Peru

• ‘Invocamos el principio de extraterritorialidad para llamar al Estado chino a rendir cuentas del impacto de sus inversiones en América Latina’

  English

  CIVICUS conversa con las cuatro responsables de la iniciativa regional “Explorando nuevos caminos para la defensa de los derechos humanos frente a las inversiones chinas en América del Sur: El Examen Periódico Universal de las Naciones Unidas y el Principio de Extraterritorialidad”: Paulina Garzón,de la Iniciativa para las Inversiones Sostenibles China América-Latina (IISCAL),María Marta Di Paola, dela Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN) de Argentina; Sofía Jarrín, del Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales (CDES) de Ecuador; y Julia Cuadros, de CooperAcción, una organización de Perú.

  1. ¿Qué impacto están teniendo las inversiones chinas en América Latina, y por qué es preocupante?

  A pesar de la desaceleración de la economía china en los últimos años, las inversiones chinas continúan creciendo en América Latina. En 2016 los préstamos soberanos de los bancos chinos alcanzaron 21.000 millones de dólares (más que el monto prestado por todos los bancos multilaterales) y la inversión directa llegó a los 10.358 millones (un crecimiento de 29,4% con respecto a 2015). La República Popular de China es el primer o el segundo socio comercial para todos los países sudamericanos, y resalta el hecho de que la gran mayoría de las exportaciones hacia China se concentra en petróleo, minerales y soja. En otras palabras, las inversiones chinas o motorizadas por la demanda china han dado un nuevo impulso al sector primario y, dentro de éste, a las industrias extractivas, de modo tal que la relación económica entre China y América Latina impone grandes desafíos tanto ambientales como en relación con los derechos de las comunidades donde se asientan estas inversiones.

  El crecimiento y la escala del financiamiento chino en América Latina ha tomado a las organizaciones sociales y a las comunidades por sorpresa. Hasta ahora, es poco lo que la sociedad civil ha podido hacer para demandar rendición de cuentas directamente a los bancos, compañías y agencias reguladoras chinas, en parte por falta de conocimiento y acceso a los procedimientos de estas instituciones, pero sobre todo por el hermetismo que las caracteriza. Ello se ve agudizado por el hecho de que la mayoría de los capitales chinos que llegan a la región aterrizan en Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela, países que tienen una o varias de las siguientes características: dificultades para acceder a los mercados financieros; gobernanza ambiental debilitada; y disminución de espacios de participación ciudadana. En estos países, vemos que las empresas transnacionales han contribuido a la violación de los derechos humanos, entre las que se cuenta la práctica sistemática de criminalización de los defensores ambientales.

  Sobre esta misma línea, cabe agregar que China ha seguido el principio de “no interferencia” en la construcción de su relación con América Latina, lo cual ha dado como resultado una interacción casi exclusiva con los gobiernos de turno, sin inclusión de actores no gubernamentales. En este contexto, las organizaciones sociales latinoamericanas no hemos logrado establecer canales de diálogo sustanciales con las instituciones chinas, y tanto menos en lo que se refiere a la demanda de rendición de cuentas acerca de los impactos negativos de su intervención.

  2. ¿Qué está haciendo la sociedad civil de América Latina para llamar a China a rendir cuentas de los efectos ambientales y sociales de sus inversiones en la región?

  Un grupo de organizaciones de varios países que han visto su situación de derechos humanos deteriorarse por efecto de la penetración de estas inversiones, hemos decidido hacer uso de las herramientas que ofrece el sistema internacional de derechos humanos para establecer una conversación sobre la necesidad de llamar a los gobiernos a rendir cuentas de los efectos de sus inversiones y de las acciones de sus empresas en el extranjero. Para ello aprovecharemos el hecho de que la República Popular de China realizará en noviembre de 2018 su Examen Periódico Universal (EPU) en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas (ONU), la evaluación de derechos humanos a la que deben someterse cada cuatro años todos los estados miembros de la ONU, sin excepción.

  Pese a que no cuenta con una autoridad y mecanismos de aplicación, el sistema universal de derechos humanos, dentro del cual se encuentra el mecanismo EPU, ofrece valiosas oportunidades de incidencia para la sociedad civil en todo el mundo. El EPU ofrece un espacio para que las comunidades afectadas en sus derechos civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales o culturales hagan oír sus reclamos. Por lo general, la responsabilidad por los derechos vulnerados es adjudicada al Estado dentro de cuyo territorio ocurren dichas violaciones de derechos. Así, en el marco del EPU de China, el grueso de las recomendaciones que recibe el Estado chino se vinculan con el trato que reciben sus ciudadanos dentro de su territorio. Sin embargo, nada impide a las comunidades afectadas en sus derechos en diversos países de América Latina presentar reclamos por las acciones de un país extranjero miembro de las Naciones Unidas. En otras palabras, nada impide a los grupos vulnerados invocar el principio de extraterritorialidad para demandar a un Estado extranjero el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de derechos humanos contraídas por la aceptación de los instrumentos de las Naciones Unidas, así como a través de todo compromiso voluntario que dicho Estado haya ratificado y asumido.

  Eso es precisamente lo que pensamos hacer durante la EPU de China. En vistas de este proceso, el Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales (CDES) de Ecuador, la Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN) de Argentina, CooperAcción de Perú y la Iniciativa para las Inversiones Sostenibles China América-Latina (IISCAL), hemos creado una alianza regional con el objeto de investigar colaborativamente y elaborar un informe sombra nacional para cada uno de los países sudamericanos incluidos en el proyecto, así como un informe sombra regional. En marzo de 2018 estos informes serán presentados a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas como aportes para el EPU de China.

  Esta iniciativa cobró vida en 2017, con la búsqueda de una alianza regional para fortalecer nuestro trabajo de incidencia frente al Estado chino. La participación en el mecanismo del EPU es para nosotras una ventana de oportunidad para canalizar las preocupaciones y visibilizar las múltiples violaciones a los derechos humanos de las comunidades afectadas por proyectos cuyo financiamiento y operación se vinculan con inversiones del Estado chino.

  Las organizaciones involucradas tenemos una extensa y probada trayectoria de trabajo sobre financiamiento internacional y derechos humanos y ambientales, y nos contamos entre las pocas organizaciones de la sociedad civil de la región que han realizado un trabajo sistemático de investigación e incidencia sobre inversiones chinas en sus respectivos países. Además, gozamos de la confianza, credibilidad y reconocimiento de las organizaciones de base y otros actores relevantes. De hecho, en varios casos, hemos abogado frente a las entidades chinas para que mejoren sustancialmente su comportamiento ambiental y social y para que actúen como buenos ciudadanos globales. La falta de respuestas por parte de tales entidades nos ha llevado a buscar nuevos espacios de interlocución con la República Popular de China en los foros internacionales. Tenemos la esperanza de que el EPU de China y demás mecanismos de las Naciones Unidas ofrezcan el tan necesario espacio para lograr un compromiso serio de parte de los bancos y empresas chinas en materia de internalización de los principios de derechos humanos en sus operaciones en el extranjero.

  3. ¿Cuál es el sustento legal de la iniciativa? ¿A qué instrumentos, convenciones y legislación apelarán para apoyar sus reclamos?

  La República Popular de China ha ratificado varios instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos. Entre ellos, los más importantes a la hora de constituir el marco de referencia y argumentación para el trabajo que pretendemos llevar adelante son el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, el Protocolo de San Salvador (Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales) y los Principios de Maastricht sobre las Obligaciones Extraterritoriales de los Estados en el Área de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Estos últimos, en particular, establecen que los Estados tienen la obligación de respetar, proteger y cumplir los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales tanto dentro de su territorio como fuera de él, y estipulan que la responsabilidad del Estado se extiende a los actos y las omisiones de los agentes no estatales que actúan por instrucciones o bajo la dirección o el control del Estado en cuestión.

  Cabe señalar que si bien nuestra argumentación se basa en el principio de responsabilidades extraterritoriales, ello no excluye la posibilidad de apelar en los informes sombra a otros instrumentos internacionales que integran el sistema universal de las Naciones Unidas, aún si no han sido ratificados por el Estado chino. En ese sentido, deba presumirse que, al aceptar ser miembro de las Naciones Unidas, China se compromete a promover sus principios y apoyar la implementación de los tratados, pactos y convenios internacionales elaborados en el seno de la organización.

  También es importante destacar que según el artículo 16 de la Constitución China, las empresas estatales tienen poder de decisión con respecto al funcionamiento y la gestión dentro de los límites prescritos por la ley, a condición de que se sometan al liderazgo unificado del Estado, en cuyo caso deben cumplir con todas las obligaciones del plan estatal. En otras palabras, las empresas estatales chinas son actores cuasi-estatales. Funcionan como una extensión de la estructura del Estado chino, ya que le pertenecen, son patrocinadas por él o actúan en pos de sus intereses. Ello convierte a las responsabilidades de derechos humanos de las empresas estatales de la República Popular de China en responsabilidades del Estado chino.

  El hecho de que China ocupe un puesto en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas y de que, durante una visita del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas a China el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de ese país haya declarado que “la ONU es una plataforma efectiva para los desafíos globales y la institución central para los esfuerzos internacionales en tratar los asuntos globales” constituye para nosotros una ventana de oportunidad. El EPU de la República Popular de China que se realizará en noviembre del 2018 es la oportunidad más concreta y cercana que tenemos.

  • Visite las páginas web delCDES,CooperAcción,FARN eIISCAL, o siga en Twitter a @CDESecuador, @CooperAccionPER, @farnargentina y @PaulinaGarzón
• Advocating for women’s sexual and reproductive rights in Peru, a risky fight against powerful enemies

  Spanish

  CIVICUS speaks to María Ysabel Cedano, Director of DEMUS –Study for the Defense of Women’s Rights, a Peruvian feminist organisation that since 1987 defends human rights, and particularly women’s sexual and reproductive rights, by promoting their free exercise and questioning the hegemonic cultural paradigm on women and their sexuality. DEMUS carries out public opinion campaigns and advocacy work with the three branches of government; it conducts strategic litigation and promotes mobilisation on issues related to the promotion of equality and non-discrimination, a life free from gender-based violence, access to justice, and sexual and reproductive rights.

  1. How would you describe the context for the exercise of feminist activism in Peru?
  Generally speaking, conditions for activism greatly depend on the ideology, programme and nature of the organisation and movement in question - on its stance regarding the state and the incumbent government, and on its relationship with political forces and the powers that be.

  Due to our agenda, we feminists are antagonists of Fujimorism, the political movement founded by Alberto Fujimori, who ruled Peru between 1990 and 2000. Our organisation has criticised and opposed them since the 1990s, as we have fought for justice and reparations for the thousands of victims of the Fujimori administration’s policy of systematic forced sterilisation. Its victims were mostly peasant, indigenous and poor women who underwent irreversible surgical contraception without being able to give their free and informed consent, in a context of widespread violence.

  On this issue, in 2003 we reached a Friendly Settlement Agreement (FSA) in the Mamérita Mestanza case. As a result, the Peruvian state acknowledged its responsibility for human rights violations in the context of the forced sterilisation policy and committed to providing justice and reparation to victims. We also obtained favourable statements by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that have boosted our work to defend the right to access justice and to promote a policy of integral reparations. That made us a target of Fujimorist attacks, in the form of defamation in the national media as well as in social media. We have in fact sued former congressman Alejandro Aguinaga, under investigation in the preliminary examination of forced sterilisations as a crime against humanity and other serious violations of human rights, which the Public Ministry opened in 2004 in compliance with the already mentioned FSA. The case still remains in its preliminary stages due to political interference, which we have publically denounced. For more than fourteen years, the Public Ministry has failed to accuse former President Fujimori and his former Health Ministers, including Aguinaga, and no prosecution has taken place. In the meantime, Fujimorism has not undergone any renovation whatsoever: it still does not believe in human rights and cannot fathom the right of women to decide on their own. In fact they all remain very convinced that it is the state that has to decide for them.

  The other antagonists we have as a result of our feminist agenda are the Catholic and Evangelical ecclesial hierarchies, as well as other conservative and fundamentalist religious groups such as Opus Dei, Sodalitium and Bethel. These are the leaders of an anti- sexual and reproductive rights agenda and seek to legislate and implement public policies to strengthen the institutions that guarantee their political, economic, social and cultural dominance, thereby ignoring the secular character of the state that the authorities in turn fail to enforce. For decades they have run a strong campaign against what they call “gender ideology”, not just in Peru but throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and beyond. These are multimillion-dollar campaigns that maintain that “gender ideology” attacks life, marriage and family. The funding they poured into the fear campaign against the peace accords in Colombia is a good example of this. They have also promoted a campaign called "Don't mess with my children" in several countries in the region.

  While these actors have questioned the scientific and legal validity of the gender perspective, the concept of gender has been adopted in the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) and in standards such as CEDAW, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Convention of Belém do Pará. In Peru it was included into several laws, public policies and institutions, as a result of which conservative sectors are currently trying, for instance, to eliminate the gender perspective from the school curriculum, including all allusions to sexual orientation and gender identity. They have done so by means of both street actions and lawsuits. These however have not yielded the desired results: the overwhelming response from the Ministry of Justice’s Attorney General even covered them in ridicule. As a result, they had no alternative left other than using their power in Congress, where there are currently two bills that have been submitted by Fujimorism towards that aim.

  Lastly, in addition to harassing us through their press, as they have always done, these sectors now also attack us for our funding sources. They say we are the instruments of great powers seeking to impose Western models of family and sexuality in our country.

  Thanks to a journalistic investigation that then became a criminal investigation, we currently know of child sexual abuse perpetrated by members of the Sodalitium, one of the most conservative and powerful groups within the Catholic Church. The scandal contributed to weakening the attacks coming from the ecclesial hierarchy. We are also beginning to know about the unholy business the Church does with education, health and even cemeteries within the framework of the Concordat between the Peruvian state and the Vatican. The very same priests who have spent years fighting us on the decriminalisation of abortion for rape cases, and who have said the worst things about us because they consider themselves to be the “defenders of life”, have allegedly covered for rapists of children and adolescents in their congregations and communities. This has helped people overcome their fear of denouncing the Catholic Church’s hypocrisy and double standards, and has limited the church’s ability to demand the government implement specific policies. For instance, the government has recently obeyed a court order to resume the distribution of emergency oral contraception despite pressures from Cardinal Cipriani.

  Given that our struggles for transitional justice have led us to seek justice and integral reparations for the victims of sexual violence during the internal armed conflict (1980-2000), we face not only Fujimorism but also APRA, a traditional party that ruled during a part of this period. They both seek to divide Peruvians between terrorists and non-terrorists and associate the left and human rights with terrorism. They never get tired of asserting that those who attack the military are terrorists - or ungrateful to say the least, for persecuting those who freed us from terrorism. If we strive for the legalisation of abortion we are abortionists, and if we defend human rights we are terrorists.

