constitution

CHILE: ‘The million-dollar question is how society will react if a new constitution does not come out of this’
CIVICUS speaks about Chile’s impending constitutional referendum with Julieta Suárez Cao, PhD in Political Science and Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the Catholic University of Chile. Julieta played a leading role in the design and promotion of an innovative electoral system that ensured a gender-parity outcome in the 2021 election for Chile’s Constitutional Convention, for which she received the American Political Science Association’s 2022 Public Engagement with Research Award.

What do you think have been the most novel elements of the Chilean constitutional process?

A novel element has been the formation of the Constitutional Convention itself. While in other parts of the world there had already been experiences such as reserving seats for Indigenous peoples and allowing non-party candidates, in Chile these two elements were combined with a third, gender parity. This had been implemented in Mexico City but had never been done at the national level.

Another novel element has to do with the fact that it this a change of constitution, not a simple reform. It is a profound change starting from scratch, without any kind of agreement having set parameters that determine what can and cannot be changed. The only predetermined things were three key procedures: the two-thirds rule for voting on the norms that would go in the constitution, the so-called entry plebiscite to enable the convening of a constitutional convention and the so-called exit plebiscite, meant to have the new constitution approved.

It is also worth noting that this is a constitutional change taking place in a democratic context, and not in a moment of transition. Although a response to the social and political crisis that Chile is going through, it has not been a hasty reaction to a fleeting situation; the discussion about constitutional reform started long before the 2019 social outburst. Former president Michelle Bachelet had already tried to carry it forward during her last term in office, from 2014 to 2018, but did not succeed. The right wing, which ruled the country under Sebastián Piñera over the following period, warned that it would shelve any constitutional reform initiative, and so it did – until the social outburst forced it to re-evaluate this position, given the need to channel social demands institutionally, by means of a constitution-making process.

What are the divides in the run-up to the 5 September plebiscite on the new constitution?

The way dividing lines have been drawn in the face of the constitutional plebiscite is very interesting. The Constitutional Convention has been extremely transparent, perhaps too transparent, because according to some literature, politics sometimes needs a certain opacity. This, on the other hand, became a sort of constitutional reality TV, a show that was broadcast every day, 24 hours a day. Clearly, the news that made it into the media tended to be about inconsequential and even ridiculous issues, so it did not represent what was really going on there. For example, one convention member proposed to dismantle all state institutions; of course, this never even made it out of the commission, but still made headlines for a long time. Such things created an adverse climate around the Convention, which I think affected the campaign.

Seen in perspective, it was a very dynamic process that in just one year managed to produce a full document for a new constitution. The process was a good one, even if it made public opinion focus on some absurd debates that were magnified by the media.

This climate of opinion ended up shaping two camps. On the one hand, the rejection camp, which includes not only the right wing, but also many centre-left personalities, including many current senators. These are people who have joined the rejection camp for several reasons, and not only because they do not agree with many of the proposed reforms.

In short, the rejection coalition ranges from the far right – which not only exists in Chile, but also reached the second round of the presidential election less than a year ago – to some individuals in the political centre. But it was the latter who became the visible face of the campaign against the constitution.

This has been the result of a good communications strategy that consisted in delegating spokespeople roles to moderate figures while keeping extremists out of sight. They have held almost no marches or public events, because in the run-up to the initial plebiscite such demonstrations included weapons, Nazi flags, swastikas and other images that provoke strong rejection.

For its part, the coalition in favour of the new constitution includes numerous former convention members, most of whom have campaigned in favour of it, deputies, senators and many popular artists. The government is not allowed to participate in the campaign or speak directly in favour of one or other option. For this reason, it only intervened by providing information: in particular, it collaborated with the printing of the new constitution, which is now one of the best-selling books in Chile.

Is Chilean society similarly divided?

Public opinion polls show that Chilean society is not polarised, unlike the elites.

What we see in Chile is asymmetric polarisation, a phenomenon that also occurs in countries such as Brazil and the USA. What creates asymmetrical polarisation is the presence of right-wing extremism. The extreme left is very small: it collects very few votes and has no media presence and no national visibility. The far right, however, has almost been normalised.

What is happening now is that it a referendum is by its very nature polarising, simply because it only provides two opposing options. If a plebiscite takes place in a context where the elites are polarised, it deepens division. For the time being, however, I think its effects have not reached deep into Chilean society.

