media
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COLOMBIA: ‘People are tired of the long hegemony of political elites who are also economic elites’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in Colombia with Gina Romero, executive director of the Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy (RedLad).Founded in 2008, RedLad promotes the full exercise of democracy as a way of life for the common good in the Americas. It undertakes advocacy in the inter-American human rights system; research through the Citizen Observatory on Corruption, Observatory on Freedom of Religion and Belief, reporting on 11 countries for the CIVICUS Monitor; work to open democratic dialogue within civil society and among civil society and international bodies, governments, the private sector and others; action to strengthen the capacities of Latin American civil society through leadership training; and advocacy in defence of the rights of vulnerable populations.
How would you assess the choice available between the two candidates in the second round of Colombia’s presidential election?
It was very revealing that both candidates called themselves ‘anti-system’, positioned themselves against traditional politics and ran outside traditional political parties. Colombian citizens are tired of the long hegemony of traditional parties and of political elites who are also economic elites.
The defeated candidate, Rodolfo Hernández, represents a right-wing political sector, although his campaign sought to emphasise his closeness to the people by championing the fight against corruption, despite the fact that he is under investigation for corruption. The winning candidate, Gustavo Petro, represents a left-wing position. The fact that a leftist option was elected for the first time in history says a lot about citizens’ social demands, the same ones that have been expressed publicly on the streets since 2019.
I believe that the second round was not a polarised confrontation between an extreme right and an extreme left, but rather a confrontation between innovative – one could say populist – proposals outside traditional politics, and particularly against the legacy of former president Álvaro Uribe, which is also embodied by the outgoing incumbent, Iván Duque.
A citizenry fed up with politics and social inequality, which has intensified as a result of the pandemic, made for a ticking bomb that manifested itself in the elections. It is great that this found expression through democratic channels, rather than through political violence, as used to be the case in the past.
How do you interpret the fact that Hernández made it into the second round?
Hernández’s presence in the runoff was quite surprising, since the candidates that were thought to have a chance were Federico Gutiérrez and Gustavo Petro. His discourse was one of closeness to citizens. He campaigned hard on social media, especially TikTok, and focused on the problems people systematically prioritise in the polls, such as corruption.
Hernández was seen as a simple person, who speaks very simply to ordinary citizens, while other candidates’ discourse sounded too lofty. He convinced many people with the argument that, as a millionaire, he would not steal like the others, and would even refuse the president’s salary. He also mobilised many people who do not understand what it means for Colombia to be going through a peace process, who voted ‘no’ in the 2016 referendum on the peace deal, and who had previously elected right-wing presidents such as Duque and Uribe.
Added to Hernández’s attractiveness were the big mistakes of centre parties and the fear elicited by Petro, both for being from the left and for being accompanied by a Black vice-presidential candidate, Francia Márquez, who had been a domestic worker and graduated from college at the age of 39. All this contributed to Hernández’s success in the first round, despite the fact that he is completely unfamiliar with politics and is neither fit to govern nor to do a good job as an opposition leader.
What was the campaign for the runoffs like?
It was a campaign of strong emotions, more than any other in the past. Political emotions are what ultimately determine the course of an election.
Fear played a big role. Many people in Colombia are afraid of any left-wing project. Moreover, Colombia is a racist, classist and misogynist country, so a candidate like Márquez also caused fear. I met few people who would vote for Hernández because they liked him rather than because they were afraid of Petro. These people described Hernández as ‘the cute old man who fights corruption and has a lot of money’. This is how right-wing populism gets close to the people.
The anti-Petro campaign circulated disinformation with the sole objective of generating fear, much as had happened in the campaign for the peace referendum. Among these unfounded fears was that Colombia would become a new Venezuela, as Petro would want to stay in power forever, as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez once did. People repeated this uncritically without realising that, in Colombia, the one who wanted to do this was Uribe, through a constitutional change in 2004 that allowed him to renew his mandate and stay in office for eight years, after which he tried to do it again.
Another idea associated with Venezuela’s fate was that of impoverishment, currency devaluation and hyperinflation. There was also much talk of the possible business reaction sector to a left-wing government and the supposed large outflow of companies from the Colombian market that would follow. It is true that the dollar rose the week after the election – as it did in Chile when Gabriel Boric won – but the dollar has been rising in recent years and the initial increase has not been catastrophic.
Fear was also instilled among the public with the irresponsible use of the term ‘guerrilla’ in reference to Petro, who had in the past been a militant in the M19, a now-deactivated guerrilla group. Petro has had a long civilian political career since, and for decades has had nothing to do with any group outside the law. But the stigma remains, which shows how far Colombia still has to go in its reconciliation process.
Disinformation and digital violence also targeted the two female candidates who ran in this election, Ingrid Betancourt – who stood in the first round of the presidential election – and Márquez. Much research on digital violence argues that when women are in politics, personal information about them is used and facts are misrepresented. But in the case of Márquez, there was real racialised hate speech. Horrible things were said about her, both because of her personal history and her past as a very poor woman, and because she is a Black woman. The worst racist and misogynist jokes were told.
Colombia needs a profound reflection on how we construct the identity of the other and how we recognise ourselves as a multicultural country. Cali is the city with the second largest Afro-descendant population on the continent, and the entire Colombian Pacific is full of Afro and Indigenous people. But there is a systemic racism that was very apparent in the campaign.
For the most part, mainstream media have done much wrong by echoing hate speech. A week before the second round, for example, Semana magazine ran a sensationalist cover story wondering who would get elected, the engineer or the former guerrilla fighter. The ex-guerrilla fighter is also an economist, but this was not about the candidates’ professions, but rather about giving a frightening message. In the last months of the campaign, Petro was forced to deny many things, while Hernández hid and refused to participate in any debate.
Thus, we were sold the idea that we were ‘between a rock and a hard place’ and had to choose the ‘least worst’ candidate. A public narrative was mounted that since the political elite was not represented in this election, all that was on offer was simply bad.
What kind of voter backed the candidates?
There was a fairly close overlap between the Colombia that voted ‘no’ in the referendum on the peace accords, the Colombia that in the past elected Duque and the Colombia that now voted for Hernández. It is made up of culturally conservative citizens who fear change, have identified with traditional political elites and have not been drawn to the peace process or felt the appeal of political progressivism. Hernández’s voters in the cities and other parts of the country fear processes of inclusion of vulnerable populations and hardly include Indigenous or Afro-descendant parts of the population. In places with the largest Indigenous populations Petro won with unprecedented numbers.