  2. How does DEMUS work to overcome these obstacles?
  We combine organisational and mobilisation strategies to strengthen the feminist and women’s diversity movement, public and political advocacy for legislation, public policies and access to justice measures, and strategic litigation. Among the latter were for instance the Manta y Vilca trial on rape during the internal armed conflict, which established that this was a crime against humanity; the case of forced sterilisations during the Fujimori administration; and other cases that have allowed us to move forward in terms of the recognition and guarantee of the human right to therapeutic abortion, among other sexual and reproductive rights.

  Ours is not just a lawyers’ struggle: we work in multidisciplinary teams and in alliances and within networks including other feminist, women’s, LGBTIQ and human rights NGOs, groups and platforms. Experience has taught us that it is not enough to obtain jurisprudence, standards, laws and public policies if there are no social movements and citizens defending them, that is, if there is no social base accompanying and empathising with the victims. Strategic litigation, legal defence and psycho-legal and therapeutic help are therefore always to be accompanied with mobilisation and campaigning.

  3. Is the Peruvian women’s movement integrated into regional or global networks, so as to face an adversary that is?
  There are indeed very important global and regional networks. In Latin America, the level of articulation reached by indigenous, peasant and environmental women human rights defenders is astonishing in contrast with the weakening of some feminist networks. New technologies have revolutionised communications, and we now have various alternative means to organise ourselves in networks.

  We must think about how to strengthen our thematic networks, for instance in the field of sexual and reproductive rights, in order to resist together. This is facilitated by a number of conceptual convergences, but complicated by the scarcity of resources reaching Latin America, competition around which affects alliances and articulations. Neoliberalism has also had an impact on inter-subjective relations: conflicts and rivalries arise due to scarce funding. It is impossible to understand the degree of difficulties we face without analysing the changes in and the new rules of international cooperation and funding mechanisms.
  On the other hand, we must not forget that Peru’s is a post-conflict society, with open wounds and an abundance of distrust, which has not yet learned to resolve differences without violence. We need to be aware of these limitations, so as not to reproduce what we criticise. But we are certainly still very strong: with much greater organisation and resources than we have, Catholics and evangelicals have not yet managed to create enough pressure in the streets and on public opinion to remove sex education from the school curriculum. Their only hope is now placed on authoritarian conservative forces in Congress.

  4. What progress or setbacks do you perceive in the struggle for women’s rights in Peru?
  Taking stock of the forty years of contemporary feminism in Peru, there has been net progress in terms of the legal-institutional framework. Advances have been the result of constant struggle and permanent dispute, and are neither ideal nor stable: they need to be continuously defended and perfected.

  For instance, in late 2015 a substantial amendment to Law No. 26260 (1993) on domestic violence was finally passed. The new legislation, Law No. 30394, is a law against gender-based violence. Shortly after, in July 2016, the Third National Plan against Gender Violence (2016-2021) was passed. In both cases there was a dispute over the diversity of the women to be protected. There was much resistance against the possibility that legislation would also protect lesbian, bisexual and transgender women. In fact, recognition of the variety of forms that gender violence can take was not as resisted as the extension and recognition of the objects of protection. The women’s movement succeeded in getting some previously unacknowledged forms of gender violence recognised as such, including gender-based violence in the context of social conflicts. We wanted the new law to protect women human rights defenders of land, the environment, and natural resources, that is, indigenous and peasant women who are currently criminalised and on whom conflicts have a differential impact on the basis of gender. This we achieved. We had also proposed that the violation of sexual and reproductive rights be recognised as gender violence. And while we achieved recognition of forced sterilisation, rape in the context of internal armed conflict, violence due to sexual orientation, and obstetric violence as forms of gender-based violence, such recognition was not expressed in the language of sexual and reproductive rights. In additional, sexual orientation-based violence was recognised but gender identity-based violence was not.

  Fifteen years after the First National Plan was launched, and more than twenty after the first law against then-called “domestic” or “intra-family” violence was passed, tension between women’s rights and family protection persists. Although Law No. 30364 has in many respects aligned legislation with the Belém do Pará Convention, violence based on gender identity discrimination has not yet been recognised. Public debate continues to focus on nature as a determinant of sexuality, reproduction and family.

  Why is it that feminists and LGBT people perceive “family protection” as contrary to our rights? First, because not all families are protected. Family rights of the LGBT population are not recognised. Secondly, because why protect the existing family – a traditional, hierarchical, violent family based on sexual division of labour and the exclusive recognition of heterosexual sexuality? A family organisation free of discrimination and gender-based violence should be promoted instead. In other words, measures should be taken to dismantle the patriarchal family, which functions as the very first place of normalisation and control, particularly for women and LGBT persons. The family has become a space in which physical, psychological and sexual violence remain unpunished: in fact, Peru has the second highest rate of denunciation of sexual offences against girls and adolescents in the region, and these are in many cases perpetrated by family members. Finally, a person’s (and in this case a woman’s) rights can never be subordinated, conditioned or reduced to a by-product of family welfare, in the same way as the rights of an actual person cannot be subordinated to the rights of being yet to be born.

  In sum, in historical perspective there has been progress in the recognition and guarantee of rights, but these have been the product of constant struggle. We face strong resistance, and if we had not permanently defended our conquests, we would certainly have seen them retreat long ago.

  5. In this context, how has DEMUS’ agenda changed since its beginnings in 1987?
  DEMUS is an organisation well known for its work for the right to a life free of gender-based violence. We specialise in prevention, care, denunciation, therapeutic and psycho-legal accompaniment, litigation, advocacy with legislative, policymaking and justice administration bodies, and campaigning and mobilisation on gender-based violence. For instance, we developed the “Not one more death” campaign, which placed femicide on the public agenda, and the “A man doesn't rape” campaign, which contributed to call attention on the problem of sexual violence, impunity and the culture of rape.
  
  In the beginning we had to dispute about the very concept of what was then called “intra-family violence”, which we designated as “violence against women” and today we call “gender-based violence”. We saw violence against women as a problem of power inequality, sexual discrimination and impunity, so we advocated for equality and access to justice. However, as years passed and the first laws and policies on the issue were passed, we realised that we were not obtaining the results we expected.

  The fight against violence against women had gained consensus as part of the state agenda and had occupied a space in the institutional structure of the state (commissions, ministries, etc.), and even ultraconservatives had begun to accept equal opportunities between men and women (which was enshrined in Law No. 28983 of 2007) all the while resisting the recognition of other sexual orientations and gender identities. So we began a conceptual revision and concluded that if we wanted to combat gender-based violence, our central strategic battle had to revolve around women’s autonomy and self-determination in the field of sexuality and reproduction, the recognition of and the provision of guarantees for sexual and reproductive rights understood as fundamental human rights, and access to justice in cases where these were violated. The perspective of sexual and reproductive rights came to enrich the equality and non-discrimination approach in addressing the problems of gender-based violence and impunity.

  Thus, although the defence of LGBT rights and the legalisation of abortion were already in DEMUS’ agenda, they have since become more central to it. And our strategies became richer in the process, because besides strategic litigation and therapeutic and psycho-legal accompaniment we started to focus as well on organisation and mobilisation, public advocacy and communication. We have used the whole toolbox in our search for justice and reparations for the victims of forced sterilisations, and also in our campaigns for emergency oral contraception and the legalisation of abortion (first of all for reasons of rape, foetal malformations incompatible with extra-uterine life, and unconsented artificial insemination and egg transfers, and eventually on the basis of women’s dignity and right to decide).

  Most recently, in our work to defend victims of sexual violence and impunity, we have learned from the indigenous and peasant women defenders of land and water that women human rights defenders are being differently affected by the extractivist economy due to their gender, and are being specifically criminalised by corporations such as the Yanacocha mining company and by the state itself. In their struggle to defend lakes and resist mining projects such as Conga, women are having a hard time, since gender-based violence is being used against them. In the actions of the police and the Armed Forces we are currently seeing a criminalisation of social protest, threats and violations of women’s rights echoing those that took place during armed conflict. In order to avoid the repetition of serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity, we are using the new legislation, which now enables it, to denounce Yanacocha and make it clear that there is gender-based violence behind situations of harassment like that suffered by women human rights defenders such as Máxima Acuña.
  
  The other agenda that we increasingly adopted as central is the defence against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, in order to achieve recognition of and guarantees for the right to gender identity and lesbians’ right to maternity. We choose the issues we fight for on the basis of several criteria. One of them is that of revolutionising whatever the system resists the most, so that if we win, we will not only have obtained a law, public policy or jurisprudence, but we will also have conquered people’s common sense. And what the system most resists today is transgender identity and the right of LGBT persons to love and family. The system condemns us to civil death, poverty, marginalisation, murder, harassment and rape.

  6. In Peru, there have recently been major mobilisations with the motto #NiUnaMenos. How was the issue placed on the public agenda in such a way that mobilisation turned out to be so massive? What roles did regional networks play in the process?

  The marches in Argentina, Mexico and other countries inspired many of us: we wanted to do something similarly massive in our own country. But mobilisation did not occur in Peru as a response to a regional call, or as a result of prior coordination within a regional network.

  A year prior to this mobilisation there was a high profile case in Peru, in which a woman was savagely attacked in a hotel in Ayacucho, dragged by the hair and almost raped and murdered. The episode had been recorded on video, and everyone followed the case in the media and expected the attacker to be convicted. The ruling came out a few months before the demonstration, and it acquitted the accused. It denied that an attempted rape and femicide had taken place, and it even ruled that the injuries on the victim had been minor. This generated a social phenomenon of indignation that spread throughout the national territory and in social media. Women who were in the ideological and social antipodes from one another agreed that something had to be done, and feminists started talking about a mobilisation meant to make it clear that “if they touch one of us, they are touching us all”. The #NiUnaMenos (#NotOneLess) slogan was adopted out of the belief that the time had finally come and that this would be a mobilisation of a magnitude similar to those that had taken place in other countries.
  
  In Peru, the idea persists that if you do not obtain justice it is because you cannot prove what has happened to you. You only have your word and that is not enough for justice administrators. Now, if even in a case where there is a video like that, the aggressor is eventually absolved, what kind of security and justice is left for the rest of us? This created an unprecedented feeling of helplessness. Fear quickly turned into indignation, and this in turn into mobilisation. I was invited to join a Facebook chat a few hours after the video was made public. There were ten of us to start with, and a little while later we were over sixty, and the next day we were meeting at a comrade’s place. Within a few hours, the closed group formed in Facebook went from a few women testifying to the various forms of violence in their daily lives to 20 thousand, 40 thousand women reporting on their own stories of violence: at home, in the streets, at work, in school. Terrible stories, and everybody was telling them and keeping each other company.

  Thus, in Peru citizens went out into the streets to reject impunity and defend the right to justice. People began to wonder why violence against women persists despite all the laws and policies to combat it. The media started talking about patriarchy and machismo as its causes. There was some recognition of the importance of the feminist struggle, at least in that particular context. Much of the leadership and organisational work towards mobilisation was done by various organised and unorganised female citizens, leaders of feminist groups in neighbourhoods, universities, trade unions, NGOs. Women of a wide diversity of movements, colours, desires, education, professions and talents, in alliance and dialogue with the survivors whose emblematic cases united diverse sectors of society. Conservative sectors have still not managed to obtain similar success in defence of their agenda.

  7. Did the mobilisation have any positive effect in terms of public policy?
  The mobilisation resulted in some concrete measures, although these were too narrowly focused and involved little public investment. A Circle of Protection program was created, thereby extending attention to 24/7 in five out of over 200 Emergency Women’s Centres (EWC). Coverage of the emergency line Línea 600 was extended to all days of the week. This contributed to an increase in addressed complaints. Also, cases of femicide and rape were subsequently included into the rewards programme to stop offenders.

  Additionally, there were announcements regarding the expansion of temporary shelters, the provision of gender training to justice operators, and in particular to the National Police, and the creation of at least 50 new EWCs in various police stations across the country. The Public Ministry adapted its guidelines to Law No. 30364 and announced the creation of prosecution offices specialised in femicide. The Judiciary established a National Gender Commission.
  
  Nonetheless, femicidal violence persists as a savage daily occurrence; there is in fact a patriarchal and male chauvinist counteroffensive underway. They continue to kill us and rape us, and the femicide and rape culture keeps blaming us for it. And the measures adopted by the state in defence of the gender approach and gender equality fall short: they are basically reactions and responses to public pressure. We women do the reporting and monitoring job that the state should be doing. The state and the government always give in when it comes to the sexual and reproductive rights of women and LGBTIQ people. Which makes it clear that unless it becomes feminist, public policy will yield no results. If public policy priorities do not change, women will continue to die.
  
  The most important changes have occurred in the realms of common sense. #NiUnaMenos has shown that there is widespread rejection of violence against women, and that women have become empowered to talk about sexual violence in the same way that we first learned to talk about partner and domestic violence. There is no longer shame in having been a victim: it is clear that the other party is the one at fault. Women now know that there are things that are not right, and that if they happen to them it is not their fault, or God’s will, or the work of nature: it is a violation of rights and a matter of justice, and those responsible have to be punished.

  Civic space in Peru is rated as ‘obstructed’ in the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with DEMUS through their website, visit their Facebook page, or follow ‪@DEMUS_f‬ and ‪@MYCfeminista‬ on Twitter.‬‬‬‬

  Image ©Peru21

• As the climate crisis intensifies, so does the crackdown on environmental activism, finds new report

  New research brief from the CIVICUS Monitor examines the crackdown of environmental activism and profiles important victories civil society has scored in the fight for climate justice.

  • Environmental protests are being criminalised and met with repression on all continents
  • State authorities and private companies are common perpetrators of violations to civic freedoms
  • Despite the risks and restrictions, activist groups continue to score important victories to advance climate justice.

  As world leaders meet in Glasgow for the UN Climate Change Negotiations (COP26), peaceful environmental activists are being threatened, silenced and criminalised around the world. The host of this year's meeting is one of many countries where activists are regularly facing rights violations.

  New research from the CIVICUS Monitor looks at the common tactics and restrictions being used by governments and private companies to suppress environmental movements. The research brief “Defenders of our planet: Resilience in the face of restrictions” focuses on three worrying trends: Bans and restrictions on protests; Judicial harassment and legal persecution; and the use of violence, including targeted killings.

  As the climate crisis intensifies, activists and civil society groups continue to mobilise to hold policymakers and corporate leaders to account. From Brazil to South Africa, activists are putting their lives on the line to protect lands and to halt the activities of high-polluting industries. The most severe rights abuses are often experienced by civil society groups that are standing up to the logging, mining and energy giants who are exploiting natural resources and fueling global warming.

