CIVICUS speaks with Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, regional director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in Turkey, about Turkey’s recent municipal elections that saw opposition parties gain ground.

Founded in 1972, the GMF is a nonpartisan policy organisation that works on issues such as the future of democracy, security and geopolitics, the rise of China and technology and innovation. The director of its office in Ankara, Turkey’s capital, Ozgur is an expert on transatlantic relations and Turkish foreign policy, domestic politics, democratisation and civil society.

What was the significance of the 31 March municipal elections?

The municipal elections were very important, particularly in metropolitan areas. The opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), claimed victory in big cities such as Istanbul, home to 15 million people, and Ankara.

The campaign of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) emphasised the benefits of harmony between the central and local governments. It argued that the municipalities that elected President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s candidates would receive more support from central government. In contrast, the CHP focused on the fact that its candidates were often young and new figures, such as Ekrem İmamoğlu in Istanbul, or very popular ones, as in the case of the re-elected Mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş.

The CHP’s strategy was a success: it prevailed in 36 out of 86 provinces. It was the AKP’s biggest defeat to date, as it failed to recover municipalities it had previously lost to the CHP and lost additional ones, notably in conservative strongholds. For the first time, it received fewer votes nationwide than the CHP.

Were the elections free and fair?

Elections in Turkey are generally free but unfair. Following the pattern, this election was unfair yet highly competitive. The country has an effective electoral system that allows for the opposition to monitor the process from beginning to end, if it can provide enough people to do so, which it sometimes fails to do.

However, well-known and documented issues with freedom of expression and the government’s control over the media and access to resources created a tilted playing field. But even in this context, elections were competitive and very consequential.

What are the implications of this unprecedented opposition victory?

The election results are significant on multiple levels. For political parties, securing control over municipalities is crucial for accessing resources, engaging with constituents through providing services and demonstrating governance competence. This last element is particularly crucial for the opposition, which has been away from central government for over two decades. Mayors can leverage their terms to bolster their leadership and popularity, paving the way for national leadership, as seen in Erdoğan’s political ascent.

Beyond local dynamics, these elections carried broader implications. Less than a year ago, the Turkish opposition alliance crumbled after an electoral defeat in the 2023 general election, which gave Erdoğan another five years in power. This prompted a leadership change in the CHP. Another electoral setback could have plunged it into internal strife, impacting on its prospects for the next national election.

However, with the recent results, the CHP’s new leader, Özgür Özel, solidified his position, and the party strengthened its standing within the political landscape. Its surpassing of the AKP holds a lot of symbolic significance.

Had Erdoğan secured victory, following his retention of the presidency and control over parliament, he might have pursued constitutional reforms to extend his tenure. The election outcomes will likely prompt a reassessment of the idea of a constitutional referendum, which would now pose significant risks to the AKP.

Despite acknowledging defeat, however, Erdoğan asserted that the party would emerge stronger. He is expected to respond to the election results by reshuffling his cabinet and party leadership. But so far he’s refrained from signalling any immediate changes to economic and monetary policies, wary of potential future challenges.

Do you think political change is on the horizon?

The recent electoral outcomes triggered a seismic shift in Turkish political dynamics, with speculation arising about potential national-level political change. However, this cannot be taken for granted due to several reasons.

One crucial aspect to consider is the difference between voter behaviour in local and national elections. While the recent results indicate a significant setback for Erdoğan’s party at the local level, it doesn’t necessarily guarantee a similar outcome in national elections.

Erdoğan was not on the ballot in municipal elections, and he’s the AKP’s strongest asset. Whether he can contest the next presidential election will depend on whether constitutional amendments are introduced to lift term limits or parliament calls for early elections, enabling him to stand for another term as he would not be able to complete the current one.

Moreover, the electoral context was heavily influenced by challenging economic conditions, which could potentially change before the next election cycle, shifting voters’ sentiments.

Looking ahead, with national elections scheduled for 2028, the political landscape remains unpredictable. Several unforeseen developments could unfold in the intervening years, shaping the trajectory of Turkish politics. While the recent local election results may indicate a shift, it’s essential to remain vigilant and consider multiple factors that could impact on future political outcomes.

Civic space in Turkey is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the GMF through its website or Instagram and Facebook pages, and follow @gmfus and @OzgurHisarcikli on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Daryl Phillip, founder and coordinator of Minority Rights Dominica (MiRiDom), about a recent High Court ruling that decriminalised same-sex relations in Dominica.

MiRiDom is a civil society organisation that advocates for people in Dominica who are denied their human rights on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

What was the process that led to the decriminalisation of same-sex relations in Dominica, and what role did MiRiDom play?

MiRiDom initiated the legal challenge that led to the decision. We filed the case in July 2019, challenging the constitutionality of sections 14 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act, which criminalised same-sex activity. This was the beginning of a long legal battle against discrimination. On 22 April, after years of advocacy, dialogue and litigation, Justice Kimberly Cenac-Phulgence of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court declared these sections of the law unconstitutional. This landmark ruling marks a pivotal moment in the struggle for equality and human rights in Dominica.

MiRiDom played a crucial role throughout the process. We engaged in consultations, negotiations and discussions with various stakeholders, including the public, government officials, religious leaders, foreign embassies and regional and international bodies up to the United Nations. We helped to raise awareness, build support and promote dialogue on issues of equality and discrimination.

We also worked with other civil society groups and people who contributed to the legal and advocacy efforts. The Jamaica AIDS Society played a key role by developing programmes to support LGBTQI+ people in the Eastern Caribbean, and the HIV Legal Network of Canada supported us with legal fees. The Rights Advocacy Project of the Faculty of Law at the University of the West Indies provided a legal perspective on the anti-sodomy laws that are common in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

Overall, the decriminalisation of same-sex relations in Dominica was the culmination of years of advocacy, legal action and collaboration among civil society groups, activists, supporters and others committed to promoting justice, equality and human rights for all.

How have you campaigned to change public attitudes, and what challenges have you faced?

Our social change efforts have been multifaceted. Advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in a small community like ours, with a population of only 70,000, has presented unique challenges. Many LGBTQI+ people have found it difficult to express their sexual orientation or gender identity for fear of criticism or victimisation. Nevertheless, we have persevered in our efforts to create a more inclusive and accepting environment.

The LGBTQI+ community in our area has been largely supportive of our initiatives. However, many people can still find it daunting to come out and openly support LGBTQI+ rights. Fear of potential repercussions, including ostracism, has led some to stay cautious about publicly expressing their identity. Despite this, a dedicated group of advocates, albeit small in number, have remained steadfast in their commitment to LGBTQI+ rights.

There have been moments of fatigue or setbacks along the way, but the recent court ruling gives us renewed hope to continue our struggle. Going forward, our focus will continue to be on promoting understanding, empathy and respect for LGBTQI+ people. We know that it is an ongoing journey to achieve full inclusion and acceptance of LGBTQI+ people, and we still have a long way to go. It will take sustained effort to get there, but we are determined to continue with patience and perseverance.

What’s next for your advocacy agenda?

Beyond the obvious goal of acceptance and social inclusion, we need to address several key areas. One critical aspect is marriage equality. It is essential that all members of our community have the same rights and privileges, including the ability to marry. Currently, some people can marry while others are denied this fundamental right simply because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. This undermines the principles of equality and fairness.

We must also continue to advocate for comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that protects LGBTQI+ people from discrimination in employment, healthcare, housing and other areas of public life. In addition, efforts to promote LGBTQI+ inclusion in education, health and social services are crucial to ensuring that LGBTQI+ people are treated with dignity and respect.

Ultimately, achieving full equality for LGBTQI+ people in Dominica will require a concerted effort to challenge societal norms, change discriminatory laws and foster a culture of acceptance and understanding. By continuing to advocate for marriage equality and prioritising the recognition of LGBTQI+ rights, we can work towards creating a society where everyone, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, can live freely and authentically.

What international support have you received, and what support do you need?

One area where support is critical is in providing emergency access to legal services, as there will be a need to cover legal fees for LGBTQI+ people who are being challenged by physical and verbal abuse. We see a need to vigorously challenge aggressors in court, and to make the disciplinary actions public to deter further aggression.

In terms of ongoing needs, we need sustained support for community education, social programmes and mental health initiatives. It is imperative to educate the wider community about LGBTQI+ issues, promote inclusion and provide support systems for those who face discrimination or exclusion.

We also seek support to empower LGBTQI+ people to embrace their identities without fear or shame. This includes promoting self-acceptance, challenging stigma and fostering a sense of belonging within the community. By developing programmes and resources tailored to the needs of LGBTQI+ people, we can create a more supportive and inclusive environment.

Ultimately, what we need most is continued international support that recognises the importance of our work and encourages our ongoing efforts. Through collaboration, advocacy and solidarity, we will continue to make progress towards equality.

Civic space in Dominica is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with MiRiDom through its Facebook page.

CIVICUS speaks about the ‘Anti-LGBTQI+ bill’ recently passed in Ghana with Solomon Atsuvia, Programmes Manager at Rightify Ghana.

Rightify Ghana is a human rights civil society organisation that documents and reports human rights abuses and advocates for community empowerment and human rights in Ghana.

What changes has the recent anti-LGBTQI+ bill introduced?

The Human Sexual Rights and Family Values Act, 2024, which parliament passed on 28 February, introduced many changes that represent a significant regression in LGBTQI+ rights and freedoms in Ghana.

The law seeks to ‘promote and protect proper human sexual rights and Ghanaian family values’ and mandates the enforcement of traditional cultural norms and values on gender and sexuality, reinforcing heteronormative standards and the exclusion of LGBTQI+ people. By enshrining discrimination and prejudice into law, it perpetuates societal stigma and inequalities.

Under its provisions, engaging in same-sex intercourse can result in sentences of up to three years in prison. This clearly infringes upon the personal autonomy and privacy of LGBTQI+ people. Public displays of romantic affection between people of the same sex or with someone who has undergone gender reassignment or who cross-dresses are also criminalised. This means LGBTQI+ people cannot freely express their identities.

Same-sex marriage is not allowed, and people are also banned from marrying someone who has undergone gender reassignment. LGBTQI+ people are banned from fostering and adopting children.

Producing, procuring or even just distributing material promoting LGBTQI+ activities can lead to six to 10 years in prison. LGBTQI+ organisations are being forced to disband, or their leaders and members will risk going to prison for years for distributing ‘homosexual propaganda’ or promoting the ‘gay agenda’. This is a severe restriction of freedoms of association and expression.

Funding and sponsoring LGBTQI+ groups are now banned. This silences LGBTQI+ voices and undermines the broader principles of democracy and human rights. Owners of platforms or premises that host LGBTQI+ events can also face legal consequences.

Teachers telling children about LGBTQI+ people and their rights, or even implying there are more genders than the male-female binary, also face the prospect of six to 10 years in prison.

The bill further includes a clause that allows the government to extradite people convicted under the new law.

What will the immediate effects of the anti-LGBTQI+ law be?

The passage of this law is a significant setback for the rights and safety of LGBTQI+ people in Ghana. By institutionalising discrimination, it poses severe threats to the physical, emotional and social wellbeing of LGBTQI+ people.

By imposing harsh penalties for engaging in same-sex intercourse or publicly displaying affection, which it portrays as against natural order, religious beliefs, national traditions and good morals, the law subjects LGBTQI+ people to permanent fear and insecurity. LGBTQI+ people will face increased risks of being arrested by the police and of being harassed or physically attacked by others who decide to take the law in their own hands.

The law will strengthen existing stereotypes, prejudice and stigma. It will exacerbate inequalities and discrimination in access to education, employment, healthcare and housing. Fear of discrimination and persecution will further deter LGBTQI+ people from seeking medical care, reporting incidents of violence or seeking legal assistance. As they find obstacles in accessing essential services and support networks, they will be even more susceptible to violence, exploitation and physical and psychological harm. The exclusion of LGBTQI+ people will likely increase.

The enactment of this law marks significant regression in LGBTQI+ rights in Ghana and poses serious challenges for the safety, dignity and equality of LGBTQI+ people. By limiting their ability to advocate for their rights, it also silences their voices and further reinforces regressive attitudes towards gender and sexuality.

What obstacles do Ghanaian LGBTQI+ groups currently face?

LGBTQI+ organisations face significant constraints in their advocacy efforts, primarily due to societal hostility, legal barriers and limited resources. The passage of the anti-LGBTQI+ bill exacerbates these challenges by criminalising their work and threatening the safety of their activists.

In a hostile social environment, LGBTQI+ groups encounter backlash from conservative religious groups, political leaders and community members. These deeply ingrained attitudes hinder their ability to advocate for LGBTQI+ rights.

Legal restrictions also limit LGBTQI+ organisations’ ability to operate. The newly imposed penalties for engaging in advocacy work and providing support services to LGBTQI+ people will only worsen an already hostile legal environment.

Additionally, LGBTQI+ groups must grapple with limited funding and therefore limited staff capacity and organisational infrastructure. This hampers their ability to carry out advocacy and campaigns, provide support services and mobilise the community. The passage of the anti-LGBTQI+ bill exacerbates these challenges because it means international donors and funding agencies may face retaliation for supporting Ghanaian LGBTQI+ organisations.

Do you view the Ghanaian anti-LGBTQI+ bill as part of a wider regressive trend?

The global LGBTQI+ rights movement has recently faced significant backlash from conservative and authoritarian governments, often manifested in the form of legislative measures aimed at curtailing LGBTQI+ rights and freedoms, restricting their activities and criminalising their identities. Ghana is part of this broader trend of regression.

The passage of this law is part of the trend that has recently emerged strongly in Uganda as well. This is driven by a combination of factors, including rising conservatism, religious fundamentalism and political opportunism.

Globally, there has been a resurgence of conservative ideologies seeking to reinforce traditional norms and values, particularly concerning gender and sexuality. This is often fuelled by religious fundamentalism, with influential religious institutions and leaders advocating for the preservation of heteronormative standards and condemning LGBTQI+ identities as contrary to their teachings. The influence of conservative religious groups in shaping public opinion and policymaking processes has contributed to the enactment of anti-LGBTQI+ legislation in several countries.

In Ghana, conservative religious Christian and Muslim organisations such as the National House of Chiefs, the Christian Council, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and the National Coalition for Proper Human Sexual Rights and Family Values have played a significant role. They promote narratives that view homosexuality as immoral and mobilise support for discriminatory legislation.

Opportunistic politicians are also seeking to capitalise on anti-LGBTQI+ sentiments, championing legislation that aligns with prevailing social norms and traditional values to bolster their popularity and secure electoral support.

Religious and political leaders have played up deep-rooted cultural norms and traditional beliefs regarding gender and sexuality that sustain negative societal attitudes towards LGBTQI+ people, creating an environment conducive to the passage of anti-LGBTQI+ legislation. Many Ghanaians view homosexuality as incompatible with Ghanaian culture and values, and this bill reinforces these prejudices.