A few months ago opinion polls appeared to show a majority in favour of approval, but now the opposite seems to be the case. Has the consensus for reform shifted?

I wouldn’t say that reformist consensus has been eroded. Practically nobody defends Pinochet’s Constitution: almost everybody who promotes rejection does so with the argument that rejection must be followed by reform. In other words, almost nobody advocates for keeping the current constitution, although if rejection wins, that is precisely what will happen, at least in the short term. Given the lack of agreement within the rejectionist coalition, its victory would open up a period of enormous uncertainty.

While reformist consensus has not been eroded, a distorted climate of opinion has been created by disinformation campaigns, presenting implausible interpretations of debates and fake news to sow doubts about the contents of the constitutional text. For example, the claim that the new constitution does not protect private property or that Indigenous people would have ‘privileges’ was widely circulated. All of this has interfered with public debate and cast doubt over the viability of the proposal.

What do think are the most positive and the most negative aspects of the new constitution?

Personally, I like the new constitution very much. It establishes a political system with less presidential powers and a better balance between the executive and legislative branches. The current constitution is an authoritarian text that is very biased in favour of the ‘strong man’.

I also like the definition of Chile as a regional state, a sort of intermediate form between the unitary and federal state. Chile is one of the most centralised countries in Latin America and the most centralised among democratic Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries.

The whole agenda of rights and the social state embraced by the new constitution also seems very positive to me. The incorporation of gender parity, a gendered perspective and multiculturalism are great advances. It was high time for plurinationality and Indigenous peoples to be recognised.

The doubts I have concern some issues that are outside my area of expertise, related to some aspects of plurinationality, such as the implementation of differentiated justice systems and Indigenous autonomies. This is also one of the issues that has highest levels of rejection among public opinion, for reasons that include racism, classism and a complex context in the south of Chile, where there is an ongoing conflict between the state and some Indigenous Mapuche communities.

But the truth is, most of these issues are only stated in the constitution and will be subject to ordinary legislation that must come from the current Congress, which has no reserved seats for Indigenous peoples. Therefore, in my opinion, positions on these issues will be tempered and there won’t be any radical changes.

Among the public, it is social rights that have the most support. Few people defend the neoliberal or subsidiary state that Chile currently has, although certain sectors of elites are concerned about the cost of changes: they wonder where the money will come from to finance all these rights, as if this were a good argument for deciding whether or not to recognise a right!

What will happen if the new constitution is approved, and what will happen if it is rejected?

If the constitution is approved the process will continue, as many provisions in the new constitution require additional ordinary legislation. In that case, a process of intense legislative activity will begin to give form to the new constitution’s mandates.

If rejection wins, much will depend on how big its win is. If it wins by a large margin, it will be more difficult for the constitution-making process to continue. If the rejectionist option wins, the government will immediately submit a bill to call for a new election to select convention members. But the approval of such a bill requires over 57 per cent of the votes in both chambers, a majority the government does not have, so it will need the right wing’s votes. The right’s willingness to sit down and negotiate will depend on its margin of victory.

If it wins narrowly, it will try to design a more inoffensive constitution-making process, with a smaller convention, a shorter mandate, no gender parity and no Indigenous peoples or very few reserved seats. If it wins by a landslide, there will be no constitutional convention, but a reform passed through Congress or designed by a commission of experts. We would be back to square one and absolutely everything would have to be renegotiated.

The million-dollar question is how society will react if a new constitution does not come out of this and the process does not continue or continues in a deficient way. I do not dare to venture an answer to this question.

Civic space in Chile is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Follow@jujuchi on Twitter.
CHILE: ‘The proposed constitution reflects the country’s division rather than being an instrument for its union’
CIVICUS speaks with Patricia Reyes, director of Fundación Multitudes, about the process to develop a new constitution in Chile since a previous draft was rejected in a referendum in September 2022.

Fundación Multitudes is a civil society organisation dedicated to generating spaces and building capacity for civil society to participate effectively in decision-making processes.

Why does Chile need a new constitution?

The constitution-making process in which Chile has been immersed since 2022 was a response to a longstanding social and political crisis that erupted in October 2019. Faced with the eruption of social demands for greater protection, equity and guarantees of basic social rights such as education, health and social security, which in some cases were expressed with unusual violence, all political sectors agreed to initiate a constitution-making process.