The Colombia that voted ‘yes’ in the referendum coincides with the Colombia that voted for Petro. This is the Colombia of the margins, which brings together the least developed regions of the country. Big cities, with the exception of Medellín, also voted for Petro. This is an urban bloc, which Márquez defines as a citizenry made up of ‘nobodies’. The people who voted for Petro are largely a frustrated citizenry that has been affected by corruption like no other, who are not part of the political elite and who have been historically relegated by development processes. These are people who have little, who see in Petro a promise of improvement. Previous candidates have offered no real solutions to their problems – not even a chance of feeling involved.
The country is divided, but this is not a new division. Past governments have failed to reconcile these differences. We have two Colombias, with immense polarisation: in the elections with the highest participation in the past 20 years, Petro won by just 800,000 votes. That means there are 10 million people who oppose Petro and 11 million who support him. Petro will have to learn how to speak to these two facets of Colombia and ensure that the Colombia that did not vote for him does not feel left behind.
What are civil society’s expectations or fears following the result?
Whoever wins, our work as civil society will always remain the same. But personally, seeing what happened when Petro was mayor of Bogotá, I fear that revanchism could hinder the government’s progress. Polarisation, hate speech and the manipulation of institutions can have very serious effects. The potential reaction of the markets to a left-wing government is also a source of fear.
There is also the fact that Petro is a very passionate person, and often does not communicate in the best possible way; both his and Hernández’s campaigns attacked the press when media criticised them. The press has a fundamental role, and this can be very annoying for any government, but it is essential that it has sufficient guarantees to do its job. There are fears that Petro could be very hostile to the press that is critical of his government.
Organisations that, like RedLad, engage in international advocacy, are concerned about how Petro will position himself in relation to other Latin American leftists. Currently Latin America has a left that is the source of a lot of hope, that proposes change and is different from the traditional left; this is the left represented by Boric in Chile. But there is also the left of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, not to mention the lefts of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, which have caused serious civic space crises. I think Petro is somewhere in the middle and faces the dilemma of who to side with. I think he should go along a more proactive and development-friendly left.
Although Petro’s party, Pacto Histórico, achieved good legislative representation in the March 2022 parliamentary election, the transformations he has put on the table are quite broad and deep, and their success they will require a wide political agreement, something that is complex to achieve in Colombia. If this is not achieved, the people who voted for Petro and believed his promises will be frustrated. It will be interesting to see how this government, elected under the banner of the 2019 mobilisations, will respond to people if they happen to mobilise again.
For the great expectations it has created not to wane, Petro’s government will need to score some early victories, showing progress in advancing the peace process and decreasing the number of assassinations of social leaders. I hope that Petro makes progress on international commitments, that civic space is not further reduced but expanded, and that the freedoms of assembly and expression are guaranteed.
Civic space in Colombia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with RedLad through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@REDLADoficial on Twitter. -
ERITREA: ‘When the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact’
CIVICUS speaks with about civil society work in Eritrea’s context of closed civic space with Helen Kidan, chairperson of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR).Founded in 2003 and based in South Africa, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that raises awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promotes the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.
What’s the situation for civil society in Eritrea?
Eritrea has never truly implemented its 1997 Constitution and until Eritrea it is run by the rule of law, human rights abuses will continue with no recourse to justice. This includes completely closed civil society space, with no semblance of rights of association, assembly and expression.
Since Proclamation No. 145 of 2005 went into effect nearly two decades ago, there has been no independent civil society in Eritrea. According to this law, the only way CSOs can implement programmes is in partnership with government agencies, which restrict the areas, themes and focus of the projects that can be implemented. There are obviously very few CSOs present and active in Eritrea.
The only way to start creating any space for independent CSOs in Eritrea would be to have Proclamation 145/2005 revoked.
What is EMDHR doing to try to improve the situation?
EMDHR advocates against the ongoing human rights abuses in Eritrea as well as for the rights of Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. Our mission is to promote and defend human right values as established in international legal instruments and advance democratic change, rule of law and constitutionalism in Eritrea, with the ultimate aim of building a society in which people exercise their basic rights and live in peace, dignity and prosperity.
We provide training, sustain networks and produce and disseminate information to create awareness of the situation of Eritreans. We have made several presentations at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in Geneva, and in July 2022 we made a presentation at the UN in New York.
We are currently working with African CSOs to bring the ongoing crisis in Eritrea to the African level and get support for Eritrean refugees. We have also commissioned a report on the state of Eritrean CSOs that makes recommendations to the international community.
In early September 2023 we co-organised the Africa Civil Society Organisations Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Through a joint project with Africa Monitors, Eritrean Satellite Television and Eritrean Diaspora for East Africa, a CSO based in Kenya, we have provided training to Eritrean human rights activists, including on digital activism, and created a space for Eritrean CSOs and activists to be able to work together.
In 2019 we provided in-person training in a workshop held in Uganda. In 2017 we co-organised a conference in Brussels on the ongoing Eritrean refugee crisis, with which we tried to elicit a reaction from members of the European Parliament, commissioners and CSOs from across Europe. And in 2015 we campaigned and got asylum for Eritrean footballers in Botswana.
What’s it like to be a diaspora activist? How do you connect with activists within Eritrea?
It’s extremely frustrating because it makes our work less effective. Connecting with people inside Eritrea is very hard as internet penetration in Eritrea is only two per cent. The government basically controls all media: all independent media ceased to exist in 2001. This is why most information is brought to us by people who have recently left the country. But while the work is challenging, it is still possible to get information. And when the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact.
A lot of funders provide funds to African organisations only when they operate in their home country. The fact that we are not able to operate inside Eritrea means we also suffer financially and hence a lot of Eritrean CSOs are forced to sustain themselves on the basis of voluntary work.
Additionally, the work remains emotionally and psychologically draining, as many Eritrean activists in the diaspora are threatened with harm to family members still living in Eritrea for speaking out against the regime back home.
As Eritrean human rights defenders, even if you are operating outside the country, the government will always discredit your work. All those that don’t agree with them are seen as traitors. The government uses social media as a means of trolling and tries to attack websites and other social media channels.