What kind of international support do LGBTQI+ activists in Ghana need?

International support is crucial for sustaining advocacy efforts and empowering LGBTQI+ activism. International partners can provide financial support, technical assistance and opportunities for strengthening advocacy skills, organisational capacities and community outreach.

Rightify Ghana actively collaborates with regional and global LGBTQI+ movements to amplify our voices, raise awareness about the challenges faced by LGBTQI+ people in Ghana, garner international support and advocate for policy change on regional and global stages. However, despite valuable support received, further help is needed, particularly considering the new anti-LGBTQI+ bill.

We need support to build up our legal advocacy capacity so we are prepared to challenge the new law effectively, provide legal representation to its victims and advocate for legal reforms that protect LGBTQI+ rights.

Funding is also needed for community-based programmes to provide lifesaving information, psychosocial support, health services, peer support networks and safe spaces for LGBTQI+ people.

International support is vital for expanding advocacy efforts for inclusive policies, access to healthcare and inclusive education curricula, towards anti-discrimination laws and the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. We need your support to protect the rights of Ghana’s already vulnerable LGBTQI+ community.

Civic space in Ghana is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor. 

Get in touch with Rightify Ghana through its website, or Facebook and Instagram page, contact Solomon Atsuvia on LinkedIn, and follow @RightifyGhana and @Sjkatsuvia on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Maverick Peter Seda, cofounder and coordinator of Youth for Change Solomon Islands (YFCSI), about civil society engagement in the country’s 17 April general election.

YFCSI is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to empower young people to engage in democratic processes and campaigns for informed voting so they can help shape a government that reflects their needs and aspirations.

What was at stake in the recent election?

At stake was the continuity of government that undermined democratic practices and freedoms and developed close ties with China. This relationship has been multifaceted, encompassing economic cooperation, diplomatic exchanges and strategic partnerships. While it has the potential to bring about mutual benefits, it has also raised concerns about sovereignty, influence and alignment with global norms and values.

The same government that tightened ties with China imposed restrictions on peaceful civil society activities. These included limitations on the exercise of freedoms of assembly, association and expression, which are essential to a vibrant democracy. This raised questions about the government’s commitment to upholding democratic principles and respecting human rights.

Moreover, the government undermined democratically elected provincial governments. For example, it sponsored organisations in Malaita province to remove a former premier from office. This interference in local politics eroded trust in the democratic process and fuelled tensions and divisions among the community.

Further, the government skipped consultations on key decisions, such as constitutional amendments to extend parliamentary terms. Similarly, it has made decisions related to the state budget without adequate input or scrutiny, raising concerns about fiscal responsibility and accountability.

How did civil society engage with the election?

Civil society plays crucial roles in shaping the voting process, and the latest election was no exception. Civil society educated people about their rights and the importance of voting and brought transparency to the vote-counting process. Despite their significant contributions, however, CSOs in the Solomon Islands have struggled to gain recognition in policymaking and policy implementation processes.

The government should acknowledge CSOs as essential partners in governance, leveraging their expertise to address societal challenges. It is vital to uphold the transparency of elections and give clear explanations for any postponements. When in 2022 the government decided to postpone the election to 2024 with the argument that it lacked the resources to stage the Pacific Games and a general election in the same year, it fuelled civil unrest. This reflected widespread discontent at what was perceived as betrayal of democratic principles and a lack of consultation.

Restrictions on public assemblies have also left citizens feeling disenfranchised, leading to violence. There is a profound disconnect between the government and the people it serves, highlighting the need for genuine dialogue and inclusive decision-making. Leaders must listen to grievances and engage in meaningful dialogue to rebuild trust.

What’s your takeaway from the results?

Following a week of vote-counting, the results have failed to produce a clear winner. The election was fiercely contested, with both sides making significant efforts to sway public opinion. Incumbent Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare didn’t gain an outright majority, so he will have to negotiate a coalition government.

Clearly a significant number of voters sought change and were reluctant to re-elect Sogavare. Rival political parties and civil society groups mobilised to challenge his candidacy. But he still received strong backing from his established support base, thanks to the advantages of incumbency and access to resources. His close ties with China gave him additional advantages, as did support from influential special interest groups in the southern islands.

CSOs and opposition parties will have to remain vigilant and proactive in their advocacy efforts. Their collective actions will play a pivotal role in shaping the political landscape and ensuring the democratic process remains transparent and accountable.

What are the most urgent issues the new administration should address?

The next administration should focus on addressing youth unemployment, infrastructure development and climate change. Around 70 per cent of our population is under 34, which is a huge demographic advantage, but it is being wasted because many young people are unable to find education and employment opportunities. Young people are also eager to participate in decision-making, including the budgetary and election processes that directly affect their lives.

It is also crucial to invest in infrastructure such as roads and bridges. This both improves market access and enhances healthcare delivery, particularly to rural areas, helping address disparities in service provision. Infrastructure development also plays a crucial role in mitigating climate change impacts.

Urgent support is needed for communities affected by rising sea levels and extreme weather events. This requires dialogue with stakeholders to help relocate people from flood-prone coastal areas to safer locations.

Civic space in the Solomon Islands is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with YFCSI through its website or Facebook page, and follow @YouthSolomon on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Eva Ekelund, Deputy Director of Act Church of Sweden, about the Swedish International Development Agency’s (Sida) decision to terminate their agreements with strategic partner civil society organisations (CSOs).

The Act Church of Sweden, one of the affected CSOs, is dedicated to defending people’s rights and dignity through church cooperation, development cooperation, humanitarian relief efforts and advocacy.

What’s Sida’s role, and what changes has it recently introduced?

Sida is the government agency within the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for managing most of Sweden’s aid budget. Its main goal is to reduce poverty in low and middle-income countries through development cooperation, and one way of doing that is by working with civil society.

The ministry allocates some of the aid budget to the multilateral system and some of it through its CSO strategy, which it implements through multi-year cooperation agreements with 17 strategic partners. These 17 CSOs, one of which is Act Church of Sweden, are tasked with undertaking humanitarian initiatives in a range of thematic and geographic areas.

The government sets strategic guidelines for cooperation on the basis of principles such as inclusive partnerships, local ownership and transparency. Multi-year agreements foster predictability and flexibility. They are based on trust and the assumption that a vibrant and diverse civil society is key for sustainable and rights-based development.

The latest strategy was valid for the 2016-2022 period, and on 1 February 2024 the government published a new strategy that will last for only one year. Changes to the strategy have traditionally been made in consultation with Swedish civil society, but in this case there were just a couple of meetings in which we didn’t even have the chance to comment on any written drafts.

On 29 February, the government commissioned Sida to submit impact assessments, proposals and descriptions of the support strategic partners had provided to CSOs. Two weeks later, without any consultation or assessment, Sida verbally communicated its intention to terminate all agreements with its strategic partners as of 31 December 2024. While this still needs to be formally communicated, it is an unprecedented move that breaks decades of trustful relationships with civil society.

Sida plans to put out a call for concept notes in May and for full applications to select new strategic partners in August. We are deeply concerned about the speed and lack of transparency of this process. Current strategic partners underwent very rigorous organisational reviews before entering their agreements with Sida. It’s difficult to see how the quality of assessments will be maintained.

Why did the government make this decision?

The decision to terminate these agreements is part of the current government’s agenda of development cooperation reform.

We initially welcomed the agenda’s focus on civil society and localisation, which will mean more funding to national and local partners and is part of our organisation’s strategy. However, we have yet to see this reflected in numbers. With this year’s reduction in civil society funding and next year’s announced overall cut to the aid budget, we are yet to see how this new focus will be implemented.

The reform agenda also emphasises economic development, trade and middle-income countries. Sweden has already phased out support for countries such as Cambodia, Mali, Palestine and South Sudan. If the aid budget is further reduced, more low-income countries will be at risk.

Moreover, the reform agenda states that the aid budget should be used to curb and control migration towards Europe in general and Sweden in particular. In December, the government issued an instruction according to which Sida must focus on strengthening the capacity of partner countries to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration. The instruction contains a lot of detail about Sida’s focus on enabling transit countries’ border procedures, cooperation and migration management, creating conditions for return and sustainable reintegration, promoting opportunities for voluntary repatriation, cooperating with the Swedish Migration Agency and tackling root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.

We think that diverting funding from fighting poverty and rights-based development initiatives to migration control represents a paradigm shift away from a rights-based approach.

Overall, the way in which this reform is being carried out is completely irresponsible and unpredictable.

How will the decision to discontinue partnerships affect civil society, in Sweden and abroad?

Sida’s strategic partners have long been key for reaching out to local CSOs in global south countries and building support for development aid among Swedish people. But our funding opportunities and space to work are gradually decreasing. When it comes to communicating development assistance results, we’ve had decreasing support. The same goes for public education. New regulations for CSOs are being proposed to parliament and even the Swedish Inheritance Fund’s support to CSOs is under threat.

The government bases its reform agenda on the argument that civil society must be more independent. This underscores the need to enhance the general understanding of civil society not only as a channel for funding but also as building material for democracy and justice.

We believe that the system could have been gradually reformed by sticking to current agreements and progressively inviting new partners as agreements expire. The sudden termination of all agreements will affect the work of more than 1,750 counterpart CSOs in 90 countries. These organisations had no opportunity to influence the decision even though they are deeply affected by it, as they are strongly reliant on this aid. Many of these are global south organisations that work with excluded communities in contexts of heavily constrained civic space. Swedish CSOs will also be affected. Some will be forced to make large staff reductions and reduce their collaboration with partner CSOs.

Act Church of Sweden faces the possibility of losing all of the support we get from Sida. We don’t know what the selection criteria for new partners will be and therefore have no idea if we’ll be able to access any upcoming funding opportunities. This will impact on our daily work, that of our partner CSOs and the lives of the people who benefit from their work. We will prioritise our programmatic work, but we anticipate significant challenges ahead.

What support can the international community offer to mitigate the effects of this decision?

The international community can and should play a crucial role. International stakeholders should follow developments in Sweden and stay informed about changes in aid funding allocation. They should take the time to understand the Swedish context before welcoming any decision that’s announced. They should share updates on social media and help raise awareness.

International calls for a predictable, transparent and accountable process and other forms of solidarity are needed. They’ll be key to avoid greater polarisation.

The outcomes of this process are still uncertain. We hope that it will result in more funding going directly to local and national civil society – but this must be done in a transparent and accountable way, based on effectiveness principles and documented knowledge, not on political ideology.

Civic space in Sweden is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Act Church of Sweden through its website or Instagram and Facebook pages, and follow @Act_Svk and @Evacekelund on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Rasmus Alenius Boserup, executive director of EuroMed Rights, about the recent deal signed between the European Union (EU) and Egypt and its implications for the rights of migrants and refugees.

EuroMed Rights is a civil society platform that promotes cooperation and dialogue among countries in the Mediterranean region. It was established in 1997 in response to the 1995 Barcelona Declaration – an agreement between the EU and 12 southern Mediterranean countries – and currently includes 68 human rights groups in 30 countries. It works to advance human rights and democratic reforms and fosters civil society partnerships to improve its members’ capacity for achieving these objectives.

What’s the recent EU-Egypt deal about, and why it is concerning?

On 17 March 2024, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen travelled to Cairo, Egypt, alongside leaders of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece and Italy to announce a new ‘Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership’ (SCP) with Egypt. This agreement is similar to other deals reached by the Commission with other Mediterranean countries, such as its 2016 agreement with Turkey and the 2023 memorandum of understanding with Tunisia.

It involves a substantial amount of money: €7.4 billion (approx. US$7.9 billion) in loans and grants will be provided to Egypt between 2024 and 2027, with the declared purpose of strengthening stability, prosperity and environmental sustainability in the region.

The SCP represents a clear enhancement of EU-Egypt relations. It encompasses several areas, including political relations, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, macroeconomic stability, sustainable investment and trade, energy, water, food security, climate change, migration, security and human capital development. However, it comes in a context of no improvement in Egypt’s human rights situation. Civic space continues to be heavily restricted and activists, journalists and anyone expressing dissent is oppressed by the regime. Arbitrary arrests and mistreatment in detention are common practices. The country’s leadership is authoritarian and unaccountable.

Most of the SCP is structured as ‘macro-financial assistance’: €5 billion (approx. US$5.3 billion) of funding will take the form of concessional loans. European macro-financial assistance, however, must be contingent on criteria such as effective adherence to democratic principles and practices, including a multi-party system and the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. These criteria have clearly been overlooked in the Commission’s proposals to the Council and the European Parliament – otherwise, Egypt shouldn’t be receiving this assistance.

Over the years, reports of human rights abuses in Egypt have resulted in European Parliament resolutions and condemnations. Numerous meetings between Egyptian civil society and European stakeholders have highlighted Egypt’s deteriorating human rights situation and warned against the Egyptian government’s cosmetic policies.

Egypt has recently adopted a national human rights strategy, lifted the state of emergency, relaunched its Pardon Committee and initiated a National Dialogue. But all this has been a public relations exercise aimed at whitewashing the authoritarian regime’s international image. The December 2023 presidential election and the campaign that preceded it made abundantly clear that there were no effective democratic mechanisms in place. Nevertheless, the Commission used those facade policies to justify Egypt’s eligibility for macro-financial assistance.

In this bleak scenario, the commitments to human rights and the rule of law included in the SCP are vague and risk perpetuating rather than resolving the human rights crisis by legitimising Egyptian president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s repression. Instead of acting in a manner guided by the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights, the EU is leaning towards supporting and financing authoritarian regimes under the guise of security.

What are the SCP’s implications for migration?

The SCP follows the same approach to outsourcing border management to non-member countries that the EU and its member states have taken for years: first with Turkey, then with Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, and now with Egypt.

Externalisation agreements make migratory routes more dangerous and deadly. We’ve seen it before: the Central Mediterranean route – the stretch of sea between Libya, Tunisia and Italy – is one of the world’s deadliest migration routes. Last year we saw one of the most lethal shipwrecks near the shores of Pylos, Greece, where at least 600 people – mainly from Egypt, Pakistan and Syria – lost their lives.

In Egypt, migrants and refugees face numerous human rights violations. The government doesn’t grant residency permits or recognise identity documents issued by the UN Refugee Agency. Egyptian security forces carry out arbitrary and systematic raids against migrants, often based on racial profiling. In border areas and within the country, thousands are arrested and detained in various facilities, from prisons to police stations, in inhumane conditions. After being detained, many are forcibly deported in breach of the international principle of non-refoulement, which forbids a country that receives asylum seekers returning them to a country where they would be in probable danger.

Given the humanitarian crises unfolding in Egypt’s neighbourhood, particularly in Gaza and Sudan, this deal puts pressure on Egypt to boost its border control capacity at its borders with Sudan and Libya, as many Egyptians cross through Libya to take to the sea from its eastern coast. We fear this will lead to even more abuses and violations against migrants and refugees in Egypt.