  As people take to the streets, governments have been instituting bans that criminalise environmental protests. Recently governments have used COVID-19 as a pretext to disrupt and break up demonstrations. Data from the CIVICUS Monitor indicates that the detention of protesters and the use of excessive force by authorities are becoming more prevalent.

  In Cambodia in May 2021, three environmental defenders were sentenced to 18 to 20 months in prison for planning a protest  against the filling of a lake in the capital. While in Finland this past June, over 100 activists were arrested for participating in a protest calling for the government to take urgent action on climate change. From authoritarian countries to  mature democracies, the research also profiles those who have been put behind bars for peacefully protesting.

  “Silencing activists and denying them of their fundamental civic rights is another tactic being used by leaders to evade and delay action on climate change” said Marianna Belalba Barreto, Research Lead for the CIVICUS Monitor. “Criminalising nonviolent protests has become a troubling indicator that governments are not committed to saving the planet .”

  The report shows that many of the measures being deployed by governments to restrict rights are not compatible with international law. Examples of courts and legislative bodies reversing attempts to criminalise nonviolent climate protests are few and far between.

  Despite the increased risks and restrictions facing environmental campaigners, the report also shows that a wide range of campaigns have scored important victories, including the closure of mines and numerous hazardous construction projects. Equally significant has been the rise of climate litigation by activist groups. Ironically, as authorities take activists to court for exercising their fundamental right to protest, activist groups have successfully filed lawsuits against governments and companies in over 25 countries for failing to act on climate change.

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• CIVICUS condemns violence, encourages peaceful dialogue in Peru

  12 June 2009. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation condemns the violence stemming from protest in Peru and supports the resumption of peaceful dialogue and cooperation between the Government of Peru and the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP). According to reports, approximately 40 people were killed and more than 100 wounded when Peruvian police and military opened fire on unarmed protestors on 5 June 2009. The indigenous protesters oppose plans by the Peruvian government to further open parts of the Amazon region for development and the extraction of oil, minerals, timber, and other natural resources by multinational corporations. They maintain that multinational corporations are gaining access to ancestral territories without consultation from indigenous peoples. Protests have resulted in road blockades and the closure of areas in the Amazon region. Talks among indigenous communities represented by AIDESEP and the Peruvian government broke down on 5 June 2009. Following vows of insurgency by protesters, the Peruvian military joined state police in a campaign of forced removals. Although threats of insurgency have since been rescinded, armed intervention continues, and the 60 day state of emergency that has been in effect since 8 May 2009 remains. The implementation of newly promulgated laws passed last year give President Garcia new powers to implement free-trade agreements, which includes new trade pacts with the United States and Canada. Such pacts threaten the preservation of rural and native communities' autonomy and use of land as affirmed by Article 89 of the Constitution of the Republic of Peru. Moreover, the laws did not follow mandatory consultation with the affected communities under Article 6 of the ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries in breach of Peru's obligations under international law. Although, the Congress has indefinitely suspended two of the decrees in response to recommendations of the Special Commission of the Congress, Constitutional Commission of the Congress and the Office of the Ombudsman, it has not repealed them to eliminate a significant cause of the conflict. CIVICUS is deeply concerned over the escalation of violence and increased use of armed intervention by the Peruvian government and recommends that: (i) an independent commission of inquiry comprising international experts be set up to investigate the violence and the events preceding it; and (ii) an invitation be extended to the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People to carry out an investigation. CIVICUS supports the rights of all peoples of Peru to peacefully organise, protest and petition the government, and encourages resumption of peaceful talks and good-faith dialogue between the indigenous peoples of Peru and the government.

• CIVICUS stands with indigenous peoples and calls for a new social contract

  #IndigenousDay: Across the world, indigenous peoples continue to face marginalisation & exclusion. Moreover, those seeking to protect their lands, natural resources, & rights are being persecuted.
  
  A new social contract is needed, our statement: https://t.co/UVpQKNixFb pic.twitter.com/bSaDUwAjwe

  — CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) August 9, 2021

  Global civil society society alliance, CIVICUS, stands in solidarity with  indigenous peoples in celebrating the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples on 9 August, which this year is calling for a new social contract that puts the voices, needs and concerns of indigenous peoples at the forefront. 

  Since 1994, the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples marks an opportunity to celebrate Indigenous Peoples, and provide an opportunity to raise awareness on critical issues relevant to indigenous peoples.

  Across the world, indigenous peoples marginalised and excluded by governments from participating in public affairs. They routinely face evictions from their lands without compensation, and are currently impacted by the harshest consequences of climate change. Moreover, human rights defenders seeking to protect and promote the human rights of indigenous peoples continue to be killed, intimidated, and harassed for defending their indigenous land and natural resources, and for advocating for the rights of indigenous communities.  

  On 20 April 2021, Liliana Pena Chocue was killed by unidentified individuals in Colombia. In February 2021, two other indigenous rights defenders. Yenes Ríos Bonsano and Herasmo García Grau were killed in Peru. All three were members of Indigenous patrol and forest control groups.

  Across the world, indigenous peoples communities have had their lands appropriated for development projects without their consent. These include the Himba community in Namibia, Biafra Indigenous People of Nigeria, Basarwa in Botswana, Benet and Batwa in Uganda, Ogiek and Endorois in Kenya, to name just a few. 

  The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples gives indigenous peoples the right “to maintain, protect and have access to their ancestral lands, religious and cultural sites. 

  CIVICUS stands in solidarity with indigenous communities across the world that continue to experience human rights violations from state and non-state actors. In this regard CIVICUS supports the demands of Sengwer indigenous people of Kenya to regain their ancestral lands at Embobut. CIVICUS stands with Batwa indigenous peoples in the Great Lakes region, the Baka and Bagyelis in Cameroon who remain vulnerable, marginalised, and landless with no compensation following the eviction from their ancestral lands by their governments.

  “In this period of the United Nations 2030 Agenda, focusing on Sustainable Development, and specifically, its pledge of “leave no one behind”, every stakeholder must ensure that indigenous peoples are not left behind in every process of development, including promoting and protecting their rights, if SDGs are to be effectively achieved,” said Paul Mulindwa CIVICUS’ Advocacy and Campaign’s Lead for Africa.

  As we celebrate the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples, CIVICUS calls on state and non-state actors to 

  1. Carry out independent investigations into the killings of all indigenous rights activists this year and hold the culprits to account. 
  2. Ensure that the rights and identities of indigenous peoples are recognised and respected at all times 
  3. Ensure that the benefits from commercial or development projects done in their ancestral lands are shared with affected communities 
  4. Empower indigenous peoples and their future generations to break the social, legal, political, and economic barriers that have kept their communities from the benefits of development and transformation taking place in Africa
  5. Guarantee effective consultations with Indigenous Peoples to obtain their free, prior and informed consent for decisions that affect them.
  6. Ensure effective participation and inclusion of indigenous peoples in public spheres.
  7. Promote and protect the land rights of indigenous peoples by ensuring clear land tenure systems that promotes communal ownership.
• CIVICUS UN Universal Periodic Review submissions on civil society space

  CIVICUS and its partners have submitted joint and stand-alone UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) submissions on 9 countries in advance of the 28th UPR session (November 2017). The submissions examine the state of civil society in each country, including the promotion and protection of the rights to freedom of association, assembly and expression and the environment for human rights defenders. We further provide an assessment of the States’ domestic implementation of civic space recommendations received during the 2nd UPR cycle over 4 years ago and provide a number of targeted follow-up recommendations.  

  Countries examined: Benin, Gabon, Guatemala, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Ukraine and Zambia.

• CIVICUS UN Universal Periodic Review submissions on civil society space in Benin, Guatemala, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka and Zambia

  The United Nations Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a unique process which involves a review of the human rights records of all 193 UN Member States once every 4.5 years.

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  CIVICUS and its partners have submitted UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) submissions on six countries in advance of the 42^nd UPR session in January-February 2023. The submissions examine the state of civil society in each country, including the promotion and protection of the rights to freedom of association, assembly and expression and the environment for human rights defenders. We further provide an assessment of the States’ domestic implementation of civic space recommendations received during the 3^rd UPR cycle over 4 years ago and provide a number of targeted follow-up recommendations. 

  Benin - See consolidated report | See full versions in English and French – The submission by the Coalition des Défenseurs des Droits Humains-Benin (CDDH-Bénin), West African Human Rights Defenders Network (WAHRDN/ROADDH), the Réseau des Femmes Leaders pour le Développement (RFLD) and CIVICUS, highlights the adoption of restrictive legislation, particularly the Criminal Code and the Digital Code, with its provisions being used against human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists. Additionally, the submission also draws attention to the increasing restrictions and violations of the freedom of peaceful assembly, which includes blanket bans on protests, the militarisation of law enforcement and the use of excessive force, including live ammunition, against protesters, along with increasing legal restrictions to the right to protest.

  Guatemala - See consolidated report | See full versions in English | Spanish –CIVICUS, REDLAD and Accíon Ciudadania detail the use of extreme violence against HRDs and journalists, aggravated by the continued criminalisation and stigmatisation they face from authorities and non-state actors. In this submission, we also express our concern on the adoption of a restrictive legislative framework which could significantly impact on the work of civil society in Guatemala, in a context where the work of CSOs is already vulnerable to obstruction through abusive judicial and administrative proceedings.

  Pakistan - See consolidated report | See full version in English –In this submission, CIVICUS and Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) report, among other issues, the legal and extra-legal barriers imposed on civil society organisations (CSOs) registration and operations in Pakistan, the criminalisation, threats and harassment of human rights defenders and the failure to hold perpetrators to account. It also highlights the alarming efforts to intimidate and censor journalists and media outlets, the criminalisation of online expression and restrictions and attacks on peaceful protests, especially by ethnic Pashtun minorities and women’s rights activists.

  Peru- See consolidated report | See full versions in English and Spanish –CIVICUS and Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH) underline the pervasive violence against HRDs, civil society groups and protesters, who continue to face attacks harassment stigmatisation and killings. State and non-state actors, despite the newly adopted protection mechanisms, have been able to escalate attacks with impunity. The submission further reports cases of judicial harassment against journalists and the gradual reduction of the space for a free and independent press.

  Sri Lanka - See consolidated report |  See full version in English –In this joint submission, CIVICUS and the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) denounce the ongoing use of excessive force against HRDs and protesters and restrictive laws to limit civic space and fundamental freedoms. Between 2017 and 2022, we observed alarming trends of a government crackdown on protests, arbitrary detention against activists and violations of the freedoms of opinion and expression. The submission further reports the alarming and continuous judicial persecution, harassment and intimidation of HRDs, journalists, student protesters and others expressing dissenting opinions against the government.

  Zambia - See consolidated report |  See full version in English – CIVICUS and Governance, Elections, Advocacy, Research Services Initiative Zambia (GEARS Initiative) report acts of intimidation and attacks on citizens, HRDs, CSOs and journalists in the period leading up to and during the presidential and parliamentary elections in August 2021. The submission also documents the continued use of excessive force by security forces in response to protests. We are moreover particularly worried by the restrictive legal framework, which undermines the freedoms of association, assembly and expression.

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  Civic space in Guatemala, Peru, Sri Lanka and Zambia is rated Obstructed, whereas Benin and Pakistan’s is rated as Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.

• Desde Perú a Bélgica, juntos somos más Fuertes

  English 

  Por Jorge Vallejo, de la Red Latinoamericana de Jóvenes por la Democracia, Peru, y miembro de la delegación de CIVICUS al foro de asociación de la CE 2018.

  Para mí fue una enorme satisfacción recibir la confirmación de haber sido seleccionado al Partnership Forum 2018 de la Unión Europea gracias a la convocatoria que lanzó CIVICUS. Recuerdo que la noche en que preparaba mi postulación era el día previo al inicio en Lima de la semana de la Cumbre de las Américas en la cual mi organización, la Red Latinoamericana de Jóvenes por la Democracia, tuvo participación. Ser notificado semanas después de que estaba invitado también al Partnership de la Unión Europea fue una gran alegría. Así, este año, a ambos lados del charco, tuve la oportunidad de seguir buscando alianzas estratégicas entre actores para el fortalecimiento de nuestras democracias y el respeto de las libertades, generando más ciudadanía para la vida comunitaria. Eso fue lo que me motivó a presentarme, y el foro me ha brindado una perspectiva más global en los temas y con más herramientas en dicho trabajo, escuchando valiosas experiencias de los 5 continentes.

  Entre nuevos aprendizajes y nuevos retos

  Ahí estábamos con Lusanda (Sudáfrica), Pek (Bután), Ekaterina (desde Kuwait) y Cathryn del equipo CIVICUS ¡los viajeros ya en Bruselas! Punto resaltante en la reunión ha sido la Agenda 2030 y el hacer que los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible lleguen a un aterrizaje local que permita efectivamente “no dejar a nadie atrás”, remarcando la relevancia de las alianzas para alcanzar objetivos (ODS 17). Hay muchos casos por mencionar, pero quisiera en este espacio hablar de la experiencia de Senegal y sus presupuestos participativos, teniendo una “certificación ciudadana” como evaluación para la acreditación de los actores locales como buenos administradores de recursos, algo rescatable y replicable en camino a la transparencia (Aliou Sow, Presidente de la Comisión del Alto Consejo de las Autoridades locales y regionales de Senegal).

• El espacio cívico sigue reduciéndose en Peru

  Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU - 53ª Sesión

  Aprobación del Informe EPU

  Pronunciada por Humberto Mendez Ramos

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  Saludos desde la Asociación por los Derechos Humanos (APRODEH). Después del periodo del conflicto armado interno y dictadura que vivió el Perú entre el 80 y el 2000, el país no experimentaba un escenario tan critico en el cual los derechos humanos y la misma democracia fueran sometidas y vulneradas por una alianza autoritaria y anti-derechos que tiene el Parlamento como su centro de poder.

  Consecuencias de esa concentración de poder, han sido no solo la grave crisis política y de represión que vivimos desde diciembre de 2022 y que produjo 49 muertos por acción de las fuerzas del orden, sino también la captura de las instituciones democráticas como la Defensoría del Pueblo, el Tribunal Constitucional, entre otras, que aseguraban mínimos de democracia y ejercicio de derechos en el país.

  Si bien nuestra democracia ha sido imperfecta en estos cuatro quinquenios, pues diversos territorios experimentaron escenarios de conflictividad social que también produjo la muerte de más de medio centenar entre el 2012 al 2021, las reglas mininas de convivencia democrática, como la independencia de poderes para la investigación y sanción de estos casos de vulneración de derechos nunca estuvo amenazada o en riesgo de existir, como sí lo está hoy en favor de la impunidad.

