit a large one that received 28 per cent of the vote. Swiss liberals must distance themselves from the SVP, which often conceals its populist and extremist nature behind a conservative facade.

  Non-extremist parties must urgently form a coalition for an open and progressive Switzerland even if they maintain fundamental differences on specific issues. To counter the SVP’s initiatives on immigration, downsizing public media and promoting ‘neutrality’, Switzerland requires a robust progressive coalition. This is feasible, despite the SVP’s electoral advances, if conservative parties refuse to become their allies.

  With a mostly conservative and right-wing parliament, it will be challenging to implement progressive reforms for a more open and equal society. But we remain hopeful because there are numerous political activists and forces aligned with our democratic vision.

  How does Operation Libero work to protect human rights and safeguard democracy?

  Since its foundation in 2014, Operation Libero has been dedicated to defending liberal and inclusive democracy, advocating for equal rights and fostering European collaboration. We scale up our campaigning every time our liberal democracy or its underlying values come under attack, which unfortunately occurs with regularity.

  Operation Libero was founded to stop right-wing populist advances but we have expanded our mission to actively shape the country through two current initiatives. Firstly, we are working to build a broad alliance to break deadlocks in relations between Switzerland and the European Union (EU) by promoting a popular initiative to embed the objectives of cooperation with the EU in the Swiss Federal Constitution. We want to have close ties with the unique peace and freedom project that is the EU. The Europe Initiative already has the support of 11 organisations.

  And in May we started collecting signatures for the Democracy Initiative, which addresses a fundamental democratic challenge: the fact that Switzerland currently excludes from citizenship, and therefore from the political decision-making process, around a quarter of its permanent resident population. Including all these people as fellow citizens with equal political rights is essential for Switzerland to become a democracy worthy of the name.

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  Civic space in Switzerland is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Operation Libero through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@operationlibero onTwitter.