What sparked recent protests by Eritrean refugees in Israel, and how has the Israeli government responded?
Those protests appeared to have been organised by a new group called Brigade N’Hamedu, which is trying to overthrow the regime. Their members hold demonstrations across the world, and they particularly attack the festivals that the regime holds abroad, which they view as a means of raising funds for the regime and spreading its propaganda. They are tired of government interference and intimidate Eritreans who have left their country but still support the Eritrean government. They want all Eritreans who claim asylum but express support for the Eritrean government to have their asylum revoked.
This is a movement of young Eritreans but a lot of veterans and older members of the community support them, as they see them as the most plausible means of removing the regime. Although they have succeeded in mobilising Eritreans, however, there seems to be no clear strategy and this could be a stumbling block. They are very unlikely to succeed.
In response to these protests, and using their unprecedented violence as an excuse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he wants all Eritreans removed from Israel. The predicament of Eritreans in Israel was already dire, but this has now opened the doors for the far-right government in Israel to deport all Eritreans. However, the UN, Israeli human rights groups and other human rights groups outside Israel are asking that genuine refugees whose lives are at risk not be deported to Eritrea.
Civic space in Eritrea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with EMDHR through itswebsite or Facebook page,and follow @emdhrorg on Twitter.
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EUROPEAN MEDIA FREEDOM ACT: ‘It will be crucial for EU member states to take this legal framework seriously’
CIVICUS speaks with Renate Schroeder, Director of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), about theEuropean Media Freedom Act, the first integrated legislation that protects freedom of expression and media independence and pluralism in the European Union.The EFJ is the largest organisation of journalists in Europe, fighting for decent working conditions and defending the right to freedom of expression.
Why was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) needed?
The European Commission (EC) produced the draft EMFA in September 2022, in a context of growing disinformation and threats to media independence and journalists’ safety across Europe. The Vice President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, understood the dangers of media capture and political manipulation. With her help and a lot of research by European institutions, we were able to show media freedom was declining in the European Union (EU), despite the bloc’s historical commitment to this principle.
That’s why the EC came up with a proposal to ensure the right of all citizens to receive plural and editorially independent information. This had never been formally addressed before. The EMFA is rooted in the need to create clear rules to level the playing field across the EU, addressing issues such as media capture, the independence of public service media, editorial independence, transparency in media ownership and state advertisement.
What regulations does the EMFA introduce?
The EMFA seeks to safeguard media freedom and integrity. It includes provisions to protect journalistic sources, ensuring confidentiality. This is particularly crucial for investigative journalism given the growing use of spyware to target journalists’ sources, as seen in countries such as Greece and Hungary.
The Act also addresses state control over public service media. Rather than state broadcasters, what the ecosystem needs is independent, strong, public service media systems free of state influence or control over funding.
In addition, the EMFA recognises readers’ right to know who’s behind what they read, so it includes an article on transparency in media ownership and another on editorial independence to prevent journalism being used for political or economic interests or propaganda. This is based on the acknowledgment there are people such as politicians or foreign business leaders who own media outlets and use them for their agendas. They don’t view journalism as a public good but as a tool for propaganda.
Another issue the Act deals with is content moderation. Journalists are no longer the gatekeepers of information – platforms are. Recognising this, the EMFA requires platforms to consult media service providers and journalists before removing content.
Finally, the Act establishes a board composed of independent regulatory authorities tasked with overseeing compliance with the EMFA and other related legislation such as the Audiovisual Media Service Directive.
What were the main points of contention during the process?
At the beginning, several stakeholders were against the EMFA. Germany raised one significant point of contention. It has a federal system where states have their own independent regulatory media systems, and they were concerned about potential interference from Brussels.
Publishers also presented a challenge. They showed little interest in any transparency or editorial regulation and had concerns about a European board having a say on that.
However, with the support of a group of media freedom organisations, digital rights advocates and other civil society groups, we overcame most of these obstacles. While the initial draft was not as good as we would have liked, the European Parliament emerged as our ally and helped strengthen transparency rules and reinforce provisions related to public media service and source protection.
One particularly contentious issue during negotiations with both the European Parliament and European Council was the protection of sources and safeguards against spyware. Some states, such as France, argued for exemptions based on national security considerations. These risked compromising the protection of journalists’ sources and transforming the EMFA into a surveillance tool. Thanks to efforts of supportive countries such as Spain, these proposals were rejected, preserving the EMFA’s integrity.
Does the final draft fully address civil society concerns?
While the final draft addresses some concerns raised by civil society, there are areas where our partners feel it could have gone further.
For instance, on the issue of transparency of media ownership, civil society groups wanted to establish a European database, but this provision didn’t go through. We also wanted to include a stronger article addressing concentration of media ownership and requiring a public interest test for mergers. The language in the final agreement is often too principled, which may cause problems when implemented at the national level.
Even so, we understand that drafting regulations at the European level, where you deal with multiple and diverse states, is not easy. The current rise of right-wing governments is only making it harder. Even traditionally supportive states such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been cautious in their approaches.
We knew it was now or never, so we are very happy the EMFA got adopted, even if some articles are not worded as strongly as we would have liked. With right-wing movements on the rise, there was a lot of pressure to agree a final text and have it passed right away, even if it wasn’t perfect, because the June European Parliament elections will likely result in a more right-wing Parliament.
What happens next?
The next step is for the European Parliament’s Plenary session in Strasbourg on 11 March to formally vote on the provision agreement, which the Council of the EU under the current Belgian presidency will officially adopt. The Act needs a three-fourths majority, and only Hungary is certain to vote against. It will enter into force a year afterwards, with some articles taking effect earlier, at six months, and others later, at 15 months. And then it will get implemented and have direct effects at the national level.
There will likely be a testing period in which civil society and journalists’ organisations will play a vital role in ensuring effective implementation and taking legal action if necessary. For instance, if media providers fail to comply with transparency rules, civil society may need to challenge them in court.
However, it is still unclear how this process will work. For instance, if a civil society organisation in Hungary believes there’s a lack of plural access to media and decides to take legal action, it may face challenges in Hungary’s judicial system and may need to escalate the issue to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, a process that could take several years.
