freedom of peaceful assembly

‘Due to the communications blockade in Kashmir, news of protests went largely underreported’
On 5 August 2019, the government of India revoked Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution, which guaranteed the autonomous status and rights of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The government also imposed a severe communications blockade that impacted on the daily lives of Kashmiri people, including by affecting access to medical care, basic necessities and emergency services. Hundreds of detentions of political activists, human rights defenders and community leaders have been reported. CIVICUS speaks about this situation with Natasha Rather, Regional Campaign Officer for the Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances, linked to the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), an organisation that focuses on enforced disappearances in the region, monitors the human rights situation and documents abuses.

What was the situation of civic freedoms in Jammu and Kashmir prior to the revocation of its special status under Indian administration?

During the first half of 2019, Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (JK) witnessed continued and increased violence and heightened tensions between India and Pakistan, following a militant attack on the Central Reserve Police Force convoy on the Jammu–Srinagar highway that resulted in the killing of 48 Indian soldiers in February 2019. Following this attack, Kashmiri people living in various cities and towns of India became targets of hate crimes. Thousands of Kashmiri students were forced to flee from their colleges and universities and return back to Kashmir. People living in JK feared the attack would have dreadful consequences – which turned out to be true.

The frequency of cordon and search operations (CASOs) and crackdowns increased in the aftermath of the attack. CASOs are a form of harassment that breach people’s right to privacy. According to a report by the APDP and Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, at least 177 CASOs were conducted by the Indian armed forced in JK, which resulted in the killing of at least 118 militants and four civilians and the destruction of at least 20 civilian properties.
In February 2019, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and the Kashmir Chapter of Jamaat-i-Islami were banned and hundreds of their leaders and workers were arrested.
Ahead of the elections to the Indian Parliament, held in JK in April and May 2019, 100 additional companies of soldiers were deployed in Kashmir and mass arrests of political and religious leaders were carried out. During polling days there were complete shutdowns, violence and killings.

The use of administrative detention under the provisions of repressive Public Safety Act (PSA) led to many arrests and detentions. Between January and June this year, at least 25 people were booked under the PSA.

Internet shutdowns have also been a common practice in JK. Internet services were curtailed 51 times in the first half of the year.

How did people in Jammu and Kashmir respond to the revocation of the state’s special status?

Before revocation was formally announced by the Indian government, many rumours made the rounds and people guessed that something sinister was underway. Official orders by the state administration added to the apprehension. People prepared themselves for a complete lockdown, drawing from their previous experience when the Indian government imposed curfews and shut down phones and the internet.
When revocation of the special status was announced amidst a complete blockade of communication and full restrictions on movement, people were not greatly shocked. The autonomy guaranteed to JK under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution allowed the state a certain amount of autonomy – its own constitution, a separate flag and freedom to make laws – but it had been greatly eroded before revocation of the special status, which downgraded JK from a state to a union territory, and there was nothing much left in it for the benefit of the people.

There have been concerns attached to the revocation of Article 35a, which permits the local legislature in Indian-administered Kashmir to define who are permanent residents of the region. People have speculated that demographic changes might be underway, designed and strategised along the same lines as the occupation of Palestine, including the demographic changes introduced by Israel in Palestine. While there are fears of demographic changes, the majority’s response has been not to fight against revocation of the state’s special status, as this would have meant legitimising the occupation of the region. The larger struggle is for the right to self-determination.

We have read reports of civic space restrictions, including a ban on meetings, restrictions on freedom of movement and arrests of leaders. Can you provide more information about this?

The announcement of the revocation of JK’s special status was accompanied by widespread restrictions. There was an increased deployment of Indian armed forces at all roads and intersections across the valley, and the unyielding troops have strictly restricted the movement of people. For the first few weeks, people were not even able to reach hospitals and doctors. Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code, which bans public gatherings of more than four people, was imposed despite a curfew being in place since the night of 4-5 August. This prevented people from organising protest gatherings and meetings.

According to a government report dated 6 September, more than 3,800 people had been detained since 5 August and only about 2,600 of them were subsequently released. Those detained include political leaders from both pro-India and pro-independence parties, civil society members, lawyers and protesters. Three former Chief Ministers of JK – Farooq Abdullah, Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti – have been detained since 5 August. On 16 September, Farooq Abdullah was detained under the PSA. Leaders and politicians like Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, Farooq Abdullah, Taj Mohiuddin and M Y Tarigami have been under house arrest. Hotels and government guesthouses have been turned into detention centres. Many leaders and civil society members have been lodged in jails in India.
There has been an extensive use of the PSA to detain people, especially young people. Many young people were detained without being formally charged and were released only after the signing of community bonds. Many young people and most political leaders continue to be detained.

Have people protested? How have the security forces responded to protests?

Despite the severe restrictions imposed on the movement and assembly of the people, there have been many protests across the valley of Kashmir, with people taking to the streets and shouting slogans demanding freedom from the Indian state. The Indian media has claimed that there were negligible protests against the abrogation of Article 370, making it seem like there is normality and acceptance of the Indian state’s decisions. Since the local media has not been able to report on these protests, stories from them have not come to the fore. There were many protests in Kashmir valley, but due to the communication blockade and restrictions on the movement of journalists and media, news of protests from other districts went largely underreported.

Protesters have been met with excessive force by the Indian armed forces. For instance, on 9 August, several people were injured during protests in the Soura area of Srinagar. A doctor confirmed that at least 53 young people were treated for injuries at Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences in Soura. Reports also emerged that five people have been killed in separate incidents as a result of excessive use of force by law enforcement officials in the policing of protests since the start of the clampdown.

How has the internet shutdown affected the work of activists and journalists?

The communication clampdown has greatly affected the work of journalists and activists. Owing to the shutdown of internet services and curbs on the movement of journalists, it has been a huge challenge for journalists to collect and file stories. The administration set up a Media Facilitation Centre in Srinagar where journalists are allowed to access the internet and email their stories. No such facilities are available in other districts of Kashmir. Newspapers in Kashmir have been publishing with a reduced number of pages. Journalists have been forced to rely just on state-issued press briefs once or twice a week, without any means to verify the stories. There has been news of journalists facing reprisals for filing stories on Kashmir’s ongoing situation.

Also, since 5 August, civil society in JK has been under threat and dealing with a very precarious situation, as many civil society members have been detained and jailed under the PSA. In this way the Indian state has put pressure on Kashmiri civil society to remain silent about the current situation, and therefore their space is completely choked. There is a lot of resistance and criticism of the communications clampdown that is preventing civil society from carrying out its work.

In this context, the support required from the international community is that they should increase their understanding of the Kashmir conflict and talking about it so as to prevent this human rights crisis from worsening.

Civic space in India is rated as ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Follow @natasha_rather on Twitter.
Advocacy priorities at the 50th Session of UN Human Rights Council
The 50^th Session of the Human Rights Council will run from 13 June to 8 July, and will provide an opportunity to advance civic space and the protection of civil society, as well as address serious country situations. This session will address particularly civic space rights: CIVICUS will engage on a resolution and debate on freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, as the Council renews the critical mandate of the Special Rapporteur, and on a resolution on peaceful protests, aiming to advance accountability for violations. It will also look to strengthen international norms on freedom of expression. On country situations, CIVICUS will engage on Eritrea, join calls to ensure continued scrutiny on Sudan, and urge the Council to take steps to protect Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in and outside Myanmarwhile addressing its ongoing serious violations and join events on both topics.

The Human Rights Council also has the opportunity to address situations of serious concern on countries that are not on the agenda. CIVICUS urges to Council to do so on India, to create a long-needed mechanism on Russiaand to address the women’s rights crisis in Afghanistan.

The full participation of civil society remains a critical part of the Human Rights Council, and CIVICUS encourages States to ensure consultation with national, regional and international civil society, and to ensure that they are fully able to participate in Council debates and negotiations.

Resolutions

Freedom of association and peaceful assembly

The resolution on freedom of peaceful assembly and association will be presented at this session, renewing the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of association and peaceful assembly. The Special Rapporteur will present a report on restrictions to access to funding, which has emerged as an existential threat to civil society. Countries such as India, El Salvador and Tunisia have had economic development and human rights activities curtailed owing to restrictions in foreign funding.

CIVICUS calls on States to support the renewal of the mandate in a strong resolution which reflect contemporary challenges, and to deliver statements during the debate with the Special Rapporteur highlighting countries and situations in which restrictions to access to funding have emerged as an existential threat to civil society.

Peaceful protests

Peaceful assembly is a fundamental right, and protests offer a powerful and successful means of advocating for and defending other vital rights. The resolution that will be presented this session on peaceful protests will provide an opportunity to strengthen protection of protests and accountability frameworks for violations during protests, building upon existing norms and standards, including the Human Rights Committee published its General Comment 37 on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

CIVICUS encourages States to support the resolution and its emphasis on crisis, and to encourage stronger language on accountability and the protection of journalists and protest monitors.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression is essential for any democratic society. The right to seek, receive and impart information is an inherent aspect of this. As internet shutdowns continue to be imposed throughout the world – from Myanmar to India to Chad to Kazakhstan – this right has been curtailed, exacerbated by existing challenges in to accessing digital space.

CIVICUS calls on States to support a resolution on freedom of expression which strengthens norms and standards around this vital issue and protects the right of people to fully participate.

Country Priorities

Eritrea

The situation of human rights in Eritrea – a Human Rights Council member – and its lack of cooperation with international mechanisms is a source of serious concern. In 2019, the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea identified ‘benchmarks for progress in improving the situation of human rights.’ To date, none have been met and there continues to be widespread impunity for past and ongoing human rights violations.

CIVICUS joins other organisations in calling for the Council to adopt a resolution that extends the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, clearly describes and condemns violations Eritrean authorities commit at home and abroad, and incorporate the Special Rapporteur’s benchmarks towards tangible improvement.

Civic space in Eritrea is rated 'closed' by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Sudan

The situation in Sudan risks further escalation, and a successful political settlement requires accountability. Following the military coup of 25 October last year, the UN Human Rights Council took urgent action by holding a special session and adopting a resolution requesting the High Commissioner to designate an Expert on Human Rights in the Sudan. The Council now must follow up on its initial action, and ensure ongoing scrutiny.

CIVICUS joins others in calling for states to support a resolution which ensures that the High Commissioner regularly reports on the human rights situation and that dedicated public debates are held.

Civic space in Sudan is rated 'repressed' by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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India

India was placed on CIVICUS’s Watchlist in February this year, illustrating its severe and rapid decline in respect for civic space. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) has been weaponized against non-profit organisations, including rejecting registrations and preventing them from accessing foreign funding. The broader human rights situation continues to deteriorate; scores of human rights defenders and activists remain in detention under the draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and other laws.

CIVICUS calls on states to raise India specifically in the interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association with particular reference to the FCRA and UAPA.

Civic space in India is rated 'repressed' by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Myanmar

15 months after the military coup, grave human rights violations by the military junta continued to be documented in Myanmar. There will be a number of opportunities to raise concerns during this Council session, including updates from the High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar. It is imperative that pressure remains on the military junta, and that further targeted action is taken by the international community to address the junta’s crimes. The coup has made the safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees untenable.

CIVICUS calls on states to ensure that the resolution on the situation of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar reflects these concerns, and to deliver strong statements to condemn the military coup and call for the restoration of an elected civilian government.

Civic space in Myanmar is rated 'repressed' by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Russia

Since the start of Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the authorities' targeting of Russian civil society has intensified significantly. Russian authorities embarked on a severe crackdown on civic freedoms after authorities brutally responded to nationwide anti-war protests, threatened and shut independent media outlets for reporting about the war in Ukraine, and blocked access to social media and media websites. Russia’s crushing of internal dissent has removed virtually all domestic checks and balances, enabling it to become a destabilizing actor not only in the region, but also globally.

CIVICUS supports Russian and international civil society groups in calling for the Council to appoint a dedicated Special Rapporteur to address the human rights situation in Russia.

Civic space in Russia is rated 'repressed' by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Afghanistan

There is a woman’s right crisis in Afghanistan: since August 2021, when the Taliban took control of the country, there has been an enormous deterioration in the recognition and protection of the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan, including with respect to the rights to non-discrimination, education, work, public participation, health, and sexual and reproductive health. The Taliban has also imposed sweeping restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement for women and girls. Afghanistan is now the only country in the world to expressly prohibit girls’ education.

CIVICUS joins partners in calling for an urgent debate on Afghanistan for the Council consider and take action on the women’s rights crisis in Afghanistan in a manner reflecting the gravity and urgency of the situation.

Civic space in Afghanistan is rated 'repressed' by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Advocacy priorities at the 51st Session of UN Human Rights Council
The 51st regular session of the Human Rights Council will run from 12 September to 7 October, and will provide an opportunity to advance civic space and the protection of civil society, as well as address serious country situations.

There are a number of opportunities for the advancement of civic space and the protection of civil society at the upcoming 51^st Human Rights Council session session. On country situations, the Council must take stronger action to address the worsening human rights situation in Afghanistan, particularly for women and girls. The Council must renew its mechanisms on Burundi, Ethiopia and Venezuela, while ensuring continued Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)'s monitoring of the human rights situation in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Thematically, the Council can reaffirm the importance of respecting human rights while countering terrorism.

Country Priorities

Afghanistan

Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, a human rights and humanitarian crisis has ensued. The establishment of a Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan was a first important step to address the situation, and now States must strengthen its focus on accountability for violations, including by establishing a Commission of Inquiry to complement the Special Rapporteur’s work.

Civic space in Afghanistan is rated "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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The Philippines

Since 2016, when Duterte came to power, CIVICUS has documented systematic intimidation, attacks and vilification of civil society and activists, an increased crackdown on press freedoms, and the emerging prevalence of a pervasive culture of impunity. With domestic accountability processes unfit for purpose, the Council must extend monitoring by the High Commissioner on the situation to ensure that scrutiny remains on the country and that impunity does not prevail.

Civic space in The Philippines is rated "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Burundi

The human rights situation in Burundi has not improved since the mandate of the Special Rapporteur was established at the Council’s 48th session, and impunity remains widespread. It is vital that the Council maintains scrutiny on Burundi, relying on benchmarks identified by the earlier Commission of Inquiry to assess its progress, so the Council must extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur. See a joint NGO letter here.

Civic space in Burundi is rated "Closed"' by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka has long been on the Council’s agenda to promote transitional justice towards accountability and reconciliation in the country. In June 2022, Sri Lanka was placed on CIVICUS’ watchlist due to its severe and rapid decline in civic freedoms, including violent force against peaceful protesters and attacks against civil society organisations. The Council must extend Office of OHCHR's mandate on reporting and accountability in Sri Lanka in a resolution which also addresses the current crisis.

Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated "Obstructed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Venezuela

The wave of human rights violations in the country continues unabated. Human rights defenders continue to be persecuted, detained, and killed. Such violations – especially against freedom of assembly, association and expression – further undermine the already fragile economic and social situation. The Council must renew the mandate of the Fact-Finding mission on Venezuela, and engage constructively with its recommendations.

Civic space in Venezuela is rated "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Ethiopia

Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in the Tigray region, the human rights situation in the country remains grave and alarming. The state of emergency endorsed by Parliament has led to a new wave of targeted and arbitrary arrests against the ethnic Tigrayans. The Council must renew the mandate of the Commission of Experts and engage constructively with its recommendations.

Civic space in Ethiopia is rated "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Thematic Priorities

Arbitrary detention

Arbitrary detention remains a tactic used by governments worldwide to silence dissent and curtail civil society action. The detention of peaceful protesters, human rights defenders and journalists persistently remains one of the most common violations of civic space. We call on States to engage in the Interactive Dialogue with the Working Group, in particular by raising cases of specific human rights defenders being held in arbitrary detention.

Terrorism and human rights

Measures to guarantee national security and stability should always fully comply with international human rights standards and they should never jeopardise core human rights. Civil society is witnessing an increasing misuse of counter-terrorism and national security laws and tactics which severely affects civil society and especially minority groups. A resolution on terrorism and human rights will be presented at this session, and we call on States to ensure that it addresses threats fundamental freedoms and and legal, regulatory and policy restrictions on civil society’s ability to operate.

The human rights violations committed by Russian forces during the ongoing unlawful aggression against Ukraine have been enabled in part by escalating serious repression within the country, and the situation and its impact merit the urgent establishment of a Special Rapporteur on Russia. Sustained attacks against civic space in Indiahave rendered the Council overdue on taking action, and we urge States to do so at this session.

Side- Events

CIVICUS and our partner, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights will hold a side event on the escalating civil and political rights violations in Zimbabwe on 26 September at 17:00 GMT +2.
ARGENTINA: ‘Citizens must be able to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them’
CIVICUS speaks with Mariela Belski, Executive Director of Amnesty International Argentina, about the potential human rights effects of changes introduced by Argentina’snew government led by President Javier Milei.

Founded in 1961, Amnesty International is the world’s largest international human rights organisation.

What are the main measures taken by Javier Milei’s government, and what are the problems with them?

As soon as he took office, President Milei issued a decree of necessity and urgency (DNU) to legislate on a large number of issues that will affect people’s lives. Although the National Constitution establishes that the president can only issue decrees when exceptional circumstances prevent the government following ordinary legislative procedures, decrees have been used often for decades. What’s new in this case is the number and magnitude of the changes included in the DNU, in sharp contrast with the executive’s argument that this is an emergency.

In addition, the government sent to Congress an ‘omnibus law‘ that covers numerous issues not included in the DNU, such as tax reforms. Although it is also justified with arguments related to the context of emergency and economic instability, the bill pushes forward on issues that far exceed the emergency.

Many changes included in the DNU and the omnibus law raise concerns about their impact on rights in areas such as employment, health, housing and freedoms of assembly and expression. Contrary to international rights standards, through deregulation and the withdrawal of the state, both pieces of legislation will have a negative impact on people’s ability to exercise their rights.

For instance, medical insurance companies will be able to increase their fees as they like, and are already doing so. If they receive complaints about their service, the state will not impose sanctions. Drug prices will also be deregulated.

In the area of labour, a series of regressive measures is being introduced regarding severance pay, overtime pay and the extension of probationary periods, among other things. The injunctions that courts have already granted to stop the implementation of these changes have only benefited some specific employment sectors.

On housing, the DNU repeals the rent law and leaves contractual terms, amounts and the currency rent is paid in up to negotiation between landlords and tenants, allowing the landlord to impose whatever conditions they wish.

According to the omnibus law, the updating of pensions will no longer be governed by a formula set by law, but left to the discretion of the executive branch.

The bill also conceives of protest as a crime rather than a right to participation and expression of dissent. It establishes, for instance, notification requirements for any public meeting or demonstration involving three or more people. Although statements have been made that this measure would be reversed, this has not yet happened. In addition, the bill establishes the role of the ‘organiser’ to allow for the identification and eventual sanctioning of protest leaders.

In the area of security, the bill expands the circumstances in which a police officer can be considered as acting in self-defence, weakening standards of police accountability designed to prevent abuses. Given Argentina’s high rates of police brutality, this goes in the opposite direction to what’s needed.

The environment will also be affected by the DNU, which amends the forestry law to further enable deforestation, the glaciers law to permit more mining and the fires law to allow more burning. These provisions put natural resources at risk and could aggravate the climate crisis in Argentina.

In terms of gender policies, both the bill and the DNU remove any reference to diversity and gender. In particular, the omnibus law introduces changes to what’s known as the ‘1,000 days law‘, approved alongside the law on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to support those who decide to carry a pregnancy to term.

The instrumentalisation of the economic emergency to subjugate the autonomy of women, who are viewed exclusively as mothers, and the incorporation of figures such as that of the ‘unborn child’ reveal an attempt to bring about a strong regression on sexual and reproductive rights. In a country where every year more than 300 women are murdered, the real emergency should be to design effective policies against gender-based violence.

How does the new ‘anti-picket’ protocol affect freedom of expression and the right to protest?

Amnesty International believes that guidelines for police and state action set out in the Protocol for the maintenance of public order in the face of roadblocks violate freedoms of assembly, association and expression. The powers vested in police and security agents to intervene aren’t aligned with international standards on the use of force and risk escalating violence and social conflict, endangering people’s lives and physical integrity.

The protocol must reconcile the objectives of preserving ‘public order’ and ‘freedom of movement’ with the state’s obligations to respect and protect the physical integrity of individuals and the right to freedoms of assembly and expression, which are protected by the National Constitution and international human rights instruments. Both the protocol and the omnibus law seek to criminalise protesters and impose sanctions, including financial sanctions, that in practice could lead to the disappearance of collectives and organisations.

Argentina’s regulatory system doesn’t establish an order of priority between rights: neither free transit nor the right to protest take precedence over the other. The banning of demonstrations because of the possible disruption of free movement contradicts domestic norms.

The Argentine state must comply with its international human rights obligations, particularly regarding the right to protest, freedoms of assembly, association and expression and the use of force by its police and security agents.

Do you view these measures, and the way they are being taken, as a danger to democracy?

Amnesty International is concerned that a bill that will impact on numerous key aspects of people’s lives is being pushed through against the clock and during extraordinary congressional sessions.

In just three weeks the executive has proposed, through the DNU and the omnibus law, massive changes in legislation and regulations that were part of a consensus built over the past 40 years. The essence of democracy lies in citizens’ ability to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them. The extremely fast-paced discussion of these policies raises serious doubts about the integrity of the deliberative process.

Argentina’s context of economic and social crisis does call for profound reforms. Poverty over 40 per cent and exorbitant inflation rates demand a change of course. Reforms, however, must be carried out within the existing institutional and constitutional framework.

The omnibus law seeks a delegation of powers to the executive on a scale never seen before, in all spheres. Further, it establishes that the regulations issued in the exercise of this delegation will be permanent, except when the nature of the measure determines its transitory character and this is expressly stated.

Congress should carry out this process in an appropriate manner, following the principles set out in our constitution. Decisions that so significantly affect people’s lives should not be made in haste, but through public debate and following established procedures.

What initiatives is Amnesty International developing on these issues?

Regarding the protocol for the maintenance of public order we have presented an analysis with input and comments based on national and international standards. Our aim is to contribute to developing public policies that respect people’s rights.

Regarding the DNU and the omnibus law, we are organising meetings with officials and colleagues from various areas to jointly analyse the legislation and evaluate next steps.

Finally, we are preparing a document analysing the first 100 days of Milei’s government from a human rights perspective. In the same vein, we will be monitoring Congress closely.

Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Amnesty International Argentina through itswebsite or itsFacebook, Instagram, TikTok orTwitter accounts, and contact Mariela Belski through herInstagram orLinkedIn accounts.
BAHRAIN: ‘Had there been civic freedoms, the authorities would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison’
CIVICUS speaks about the situation of political prisoners on hunger strike in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

Founded in 2012, Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) registered in France, Switzerland and the UK. It undertakes research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

Maryam al-Khawaja, daughter of imprisoned human rights defender Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, intends to return to Bahrain imminently to ensure her father gets medical treatment and press for his immediate and unconditional release. Yet she, too, faces possible arrest. What’s your assessment of the situation?

Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, 62, a dual Danish-Bahraini citizen, is the co-founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and has a long history of activism. He was arrested by the government of Bahrain in 2004, 2007 and again amid mass unrest in April 2011. After this he faced a grossly unfair trial before a military court, including on charges of ‘seeking to overthrow the government’. He was tortured in pretrial custody and since his arbitrary imprisonment he has been repeatedly denied access to adequate healthcare.

On 9 August he joined some 800 other hunger strikers. They called for an end to lockdown policies that require them to spend up to 23 hours of the day in their cells, the suspension of solitary confinement, the opportunity for collective or congregational prayer in Jau Prison’s mosque, face-to-face meeting rights with family members without a glass screen and access to healthcare commensurate with that available to the public, among other improvements in prison conditions.

On 13 September the mass hunger strike ended with the authorities reportedly meeting many of these demands. This came as Bahrain’s Crown Prince visited Washington, DC, where he met with senior members of the Biden administration: the problem had to go away.

Maryam nevertheless intends to travel and she has our full support. We continue to call for Abdulhadi’s immediate and unconditional release. The Danish and European Union (EU) authorities must do more.

What is at the core of this problem is the absence of civic space in Bahrain. If there was space for independent civil society, then CSOs would have effectively alerted the authorities to prison conditions and they could have addressed the situation. An independent civic space makes it possible to find a balance in government conduct.

What does this mean for Maryam al-Khawaja and our courageous colleagues travelling with her? It means they should be allowed to enter Bahrain and make their demands. The government should engage with them in a spirit of transparency. The absolute worst that could happen is for dissent to be tolerated just a little bit more. While this seems unlikely to happen, it is what the government should do. We wish them all Godspeed.

How is it possible to conduct human rights activism in such a closed environment? How does Salam DHR do it?

Bahrain has closed civic space. Government officials decide which CSOs can be registered and who can stand for their boards. They prevent people from engaging in public life who have no criminal records or public complaints but rather perhaps a past association with a political movement or party that was unfairly banned years ago.

The Bahraini constitution provides for freedoms and safeguards similar to many other states, but the reality is that the government continues to carry out arbitrary arrests and stage unfair trials for acts that are not internationally recognised as crimes. The authorities torture detainees and use the death penalty, despite domestic opposition and international condemnation. They have stripped hundreds, including myself, of citizenship, depriving us of even the right to have rights in our homeland. They use the digital space to monitor and punish dissent and to foment religious and sectarian strife.

Activists linked with Salam DHR cannot, in effect, exercise their right to peaceful assembly, let alone openly campaign for freedoms of association and expression, the release of prisoners unfairly tried and imprisoned or a moratorium on the death penalty. They would risk arrest if they did that.

Yet engaging in civic activism is not totally impossible, only very challenging. Alongside CIVICUS and other partners, Salam DHR engages with allies and like-minded activists as well as the few CSOs that openly but cautiously raise human rights concerns so that the wider Bahraini society hears our message. We echo and amplify their appeals.

We are a catalyst: we help Bahraini activists access platforms to reach domestic and international audiences and provide training and development opportunities such as internships. Alone and in partnership with others, we research, document and publicise developments, grounding our message in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

How useful for advocacy purposes was theglobal event held by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023?

It was mixed: Danish parliamentarians and those from other countries addressed human rights issues and the absence of an independent civic space. The IPU’s human rights team raised concerns about freedom of expression and violations against Bahraini parliamentarians. But despite the IPU’s affiliated status with the United Nations (UN), the government still denied access to independent observers and human rights organisations, denying them either visas or access and turning at least one around at the airport. This was the authorities once again restricting civic space.

A few days before the IPU meeting officially began, Bahraini lawyer and activist Ebrahim Al-Mannai called for parliamentary reforms on social media. He and three others who shared his post were arrested for publishing material that could ‘disturb public order’.

At the event itself, the government appeared uninterested in seriously engaging with visiting parliamentarians on human rights issues, despite attempts from the Danish delegation and representatives from Finland, Iceland and Ireland. Our message is clear: open up civic space, free up CSOs and political parties and liberate discourse, otherwise the cycle of political unrest will continue.

Reports indicate that the mass hunger strike in Jau Prison has ended. What’s your assessment of this episode?

The painful August 2023 mass hunger strike was wholly avoidable. It happened mainly due to the government’s stubborn and short-sighted refusal to allow civic space to exist even to a minimum degree. Had there been freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, they would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison. If you don’t let people say what they think, then public life can only lurch from crisis to crisis.

The hunger strike was the expression of the accumulation of a number of factors that have been present in Bahraini prisons for years and it was based on grievances that have been repeatedly expressed: prison conditions and ill treatment of prisoners amounting to torture. The abuses worsened and conditions deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, medical neglect resulted in the deaths of two prisoners, Hussein Barakat and Abbas Mallalah.

We appeal once more to the authorities to allow for the opening of civic space and provide a social vent to end the cycle of human rights crises we face.

Is the international community doing all it can to support the struggle for democracy and human rights in Bahrain?

International human rights organisations, UN treaty bodies and Special Procedures and partner states, for instance in the context of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process of Bahrain, have all joined us in calling on the government of Bahrain to abide by its international human rights obligations, starting with the basic step of letting people have a voice in public life.

Today, 15 September, is International Day of Democracy, and we are joining the UN in calling on the government of Bahrain to empower the next generation by ensuring that their voices are included in the decisions that will have a profound impact on their world. In his address, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that ‘walls are closing in on civic spaces’. Those walls are also the walls of Jau Prison, where it took 800 detainees’ unjust suffering for the government to even take notice.

But the UN has also let neighbouring United Arab Emirates, which is as closed as Bahrain, host the forthcoming COP28 climate change summit. Lack of civic space means there can be no activism for climate justice in Bahrain – for instance, no public demands for accountability can be expressed over costly and environmentally damaging land reclamation in Bahrain’s northeast, which has already eroded the livelihood of fishing communities. We need to be able to address these challenges openly, with a rights-based approach, to avoid a future calamity.

And powerful states that could be putting some pressure for change are avoiding the issue. Right now, Bahrain’s Crown Prince is wrapping up meetings with senior Biden administration officials, none of whom appear to have raised civic space concerns or addressed the needless suffering of 800 Bahraini prisoners. The UK has removed Bahrain from its list of ‘countries of concern’ at the same time as it trumpeted a billion-dollar Bahraini investment in the UK. In October the EU will recommence its cycle of so-called human rights dialogues.