Initially, an inclusive process unfolded that produced a draft constitution that incorporated adequate standards of rights protection for a democratic and social state. But the proposal failed to win the support of the more conservative parts of society and was rejected in a referendum, largely because of mistakes made in the process. These were mainly due to the political inexperience of the members of the constituent commission, who were mostly independents with no links to political parties. They overlooked the need to reach broad agreements encompassing all parts of society, and particularly traditional political players. Other factors were the incorporation of some drastic changes in political institutions and the inability to communicate the benefits of the new constitutional text adequately to the public as a whole.

After the proposal was rejected, the social demands that had triggered the process were still there, and the existing constitution continued to be as ineffective in resolving them as it was when the social outburst occurred. To solve our problems of democratic coexistence, we need a new social pact that can unite us around a shared institutional project. That is why the constitution-making process was resumed, this time in a more traditional format, which has produced a new draft that will again have to be submitted to a popular vote.

How different is the new draft from the one that emerged from the 2021 Constitutional Convention?

The new draft is a lot more similar to the current constitution. It introduces more modest changes. Compared to the previous one, I think it rolls back some rights that had already been won, particularly for historically excluded groups such as women. Nor does it introduce recognition of other vulnerable population groups , such as Indigenous peoples and children and adolescents. But it does share with the previous draft the reaffirmation of freedom of enterprise and the concept of a subsidiary state.

The two processes have been quite different because in the first case the constituent body included many citizens elected by popular vote and independent of political parties, while the second involved a Council of Experts appointed by the two chambers of Congress and a Constitutional Council elected by popular vote but made up mostly of members proposed by political parties ranging from the centre to the far right.

However, there is one thing that the proposals resulting from both processes share: both have been considered partisan in nature, viewed as aligned with the interests of a specific political camp. They reflect the division of Chile rather than being an instrument for its union.

What changes would the new draft make to the existing constitution?

Overall, the text reproduces the current institutional framework, except for the fact that it reduces the number of members of parliament. It also enshrines the same rights as the current constitution. It shares many of its strengths but also suffers from many of the same weaknesses.

The draft contains several articles that have caused controversy because of the regressive way in which they could be interpreted. For example, in the area of reproductive rights, constitutional provisions could mean that the rule that currently allows abortion in cases of rape, danger to the life of the mother and non-viability of the foetus could be declared unconstitutional.

The incorporation of a special anti-corruption body could enter into conflicts of competence with the current Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Additionally, some populist tools would be introduced to allow the immediate expulsion of undocumented migrants, along with some tax exemptions – a matter that generally does not belong in a constitutional text – and a number of highly sensitive provisions, such as the possibility of allowing terminally ill convicts to serve their sentences at home, which could benefit people convicted of crimes against humanity committed during the period of dictatorship.

On the plus side, a Victims’ Ombudsman’s Office would be established and progress would be made on decentralisation, granting greater powers to local governments.

What’s the position of different groups towards the referendum to be held on the latest draft?

Most right-wing parties approve of the project, while those on the left reject it and those in the centre have a great diversity of opinions, with some campaigning for approval and others for rejection.

But the last word will be up to voters, who are going through what has been defined as a moment of constitutional exhaustion. Because of the lengthy and controversial process and the lack of cross-cutting agreements, there is a lot of apathy and indecision, as well as conflicting positions. Right now polls show a majority of people would reject the new constitution, but the vote is on 17 December, so there is still a long way to go, and there are many people who have not yet decided how they will vote.

Civic space in Chile is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Fundación Multitudes through itswebsite orFacebook account, subscribe to itsYouTube channel and follow @FMultitudes onInstagram andTwitter.
FRANCE : « L’inscription du droit à l’avortement dans la Constitution est une véritable victoire féministe »
CIVICUS échange avec Floriane Volt, Directrice des Affaires Publiques et Juridiques de la Fondation des Femmes, sur les récentes modifications apportées à la Constitution française pour y inclure le droit à l'avortement.

La Fondation des Femmes est une organisation de référence en France pour la liberté et les droits des femmes et contre les violences sexistes.

D’où vient l’initiative d’inscrire le droit à l’avortement dans la Constitution française ?

Le droit des femmes à disposer de leur corps constitue la condition essentielle de la liberté des femmes et d’une égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. L’inscription du droit à l’interruption volontaire de grossesse (IVG) dans la Constitution était donc à la fois une nécessité et une consécration des droits des femmes et de l’égalité.