I am also worried about how the article on the protection of sources will be implemented. Even though safeguards are in place, this article may be misinterpreted. At the end of the day, national security issues are always defined at the national level. That’s a limitation of all EU treaties and some states may end up finding clever ways to circumvent these protections.
Having this legal framework in place is a big step forward, but it will also be crucial for states to take it seriously.
Over the last five years, the EC has made significant progress in regulating the information ecosystem, with initiatives such as the Digital Service Act, Digital Markets Act, Artificial Intelligence Act and now the EMFA. The main challenge will be the effective implementation of all these measures. We hope the EC will prioritise implementation and sanction states that fail to comply. We also hope the EMFA will receive sufficient funding for the board to deal with monitoring and implementing it. Without proper enforcement, no regulation will be of any help.
What further reforms are needed?
We are worried about the use of generative AI to promote disinformation and deep fakes. Voluntary guidelines are not enough. We need stronger measures that balance freedom of expression with human control over AI systems. While AI can be a great tool for journalists it can also be misused.
The EU is at a crossroads. The European Parliament has always been on the side of media freedom, and for the first time we risk losing this support. Young voters will play a vital role in the upcoming elections. Their engagement, informed vote and understanding of the role of the EU and what is at stake may change the course of the elections. And for that facts are needed, and a healthy information ecosystem with limited disinformation circulating in social media.
Get in touch with the European Federation of Journalists through itswebsite orInstagram andFacebook pages, and follow@EFJEUROPE and@renatemargot on Twitter.
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IRAN: ‘The severity of the crackdown only shows how scared the regime is of the protest movement’
CIVICUS speaks with Sohrab Razaghi, executive director of Volunteer Activists (VA), about the situation in Iran on the anniversary of the anti-regime protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of morality police.VA is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) based in the Netherlands, whose primary aims are building capacity among activists and CSOs, facilitating information exchange among civil society activists, community peacebuilding and advocating for the expansion of democracy and human rights in Iran and more generally in the Middle East. VA is the successor of a pioneer Iranian CSO, the Iranian Civil Society, Training and Research Centre, founded in 2001 and based in Tehran until 2007.
What is the situation in Iran one year on from the start of the protest wave?
The situation in Iran is complex. While last year’s massive protests made people hope for change, the crackdown on the protests caused hopelessness. The authorities were mostly able to suppress the protests and regain control of the streets, forcing people back into their homes.
Moreover, while the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protest movement had an appealing chant and vision, it lacked a long-term plan that could lead to change. Over the past year, it has been unable to translate its slogan into a political programme and was therefore unable to mobilise other social and political forces around its goals.
But despite the authorities’ success in regaining control, we have continued to see acts of civil disobedience across Iran. Activists, artists and academics express themselves through social media and make public displays of protest not wearing hijab. The fact that the voices of protesters have not been silenced sustains hope for change.
A concerning development, however, is the increasing gap between established civil society and the protest movement. CSOs were hesitant to participate in the protests when they began, and this gap has only increased since. There is even a lack of a common vocabulary in calling for mobilisation and articulating demands. Established CSOs disagree with what they view as radical moves by the protest movement, as they have a more conservative view of society and the future. A possible explanation for this divergence may be the generation gap, as the protest movement is formed by much younger activists.
To reassert control, the authorities have imposed stricter control over media, universities, unions and other associations. In essence, civic space has shrunk dramatically over the past year, with the authorities purging most sectors of everyone who disagrees with them.
Internationally there was a huge wave of support for the protest movement from governments, civil society and media, particularly early on. This was extremely helpful for echoing the voices of Iranian protesters and pressuring the authorities to meet their demands. But as the authorities regained control of the streets, we have seen a change in the approach of western governments. They are returning to diplomacy and negotiations with Iran, slowly normalising their relations. This has boosted the Iranian regime’s confidence, re-legitimising it and giving it space to spread its propaganda.
What tactics has the government used to limit further mobilisation?
The number one tactic of the regime to crack down on protests has been to arrest protesters. Over the past year, thousands have been arrested, including over 20,000 who were arrested during the protests. Some have been given long jail sentences.
The second tactic has been the prevention of organising and networking. Even small communities have been actively prevented from getting together. Online networking has been limited by censorship, filtering and hacking. Leaders and activists trying to establish any form of group are arrested and their work is disrupted. They threaten activists with jail and even death. They also target their personal life by demanding that they be fired or suspended from work or university. Many teachers and professors who supported the protest movement have been fired and students expelled.
To reach those who may not have joined the protest yet, the authorities spread propaganda, fake news and conspiracy theories that delegitimise the protest movement. Some communities fear the protest movement as a result.
To prevent the development of a political alternative to the regime, the authorities have targeted the opposition within and outside Iran. Their main aim seems to be to sow division among opposition groups and force them to deal with issues internal to the opposition movement instead of focusing on developing an alternative coalition. Iranian cyber forces have supported these efforts through hacking and social media manipulation.
What forms has resistance taken in response?
Iranian activists have pursued two strategies in response. First, the protest movement sought to widen its scope to increase its resilience. By mobilising excluded ethnic groups such as Baloch and Kurdish people, the protest movement expanded to more cities and communities, making the crackdown more difficult. Second, the protest movement tried to stay on the streets for as long as possible, hoping to create division among crackdown forces.
Internationally, the movement’s main strategy was to try to isolate the regime by forcing the severance of as many diplomatic connections as possible. For example, it successfully advocated for Iran to be removed from the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women and it also sought to force the closure of Iranian embassies in western states.
How have Iranian organisations from the diaspora or in exile supported the protest movement in Iran?
We have observed two phases in the involvement of the diaspora and exiled Iranian organisations in the protest movement. In the first phase, they organised large-scale solidarity mobilisations and projects in support of the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests in Iran. Over 80,000 Iranians from the diaspora participated in the solidarity protest in Berlin in Germany, for example.
After this initial phase, however, each political group in exile tried to present itself as the leader of the protest movement. This broke the solidarity and unity of the movement. Instead of fighting against the regime, some diaspora groups mostly fought each other. Independent activists and organisations in the diaspora that didn’t want to be caught in this fight decreased their involvement. For the protest movement to succeed, opposition groups and political movements need to get better at resolving their conflicts, reaching compromises and building a unified anti-regime coalition.