The international community’s inexplicable complacency over the festering human rights quagmire in Bahrain will further embolden the government in crushing civic space. Many leaders miss the point when it comes to Bahrain and its Gulf neighbours: they appear to accept the facade of what is presented as pragmatic autocracy and appear to accept regional rulers’ colonial-mindset contention that democracy will destabilise the region.

Democracies have in fact produced the most stable, enduring and dynamic systems in the world. Human rights and democracy are essential for Bahrain and its neighbours because their deficits continue to be the primary cause of resentment and unrest. A security-based approach does not remedy these problems. Bahrain’s history has shown these methods to be a failure, as it has endured continuous waves of mass unrest followed by violent crackdowns.

Authoritarianism and the forms of violence it fosters are the real destabilising forces, a cycle that can only be broken through the recognition and enactment of democratic rights. The first step towards this goal is simply letting civic space exist.

Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.
BAHRAIN: ‘The government uses public relations to mask human rights violations’
CIVICUS speaks withDrewery Dyke of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR) about closed civic and democratic space in Bahrain as the state prepares to host the Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU Assembly takes place in the capital, Manama,from 11 to 15 March 2023.

Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, and also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

We last spoke on the eve of the parliamentary election held in November 2022. How has civic space in Bahrain evolved since?

The government of Bahrain held the November 2022 parliamentary election under the same, highly restrictive, 2018 Political Rights Law used in the 2018 elections. It banned scores of people from being able to vote or stand for election on spurious grounds such as affiliation to a banned political party or having a criminal record.

Bahrain’s international partners, United Nations (UN) human rights bodies and civil society all decried the banning of political parties, as it flew in the face of international standards and simply deprived many people of having a voice. The court cases, too, dating from the 2011 unrest, were grossly unfair. In November 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee denounced both the Political Isolation Law and the Law on Associations

And yet there seems to be a small opening for civil society and greater freedoms. The regional mood music appears to be changing, with the governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates normalising relations with Qatar, and the Bahraini government having set out a 2022-2026 National Human Rights Plan.

Bahrain’s government appears to have signalled that it is minded to undertake some reform but civil society remains highly sceptical. Many of us are concerned that the government is once again using public relations initiatives to project an image of the country that masks longstanding, unresolved human rights violations for which there has been no accountability.

Is change possible? Yes, to some degree, it appears so. But civil society needs to remain vigilant and sceptical. Action will speak louder than words. An amendment of existing laws on political and civil society organisations is now a must.

How does Salam DHR manage to work in such a restrictive environment?

Current legislation makes it impossible for our organisation to register and openly carry out any research or advocacy in Bahrain. That has been the case since 2013. And yet at least one woman human rights defender who is linked to Salam DHR and other human rights CSOs has remained active inside Bahrain. She walks a tightrope on a daily basis, taking action to support individuals, notably prisoners of conscience. Lawyers, political and civil society activists and others from all walks of life continue to contact us but we cannot discuss their identities to protect their safety. It is a challenge.

In November 2022, however, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights obtained accreditation to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, which means it can now formally participate in UN meetings and events. This important step could help prise open the space for civil society just that little bit more. We will see.

Why do you think the Bahraini government offered to host the IPU Assembly?

The Bahraini government invited the IPU to hold its 146th Assembly in order to project an image of a democratic country and boost its international standing. The IPU’s catchphrase on its website is ‘For democracy. For everyone’. The government seeks to own this message in a situation where democracy does not exist.

The theme of the 146th Assembly is ‘Promoting peaceful coexistence and inclusive societies: Fighting intolerance’. Yet by limiting freedoms of association and assembly and the right to peaceful religious expression, Bahrain’s government promotes exclusion and intolerance.

Possibly to foster its mission, the IPU accepted the Bahraini government’s offer to hold its meeting in Manama. Is that problematic? In some ways, yes. But it is upon us to promote – peacefully – democratic change that advances adherence to international human rights standards. And parliamentarians from around the world attending the IPU Assembly could help chip away at deeply rooted discrimination and the fact that so many in civil society are deprived of having a voice or are afraid to use it.

Links between Bahraini parliamentarians and civil society are uneven. Some have few if any links while others have better connections and communication with their electorate, including civil society. Some seek to hold government action to account, albeit timidly.

The IPU Assembly may be an opportunity for Bahraini members of parliament to learn how their counterparts in other parts of the world engage with their electors and effectively represent their concerns. Parliamentarians are a building block of a free civil society. We need them to step up during the Assembly to make that a reality in Bahrain.

How could this whitewashing attempt become an advocacy opportunity?

The IPU Assembly will be a pivotal opportunity for advocacy. Visiting parliamentarians must make it so. They must reject baseless hype and propaganda depicting Bahrain as a land of freedom and democracy.

In a recently published brief, Salam DHR is urging attending parliamentarians to join with other parliamentarians from across the globe to call on the government of Bahrain to rescind all provisions that restrict parliamentary life and freedom of expression and association of Bahraini members of parliament. We want them to call for the government to resolve two outstanding cases the IPU’s Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarianshas lodged with the government of Bahrain, and examine the cases of 15 former parliamentarians targeted with arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trial and imprisonment and arbitrary stripping of citizenship. We’re also asking parliamentarians to urge the government to implement all recommendations arising from human rights treaty obligations and as many as possible of those made by UN Special Procedures and arising from Bahrain’s 2022 UN Universal Periodic Review.

We urge visiting parliamentarians to inform themselves of other widely shared human rights concerns in relation to Bahrain, including the denial of political rights and women’s rights, the use of the death penalty and the tactic of revoking citizenship as punishment, and to meet with human rights activists and others in civil society while in Bahrain.

How can the international community better support Bahraini civil society and activism for democracy?

Civil society in and engaged with Bahrain needs the international community to listen and speak with us, to hear our experiences and work with us. There is a narrative and experience that differs from the public relations whitewashing by the government.

We are saying that there are longstanding problems that need to be addressed, in terms of law, practice and accountability. But we are also saying that we believe that Bahrain’s international partners – from varying states, including European Union member states, the UK and USA, and the UN and its human rights bodies – and now parliamentarians can all work together, in unison, to erode the climate of repression that denies respect for human dignity, in order to empower Bahraini civil society and gradually build a more open and rights-respecting country.

Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Salam DHR through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@drewerydyke on Twitter.
BAHRAIN: ‘This election is make-believe: its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy’
CIVICUS speaks about the election being held today in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

Jawad Fairooz is a former Bahraini parliamentarian. In the 2010 election his political group, al-Wefaq, won 18 out of 40 seats, becoming the largest group in the Council of Representatives. They all resigned in repudiation of the repression of protests in 2011, and Jawad and another parliamentarian were arrested, tortured and ill-treated in detention. In November 2012, while he was visiting the UK, the government withdrew his citizenship, making him stateless. He became a campaigner against statelessness and for the rights of the stateless and founded Salam DHR in 2013.

What is the significance of today’s election?

Elections matter, or at least they should. In Bahrain, elections for municipal councils and the 40-seat parliament, the Council of Representatives, are held every four years, with possible runoffs where no candidate obtains a majority.

Between 2002 and 2010, these elections were carried out in a context where civil society had become relatively more vibrant. They continued – even if only just – to carry the promise that parliament would take an increasingly larger and more responsible role in deepening democracy and freedoms and ensuring the continuing existence of civil society.

Far more than now, they showed elections are a pivotal moment for social and political renewal – for those who will shape society to engage with civil society and to accommodate differing social and political views. Elections can create a sense of shared ownership, and in a context of tolerance and acceptance they can foster a vibrant and responsible civil society. They can help build a culture of human rights.

But that is not the case with today’s election.

This one reflects an ever-shrinking civic space. Parliamentarians’ institutional power has weakened, as they too operate under limited civic space. The government is inclined to seek less qualified parliamentarians whose conduct it will be able to control. To further weaken and subordinate parliament to the government’s will, the King recently issued a decree giving more power to parliament’s chair, a government loyalist, to determine the body’s workings. This will further extend government writ and further chill civic space.

This election, like those of 2014 and 2018, is controlled or stage managed in a way that makes it clear that its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy. It’s make-believe.

But let’s be clear: it is also an opportunity for us to get back to work on our own renewal, to locate openings and fissures and pry them open, and to chip away at walls enclosing us, in Bahrain, in the Gulf and across the region. An opportunity to look forward.

Flaws notwithstanding, we need to engage with the new parliamentarians. Will the government let them engage with independent civil society? It looks unlikely, but we will try, both through bilateral parliamentary visits and in the context of the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s General Assembly, which will be held in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023. We need to start organising now so that global parliamentarians can help carry our voices and those of international civil society to the heart of Manama.

We also need to plant the seeds for civil society activism around COP28, which will take place a year from now in neighbouring United Arab Emirates, where civic space is non-existent. We just can’t stop now, however bleak the situation of Bahrain or the Gulf may seem. This cycle of unfair elections is done, but our task to continue to look for avenues of engagement and activism continues apace. We are looking forward.

Have further restrictions been imposed on civic space in the run-up to the election?

Not really, as most of the damage was already done.

In December 2014, the authorities imprisoned Ali Salman, the leader of al-Wefaq, the largest political association. He was arrested for protesting against the parliamentary elections, which al-Wefaq boycotted because promised reforms had not been implemented. In 2015 he was sentenced to four years in prison on charges such as inciting hatred, disturbing the peace and insulting public institutions, but he was acquitted of the most serious charge, of inciting political change, which could carry a life sentence.

He appealed, but so did the prosecutor, who demanded a stricter sentence, and in 2016 his prison sentence was increased to nine years. Further charges were subsequently added and in 2017 he was accused and tried for the crime of ‘spying for Qatar’. For having tried to mediate in Bahrain’s conflict with Qatar, the authorities handed him a life sentence.

In July 2016, a court in Bahrain dissolved and banned Al-Wefaq after accusing it of fostering violence and ‘terrorism’. In May 2017, the main non-sectarian political association, Wa’d, was shut down as well, also under accusations of advocating violence, supporting terrorism and inciting crimes.

In advance of the 2018 parliamentary election, the government amended the NGO law, extending restrictions on who could establish or be on a CSO board, irrespective of the organisation’s nature – this applies even to organisations working on sports, working with the community or providing charitable services. It also forbade all those linked to banned political parties from engaging with CSOs.

In addition, anyone sentenced to more than six months’ imprisonment, even if subsequently pardoned by the King, convicted in error or provided with a ‘no objection certificate’, is now deprived for life of voting rights and the right to stand for election. Likewise, all those who for whatever reason did not take part in the previous election have been banned from taking part in the next.

Having crushed civic space for years, in the run-up to the 2022 election the authorities only needed to ensure that calm persisted. To that effect, in September the Ministry of Municipalities Affairs issued vaguely worded regulations that appeared to link electioneering and religion. Among other things, these regulations banned the holding of meetings in public religious centres and other public places such as educational facilities. They appeared aimed at the majority Shi’a community for whom such centres have often become the only places where they – we – are allowed to gather.

What are the conditions for civil society like in Bahrain?

In Bahrain, the very existence of a civil society – let alone an independent one – depends on the political will and whim of the government: the Ministry of Labour and Social Development controls the licensing of all CSOs.

The newly amended NGO Law redefined who could establish and run a CSO and prohibited members of banned political bodies from setting up a CSO. These new rules were applied in January 2022 to forbid two peaceful women activists, Zainab al-Durazi and Safia al-Hasan, taking up the board positions to which they had been freely elected in a women-focused CSO. The two women had been linked to the banned group Wa’d.

Do some of the activities of CSOs whose directors are demonstrably loyal to the state help and support society’s needs? Of course they do. We need them and we commend such organisations. But they are not independent.

Those perceived as not personally loyal to the government and its leaders do not get licences to operate any CSO and are not allowed to be on supervisory boards, in any sector, in total contravention to international law and practice, and completely against the wishes of Bahraini people. A thorough vetting process ensures this remains the case.

All CSOs must obtain permission to engage in any way with non-Bahraini bodies such as foreign or international human rights groups or to meet with foreign Bahrain-based diplomats. If they get permission and the meeting takes place, the government requires the participation of a Foreign Ministry representative and the preparation of notes for the meeting, subject to approval. If this is not done, the representative of the CSO risks criminal charges or the closure of the organisation.

The absence of an independent civil society means that any consultation that does take place is performative – just for show. The authorities don’t typically take the limited civil society that is loyal to the government into account, so independent voices are simply not even in the picture.

If the government only consults those of whom they approve, and even then, only barely, how will that shape government policy? How can it capture the concerns and wishes of the wider population? How is this sustainable? Well, it isn’t. It is unwise and risks creating conditions similar to those that resulted in a national crisis in 2011.

What would it take to build democratic institutions in Bahrain?

Recent history has shown that democratic institutions are difficult to build and easy to lose. In Bahrain and the Gulf, the human rights movement does not call for removal of X so that they be replaced by Y. Instead, we build case studies from each country to show the inequities of laws and practices, and we campaign on that. The reform of specific practices, in certain areas – the administration of justice, the freedom of assembly – is achievable if the authorities in Bahrain and across the Gulf actually engage with human rights groups and United Nations human rights bodies.

We need the Bahraini authorities to provide some genuine representation of the people by the people. We are ready to have a real, genuine dialogue with the authorities, but there needs to be a level playing field. If, despite the restrictions placed on them, the parliamentarians elected in this election step up, then we will have a chance to make a difference going forward. But just as we dare to dream and act, they need to do so too.

What kind of support does Bahraini civil society need from the international community?

We need more engagement. We need states and friends in international civil society to step up and explain the character and vision of the democratic society that the majority of Bahrainis seek; to explain that it does not represent a threat but rather an unlocking of potential.

We need international civil society counterparts to engage in international fora, not only to reflect and project our voice but also to emphasise the role and inherent legitimacy of Bahraini civil society to the Bahraini authorities.

We need our international partners to put pressure on the government’s human rights oversight bodies – the Ombudsman’s office, the Special Investigative Unit and the National Institution for Human Rights – to provide real rather than cosmetic redress, accountability and reform. Some of these oversight bodies have helped migrant workers facing abuse, but even then, their scope has been limited as they have failed to address underlying unjust laws or practices.

We need help and expertise to collate evidence to mount realistic claims for accountability in jurisdictions that have provisions for sanctioning, such as the Global Magnitsky Act that the US government uses to sanction foreign government officials deemed to be human rights offenders,

We need international civil society to press the government of Bahrain to explain why it has failed to adhere to the international conventions to which it has acceded, or why it has not acceded to additional standards such as optional protocols, or been clearer about imposing a moratorium on the death penalty.

Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through their website and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.
Call to action to protect the democratic transition and human rights in Sudan
A military coup targeting the civilian government in Sudan took place on Monday 25 October 2021. The African Union suspendedSudan’s membership. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat made a statement noting that the deeply concerning events occurring in Sudan have resulted in the arrest of the Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdock, who was releasedon October 26, and other civilian officials. The total number of arrests made during the coup in unknown, but it is believed all cabinet ministers have been arrested and are being subjected to torture or at severe risk of torture. Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat calls for “the immediate resumption of consultations between civilians and [the] military” and “the release of all arrested political leaders”.

At the international level, the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and United Nations Security Council must take urgent action to protect Sudan’s transition to democracy and the human rights situation in the country following the second military coup in so many months which targeted the civilian government today.

The UN High Commissioner strongly condemnedthe military coup in Sudan and the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency, the suspension of key articles of the Constitutional Document and the governing bodies, deplored the reported arrest of the Prime Minister, several Ministers, leaders of the Forces of the Freedom and Change and other civil society representatives, and call for their immediate release, and reminded the military and security forces to refrain from unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, to respect people’s freedom of expression, as well as the right of peaceful assembly.

It is crucial that women’s rights and the situation of women human rights defenders (WHRDs) is addressed in the international community’s response to the coup as their position is particularly worrisome and today’s events have only exacerbated their already vulnerable position. This comes as militarisation of the State and violence against protestors remain some of the biggest threats to women’s rights in Sudan.

Civil and political rights were once again violated as peaceful protesters were met with violence including live ammunition, resulting in at least five confirmed deaths and hundreds being injured. Rapid Security Forces (RSF) stormed medical centers that were providing medical care to the injured. A number of activists and protesters were arrested in several cities. Residential areas were also attacked by weapons. Further the majority of means of communication in the country have been cut off including phone lines and internet connection. Blanket internet shutdowns contravene international law. On October 26, Internet and mobile services were briefly restored for a few hours, they must be immediately restored

We call on all States at the Human Rights Council to consider urgent action, such as convening a Special Session, to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law. In addition, the upcoming Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Sudan on 3 November presents one opportunity for States to bring to the fore these issues and call on the required urgent action. We urge all States to make statements during Sudan’s UPR condemning the coup and supporting the civilian-led democratic transition, and make recommendations relating to^{^[1]}:
- reform of the military and security forces
- accountability for violence against protesters
- access to justice for women
- legal reforms combatting violence and discrimination against women
- ensuring gender equality
- ratification of international and regional instruments
- women, peace and security
- guaranteeing freedom of expression and assembly
- the protection of women human rights defenders.
Read also here a statement by the MENA Women Human Rights Defenders Coalition.

Signatories

Organisations:
- Sudan Women’s Rights Action
- Regional Coalition for Women Human Rights Defenders in the Middle East and North Africa
- International Service for Human Rights
- Global Fund for Women
- Inter Pares, Canada
- Canada for Africa Group
- Rights for Peace Foundation
- Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan
- Vital Voices, USA
- Equality Fund, Canada
- Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
- CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Individuals
- Susan Bazilli, Director of International Women’s Rights Project
- Karen Breeck MD
- Carole Doucet, Gender/ Women, Peace and Security Expert Adviser
- Georgina Bencsik, Advisor, Consultant and Strategist
- Monique Cuillerier (WPSN-C)
Civic space in Sudan in rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor

[1] In March 2021 Sudan Women Rights Action, Nora Centre for Combating Sexual Violence, ISHR and the Regional Coalition for Women Human Rights Defenders in the Middle East and North Africa made a joint submission to the UPR of Sudan. Read here a summary of the recommendations to Sudan on women’s rights and women human rights defenders and the full joint submission to the UPR of Sudan.
Cambodia Human Rights Crisis: The UN Human Rights Council Should Act Now
To Members and Observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council

The undersigned civil society organizations are writing to draw your attention to the ongoing human rights crisis in Cambodia and to call for your support at the upcoming 48th session of the UN Human Rights Council (the “Council”) to ensure that the resolution on Cambodia effectively reflects the significant deterioration of the human rights situation in the country and enhances the monitoring and reporting by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

The human rights situation in Cambodia has continuously worsened since 2017, as the government-controlled courts dissolved the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), and barred its co-founders, Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha and more than a hundred CNRP politicians from politics, while replacing over 5,000 locally elected officials with members of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).

The situation has further deteriorated since the last Human Rights Council resolution on Cambodia was adopted in September 2019. Judicial harassment against opposition members has sharply increased, including through the conduct of mass trials against them in more recent months. Human rights defenders, activists, independent media and media workers, and trade unionists have continued to be relentlessly persecuted through judicial harassment and legal action. Environmental human rights defenders and youth activists have specifically been targeted: recently, six members¹ of Mother Nature - a grassroots environmental group - were detained under serious charges including “plotting” to overthrow the government and face up to 10 years in prison. A highly politicized judicial system renders the prospect of fair trials for those deemed a threat to the interests of the government virtually non-existent.

The government has used the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse to significantly expand its powers through an over-broad and vague state of emergency law² ; a similarly broad Covid-19 law that allows for up to 20-year prison sentences for violations of Covid-19 measures; and the selective prosecution of political opponents who criticized the government’s Covid-19 efforts. The government also failed to protect human rights in its Covid-19 response. The government’s lockdowns were imposed without ensuring access to adequate food, medical, and other humanitarian assistance, and authorities took insufficient steps to prevent major Covid-19 outbreaks among the prison population in a penal system plagued by chronic overcrowding.

Laws are routinely misused in Cambodia to restrict human rights, undermine and weaken civil society, and criminalize individuals for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. The authorities continue to adopt repressive legislation, with complete lack of oversight. In the past year, the government has taken drastic measures to further increase online surveillance, clamp down on freedom of expression online and erode privacy rights. In February 2021, the authorities adopted the “Sub-decree on the Establishment of a National Internet Gateway” which aims at forcing all web traffic and internet connections through government controlled and monitored gateways by February 2022. The pending “Draft Law on Cybercrime” and the “Draft Law on Public Order” would provide further tools to criminalize freedom of expression or behaviors in the digital, print, and public spaces, in addition to legislation already denounced by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Cambodia and other UN Special Procedures³.

Noting the announcement of Commune Council elections to be on June 5, 2022, we are deeply concerned that there has been no meaningful progress to restore human rights.

The Council has a critical role to play in addressing the ongoing human rights crisis in Cambodia. It is imperative that the Council takes robust action with regard to the government’s escalating repression by sending a strong signal at its 48th session - the last opportunity within the context of the biennial Human Rights Council resolution to address the human rights crisis in Cambodia before the Commune Council elections in 2022 and the National Assembly elections in 2023. For this reason, our organizations urge the Human Rights Council to:
- Renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Cambodia, so as to allow the mandate to continue to work on long-term issues.
- Request the OHCHR to monitor and report on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, and in particular in the context of the electoral process, and to present to the Human Rights Council an oral update with recommendations at the 49th session, to be followed by an interactive dialogue, and to present a written report at the 51st session in an enhanced interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia.
- Highlight escalating repression and restrictions on human rights, including persecution of human rights defenders, media workers and trade unionists, and misuse of legislation to restrict human rights.
We further urge your government, during the 48th session of the Human Rights Council, to speak out clearly against ongoing violations in Cambodia.

We remain at your disposal for any further information.

Sincerely,

1. Amnesty International
2. ARTICLE 19
3. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
4. CIVICUS – World Alliance for Citizen Participation
5. Human Rights Watch
6. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
7. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)

¹In May 2021, the authorities convicted and sentenced three Mother Nature activists to 18 and 20 months in prison. Two others were convicted in absentia.
In June 2021, the authorities arrested four Mother Nature activists, released one, and maintained the other three in pre-trial detention.
²The Law on the Management of the Nation in State of Emergency (April 2020)
³See, for example, Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO), Law on Trade Unions, Law on Political Parties

Civic space in Cambodia is rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.
CHILE: ‘There's radical discontent with how the country's been ruled for decades’

Protests broke out in Chile in October 2019, initially led by students rejecting an increase in the price of transport and quickly escalating into mass demonstrations urging structural change. Protests were repressed with savagery by security forces. CIVICUS speaks about the protests with Nicole Romo, director of the public policy area of the Community of Solidarity Organisations (Comunidad de Organizaciones Solidarias), a network of more than 200 Chilean civil society organisations that work to combat poverty and exclusion. Together, its member organisations work with more than 900,000 people, mobilising around 11,000 staff members and over 17,000 volunteers.

Why did protests break out in Chile, and what made them escalate as they did?

The social outbreak in Chile came after decades of the promotion of a development model that focused on creating wealth, which for years was distributed with no fairness or justice. Individualistic, short-term and assistance-based social policies that deeply damaged social cohesion and the community and collective sense of wellbeing were implemented. Alongside this there were housing policies that segregated Chileans into ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ territories where access to goods and services was distributed in the same way, a pension system that impoverishes senior citizens, lack of access to healthcare in a timely manner and with adequate quality standards, and an education system that also segregates and grants diametrically opposed opportunities to the rich and the poor.

In this context, the motto ‘it is not about 30 pesos, it is about 30 years’, which was heard a lot during the protests, expresses quite well the feeling that prevailed among the citizenry. Although this social movement began with students massively evading payment of public transportation fares, after a rise of 30 Chilean pesos in the cost of a metro ticket, deep-seated malaise has been accumulating for over 30 years. There have been several protests to advance various social demands over the years, but this profound discontent had never been heard or even made visible. The social eruption of 18 October 2019 was the result of the accumulation of radical discontent with the government and the way the country has been ruled for several decades.

How have people and civil society organisations reacted to the protests?

The national state of mobilisation that we are experiencing has clearly shown that two Chiles coexist within the same territory – two Chiles that do not know each other and do not intersect. This division is the brutal expression of the difference in the quality of life between those who have privileges and those who don’t. Our country spent the past few decades convincing itself that achievements are based on individual merit, that each person’s efforts are the only guarantee of social mobility, which in fact, as shown by a variety of studies, is absolutely untrue.

In the face of this, data from various surveys show a high rate of approval of social demands among citizens. On the other hand, people are more divided when it comes to violence, and especially the forms of violence that have resulted in damage to public and private infrastructure, such as looting, the destruction of stores and the burning of commercial premises and other types of services, as well as regarding violence by state agents, who have been responsible for numerous human rights violations.

How has the government reacted to the protests?

The government has handled this conflict in a quite regrettable way, by mainly emphasising its security agenda, criminalising protests and furthering a legislative agenda focused on punishing protesters, which reveals their lack of understanding of the nature of the protests, their demands and their urgency.

The social agenda proposed by the government is quite weak. It does not seek to make radical changes to existing structures that deepen inequality and does not guarantee the rights of all people. The changes and the contents of the social agenda led by the government are not up to the protesters’ demands and their urgency. Its numerous initiatives and measures involve limited improvements, which are necessary but will not affect the structures that reproduce unfairness in our country; therefore, they only duplicate the same old short-term public policies that are not based on a rights approach and focus on the individual rather than on the needs of the thousands of families in vulnerable conditions.

The latest reports speak of dozens of people dead and hundreds injured. Could you describe the extent of the repression and human rights violations committed during the protests?

Since the protests broke out in Chile, numerous human rights violations have been committed by state security agents. These violations have been denounced by national and international organisations, but the state has tended to downplay them.

It is essential for us to reiterate that at all times unrestricted respect for human rights must prevail, and that each case of violation must be investigated, resulting in punishment for the perpetrators and reparation for the victims. Civil society is key in monitoring and watching over these processes, to ensure that they remain transparent and foster accountability of the state.

Data from the National Institute of Human Rights indicate that in 48 per cent of the observed cases of detention, detainees were protesting peacefully, regardless of whether or not they were occupying roads. Likewise, gases were used indiscriminately in 56 per cent of recorded cases, and in 60 per cent of the cases observed, force was not used in a graduated way, and was instead applied without prior notice and in the absence of any kind of dialogue. There were 2,727 documented cases of injured adults who were treated in hospitals, as well as 211 children and adolescents, and 241 people with eye injuries. There was also a series of human rights violations against people detained and held in police stations. The most frequent of these was the excessive use of force during detention, with 751 cases. Overall, 190 cases of sexual harassment or sexual violence were recorded, 171 of them being cases in which detainees were stripped naked.

How have people and civil society organisations responded to the state repression and rights violations that occurred during the protests?

We have responded without fear. Entire cities have shouted fearlessly in protest at the human rights violations that occurred during the past months. Many people have compiled testimonial material to make visible the level of exposure and violence they experienced during the protests.

From civil society organisations the responses have been diverse, but generally speaking all organisations have called for non-violence and the establishment of new spaces for dialogue leading to the strengthening of a society based on social justice and fairness. Without a doubt, civil society organisations have played a prominent role, promoting the establishment of meeting spaces and helping present the demands of the citizenry. This was done through the creation of a large network of networks called the New Social Pact, which brings together more than 600 civil society organisations that have worked tirelessly to search for real solutions to substantial demands.

The Community of Solidarity Organisations supports the principle of nonviolence and since day one of the protests we voiced the need for unrestricted respect for human rights. Even if it is not our field of work, we believe that this outbreak revealed how urgent it is to restructure the police forces. We faithfully believe in the data published by the National Institute of Human Rights, and we know that their work is conscious and rigorous, as is the report delivered by Amnesty International, so as civil society we will support from our field of work all actions aimed at bringing reparation for the rights violated during the protests.

What immediate measures should the Chilean government take to overcome this crisis? What are the chances of this happening and a lasting solution being reached?

A lasting solution would require a long process of construction and change including short-term, medium-term and long-term measures.

The short-term and medium-term measures are related to the social agenda, which has three dimensions. The first consists in improving the quality of life through measures on issues such as health, education and pensions. The second dimension includes measures to end abuses by economic and political elites and close the gaps in justice administration between cases involving members of the economic elite and ordinary citizens, who face completely different sanctions for committing crimes: ‘ethics classes’ for the former and effective jail terms for the latter. The third dimension involves raising the resources that the state needs to implement a deep and powerful social agenda. Chile requires a tax reform to increase revenue and needs a much more efficient tax management system.

The long-term axis refers to a constituent process whose main milestones have already been established: an initial referendum, the election of representatives and a ratification referendum. However, conditions guaranteeing participation by a cross section of people, equitable representation, gender parity, minority quotas and independent candidacies have not yet been achieved. Without these conditions in place, the legitimacy of the constitutional process will severely weaken.