Il est bien du rôle de la Constitution – texte fondateur de notre société, protégeant les droits fondamentaux des citoyennes et citoyens – de venir sécuriser le droit à disposer de son corps. C’est une garantie supplémentaire pour toutes les femmes. Sa remise en cause s’avèrera également plus complexe puisqu’elle relève d’une réforme constitutionnelle, un processus plus complexe qu’une simple suppression dans un texte de loi.

Cela faisait longtemps que les associations féministes demandaient d’inscrire l’IVG dans la Constitution. C’était notamment parmi les propositions programmatiques portées par la Fondation des Femmes et le secteur associatif féministe lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2022. Déjà en 2017, une sénatrice Laurence Cohen avait porté une proposition de loi pour constitutionnaliser ce droit.

La décision de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis en juin 2022 de revenir sur la protection de l’IVG a agi comme une déflagration sur la scène politique française et de nombreuses voix se sont élevées pour demander cette constitutionnalisation.

Il a fallu deux ans de travail de mobilisation d’associations comme la Fondation des Femmes, le Planning Familial et le collectif Avortement Europe, appuyées par des parlementaires engagés, pour y parvenir. Cette véritable victoire féministe a été obtenue grâce à l’union solide des féministes.

C’est aussi la victoire de toutes les Françaises et Français qui étaient massivement en faveur de cette réforme et qui ont été quasiment 110.000 à se mobilier en trois semaines pour demander au Sénat de l’approuver, dans le cadre d’un appel de la Fondation des Femmes sur Change.org.

Comment l’opinion publique a-t-elle réagi à cette demande ?

Plus de 86% des Français.es étaient favorables à l’entrée du droit à l’avortement dans la Constitution.

Il n’y avait qu’à voir les milliers de personnes qui se sont réunies dans l’après-midi du 4 mars pour célébrer l’entrée de l’IVG dans la Constitution sur le parvis des Libertés et des Droits de l’homme au Trocadéro, un lieu hautement symbolique choisi par la Fondation des Femmes pour diffuser le vote, à la hauteur de la gravité historique du moment.

Ce fort soutien de l’opinion publique, associé au combat sans relâche des associations féministes, est venu à bout des résistances de la droite sénatoriale, qui plaidait l’absence de réelle menace sur l’avortement en France.

Au-delà de la France, c’est une victoire et un signal très fort pour toutes les femmes et féministes du monde entier qui se battent pour l’accès à ce droit. Il y a de grandes chances que cette initiative soit reprise par d’autres États membres de l’Union européenne (UE). C’est en tout cas un des objectifs de toute cette mobilisation, qu’elle serve d’exemple.

Une Initiative Citoyenne Européenne a été soumise à la Commission européenne pour que l’UE finance l’avortement pour toute personne en Europe qui n’y a pas accès.

Quelles stratégies recommanderiez-vous aux activistes des droits génésiques dans d’autres pays d’Europe et au-delà ?

Ce qui a fonctionné en France, c’est une union solide des associations qui luttent pour les droits des femmes et de la société civile soutenue par des relais politiques – notamment des sénatrices et députées qui ont su porter ce projet commun dans les institutions.

Cette union a été le fruit d’un long travail de coordination et de création de liens entre les associations féministes pour se mettre toutes d’accord sur un projet commun.

Par ailleurs, il nous a semblé indispensable de pouvoir nous appuyer sur des données et des études fiables et pertinentes au sujet du droit à l’avortement. Par exemple, pour construire le plaidoyer nous avons pu nous appuyer sur un sondage montrant que cette révision constitutionnelle était soutenue par la majorité des Français.es, que la Fondation des Femmes et le Planning Familial avaient fait réaliser dès février 2021.

Plusieurs rapports sur l’organisation et la menace que représentent les mouvements anti-choix ont également démontré l’utilité de la constitutionnalisation du droit à l’avortement. Parmi eux, un rapport du Forum parlementaire européen pour les droits sexuels et reproductifs sur les financements massifs des mouvements anti-choix en Europe et un rapport de la Fondation et de l’Institut pour le dialogue stratégique (ISD) sur la menace que représente la présence des mouvements anti-avortement sur les réseaux sociaux.

Quels sont les prochains enjeux de l’agenda des droits des femmes en France ?