  Este escenario de progresivo autoritarismo, camino a consolidar un nuevo tipo de dictadura, nos preocupa no sólo por la eliminación de la independencia de poderes o la imposición de la impunidad frente a los casos de muerte producidos recientemente, sino a la amenaza y riesgo de poder vivir un nuevo escenario de amplia represión y un Estado anti derechos como el que tuvimos en la década de los noventa y que implicó amplias y sistemáticas violaciones a los derechos humanos.

  Bajo este contexto, solicitamos a las instituciones internacionales estar alertas y vigilantes ante el reinicio de movilizaciones que se van a producir desde el diecinueve de julio en adelante.

  Muchas gracias.

• Peru: Avoid violence and create enabling conditions for civic freedoms

  CIVICUS expresses concern about the use of excessive force by security forces against protesters in Peru following the ouster of former President Pedro Castillo. We call on the country’s authorities to remove undue restrictions on civic space and ensure people can fully exercise their fundamental freedoms in the context of the political crisis.

• Perú: No a la violencia y sí a las libertades cívicas

  Desde CIVICUSexpresamos nuestra preocupación por el uso excesivo de la fuerza por parte de las fuerzas de seguridad contra las personas que se manifiestan en Perú tras la destitución del ex presidente Pedro Castillo. Hacemos un llamamiento a las autoridades del país para que eliminen las restricciones indebidas al espacio cívico y garanticen que las personas puedan ejercer plenamente sus libertades fundamentales en el contexto de la crisis política.

• PERU: ‘Constitutional debate has taken on new relevance as a result of the protests’

  CIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Peru with Rafael Barrio de Mendoza, a researcher on processes of territorial transformation from Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, a consortium of 10 civil society organisations with a presence in 16 regions of Peru. Propuesta Ciudadana seeks to contribute to the formulation of policy proposals for an inclusive state and the adequate management of public resources. It promotes a vision of territorial governance that starts with the identification of and respect for diversity and in which democratic development is a key component.

  What triggered the protests that broke out in Peru in November 2020?

  The immediate cause was the decision by a parliamentary majority to force out President Martín Vizcarra, using a mechanism that had been scarcely used in the past and whose content and process involve a wide margin of discretion. The publication of accusations against Vizcarra was carried out in a sequence that proved to be planned, and a feeling prevailed that they were instrumentalised by the so-called ‘vacating coalition’. Although there is some controversy regarding the quality of the evidence brought forward about the crimes Vizcarra is accused of, allegedly committed during his term as governor of the Moquegua region five years ago, a consensus formed in public opinion that these accusations could have been credibly pursued after the end of his presidential term, given that general elections had already been called for April 2021.

  But from a more structural point of view, the political crisis was the expression of the maturing of a crisis of political representation, which made it apparent that there were few organic links between politicians and citizens’ sensibilities and that we have a precarious and cartelised system of political representation, in which a myriad of illegal, informal and oligopolistic interests have resisted successive generations of reforms – educational, judicial, fiscal and political, among others – aimed at regulating them. Revelations of corruption involving much of the political establishment, including the Lava Jato/Odebrecht case and the White Collars case, which uncovered a widespread network of corruption within the judicial system, resulted in a consensus that the management of public affairs had irremediably deteriorated. At the same time, the relative effectiveness of the fiscal measures taken against the political leaders involved in these cases fuelled the prospect of a cleansing of the political class and the possibility of cultivating a transition to a better system of representation. To a certain extent, the populist link that Vizcarra established with this sensitivity – sealed with the constitutional dissolution of the previous Congress, in which former President Alberto Fujimori’s party had a majority – was the factor that sustained his government, which lacked parliamentary, business, media, or trade union support. Vizcarra’s removal was experienced as the comeback of a constellation of interests that had experienced a setback as a consequence of prosecutors’ work and recent education, political and judicial reforms.

  How would you describe the institutional conflict that resulted in the removal and replacement of the president?

  Institutional conflict arose due to the precarious character of a political system that included a new Congress with multiple caucuses but none of them of the president’s party and a president who enjoyed popular support but lacked institutional backing, and whose legitimacy was therefore sustained on his versatile management of public debate through a combination of political gestures, the recruitment of competent technicians in key positions and a calculated exercise of antagonism with Congress on key issues such as education, political and judicial reforms.

  The majority coalition in Congress broadly took up the agenda and represented the interests of the former so-called ‘Fujiaprist’ majority – described in reference to the tacit alliance between the Aprista party and the political movement founded by former President Fujimori – on top of which it added new populist demands that put at risk the budgetary and macroeconomic management that enjoyed technocratic consensus. In this context, certain people who had survived the dissolution of the previous Congress managed to reposition themselves in the new one and conduct, alongside some media outlets, a campaign seeking to undermine Vizcarra’s popularity by levelling accusations of corruption in unclear cases. These were the dynamics that fed the institutional conflict.

  For its part, civil society provided a unified response to the president’s removal and the new regime that resulted from it. Their response ranged from expressing concern and demanding accountability to openly condemning the establishment of the new administration. The mass protests and repression they faced fuelled this shift in most of civil society. Many civil society organisations played an active role in framing the conflict, producing a narrative for international audiences and putting pressure on the state actors with whom they interact.

  Who mobilised, and what did they demand?

  At first, demonstrators protested against the removal of President Vizcarra and against the inauguration of the president of Congress, Manuel Merino, as the new president. A subsequent survey by Ipsos showed that just over three quarters of the population agreed with the protest against President Vizcarra’s removal and that at least two million people mobilised in one way or another or took an active part in the protests.

  The demonstrations were led mostly by young people, between 16 and 30 years old, who did most of the organising and produced the protest’s repertoires and tactics. The generalised mood of weariness was embodied by the so-called ‘bicentennial generation’, born after the end of the Fujimori regime, who are digital natives and, for the most part, disaffected with conventional politics. This is also a mesocratic generation – both in the traditional segments of the middle class and in the popular sectors – that is embedded in virtual communities mediated by digital platforms. This partly explains the speed with which organisational forms emerged that were efficient enough to produce repertoires, coordinate actions, document protests and shift public opinion. The mediation of social media and the use of micro money transfer applications led to a decentralised organisation of the protests, with multiple demonstrations taking place in different locations, a variety of converging calls and a diversity of repertoires and channels for the rapid transfer of resources.

  The youth-led mobilisation was fed by a middle class willing to assume the cost of demonstrating. Around this nucleus coalesced, both sociologically and territorially, other segments of the population, more or less used to conventional protest strategies or simply distant from all public participation.

  The protests began on 9 November, followed by daily demonstrations, and reached their peak on 14 November, when the Second National March took place. The so-called 14N mass mobilisation was fuelled by the sudden awakening of a fed-up feeling that ran through society and was particularly intense among young people. Hence its exceptional character in terms of its scope, magnitude, level of organisation and the rapid adoption of a non-partisan citizen identity, which could only be partly explained by the existing support for Vizcarra, as it far exceeded it.

  14N culminated with the death of two young protesters who were hit by lead bullets. Merino had taken over on 10 November and formed a radically conservative government. The nature of his cabinet quickly revealed itself through the authorisation of severe repression of the protest, particularly in the capital, Lima. After the first days of police violence, the president of the Council of Ministers congratulated and guaranteed protection to the police squads involved. The deaths that took place on 14N resulted in overwhelming citizen pressure, triggering a cascade of disaffection among the few political supporters sustaining the regime. As a result, by midday on 15 November Merino had resigned.

  The space generated by the mobilisation was populated by a number of heterogeneous demands, ranging from the reinstatement of Vizcarra to the demand for constitutional change to pave the way out of neoliberalism, including citizen-based proposals focused on the defence of democracy, the continuity of reforms, the injustice of the repression, and the insensitivity of the political class regarding the pandemic health emergency. Ferment for these demands continues to exist and it remains to be seen how they end up taking shape in the electoral scenario of 2021.

   

  How did these protests differ from others in the past? Were there any changes related to the context of the pandemic?

  In previous urban mobilisations, the coordination mechanisms provided by social media had already been tested, but these demonstrations had been led by conventional groups, such as social movements, political parties and trade unions. On this occasion, new activist groups were formed, including to deactivate teargas projectiles and to provide medical relief, which are similar to mobilisation techniques tested in other scenarios, such as the Hong Kong protests and the Black Lives Matter protests in the USA. This speaks of the emergence of global protest learning spaces.

  In part, it was the health emergency that conditioned the composition of the protests, which were mostly made up of young people, while also encouraging the dissemination of new repertoires, such as ‘cacerolazos’ (pot banging), ‘bocinazos’ (horn blowing) and digital activism among those more reluctant to take to the streets. At the same time, the massive character of the protests can be explained by the fact that health indicators at the time suggested the end of the first wave of COVID-19 infections, and by the fact that the Black Lives Matter marches had not been linked to any relevant outbreaks, which encouraged a sense of safety among protesters.

  Why did protesters demand constitutional reform, and what kind of constitutional reform do they want?

  Proposals of constitutional change were among the demands of the mobilisation, but they were not its main demands. They did however gain new impetus in public debate. The history of these demands can be traced in two ways. Constitutional change through a constituent assembly has been one of the key demands of the left since the end of the Fujimori regime, which ruled from 1990 to 2001. Right after its fall, a congress was convened with a constituent mandate, but it was unable to produce a new constitution; since then this aspiration has come to live in the progressive camp, while it has lost popularity among more moderate and right-wing groups. The left often presents the mythical 1979 Constitution as an alternative, proposes new texts inspired by the Bolivian and Ecuadorian processes, and points to the illegitimate character of the current constitution, born after a coup d’état. The sustained economic growth of the post-Fujimori decades and a number of reforms of some constitutional mechanisms conferred legitimacy on the constitution, but many of the institutions and principles it enshrines have been rendered obsolete by the sociological and economic changes they helped bring about.

  The second source of the demand for constitutional change is more organic and follows the realisation of the limits of the market model, apparent above all in the persistent lack of social protection, precarious and informal work and abuses by oligopoly interests in service provision, as well as in the crisis of the system of political representation. Vizcarra inaugurated a reformist stance in judicial and political matters, as well in the legal frameworks governing extractive industries and the pension system. He also continued with education reform. His reformist spirit – viewed by moderate groups as a path to a ‘responsible’ transition – was attacked by the political forces representing the sectors that had been affected by the reforms, creating a space in which reform aspirations can be promoted in the language of constitutional change.

  Even so, this debate has taken on new relevance as a result of the 14N protests. However, the terms of the conversation and the content of the most significant changes are not yet clear, and neither is the existence of mature political actors capable of interpreting and implementing them. Danger lies in the possibility that, in a context of high uncertainty, the process may end up being defined by those whose motivations are foreign to the spirit of change.

  Civic space in Peru is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Propuesta Ciudadana through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@prop_ciudadana and@BarrioZevallos on Twitter.

   

• PERU: ‘Environmental regulations were relaxed, when they should have been strengthened’

  CIVICUS discusses the recent oil spill off the coast of Lima, Peru, with Juan Carlos Sueiro, Director of Fisheries at Oceana, the world’s largest international organisation dedicated to protecting and restoring the world’s oceans. Founded in 2001, Oceana focuses its work on restoring fisheries, promoting clean energy and establishing protected marine areas.

  Has anyone been held responsible for the oil spill off the coast of Lima?

  The oil spill, caused by the Spanish oil company Repsol, happened on 15 January 2022. Due to its magnitude and visibility, it was the worst ecological disaster in Peru’s recent history. It occurred in an artisanal fishing zone, with protected areas and important seasonal economic activity. It is the largest spill we have ever had.

  The spill happened because of the high tides caused by the eruption of the Tonga submarine volcano, which affected the process of unloading oil from a Repsol oil tanker to the La Pampilla refinery. The question is: how is it possible that the company only became aware of the magnitude of the spill the next day? The company’s negligence magnified the consequences of this spill.

  Unfortunately, we have seen little progress in terms of Repsol taking responsibility for recovering the ecosystem. Even the exact volume of oil spilled is not known with any certainty. The company’s reaction was very slow, which is worrying because the first 24 hours following this kind of accident are key, as the oil film becomes very thin and expands a lot. It was only almost 20 days later that more sophisticated equipment was brought in to address the problem.

  Overall there is not enough transparency. In this case, the contingency plan was not implemented. The activities currently underway are supposed to be the product of a plan, but neither the company’s commitments nor the contents of that plan have been made public. The area between Ancón and Chancay was heavily impacted on by the spill, and there is no bay there, only cliffs and water. It is visible how little has been done in the way of recovery.

  There is also little transparency in the investigation. It is still not clear whether Repsol has handed over the equipment that was underwater in order to investigate and determine what happened on the day of the spill.

  This lack of transparency is symptomatic of the way the Peruvian state operates. This is similar to what happened when the pandemic broke out and we ‘discovered’ that we had an absolutely precarious health system, which was clearly not up to the task. In this case, we have environmental structures, legislation and procedures on paper, but not in reality. The opacity of information is intended to hide this discrepancy.

  For us it is very clear: Repsol must publicly assume clearly defined responsibilities.

  What have been the environmental and economic impacts of the spill?

  There has been great environmental damage. The area affected by the spill includes several protected natural areas: the Ancón Reserved Zone, the Guaneras Islands and the Punta Salinas Reserved Zone. The spill has impacted on marine fauna, affecting animals such as sea lions, otters, penguins and birds. Many have been stained with oil and their lives are at risk. Oceana is currently surveying this damage, as well as the additional damage caused by the company’s delayed reaction.

  For communities in the area, the greatest concern is economic. These are mostly low-income people engaged in artisanal fishing. Beyond individual and immediate impacts – for example, for those who had invested in a seasonal business just before the spill – the consequences are collective and long-term. It is now impossible to fish in Ancón or Chancay, and it is difficult to know when it will be possible to do so, because oil has a much longer degradation time when it settles on the seabed. The fishermen and all the workers involved in processing and distribution logistics are also concerned about the variation in fish prices and the drop in demand.

  We have run a calculation of the economic worth of coastal fisheries in these places to give us an idea of the economic loss. We also believe that there is an important impact on tourist activity: for the nine million inhabitants of the capital, Lima, and the three million living a little further north, these beaches are the closest place to spend the summer, and the spill has cut short the summer season, which runs from January to April. We have already warned the local municipalities that they must estimate the damage caused to tourism.

  How has civil society responded?

  We have all reacted with concern and a great interest in helping others. We have seen many volunteers helping to clean up the beaches, as well as experts and academics contributing within their areas of expertise.

  However, volunteer work has limitations because in order to rescue marine wildlife from the damage caused by oil, certain procedures and products must be used to properly remove oil from an animal’s plumage or skin. Because of this, interest in helping usually does not translate into 100 per cent successful results.

  Moreover, as this is the first time we have faced a disaster of this magnitude, Peru does not have all the expertise it needs. There is post-disaster expertise and experience elsewhere; it is necessary to bring it in. It would also be important to deepen the discussion about the energy mix we have and how to change it by turning towards the renewable resources that are available to us.