What was civil society’s position during SCP negotiations?

In the weeks leading up to the announcement of the deal, we took part in discussions with policymakers at various levels. We advocated for the deal to include clear human rights benchmarks and prioritise accountability. We emphasised the need to avoid legitimising Sisi’s authoritarian rule, which has resulted in a steady decline in Egypt’s human rights situation since 2014. We also highlighted the connection between human rights and the socioeconomic crisis, pointing out that the deterioration of the rule of law has discouraged investment in Egypt and worsened the economic situation.

We passed on demands from local civil society organisations (CSOs), including ending harassment of human rights defenders, releasing political detainees and lifting media censorship. These should be essential conditions for any progress in relations with Egypt. We want our Egyptian colleagues in exile to be able to return to their country without fear of arrest or travel restrictions.

On migration, the EU’s focus on border management is misguided and short-sighted. Instead of prioritising border management, the EU should urge the Egyptian government to establish protection mechanisms for refugees. It must also avoid legitimising authoritarianism.

What should the EU do to ensure human rights are respected in the deal’s implementation?

The EU appears eager to act quickly. Egypt has recently received pledges amounting to US$50 billion from the United Arab Emirates, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, enabling authorities to borrow on financial markets again and avoiding an immediate risk of debt default. Despite this, the European Commission pushed for the approval of an initial instalment of €1 billion (approx. US$1.07 billion) for macro-financial assistance through an urgent procedure, bypassing European Parliament scrutiny.

The Council has already approved this first instalment, with the remainder expected to follow in three instalments before 2027. The Council has again stated that respect for effective democratic mechanisms, human rights and the rule of law is a precondition of granting the assistance. This is somewhat positive, but the wording is vague, creating uncertainty about how such conditionality will be enforced.

It is crucial that, when negotiating the details, the Commission implements credible mechanisms to assess whether tangible steps are being taken in the areas of democratisation and human rights. Each instalment must be contingent on measurable and timebound benchmarks, with the priority being the expansion of civic space beyond the cosmetic measures seen in recent years.

How is civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean region working to defend migrants’ rights?

Civil society calls for the opening of new and expanding existing legal pathways for migration, such as resettlement, family reunification, humanitarian corridors and wider access to visas. This is key to counter the trends we have monitored, condemned and worked to stop for years: deaths along migratory routes, border violence and systemic violations of the human rights of migrants and refugees.

Another crucial issue highlighted by civil society is that migration management agreements often involve financial support, equipment and training of security forces in authoritarian regimes. This ultimately strengthens non-democratic states people are trying to escape from.

In relation to the deal with Egypt, a primary civil society demand is to shift focus away from border management and towards establishing protection mechanisms for refugees and expanding access to legal pathways for safe migration.

What international support does civil society need to continue this work?

There is a growing sense of isolation and hopelessness among civil society organisations (CSOs) across the Mediterranean. International mechanisms have proved inadequate in addressing the challenges we face, and the progressive erosion of human rights and civic freedoms in many Mediterranean countries has led to a strong sense of abandonment.

Some EU member states are cutting funding to civil society in the region. Germany, for instance, has decided to withdraw funding from some CSOs for criticising Israel and advocating for boycott, sanctions and divestment policies towards it. This jeopardises their ability to do essential work and undermines the values European states claim to uphold.

The EU has lost much of its credibility as a value-driven global player and ally to civil society. By prioritising a security-first approach and reaching compromises with authoritarian rulers to reinforce its borders, it has disappointed the hopes of activists, human rights defenders and journalists who pay a high price to keep civic space open.

International support should begin with a shift in mindset and a recentring of human rights and democratic values. International human rights organisations, diaspora voices and media have a crucial role in building alliances and amplifying messages to alleviate local civil society’s sense of isolation and ensure voices from the ground reach policymakers.

Get in touch with EuroMed Rights through its website and follow @EuroMedRights and @rasbos on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Chris Jones, executive director of Statewatch, about the European Union’s (EU) Prüm II regulation and its implications for human rights and civic freedoms.

Statewatch is a UK-registered civil society organisation (CSO) that produces and promotes critical research, policy analysis and investigative journalism to inform public debate and campaigning on civil liberties, human rights and democratic standards.

What’s the Prüm II regulation?

Passed in November 2023, the regulation on automated data exchange for police cooperation, also known as Prüm II, aims to enhance police forces’ cross-border data exchange capabilities. This means fostering connections between different cases and expanding investigations, ultimately leading to more arrests and convictions. The regulation focuses on specific types of biometric data and other information. It requires EU member states to allow cross-border searches of databases containing fingerprint, DNA, vehicle registration and facial image data. Member states lacking such databases are compelled to establish them. They can also voluntarily allow cross-border searches of police records, which are defined as any type of information stored in the national registers of law enforcement authorities.

Similar obligations were imposed by the initial Prüm rules, adopted in 2008. These covered fingerprint, DNA and vehicle registration data and led to Ireland and Luxembourg establishing national DNA databases. The legal framework originated in a treaty among six EU member states in the mid-2000s and was later integrated into EU law through Council decisions in 2007 and 2008, bypassing parliamentary scrutiny. The new legal framework was designed to make it easier to exchange more types of data, and ostensibly to enhance the data protection framework.

What are the most concerning aspects of the new legislation?

The primary objective of the rules is to facilitate the collection and exchange of sensitive personal data – that is, biometric data – along with other information stored by police forces. Several concerns arise from this. For instance, under the regulation, member states without existing police-operated facial image databases are required to establish them. This infrastructure could pave the way for public facial recognition surveillance systems. It is easy to imagine a police force connecting CCTV cameras to its facial image database, if it was technically feasible, although there is no indication that this is being done at the moment.

A more immediate concern pertains to police records. The regulation enables EU states to interconnect their databases on a voluntary basis, although the European Commission is providing financial incentives for this. It is well known that huge amounts of information stored by police forces are incorrect, and that it is often excluded and racialised groups that are over-represented in these kinds of systems. For example, the UK participates in the current Prüm system and will likely be invited to join the updated one, and police forces here have been found to illegally store vast amounts of data on young Black men. This makes it more likely that information on these groups will be searched and exchanged across borders.

Additionally, the regulation empowers Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency. Europol will manage the police records index system, which will facilitate the interconnection of national police records databases, and will also be allowed to search biometric data received from non-EU states against national databases. This raises accountability and privacy issues, given Europol’s limited transparency and democratic oversight, and the fact that it has a growing number of agreements with police forces around the world that have little respect for basic rights.

The regulation also involves the creation of a central router to facilitate database searches. While seemingly technical and somewhat innocuous, this sets a precedent for integrating and interconnecting various data sources, raising broader privacy and surveillance concerns within the EU and its member states. Under the Prüm II rules, this router will be connected to the Common Identity Repository, a huge new database storing data on non-EU nationals. It is likely this infrastructure will be used to interconnect other data sources in the future.

In sum, the Prüm II regulation falls short of meeting the necessity, proportionality and other fundamental requirements of EU law. However, it contains improvements over the initial proposal, which can be attributed to advocacy efforts by the European Digital Rights Network. For example, data protection impact assessments must be carried out by member states before they interconnect their databases. This was a requirement in the original Prüm rules but did not feature in the Commission’s proposal.

Do you think this will have negative impacts on civic space and civil society?

It definitely will. Social and political context is crucial when considering the implications of implementing such a system. Unfortunately, within the EU, there are governments with minimal regard for civil liberties, and upcoming elections suggest more such governments may come to power. This creates a challenging environment for independent CSOs, many of which are already under significant pressure. For instance, groups helping migrants and refugees often face persecution, a form of repression which has come to be known as the criminalisation of solidarity, resulting in harassment, criminal charges and imprisonment.

Recent responses by European governments to protests against events such as Israel’s attack on Gaza have involved massive limitations or even outright bans on freedom of expression and assembly. We also know that non-violent environmental direct action movements are of interest to the police at a European level. Peaceful protesters are frequently arrested, leading to the creation of police files. The issues this raises for civil liberties are now compounded by the increased ability of police forces to access such information across borders.

An interconnected police records system will facilitate cross-border access to information on protesters and activists. Unlike facial image searches, which require a crime with a minimum one-year sentence for search purposes, no such threshold exists for police records searches under the Prüm II rules. This means vast amounts of potentially irrelevant or unlawfully collected data can be readily accessed by authorities, providing new avenues for monitoring people exercising their rights.

Given these developments, there should be heightened scrutiny from civil society groups and journalists regarding the contents and legality of police systems, as well as the legitimacy of information included.

While these issues may appear technical on the surface, they carry significant ramifications for civil liberties and democratic freedoms. The risk of excluded groups being disproportionately targeted for inclusion in police databases underscores their broader societal implications.

How should the EU balance security with the protection of rights?

I would rather rephrase the question. There is a framing that pits security against rights, implying that sacrificing rights is necessary for ensuring security. This dichotomy is not necessarily accurate or helpful. Security and rights are not inherently opposing concepts.

What truly fosters safety and security is addressing the root causes of insecurity: inequality, lack of opportunity and social exclusion. Access to education, employment, healthcare and community support are essential components of a secure society and they do not require expanded police powers.

By reframing the discussion in this way, we can challenge the dominant narratives and advocate for more holistic approaches to security that prioritise social wellbeing and human rights.

That being said, there are data protection provisions within the law as it stands that will be important for protecting people’s rights, primarily the data protection rules. However, there is often a disconnection between the enactment of laws and the allocation of resources for supervisory authorities. Laws requiring new tasks of data protection authorities are passed frequently, without those authorities being given any more resources. Many data protection authorities are understaffed and underfunded, undermining their ability to effectively oversee compliance with data protection regulations.

If governments are not even willing to fund basic data protection enforcement activities adequately, their commitment to upholding rights is clearly questionable. Even if we take the question at face value, looked at from this angle it is evident that the EU and its member states are failing to balance security and rights.

Get in touch with Statewatch through its website or Facebook page, and follow @StatewatchEU on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about recent protests against femicides in Somalia with Ilyas Adam, a Center for Victims of Torture fellow, award-winning human rights journalist and senior consultant at the Coalition of Somali Human Rights Defenders (CSHRD).

CSHRD is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works for the promotion and protection of human rights in Somalia.

What sparked recent nationwide protests against femicide?

The brutal killing of a pregnant woman who was burned alive by her husband, alongside two other femicides that took place in the first week of February, sparked protests in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. These cases were not exceptional – Somalia has a very high femicide rate – but their extreme brutality deeply shocked and outraged the public.

In taking to the streets, people in Somalia became part of a wider regional trend of protests in reaction to brutal femicides. Protesters demanded justice for victims and survivors, recognition of and respect for women’s rights and the end of a variety of forms of gender-based violence (GBV) that can escalate all the way to femicide.

What’s the role of the Somali women’s right movement?

In the recent protests, local women’s groups played a crucial role in putting pressure on the government to demand it take legal action against perpetrators of GBV.

The Somali women’s right movement works tirelessly to eradicate all forms of GBV, by raising awareness, challenging societal norms and mobilising public support. The first step to achieving gender equality is to advocate for thorough legislative reforms and policy initiatives that protect women and girls from violence, exploitation and discrimination. But without a change of mindset, violence will endure.

The work of women’s rights CSOs is vital in changing the perceived role of women in society. By raising awareness about GBV and femicide, providing essential support services to survivors, engaging with local communities and pushing for reform, they help create a safer and more inclusive community for all. If only they are given the space, they can collaborate with others to develop comprehensive strategies to combat GBV and enforce women’s rights.

How did the government respond to the protests?

The police conducted investigations into these cases, naming the suspects and bringing them to justice. The man who burned his wife alive was eventually sentenced to death.

However, these cases also underscored broader societal issues surrounding women’s rights in Somalia. GBV is pervasive in the daily lives of Somali women. Girls and women are expected to remain silent and accept domestic violence and other forms of GBV such as rape, female genital mutilation or being forced to marry or join the army at a young age. All are significant violations of women’s rights and pose grave threats to the wellbeing and dignity of women and girls.

If the root causes of GBV aren’t addressed, Somali women won’t be able to enjoy their rights and freedoms fully. Government institutions, CSOs and local communities must work together to combat femicides and all forms of GBV. We advocate for a national law that ensures gender equality, non-discrimination and protection from violence. By advocating for legal systemic reforms, civil society aims to create a safer society for all.

Why is it so hard to deliver justice for GBV victims and survivors?

It is not an easy task to prosecute perpetrators of GBV in Somalia. It becomes particularly difficult when offenders live in regions controlled by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, or if they belong to any of Somalia’s dominant clans located in areas such as Hirshabeele, Jubaland, Puntland and Southwest State. Clans are both a source of identity and political forces. They have their own militias and compete with one another.

When high-ranking officials from national security and intelligence agencies are involved, this adds another layer of difficulty to legal proceedings, particularly when they come up against Al-Shabaab, as was the case of Ikran Tahlil, a female spy who has been missing since 2021 and is presumed to have been kidnapped and killed by the terrorist group.

Civic space in Somalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Coalition of Somali Human Rights Defenders through its website or Facebook page, and follow @HRDsCoalition1 on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Amina Hersi, head of Gender Rights and Justice at Oxfam International, about women’s rights activism and anti-gender backlash at the 68th session of the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the main UN forum promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Oxfam is a global movement of people who fight inequality and seek to end poverty and injustice. Across regions and from local to global, Oxfam works with people to bring lasting change. Its work is grounded in the commitment to the universality of human rights.

Do you see a trend of anti-gender backlash at CSW sessions?

This year, news emerged of confrontations between feminist and anti-rights advocates at the CSW session. But while this may have received more media coverage than in previous years, it’s by no means a new development. Anti-rights trends at CSW are well-known to feminist movements, which for years have repeatedly raised concerns over the rise in anti-rights civil society mobilisation in UN spaces, including but not limited to CSW.

Although their presence is not new, the space anti-rights groups occupy has certainly grown. They have formed regressive coalitions to lobby states and weaken the language of negotiated texts. They use their access to advocate for policies that undermine and seek to reverse progress on bodily autonomy, sexual rights, reproductive rights, sexual orientation and gender identity and expression for women, girls and non-binary people. It’s unfortunate they continue to occupy these spaces and are able to reverse years of progress towards gender justice.

What tactics are anti-rights groups using at CSW, and what impact are they having?

What we saw this year is that many anti-rights groups were very well organised. They arrived in large numbers, strategically disrupted specific events and spread themselves across the room to avoid easy identification. Their main tactic was to attract attention to their positions, which they repeated over and over, with interventions that reinforced one another to create the impression of a large constituency opposing the views of feminists and women’s rights activists presenting or present in the room.

Anti-rights activists were not necessarily hijacking CSW: many of them came invited by conservative governments as part of their delegations. They brought them in as speakers in their events and filled the rooms during side events. But they were certainly not invited to the NGO CSW space, and I would say hosting their event at the same time was an attempt to disrupt women’s rights, feminist and queer spaces.