Has the crackdown intensified as the first anniversary approaches?
Civil society activists have continued to be arrested and organisations put under pressure and shut down. But as the first anniversary approaches, we are seeing repression increase, particularly in universities and among journalists. Universities have recently fired more lecturers and professors and expelled more students who participated in last year’s protests. Student associations have been shut down long ago and any form of student organising is banned.
Journalists are also being heavily repressed. The authorities are disrupting reporting and coverage of protest actions and calls for protests around 16 September. They are threatening and arresting journalists, prosecuting them and handing them heavy sentences.
Independent lawyers, who have been instrumental in supporting arrested and imprisoned activists, are also being threatened. Lawyers have played key roles in defending activists in court and spreading information about their trials, informing the public on the authorities’ repression. As a result, they are being threatened with losing their licences or being arrested.
Is Iran closer to change now than a year ago?
I think we are multiple steps closer to change than before. Iranians are less scared of the consequences of their activism. They dare to take action against the regime. The voice of protest is louder and the severity of the crackdown only shows how scared the regime is of the protest movement. The regime understands it won’t be easy to shut down this protest movement, which threatens the legitimacy and therefore the existence of the regime.
We also see a major lifestyle change. People on the streets are now dressed differently and are less afraid of showing their lifestyle in public. Although political change is minimal, cultural change following last year’s protests is clearly visible. This change shouldn’t be underestimated.
What needs to happen for political change to take place?
Iranians need to realise the power of being together. Change comes from power, and power comes from organising and acting together. To bring about change, we need social power and to create social power, organising is essential. By forming associations, organisations and networks, Iranians can demand and achieve change.
For this to happen, three types of changes are required. First is a change in attitude. Iranian activists need to think positively and constructively instead of negatively and destructively. Second is a change in behaviour. We will only achieve democracy if we also act democratically and use democratic tools. This means avoiding any form of violence and understanding that democracy does not rise from bloodshed and fire. Third is a change in context. It is key to empower society to say no and resist the regime.
The international community could support change by helping to increase the resilience of the social movement and its activists, both online and offline. The pursuit of meaningful and sustainable change is a marathon and it’s instrumental to echo the voices of activists and provide sustainable support. A coalition of international civil society organisations could help by providing strategic support to Iranian activists.
Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Volunteer Activists through itswebsite.
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LESOTHO: ‘We need constitutional protections for press freedom and access to information’
CIVICUS speaks about press freedoms in Lesotho with Kananelo Boloetse, chairperson of the Lesotho Chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA Lesotho).Established in 1996, MISA Lesotho is a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations and promoting media freedoms and the freedom of expression through research, advocacy, collaboration and capacity development.
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PAKISTAN: ‘They put a black hood over my face and took me to the airport’
CIVICUS speaks with Syed Fawad Ali Shah, a writer and journalist from Pakistan, about the situation of journalists in his country and his experience of persecution, exile and deportation.In retaliation for his reporting on terrorism, crime, drugs, corruption and human rights, in 2011 Syed was kidnapped and tortured by Pakistani intelligence officers, forcing him to seek asylum in Malaysia. He remained there until August 2022, when he was deported back to Pakistan, allegedly because the Pakistani authorities falsely identified him as a police officer subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
What is the situation for journalists in Pakistan?
It is too easy to kill, kidnap or torture journalists in Pakistan. Many Pakistani journalists have sacrificed a lot for press freedom, which the Pakistani government has strangled. Journalists working for most newspapers and TV channels in Pakistan have not received their salaries for several months because critical newspapers do not receive government advertising, putting pressure on journalists.
Why did you flee Pakistan in 2011?
In 2011, I was kidnapped in Islamabad by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), precisely for raising my voice for the freedom of people forcibly disappeared by the ISI. I was also exposing corruption in the police and bureaucracy and reporting on terrorism and the Taliban.
The ISI kept me in a secret, black hole-type jail for three months and 18 days. They released me on the condition that I quit journalism, leave the country, or work as a spy for them. I told them I would quit journalism, but it was impossible for me to leave the country or spy for the ISI.
To save my life, I kept my word. The ISI freed me in April. In June, I was wounded in a bomb blast in Peshawar. After my name was published in a local newspaper, the ISI called me threateningly, accusing me of starting journalism again. I told them that I had not; I just happened to be there. In August, I reluctantly left my country. I travelled to Thailand and a few days later I arrived in Malaysia, where I was granted refugee status.
What was your experience as a refugee?
As a refugee registered with the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), I experienced many hardships. UNHCR cardholders are sometimes arrested in Malaysia, so I lived in fear of being deported back to Pakistan. During my 13 years in Malaysia, I moved from place to place to avoid arrest. I wrote for various newspapers and websites, reporting mostly on refugee issues and immigration policies.
In 2016, UNHCR Malaysia referred my resettlement case to the United States Refugee Admissions Program through the International Rescue Committee (IRC). However, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) refused to resettle me in the USA due to alleged security issues. They gave me a series of reasons I could not be admitted as a refugee in the USA. I applied for reconsideration in 2016 but did not hear back from the DHS until June 2022.
From 2016 to 2022, I waited for a response from the US government that never came. I finally asked the IRC to send my case file back to UNHCR Malaysia, which they did. I wrote hundreds of times to UNHCR Malaysia requesting resettlement in a safe country but got no response, although I sent them copies of the threats I received from the Pakistani government, the police report and the letter written to Interpol for my arrest. Other who became refugees after me were resettled by UNHCR, but I was stuck there. Pakistani intelligence officers stationed at the Pakistani High Commission in Kuala Lumpur often spied on me.
How did your arrest and deportation happen?
On 23 August 2022, at 9pm, I was abducted by Malaysian immigration officials in a joint operation with the Pakistani ISI in the Bangsar area of Kuala Lumpur. They took me to the Immigration Headquarters in Putrajaya, where they locked me up in the basement. On 25 August they put a black hood over my face and took me to the airport. Before taking me to the airport, they gave me a drug, saying it was for COVID-19, after which I fell unconscious. At the airport they removed the black hood and put me on a Pakistan International Airlines flight to Islamabad, with two ISI officers at either side. More than 30 people from Malaysian Immigration and the Pakistani diplomatic mission saw me off at the airport.