  How can private companies be called to account and contribute to preventing future disasters?

  Lack of accountability is a longstanding concern for the communities in these areas, and the fact that their demands have been systematically ignored is a symptom of Peru’s strong centralism. Artisanal fishermen in the north have been warning about this situation for several years and there has been no meaningful response. Oil extraction in Peru dates back to the 19th century; Peru had the first oilwell in South America. In the 1950s and 1960s, offshore platforms were installed, which are at the root of the spills and leaks that fishers complain about. There are also complaints about what happens in the transportation process, which has much greater implications.

  This situation has encouraged civil society to prioritise the search for solutions. For almost a decade, environmental requirements have been reduced in Peru; it is necessary to walk back that path. Peru is engaged in fishing, mining and other activities for which regulations have been relaxed, when they should have been strengthened. The very low environmental capacity of the state and the poor response of companies to disasters clearly shows their inadequacy. Peru suffers from a major crisis of governance and respect for the rule of law. 

  The possibility of another spill is always present. It is necessary to minimise the likelihood of it happening, and to ensure that when it does, it has the least possible impact in terms of magnitude, frequency and consequences. To do this we have to start by not losing sight of who is responsible for this disaster and the consequences of their irresponsible action.

  Civic space in Peru is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Oceana through itswebsite or itsFacebook,Instagram andTik Tok accounts, and follow@Oceana_Peru and@SueiroJC on Twitter.

• PERU: ‘It is necessary to restore trust in elections’

  CIVICUS speaks with Iván Lanegra, secretary general of Transparency Civil Association (Asociación Civil Transparencia), about Peru’s recent presidential elections and the state of its democracy. Transparency is an independent civil society organisation that works to improve the quality of democracy and political representation by facilitating dialogue between political, governmental and civil society actors, implementing education and capacity-building programmes for citizen and political leadership, developing public policy proposals and observing electoral processes.

  

  What was different and what was at stake in this election?

  The recent general election was embedded in several political and social processes. First, it took place at the end of a very politically unstable five-year period, in which we had four presidents – Pedro Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Manuel Merino and Francisco Sagasti – and Congress was constitutionally dissolved. At the same time, the economy was no longer growing as much, and social discontent began to increase. In this context, corruption scandals undermined the credibility of political parties. This was compounded by the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, which fuelled greater demands for redistribution.

  As a result of all these processes, there was an atomisation of citizens’ preferences. The effects of this situation translated into high fragmentation of the vote in the parliamentary elections of January 2020 and, again, in the first round of the presidential election, held in April 2021, in which the two candidates who came out on top, and therefore went on to the second round, jointly received barely 33 per cent of the vote. There are 10 different political parties represented in our 130-seat Congress.

  In the second electoral round, the victory of Pedro Castillo, of the left-wing Perú Libre (Free Peru) party over Keiko Fujimori, of the right-wing Fuerza Popular (Popular Force), showed the importance of the demands for change and rejection of conventional politics that grew in recent years.

  However, the announcement of the official results was severely delayed, which created a climate of great uncertainty. In a context of high polarisation, there was an exponential increase in the number of appeals against the election results: normally, fewer than a dozen are filed, but on this occasion there were more than a thousand, none of which were considered well-founded. These appeals were used instrumentally: unfounded allegations of fraud were used to prolong the process as much as possible and to try to prevent the announcement of the results. While this attempt was unsuccessful, it delayed the transfer of power and increased distrust of politics and electoral institutions.

  Why did many people not vote?

  The rate of absenteeism in the first electoral round was almost 30 per cent, somewhat higher than in the 2020 legislative elections, when it reached 26 per cent; however, it dropped to less than 24 per cent in the runoff election. It is important to bear in mind that the first round of election took place when the COVID-19 pandemic was at its highest point in Peru. In other countries, such as Chile, it was not even possible to hold a vote due to the health emergency, but the elections took place normally in Peru. In fact, what is remarkable is that absenteeism wasn’t any higher.

  What role did Transparency play in relation to the electoral process?

  In the run-up to the election, as part of the #DecideBien (#ChooseWell) campaign, Transparency disseminated systematic information about the parties, their candidates and their proposals, so that citizens could assess their options. We broke down the parties’ policy programmes so that each person could learn about and compare the proposals of each candidate on the issues that interested them, and vote on the basis on that knowledge.

  In addition, we invited citizens to register with the National Transparency Volunteer Network to become election observers. From our perspective, election observation consists of monitoring, providing guidance and bearing witness to the events that take place during election day, as well as educating citizens about electoral conduct and rules.

  With this network of volunteers, Transparency observed the election process and from the outset we noted that the electoral process had been conducted normally, with only the kind of minor incidents that tend to occur in all elections, but which do not affect the results.

  In view of the unfounded allegations that were made in an attempt to discredit the process, we also worked to counter electoral disinformation. The phenomenon of disinformation on social media, particularly after the runoff election, was much stronger than in previous elections, and the electoral authorities themselves had to set up teams dedicated almost exclusively to debunking ‘fake news’. The climate of polarisation surely contributed to increasing the impact of disinformation.

  What political challenges lie ahead in the aftermath of the election?

  The main challenges are how to reduce distrust in the state, how to address dissatisfaction with democracy and how to improve political representation. Although compared to these challenges, political polarisation, which was exacerbated in the electoral context, is less of a concern, it must also be considered. While the most radicalised sectors continue to fuel polarisation, they are in the minority. They managed to polarise the election because they were able to get through to the second round despite having received a low percentage of the vote, but after the election, the majority of citizens are far from the extremes. However, it is important to bear in mind that distrust, dissatisfaction and the feeling of lack of representation are elements that those who seek to exploit polarisation can use to their advantage.

  It is necessary to restore trust in elections. To this end, we must continue to educate and inform citizens about the rules of elections, politics and democracy. We must also improve the mechanisms available to us for combatting disinformation. It is also necessary to move electoral reforms forward, in order to create incentives for the strengthening of political parties, as well as to improve the quality of political representation.

  Civic space in Peru is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Transparency Civil Association through itswebsite or itsFacebook,Instagram andTik Tok pages, and follow@actransparencia and@ilanegra on Twitter.

   

• PERÚ: ‘La corriente ultraconservadora está afectando la vida democrática y los derechos fundamentales’

  En el marco de nuestro informe temático 2019, que será publicado en octubre, estamos entrevistando a activistas, líderes y expertos de la sociedad civil acerca de su experiencia frente al avance de los grupos anti-derechos y sus estrategias para fortalecer las narrativas progresistas y la capacidad de respuesta de la sociedad civil. En esta oportunidad, CIVICUS conversa conEliana Cano, fundadora de Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir – Perú (CDD-Perú), un movimiento de personas católicas y feministas, comprometidascon la búsqueda de justicia social y elcambio de los patrones culturales que limitan la autonomía de las mujeres y sus derechos sexuales y reproductivos. Recientemente, CDD-Perú fue demandada civilmente por el Centro Jurídico Tomás Moro, que busca quitarle la personería jurídica con el argumento de que, en el marco del concordato entre el Vaticano y Perú, no debería utilizar la designación de “católicas”.

  CDD-Perú ha sido demandada civilmente para que se le retire la personalidad jurídica y se le impida definirse como ‘católica’. ¿Quiénes las están demandando, por qué se han ensañado con ustedes, y qué pretenden lograr?

  Hace aproximadamente un mes y medio fuimos notificadas de que el Centro Jurídico Santo Tomás Moro, que se autodesigna representante de la Iglesia Católica, nos había iniciado una demanda. Según los abogados que nos están asesorando, este grupo empezó a explorar todo el quehacer de nuestra organización hace aproximadamente un año. Eligieron la vía civil para demandarnos porque quieren hacer de esto un proceso largo, tedioso, cansado, de apelación permanente. Es un proceso que podría llevar en promedio entre tres o cuatro años. La estrategia de fondo es agotarnos en el proceso.

  Quieren que nosotros, como organización, dejemos de existir en la Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros Públicos, es decir, que perdamos nuestra personería jurídica y no podamos seguir operando en el Perú. Para ello aducen que, por llamarnos como nos llamamos, estamos faltando el respeto a la Iglesia Católica y a la feligresía; dicen que, en el marco del concordato entre el Vaticano y el Estado peruano, que reconoce el rol de la Iglesia Católica, estaríamos usando de mala fe el término ‘católicas’, que representa a una institución y a una identidad histórica. No aceptan la interpretación que hacemos de los textos bíblicos desde la teología feminista para cuestionar el dogma, la conciencia impuesta, el control que buscan hacer de la gente en nombre de Dios. Es importante señalar que nuestra organización no está registrada en la Iglesia Católica como grupo de fieles, y por lo tanto no está sujeta al mandato interno de la Iglesia.

  Ustedes existen desde hace unos cuantos años. ¿Es la primera vez que enfrentan una reacción semejante?

  Efectivamente, el proyecto Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir es bastante antiguo en América Latina. Comenzó en Uruguay y luego se extendió a Estados Unidos, y de allí pasó a México y a otros países de América Latina. En Perú la organización tiene existencia jurídica desde el año 2009. Nos organizamos porque nos identificamos como feministas con identidad católica, nos sentimos mujeres católicas de fe, pero tenemos una mirada crítica frente al dogma, al pensamiento estático y cerrado, sobre todo cuando se debaten temas relacionados con los derechos sexuales y reproductivos, donde el cuerpo y la sexualidad son el terreno donde se libran luchas políticas. En Perú siempre ha habido una voz pública muy homogénea alrededor de los Evangelios y el derecho a mandar sobre los cuerpos y las vidas de las mujeres, y nosotras, al ponerla en duda desde nuestra identidad católica, recibimos una respuesta bastante agresiva de la jerarquía de la Iglesia Católica local y grupos vinculados a esta.

  El primer ataque público fue por el debate en torno al protocolo por el aborto terapéutico, es decir, justificado por razones médicas, cuando hay riesgos graves para la salud o la vida de la mujer. Fue un ataque teñido por los mismos recursos que ellos siempre utilizan, fundados en la difamación, el descrédito y la mentira. Pero se trató básicamente de ataques verbales y escritos a través de las redes sociales.

  Estos grupos conservadores se manejan bien en las redes sociales, permanentemente nos atacan públicamente por cada cosa que se sale del sitio del dogma, del discurso homogéneo. Sin embargo, es la primera vez que enfrentamos una demanda legal; no esperábamos un ataque tan directo y de semejante magnitud. Tal vez deberíamos haberlo previsto, ya que en América Latina, y en el Perú específicamente, la corriente ultraconservadora ha penetrado profundamente en la estructura política del país y está afectando la vida democrática.

  Daría la impresión de que estos grupos ultraconservadores son ahora más grandes y están más envalentonados que en el pasado. ¿A qué se debe?

  Considero que una mirada en el tiempo permite ver cómo desde hace varias décadas se decidió desarrollar una respuesta global y regional para desalentar y debilitar el discurso de la Teología de la Liberación, cuyo énfasis estuvo principalmente en la preocupación por la pobreza. Con su discurso cuestionador dentro de la Iglesia que se extendía a otros ámbitos de la vida, la Teología de la Liberación afectó o incomodó mucho a la parte más dura y conservadora de la Iglesia. La reacción contraria ha sido de largo aliento. Ha logrado avances, al punto que hoy se hace visible una red altamente orgánica, con sedes de encuentro en los diferentes países de América Latina, publicaciones, conferencias y recursos económicos considerables. Su presencia comenzó a hacerse sentir con fuerza en el año 2005, con el II Congreso Internacional Pro-Vida organizado por el Centro de Promoción Familiar y de Regulación de la Natalidad (Ceprofarena) en la capital del Perú. Este congreso produjo un documento conocido como la Declaración de Lima, expresión de la concertación entre los grupos conservadores.

  Ceprofarena existe desde comienzos de los años ochenta; está estrechamente vinculado con Human Life international, una poderosa organización internacional conservadora, y cuenta entre sus miembros a reconocidos médicos y altos funcionarios del Estado, incluidos ex ministros de Salud. La organización se mueve dentro de numerosas organizaciones médicas y de salud, públicas y privadas. Estos actores ponen el discurso “científico” conservador al servicio de atropellos tales como la denegación de la anticoncepción oral de emergencia, tema en el cual le ganaron la pulseada al Ministerio de Salud: le hicieron una demanda, llevaron ante los tribunales el derecho a informarse y decidir de miles de mujeres, y lograron la prohibición de su distribución en todos servicios de salud a nivel nacional. Ahora están en campaña para deshabilitar el protocolo de aborto terapéutico que se logró establecer en el quinquenio 2011-2016.

  El entramado de organizaciones conservadoras en Perú se completa con la Oficina para Latinoamérica del Population Research Institute , con sede en Lima; la sede peruana de la Alianza Latinoamericana para la Familia, que promueve formatos familiares clásicos y produce y difunde libros escolares; y por supuesto organizaciones más antiguas como el Opus Dei, que hace labores de desarrollo y apoyo local y está muy inserto en espacios educativos, además de dentro de la burocracia de la Iglesia; y el Sodalicio de la Vida Cristiana, una organización de laicos.

  Estos grupos tienen mucho dinero del empresariado conservador y se han apropiado tanto de estrategias como de discursos efectivos. Esta demanda jurídica es una estrategia práctica que denota cambios en su forma de organizarse. Ya no hablan el lenguaje divino y clerical porque saben que cada vez atrae menos; en cambio se han apropiado del discurso de la democracia y los derechos humanos.

  ¿Están ustedes pensando nuevas estrategias para enfrentar este desafío?

  En este escenario nos vemos en la necesidad de fortalecer nuestras estrategias de comunicación. También tenemos que reforzar la parte económica ya que no contamos con financiación para enfrentar una demanda legal de esta magnitud. Los donantes internacionales no necesariamente contemplan en sus apoyos un rubro para planes de defensa institucional. Pero en los tiempos actuales se trata de un aspecto muy necesario para las organizaciones defensoras de los derechos humanos. En esta situación específica, felizmente, el Instituto de Defensa Legal, que ya había asumido casos parecidos en relación con periodistas, se interesó y decidió patrocinar el caso como parte de su apuesta institucional. Ellos consideran que esto es una “pelea ideológica” y que el cuestionamiento del nombre es un “pretexto” para desaparecernos como actores con influencia. El suyo es un gesto que agradecemos infinitamente.