Dans le sillage de #MeToo,les organisations féministes qui alertent depuis des décennies sur l’ampleur et la gravité des violences sexistes et sexuelles, ont enfin trouvé un réel écho. La société prend graduellement conscience de ce phénomène massif.

Or, les chiffres de la justice disent toujours l’insupportable impunité des auteurs de violences sexuelles : alors que 94.000 femmes majeures sont victimes de viols ou tentatives de viols chaque année en France, moins d’un agresseur sur trois fait l’objet de poursuites. Nombre de #MeToo restent à faire pour résoudre le paradoxe d’une société convaincue d’avoir pris conscience de l’ampleur des violences sexuelles, mais qui n’en tire aucune conséquence pour ceux qui en sont les responsables.

Nous faisons face à un manque d’action politique. À la Fondation des Femmes, nous militons depuis toujours pour une réponse politique à la hauteur de l’enjeu, qui passerait notamment par une hausse du budget alloué. Face aux sollicitations de victimes toujours plus nombreuses, nous avons revu son chiffre à la hausse. Dans un rapport publié en septembre 2023, nous estimons désormais les besoins entre 2,3 et 3,2 milliards d’euros par an.

Or, la tendance est toujours à la rigueur budgétaire. Le Ministre d’Économie annonçait début mars 2024 faire l’économie de 7 millions d’euros dans le cadre de la mission égalité femmes-hommes du budget 2024. Cette coupe budgétaire représente une diminution de 10% du budget de 77 millions d’euros, voté en décembre, alors qu’il y a urgence à donner davantage de moyens aux associations qui assurent la prise en charge des femmes victimes de violences.

L’espace civique en France est classé « rétréci » par leCIVICUS Monitor.

Contactez la Fondation des femmes sur sonsite web, son compte d’Instagram ou sa pageFacebook, suivez@Fondationfemmes et@FVolt sur Twitter, et contactez Floriane Volt surLinkedIn.
FRANCE: ‘The inclusion of the right to abortion in the Constitution is a true feminist victory’
CIVICUS speaks with Floriane Volt, Director of Public and Legal Affairs at the Women’s Foundation (Fondation des Femmes), about recent changes to the French Constitution to include the right to abortion.

The Women’s Foundation is a leading French organisation working for women’s rights and freedoms and against gender-based violence.

Where did the initiative to enshrine the right to abortion in the French Constitution come from?

Women’s right to control their own bodies is an essential condition for women’s freedom and equality between women and men. So enshrining the right to abortion in the constitution was both a necessity and a consecration of women’s rights and equality.

It is the role of the constitution – the founding text of our society, which protects the fundamental rights of all citizens – to safeguard the right to control one’s own body. It is an additional guarantee for all women. It will now also prove more difficult to challenge it as it will require constitutional reform, a more complex process than simply deleting it from a piece of legislation.

Feminist organisations have long called for abortion to be enshrined in the constitution. It was one of the programmatic proposals put forward by the Women’s Foundation and other feminist organisations during the 2022 presidential election. Back in 2017, a female senator, Laurence Cohen, tabled a bill to include this right in the constitution.

The US Supreme Court’s June 2022 ruling reversing its decision to protect abortion sent shockwaves through the French political scene, and many people called for the right to abortion to be enshrined in the constitution.
SOMALIA: ‘Civil society is playing key roles in the ongoing constitutional process’
CIVICUS speaks with Mahad Wasuge, executive director of Somali Public Agenda (SPA), about recent constitutional change and its implications for Somali civil society.

SPA is a non-governmental, non-partisan think tank based in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. It focuses on producing independent, high-quality research and analysis on public policy issues in Somalia. Its work encompasses governance, security, economic development, social issues and public service delivery. SPA aims to inform policy decisions and improve the quality of governance and public services through evidence-based research.

What’s the state of civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law in Somalia?

Civic space in Somalia is not particularly strong. It falls short of standards due to the country’s fragility and the state of its public institutions. Weak public institutions mean civic freedoms are not enforced as they should be. While several civil society organisations (CSOs) focus on governance issues and support dialogue, there are many that are closely aligned with the government and therefore lack a critical approach.

Some CSOs, including SPA, conduct independent analysis and facilitate dialogue between politicians and civil society actors. In Mogadishu and other parts of the country, freedom of speech is generally respected. People can express their views without fear of government retaliation. There are various radio and TV stations in Mogadishu covering national stories.