When I arrived, the ISI sent me to an unknown prison in Islamabad without entering my data in the Federal Investigation Agency’s immigration system. I was detained for six months, during which time the Pakistani government did not acknowledge I was in Pakistan. But in March 2023, Malaysia’s Home Affairs minister finally acknowledged I had been deported and this was reported by international media.
The authorities couldn’t hide me for longer and eventually handed me over to the Federal Investigation Agency’s (FIA) cybercrime wing, who slapped me with two fake charges under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. After I received temporary bail, the judge was pressured by FIA’s cybercrime wing to fabricate further cases against me, so I am constantly afraid that the court will send me to jail. The ISI often oversteps its authority and kidnaps and disappears innocent people, which has led to thousands of cases pending in the Supreme Court of Pakistan without any result.
What are your requests to the international community?
I urge organisations working for the rights of refugees and journalists around the world, as well as the heads of all states that have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, to provide me with protection and immediately relocate me to a safe country under special circumstances.
I also urge the leaders of democratic states to put pressure on the Pakistani government regarding my situation and to provide me with a way to leave the country safely, as was done for Asia Bibi, who was resettled in France in 2020.
Due to pressure from Pakistani security agencies, my passport has been blocked for 10 years, and my name has been added to the Integrated Border Management System of Immigration, forcing me to change location every day. I am unable to sleep due to fear. Every time there is a knock at the door I panic. My heart beats fast all the time and I have fallen ill many times.
Civic space inPakistan is rated ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Follow@SyedFawadAli303 on Twitter.
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PHILIPPINES: ‘We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in the Philippines with Marinel Ubaldo, a young climate activist, co-founder of the Youth Leaders for Environmental Action Federation and Advocacy Officer for Ecological Justice and Youth Engagement of Living Laudato Si’ Philippines (LLS).
Founded by Catholic lay people, LLS began in 2018 as an interfaith movement calling on Filipino financial institutions to divest from coal-related operations and other environmentally harmful activities. It aims to empower people to adopt lifestyles and attitudes that match the urgent need to care for the planet. It promotes sustainable development and seeks to tackle the climate crisis through collective action.
From your perspective, what was at stake in the 9 May presidential election?
The 2022 election fell within the crucial window for climate justice. As stated in the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, we need to keep global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius or we will suffer terrible consequences, such as a rise in sea levels that will submerge much of the currently populated land, including the Philippines. Upcoming leaders will serve for the next six years –and possibly beyond. They have the immense responsibility of putting a climate change mitigation system in place for our country and urging more countries to do the same.
As shown by Super Typhoon Rai that hit the Philippines in December 2021, climate change affects all of us. Whole communities lost their loved ones and their homes. Young people will reap the fruits, or pay the consequences, for whatever our incoming leaders do in response to this crisis. This is why climate anxiety is so prevalent among young people.
How did young people mobilise around this election?
Young people campaigned house to house. We also went to grassroots communities to educate voters on how to vote wisely. Alongside other organisations that form the Green Thumb Coalition, our organisation produced a Green Scorecard and we used our social media platforms to promote the ‘green’ candidate.
One of the biggest youth initiatives around the elections was ‘LOVE, 52’, a campaign aimed at empowering young people and helping them engage with candidates and make their voices heard in demand of a green, just, and loveable future through better governance. We wanted to shift the focus from candidates’ personality and patronage politics to a debate on fundamental issues, and to help young people move traditional powerholders towards a people-centred style of policymaking.
We called this initiative ‘LOVE, 52’ in reference to the fact that young people – people under 40 – comprise 52 per cent of the Philippines’ voting population. We sought to appeal to younger voters’ emotions, and our central theme was love because a frequent response to the question ‘why vote?’ is to protect what we love: our families, our country, and our environment. The main element of this campaign was a ‘love letter’ drafted by several youth organisations and addressed to the country. It contained young people’s calls to incoming leaders, including those of prioritising environmental and social issues, coming up with a coherent plan to address the climate crisis, and supporting a vibrant democracy that will enable climate and environmental justice. We gathered all the love letters people wrote, put them in one envelope, and delivered them physically to the presidential candidates’ headquarters.
What are the implications of the election results for civil society and civic freedoms?
The results of these elections will have a lot of implications for the Filipino people. They will have a direct impact on civil society and our freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly.
The winning candidate, senator Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr., the son and namesake of a former dictator, has said that he will include his family in his administration. Just today, I saw the new president’s spokesperson on the news saying Marcos will make his own appointments, bringing in the people he trusts. I think he will really try to control the government with people who follow him unconditionally. He will put such people in all the positions available, so everyone will tell him what he wants to hear and no one will disagree with him. I think this is the scariest part of it all.
I fear in a few months or years we will be living under a dictatorship. Marcos may even be able to stay in power for as long as he wants. After trying to reach power for so long, he has finally won, and he won’t let go of power easily.
It’s very scary because the human rights violations that happened during his father’s dictatorship are not even settled yet. More human rights violations are likely to happen. It’s a fact that the Filipino people won’t be allowed to raise their voices; if they do so, they may risk being killed. This is what happened under martial law during Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship.
This will definitely affect civil society. It will be very difficult for humanitarian workers to respond to any crisis since Marcos will likely aspire to micro-manage everything. We fear the democracy those before us fought so hard for will be erased.
Regarding the specifics of policymaking, we don’t really know what the plan is. Marcos campaigned on vague promises of national unity and implied that all problems would be solved if people unite behind his leadership. Needless to say, he never mentioned any policy to tackle climate change and the environmental crisis.
Against all signals, I keep hoping the new administration will be receptive to people’s demands. I really hope our new president listens to the cries of the people. Our leaders must reach out to communities and listen to our issues. I doubt Bongbong Marcos is capable of doing that, but one can only hope.
What support does Filipino civil society need from international civil society and the international community?
We need to ensure the international community sends out a consistent message and stands by our side when oppression starts. We also need them to be ready to rescue Filipinos if their safety is at risk. We activists fear for our lives. We have doubts about how receptive and accepting the new administration will be toward civil society.
Today is a gloomy day in the Philippines. We did our best to campaign for truth, facts, and hope for the Philippines. Vice President Leni Robredo campaigned for public sector transparency and vowed to lead a government that cares for the people and bolsters the medical system. If she had won the elections, she would have been the third woman to lead the Philippines after Cory Aquino and Macapagal Arroyo.