While anti-rights tactics are not unique or new, the increasing normalisation of the presence of anti-rights groups in spaces intended to advance gender justice is a concerning trend.

What were the impacts of the Conference on the State of Women and Family (CSWF) on this year’s CSW?

I’m not very familiar with the CSWF beyond what’s stated on its website, so I’m unable to offer an official comment. As far as I know, the CSWF presents itself as a two-day event that runs parallel to CSW and features a ‘pro-family’ and ‘pro-life’ programme. It seeks to shift the focus from women’s rights to the rights of ‘the families they love’. It claims to pursue the same aims as CSW – such as women’s empowerment and the eradication of poverty – but says these can only be achieved through the recognition, protection and strengthening of the family – the ‘traditional family’, of course, re-entrenching the patriarchal understanding of family.

By strategically organising their conference on the margins of CSW, anti-rights groups increased CSW attendance by activists and groups seeking to undermine the parallel events held by women’s rights organisations. As you may know, unlike official side events, which are held within UN grounds, parallel events take place outside the UN and are open to anyone who wishes to attend and engage in the day’s activities.

I think the concerning impact of CSWF was that it reduced existing safe spaces in which feminist and queer activists could gather, organise, strategise and advocate for full and equal rights. The need to hold firm against anti-rights actions and resist regression is consuming an increasing amount of energies and affecting the ability of feminist and queer groups to push effectively for progressive, gender-just policies.

How have anti-rights groups managed to gain so much space in international policy forums?

Anti-rights forces do not operate in isolation. Globally, we are witnessing governments increasingly restricting civic space, deprioritising gender justice and regressing on their commitments to uphold human rights. Although anti-rights forces have long existed, their recent surge aligns with a shared desire to reduce recognition of human rights and reinforce patriarchal and heteronormative family structures.

How are women’s and LGBTQI+ rights groups working to contain their advances?

Feminist and queer activism has historically been the most crucial and consistent driver of change for gender justice. Activists resolutely refuse to focus on anti-rights action in the pursuit of gender justice. As civil society spaces are co-opted and eroded, many are raising the alarm and urging the UN to take measures to strengthen and enable feminist engagement.

Feminist movements are creating their own safe and enabling spaces. They are also determined in their efforts to hold their governments accountable for respecting, protecting and promoting their full rights and advancing gender justice.

Get in touch with Oxfam International through its website, Instagram or Facebook page, and follow @Oxfam on Twitter and @aminahersi on LinkedIn.

CIVICUS speaks with Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, chair of the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF), about the response to the earthquake that Taiwan experienced in early April – the strongest in 25 years.

TAEF is a policy-oriented think tank that specialises in Southeast Asian and South Asian affairs. It seeks to foster a sense of regional community and advocates for Taiwan’s commitment and contribution to Asia’s development.

How prepared was Taiwan for the latest earthquake?

Taiwan’s government and people are prepared to cope with earthquakes and other natural and man-made disasters. The turning point in terms of disaster and risk preparedness was the 921 Earthquake of 1999, which claimed more than 2,000 lives and left heart-breaking lessons.

Over the past 25 years, the government reformed building codes and regulations to enhance resistance of buildings against earthquake damage. Institutionalised rescue capacity and related technological progress were also improved to handle evacuation, rescue, lifesaving and the demolition of damaged buildings more efficiently.

People, families and communities have become more educated in their perception of risk, awareness and preparedness to deal with natural disasters such as earthquakes, which are very common in Taiwan. Hundreds take place every year, of which dozens can be felt, and some can be quite strong. In many communities, mutual aid organisations have been established to cope with both natural and man-made risks and disasters. Additionally, local environmental and civic defence civil society organisations (CSOs) have become increasingly active in recent years, engaging in natural disaster risk education along with civic defence education to tackle potential invasions by China.

Why did China offer help, and why did Taiwan reject it? How did public opinion react?

The People’s Republic of China has long asserted that Taiwan is part of China and wants to annex it through either peaceful means or force. China’s communist regime views Taiwan’s affairs as domestic affairs. In recent years, it has continuously harassed Taiwan with aircraft and naval vessels. However, the vast majority of Taiwanese people reject China’s ‘One China’ claim and oppose its military intimidation. Most are in favour of the status quo in which China and Taiwan exist as separate entities and intend to preserve it collectively for as long as possible.

In Taiwan, China’s offer of aid following this year’s 403 earthquake was widely viewed as a political tactic towards unification. Taiwanese people still remember that, following the 921 earthquake, China insisted that the aid offered by many countries be channelled through its Red Cross. These tactics angered Taiwanese people and isolated China from the international community.

So this year, when Taiwan’s government declined China’s offer by simply saying that it wasn’t needed, it received widespread support from the public, civil society and even opposition parties.

How have Taiwanese civil society and political parties positioned themselves in the face of China’s challenge?

Over the past decade, the ‘China threat’ has increasingly influenced various aspects of Taiwanese politics and society.

Taiwan’s civil society has increasingly organised and mobilised to counter external threats from a hostile China. Numerous CSOs, particularly advocacy groups, have emerged to monitor the escalating tensions and complex dynamics of Taiwan-China relations, as well as the growing influence of ‘fake news’, disinformation and cyber threats originating from China. They provide fact-checking services and media literacy education to the public, helping minimise the spread of misinformation and media distortion originating from China. They closely watch legislative proceedings in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament. By monitoring interpellations and law-making processes, they aim to ensure that policies align with Taiwan’s interests and security concerns. And they also raise awareness and provide education and training in preparation for potential Chinese invasion scenarios.

As a result of their heightened engagement in addressing the China threat, many advocacy groups and public intellectuals have increasingly aligned with pro-Taiwan political forces such as the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

The DPP government has been vigilant and implemented several political, regulatory and legal reforms to face the China threat. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT), which leans towards China, has objected to them. Disagreements and conflicts between the DPP government and the KMT and, to a lesser extent, the Taiwan People’s Party on issues such as national identity, security, defence and China policy pose significant challenges to fostering political unity to confront the threat.

What support from the international community does Taiwanese civil society need to continue doing its work?

Taiwan’s CSOs need support from their international counterparts, professionally, technically and morally, to continue their crucial work to enhance Taiwan’s preparedness for various natural, man-made and external threats. Fortunately, in recent years Taiwan has garnered significant attention and support from various players in the international community. Governments, elected legislators, mainstream media, public opinion leaders, think tanks and international CSOs have all contributed to this effort. The concept of a Taiwan contingency has expanded to encompass contingencies for Japan, Korea, the Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific and ultimately a global contingency as well.

Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation through its webpage or Facebook page.

CIVICUS speaks with Julio Armando Morón Pulido of CIVILIS about the threat posed by a draft law against fascism currently in discussion in Venezuela’s congress.

Founded in 2010, CIVILIS is an independent, pluralist and autonomous civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to supporting the work of civil society from a human rights perspective.

What does the draft law against fascism say, and what are its objectives?

The bill establishes concepts such as fascism, neo-fascism and what it designates as ‘other similar expressions’, and links them to violence and the denigration of democracy. It also associates fascism with racism, classism and other ideological positions it rejects.

The bill prohibits and criminalises ideas, expressions and activities that are considered fascist, limiting rights and freedoms. It does so on the basis of vague and ambiguous definitions, which leave a wide margin for interpretation and can therefore be used arbitrarily. It also provides for criminal and administrative sanctions, as well as the dissolution of CSOs and political parties.

This bill follows the same lines as the 2017 Anti-Hate Law. Both promote disproportionate sanctions and deepen an internal enemy narrative. But the anti-fascism bill goes even further, attacking freedom of thought by persecuting ideas contrary to the official ideology.

While purporting to confront fascism, this bill seems to be a tool of stigmatisation and political persecution against all forms of dissent. If passed, it will institutionalise the criminalisation of people and organisations the state identifies as fascist, regardless of their beliefs or activities.

What groups would be most affected if this bill is passed?

If passed, this bill would have a far-reaching impact on human rights and civil society, as it would affect freedoms of thought, expression, association, dissent and peaceful assembly.

By listing ‘neoliberalism’, ‘moral conservatism’ and ‘anti-republicanism’ among the ideas to be persecuted, the bill infringes on freedom of thought. It would seriously affect freedom of expression because it prohibits the spreading of messages that denigrate democracy or express support for what is vaguely defined as fascism. In addition, it would impose a heavy responsibility on the media to avoid propagating any fascist messages, inducing self-censorship.

The bill also restricts freedom of association because it bans organisations based on fascist ideas or ‘similar expressions’ and gives the state the power to dissolve them. As for the right to democratic dissent, the bill establishes political disqualification as punishment for those who advocate for fascism, which could even apply retroactively.

Finally, the bill criminalises the right to peaceful assembly by penalising the organisation of demonstrations that allegedly promote fascism. Virtually any demonstration of opposition to the government could be interpreted as fascist, and therefore banned and criminalised.

CIVILIS believes that open and safe civic spaces are fundamental for democracy and that these restrictions would represent serious violations of civic space and therefore negatively affect Venezuela’s 28 July election.

How have civil society and public opinion reacted to the bill?

Civil society has engaged with international bodies to sound the alarm about the threat this bill represents to human rights and civic space.

We call on the state not to move forward with the process to approve this bill, or any other bill that violates rights and freedoms. Further, we urge an end to the harassment, aggression and persecution of human rights defenders, political and trade union leaders and activists, educators and other people who are considered dissidents.

It is crucial that international protection mechanisms intensify their monitoring of the situation in Venezuela, in the run-up to the election, on election day and in the months that follow. In recent years, Venezuela’s elections have been marked by increased repression and political persecution, so it is critical that they be vigilant in documenting and reporting violations.

What other restrictions weigh on civic space in Venezuela?

Over the past 24 years, a hostile environment for civil society has developed in Venezuela, as the state has increasingly shut down civic space. It has done so with successive laws, regulations and other measures that it has justified with arguments such as the defence of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism, although they don’t conform to democratic standards. CIVILIS has identified at least 13 restrictive laws and regulations.

These include the Law against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing, which subjects all CSOs to restrictions based on a biased interpretation of Financial Action Task Force standards, even when there is no evidence of terrorist activity. Administrative Ruling 002-2021 obliges CSOs to undergo a complex registration and licensing process, under threat of being declared illegal.

By order of the authorities, CSOs face obstacles in updating their registers, hampering their operations. For instance, they are prevented from incorporating if their statutes include references to human rights and democracy. Similarly, international organisations are kept waiting for authorisation to operate in the country despite the fact that a special registry was created for them in 2020.

Two other bills currently in the National Assembly also threaten civil society. One is the Fiscalisation Bill, which makes the existence of CSOs conditional on state approval, imposing requirements that are almost impossible to meet and prohibiting political activities, with sanctions that include dissolution. The other is the draft Law on International Cooperation, which seeks to centralise cooperation resources in a state fund.

Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CIVILIS through its website and follow @_civilis_ on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about Chad’s upcoming presidential election with Remadji Hoinathy, senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies’s (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa.

Established in 1991, the ISS is an African multidisciplinary human security organisation that works with partners to build knowledge and skills to support sustainable peace, development and prosperity in Africa.

What’s at stake in Chad’s upcoming presidential election?

What’s at stake in the election is the credibility and quality of election processes and people’s interest and participation in the campaign. Also concerning is the degree to which the president elected under the current conditions will be legitimate. If results are contested, it could lead to political violence.

Beyond these immediate concerns, Chad’s future trajectory is at stake. If open political debate and alternative leadership are not fostered, the country risks reverting to historical patterns of rebellion and armed conflict as a favoured means of resisting and seeking power.

Since 2021, when longtime president Idriss Déby, in power since a 1990 coup, was killed in action, there’s been a military-backed transitional government led by his son, Mahamat Déby, who is now running for president. This election should mark the end of the transitional phase, but several factors cast doubt on the likelihood that democracy will result.

What are the indicators that the election won’t be free and fair?

The National Agency for the Management of Elections lacks autonomy. While on paper it’s meant to operate independently, the process to appoint its members heavily favours the ruling party. The Constitutional Council, tasked with evaluating candidates and certifying election results, also lacks impartiality. This all erodes the legitimacy of the electoral process.

Political violence, including the recent assassination of an opposition leader, also sends a chilling message to dissenting voices and raises concerns about the fairness of the election.

There is little room for genuine competition. Out of 10 candidates, there’s two who focus on better governance, equity and justice. Their platforms address pressing issues, including the lack of basic services such as electricity and water, as well as ongoing strikes in critical sectors such as education and health. In contrast, the incumbent president promises stability and security. While their candidacies were accepted, opposition candidates face challenges, including violence and strong control over the public sphere by the ruling party.

We must recognise that simply holding an election doesn’t mean there’s democracy, particularly if the election lacks genuine competition and meaningful participation. Ultimately, it’s Chad’s future hanging in the balance. If the current trend persists and power remains concentrated in the hands of the ruling party, there’s little prospect of genuine political change.

What roles is civil society playing in fostering a democratic transition?

When discussing Chad’s civil society, it’s important to acknowledge its evolution. Initially, civil society flourished and advocated strongly for democratic change. During the transition period, a coalition called Wakit tama emerged to push for democracy, freedom and citizen empowerment.

But those in power made concerted efforts to undermine its influence. The military initially promised a transition that would conclude in October 2022, but then launched the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue that was held between August and October 2022 and extended the transition by two years and validated the eligibility of transition authorities. After the dialogue, the government cracked down on civil society. Many organisations had to stop their work and many leaders and members of civil society were forced into exile.

In response to the flawed electoral process, Wakit tama and other civil society platforms have called for a boycott, urging people to abstain from voting in an election they view as lacking legitimacy.

It’s also worth noting that there are also civil society organisations aligned with the government. The state funds them to counterbalance dissenting voices. However, the public is generally able to distinguish between the civil society that advocates for people’s interests and that aligned with the government’s agenda.

What are your expectations for the post-election period?

The election seems orchestrated to ensure the permanence of the transitional president.

Conditions for civil society in Chad are already challenging, with the government employing repression against political and civil society dissenters alike. Unfortunately, the election will likely further worsen the situation.

If Déby gains legitimacy through the election, he will only strengthen his power and further restrictions on civic space are likely to follow.

How can the international community support a transition to democracy in Chad?

Under the current circumstances, there is no simple answer to this question. The international community has already provided funding and diplomatic support for the election to take place, and at this point the dice are already loaded.

However, it is imperative to continue advocating for future leaders to open the door to fairer election processes, at least for the coming local and legislative elections, and international solidarity plays a pivotal role in this. It’s essential for people in local civil society and human rights defenders to feel protected and connected to the international community. In a country like Chad, where literacy rates are low, civil society plays a vital role in educating and mobilising the public. With adequate support and training, civil society personnel can play a significant role in advocating for democracy and fostering positive change, albeit over time. Without such support and action, prospects for democratic progress will be uncertain.