Civic space in Chile is classified as ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Comunidad de Organizaciones Solidarias through theirwebsite orFacebook page, or follow@ComunidadOrgSol and@nromo_flores on Twitter.
CUBA: ‘Dissidents are in the millions; there aren't enough jail cells for so many people’
CIVICUS speaks with Juan Antonio Blanco, director of the Cuban Observatory of Conflicts (Observatorio Cubano de Conflictos), an autonomous civil society project supported by the Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (Fundación para los Derechos Humanos en Cuba). The Observatory is a proactive civil society platform to promote non-violent change, and combines rigorous analysis of conflict with capacity development and empowerment of citizens to claim their rights.

Successful protest in the El Cerro neighbourhood, Havana, in demand for the restoration of electricity and water services, 13 September 2017.

The CIVICUS Monitor rates the space for civil society – civic space – in Cuba as ‘closed’, indicating a regime of total control where it is difficult to even imagine the existence of protests. Is this what you see?

Absolutely. Cuba is a closed society, anchored in Stalinism not only politically but also economically, as the state suffocates or blocks the initiatives and entrepreneurial talent of citizens, a phenomenon known as ‘internal blockade’. The state denies individual autonomy and crushes any independent association to maintain a balkanised society. This is, they believe, how they can ensure state control over citizen behaviour.

In the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it was clear that Cuba would have to make a transition to survive. The geopolitical ecosystem that had sustained it with infinite and massive subsidies collapsed alongside Eastern European communism. We all thought – and not because we believed in the so-called ‘end of history’ – that the only possible transition was towards some form of open society, political democracy and market economy. It could be more or less social democrat or liberal, but it should be based on those pillars in any case. Some of us pushed for that transition from reformist positions. We were wrong.

In the end, the transition that did take place was neither the one advocated by Marxism, towards communism, nor Francis Fukuyama’s, towards a liberal state and a market society. We transitioned towards a transnational mafia state instead. This is not about giving it yet another pejorative label: this is the reality revealed by the analysis of the changes that have taken place in the structuring of power and social classes, the instruments of domination and the mechanisms for the creation and distribution of wealth. There has been a real change in the DNA of the governance regime.

Real power is now more separate than ever from the Communist Party of Cuba. It is in the hands of a political elite that represents less than 0.5 per cent of the population, in a country that has abandoned even the ideology of the communist social pact that pushed the idea of submission based on a commitment to basic social rights, which were granted at the price of the suppression of all other rights.

In early 2019 a constitutional reform process took place that did not create any significant change in terms of opening civic space. An image of change was projected externally that contrasted starkly with the internal reality of stagnation. Some phrases placed in a speech or in the new Constitution itself have served to feed eternal hopes that leaders – who are not held accountable by the public – will see the light on their own and create the necessary change. This also distracts the attention of international public opinion from the monstrosity born out of collusion with Venezuela.

How would you describe the current conditions for the exercise of the right to protest in Cuba? Is there more space for people to make demands that are not regarded as political?

There is no greater political, legal, or institutional space for the exercise of the right to protest, but citizens are creating it through their own practices. All rights proclaimed in the Constitution are subordinate to the regulations established by supplementary laws and regulations. In the end, the Constitution is not the highest legal text, but one subordinated to the legality created by other laws and regulations. An example of this is the Criminal Code, which includes the fascist concept of ‘pre-criminal danger’, by virtue of which an individual can spend up to four years in jail without having committed a crime. Nonetheless, conflict and protests have increased.

The government has changed its repressive tactics towards political opponents to project a more benevolent outward image. Instead of long prison sentences it now resorts to thousands of short-term arbitrary detentions. Instead of holding acts of repudiation outside a meeting place, it now suppresses meetings before they happen, arresting activists in their homes. Instead of refusing to issue them passports or throwing activists in jail for attending a meeting abroad, it now prevents activists from boarding their flights. If a member of the opposition is put to trial, this is done not on the basis of accusations of political subversion but for allegedly having committed a common crime or for being ‘socially dangerous’.

At the same time, Cuban citizens – more than half of whom now live in poverty according to respected economists based in Cuba – have increasingly serious and urgent needs, the fulfilment of which cannot wait for a change of government or regime. In a different context these would be ‘personal problems,’ but in the context of a statist governance regime, which makes all solutions depend on state institutions and blocks all autonomous solutions, whether by citizens or the private sector, these become social and economic conflicts of citizens against the state.

At this point it is important to establish a difference between opposition and dissent. Opponents are those who openly adopt, either individually or collectively, a contesting political stance towards the government. A dissident, on the other hand, is someone who feels deep discomfort and disagreement with the governance regime because it blocks their basic needs and dreams of prosperity. Social dissidents tend not to express themselves in a public way if they do not believe this will help them achieve concessions on a specific demand. But if their situation becomes distressing, they move – often spontaneously – from complaining and lamenting privately to protesting publicly.

Over the past two years there has been a notable increase in protests for social and economic reasons. These protests do not have legal protection, as the right to public demonstration is non-existent. However, the state has often preferred to appease these protests rather than react with force. Given the degree of deterioration of living conditions – and the even more deteriorated legitimacy of the authorities and the official communist ideology – Cuban society resembles a dry meadow that any spark can ignite.

Domination by the political elite has been based more on control of the social psychology than on the resources of the repressive apparatus. As a result of the Great Terror of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, with firing squads that never stopped and the handing out of 30-year prison sentences for insignificant issues, three generations were formed on the false premise that ‘there is nobody who can knock down or fix this’. This has been the guiding idea of a pedagogy of submission that is now in crisis.

Why the change?

The factors that have most influenced the current change in citizens’ perspectives and attitudes have been, on the one hand, the breakdown of the monopoly of information that has resulted from new digital technologies, the leader’s death and the gradual transfer of power to people without historical legitimacy to justify their incompetence. On the other hand, the accelerated deterioration of living conditions and the country’s entire infrastructure turns everyday life into a collection of hardships. Health and education systems, food, medicine, the transportation system and cooking gas and gasoline supply are in a state of collapse. Hundreds of multi-family dwellings are also collapsing and people waste their lives demanding, waiting for years for a new home or for their old home to be repaired. Many also lose their lives among the rubble when buildings collapse.

In this context the social dissident, who had remained latent and silent, goes public to express their discontent and demand basic social rights. They claim neither more nor less than the right to dignity, to dignified conditions of existence. And unlike political opponents, dissidents are not in the thousands but in the millions. There are not enough jail cells for so many people.

How did the Cuban Observatory of Conflicts come into existence?

The Cuban Observatory of Conflicts emerged in Cuba as an idea of a group of women who had previously created the Dignity Movement. In its origins, this movement had the mission of denouncing pre-criminal dangerousness laws (i.e. laws allowing the authorities to charge and detain people deemed likely to commit crimes, and sentence them to up to four years in prison) and abuses in the prison system, against any category of prisoners, whether political or not.

From the outset this was an innovative project. It was not conceived as a political organisation or party, but as a movement, fluid and without hierarchies, fully decentralised in its actions, without an ideology that would exclude others.

For two years these women collected information about prisons and the application of pre-criminal dangerousness laws. Their work within Cuba fed into reports to the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. They placed the letter ‘D’ for dignity, which identifies their movement, in public sites as a reminder to the political police that they had not been able to crush them.

However, the original mission of the Dignity Movement was too specific for a movement whose name was such a broad concept. Nowadays, Cuban citizens’ struggles are primarily for living conditions, for the full respect of their human dignity. This is thy the Dignity Movement expanded its mission to supporting citizen groups in their social and economic demands, without abandoning its initial objective. To fight back against the psychology of submission and replace it with another one based on the idea that it is possible to fight and win, the Dignity Movement now has a specific tool, the Cuban Observatory of Conflicts.

Can you tell us more about how the Observatory works?

The philosophy on which the Observatory is based is that life should not be wasted waiting for a miracle or a gift from the powerful; you have to fight battles against the status quo every single day. In just one year we have successfully accompanied about 30 social conflicts of various kinds that had remained unresolved for decades, but now obtained the concessions demanded from the state.

What has been most significant is that when the authorities realised that these citizens were mentally ready to go to public protests, they decided to give them what they demanded, in order to prevent an outburst and to take credit for the result, although this would never have been achieved in the absence of citizen pressure. They showed their preference for occasional win-win solutions to avoid the danger of a viral contagion of protests among a population that is fed-up with broken promises. Each popular victory teaches citizens that protesting and demanding – rather than begging and waiting – is the way to go.

The method is simple: to generate a collective demand that has a critical number of petitioners who identify with it and subscribe to it, and send negotiators to request a solution, clarifying that they will not accept negative, delayed responses or a response that does not identify the person responsible for its implementation. At the same time, information is filtered to social media and digital media covering Cuba. That is the way to go along the established roads in a constructive way. What is new here is that it is made clear that if an agreement is not reached and its implementation verified, people are willing to take nonviolent public actions of various kinds.

Civic space in Cuba is rated as ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Observatorio Cubano de Conflictos through its webpage and Facebook profile, or follow @conflictoscuba on Twitter.
DRC: ‘Civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller’
CIVICUS speaks with Bahati Rubango, country coordinator at the Women’s International Peace Centre (WIPC), about conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

WIPC is a feminist organisation seeking to catalyse women’s leadership, amplify their voices and deepen their role in peacebuilding. It started out in 1974 as Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange, and in 1994 it moved from Geneva to Uganda and deepened its focus on the women, peace and security agenda.

What’s the security situation in the DRC, and how is civil society working to address it?

In the DRC, and particularly in Kivu and other parts of eastern DRC, including Beni, Bunagana, Masisi and Rutshuru territories and Ituri and South Kivu provinces, the situation is dire due to ongoing conflict. The prominence of the M23 rebel group exacerbates the crisis. The DRC’s government has accused Rwanda of supporting M23, with these claims substantiated by United Nations (UN) reports. The region is also plagued by the presence of over 120 other armed factions, foreign and local, some of which receive backing from Uganda, further complicating the situation.

This has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe, characterised by widespread displacement, killings, rape, plundering of natural resources, instances of sexual violence and severe limitations on access to education and healthcare, worsening the suffering and vulnerability of millions of civilians.

Despite the deployment of various regional and international peacekeeping missions, the violence persists. The peacekeeping efforts of MONUSCO, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC, have fallen short. The conflict has regional and global dimensions beyond the DRC’s borders, impacting on peace and security across multiple countries.

There is a complex interplay of local and international dynamics, including economic interests that perpetuate the conflict. The conflict’s economic dimension has been illustrated by the fact that rebel groups are mainly located where there are strategic natural resources.

Efforts to quell the insurgency by national militia groups such as the Wazalendo movement find obstacles in the challenging terrain and the firm grip of rebel groups on strategic areas. As a result, access to Goma and other conflict-affected regions is primarily limited to air travel and boats across Lake Kivu, which impedes humanitarian aid and peacekeeping efforts.

Civil society organisations play a crucial role in peacebuilding, monitoring human rights violations and advocating for justice and security sector reforms. Civil society highlights the need for justice for victims and the involvement of women and young people in peace processes. Despite challenges, including threats to human rights defenders, civil society strives to raise awareness, combat hate speech and protect vulnerable populations.

How much space is there for civil society action in the DRC?

The situation has been tumultuous since May 2021, with the declaration of a state of siege in conflict areas that has subsequently been renewed. Under the ongoing state of siege, the military displaced civilian authorities and assumed control. This shift resulted in a significant curtailment of civic freedoms, particularly for public demonstrations and speech. Military justice has taken precedence over civilian law, raising ethical concerns and contributing to lack of accountability.

Problems have been compounded by the questionable level of training and education in the army. There have been reports of inadequately trained people being integrated, including former rebel fighters with no regard for human rights principles, approaches or values. This has led to a rise in criminal activities and violations committed by security forces, further restricting civic space.

Human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government have faced persecution. Arrests and criminalisation under baseless charges have become commonplace. Despite legislative efforts to protect activists, implementation has been lacking, exacerbating the erosion of civic space. An example is Lucha (Lutte pour le changement – Fight for Change), an organisation of young activists, several of whom spent four days under arrest simply for signing a declaration urging the state to stop war.

Advocacy at national, regional and global levels is needed to address the challenges of conflict. However, entrenched power dynamics in the DRC, including the dominance of the ruling party, pose significant obstacles to meaningful reform. Urgent action is needed to reverse the trend of declining civic space, because civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller.

What’s the likelihood of tensions between the DRC and Rwanda escalating into a regional conflict?

Rwanda’s involvement in destabilising the DRC is concerning, especially considering its history of aggression in the region, but it won’t necessarily lead to a regional conflict. Despite Rwanda’s attempts to exert influence, the DRC has demonstrated significant military strength in defending its territory against its aggression in the past.

Rwanda’s diplomatic prowess and hidden support from foreign countries – often driven by economic interests around mineral resources – contribute to its ability to manipulate regional dynamics. Rebel groups such as the M23 and the Allied Democratic Forces exploit the porous borders between Rwanda and the DRC, seeking refuge in and support from Rwanda to evade accountability for their actions. This exacerbates tensions between the two countries.

But the likelihood of the conflict escalating into a full-blown regional war is mitigated by mutual interests and dependencies. Both countries rely on resources derived from the DRC, which acts as a deterrent to all-out warfare. Regional initiatives like the Nairobi Process, brokered by the East African Community in November 2022, seek to address underlying tensions and promote peacebuilding efforts. However, the effectiveness of such initiatives is undermined by external influences dictating the terms of engagement and providing support to conflicting parties.

Civil society plays a crucial role in advocating for peace and stability, but its efforts are hindered by external interference and power dynamics that dictate the trajectory of the conflict. While regional organisations, notably the African Union, are theoretically focused on addressing conflict in the continent, external influences and interests often compromise their effectiveness.

Ultimately, it will require a concerted effort from regional and global players committed to peace and stability in the Great Lakes region to prevent the escalation of the conflict and resolve it for good.

How can the international community support peacebuilding efforts in the DRC?

There is a pressing need for support from the international community to assist internally displaced people in desperate need of essentials such as food and shelter. Efforts are also needed to document atrocities to ensure accountability further along the road. This includes highlighting the responsibilities of perpetrators and using this information to ensure justice is served, even if it takes years. Support for civil society groups involved in peacebuilding processes is crucial, particularly since the state lacks adequate resources.

Although it may not generate enthusiasm in all quarters of the international community, security sector reform requires attention. Fortunately, there are promising initiatives funded by international donors.

Another critical need is justice reform, which should include mechanisms for transitional justice. This will be vital to address the immediate effects of conflict and the long-standing grievances and cycles of violence that have plagued the region for decades. Access to justice for victims is paramount to break the cycle of impunity and prevent further atrocities. There’s a need for collective and individual reparations for victims, as well as guarantees that such violence will not be repeated. This includes addressing psychological trauma and providing survivors the support they need to rebuild their lives.