  En lo que se refiere al discurso, sin embargo, no deberíamos movernos de nuestras posiciones, sino más bien poner en evidencia que la apropiación del discurso de los derechos humanos y la democracia por parte de los grupos ultraconservadores es tan superficial como poco respetuosa de los principios democráticos. Tal como acaba de suceder con la campaña “Con mis hijos no te metas”, centrada en la oposición a la educación sobre la igualdad de género y el respeto por las identidades sexuales, su discurso tiende a volverse muy agresivo cada vez que se sienten acorralados. Se les percibe como desesperados, porque en el fondo no hacen sino reaccionar frente a conquistas en materia de derechos.

  La situación de hecho ha progresado, porque no somos solamente nosotras, sino que se encuentran en movimiento nuevas generaciones y mucha gente respetuosa de la libertad, de la diversidad, de la garantía de derechos, que también está ganando espacios. No solamente son las tres o cuatro organizaciones feministas fundadoras que se mueven en la ciudad de Lima; se evidencian voces, rostros y jóvenes organizados desde las universidades, desde las comunidades, desde otras regiones del Perú que con un pensamiento crítico no aceptan los dogmas, incluso reaccionan con tono sarcástico ante ese tipo de discursos y posiciones.

  Desde ya que hay una juventud católica que es convocada por el Papa y ha decidido quedarse en ese perímetro ultraconservador, pero también hay una movilización social juvenil en torno de muchos temas, y con ellos muchas cuestiones de la agenda de derechos sexuales y reproductivos van permeando el debate público. Creo que esto está desesperando a los grupos ultraconservadores, y entonces reaccionan de manera feroz, con cólera, frustración, y hasta me atrevería a decir que odio. Es decir, reaccionan con actitudes que no se parecen nada a la misericordia, la bondad, la humildad, la comprensión y el no juzgamiento.

  ¿Por qué el hecho de que se definan como ‘católicas y feministas’ genera este tipo de rechazos?

  Nosotras somos mujeres de fe y la religión es parte de nuestra identidad. Hemos sido criadas como católicas, y en ese marco el mensaje que se nos inculcó fue de obediencia, prohibición y opresión. Conforme hemos crecido, nos rebelamos ante este y otros aspectos del control de la vida y la dimensión sexual-afectiva. Nos identificamos como católicas desde una interpretación renovada y no renunciamos a nuestra fe. Somos conscientes de que el catolicismo no es solamente una cuestión de fe, sino que también opera o se materializa en una institución, y como tal tiene prácticas tanto positivas como negativas que tienen impacto en la vida de la gente, y específicamente sobre su feligresía.

  Al mismo tiempo, todas nosotras venimos de trayectorias en organizaciones con identidad feminista. Somos feministas, cuestionamos el patriarcado como sistema de relaciones de poder asimétricas, pero no renunciamos a nuestra fe. Siempre nos hacemos estas preguntas: ¿por qué nuestra religión tendría que tener una sola voz, uniforme e incuestionable? ¿Por qué obedecer en silencio y validar el sacrificio y el sufrimiento en nuestras vidas y cuerpos? Encontramos un asidero en la teología feminista, que pasa por una deconstrucción y una reconstrucción del Evangelio. Estas herramientas conceptuales y políticas fortalecen nuestra convicción y nuestra lucha pública por los derechos sexuales y reproductivos.

  Desde la oficialidad se nos dice “ustedes no son católicas, quiénes son ustedes para hablar en nombre del catolicismo”, a lo que nosotras respondemos: “qué te hace a ti católico, qué te permite atropellar derechos en nombre de Dios”. Nosotras hemos hecho una reapropiación del lenguaje del evangelio que se centra en el derecho de las personas a deliberar en conciencia, a discernir y a decidir, y esto les incomoda. Yo soy católica, bautizada y apuesto por una teología feminista. No puedes cuestionar mi fe, así como yo tampoco puedo cuestionar la tuya. Es una lucha muy fuerte, porque puede ser fácil derrumbarse frente a una masa mayoritaria que te dice que tú no eres uno de ellos. Desde el principio supimos que enfrentaríamos la descalificación, la mentira y la difamación; sin embargo, no pensamos que los ataques llegarían a ser tan violentos como los que experimentamos actualmente en las redes sociales y a través de esta demanda.

  Como la experiencia de fe no nos la pueden arrancar, lo que intentan es arrancarnos la personería jurídica, hacernos desaparecer. Representamos un peligro porque no somos pocas, cada vez somos más quienes nos conocen y se sienten identificadas/os. Representamos la posición de muchas personas que no necesariamente tienen la oportunidad de articular públicamente este pensamiento, pero que lo sienten y lo viven. Hay una feligresía amplia y diversa que no piensa como la jerarquía y considera que la respuesta ultraconservadora en materia de políticas públicas es digna de la época de la Inquisición. Según las encuestas, la mayoría de los católicos disiente de la jerarquía en muchas cuestiones importantes, tales como la homosexualidad, que no consideran que sea una enfermedad o un castigo divino, o el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo. Decidir un aborto en circunstancias específicas de vida es una decisión altamente ética y responsable, no te hace una mala mujer, ni menos católica ni mala madre. Utilizar anticonceptivos para regular la maternidad y la paternidad o disfrutar una relación sexual sin procrear no está prohibido en los evangelios. El mal llamado estado de “virginidad” va perdiendo credibilidad divina y libera a las mujeres de sentimientos de culpa incluso en sociedades como las de América Latina, donde los gobiernos de turno y la Iglesia Católica estuvieron siempre de la mano para regular la vida de la gente. Es más, actualmente siguen utilizándose mutuamente cuando uno de ellos pierde credibilidad.

  ¿De qué maneras están promoviendo la distinción entre la privada y política pública?

  La nuestra es también una lucha por un Estado laico, un Estado que se encuentre separado de las iglesias. Esto es muy difícil de conseguir en la práctica, ya que la Iglesia Católica y el Estado peruano mantienen fuertes vínculos institucionales. Sin embargo, más allá de conseguir legal y constitucionalmente la separación entre la Iglesia y el Estado, hay otra lucha que estamos dando en el terreno de los imaginarios colectivos y de las actitudes. Mucha gente (políticos, funcionarios, servidores públicos) llegan a la esfera pública sin una reflexión sobre la importancia de separar la creencia religiosa de la función pública. En consecuencia, muchos legisladores y funcionarios públicos toman decisiones sobre la base de sus creencias religiosas. Es usual encontrar en los edificios de los Ministerios crucifijos, capillas e imágenes de carácter religioso. En el día a día la religión nos rodea y nos limita, no existen fronteras claras entre la práctica religiosa y la función pública.

  Los grupos ultraconservadores se afirman sobre este terreno y buscan expandir aún más los dictados de una religión que se presenta como homogénea, con la intención de obligar a toda la ciudadanía a vivir según sus propias creencias y mandatos. El problema no es la religión; la dificultad radica en el uso político que se hace de ésta en la esfera político–pública, donde el deber es garantizar los derechos humanos.

  El espacio cívico en Perú es clasificado como ‘obstruido’ por elCIVICUS Monitor.

  Contáctese con Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir-Perú a través de supágina web o su perfil deFacebook, o siga a@CDDperu en Twitter

   

   

• PERU: ‘Political and social instability has already cost dozens of lives’

  CIVICUS speaks about the political crisis in Peru with Nadia Ramos, CEO of the Women’s Leadership Centre of the Americas and official spokesperson for the Hemispheric Network Somos Lideresas, two organisations that promote women’s leadership and empowerment in Peru and Latin America.

• PERU: ‘The ultra-conservative tide is affecting democratic life and fundamental rights’

  As part of our 2019 thematic report, we are interviewing civil society activists and leaders about their experiences of backlash from anti-rights groups and their strategies to strengthen progressive narratives and civil society responses. CIVICUS speaks toEliana Cano, founder of Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir – Peru (Catholics for the Right to Decide – CDD-Peru), a Catholic and feminist movement committed to the pursuit of social justice and the change of cultural patterns that limit women's autonomy and their sexual and reproductive rights. CCD-Peru has recently been sued by the Tomás Moro Legal Centre, which wants to strip it of its legal status on the basis that, within the framework of an agreement between the Vatican State and Peru, it should not be using the term ‘Catholics’.

  CDD-Peru is being sued to have its legal personality withdrawn and prevented from calling itself 'Catholic'. Who is suing you, what do they have against you, and what are they trying to achieve?

  About a month and a half ago we were notified that the Santo Tomás Moro Legal Centre, which is a self-appointed representative of the Catholic Church, had brought a lawsuit against us. According to the lawyers who are advising us, this group began to look into the work done by our organisation about a year ago. They decided to sue us in the civil courts because they want to make this a long, tedious, tiring process, one of permanent appeal. The whole thing can take up to three or four years. Basically, their strategy is to drain us of energy in the process.

  They want us to cease to exist as a registered organisation, recognised by the National Superintendency of Public Registries. In other words, they want us to lose our legal status and not be able to continue operating in Peru. They argue that, by calling ourselves what we do, we are disrespecting the Catholic Church and its parishioners. They say that, in light of the existing agreement between the Vatican State and Peru – which recognises the role of the Catholic Church – we are using the term 'Catholic', which represents an institution and a historical identity, in bad faith. They do not accept the interpretation we make of biblical texts on the basis of feminist theology in order to question dogma, imposed conscience and control of people in the name of God. It is important to note that our organisation is not registered with the Catholic Church as a faith group, and therefore is not subject to the internal mandate of the Church.

  You have been around for a few years. Is this the first time you have faced such reaction?

  Indeed, the project of Catholics for the Right to Decide is quite old in Latin America. It began in Uruguay and then spread to the USA, and from there it passed on to Mexico and other countries of Latin America. In Peru the organisation has had a legal existence since 2009. We organised ourselves because we identify as feminists with a Catholic identity. We see ourselves as Catholic women of faith, but we have a critical view of dogma, of static and closed thought, especially where issues related to sexual and reproductive rights are concerned, as body and sexuality are a terrain where political battles are fought. In Peru there has always been a very homogenous public voice around the Gospels and the right to command over the bodies and lives of women, and we, by questioning this from the position of our Catholic identity, have received a rather aggressive response by the hierarchy of the local Catholic Church and groups linked to it.

  The first public attack happened on the occasion of the debate around the definition of a protocol for therapeutic abortion: abortion that is justified for medical reasons, when there are serious risks to the woman’s health or life. It was an attack tinged with the same resources these groups always use, based on defamation, vilification and lies. But in this case attacks basically took the form of verbal and written attacks on social media.

  Conservative groups know how to manage social media and constantly attack us publicly for everything we do that deviates from dogma or homogeneous discourse. However, this is the first time we have faced a lawsuit, and we were not expecting an attack so direct and of such magnitude. Maybe we should have foreseen it, since in Latin America, and in Peru specifically, ultra-conservative groups have penetrated deeply into the political structure of the country and are affecting democratic life.

  It would seem that these ultra-conservative groups are now larger and more emboldened than they used to be. Why is that?

  When looking back you realise that for several decades a global and regional response has developed to discourage and weaken the liberation theology discourse, which put the emphasis mostly on poverty. With a questioning discourse within the Church that extended to other areas of life, liberation theology made the most hardcore conservative elements of the Church very uncomfortable. The reaction against it has been sustained. It has made a lot of progress, to the point that today a highly organic network has become visible, which has bases in various Latin American countries and its own publications, conferences and considerable economic resources. Its presence began to make itself felt strongly in 2005, when the Center for Family Promotion and Regulation of Birth (Ceprofarena) organised the Second International Pro-Life Congress in the capital, Lima. This congress produced a document known as the Lima Declaration, an expression of the agreement reached by conservative groups.

  Ceprofarena has existed since the early eighties. It maintains close links to Human Life International, a powerful international conservative organisation, and among its members are renowned physicians and senior state officials, including former health ministers. The organisation acts within numerous medical and health organisations, both public and private. These actors put conservative ‘scientific’ discourse at the service of abuses such as the denial of emergency oral contraception, an issue on which they successfully took on the Ministry of Health. They sued the Ministry, bringing to court the right to information and choice of thousands of women, and succeeded in achieving the prohibition of the distribution of emergency contraception by all health services nationwide. Now they are campaigning to dismantle the therapeutic abortion protocol established during the 2011 to2016 period.

  The network of conservative organisations in Peru also includes the Office for Latin America of the Population Research Institute, based in Lima; the Peruvian headquarters of the Latin American Alliance for the Family, which promotes classic family formats and produces and disseminates school books; of course older organisations such as Opus Dei, which does local development and support work and is deeply embedded in educational spaces, as well as within the bureaucracy of the Church; and the Sodalicio de la Vida Cristiana, an organisation of lay people.

  These groups have a lot of money that comes from the conservative business sector and have appropriated effective strategies and discourses. This lawsuit is a practical strategy that denotes a change in their way of organising. They no longer speak the language of the divine and the clerical because they know that it attracts fewer and fewer people; instead they have appropriated the discourse of democracy and human rights.

  Are you thinking of new strategies to face this growing challenge?

  In the present scenario we view ourselves as in need of strengthening our communication strategies. We also need to strengthen our resourcing, since we do not have funds to face a lawsuit of this magnitude. International funders do not necessarily provide support that can be used to develop institutional defence plans. But at present, this is a profound need of human rights organisations. In our case, fortunately the Legal Defence Institute, which had already taken on similar cases affecting journalists, became interested and decided to sponsor the case as part of its institutional priorities. They consider that this is an "ideological fight" and that questioning our name is a "pretext" to make us disappear as influential actors. Theirs has been a gesture that we are infinitely thankful for.

  As far as discourse is concerned, however, we should not move from our positions, but rather show that the appropriation of the discourse of human rights and democracy by ultra-conservative groups is as superficial as disrespectful of democratic principles. As happened recently with the ‘Do not mess with my children’ campaign – against education about gender equality and respect for sexual identities – their discourse tends to become very aggressive every time they feel cornered. They seem to be desperate, because deep down they do nothing but react in the face of newly acquired rights.

  And the situation has indeed progressed, because this is not just us – new generations are mobilised and lots of people who are respectful of freedom and diversity and who uphold guarantees for rights are gaining ground. It is not just three or four old-time feminist organisations that are active in Lima; there are also the voices and faces of young people organised in universities, people in communities in various regions of Peru who think critically, do not accept dogmas, even react in a sarcastic tone to that type of discourse and perspective.

  Of course there is always a Catholic youth following that responds to the Pope and has decided to stay within the ultra-conservative field, but there is also youth social mobilisation around many issues, and with their help many aspects of the sexual and reproductive rights agenda are permeating the public debate. I think this is causing ultra-conservative groups to despair, and that is why they are reacting with such anger, frustration and, I would even dare say, hate. That is, they react with attitudes that are nowhere close to mercy, kindness, humility, understanding and non-judgement.

  Why does the fact that you define yourselves as both Catholics and feminists cause this type of reaction?