Civic space in Chad is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Institute for Security Studies through its website or Facebook page, and follow @issafrica and @HoinathyR on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Mahad Wasuge, executive director of Somali Public Agenda (SPA), about recent constitutional change and its implications for Somali civil society.

SPA is a non-governmental, non-partisan think tank based in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. It focuses on producing independent, high-quality research and analysis on public policy issues in Somalia. Its work encompasses governance, security, economic development, social issues and public service delivery. SPA aims to inform policy decisions and improve the quality of governance and public services through evidence-based research.

What’s the state of civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law in Somalia?

Civic space in Somalia is not particularly strong. It falls short of standards due to the country’s fragility and the state of its public institutions. Weak public institutions mean civic freedoms are not enforced as they should be. While several civil society organisations (CSOs) focus on governance issues and support dialogue, there are many that are closely aligned with the government and therefore lack a critical approach.

Some CSOs, including SPA, conduct independent analysis and facilitate dialogue between politicians and civil society actors. In Mogadishu and other parts of the country, freedom of speech is generally respected. People can express their views without fear of government retaliation. There are various radio and TV stations in Mogadishu covering national stories.

But the overall quality of civic space is lacking. Institutions that should uphold freedoms face numerous challenges, including lack of funding and limited independence due to political interference.

How have recent constitutional changes impacted on this situation?

The constitutional amendments haven’t had a significant impact yet, as they were only approved on 30 March. Parliament went into two months of recess after approving them, and civil society has so far had little time to work on the amendments made and the related challenges, including around implementation.

The main change is that the president will now be elected by popular vote and will appoint a prime minister, who the president will be able to remove at their discretion. Previously, the president was elected by parliament and the prime minister was approved by parliament after being appointed by the president, and could only be removed through a parliamentary no-confidence motion. The change shifts the system of government from semi-parliamentary to semi-presidential. Some argue that it represents a disruption of the existing power-sharing system, which has been a source of political stability.

The change hasn’t been fully supported by key opposition groups. It has also caused friction with the semi-autonomous state of Puntland. Lack of broad acceptance among key stakeholders will create challenges to implementation. The federal government’s limited authority and Puntland’s effective control over its jurisdiction pose specific implementation challenges. There’s a chance that the constitutional amendments and the current stalemate could lead to political crisis and worsen centre-periphery relations.

How did civil society engage with the constitutional amendment process?

Civil society engaged in several ways. For instance, we organised dialogues and invited the chair of the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission to a forum so he could explain the process. We invited policymakers involved in the amendment process onto our podcasts and authored papers on the topic. We also participated in a two-day conference organised by the government to gather civil society views on the amendments.

Other CSOs held dialogues. Women’s groups advocated for a 30 per cent parliamentary quota for women, while journalists’ associations focused on freedom of speech and expression.

Many CSOs and activists tried to influence and contribute to the process. The constitution has 15 chapters, with only four amended so far, leaving 11 chapters untouched. These include critical issues such as the devolution of power, the roles of the president, prime minister and cabinet, the judiciary, financial governance and independent commissions. Civil society should play a role in influencing and contributing to these discussions as well.

For the first four chapters of the constitution that were amended and approved recently, changes were made following parliamentary debates and societal input. For instance, it was established that the requested gender quota will be addressed by special legislation. The minimum age for membership in the election management body was reduced from 40 to 35 years, making it more inclusive. It can be challenging to attribute specific changes made to civil society, as similar views may have been expressed in parliamentary debate. However, it's clear that civil society’s advocacy played a key role in shaping the final version of the amendments.

What are the potential consequences of Puntland’s rejection of the constitutional changes?

Puntland’s rejection of the constitutional changes would mean limited legitimacy due to lack of representation from key regions, as is already the case with the breakaway region of Somaliland.

This is why the role of civil society in the upcoming period will be crucial. We have discussed the situation internally at SPA, thinking of how to create a space for dialogue between the federal government and Puntland. We’re trying to facilitate discussions on critical political issues, although we are a non-political CSO and can only create a space for dialogue when stakeholders are willing to sit together and discuss issues.

The present priority should be to engage with key stakeholders, hearing their perspectives and potentially making further amendments, particularly on contentious issues such as power-sharing and elections. Mediation is essential. International actors, notably the United Nations, have been working to bring the federal government and Puntland together for dialogue. Civil society also plays a role in bridging the gap and facilitating communication. A compromise could address key grievances and offer solutions to both parties.

If direct dialogue is not possible, civil society can still share written views and recommendations with the relevant authorities to suggest potential solutions for the rift between the federal government and Puntland. Other member states of Somalia may also oppose the federal government if they disagree with the constitutional amendments, although they have not yet clarified their position on these.

What international support does Somali civil society need to continue playing these roles?

The international community has supported Somali civil society over the years, but broader instability continues posing challenges to civil society. Many civil society actors who could be effective at the societal level have joined the government, partly because the government requires their expertise. Civil society also struggles with funding, a common problem for civic institutions worldwide, as they rely on domestic and international financial support rather than profits.

International actors can help by facilitating interactions among different civil society groups. They could promote dialogue and establish strong relationships between them, enabling these groups to collaborate and advocate collectively for common causes. This type of coordination is currently lacking in Somalia, as many organisations operate independently without joining forces. International organisations could play a key role in fostering these connections and promoting unity among civil society groups.

Civic space in Somalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Somali Public Agenda through its website and follow @somalipubagenda and @MahadWasuge on X, formerly Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Brendan Gilligan, a legal fellow at the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) civil liberties team, about the US government’s initiative to ban TikTok or force its sale.

Established in 1990, EFF is a leading civil society organisation dedicated to defending civil liberties in the digital world. It champions user privacy, free expression and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism and technology development. Its mission is to ensure technology supports freedom, justice and innovation for all people of the world.

Why is the US government talking about banning TikTok?

We can only assess the government’s justifications for banning TikTok based on what government officials have said publicly. Those public justifications have shifted over time.

Earlier efforts to ban the application focused on data privacy concerns that TikTok poses to US users. To be sure, TikTok and other social media platforms collect too much information on US users. But the solution to this is comprehensive data privacy, not banning an application: TikTok is not unique from American social platforms when it comes to its data privacy practices. And while some have suggested TikTok differs because China could require the company to provide user data, the US government does much the same thing through authorities like Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and National Security Letters. Indeed, the US government is currently opposing important data privacy protections in the current debate over renewing Section 702.

CIVICUS speaks with activist Jeff Okoroafor about Nigeria’s security situation, including the trend of kidnappings of schoolchildren by rebel groups.

Jeff is spokesperson for #BringBackOurGirls, a diverse citizen group that advocates for the effective search and rescue of all abducted children and the containment and neutralisation of insurgency in Nigeria.

What’s the security situation in Nigeria’s Kaduna state?

The security situation in Kaduna state is alarming and continues to deteriorate. Kidnappings for ransom and other forms of violence are on the rise. Those primarily responsible for these criminal activities appear to be Fulani herders, organised in bandit groups that have reportedly become affiliated with the Boko Haram insurgency. They are creating widespread chaos and terror in northern Nigeria.

The state’s inability to curb such criminal activity and protect its citizens was reflected in the recent abduction of 287 students. A whole decade after Boko Haram kidnapped 276 high school girls in Chibok, a town in northeast Nigeria, the security situation remains precarious and has even worsened.

Kaduna’s state authorities have proven ineffective in addressing these challenges. Instead of taking decisive action to dismantle these groups, they have opted to pay off insurgents to temporarily halt the violence. This is ultimately counterproductive, as the government submits to blackmail by rebel groups, further undermining security and leaving people vulnerable.

During the recent Eid al-Fitr festival, a video emerged of over 100 armed Fulani herders conducting prayers in Kaduna. Gatherings of such size cannot happen without security agents being aware, pointing to possible complicity by the authorities. This lack of reaction fosters an environment of fear and insecurity.

The ongoing cycle of violence, displacement and ransom-taking disrupts the lives of local communities, contributing to food insecurity as farmers cannot safely work their lands. It is crucial for the government to take a more strategic and robust approach to restore order and protect people.

How have kidnappings affected the situation of girls and women?

Right after the abduction of the Chibok girls, efforts were made to develop strategies to improve security in schools and safeguard girls and women in society. A task force involving community members and government representatives, including the then Minister of Finance, initiated the Safe School Initiative.

This programme proposed to enhance security in schools by installing CCTV cameras, bringing in security agents, putting up perimeter fences and providing secure transportation. However, it never materialised.

Today, many families prefer to keep their daughters at home to ensure their safety rather than risk sending them to school. In northern Nigeria, over 13.8 million children aren’t attending school, and the number continues to increase. Lack of formal education only exacerbates existing inequalities that disproportionately affect women and girls. The situation demands urgent action, but unfortunately the government is not doing much.

What’s the government’s approach to securing the safe return of abducted people?

The government doesn’t have a specific approach. The fact that mass abductions have continued, including the kidnapping of 300 female students in Zamfara state in 2021 and 100 schoolchildren in Kebbi state a few months later, highlights the lack of a real strategy to address the issue. Between January and April 2024 alone, 599 people were kidnapped.

The government is largely reactive rather than proactive, which is concerning. It has not clearly communicated any specific measures. This indicates a significant gap in leadership and a disconnect between its goals and people’s needs.

Civil society, which often operates close to affected communities, is calling on the government to adopt more effective strategies. These include developing a comprehensive plan for the safe return of the remaining 91 Chibok girls and other abducted people. Civil society also proposes establishing a military situation room with civil society participation to enhance information sharing and collaboration in addressing security challenges.

We also demand an end to political interference in security matters, as this has been a barrier to effective action in states like Kaduna. The Nigerian military and police have the capacity to tackle these challenges, yet there seems to be a lack of political will to take decisive action.

There is a pressing need for the government to adopt a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to address the security crisis and protect the lives and properties of its citizens. This includes collaborating with civil society, improving information sharing and taking decisive military and law enforcement actions to dismantle insurgent groups.

How is civil society working to address the problem, and what obstacles does it face?

Civil society organisations are making significant efforts to raise awareness and urge government action, but progress has been slow. Overall, there have been 80 new attacks on schools since the Chibok girls were abducted, resulting in the kidnapping of 1,800 students and 64 teachers.

Nigerian civil society faces significant challenges in doing this work. Freedom of speech is not fully guaranteed, and those who speak out often face threats or retaliation. For instance, members of Bring Back Our Girls, including myself, have faced arrests and harassment for advocating for justice and the safe return of abducted girls.

Ethnicity and religion also divide Nigerian society, making it difficult for people to unite in pursuit of common goals. People tend to support leaders from their own ethnic or religious groups, even when they don’t act in the best interests of the country.

Advocacy work isn’t just challenging due to these obstacles – it’s also costly. Organisations must carefully plan and execute their strategies with very limited resources. In the past, strong international partnerships helped support civil society efforts, but these relationships have weakened over time.

Still, civil society continues pushing for change and striving to hold the government accountable.

What forms of international support does Nigerian civil society need?

In the early days of the Bring Back Our Girls movement, prominent figures such as then-President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama raised awareness by publicly supporting the cause. Hollywood celebrities, musicians and news networks also played a crucial role in amplifying the movement.

We need to achieve a similar level of international support and visibility. The Nigerian government tends to be more responsive to international pressure, so we encourage world leaders and organisations to keep the conversation alive and help us hold the Nigerian government accountable. This includes asking about the whereabouts of the 91 remaining Chibok girls and demanding action from Nigerian officials.

We urge people around the world to use their platforms to put the Nigerian government under the spotlight and keep these issues alive.

Civic space in Nigeria is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Bring Back our Girls through its website and follow @BBOG_Nigeria and @JeffOkoroafor on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with freelance journalist Nancy Roc about the increase in gang violence and the political situation in Haiti.

With 38 years of experience, Nancy is a Haitian-born journalist renowned for her work for press freedom. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including UNESCO’s Jean Dominique Prize for Press Freedom.

What’s the current security situation in Haiti?

The situation is untenable, to use the exact words of Volker Türk, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights. Despite a state of emergency and a succession of curfews the government has declared since 4 March to try to regain control of the capital, Port-au-Prince, not a week goes by without kidnappings. Violence is a daily occurrence.

People are holed up in their homes, most schools are closed and economic activity is severely affected. The same goes for roads, where gangs have been imposing their law for more than three months and many drivers are out of work. Virtually all the capital’s infrastructure has been destroyed or seriously affected by gang attacks.

An attack on the National Penitentiary on 2 March came as a great shock to Haitians, even though they are used to living under the constant threat of violence. More than 4,500 inmates are believed to have escaped, including prominent gang members and people arrested in connection with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. There have been widespread looting and attacks, particularly against the National Library, which was stormed on 3 April.

On the evening of 2 April, heavily armed bandits looted dozens of homes and seized private vehicles in the villages of Tecina and Théodat, in Tabarre municipality, northeast of Port-au-Prince. The vast majority of the population, already living in extreme poverty, have now been plunged into hell and left to fend for themselves.

As for the police, despite some efforts, they are neither equipped nor numerous enough to deal with such a situation of urban guerrilla warfare against heavily armed gangs. There are currently around 23 gangs operating in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, divided into two major coalitions: G-Pèp, led by Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as Ti Gabriel, and G9 Family and Allies, led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue. However, UN experts estimate there are between 150 and 200 gangs throughout Haiti.

According to the UN, since the start of the year, 1,193 people have been killed and 692 injured as a result of gang violence. The health system is on the verge of collapse, and hospitals often lack the capacity to treat the injured. The economy is suffocating as the gangs impose restrictions on people’s movements. The main supplier of drinking water has stopped deliveries. The situation has led to a major food crisis: almost half of Haiti’s 11 million inhabitants need some form of food assistance.

How did the gangs become so powerful?

The gangs have powerful backers in government and the private sector. Under former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who resigned in March, the government funded 30 per cent of the members of the G9. It wouldn’t be surprising if some people, both in the private sector and former senior government officials, have continued to fund them, particularly those who have been sanctioned by the international community.

A UN expert report published in 2023 also singled out former president Michel Martelly, in power between 2011 and 2016, as well as several prominent business leaders and legislators, as providing resources to armed gangs, whether in kind or in cash.

The proliferation of gangs began under Martelly and intensified after Moïse’s assassination. By 2019, some 162 armed groups had been identified, more than half of them operating in the metropolitan area. In total, they are said to potentially have over 3,000 soldiers armed with firearms, including adolescents and children.

Under Moïse, numerous massacres took place, such as the La Saline massacre in 2018, the Bel Air massacre in 2019 and the Cité Soleil massacre in 2020. All took place in neighbourhoods with significant electoral power where members of the opposition lived, and these crimes all went unpunished.