But the overall quality of civic space is lacking. Institutions that should uphold freedoms face numerous challenges, including lack of funding and limited independence due to political interference.

How have recent constitutional changes impacted on this situation?

The constitutional amendments haven’t had a significant impact yet, as they were only approved on 30 March. Parliament went into two months of recess after approving them, and civil society has so far had little time to work on the amendments made and the related challenges, including around implementation.

The main change is that the president will now be elected by popular vote and will appoint a prime minister, who the president will be able to remove at their discretion. Previously, the president was elected by parliament and the prime minister was approved by parliament after being appointed by the president, and could only be removed through a parliamentary no-confidence motion. The change shifts the system of government from semi-parliamentary to semi-presidential. Some argue that it represents a disruption of the existing power-sharing system, which has been a source of political stability.

The change hasn’t been fully supported by key opposition groups. It has also caused friction with the semi-autonomous state of Puntland. Lack of broad acceptance among key stakeholders will create challenges to implementation. The federal government’s limited authority and Puntland’s effective control over its jurisdiction pose specific implementation challenges. There’s a chance that the constitutional amendments and the current stalemate could lead to political crisis and worsen centre-periphery relations.

How did civil society engage with the constitutional amendment process?

Civil society engaged in several ways. For instance, we organised dialogues and invited the chair of the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission to a forum so he could explain the process. We invited policymakers involved in the amendment process onto our podcasts and authored papers on the topic. We also participated in a two-day conference organised by the government to gather civil society views on the amendments.

Other CSOs held dialogues. Women’s groups advocated for a 30 per cent parliamentary quota for women, while journalists’ associations focused on freedom of speech and expression.

Many CSOs and activists tried to influence and contribute to the process. The constitution has 15 chapters, with only four amended so far, leaving 11 chapters untouched. These include critical issues such as the devolution of power, the roles of the president, prime minister and cabinet, the judiciary, financial governance and independent commissions. Civil society should play a role in influencing and contributing to these discussions as well.

For the first four chapters of the constitution that were amended and approved recently, changes were made following parliamentary debates and societal input. For instance, it was established that the requested gender quota will be addressed by special legislation. The minimum age for membership in the election management body was reduced from 40 to 35 years, making it more inclusive. It can be challenging to attribute specific changes made to civil society, as similar views may have been expressed in parliamentary debate. However, it's clear that civil society’s advocacy played a key role in shaping the final version of the amendments.

What are the potential consequences of Puntland’s rejection of the constitutional changes?

Puntland’s rejection of the constitutional changes would mean limited legitimacy due to lack of representation from key regions, as is already the case with the breakaway region of Somaliland.

This is why the role of civil society in the upcoming period will be crucial. We have discussed the situation internally at SPA, thinking of how to create a space for dialogue between the federal government and Puntland. We’re trying to facilitate discussions on critical political issues, although we are a non-political CSO and can only create a space for dialogue when stakeholders are willing to sit together and discuss issues.

The present priority should be to engage with key stakeholders, hearing their perspectives and potentially making further amendments, particularly on contentious issues such as power-sharing and elections. Mediation is essential. International actors, notably the United Nations, have been working to bring the federal government and Puntland together for dialogue. Civil society also plays a role in bridging the gap and facilitating communication. A compromise could address key grievances and offer solutions to both parties.

If direct dialogue is not possible, civil society can still share written views and recommendations with the relevant authorities to suggest potential solutions for the rift between the federal government and Puntland. Other member states of Somalia may also oppose the federal government if they disagree with the constitutional amendments, although they have not yet clarified their position on these.

What international support does Somali civil society need to continue playing these roles?

The international community has supported Somali civil society over the years, but broader instability continues posing challenges to civil society. Many civil society actors who could be effective at the societal level have joined the government, partly because the government requires their expertise. Civil society also struggles with funding, a common problem for civic institutions worldwide, as they rely on domestic and international financial support rather than profits.

International actors can help by facilitating interactions among different civil society groups. They could promote dialogue and establish strong relationships between them, enabling these groups to collaborate and advocate collectively for common causes. This type of coordination is currently lacking in Somalia, as many organisations operate independently without joining forces. International organisations could play a key role in fostering these connections and promoting unity among civil society groups.

Civic space in Somalia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Somali Public Agenda through itswebsite and follow@somalipubagenda and@MahadWasuge on X, formerly Twitter.