  We are women of faith and religion is part of our identity. We have been raised Catholic, and in that context the message that was instilled in us was one of obedience, prohibition and oppression. As we grew up, we rebelled against this and other aspects related to the control of our lives and their sexual dimension. We identify ourselves as Catholic on the basis of a renewed interpretation, but we do not renounce our faith. We are aware that Catholicism is not only a matter of faith, but it also operates within or materialises in an institution, and as such it includes both positive and negative practices that have an impact on the lives of many people, and specifically on its members.

  At the same time, we all come from organisations with a feminist identity. We are feminists and we question patriarchy as a system of asymmetric power relations, but we do not renounce our faith. We always ask ourselves these questions: why should our religion have to have one single voice, uniform and unquestionable? Why obey in silence and validate sacrifice and suffering in our own lives and bodies? We find a foothold in feminist theology, which offers a deconstruction and reconstruction of the Gospel. These conceptual and political tools strengthen our conviction and our public struggle for sexual and reproductive rights.

  High Church officials tell us: ‘you are not Catholic, who are you to speak in the name of Catholicism?’ We respond: ‘what makes you a Catholic, what allows you to trample rights in the name of God?’ We have claimed ownership of the language of the Gospel that focuses on the right of people to deliberate in conscience, to discern and to decide, and this bothers them. I am a Catholic, I was baptised and I am guided by feminist theology. You cannot question my faith, just as I cannot question yours. This is a very hard fight, because it is easy to fall in the face of a mass telling you that you are not one of them. From the beginning we knew that we would face disqualification, defamation and lies; we did not, however, think that the attacks would become as violent as those we are currently experiencing on social media, as well as in the form of a lawsuit.

  Given that the experience of faith cannot be taken away from us, what they are trying to do is take away our legal status, make us disappear. We represent a danger because we are not just a few. In fact, more and more people are increasingly getting to know us and identify with us. We represent the position of many people who do not necessarily have the opportunity to articulate this strand of thought publicly, but who feel it and live by it. There is a wide and diverse congregation that does not think the same way as the Church hierarchy and considers that the ultra-conservative response to public policy is more suitable to Inquisition times than today. According to polls, most Catholics disagree with the Church hierarchy on many important issues, such as homosexuality, which they do not consider to be an illness or a divine punishment, or same-sex marriage. Choosing an abortion in specific life circumstances is a highly ethical and responsible decision, and it does not make you a bad woman, a lesser Catholic, or a bad mother. Using contraceptives to regulate motherhood and fatherhood or enjoying a sexual relationship without procreating is not prohibited by the Gospels. The state of virginity is losing its divine quality and this is freeing women from feelings of guilt, even in societies such as Latin America’s, where governments and the Catholic Church have always worked in concert to regulate people’s lives. Still today they support one another every time one of them loses credibility.

  How else are you trying to encourage a distinction between private faith and public policy?

  Ours is also a struggle for a secular state, a state that is separated from all churches. This is very difficult to achieve in practice, since the Catholic Church and the Peruvian state maintain strong institutional ties. However, short of achieving constitutional and legal separation between Church and state, there is another fight to be had in the sphere of collective attitudes. Many people – politicians, public officials, civil servants – reach the public sphere without giving a thought to the importance of separating religious beliefs from public function. As a result, many lawmakers and public officials make decisions based on their religious beliefs. It is very common to find crucifixes, chapels and religious images in ministry buildings. In our everyday lives religion surrounds us and limits us; there are no clear boundaries between religious practice and public functions.

  Ultra-conservative groups set themselves on this ground and seek to further expand the dictates of a religion that presents itself as homogeneous, with the intention of forcing all citizens to live according to their own beliefs and mandates. The problem is not religion in itself; the difficulty lies with the political use of religion within the political-public sphere, where there is a duty to guarantee human rights.

   

  Civic space in Peru is rated as ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir-Perú through their webpage and Facebook

• PERÚ: “El debate constitucional ha adquirido una nueva relevancia a partir de las protestas”

   

  

  CIVICUS conversa acerca de las recientes protestas en Perú con Rafael Barrio de Mendoza, investigador sobre procesos de transformación territorial del Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, un consorcio de diez organizaciones de la sociedad civil con presencia en 16 regiones del Perú. Propuesta Ciudadana busca contribuir a la formulación de propuestas de política para un Estado inclusivo y la adecuada gestión de los recursos públicos. Promueve una visión de la gobernanza territorial que parte de la identificación y el respeto de las diversidades y se centra en el desarrollo democrático.

  ¿Cuál fue la causa desencadenante de las protestas que estallaron en Perú en noviembre de 2020?

  La causa inmediata fue la decisión de una mayoría parlamentaria de vacar al presidente Martín Vizcarra, empleando un mecanismo escasamente utilizado en el pasado y cuyo contenido y proceso tiene un amplio margen de discrecionalidad. La publicación de las acusaciones contra Vizcarra fue dándose en una secuencia que se revela planificada, y predominó la sensación de su instrumentalización por parte de la llamada “coalición vacadora”. Si bien hay un espacio de controversia sobre la calidad de los indicios de los delitos que se le imputan a Vizcarra, presuntamente cometidos durante su mandato de gobernador de la región de Moquegua, hace cinco años, existía un consenso en la opinión pública de que dichas acusaciones podrían haberse perseguido creíblemente al terminar su mandato presidencial, en particular dado que las elecciones generales ya estaban convocadas para abril de 2021.

  Pero desde un punto de vista más estructural, la crisis política fue la expresión de la maduración de una crisis de representación política, con vínculos poco orgánicos entre la oferta política y las sensibilidades ciudadanas y un sistema precarizado y cartelizado de representación política, en el cual una miríada de intereses ilegales, informales y oligopólicos han resistido sucesivas generaciones de reformas - educativa, judicial, fiscal y política, entre otras – que pretenden regularlos. Las revelaciones de casos de corrupción que involucraban a gran parte del elenco político, como el caso Lava Jato/Odebrecht y el de los Cuellos Blancos, que destapó una extendida red de corrupción en el sistema judicial, sirvieron para instalar el consenso de un deterioro general del manejo de lo público. A la vez, la relativa eficacia de las medidas fiscales en contra de los líderes políticos involucrados alimentó la perspectiva de una limpieza de la clase política y la posibilidad de cultivar una transición hacia un mejor sistema de representación. En cierta medida, el vínculo populista que estableció Vizcarra con esa sensibilidad - sellado con la disolución constitucional del anterior Congreso, en el cual el partido del expresidente Alberto Fujimori contaba con la mayoría - fue el factor que sostuvo su gobierno, carente de apoyos parlamentarios, empresariales, mediáticos o sindicales. La vacancia de Vizcarra se experimentó como la restitución de la constelación de intereses que hasta entonces había retrocedido con la labor fiscal y las reformas educativa, política y judicial.

  ¿Cómo describirías el conflicto institucional que resultó en la destitución y el reemplazo del presidente?

  El conflicto institucional se gestó en la precariedad de un sistema político caracterizado por un nuevo Congreso con múltiples bancadas pero ninguna de ellas oficialista y un presidente popular pero sin apoyos institucionales, cuya legitimidad se sostenía en el manejo versátil del debate público a través de una combinación de gestos políticos, el reclutamiento de técnicos competentes en puestos clave, y un ejercicio calculado de antagonización con el Congreso en temas clave, tales como las reformas educativa, política y judicial.

  La coalición mayoritaria en el Congreso retomó, a grandes rasgos, la agenda de intereses de la anterior mayoría “fujiaprista” - así designada por la alianza tácita entre el Partido Aprista y la corriente política fundada por el expresidente Fujimori - a la que añadió nuevas demandas populistas que ponían en riesgo el manejo presupuestal y macroeconómico en torno del cual existía un consenso tecnocrático. En este marco, actores que sobrevivieron a la disolución del anterior Congreso lograron recolocarse en el nuevo y operar, junto a algunos medios de comunicación, una campaña que buscaba deteriorar la popularidad de Vizcarra mediante el levantamiento de acusaciones de corrupción en casos poco claros. Estas fueron las dinámicas que nutrieron el conflicto institucional.

  Por su lado, la sociedad civil tuvo una respuesta unificada ante la vacancia y el nuevo régimen que se instaló. Su respuesta se movió desde la expresión de preocupación y el reclamo de toma de responsabilidad hasta la abierta condena ante el establecimiento de la nueva gestión. Las protestas masivas y la represión con que fueron enfrentadas alimentaron esa transición en la mayoría de la sociedad civil. Muchas organizaciones de la sociedad civil tuvieron un papel activo en el enmarcamiento del conflicto, la producción de una narrativa para audiencias internacionales y la colocación de presión sobre los actores públicos con que interactúan.

  ¿Quiénes se movilizaron, y qué reclamaban?

  En un comienzo, los manifestantes protestaban contra la vacancia del presidente Vizcarra y contra la asunción del presidente del Congreso, Manuel Merino, como nuevo presidente. Una encuesta realizada posteriormente por Ipsos mostró que poco más de tres cuartos de la población estaba de acuerdo con la protesta contra la remoción del presidente Vizcarra, y que al menos dos millones de personas se movilizaron de una u otra forma o tomaron parte activa en las protestas.

  Las manifestaciones fueron mayormente protagonizadas por jóvenes de entre 16 y 30 años, quienes vertebraron la organización y generaron los repertorios y tácticas de protesta. El estado de ánimo de hartazgo generalizado fue movilizado por la llamada “generación del bicentenario”, nacida después del fin del fujimorismo, nativa digital y, en su mayoría, desafecta de la política convencional. Se trata también de una generación mesocrática -tanto en los segmentos tradicionales de la clase media y en los sectores populares- y partícipe de comunidades virtuales mediadas por las plataformas digitales. Eso explica en parte la velocidad de la emergencia de arquitecturas de organización bastante eficientes para producir repertorios, coordinar acciones, documentar las protestas y generar movimientos de opinión pública. La mediación de las redes sociales y el uso de aplicaciones de microtransferencias monetarias propiciaron una organización descentralizada de la protesta, con múltiples manifestaciones en distintas locaciones, distintas convocatorias convergentes, diversidad de repertorios y canales de transferencia rápida de recursos.

  La movilización liderada por los jóvenes se nutrió de una clase media dispuesta a asumir el costo de manifestarse. Alrededor de este núcleo se articularon sociológica y territorialmente otros sectores de la población, más o menos acostumbrados a estrategias convencionales de protesta, o simplemente alejados de toda expresión pública.

  Las protestas comenzaron el 9 de noviembre, se sucedieron día a día y alcanzaron su punto álgido el 14 de noviembre, fecha de la Segunda Marcha Nacional. La movilización masiva del llamado 14N se alimentó de la súbita expresión de un hartazgo que atravesaba de lado a lado a la sociedad y que era particularmente intenso entre los jóvenes. De ahí su carácter excepcional por su alcance, magnitud y organización, así como por la rápida instalación de una identidad ciudadana no partidarizada, que solo en parte puede explicarse por el apoyo a Vizcarra, ya que lo excedía.

  El 14N culminó con la muerte de dos jóvenes manifestantes por perdigones de plomo. Merino había asumido el 10 de noviembre y había formado un gobierno radicalmente conservador. El signo del gabinete se reveló rápidamente en la autorización de la represión severa de la protesta, sobre todo en Lima, la capital. Tras las primeras jornadas de violencia policial, el presidente del Consejo de Ministro felicitó y garantizó protección a los escuadrones policiales involucrados. Las muertes del 14N activaron una cascada de desafecciones en los pocos apoyos políticos que sostenían al régimen en respuesta a una presión ciudadana desbordada, y hacia el mediodía del 15 de noviembre Merino había renunciado.

  El espacio generado por la movilización se pobló de una cantidad de demandas heterogéneas, desde el restablecimiento de Vizcarra hasta el reclamo de un cambio constitucional que cimentara la salida al neoliberalismo, pasando por propuestas más claramente ciudadanas, centradas en la defensa de la democracia, la continuidad de las reformas, la injusticia de la represión y la insensibilidad de la clase política frente a la emergencia sanitaria de la pandemia. El fermento para estos reclamos sigue existiendo y queda por verse cómo terminan tomando forma en el escenario electoral de 2021.

  ¿En qué se diferenciaron estas protestas de otras que ocurrieron en el pasado? ¿Hubo algún cambio relacionado con el contexto de la pandemia?

  En anteriores movilizaciones urbanas ya se habían ensayado los mecanismos de coordinación que proporcionan las redes sociales, pero esas manifestaciones habían sido protagonizadas por actores convencionales, tales como movimientos sociales, partidos políticos y sindicatos. En esta oportunidad se formaron nuevos grupos de activistas, tales como brigadas para desactivación de bombas lacrimógenas y de auxilio médico, similares a las técnicas de movilización ensayadas en otros escenarios, como las protestas de Hong Kong y las de Black Lives Matter en los Estados Unidos. Ello habla de la emergencia de espacios de aprendizaje global de protesta. 

  En parte, fue la emergencia sanitaria la que condicionó la composición de las protestas, en su mayora integradas por jóvenes, al tiempo que propició, entre aquellos que tenían mayores reparos en salir a las calles, la difusión de nuevos repertorios, como los cacerolazos, los bocinazos y el activismo digital. Al mismo tiempo, el carácter masivo de las protestas se explica por el hecho de que los indicadores sanitarios del momento sugerían el cese de la primera ola de COVID-19, y por la constatación de que las marchas de Black Lives Matter no habían estado vinculadas a brotes relevantes, lo cual alentó una sensación de seguridad para las marchas.

  ¿Por qué acabaron los manifestantes reclamando una reforma constitucional? ¿Qué clase de reforma constitucional reclaman?

  Las propuestas de cambios constitucionales formaron parte de las demandas de la movilización, pero no terminaron de protagonizarla. En todo caso, ganaron un nuevo ímpetu en el debate público. La genealogía de estas demandas puede pensarse en dos vertientes. El cambio constitucional a través de una asamblea constituyente es una de las demandas centrales de las izquierdas desde el fin del fujimorismo. Inmediatamente después de la caída del régimen de Fujimori (1990-2001) se convocó un Congreso con un mandato constituyente que no pudo producir un nuevo texto constitucional, y desde entonces esta aspiración pasó a habitar el campo del progresismo, perdiendo vigencia entre otros actores moderados y de derecha. Las izquierdas a menudo reivindican la mitificada Constitución de 1979 como alternativa, proponen un nuevo texto inspirado los procesos boliviano y ecuatoriano, y apuntan el carácter ilegitimo de la Constitución actual, nacida tras un golpe de Estado. El crecimiento económico sostenido de las décadas post-Fujimori y las reformas puntuales de algunos mecanismos constitucionales otorgaron legitimidad a la Constitución, pero muchas de las instituciones y principios que consagra han ido agotándose con los cambios sociológicos y económicos que ayudaron a propiciar.