In 2020, the situation worsened when Chérizier, a former police officer, federated the gangs with the G9 Family, allied to the nine most powerful gangs in the region. This enabled him to control a large part of Port-au-Prince – all while being covertly financed by high-ranking government officials.

The federation of gangs was even hailed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, who claimed that federating the gangs had reduced the number of homicides by 12 per cent in three months. This caused such a scandal that she was forced to retract her statement, describing it as a ‘misinterpretation‘.

A year after the assassination of Moïse, as the situation worsened, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution establishing a sanctions regime that targeted gang leaders and those who financed them. Chérizier was the only gang leader named in an annex to the resolution, but to date no action has been taken against him.

On 29 February 2024, the situation in the capital took a decisive turn for the worse when Chérizier announced, in a video posted on social media, the reconstitution of the coalition of armed groups known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together). In the video, he claimed responsibility for the tensions that have shaken Port-au-Prince and declared that the gangs’ primary objective was to overthrow the government. He also stated that a hunt was now on for ministers and the Director General of the National Police. He wanted to arrest them and prevent Henry, who was in Puerto Rico, returning to the country. Police officers were killed, police stations were attacked and several flights were cancelled following an assault by gangs at Toussaint Louverture international airport, which has since been closed.

Chérizier claims to be launching a revolution to liberate the Haitian people from the authorities and the oligarchs. But the gangs have targeted every stratum of society, as well as the poor districts of Port-au-Prince and many state structures that serve the poor, such as the main public hospital. The destruction is such that the UN refers to Haiti as ‘a state on the brink of collapse’.

By December 2023, more than 310,000 people had been displaced within Haiti. According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 50,000 people left Port-au-Prince in three weeks in March 2024. The scale of the disaster is staggering, and all the countries that had promised police or military aid are absent. Haiti has been abandoned to its sad fate and gangs are controlling the country instead of the authorities.

Why hasn’t the government reacted to the growing gang threat?

Four years ago, the Haitian National Police officially had a force of 15,498 police officers, among them only 1,711 women, although the actual number of officers was estimated to be much lower. Moreover, the humanitarian programme put in place by the Biden-Harris administration to make it easier for Haitians to live in the USA has put the police at risk of losing up to a third of its workforce to emigration.

Against this backdrop, chaos and violence have reached unprecedented levels. Since Moïse’s assassination, the government has been unable to establish order with the police, and the army has only had around 2,000 soldiers. No legislative or general elections have been held since 2016. As a result, there are no longer any elected representatives, as the terms in office of the previously elected ones have expired. Critics of Henry, who was very unpopular, considered his government illegitimate.

In October 2022, Henry appealed to the international community, requesting the intervention of a foreign force. Given his unpopularity, this aroused public mistrust, as people feared this intervention would strengthen an illegitimate government accused of colluding with gangs. What’s more, the composition of this mission turned into a headache.

Almost a year later, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the use of force by an international security assistance mission in Haiti. Neither Canada nor the USA wanted to intervene directly, stressing that the solution had to come from Haitians themselves. But Haitians have been unable to reach agreement, and what’s more, they fear foreign intervention, given the catastrophic interventions led by the UN since 2004. Canada, which had been asked by the USA to take the lead in the intervention, withdrew in March 2023, passing the leadership on to Kenya.

Deployment of a multinational intervention force was due to begin on 1 January 2024. Last July, Kenya offered to lead the mission with a thousand police officers. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas and Jamaica had pledged to send security personnel, and more recently Belize and Guyana did as well. Canada has also pledged to participate in the mission. For its part, the US government pledged to fund the mission to the tune of at least US$100 million.

As the gangs extended their hold over Port-au-Prince and formed an alliance with the declared aim of overthrowing Henry, he planned to travel to Kenya to sign a reciprocity agreement. While he was away, Chérizier’s criminal gangs launched their attacks on police stations, the airport and prisons. They threatened civil war if Henry returned to Haiti. He resigned on 11 March 2024. The next day, Kenya suspended the dispatch of police to Haiti.

Who is in charge today, and what are the chances of democracy being restored?

In the wake of Henry’s resignation, the government declared a state of emergency. On the same day, it was announced that a Presidential Transitional Council (PTC) had been formed to restore order. The Council is made up of nine members: seven voting members and two observers. It includes representatives of the main political parties, civil society and the private sector. Its 22-month mandate is due to end on 7 February 2026 after it has organised ‘democratic, free and credible elections’.

There are already a number of obstacles to achieving this goal. First, how can security be re-established when the gangs are still receiving weapons from the USA? The latest twist is that when Henry issued the decree announcing the formation of the PTC, it didn’t include any of the members’ names. Since then, the organisations of the PTC’s appointed representatives have expressed their disagreement with the government decree published in the official gazette on 12 April 2024. Finally, the decree formalising the appointment of PTC members was published on 16 April.

In addition, the Council wishes to be sworn in at the National Palace before the nation, even though the Palace has been targeted by gangs on several occasions. Who will provide security? How can peace be restored to Haiti in a context of such political uncertainty and economic fragility? Will the members of the Council, some of whom are frenemies, be able to look beyond their own interests for the benefit of the nation? And who will rebuild the country after so many young people have left? Will the diaspora finally be called upon?

Further, the possibility of famine looms on the horizon and the World Food Programme fears that its food stocks will run out by the end of April.

Finally, how can gangs be persuaded to lay down their arms when they are making millions from kidnappings and arms sales? Crime is a very lucrative business for gangs and for citizens facing great poverty.

How can we restore justice and punish those who have committed so many crimes against humanity? As the saying goes, no justice, no peace. Finally, what about the gangs’ political ambitions? On 11 March, Chérizier declared that it would be ‘the Viv Ansanm alliance, along with the Haitian people, who will elect the person who will lead the country’. Will the PTC have to negotiate with the gangs?

The challenges facing the PTC are therefore significant, and one of the most arduous will be to find a way of articulating a request for external aid without losing Haiti’s sovereignty.

Civic space in Haiti is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Nancy Roc on her Facebook page and follow @TheNancyRoc on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Floriane Volt, Director of Public and Legal Affairs at the Women’s Foundation (Fondation des Femmes), about recent changes to the French Constitution to include the right to abortion.

The Women’s Foundation is a leading French organisation working for women’s rights and freedoms and against gender-based violence.

Where did the initiative to enshrine the right to abortion in the French Constitution come from?

Women’s right to control their own bodies is an essential condition for women’s freedom and equality between women and men. So enshrining the right to abortion in the constitution was both a necessity and a consecration of women’s rights and equality.

It is the role of the constitution – the founding text of our society, which protects the fundamental rights of all citizens – to safeguard the right to control one’s own body. It is an additional guarantee for all women. It will now also prove more difficult to challenge it as it will require constitutional reform, a more complex process than simply deleting it from a piece of legislation.

Feminist organisations have long called for abortion to be enshrined in the constitution. It was one of the programmatic proposals put forward by the Women’s Foundation and other feminist organisations during the 2022 presidential election. Back in 2017, a female senator, Laurence Cohen, tabled a bill to include this right in the constitution.

The US Supreme Court’s June 2022 ruling reversing its decision to protect abortion sent shockwaves through the French political scene, and many people called for the right to abortion to be enshrined in the constitution.

CIVICUS speaks with Sinéad Murray, Communications, Membership and Information Officer at Treoir, about Ireland’s recent unsuccessful Family and Care Referendums.

Set up in 1976, Treoir, is a federation of Irish civil society organisations (CSOs) that promote the rights and best interests of unmarried parents and their children in order to achieve legal and societal equality.

What were the recent referendums held in Ireland about, and why were they important?

The two referendums held on 8 March were aimed at changing the constitution, which was drafted in 1937 and heavily influenced by traditional social values regarding women, religion and family. Several referendums were held in the past few years to remove outdated concepts and replace them with more inclusive ones that reflect the modernisation of our society, and these two referendums were part of this trend.

Although 40 per cent of families in Ireland are not based on marriage, article 41 of the Constitution of Ireland defines family on the basis of marriage. It only offers full protections to families based on traditional Catholic values, leaving out other family types, including single-parent or lone-parent families, cohabiting couples with or without children and kinship care families, in which the extended family steps in to take care of a child when a parent isn’t available.

The Family Amendment sought to rectify this by providing greater constitutional protections and societal recognition to diverse family types and promoting gender equality in caregiving roles. The Care Amendment aimed to address the sexist language in a clause of article 41 that is colloquially known as the ‘women’s place in the home’ clause. It implies that women who work outside the home are neglecting their domestic duties.

Although over time progress has been made in removing legislative discrimination against non-marital families, discrimination and inequality persist. For instance, lone-parent families face higher rates of poverty and housing insecurity. Further, since the 1930s, the government has regularly cited the constitutional definition of family to justify its discriminatory policies against non-marital families.

Feminists have long campaigned against these constitutional clauses because they have contributed to a considerable amount of legislation that prevented women’s equality. To add insult to injury, article 41 doesn’t even recognise rights or provide protection for women who stay in the home, including married women, lone mothers, stay-at-home mothers and female family carers.

Instead of simply deleting the article, the proposed amendment aimed to establish a positive, rights-based, gender-neutral, modern obligation of the state to protect caregiving, which is still overwhelmingly done by women.

Unfortunately, neither amendment was passed. Sixty-seven per cent of voters rejected the Family Amendment and 74 per cent voted against the Care Amendment.

What can the results be attributed to?

Opinion polls indicated that around 20 per cent of voters would reject the amendments regardless of how they were worded or what arguments they heard in the campaign. I would argue this corresponds roughly to the conservative and far-right electorate. Although conservative and traditional voters likely contributed to the referendums’ outcome, they were far from its primary drivers.

The numbers clearly indicate that many people who voted no in these two referendums had voted yes in the successful referendums on same-sex marriage in 2015 and on abortion in 2018. We need to understand why. Exit polls revealed the main reasons behind the two no votes in the 2024 referendums: a lack of clarity or information, a rushed process, lack of public consultation, a change perceived as insufficient and a general distrust in the current government.

It was the government’s misunderstanding of past referendum successes that led to the lack of clarity and structure in this process. They took the progressive vote for granted and underestimated the importance of the actual wording and public engagement.

The government published the wording for both referendums in December 2023, leaving a remarkably short window for campaign activities. It gave itself only six weeks to educate the public about the referendum process, communicate what was being voted on and try to persuade people to approve the changes. This limited timeframe posed logistical and political challenges.

Surprisingly, the chosen wording deviated from the terms proposed by the Citizen’s Assembly – a body made up of randomly selected citizens tasked with deliberating on key political issues – and the Joint Oireachtas (Ireland’s two houses in parliament) Committee on Gender Equality. The Care Referendum, for instance, focused solely on protecting family care instead of encompassing care provided in the broader community. The government’s commitment to ‘strive’ to support care rather than being mandated to do so also raised concerns. The formulation for the Family referendum included terms such as ‘durable relationships’ that were undefined and caused further confusion.

The rather abstract language used in both referendums also failed to afford enforceable new rights to the people concerned. If passed, the amendments wouldn’t have led to immediate, practical improvements in the lives of family carers or non-marital families – they would only have given them the right to challenge government decisions in court, which is a costly, intimidating and lengthy process. If the abortion referendum had only given women the right to go to court to demand an abortion, it likely wouldn’t have passed either.

This lack of tangible benefits left many uncertain whether to vote in favour, strengthening the campaign against and allowing for misinformation to proliferate, driven particularly by far-right groups.

Lack of trust in the current government exacerbated uncertainty. Public perceptions of the government’s failure to address pressing issues such as the housing and cost of living crises contributed to scepticism about the proposed changes.

In essence, results were driven by a combination of factors and underscored the importance of clear communication, grassroots engagement and addressing public concerns in referendum campaigns.

What should the government have learned from the successful referendums on abortion and same-sex marriage?

The most serious mistake was to think that because they were on the same line of progressive, inclusive and rights-expanding change, the new referendums would produce the same result as the referendums on abortion and same-sex marriage. The government shouldn’t have taken a yes vote for granted.

The government clearly misread the situation following the legalisation of same-sex marriage and abortion. In fact, the outcomes on abortion and same-sex marriage were far from preordained: they were the result of extensive, years-long grassroots mobilisation. Thousands of people advocated and protested for same-sex marriage and abortion for many years. Campaigns centred in the personal experiences of women and LGBTQI+ people affected by Ireland’s restrictive laws. Thousands of LGBTQI+ people spoke up about the stigma and discrimination they and their loved ones continued to face even after the passage of the 2011 civil partnership law. High profile cases such as that of Savita Halappanavar, who died after being refused an abortion, galvanised tens of thousands of women to speak out. The purpose was clear and the benefits of the referendums were obvious.

The promise of tangible rights also motivated supporters. They knew that even if removing the constitutional ban on abortion would not result in abortions becoming legal overnight, the government had published a clear legislative plan for if the referendum passed. During the referendum campaign, it also said it would push for the legalisation of abortion up to 12 weeks into pregnancy. This gave people certainty about what they were voting for. Similarly, it was clear that same-sex couples after the referendum campaign would have the same rights and responsibilities associated with marriage as opposite-sex couples.

The government didn’t see this, and so it overlooked the need to engage affected communities. Mobilising these groups is the most important asset in a referendum campaign and this was lost in the Family and Care referendums by the wording. The government also failed to clearly articulate the benefits of a yes vote. Unlike previous campaigns, the Family and Care referendums lacked a compelling narrative to rally public support. Legal or statistical arguments don’t persuade voters – personal stories do. But without the affected communities on board, those personal stories were hard to share. When those stories were shared, it was hard to definitely show how the referendum would adequately address the discrimination people faced. Lacking strong grassroots support, the Family and Care referendums faced great challenges in mobilising public opinion.

Who campaigned for, and who campaigned against the proposed changes?

Despite these shortcomings, most political parties supported a yes vote for both amendments, a common stance in Irish referendums. Although at Treoir we believed the government’s wording fell short, we still advocated for the change as we believed it was a step towards greater equality. Along with the National Women’s Council, One Family and Family Carers Ireland we led a campaign formed by 20 CSOs pushing for two yes votes.

Only two political parties – both of which hold a small number of seats in the Dáil, the lower house of parliament – opposed the changes: Aontú and Independent Ireland. Their campaign focused on the confusing wording chosen by the government, and used the regular slogan of campaigners against change in referendums – ‘Don't know? Vote no!’. For them, the referendum was a cover to push for increased immigration or the legalisation of polygamy in Ireland. They also argued that the ‘women’s place in the home’ clause was a positive element of the constitution and removing terms like ‘mother’ and ‘women’ was part of an agenda to eradicate the concept of biological women. This stance was also supported by the Catholic Bishops Conference and the Iona Institute, a Catholic pressure group.

Additionally, a third campaign emerged in support of a mixed vote, with the Free Legal Advice Centre among its supporters. They viewed the Family Amendment as an improvement but expressed reservations about the Care Amendment, arguing it would not provide any new rights and would perpetuate harmful stereotypes about women and people with disabilities. Equality Not Care, a group formed during the campaign, advocated for a no vote on the Care Amendment due to the impacts on people with disabilities, who would be considered as ‘subjects’ of care rather than independent rights-holders.