Leni’s loss is the loss of the Philippines, not just hers. There are still too many people in the Philippines who believe Marcos’s lies. I don’t blame the masses for believing his lies; they are victims of decades of disinformation. Our system sadly enables disinformation. This is something that needs to be urgently tackled, but the next administration will likely benefit from it so it will hardly do what’s needed.
We now fear every day for our lives and for the future of our country.
Civic space inthe Philippinesis rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Living Laudato Si’ Philippines through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@LaudatoSiPH on Twitter and@laudatosiph on Instagram. -
SENEGAL: ‘After being an example of democracy in Africa, we are increasingly tending towards authoritarianism’
CIVICUS speaks with Abdou Aziz Cissé, Advocacy Officer at AfricTivistes, about President Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the presidential election that was due on 25 February and its implications for democracy in Senegal.AfricTivistes is a pan-African civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes and defends democratic values, human rights and good governance through civic tech. It aims to empower African people to become active players in building their societies and holding their governments to account.
Why did President Sall postpone the 25 February presidential election?
This latest crisis in Senegal began with a solemn address by President Sall on 3 February, the day before the planned day for the start of the campaign for the 25 February election, in which his successor was to be elected. He repealed the decree convening the electoral body, which had set the presidential election for 25 February.
He cited three reasons: a supposed institutional crisis between the National Assembly and the Constitutional Council concerning an alleged case of corruption of judges, the need to set up a parliamentary commission to investigate suspected irregularities in the process of verifying sponsorships for the election and the revelation that one of the candidates vetted by the Constitutional Council has dual nationality.
It should be noted that Karim Wade, son of former president Abdoulaye Wade and candidate for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), was not on the final list of candidates for the presidential election announced on 20 January. To contest this decision by the Constitutional Council, PDS members of parliament called for the creation of a parliamentary commission of enquiry to shed light on the process of candidacy verification. They also accused two Constitutional Council magistrates of corruption. Parliament approved the establishment of this commission on 31 January.
On 5 February, a bill to postpone the presidential election until 15 December was passed after opposition legislators were ejected from parliament by security forces. It should be remembered that on 3 July 2023, after stating that he would not seek a third term in office, Sall promised to hand over power on 2 April following free, inclusive and transparent elections.
Why has this decision been described as a ‘constitutional coup’?
Sall’s actions have been described as a constitutional coup because he is not allowed to interrupt an electoral process that has already begun. The postponement of an election is the exclusive prerogative of the Constitutional Council.
Sall’s decision also violates other articles of the constitution, notably article 27, which provides for a five-year presidential term and a limit of two consecutive terms, which means the president cannot extend his term of office. There is also article 103, which states that ‘the republican form of the state, the method of election, the duration and number of consecutive terms of office of the President of the Republic may not be revised’.
I would like to emphasise that in accordance with article 52 of the constitution, the president can only interrupt the process ‘when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of the national territory or the fulfilment of international commitments are threatened in a serious and immediate manner’. However, all institutions of the republic were operating regularly. The establishment of a parliamentary commission of enquiry and the passage of a bill clearly proved it.
By making this illegal decision, Sall became the first president in Senegal’s history not to organise a presidential election on its due date since 1963.
What has the reaction of civil society been?
The reaction of civil society was spontaneous. Several CSOs, including AfricTivistes, condemned this anti-democratic act in press releases and media statements. The nation’s other driving forces, such as trade unions from all professions, also voiced their disagreement.
On social networks, citizens shared their indignation, internationalising their anger at the decision.
On 4 February, 19 candidates held a press conference, joined by members of civil society, to reaffirm their willingness to campaign together.
Another demonstration was declared for 5 February, the day of the parliamentary vote, but could not take place because all the strategic roads leading to the National Assembly were cordoned off. Since June 2023, the administrative authorities have systematically banned demonstrations, even peaceful ones.
The ‘Aar Sunu Election’ (‘Let’s protect our election’) platform brought together more than a hundred CSOs to reject the postponement of the election. The pressure paid off, because on the evening of 15 February, the Constitutional Council declared the presidential decree of 3 February and the law passed by the National Assembly on 5 February invalid.
How has the government reacted?
The government began by cracking down on the demonstrations that took place on 4 February, the day after the president’s announcement and the day on which the election campaign was due to begin. Censorship was also imposed that day, with the internet via mobile data cut off, according to the minister in charge, to stop ‘the dissemination of hateful and subversive messages’. The same reasons had been provided to justify acts of internet censorship in June, July and August 2023. Mobile data was restored on 7 February, then restricted to specific time slots on 13 February.
Internet blackouts and other forms of online restrictions violate the constitution and several international conventions ratified by Senegal. They are violations of freedom of expression, access to information and economic freedoms. According to Senegalese telecoms unions, censorship has caused losses amounting to 3 billion CFA francs (approx. US$ 4.9 million).
With this in mind, AfricTivistes and two Senegalese journalists are taking the state of Senegal to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, the regional organisation, to seek an end to untimely cuts in mobile internet data.
In addition, the licence of the Walfadjri television station was suspended at the height of the protests following the announcement of the postponement of the election. Walfadjri has been subjected to a relentless attack by the authorities. Its signal was restored on 11 February.
On 9 February, a peaceful rally held by numerous organisations on the Place de la Nation in Dakar was dispersed by the police. People mobilised throughout the country, particularly in the northern city of Saint-Louis. Peaceful protesters were violently repressed with disproportionate use of force, resulting in three deaths and several people injured, some of whom were not even taking part in demonstrations, along with over 200 arrests.
The press was also prevented from covering the demonstrations and providing people with fair and accurate information. Journalists, most of them women, were teargassed, arrested and roughed up in the same way as protesters. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 25 journalists were attacked, detained or teargassed during the demonstrations. Journalist Absa Anne, of the news website Seneweb, was dragged into a police vehicle and beaten unconscious, becoming a symbol of the indiscriminate crackdown on the press that took place that day.
A silent march announced by the ‘Let’s protect our election’ platform was banned on 13 February by the administrative authorities. However, another march on 17 February was authorised, and people came together in huge numbers to enjoy their long-threatened constitutional freedoms. This national moment of communion was proof that when authorised by the administrative authorities, demonstrations go off peacefully.