Both local and international engagement will be needed to ensure that peacebuilding agreements are fully respected and implemented, including by holding all parties responsible and accountable. Civil society activists, academics and journalists will have a crucial role in monitoring and advocating for these agreements to be fulfilled.

Finally, it’s essential to recognise that the conflict in the DRC is not isolated but has regional and global implications. Efforts to address the crisis must consider its broader context and involve stakeholders at all levels, from local communities to international organisations. Only through a holistic and inclusive approach can lasting peace and stability be achieved in the region.

Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Women’s International Peace Centre through itswebsite and follow @TheWIPCentre and@BRubango on Twitter.
ERITREA: ‘When the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact’
CIVICUS speaks with about civil society work in Eritrea’s context of closed civic space with Helen Kidan, chairperson of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR).

Founded in 2003 and based in South Africa, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that raises awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promotes the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.

What’s the situation for civil society in Eritrea?

Eritrea has never truly implemented its 1997 Constitution and until Eritrea it is run by the rule of law, human rights abuses will continue with no recourse to justice. This includes completely closed civil society space, with no semblance of rights of association, assembly and expression.

Since Proclamation No. 145 of 2005 went into effect nearly two decades ago, there has been no independent civil society in Eritrea. According to this law, the only way CSOs can implement programmes is in partnership with government agencies, which restrict the areas, themes and focus of the projects that can be implemented. There are obviously very few CSOs present and active in Eritrea.

The only way to start creating any space for independent CSOs in Eritrea would be to have Proclamation 145/2005 revoked.

What is EMDHR doing to try to improve the situation?

EMDHR advocates against the ongoing human rights abuses in Eritrea as well as for the rights of Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. Our mission is to promote and defend human right values as established in international legal instruments and advance democratic change, rule of law and constitutionalism in Eritrea, with the ultimate aim of building a society in which people exercise their basic rights and live in peace, dignity and prosperity.

We provide training, sustain networks and produce and disseminate information to create awareness of the situation of Eritreans. We have made several presentations at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in Geneva, and in July 2022 we made a presentation at the UN in New York.

We are currently working with African CSOs to bring the ongoing crisis in Eritrea to the African level and get support for Eritrean refugees. We have also commissioned a report on the state of Eritrean CSOs that makes recommendations to the international community.

In early September 2023 we co-organised the Africa Civil Society Organisations Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Through a joint project with Africa Monitors, Eritrean Satellite Television and Eritrean Diaspora for East Africa, a CSO based in Kenya, we have provided training to Eritrean human rights activists, including on digital activism, and created a space for Eritrean CSOs and activists to be able to work together.

In 2019 we provided in-person training in a workshop held in Uganda. In 2017 we co-organised a conference in Brussels on the ongoing Eritrean refugee crisis, with which we tried to elicit a reaction from members of the European Parliament, commissioners and CSOs from across Europe. And in 2015 we campaigned and got asylum for Eritrean footballers in Botswana.

What’s it like to be a diaspora activist? How do you connect with activists within Eritrea?

It’s extremely frustrating because it makes our work less effective. Connecting with people inside Eritrea is very hard as internet penetration in Eritrea is only two per cent. The government basically controls all media: all independent media ceased to exist in 2001. This is why most information is brought to us by people who have recently left the country. But while the work is challenging, it is still possible to get information. And when the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact.

A lot of funders provide funds to African organisations only when they operate in their home country. The fact that we are not able to operate inside Eritrea means we also suffer financially and hence a lot of Eritrean CSOs are forced to sustain themselves on the basis of voluntary work.

Additionally, the work remains emotionally and psychologically draining, as many Eritrean activists in the diaspora are threatened with harm to family members still living in Eritrea for speaking out against the regime back home.

As Eritrean human rights defenders, even if you are operating outside the country, the government will always discredit your work. All those that don’t agree with them are seen as traitors. The government uses social media as a means of trolling and tries to attack websites and other social media channels.

What sparked recent protests by Eritrean refugees in Israel, and how has the Israeli government responded?

Those protests appeared to have been organised by a new group called Brigade N’Hamedu, which is trying to overthrow the regime. Their members hold demonstrations across the world, and they particularly attack the festivals that the regime holds abroad, which they view as a means of raising funds for the regime and spreading its propaganda. They are tired of government interference and intimidate Eritreans who have left their country but still support the Eritrean government. They want all Eritreans who claim asylum but express support for the Eritrean government to have their asylum revoked.

This is a movement of young Eritreans but a lot of veterans and older members of the community support them, as they see them as the most plausible means of removing the regime. Although they have succeeded in mobilising Eritreans, however, there seems to be no clear strategy and this could be a stumbling block. They are very unlikely to succeed.

In response to these protests, and using their unprecedented violence as an excuse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he wants all Eritreans removed from Israel. The predicament of Eritreans in Israel was already dire, but this has now opened the doors for the far-right government in Israel to deport all Eritreans. However, the UN, Israeli human rights groups and other human rights groups outside Israel are asking that genuine refugees whose lives are at risk not be deported to Eritrea.

Civic space in Eritrea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with EMDHR through itswebsite or Facebook page,and follow @emdhrorg on Twitter.
Five reasons why the elections in Nicaragua do not guarantee human rights
On 7 November 2021, general elections will be held in Nicaragua in the context of a deterioration of the human rights crisis that began with the repression of protests in April 2018. The undersigned organizations are deeply concerned about the continuing grave human rights violations and their recent escalation. The following sets out five reasons which explain why the coming general election will take place in a context of severe restrictions on civil and political liberties.

As President Daniel Ortega seeks a fourth consecutive term, government repression of critics and the political opposition has intensified. This increasingly alarming deterioration includes violations of personal freedom and safety, freedom of expression and association, freedom of the press, as well as other restrictions on the exercise of civil and political rights. These human rights violations have affected various groups in situations of vulnerability, including women, who, as reports have stated, experience differentiated impacts.

Since the end of May, the Nicaraguan government has detained 39 people it views as government opponents, including seven presidential candidates. Some of these detainees were victims of enforced disappearance for weeks or months. These abuses mark the beginning of a new stage in the campaign of repression and criminalization of dissident voices, journalists and human rights defenders, facilitated by a lack of judicial independence and the executive’s control of the National Assembly, which has enacted laws that violate fundamental rights of freedom of expression, assembly and association, and the right to vote and run for public office in free and fair elections.

It is clear that, at this time, the conditions do not exist in Nicaragua for holding elections that guarantee the exercise of rights and, therefore, we call on the international community, multilateral organizations and international human rights organizations to strengthen their efforts to put an end to the human rights crisis.

1. ARBITRARY DETENTION AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

Since 28 May 2021, the government of Daniel Ortega has detained 39 people perceived as government opponents, including presidential candidates, public political figures, student leaders, activists, campesino representatives, defence lawyers and journalists. Some were subjected to enforced disappearance for weeks or months before the authorities provided information on their whereabouts. Many have been subjected to continuous interrogation in abusive conditions of detention, including prolonged isolation and insufficient food, which may constitute torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under international law. The recent arrests are in addition to the more than 100 people perceived as critics who have remained arbitrarily detained for a prolonged period in the context of the human rights crisis in the country.

The Nicaraguan state mustend the practice of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance and immediately and unconditionally release all those unjustly detained for exercising their rights. This is essential in order to restore the full enjoyment of all their rights, including the rights to vote and to run for and hold public office in general conditions of equality.

2. LACK OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE

The authorities continue to use the criminal justice system, taking advantage of the lack of judicial independence, to subject people perceived as opponents to arbitrary proceedings and imprisonment. Frequently, violations of due process and fair trial guarantees include violations of the presumption of innocence, the requirement to present a court order at the time of arrest, the right to be tried before an independent and impartial judge, the right to access detailed information about the charges against them, the right to legal defence and to free and confidential communication with a lawyer of their choice. The Nicaraguan judiciary’s lack of independence also means that those who are the targets of threats do not have access to any impartial authority to which they can turn to make a complaint or request protection.

The authorities have also failed to comply with the recommendations of international human rights mechanisms, thereby obstructing the exercise of fundamental rights.

The Nicaraguan state mustensure that people have access to justice, truth and reparation for crimes under international law and other serious human rights violations (such as enforced disappearance, torture and arbitrary detention) committed before and during the election context.

3. VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS

The authorities persecute human rights defenders, independent journalists and dissidents or perceived opponents solely for exercising their right to freedom of expression. As part of this repressive strategy, in October 2020 the National Assembly adopted theLaw to Regulate Foreign Agents and theSpecial Law on Cybercrime, which severely restrict freedom of expression and association.

Between July and August 2021, the authorities ordered the closure of 45 non-governmental organizations, including women’s associations, international humanitarian organizations and several medical associations. Another 10 organizations have been closed down since 2018.

In addition, the government continues to support a series of attacks and undue restrictions on the independent media and communications workers, as well as organizations that defend press freedom; these include administrative and criminal investigations, the detention of journalists and raids on media offices and the seizure of their assets. In this worrying context, not only are the rights of the professionals and the media under attack violated, but the public’s access to information, key for the proper exercise of political rights, is restricted.

The Nicaraguan state must protect and respect the right to freedom of expression, including freedom of the press, which is essential for access to information and pluralistic debate in the context of an election. In addition, it must stop the harassment, stigmatization and criminalization of human rights defenders, journalists and dissidents or perceived opponents, solely for expressing their criticism of state policies.

4. VIOLATIONS OF POLITICAL RIGHTS

The government has tried to eliminate and discourage electoral competition through the arbitrary detention and prosecution of opponents and presidential candidates, resulting in the withdrawal of their political rights. In turn, it has revoked the legal status of the main opposition parties, preventing them from participating in the elections.

In December 2020, the National Assembly approved theLaw for the Defence of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty and Self-determination for Peace, which has been used to open criminal investigations against many of those detained since late May. This law includes broad and vaguely worded provisions that restrict the right to run for public office.

Local organizations have already indicated that, in these conditions, the electoral process does not guarantee the full exercise of political rights.

The Nicaraguan people have a right to exercise their right to vote freely, without intimidation, and the right to run for and hold public office in general conditions of equality. For thefull and effective exercise of these rights, it is essential that freedom of expression, assembly and association be guaranteed.

The Nicaraguan state must guarantee the conditions necessary for the population to satisfactorily exercise its right to participate in the conduct of public affairs.

5. LACK OF GUARANTEES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

In response to the 2018 protests, state officials used excessive, disproportionate and often unnecessary force against demonstrators demanding their rights. According to a group of independent experts appointed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the police and pro-government armed groups, with the support of the Nicaraguan government, committed widespread abuses, including extrajudicial executions, against protesters who, in the vast majority of cases, were unarmed. Impunity has been the norm for serious abuses during the 2018 protests.

Despite international scrutiny, the response to those demonstrating and promoting respect for human rights has continued to be one of repression.

The recent upsurge in the repression and harassment of dissident voices allows the conclusion that the state will not guarantee the right to peaceful assembly if new demonstrations are held in the context of the elections.

The Nicaraguan state must guarantee freedom of peaceful assembly before, during and after the election process.

Amnesty International

Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL)

CIVICUS

Human Rights Watch

International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights

Washington Office on Latin America

World Organisation Against Torture

People in Need

International Network of Human Rights

Women’s Link Worldwide
GABON: ‘Civic space and the conditions for the exercise of human rights were difficult under the former regime’
CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Georges Mpaga, National Executive President of the Network of Free Civil Society Organisations of Gabon (ROLBG).

Over the past decade, ROLBG has focused on enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention. It advocates to improve civic space in Gabon and Central Africa and campaigns on inhumane detention conditions.

What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent elections and subsequent military coup?

The 26 August elections were undoubtedly fraudulent, as were the previous ones. The regime led by predatory dictator Ali Bongo had banned international and domestic observer missions and international media. ROLBG was the only organisation that carried out citizen observation through the parallel vote tabulation system. Because of Bongo’s despotic will, the election was held under totally irregular conditions, in flagrant violation of international norms and standards. The vote count was held behind closed doors, in an opaque context that allowed for large-scale electoral fraud and falsified results.

On 30 August 2023, the salutary intervention of the defence and security forces put an end to this aberration. For me, as someone from civil society, what has just happened in Gabon is by no means a military coup; it is quite simply a military intervention led by patriots within the army, under the leadership of General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, that put an end to a 56-year imposture, a predatory system and an infernal cycle of rigged elections often punctuated by massive human rights violations. This is our reading of the situation, and it is the general opinion of the Gabonese people, who have just been freed from a criminal dictatorship and oligarchy.

Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

The military intervention on 30 August was justified as a response to the desire shown by the Bongo clan and its Gabonese Democratic Party to remain in power by will or by force, through fraudulent elections and police repression orchestrated by the defence and security forces, which were instrumentalised and took orders from the former president.

The Gabonese armed forces intervened to avert a bloodbath and replace the Bongo regime: an unrelenting regime that was ruthless towards the Gabonese people, tainted by clientelist relationships, shady business deals, predatory corruption and widespread violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, all sanctioned by fraudulent elections.

In this sense, the coup in Gabon is not part of a regional trend, but the result of a purely internal process resulting from 56 years of dictatorship and its corollary of human rights violations and the destruction of the country’s economic and social fabric. However, the events underway in Gabon obviously have repercussions in the Central African region, home to some of the worst of Africa’s dictatorships.

What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

Civil society welcomed the military intervention because it sounded the death knell for more than half a century of deceit and predation at the top of the state. Without this intervention, we would have witnessed an unprecedented tragedy.

The Gabonese army, under the leadership of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), the military junta in power, allowed the country to escape a tragedy with incalculable consequences. Seen in this light, the military should be celebrated as heroes. As soon as he took power, General Oligui set about uniting a country that had been deeply divided and traumatised by such a long time of calamitous management by the Bongo family and the mafia interests around them.

The attitude of the international community is unacceptable to civil society, human rights defenders and the people of Gabon, who have long paid a heavy price. In 2016, when Bongo planned and carried out an electoral coup followed by atrocities against civilians who opposed the electoral masquerade, the international community remained silent, leaving Gabon’s civilians to face their executioner. In view of this, we categorically reject the declarations of the international community, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union, two institutions that have encouraged the manipulation of constitutions and presidencies for life in Central Africa.

What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance that the situation will now improve?

Civic space and the conditions for exercising democratic freedoms and human rights were difficult under the former regime. The rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression were flouted. Many civil society activists and human rights defenders, including myself, spent time in prison or were deprived of their fundamental rights.

With the establishment of the transitional regime, we are now seeing fundamental change towards an approach that is generally favourable to civil society. The new authorities are working in concert with all the nation’s driving forces, including civil society, which was received on 1 September by General Oligui and his CTRI peers, and I was the facilitator of that meeting. The transitional president, who was sworn in on 4 September, took to work to restore state institutions, human rights and democratic freedoms, and to respect Gabon’s national and international commitments. A strong signal was given on 5 September, with the gradual release of prisoners of conscience, including the leader of Gabon’s largest civil service union confederation, Jean Remi Yama, after 18 months of arbitrary detention.

Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Georgesthrough hisFacebook page and follow@gmpaga on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
GABON: ‘Under the old regime civil society was not taken into account’
CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Pepecy Ogouliguende, expert in human rights, governance, gender and peace mediation and founder and president of Malachie.

Malachie is a Gabonese civil society organisation that combats poverty and promotes sustainable development and gender equality. It is active in a areas that include biodiversity protection, aid in the event of natural disasters, medical support, particularly for people living with HIV/AIDS, and human rights education, especially for the most vulnerable groups in society.

What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent general election and subsequent military coup?

At around 3am on 30 August 2023, the Gabonese Electoral Commission announced the results of the presidential election, with incumbent Ali Bongo as the winner. A few minutes later, the military announced they had seized power. It is important to stress that this was not a coup d’état, but a seizure of power by the military. This distinction is justified by the fact that it took place without bloodshed.

The election was marred by irregularities and the announcement of the results would have led to protests, albeit legitimate, but which would have ended in violence. I would therefore like to salute the bravery of the defence and security forces.

The military then dissolved all governing institutions and set up a Transition Committee for the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI).

Was your organisation able to observe the election?

No, my organisation was unable to observe the election for the simple reason that no international or national observers were admitted. The election was conducted in total secrecy. Like all Gabonese people, I saw that the announced results did not correspond with the results at the ballot box.

The seizure of power by the defence and security forces in this particular context of public distrust of the authorities and deep suspicion of the election results is rather akin to a patriotic act.

Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

Our defence and security forces, along with the public, have observed numerous irregularities and dysfunctions in the state apparatus in recent years. They therefore decided to put an end to this regime, which no longer corresponded to the aspirations of the Gabonese people.

The military saw an opportunity in the 26 August election to end the current system by assuming their responsibilities to save the nation and the rule of law. The aim of this seizure of power is to ‘restore the dignity of the Gabonese people’. As the CTRI spokesperson put it, ‘we are finally on the road to happiness’.

What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

The international community simply acted by the book without first analysing the context. Gabon’s is a very special case.

Celebrations on the streets of Gabon’s main cities showed the extent to which the old regime was no longer wanted, just tolerated. These scenes of popular jubilation, which contrast with the international community’s condemnation, should be a wake-up call to the international community, inviting it to review its approach, which is more focused on safeguarding stability at all costs, often to the detriment of real social progress, development or economic growth – in short, at the expense of the wellbeing of the majority.

All those in the international community who spoke up condemned the ‘coup d’état’ and assured us that they were following developments in Gabon with interest, while reiterating their attachment to respect for institutions. Reactions from international organisations were very strong: the United Nations condemned the coup and the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) suspended Gabon because they directly associated this ‘coup d’état’ with those that had previously taken place elsewhere in the region.

The USA has distanced itself somewhat by stating that it will work with its partners and the people to support the democratic process underway. This is where we look to the rest of the international community to help us work towards building strong institutions.

We salute those states that have clearly understood the need for this change. We condemn AU and ECCAS sanctions. The international community should support states in respecting their laws and constitutions and ensuring that democracy and human rights are respected.

Do you think this coup is part of a regional trend?

First and foremost, it should be reminded that in the case of Gabon, this was a military takeover and not a coup d’état in the strict sense of the term. It was in fact the result of bad governance and failure to take account of the needs of the population, particularly social needs, but also of the thirst for change. It can have regional impacts in the sense that most African populations are experiencing the same difficulties – youth unemployment, poverty, lack of access to healthcare – and aspire to major change. When people don’t feel taken into account by policymakers, they become frustrated.

We don’t rule out the possibility that this will have an impact on our neighbours. It is not too late for the regimes in power in Central Africa to seize this opportunity to rethink the way they serve their people.

What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance the situation will now improve?

In Gabon, the operation of organisations and associations is governed by law 35/62, which guarantees freedom of association. That said, under the old regime civil society was not taken into account. It was only partly involved in the management of public affairs.

Some leaders, particularly trade union leaders, could be arrested or intimidated if the regime felt they were being overzealous. Several Gabonese civil society leaders denounced arbitrary arrests linked to their opinions and positions.

Like the Gabonese people, civil society is delighted at the change. Civil society as a whole is committed to taking an active part in the actions and reforms carried out by the authorities during the transition, to promote respect for human rights, equity and social justice, the preservation of peace and good governance.

The CTRI has just authorised the release of some of Gabon’s leading trade unionists and prisoners of conscience. In view of the first decisions taken by the CTRI, the best is yet to come. I can safely say that the Gabon of tomorrow will be better. Today there is a glimmer of hope.

Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Malachie through itswebsite or itsFacebook page.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
GUATEMALA: ‘Judicial harassment and criminal prosecution have wearing effects’
On World Press Freedom Day, CIVICUS speaks with Carlos Ernesto Choc, a Q’eqchi’ Mayan journalist with almost two decades of experience, about the criminalisation of journalism and the media in Guatemala.

What are the conditions for journalists in Guatemala?

The conditions for the practice of journalism in Guatemala are quite difficult. We face criminal prosecution by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and threats from various sources, including public officials that journalists are questioning or investigating. Defamation campaigns against journalists are also very concerning.

The internet and social media are full of trolls who send threatening and defamatory messages. They discredit journalistic work and attacks naturally follow. These even come from the state, and particularly from public security agencies. The National Civil Police attack the media and journalists both in the context of demonstrations and at other times and places where they do not want coverage of events in order to preserve impunity for crimes or violations of rights perpetrated on the ground.

Since 2015, aggressions against the press have only escalated. Now as well as being criminally prosecuted, judicially harassed, threatened, intimidated and vilified, you can be thrown into prison. To be able to do this, they accuse you of charges that are normally used to fight organised crime, such as illicit association, as in my case, or money laundering, as in the case of my colleague Rubén Zamora. In other words, we are accused of being criminals and prosecuted under accusations of having links to organised crime, leading land invasions or instigating crime. These are clearly fabricated accusations, so we are baselessly, illegally detained. They ultimately have no way of proving their accusations, but in the meantime you remain subject to lengthy criminal proceedings.

While all journalists are vulnerable in this country right now, those of us who investigate environmental aggression, human rights violations and issues related to drug trafficking and corruption are particularly vulnerable. These are really complicated issues and some investigate them anonymously because many have been murdered, the most recent being Eduardo Mendizabal, just over a month ago.

The situation is getting more complicated by the day and some community journalists have chosen to emigrate and quit journalism. It is sad to see colleagues leave, and under the current government there have been more and more of them. I don’t see myself in exile, but I view this as an option of last resort.

What is your situation after the criminalisation you have experienced?

Mine has been a case of judicial persecution that has been used to attempt to silence me. It started in 2017 when I was investigating the pollution of Lake Izabal. I was documenting protests by fishers against mining and I captured the exact moment when a protester was killed by shots fired by the National Civil Police. The accusation against me came from the mining company, Solway Investment Group – a Russian-owned company based in Switzerland. In August 2017, a warrant for my arrest was issued. One hearing after another was postponed so only in January 2019 could I finally give testimony before the court, as a result of which I was handed an alternative measure to prison.

When you have an alternative measure to imprisonment you are free under certain conditions: you are forced to visit the Public Prosecutor’s Office every 30 days to sign in and forbidden to be in any place where alcoholic drinks are sold, among other things. The security forces, the police, the authorities are watching where you are and waiting for you to commit a breach to be able to prosecute you. I see these alternative measures as forms of punishment that imply restrictions and limitations on your right to inform and be informed.

In January 2022, I was criminally prosecuted again, under accusations by the National Civil Police of instigating violence during a protest by Indigenous communities in Izabal against the country’s largest active open-pit mine, owned by Solway’s subsidiary Compañía Guatemalteca de Níquel. Thirteen police officers accused me of having physically assaulted them, when all I was doing was documenting the moment when security forces repressed people with teargas. Since then I could not continue doing my job as a journalist, nor move around freely, until my lawyers managed to prove to the judge that I really am a journalist and not a criminal. In September the charges against me were dropped. It has been very exhausting: judicial harassment and criminal prosecution have wearing effects.

What strategies have journalists adopted to be able to continue working?

Strategies to break through censorship are renewed every day and are often focused on both physical and digital security, particularly concerning the security of documents and files. Local, national and international networking among journalists and alternative and independent media is also very important.

Such networks have made possible works such as Green Blood, published in 2019, and Mining Secrets, published in 2022. Both were led by Forbidden Stories, an organisation based in France that supports the publication of the work of journalists facing threats, criminalisation and violence in their countries. Green Blood was the result of research conducted in three countries on three continents: Guatemala, India and Tanzania, and looks into the mining industry’s tactics to hinder journalistic work and criminalise those who oppose its practices. Mining Secrets arose from the leak of a huge amount of Solway’s internal files concerning the operation of its Fénix mining project in Izabal. A consortium of 20 media outlets from 15 countries around the world carried out an investigation, with information corroborated by 65 journalists, including the Prensa Comunitaria team I was part of.

It is all about finding a way to continue doing the work you are doing. Like many others, I do journalism out of passion and conviction. I don’t expect a prize or international recognition. I know that what I am doing is going to help my community and society in general. I believe that shedding light on environmental damage and human rights violations is very important.

What kind of support do journalists and community media in Guatemala currently receive, and what additional support would they need?

We receive support mainly in the form of accompaniment: legal accompaniment, accompaniment from human rights organisations and accompaniment from communities and community authorities who support our work.

This is very important, but much more is needed. A difficulty that criminalised or at-risk journalists experience is that of surviving economically and supporting their families, which is why economic support is important. The same goes for health support, because there are times when, due to all you are going through, your body no longer responds. Finally, it is key to provide opportunities for exchange with other journalist colleagues. It helps a lot to learn about the experiences of others.

Civic space in Guatemala is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Follow@CarlosErnesto_C on Twitter.
INDONESIA: ‘The new Criminal Code spells danger for civil society’
CIVICUS speaks about the new criminal code passed in Indonesia withFatia Maulidiyanti, Executive Coordinator of KontraS/The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence.

KontraS is an Indonesian civil society organisation (CSO) established in 1998 to investigate enforced disappearances, acts of violence and other human rights violations.

What are the main changes introduced in the new Criminal Code?

It is KontraS’s opinion that this Criminal Code Bill will have effects well beyond hampering people’s right to privacy. Many of its articles seek to legitimise the ongoing restrictions that are shrinking civic space, bringing back the spirit of the authoritarian Suharto era.

For example, articles 218 and 219 introduce the crimes of defamation and insult against the president and vice president. This will allow the criminalisation of government critics. Similarly, article 240 bans defaming and insulting the government, and article 351 makes it a crime to defame or insult any authorities or state institutions. These articles are meant to criminalise the publication of any kind of research, data or criticism of the government and the state institutions.

This amounts to the reintroduction of a once repealed lèse-majesté clause dating back to Dutch colonial times, which of course has long been repealed in the Netherlands. And it spells danger for civil society. It is worth noting that the policing and judicial systems in Indonesia are very problematic. Police standards are low and there is a lot of corruption. Arbitrary arrest and detention are commonly used, as are unfair trials. This already hinders the ability of civil society movements to exist and sustain their work.

There are also several problematic articles related to the need to request and obtain permits to conduct demonstrations, rallies and other public gatherings.

What are the forces behind the changes?

There have been too many obscure political bargains between the government and parliament to accommodate the interests of all political parties at the expense of civil rights and fundamental freedoms.

While there seems to have been a group of academics supporting the drafting process, there has been no consultation with or participation of civil society or business interests. At the centre of the new criminal code is an attempt to secure power, guarantee public order and gain control in preparation for the 2024 presidential election.

What do you make of the changes regarding ‘morality’ issues such as sex outside marriage?

Regression on morality issues may be counterproductive at a time when the government is trying to prevent mass protests against their policies, particularly in view of the upcoming election.

But the criminalisation of private relationships, acts and behaviours can also be seen as a bargaining chip as the current government is trying to bring Islamic fundamentalist groups into the fold. They are trying to ensure their loyalty by showing they are willing to safeguard conservative religious values. LGBTQI+ rights have been at the forefront of the battles waged by fundamentalist political and religious groups, so they have been the first to go.

How has civil society tried to stop these changes from happening?

We often discussed with our allies whether and how to provide inputs and recommendations to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and to the House of Representatives during the process. We did have meetings and took part in various consultations, but as it turned out, these just went through the motions of public engagement, keeping the formalities but disabling any meaningful opportunity to influence the outcomes.

Numerous CSOs across Indonesia have been protesting about this since at least 2019. There was a big campaign, #ReformasiDikorupsi (‘corrupt reform’) followed by a series of demonstrations against the enactment of the criminal code. However, the government and parliament chose to continue ignoring our objections and instead accelerated the process.

What kind of support does Indonesian civil society need from the international community?

We need all sectors of the international community, including international CSOs, foreign governments and their diplomatic missions and United Nations bodies, to send a clear warning to the Indonesian government against continuing to shut down civic space.

We really hope the movement to warn the government of Indonesia comes not only from domestic civil society, but also from our international counterparts.

Investors should also use their leverage, as the government is trying to attract foreign investments while the human rights situation continues to deteriorate on the ground.

The Indonesian state should be held accountable and be persuaded to step back and change course.

Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with KontraS through itswebsite and follow@kontras_update on Instagram and@KontraS on Twitter.
IRAN: ‘The regime uses executions to maintain its grip on power through fear and intimidation’

CIVICUS speaks with Jasmin Ramsey, Deputy Director of the Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI), about the ongoing wave of executions as part of the Iranian regime’s effort to suppress dissent and discourage further protests.

Founded in 2008, CHRI is an independent civil society organisation that works to protect and promote human rights in Iran. Headquartered in New York, it researches and documents human rights violations throughout Iran, and provides governments, the United Nations, think tanks, global media and research centres around the world with detailed information, analysis and policy recommendations. CHRI’s approach is strictly nonpartisan, operating within the framework of international human rights law.

What has led to the current wave of executions in Iran?

Executions in Iran are not just a pillar of the founding of the Islamic Republic, but a ruthless tool wielded by the regime to maintain its grip on power through fear and intimidation. Although the vast majority of the more than 834 people who were hanged in Iran in 2023 were accused of drug offences or other non-political activities, the increase in executions after the protests, and the growing number of political prisoners among those executed in recent years, underscore the regime’s desperation to crush dissent. It is determined to prevent the emergence of another grassroots movement such as the Woman, Life, Freedom protests triggered by the September 2022 killing of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police.