What’s next in the struggle for gender rights in Ireland?

The referendum campaign highlighted many of the issues that need to be urgently addressed, including the disproportionate number of lone-parent families, with 80 per cent of those headed by women facing poverty and housing insecurity. There’s also a need for a public childcare system, which would be essential for gender equality and hugely beneficial for lone parent families, along with real support for all types of carers, support for independent living for people with disabilities and family justice reform.

Following this defeat, another referendum on these articles is highly unlikely any time soon. However, changing the constitution wasn’t civil society’s primary focus to begin with. Moving forward, we should concentrate our efforts in pushing for legislative measures rather than constitutional amendments.

Civic space in Ireland is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Treoir through its website or Facebook and Instagram pages, follow @treoir on Twitter, and contact Sinéad through LinkedIn.

CIVICUS speaks with Bahati Rubango, country coordinator at the Women’s International Peace Centre (WIPC), about conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

WIPC is a feminist organisation seeking to catalyse women’s leadership, amplify their voices and deepen their role in peacebuilding. It started out in 1974 as Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange, and in 1994 it moved from Geneva to Uganda and deepened its focus on the women, peace and security agenda.

What’s the security situation in the DRC, and how is civil society working to address it?

In the DRC, and particularly in Kivu and other parts of eastern DRC, including Beni, Bunagana, Masisi and Rutshuru territories and Ituri and South Kivu provinces, the situation is dire due to ongoing conflict. The prominence of the M23 rebel group exacerbates the crisis. The DRC’s government has accused Rwanda of supporting M23, with these claims substantiated by United Nations (UN) reports. The region is also plagued by the presence of over 120 other armed factions, foreign and local, some of which receive backing from Uganda, further complicating the situation.

This has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe, characterised by widespread displacement, killings, rape, plundering of natural resources, instances of sexual violence and severe limitations on access to education and healthcare, worsening the suffering and vulnerability of millions of civilians.

Despite the deployment of various regional and international peacekeeping missions, the violence persists. The peacekeeping efforts of MONUSCO, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC, have fallen short. The conflict has regional and global dimensions beyond the DRC’s borders, impacting on peace and security across multiple countries.

There is a complex interplay of local and international dynamics, including economic interests that perpetuate the conflict. The conflict’s economic dimension has been illustrated by the fact that rebel groups are mainly located where there are strategic natural resources.

Efforts to quell the insurgency by national militia groups such as the Wazalendo movement find obstacles in the challenging terrain and the firm grip of rebel groups on strategic areas. As a result, access to Goma and other conflict-affected regions is primarily limited to air travel and boats across Lake Kivu, which impedes humanitarian aid and peacekeeping efforts.

Civil society organisations play a crucial role in peacebuilding, monitoring human rights violations and advocating for justice and security sector reforms. Civil society highlights the need for justice for victims and the involvement of women and young people in peace processes. Despite challenges, including threats to human rights defenders, civil society strives to raise awareness, combat hate speech and protect vulnerable populations.

How much space is there for civil society action in the DRC?

The situation has been tumultuous since May 2021, with the declaration of a state of siege in conflict areas that has subsequently been renewed. Under the ongoing state of siege, the military displaced civilian authorities and assumed control. This shift resulted in a significant curtailment of civic freedoms, particularly for public demonstrations and speech. Military justice has taken precedence over civilian law, raising ethical concerns and contributing to lack of accountability.

Problems have been compounded by the questionable level of training and education in the army. There have been reports of inadequately trained people being integrated, including former rebel fighters with no regard for human rights principles, approaches or values. This has led to a rise in criminal activities and violations committed by security forces, further restricting civic space.

Human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government have faced persecution. Arrests and criminalisation under baseless charges have become commonplace. Despite legislative efforts to protect activists, implementation has been lacking, exacerbating the erosion of civic space. An example is Lucha (Lutte pour le changement – Fight for Change), an organisation of young activists, several of whom spent four days under arrest simply for signing a declaration urging the state to stop war.

Advocacy at national, regional and global levels is needed to address the challenges of conflict. However, entrenched power dynamics in the DRC, including the dominance of the ruling party, pose significant obstacles to meaningful reform. Urgent action is needed to reverse the trend of declining civic space, because civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller.

What’s the likelihood of tensions between the DRC and Rwanda escalating into a regional conflict?

Rwanda’s involvement in destabilising the DRC is concerning, especially considering its history of aggression in the region, but it won’t necessarily lead to a regional conflict. Despite Rwanda’s attempts to exert influence, the DRC has demonstrated significant military strength in defending its territory against its aggression in the past.

Rwanda’s diplomatic prowess and hidden support from foreign countries – often driven by economic interests around mineral resources – contribute to its ability to manipulate regional dynamics. Rebel groups such as the M23 and the Allied Democratic Forces exploit the porous borders between Rwanda and the DRC, seeking refuge in and support from Rwanda to evade accountability for their actions. This exacerbates tensions between the two countries.

But the likelihood of the conflict escalating into a full-blown regional war is mitigated by mutual interests and dependencies. Both countries rely on resources derived from the DRC, which acts as a deterrent to all-out warfare. Regional initiatives like the Nairobi Process, brokered by the East African Community in November 2022, seek to address underlying tensions and promote peacebuilding efforts. However, the effectiveness of such initiatives is undermined by external influences dictating the terms of engagement and providing support to conflicting parties.

Civil society plays a crucial role in advocating for peace and stability, but its efforts are hindered by external interference and power dynamics that dictate the trajectory of the conflict. While regional organisations, notably the African Union, are theoretically focused on addressing conflict in the continent, external influences and interests often compromise their effectiveness.

Ultimately, it will require a concerted effort from regional and global players committed to peace and stability in the Great Lakes region to prevent the escalation of the conflict and resolve it for good.

How can the international community support peacebuilding efforts in the DRC?

There is a pressing need for support from the international community to assist internally displaced people in desperate need of essentials such as food and shelter. Efforts are also needed to document atrocities to ensure accountability further along the road. This includes highlighting the responsibilities of perpetrators and using this information to ensure justice is served, even if it takes years. Support for civil society groups involved in peacebuilding processes is crucial, particularly since the state lacks adequate resources.

Although it may not generate enthusiasm in all quarters of the international community, security sector reform requires attention. Fortunately, there are promising initiatives funded by international donors.

Another critical need is justice reform, which should include mechanisms for transitional justice. This will be vital to address the immediate effects of conflict and the long-standing grievances and cycles of violence that have plagued the region for decades. Access to justice for victims is paramount to break the cycle of impunity and prevent further atrocities. There’s a need for collective and individual reparations for victims, as well as guarantees that such violence will not be repeated. This includes addressing psychological trauma and providing survivors the support they need to rebuild their lives.

Both local and international engagement will be needed to ensure that peacebuilding agreements are fully respected and implemented, including by holding all parties responsible and accountable. Civil society activists, academics and journalists will have a crucial role in monitoring and advocating for these agreements to be fulfilled.

Finally, it’s essential to recognise that the conflict in the DRC is not isolated but has regional and global implications. Efforts to address the crisis must consider its broader context and involve stakeholders at all levels, from local communities to international organisations. Only through a holistic and inclusive approach can lasting peace and stability be achieved in the region.

Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Women’s International Peace Centre through its website and follow @TheWIPCentre and @BRubango on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the war in Sudan and its repercussions for women and civil society with Reem Abbas, a Sudanese feminist activist, writer and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP).

Founded in 2013, TIMEP is a civil society organisation that works to centre advocates and experts from and in the Middle East and North Africa in policy discourse to foster more fair and democratic societies.

What’s the current humanitarian situation in Sudan?

Active conflict persists in around 60 per cent of Sudan’s territory. The continuous fighting entails targeting of civilians and mass displacement. In some states, much of the civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets, schools and universities, has been damaged. In Khartoum and West Darfur states, about 70 per cent of hospitals have been damaged or partially destroyed.

Civilians and civil society activists are unsafe. The situation greatly restricts people’s freedom of movement, their ability to sustain a livelihood and their capacity to express their opinions freely. There are pockets of relative security in Eastern and Northern Sudan, but even in areas deemed secure displacement persists and schools remain closed because internally displaced people are living in them and other public buildings.

Many livelihoods have totally collapsed, leaving people increasingly dependent on aid. We are already witnessing cases of famine, particularly affecting children, resulting in deaths.

How has the conflict impacted on women and girls?

Women have always been targeted in conflicts in Sudan. Political violence, rife in Sudan given its volatile political history, has also often taken aim at women. There’s rarely any accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the militias that are fighting against the army – are abducting women and selling them as sexual slaves in markets or holding them captive for extended periods. Families are left in distress, unsure of the whereabouts of their daughters, and are sometimes embezzled for money.

This is a war on women. Part of it stems from structural factors that place women in subordinate positions, but there’s also a punitive element directed at women for their pivotal role in the 2019 revolution that overthrew dictator Omar al-Bashir. During the revolution, women were out there, highly visible on the frontlines, and now it feels like they’re being punished for it.

The targeting of women is tearing the social fabric apart. As public spaces become unsafe for women, fewer women are participating in public life, including in economic activities and activism. This will have long-term consequences.

What roles is civil society playing in this context, and what challenges does it face?

It’s important to recognise that civil society in Sudan isn’t a monolithic entity, but rather a complex mix of different layers. Some were heavily involved during the transitional period that followed the revolution, getting deeply integrated with government structures at the time. Then there are women’s groups, each with their own focus and agenda. Alongside them, there are more formal organisations such as non-governmental organisations and trade unions. And let’s not overlook the revolutionary elements, such as the resistance committees and emergency response rooms, decentralised and horizontal structures working to shelter displaced people, support hospitals and secure food and water supplies.

The more formal parts of civil society are currently heavily involved in politics, while its revolutionary segments are deeply engaged in grassroots humanitarian efforts. They’re essentially functioning as local governments in areas where official governance structures are absent.

Despite its crucial role, civil society faces numerous challenges. The organic growth of grassroots movements is stunted by conflict and dictatorship. The polarising effects of war have led to divisions along political, ethnic and regional lines, further fragmenting civil society. Activists are increasingly targeted by the RSF or the army, threatening their ability to operate.

In an environment where conformity to mainstream opinions is increasingly enforced, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain dissenting voices. This situation underscores the urgent need to safeguard the diversity and autonomy of civil society in Sudan.

However, attention and funding often gravitate towards already well-funded organisations, leaving grassroots initiatives to rely solely on community support. While funding alone doesn’t create a functional organisation, it’s important for organisations and groups to grow in an organic way and be able to garner support from the community.

How is civil society advocating for peace and democracy?

Right now, the conversation is all about security and getting things back to normal. People are doubting whether we can even think about democracy after all this chaos. The situation’s tough, with militarisation and conflict everywhere. But the only way out of this mess is through civilian rule. We need to figure out how to link the peace process to a long-term political solution that puts us back on track for democracy.

Unfortunately, the focus of the political elite appears to be more on preserving its positions rather than addressing urgent issues. There are concerns that the largest political coalition has developed close ties with the militia, causing unease among those involved in the revolution. Without a bigger political group that really listens to people and leads responsibly, we’re going to be stuck with military rule for ages. Right now, it should be all about finding common ground and putting the focus on the people who’ve suffered most from this war – not about politicians trying to claw back power or siding with the military.

There’s a lot of talk about how the transitional government messed up and led to the coup and the war. People are sceptical about civilian rule and whether it can fix things. It’s easier to sell the idea of a military-run government when people are feeling scared and vulnerable. Even though it’s militarisation that got us into this mess in the first place, it’s understandable because people just want to feel safe again.

What should the international community do to address Sudan’s dire security and humanitarian situation?

It’s time for the international community to stop sticking to one side of the story and start listening to everyone involved. They’re pumping all their funds into one camp and ignoring a whole bunch of other perspectives. We need more humanitarian aid, particularly considering the famine situation. Millions of people are at risk, with nowhere to turn and nothing to support themselves with.

Investment in basic infrastructure like hospitals and water plants is crucial too. People need services, and they need them now. Some areas haven’t had clean water for months because water plants are getting caught in the crossfire.

The international community must also demonstrate political determination. People’s lives are on the line. We need clear plans and urgent action to stop this war.

I want to emphasise the significance of civil society solidarity. This is crucial when our governments show ambivalence towards our concerns. In such situations, we must become each other’s voices and amplify our collective message. We must seek ways to connect, demonstrate solidarity and collaborate effectively.

It’s important to learn from one another and work together towards shared objectives. Collaboration with civil society groups and networks across the world is greatly appreciated. It’s through such partnerships that we can make a meaningful impact and bring about positive change.

Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with TIMEP through its website or its Facebook and LinkedIn pages, and follow @TimepDC and @ReemWrites on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Ousmane Miphal Lankoandé, Executive Secretary and Coordinator of the governance and citizen mobilisation programme at Balai Citoyen (‘Civic Broom’) about human rights and civic space in Burkina Faso.

Founded in 2013, Balai Citoyen is a civil society organisation (CSO) that mobilises citizen action to promote democracy, government integrity, justice and the rule of law in Burkina Faso.

How have human rights and civic freedoms deteriorated under Burkina Faso’s military junta?

Since the rise of the military to power in January 2022, there has been a clear deterioration in human rights and civic freedoms, a phenomenon that became even more marked following the second coup in September 2022. Any voice of dissent from the official line of the military regime is systematically repressed.

To achieve this, the regime gradually introduced insidious measures. Initially, it suspended the activities of political parties, even after it restored the constitution following a temporary suspension. In addition, some international media have been banned from broadcasting and some national media have been suspended. Journalists and activists are subjected to intimidation and threats, and some have been kidnapped. The fate of several, including two Balai Citoyen activists, remains unknown to this day.

CIVICUS speaks with Tatiana Luján, Materials Systems Lead at ClientEarth, about a lawsuit filed in collaboration with 15 other civil society organisations (CSOs) against a plan to open a huge plastics plant in Belgium, known as Project One, by petrochemicals giant INEOS.

ClientEarth is one of the world’s most ambitious environmental CSOs, established to create systemic change by using law to protect the planet for – and with – all its inhabitants.

Why are plastics a problem, and what should be done about it?

Plastics are mostly derived from fossil fuels, which poses a significant challenge to our future. Their production perpetuates a fossil-based economy, which promotes endless production and consumption, rather than a circular economy. Despite increasing awareness of the unsustainability of burning fossil fuels, the industry is shifting towards using them as feedstock for petrochemicals, which create far-reaching environmental harm and violate human rights.

Simply put, plastics are the fossil fuel industry’s plan B to keep their business alive now there is pressure to move away from fossil fuels. But we already have more plastic than we need, so projects that would fuel more unnecessary plastic production – such as Project One, planned by the global chemical company INEOS in Belgium – will inundate a market already saturated with plastic.