How do you see the future of democracy in Senegal?
After being an example of democracy and political stability in Africa, with peaceful democratic alternation in power in 2000 and 2012, Senegal is increasingly tending towards authoritarianism, symbolised by the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms.
Even if the release, since 15 February, of more than 600 political detainees arrested for crimes of opinion or belonging to the opposition is helping to ease the political climate, the crisis that we are currently experiencing does not augur a bright future for Senegalese democracy.
But I am optimistic, because even if the political class is engaged in a fierce power struggle, civil society is strong and has a considerable ability to assert itself in all areas of the country’s social life. Not to mention the new force of protest that has emerged with the advent of civic technologies. Social media amplifies citizens’ voices and gives them an international dimension, hence the moves by the authorities to try to silence the voices that express themselves through online tools.
Senegal also has strong justice and administrative systems, which have always played their role as a counterweight. We must also take into account that, like all democratic systems, Senegal’s needs to be perfected. It has made significant progress, albeit with ups and downs like those we are currently experiencing. And we must bear in mind that it is from crises that opportunities emerge.
What should the international community do to help solve this crisis?
The international community can play an important role in supporting a transparent and fair democratic process by sending election observation missions.
As well as supporting civil society, international partners can exert diplomatic pressure, as Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, Joseph Borell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have done, calling for independent investigations to shed light on the killings of protesters. All this goodwill can help to encourage an inclusive dialogue. This could foster a search for consensual solutions.
The international community must condemn all political violence and reiterate the importance of respecting fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of peaceful assembly.
How do you assess the state of democracy in West Africa, and how is AfricTivistes working to help activists in countries affected by coups?
Over the past three years democracy in the region has declined. Between 2020 and 2022, West Africa experienced five coups against a backdrop of terrorism in the Sahel and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Civil society plays a crucial role in shaping democracy, but civic space is stifled in countries where the military has taken over.
However, each country has its own historical and political dynamics. Democratic trends vary considerably depending on historical, cultural and socio-economic factors. Countries that have succeeded in implementing institutional reforms to combat corruption have generally seen the quality of their democracy improve, as seen in Cabo Verde, West Africa’s champion of good governance.
Several countries have maintained relative political stability, such as Senegal before the latest developments. The last country to hold a presidential election was Côte d’Ivoire, following post-election incidents and the violation of the Ivorian constitution, which also limits the number of presidential terms to two.
With a large community enabling us to internationalise our advocacy, AfricTivistes provides moral support to democracy activists by publishing press releases to point out the illegality of their arrest and censorship.
We also provide them with technical support so they can circumvent the censorship they face in their countries. To date, we have supported seven democracy activists and journalists in danger.
Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with AfricTivistes through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@afric_tivistes and@frican_excellency on Instagram and@AFRICTIVISTES and@AbdouJCisse on Twitter.
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SERBIA: ‘We live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism, with a government hostile to critical voices’
CIVICUS discusses recent local elections in Serbia with Tamara Branković, deputy program director at the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA). CRTA is an independent, non-partisan civil society organisation working to develop democratic culture and civic activism in Serbia.In Serbia’s 2 June local elections, the coalition led by President AleksandarVučić’snationalistSerbian Progressive Party won in the two largest cities, including the capital, Belgrade, where the polls were a rerun of a December election found by international observers to have serious irregularities, and which sparked months of protests. In Belgrade’s rerun, a new centre-right group came second and the left-wing greens third. This time, the elections appeared to be cleaner, but competitiveness was limited as the ruling party misused state resources to favour its candidates.
Why did the ruling coalition win in the local elections?
We only observed the elections for the Assembly of the City of Belgrade, but I believe our conclusion also applies to other local elections that took place on 2 June.
It should be noted that the election in Belgrade was a rerun of last December’s election, which, as CRTA proved, was severely compromised by illegal and illegitimate electoral engineering, mainly through organised voter migration. The June election was the second, less bad half of an extremely dirty match.
The campaign didn’t feel like a campaign for local elections but rather for national elections. The dominant political force, with President Aleksandar Vučić at its head, placed what it called issues of ‘national survival’ at the top of the agenda, charging the atmosphere with hardcore nationalist sentiments.
This was further fuelled by a vote just a few days before the election in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on a resolution on genocide in Srebrenica. It drove an unparalleled propaganda surge, presented as a dignified national defence against a hostile west allegedly attempting to put a label of collective guilt on Serbian people.
When I refer to the dominant political force, I mean not only the ruling Serbian Progressive Party but also state officials, because the line between the ruling party and the state has increasingly blurred, which is a key explanation of the election results. Political clientelism and pressures on voters contributed significantly to the ruling party’s victory.
What role did civil society play in the elections, and what challenges did you face?
Our role was to try to rescue what could be saved of the integrity of the electoral process. We tried to inform and educate citizens about their electoral rights and the ways those rights were being manipulated and abused. We sought to mobilise citizens to report any violations they saw to our observation mission. And most importantly, we tried to recruit and train enough citizen observers so we could get a full picture of the quality of elections. It was a large operation that lasted from April to June, involving 1,500 people.
But we live in a system that’s allergic to pluralism. Our government is hostile to critical voices, so the space for civil society is constantly shrinking. We need our international friends to be aware of this and spread the word that democracy in Serbia is in danger.
What other concerning trends did you see?
Unfortunately, we’ve seen a growth of several negative trends. We witnessed a record number of cases of vote buying and numerous tense situations that approached or crossed the line into violence. All the chronic problems that have devalued elections for many years continued to grow, from people’s distrust of the voters’ register and extremely unequal media access for candidates, to abuse of state institutions and public resources, unscrupulous pressure on voters and deteriorating conditions for election observation.
Since the December 2023 elections, a number of international voices have spoken out about the situation in Serbia. The UN Human Rights Committee issued a strong rebuke, criticising the Serbian authorities for their opaque handling of election violations. Various UN human rights experts reported serious state attacks on election observers, civil society and the media and asked for clarifications from the Serbian government, but barely received a response.
These problems remain unresolved because of state capture. State institutions are subordinated to party interests, and the party in power shows no political will to change this situation.
Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with CRTA through itswebsite, and follow@CRTArs and@nemaperspektive on Twitter.