  La segunda vertiente viene de un reclamo más orgánico tras la constatación de los límites del modelo de mercado, evidentes sobre todo en la persistencia de la desprotección social, el trabajo precario e informal y los abusos de los oligopolios en la provisión de servicios, así como en la crisis del sistema de representación política. Vizcarra inauguró una etapa reformista en materia judicial y política, y en los marcos legales que gobiernan a los sectores extractivos y el sistema de pensiones. Asimismo, dio continuidad a la reforma educativa. El ánimo reformista -pensado por los sectores moderados como el camino de una transición “responsable”- fue agredido por la pugna política alimentada por los sectores afectados, creando un espacio para que las aspiraciones de reforma puedan empezar a predicarse en el lenguaje del cambio constitucional.

  Con todo, este debate ha adquirido una nueva relevancia a partir de las protestas del 14N, y aún no están claros los términos de la conversación, el contenido de los cambios más significativos y, sobre todo, la oferta de actores políticos maduros capaces de interpretarlos y llevarlos a cabo. El peligro radica en que, en un contexto de alta indeterminación, el proceso termine siendo definido por actores cuyas motivaciones no participan del ánimo de cambio.

  El espacio cívico en Perú es calificado como “obstruido” por elCIVICUS Monitor.
  Contáctese con Propuesta Ciudadana a través de supágina web o su perfil deFacebook, y siga a@prop_ciudadana y a@BarrioZevallos en Twitter.

   

• PERÚ: “Es necesario recuperar la confianza en las elecciones”

  CIVICUS conversa con Iván Lanegra, secretario general de la Asociación Civil Transparencia, sobre las recientes elecciones presidenciales y el estado de la democracia en Perú. La Asociación Civil Transparencia es una organización de la sociedad civil independiente que trabaja por la calidad de la democracia y la representación política mediante la facilitación del diálogo entre actores políticos, gubernamentales y de sociedad civil, la implementación de programas de educación y de desarrollo de capacidades para el liderazgo ciudadano y político, la elaboración de propuestas de política pública y la observación de los procesos electorales.

  

  ¿Cuáles fueron las particularidades de este proceso electoral, y qué es lo que estuvo en juego?

  Las últimas elecciones generales estuvieron vinculadas con varios procesos políticos y sociales. En primer lugar, tuvo lugar al cabo de un período de cinco años muy inestable políticamente, en el cual tuvimos cuatro presidentes -Pedro Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Manuel Merino y Francisco Sagasti- y el Congreso fue disuelto constitucionalmente. Al mismo tiempo, la economía ya no venía creciendo tanto, con lo cual empezó a aumentar el descontento social. En este contexto, los escándalos de corrupción terminaron por minar la credibilidad de los partidos políticos. A esto se sumó el impacto socioeconómico de la pandemia, que generó mayores demandas redistributivas.

  Como resultado de todos estos procesos, se produjo una atomización de las preferencias de la ciudadanía. Los efectos de esta situación se expresaron en una gran fragmentación del voto en las elecciones parlamentarias de enero de 2020 y, nuevamente, en la primera vuelta de la elección presidencial de abril de 2021, donde los dos candidatos que salieron primeros, y que por lo tanto pasaron a la segunda vuelta, sacaron en conjunto apenas el 33% de los votos. En un Congreso de 130 asientos hay representados diez partidos políticos diferentes.

  En la segunda vuelta, el triunfo de Pedro Castillo, del partido de izquierda Perú Libre, frente a Keiko Fujimori, de Fuerza Popular -un partido de derecha-, mostró el gran peso que tuvo la demanda de cambio, sumada al rechazo de la política convencional de los últimos años.

  Sin embargo, los resultados oficiales demoraron en ser proclamados, lo cual generó un clima de gran incertidumbre. En un contexto de alta polarización, hubo un aumento exponencial de los recursos contra los resultados electorales: lo habitual es que se presente menos de una decena, pero en esta ocasión se presentaron más de mil, ninguno de los cuales fue considerado con fundamentos. Se hizo un uso instrumental de estos recursos: las denuncias infundadas de fraude fueron utilizadas para alargar al máximo el proceso y tratar de impedir la oficialización de los resultados. Si bien este intento no tuvo éxito, demoró la transferencia del poder y aumentó la desconfianza hacia la política y las instituciones electorales.

  ¿Por qué hubo tanta gente que no fue a votar?

  La tasa de ausentismo en la primera vuelta fue de casi 30%, algo superior a la de las elecciones legislativas de 2020, cuando había sido del 26%; sin embargo, en la segunda vuelta bajó a menos de 24%. Hay que recordar que la primera vuelta electoral se dio en el punto más alto de la pandemia de COVID-19 en Perú. En otros países, como Chile, ni siquiera fue posible votar debido a la emergencia sanitaria, pero en Perú las elecciones se desarrollaron normalmente. En realidad, es notable que el ausentismo no haya sido más alto.

  ¿Qué rol desempeñó Transparencia en relación con el proceso electoral?

  En el período previo a las elecciones, en el marco de la campaña #DecideBien, Transparencia difundió información sistemática sobre los partidos, las candidaturas y las propuestas, para que la ciudadanía pudiera evaluar sus opciones. Desglosamos los programas de gobierno para que cada persona pudiera conocer y comparar las propuestas de cada candidato en torno de los temas de su interés y votar en función de ese conocimiento.

  Además, invitamos a la ciudadanía a inscribirse a la Red Nacional de Voluntariado de Transparencia para participar como observadores en las elecciones. Desde nuestra perspectiva, la observación electoral consiste en vigilar, orientar y dar testimonio de los hechos ocurridos durante la jornada electoral, además de hacer pedagogía ciudadana sobre la conducta y las reglas electorales.

  Con esta red de voluntarios y voluntarias Transparencia observó el proceso y desde un primer momento señaló que el proceso electoral se había desarrollado con normalidad, más allá de los incidentes menores que suelen ocurrir en todas las elecciones, pero que no afectan los resultados.

  En vistas de las alegaciones infundadas que buscaron desacreditar el proceso, también trabajamos para contrarrestar la desinformación electoral. El fenómeno de la desinformación en redes sociales, en particular después de la segunda vuelta, fue mucho más fuerte que en elecciones anteriores, y las propias autoridades electorales tuvieron que montar equipos dedicados casi exclusivamente a desmentir las “noticias falsas”. El clima de polarización seguramente contribuyó a aumentar el impacto de la desinformación.

  ¿Qué desafíos políticos se perfilan tras las elecciones?

  Los principales desafíos son cómo reducir la desconfianza en el Estado, como encarar la insatisfacción con la democracia y cómo mejorar la representación política. Aunque en comparación con estos retos, la polarización política, que se exacerbó en el contexto electoral, es menos preocupante, también debe ser considerada. Si bien los sectores más radicalizados siguen atizando la polarización, se trata de sectores minoritarios. Lograron polarizar las elecciones porque consiguieron pasar a la segunda vuelta a pesar de haber conseguido un bajo porcentaje de votos, pero pasadas las elecciones, la mayoría de la ciudadanía se ubica lejos de los extremos. Sin embargo, es importante tener en cuenta que la desconfianza, la insatisfacción y la sensación de falta de representación son elementos que los sectores que buscan polarizar pueden aprovechar en su beneficio.

  Es necesario recuperar la confianza en las elecciones. Para eso debemos continuar formando e informando a la ciudadanía sobre las reglas de las elecciones, la política y la democracia. También debemos mejorar los mecanismos de que disponemos para combatir la desinformación. Asimismo, es necesario avanzar en las reformas electorales pendientes, para crear incentivos para el fortalecimiento de los partidos políticos, así como para mejorar la calidad de la representación política.

  El espacio cívico en Perú es calificado como “obstruido” por elCIVICUS Monitor.
  Póngase en contacto con la Asociación Civil Transparencia a través de susitio web o sus páginas deFacebook,Instagram y Tik Tok, y siga a@actransparencia y a@ilanegra en Twitter.

   

• PERÚ: “La inestabilidad política y social ya ha costado decenas de vidas”

  CIVICUS conversa sobre la crisis política en Perú con Nadia Ramos, CEO del Centro de Liderazgo para Mujeres de las Américas y portavoz oficial de la Red Hemisférica Somos Lideresas, organizaciones que impulsan el liderazgo y el empoderamiento de las mujeres en Perú y en América Latina.

  ¿Cómo se gestó el conflicto de poderes que acabó con la salida del presidente Castillo?

  El expresidente Pedro Castillo fue elegido democráticamente a través del voto popular, pero desde antes de iniciar su mandato vivió un acoso constante de grupos que argumentaban que su victoria electoral nació a partir del fraude y, por ende, no lo reconocían como presidente legítimo. Estos grupos presentaron denuncias sin pruebas ante organismos internacionales para tratar de impedir su juramentación.

  Perú tiene un sistema presidencialista híbrido, ya que, en vez de estar completamente separados, los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo tienen poderes para destituirse o disolverse recíprocamente. Hay un Consejo de Ministros conformado por todos los ministros de Estado cuyo presidente es nombrado directamente por el presidente del Perú. El Congreso otorga su voto de confianza al presidente del Consejo de ministros, pero si le niega su confianza en dos oportunidades el presidente de la República puede disolver el Congreso.

  Los dos poderes están constantemente midiendo fuerzas, y durante el Gobierno de Castillo el choque institucional se sintió aún más. Si a esto se le suma que tenemos partidos políticos débiles, el resultado es una situación política inestable, algo a lo que estamos los peruanos muy acostumbrados.

  Durante su gobierno, Castillo fue acosado por el Congreso, a lo que luego se sumó una denuncia grave de corrupción presentada por la Fiscal de la Nación. También fue atacado por la prensa tradicional, que durante meses nunca pudo obtener una entrevista con el presidente. Castillo no daba explicaciones de nada: guardó absoluto silencio y daba mensajes a la nación de un minuto de duración para explicar temas puntuales de su gestión.

  A pesar de no tener mayoría en el Congreso, Castillo evitó ser destituido por el Congreso en varias oportunidades. Como se supo luego, lo hizo buscando discretamente apoyos en algunas bancadas clave. Pero mientras que sus antecesores tuvieron entre seis meses y un año en que pudieron gobernar, Castillo nunca tuvo tregua. Ante el acoso y la persecución, finalmente recurrió a la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) para solicitar la activación de la Carta Democrática, un instrumento de defensa de la democracia bajo amenaza, argumentando que era víctima de un complot que buscaba sacarlo del poder. La OEA respondió enviando una Comisión de Alto Nivel a Perú para analizar la situación política y confirmar si se estaba gestando un complot en su contra, amenazando la democracia.

  La democracia en Perú es muy precaria, y este fue un gobierno precario que buscó sobrevivir día a día. Era prácticamente imposible que llegara hasta el final de su mandato el 28 de julio de 2026.

  ¿Qué ocurrió el 7 de diciembre?

  Desde hacía tiempo Castillo venía siendo hostigado por el Congreso, que de manera constante presentaba mociones de vacancia, aunque no obtenía los votos suficientes para destituirlo. Mientras tanto, el presidente guardaba silencio y se concentraba en lograr los apoyos necesarios para sobrevivir en el cargo. Hasta el 7 de diciembre, cuando el escenario político cambió por error del propio Castillo.

  Ese día, el presidente inesperadamente quebró el orden constitucional de Perú y cometió un suicidio político. Durante su mensaje a la nación ordenó instaurar un “Gobierno de excepción”, disolvió el Congreso y convocó a elecciones para un Congreso Constituyente encargado de elaborar una nueva constitución. Declaró un toque de queda por 48 horas y anunció la reorganización del Poder Judicial, entre otras medidas.

  Pero Castillo no contaba con que sus ministros renunciarían en bloque y las Fuerzas Armadas le darían la espalda y sacarían un comunicado indicando que no le debían obediencia a un gobierno usurpador. En respuesta a su mensaje a la nación, el pleno del Congreso hizo un llamado a todas las bancadas para celebrar una sesión extraordinaria en la que aprobó la moción de vacancia presidencial por incapacidad moral con 101 votos a favor -bastantes más de los 87 requeridos- y cuatro en contra, en ausencia de varios congresistas afines al gobierno.

  Castillo quedó detenido y una semana más tarde un juez dictó 18 meses de prisión preventiva mientras es investigado por rebelión, crimen organizado y corrupción, delitos por los cuales de ser condenado podría pasar varias décadas de prisión.

  ¿Cómo se resolvió la crisis institucional?

  En los últimos años hemos visto pasar a seis presidentes y sobrevivido a varias situaciones de inestabilidad profunda. Esta crisis política se resolvió en pocas horas, ya que el Congreso enseguida vacó al presidente y convocó a la vicepresidenta, Dina Boluarte, para asumir como la primera presidenta del Perú.

  No obstante, la ciudadanía esperaba que Boluarte renunciara, que el Congreso eligiera una nueva Mesa Directiva – el órgano encargado de la dirección administrativa del Congreso – y que el presidente del parlamento asumiera la presidencia para convocar a nuevas elecciones generales. Cuando Boluarte decidió continuar al frente se desató una ola de protestas en todo el país en reclamo de su dimisión. En la represión de las protestas fueron asesinadas 28 personas, entre ellas cuatro menores de edad. Esto llevó a la renuncia de dos ministros y a la renovación del primer gabinete del gobierno de Boluarte.

  A continuación el Congreso aprobó en primera votación que las elecciones generales se lleven a cabo en abril de 2024. Ahora toca llevar a cabo una segunda votación en la siguiente legislatura ordinaria. Esperamos que las reformas electorales y políticas continúen para garantizar que las personas correctas puedan llegar al Congreso y a la presidencia.

  ¿Qué posición ha adoptado la sociedad civil peruana, y qué clase de apoyos internacionales necesita?

  La sociedad civil peruana está llevando a cabo protestas pacíficas, pero la represión ha sido una constante durante las últimas semanas. La inestabilidad política y social ya ha costado decenas de vidas, por lo que esperamos mensajes firmes de condena de la comunidad internacional, la continuidad de las investigaciones de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, y que las redes internacionales de derechos humanos sean nuestra voz para que los crímenes cometidos contra adultos y adolescentes peruanos no queden impunes.

  Buscamos y exigimos justicia y reparación para los familiares de las víctimas. Asimismo, exigimos judicialización de todos los responsables –desde quien dio la orden y cometió las matanzas, hasta los involucrados en el sembrado de pruebas falsas contra líderes de organizaciones sociales y civiles para acusarlas falsamente de terrorismo.

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  El espacio cívico en Perú es calificado como “obstruido” por elCIVICUS Monitor.

  Póngase en contacto con elCentro de Liderazgo para Mujeres de las Américas y conSomos Lideresas a través de sus respectivas páginas de Facebook, y siga a@SLideresas y a@ramosnadia en Twitter.