This wave of state-sanctioned killings has galvanised civil society to unite in condemnation. Women prisoners of conscience, in particular, have shown remarkable resilience, leading calls against the death penalty among Iranian civil society through joint statements and hunger strikes.

Iranian civil society is uniting to demand not just a cessation of executions, but the abolition of the death penalty. No matter how much the regime uses force and violence, it has failed to quell the desire for fundamental and systemic change in Iran. At every turn, society is pushing back against state policies that are repressive and discordant with the desires and beliefs of much of the population.

Alongside increasing executions, how else has the regime reacted to the protests?

Repression in various forms has escalated significantly since the emergence of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in 2022, manifesting in various forms such as increased arrests and detentions of peaceful activists and family members seeking justice for victims of state violence.

The government is also pushing for a law to impose harsher penalties on women appearing in public without the mandated hijab. This proposed law burdens citizens, encourages vigilante violence and increases women’s vulnerability to abuse through increased surveillance and state security forces deployed on the streets.

Is there any space for civil society in Iran?

While technically there might some room for civil society to operate in Iran, as established in legislation, the reality is starkly different. Article 27 of Iran’s constitution allows for public gatherings and marches under some conditions, but protests critical of the state are swiftly suppressed, often with violence. Fundamental rights such as freedoms of speech, expression and the press are severely curtailed, and peaceful activism is often treated as a threat to national security.

Despite these challenges, activists and citizens persist in reclaiming their rights, using a variety of methods such as social media posts, prison letters and acts of civil disobedience, like women defying the state’s forced hijab law by walking the streets unveiled. Despite facing repression and economic hardships exacerbated by governmental corruption and sanctions, their determination remains strong.

I am grateful to be doing this work in a place of safety, where, at least for now, I am shielded from the dangers faced by activists in Iran. I consider myself fortunate to learn from the courageous Iranians, especially women, who persist and resist despite immense risks. CHRI’s mission is to amplify their voices and advocate for civil society’s demands internationally, a task that comes with its own set of challenges. However, these challenges pale in comparison to the dangers faced by those on the frontlines in Iran.

What should international allies do to support the struggle for freedoms in Iran?

During the initial surge of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, there was a heightened international focus on the events unfolding in Iran. This sparked hope for more substantial action from governments with influence over the Islamic Republic. At that time, we outlined steps for the international community to pressure Iran to cease its violent crackdown on protests.

Among our recommendations, we emphasised the need for governments that have diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic to recall their ambassadors in protest against the killing of protesters and hanging of prisoners. We asked them to summon Iran’s diplomats to communicate directly their outrage and warn that further costs and isolation would ensue unless the Iranian authorities halted executions, annulled death sentences, ceased torture under custody, released prisoners and respected due process for those accused.

We urged the international community to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation and impose or expand human rights sanctions against Iranian officials and entities associated with rights violations and freeze the assets of officials who violated human rights, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many more.

We also asked parliamentarians around the world to sponsor individual political prisoners, particularly those facing execution, to publicise their cases and the unjust nature of their prosecution or sentences and publicly demand their safety and release, both on the international stage and directly with Iranian ambassadors and other Islamic Republic officials.

Additionally, we urged states to suspend negotiations over Iran’s nuclear deal, which could provide increased revenue to the Iranian state and therefore increase its repressive capacity. We demanded it be expelled for multilateral bodies and various international platforms and associations, particularly those whose principles it blatantly violates. We also asked governments to support the United Nations (UN) Fact-Finding Mission on Iran and assist those fleeing Islamic Republic persecution, and asked tech companies to support safe digital communications for the Iranian people.

This roadmap remains relevant today. It is crucial for international allies to rally behind the UN’s independent international Fact-Finding Mission, tasked with investigating atrocities committed by the regime since the onset of the violent repression of the protests in September 2022. As the Fact-Finding Mission presents its first report to the UN Human Rights Council in mid-March, a united, multilateral approach to supporting its mandate is essential for holding the Iranian government accountable and advancing the struggle for justice and human rights in Iran.

Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CHRI through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@ICHRI onTwitter and@centerforhumanrights onInstagram.
Malaysia: Government should respect human rights as it seeks UN Human Rights Council membership

#Malaysia: The government should respect human rights and implement a comprehensive program of reforms as it seeks UN Human Rights Council membership https://t.co/9lwz41q3TY #UNGA #HRC48 pic.twitter.com/JCzX4jqU6d
— CIVICUS (@CIVICUSalliance) September 21, 2021

YAB Dato Sri Ismail Sabri Yaakob
Prime Minister of Malaysia
Pejabat Perdana Menteri, Blok Utama, Bangunan Perdana Putra, Pusat Pentadbiran Kerajaan Persekutuan, 62502 Putrajaya, Malaysia

Dear Prime Minister,

We, the undersigned international human rights organisations—ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation—call on the new government of Malaysia to implement a comprehensive program of reform to strengthen human rights in Malaysia, especially the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, as a prospective member of the UN Human Rights Council. Malaysia must also sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and demonstrate that it is committed to protect human rights.

During the Human Rights Council pledging session on 8 September 2021, organised by Amnesty International and International Service for Human Rights, H.E. Dr Ahmad Faisal Muhamad expressed Malaysia’s unequivocal commitment to advancing human rights for all, noting the domestic legislation in place to enable citizens to “exercise rights and freedoms responsible and not to suppress them.” However, over the last two years there has been a deterioration in the state of human rights and fundamental freedoms under the former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s government. This has included violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, the failure to ratify key international human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, together with the government’s dismal record of cooperating with the UN human rights system.

As the government seeks membership to the UN Human Rights Council and has made public pledges to uphold human rights, it is imperative that the new government takes sincere and concrete action to improve its rights record at home. The new government has a unique opportunity to reverse the rights-violating actions of its predecessors and shift to a new rights-respecting approach. Legal and policy reform are pivotal to attain this and would demonstrate a genuine intention from the new government to meet its international human rights obligations.

Without overhauling the violations and abuse of human rights in its country, Malaysia cannot be a valuable and effective member of the Human Rights Council.

Freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association
Several laws in Malaysia unduly fetter the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association. In order to fulfil its pledges made to the Human Rights Council, Malaysia must repeal or substantially revise the following laws:

• The Sedition Act 1948 – Despite the former government’s commitment to conduct a study and a review of the security laws, including the Sedition Act, the authorities aggressively applied the law, primarily against government critics. Between January and August 2021, NGOs documented the investigation of 17 cases involving 37 individuals under the Sedition Act. The recent investigation of the #Lawan protest organisers under the Sedition Act is worrying and runs contrary to Malaysia’s international human rights obligations. The new government must follow-through with its pledge to review this archaic colonial law and should ultimately repeal it, noting that it has no place in a rights-respecting democracy.

• The Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 – Under the former government, the Communications and Multimedia Act continued to be used as the primary tool to censor human rights defenders, journalists, artists, political opponents, and ordinary members of the public who have been critical of government officials or Malaysian royalty or shared opinions about issues deemed sensitive, such as race and religion. We are encouraged to hear H.E. Dr Ahmad Faisal Muhamad state during the Human Rights Council pledging session on 8 September 2021 that, “the government is in the midst of amending the Communications and Multimedia Act.” The new government must ensure the Act is adequately reformed in consultation with stakeholders so it can no longer be used by authorities as a weapon to silence expression.

• The Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 – In its pledges to the Human Rights Council, the government committed to a review of the problematic Peaceful Assembly Act. It is imperative that this review leads to legislative reform of this law, which authorities have used to target protest organisers and discourage assemblies. The space for peaceful protests shrank considerably under the previous administration, who disrupted gatherings critical of authorities and arbitrarily arrested peaceful protesters under the guise of dealing with the pandemic. We urge the new government to reverse this approach and ensure adequate protection for the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

• The Societies Act 1966 – Muhyiddin’s government utilised the broad powers of the Societies Act to delay and even rejectthe formation of new political parties, undermining the right to freedom of association, which is critical in a functioning democracy. While not included in its written pledges, we encourage the government to substantively revise this law, ceasing its use as a barrier to the exercise of the freedom of association.

• Other legislation routinely used to silence dissent includes Sections 504 and 505b of the Penal Code, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, the Film Censorship Act 2002, Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1950, and the Official Secrets Act 1972. Wholesale reform of these laws is required to ensure that the right to freedom of expression can be exercised in the country without fear.

The reform or repeal of the aforementioned laws have been repeatedly raised by the Malaysian human rights commission, human rights groups, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteurs, and other States as essential to safeguarding human rights in the country. Encouragingly, during the pledging session, H.E. Dr Ahmad Faisal Muhamad stated that “the government is cognizant of the need to continuously review these acts to make sure that they continue to be efficient, continue to be relevant, and in line with international standards.” To demonstrate that this commitment is sincere, the government must prioritise meaningful legislative reform of all laws impeding on the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.

Undermining accountability mechanisms
ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS are further concerned that domestic accountability mechanisms have been weakened in Malaysia. While the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) retains its “A” status as a National Human Rights Institution, SUHAKAM’s yearly reports have been largely ignored by the government. Although SUHAKAM’s 2018 report was debated for the first time in parliament after 19 years under the previous Pakatan Harapan government in December 2019, there was a lack of follow-through by Muhyiddin’s government.

Concerningly, on 8 August 2021 SUHAKAM announced that its commissioners have been called in for police questioning over their attendance as monitors at the #Lawan protest. Two SUHAKAM commissioners, Jerald Joseph and Dato Mah Weng Kai, were investigated on 5 August at the Dang Wangi District Police Headquarters under Section 21A of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 and the Peaceful Assembly Act.

In presenting its candidacy for membership of the UN Human Rights Council, Malaysia made the voluntary commitment to “[c]ontinue to strengthen human rights institutions and mechanisms in Malaysia.” The government pledged funding support, law review, and more government agency engagement with SUHAKAM. A crucial requirement for fulfilling this pledge is for the government to meaningfully engage with SUHAKAM, viewing them as a key partner in upholding human rights.

Discrimination
In its pledges to the Human Rights Council, the government stated that it would “continue to promote diversity,” and that it “firmly embraces the values of inclusivity, acceptance, and understanding in ensuring harmony and peaceful coexistence.” The government asserted that it will take a “whole-of-society approach in the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.”

Despite legislative protections in Malaysia, namely Article 8(2) of the Malaysian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender, systemic discrimination against minorities persists. ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS are concerned about homophobic and discriminatory language and actions directed at LGBTQI communities, refugees, migrants, and religious minorities in Malaysia. Any form of national unity must include the rights of minorities, and there is a crucial need for more inclusive and non-discriminatory policies in place.

Police reform
While the government made no reference to police reform in its pledges to the Human Rights Council, ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS note that it is a pivotal aspect of improving rights protection in Malaysia. Police reform should be prioritised alongside legal reform, as the arbitrary implementation of rights-respecting laws can still lead to human rights violations.

ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS have recorded dozens of incidents of harassment and intimidation by police against activists, human rights defenders and ordinary citizens because of the exercise of their right to freedom of expression. Without police reform, existing restrictive legal provisions will continue to be used to intimidate vocal critics and to shrink civic space in Malaysia.

The new government must reform the Royal Malaysia Police and establish a dedicated Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC) with a mandate to receive and investigate complaints about police misconduct and abuse. The IPCMC should be given the necessary powers to investigate abuses, compel cooperation from witnesses and government agencies, subpoena documents, and submit cases for prosecution.

Commitments to the UN human rights mechanisms
It is encouraging to hear Malaysia’s pledge to assess, monitor and implement its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) recommendations. The government has committed to work closely with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN in Malaysia to jointly develop a UPR “Monitoring Matrix” to measure the implementation of UPR recommendations that Malaysia has accepted. It has also committed to a “multi-stakeholder biannual consultation” with involvement from civil society and the UN to follow up on UPR recommendations. If adequately acted upon, these commitments could give rise to far-reaching improvements to human rights in Malaysia.

Despite this, the government’s cooperation with mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council has historically been incredibly poor. Civil society groups working on the UPR process in Malaysia, in their 2021 midterm UPR report, concluded that steps towards ratifying the core human rights instruments, including the ICCPR, have progressed extremely slowly despite commitments made since the first UPR cycle in 2009. ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS hope the new administration will speed up the process of ratification to illustrate its commitment to human rights as it seeks Human Rights Council membership.

In 2019, the Pakatan Harapan government implemented a policy of standing open invitations for visits by the UN Special Procedures. Malaysia has previously hosted various Special Rapporteurs including on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, and on extreme poverty and human rights. The new government should uphold this policy of open invitations, and in particular extend invitations to the Special Rapporteurs on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, and on Freedom of Religion or Belief. ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS urge the new government to respond to individual communications from Special Procedures and enter into meaningful dialogues with UN experts rather than deny allegations outright as previous governments have.

Recommendations
To demonstrate its commitment to human rights as a prospective member of the UN Human Rights Council, ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS make the following recommendations to the Malaysian government:

• Ratify the core human rights instruments and their optional protocols, including the ICCPR, and rescind reservations to existing treaties that are contrary to their objectives and principles;
• Extend a standing invitation to all UN Special Procedures, and act swiftly to facilitate visits by the mandates on freedom of expression and on freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
• Implement all recommendations made by UN Member States during the previous cycle of Malaysia’s UPR, in particular those relating to civic space;
• Repeal the Sedition Act 1948, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, Official Secrets Act 1972, and the Film Censorship Act 1998;
• Reform the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, in particular Section 233(1)(a), to ensure it fully complies with international freedom of expression law and standards;
• Reform the Penal Code, including Sections 504 and 505b, the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and the Societies Act 1966 in accordance with international law and standards;
• Drop all investigations and charges against those exercising their right to freedom of expression, including social media users;
• Ensure authorities do not harass or instigate arbitrary criminal investigations and proceedings against human rights defenders, protesters, activists, media workers, or opposition political figures;
• Consult with civil society organisations on the shortcomings of Malaysia’s legal framework as they relate to freedom of expression and access to information;
• Establish an IPCMC to investigate police abuses as per the recommendations of the Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysia;
• Should Malaysia be granted membership to the Human Rights Council, ensure it exercises earnest efforts to defend and enhance international human rights standards and ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses in other countries in Southeast Asia and worldwide.

ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS express sincere hope that the new government will take these steps to address the human rights concerns highlighted above and stand ready to engage in constructive dialogue to support such efforts. We hope to hear from you regarding this matter as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

ARTICLE 19 and CIVICUS.

Cc. Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva
International Center Cointrin
Bloc H
Route de Pré-Bois 20
1215 Geneva 15

For more information, contact:

David Diaz-Jogeix, ARTICLE 19 Senior Director of Programmes, , or
Josef Benedict, CIVICUS Civic Space Researcher, .

Civic space in Malaysia is rated as obstructed by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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