The production of plastics from petrochemicals also emits vast amounts of greenhouse gases. Even if 70 per cent of plastics were recycled – which would be a lot, considering that less than 10 per cent is recycled today – two-thirds of carbon stored in plastics would still be released back into the atmosphere within 15 years. And even the most recyclable plastics can only be recycled for a few cycles. Contrary to belief, simply recycling plastic doesn’t result in carbon neutrality, as this still emits greenhouse gases and requires energy-intensive production.

Petrochemicals and plastics are so carbon intensive that continuing to rely on them hinders our ability to meet our climate goals under the Paris Agreement. Investments in these projects also lock in plastic production for decades, further impeding the ability to reach our climate targets and delaying the transition to more sustainable economies.

Additionally, the development of new plastic plants in areas already burdened with pollution poses serious health risks and further exacerbates damage to nature and our environment. To address climate change and safeguard nature and our health, we need to promote sustainability by exploring and investing in alternatives. This includes redirecting funding towards scaling up circular economies and prioritising reduce, reuse and recycle models. It is crucial to reconsider such projects and align investments with environmental and societal goals.

What are INEOS’ arguments in favour of their new development, and what are your objections?

One of its key arguments is that its plan would be less carbon-intensive than other plants currently in operation because of its relatively newer technology. It claims that emissions from its plant would be lower by comparison. However, it is essential to consider the long-term implications. Plants like Project One have a 40-year lifespan, so investments of this kind lock in plastic production and the repercussions of that production for decades to come.

INEOS also addresses climate concerns by suggesting it will explore technologies to capture and reduce emissions in the future. These could include using green hydrogen or carbon capture storage.

However, the hydrogen technology and carbon capture and storage units that INEOS foresees relying on are not viable options as they are currently not available commercially at scale. The certainty of Project One’s climate impacts therefore contrasts with the uncertainty of these technological fixes. It is inconsistent to accept certain environmental damage based on uncertain solutions to climate change. Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate critically the long-term consequences of such projects and prioritise sustainable alternatives.

How has the legal case unfolded so far?

We launched a legal battle against Project One in 2019, supported by a coalition of 15 CSOs. After INEOS submitted its initial permit application, we swiftly filed an administrative objection. Despite the permit initially being granted by the Port of Antwerp, we appealed to the Flemish Ministry of Environment due to an incomplete Environmental Impact Assessment report, crucial for assessing the project’s effects comprehensively.

The permit focused solely on the construction’s environmental impacts, neglecting the plant’s operational effects. This practice, known as ‘salami slicing’, violates the requirement in European law to consider the project as a whole. Securing an injunction in December, we compelled INEOS to withdraw its permit request, prompting it to re-evaluate its plans.

INEOS subsequently scrapped half of the project and submitted a new permit application in 2021, approved by the Flemish Ministry of Environment in December 2021. In response, the civil society coalition filed a lawsuit in January 2022, highlighting the permit’s incomplete assessment of environmental impacts, including climate effects, and air pollution impacts on public health.

Simultaneously, two Dutch provinces, North Brabant and Zeeland, filed lawsuits. The two provinces argued that Project One would generate nitrogen pollution, which would contaminate neighbouring protected areas in the Netherlands already oversaturated by nitrogen. After a year and a half, the Council for Permit Disputes ruled on the Dutch cases and annulled the permit, citing violations of European Union (EU) nature laws.

INEOS appealed this decision, and the case is currently before the Council of State, Belgium’s highest administrative court. The Council for Permit Disputes also granted the Flemish Ministry of Environment six months to revise the permit to ensure compliance with EU law. INEOS obtained a new permit in January this year, prompting us to file a new lawsuit reiterating our concerns in February.

Considering the previous timeline, we anticipate a decision on the latest lawsuit within a year and a half.

What impacts could a positive ruling have in Belgium and beyond?

This case, based on the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, carries significant implications for Belgium and the wider community.

EU laws clearly require an assessment to be made on the direct and indirect impacts of a planned project on biodiversity, climate, human health, soil and water. However, there is a need for further legal clarity around assessing indirect greenhouse gas emissions, which our legal action aims to address. In light of the urgent need to address the climate crisis and reduce plastic pollution, it is crucial to scrutinise projects like Project One.

A court ruling, particularly from the Court of Justice of the EU, would set a precedent and provide clarity on how to navigate the complex intersection of environmental protection and industrial development. Such a ruling would prompt a re-evaluation of our trajectory, compelling us to rethink the role of the petrochemical industry within our planetary boundaries.

It is evident that mere technological fixes focused solely on improving the production process are insufficient. Instead, we must take a holistic approach, questioning the necessity of petrochemical production and ensuring it aligns with the wellbeing of humanity and the environment. This case presents a unique opportunity to advance towards a more sustainable future, where humans and nature thrive together.

How do you connect with wider regional and global environmental movements?

We are proud members of the Break Free from Plastic coalition, actively participating in regular meetings and catch-ups in person and online. Many of our CSO partners are located in Belgium and the Netherlands, allowing easy travel by train for face-to-face meetings, which greatly facilitates collaboration.

We are also engaged in the broader global movement of Break Free from Plastic. This collaboration extends to experts such as CSOs in Asia and the USA. Our focus spans the entire lifecycle of plastic, from the fracking process in the USA to the plastic pollution affecting Southeast Asian countries due to the export of European plastic waste.

Being part of this movement and community facilitates collaboration with experts, scientists and climate activists and provides access to valuable resources and knowledge-sharing opportunities.

What other initiatives are you undertaking to tackle plastics pollution?

Our efforts extend across various stages of the plastic lifecycle. We are actively engaged in combating greenwashing practices, ensuring that companies accurately represent their environmental impact. At the European level, we advocate for stringent regulations, including the Eco-Design Directive, the Packaging and Packaging Waste Regulation and the implementation of the Single-Use Plastic Directive.

We also focus on capacity development and knowledge exchange with partners worldwide, learning from, and collaborating with, organisations tackling similar challenges globally. Our work also encompasses non-financial disclosures, urging companies to recognise the risks associated with heavy investment in plastic production and use. We have engaged with banks, investors, supermarkets and United Nations bodies in relation to their obligations to disclose and manage their material business risk and material environmental impact in relation to plastics.

By addressing multiple angles, such as plastic usage, production and investment, we strive to mitigate the environmental and societal risks posed by plastic pollution. Our comprehensive approach aims to drive systemic change and foster a more sustainable future for all.

Civic space in Belgium is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with ClientEarth through its website or Facebook page, and follow it on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Vibe Klarup, Secretary General of Amnesty International Denmark, about the joint civil society lawsuit brought against the Danish state to stop Danish arms exports to Israel.

Established in 1964 and with 65,000 members, Amnesty International Denmark advocates for a fairer world where every person enjoys freedom and dignity.

CIVICUS speaks about Niger’s recent decision to suspend military cooperation with the USA with Dr Boubacar N’Diaye, Emeritus Professor of Pan-African Studies and Political Science at the College of Wooster, international consultant on security sector governance and former chair of the African Security Sector Network, a pan-African think tank focused on security governance issues in the continent, and particularly in West Africa.

How would you describe Niger’s security situation?

Niger is located in a very strategic position in the continent – it’s at the heart of West Africa and the Sahel, and shares borders with Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali and Nigeria. This makes it an ideal location for geopolitical powers to have a presence.

Until recently, Niger was a key security partner of France and the USA. There were French troops in the country, and in 2012, the government signed an agreement with the USA to establish a drone base to conduct surveillance and military operations against terrorism. Between 1,000 to 1,500 US soldiers were deployed under this agreement.

But despite promises to assist Niger in fighting terrorism, little was done in this regard. Instead, the USA utilised this alliance to carry out surveillance operations in the region in support of its global geopolitical strategy.

On 26 July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, with the junta claiming the president’s response to the dire security situation was inadequate. The country has confronted terrorist attacks on military and civilians for quite some time. Yet the crisis extends beyond security to encompass political and social dimensions.

Following the coup, the junta demanded France and its soldiers leave the country. France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions on Niger, resulting in power cuts and border closures. No goods or medical supplies were allowed in or out across ECOWAS borders, while terrorist attacks persisted, claiming the lives of Nigerien military personnel. Sanctions were subsequently lifted, but the crisis persisted.

Why did Niger suspend military cooperation with the USA?

While France maintained a firm stance against military coups in the region, the USA took a more conciliatory approach. For that, one would have expected General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the junta’s leader, to be more accommodating with the USA.

While the military leaders were quite grateful for this, they were also irked by the arrival of a US delegation of high-ranking State Department officials who, with a typical imperial attitude, lectured them on democracy and demanded they cut all links with the Russian government. They also accused them of having secret deals with Iran to sell uranium.

The fact that the USA belittled and showed no respect to Niger led the military junta to revoke the 2012 agreement, which it highlighted was a secret document not endorsed by the public that granted the USA carte blanche to operate in Niger as they pleased.

In requesting the USA lo leave the country, Niger asserted its rights as a free and sovereign nation. As such, Niger is free to make deals with whichever country it chooses, with neither the USA nor France having the authority to dictate any decision.

This decision significantly affects the USA’s geostrategic position, as Niger is the only country in West Africa where it has a military presence. If compelled to withdraw entirely, the USA would lose its surveillance capabilities and ability to project power. If the USA wants to stay and seek a new agreement with the junta, it will need to tone down its demands. But if it keeps pressing Niger to cut ties with Russia, it is unlikely to be able to reach a deal.

Do you see Niger’s decision as part of a broader regional trend?

Over the past few years, people in other countries in the region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, have shown a desire to reaffirm sovereignty and reject the influence of imperial powers.

France, as the former colonial power and on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the west, has particularly had a lot of influence in the region. It has conducted military operations, done business and even imposed the CFA franc, the regional currency and a relic of French colonialism in Africa.

France, and to a lesser extent the USA, have displayed imperial attitudes towards poor countries in Africa. They have completely disregarded their national sovereignty and ignored their need for dignity. They aim to dictate to their people the type of government they should have, the decisions they should make and who they should partner with. This imperial mentality must stop.

The public, guided by a very active civil society, is happy to see France and the USA being told to leave. They are happy to see Niger behave as a sovereign country that rejects foreign influence, particularly when both countries have done little to nothing to help resolve the insecurity dilemma Niger has faced for a decade.

How do you understand the growing power of Russia in this context?

Russia, and to a lesser extent China, are the default partners in the region. Despite their substantial presence and technological capabilities, France, the USA and even the United Nations have not achieved the same level of success as Russia in nations such as the Central African Republic (CAR) or Mali. Russia has been able to stabilise the security situation in the CAR, at least to some extent, and recapture major strategic cities in Mali that have been under rebel control for the last 10 years.

Countries in the region see an alternative in Russia. This is not rooted in a Cold War mentality but rather in Russia’s longstanding presence in the region, its support for many nations during the early years of independence and its demonstrated effectiveness in combating terrorism.

What international support does Niger’s civil society need?

Nigerien civil society needs the solidarity of civil society across the world. Civil society organisations have suffered a lot. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world and has faced months of a severe embargo, sanctions, electricity cuts and medicine shortages. While these measures have been lifted, so has financial assistance from the EU and France, which has exacerbated socioeconomic hardships and security issues.

The country hasn’t collapsed – as some had hoped – but is undergoing serious socioeconomic hardship and security challenges. The military coup is not to be applauded – it’s a clear sign of political failure. But considering the context, it can be understood. People have accepted that the military are in charge, and now they need all the help and solidarity they can receive.

The international community should adopt a more empathetic stance towards Niger, supporting the country and its authorities. They should avoid punitive measures such as sanctions, which only harm the public, and refrain from imposing decisions and norms upon the nation.

Instead, the international community should find a formula to help Nigerien authorities navigate through this complicated context and transition back to a constitutional order, with the active involvement of local civil society.

Civic space in Niger is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the African Security Sector Network through its website or Facebook and LinkedIn pages, and follow @ASSN_Africa on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks with Malick Ndome, senior policy adviser and board member at the Council of Non-Governmental Organisations in Support of Development (CONGAD), about the recent election in Senegal.

CONGAD was founded in 1982 by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in Senegal to coordinate relations with the state and other partners. CONGAD provides training for CSOs, local authorities and the media. It also advocates for a stronger civil society capable of influencing public policy.

What was the significance of the victory of opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye in the recent presidential election?

Faye’s first-round victory was difficult to predict. However, it is important to recognise the impact of his release from prison, as well as that of Ousmane Sonko, the leader of his party, Senegal’s Patriots (PASTEF), just 10 days before the election.

Sonko had been barred from standing following a controversial conviction for youth corruption and defamation in 2023. Faye was nominated as a candidate in his place, but was also sent to prison for criticising the court’s decision in the Sonko case. Their release galvanised the support of PASTEF supporters and activists, and young people in general, who appreciated their message of change and their anti-corruption aura. In contrast, there seems to have been a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the government coalition.

In addition, there was much speculation and a lot of rumours about President Macky Sall’s lack of support for his party’s presidential candidate, which undoubtedly influenced the electoral landscape.

Given the circumstances, the clear victory of an opposition candidate has profound implications for the strength of Senegalese democracy. First, it signifies a strengthened commitment to the rule of law, guaranteeing every Senegalese citizen a fair chance of access to the highest office. It also demonstrates the resilience of Senegal’s electoral institutions in the face of challenges. Further, despite persistent concerns about voter turnout, Senegalese citizens demonstrated a commendable level of confidence in electoral processes, underlining their commitment to democratic principles. Voter turnout was 61 per cent.

This provides an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the electoral law and the electoral code, with a focus on correcting the main shortcomings identified by political stakeholders and civil society. It is imperative to review the role and effectiveness of institutions such as the National Autonomous Electoral Commission in overseeing elections, ensuring that it has the resources and capacity to fulfil its mandate impartially and effectively.

In sum, while Faye’s victory may have been unexpected, it marks a crucial moment in Senegal’s democratic journey, highlighting both strengths and areas for improvement in its political system.

Was civic space restricted before the election? What challenges did this pose and what can be expected in the future?

Significant restrictions were observed in February, when Sall’s announcement of the postponement of the election led to violent demonstrations and deaths. The Constitutional Council’s positive response in favour of holding the election helped ease tensions, leading to the lifting of the suspension of TikTok and the restriction of Facebook, which had an impact on digital industries and small-scale workers in the informal sector.

The restriction of civic space has been strongly criticised by various groups and people. Under the new government, we expect to see restrictions on civic space lifted, but I can’t prejudge that. It remains a strong demand from civil society and the political arena.

How did civil society contribute to a free and fair election?

Civil society’s actions were analysed and perceived differently depending on whether you were in the opposition or the presidential camp. There were many citizens’ initiatives to ensure that the electoral timetable was respected and free and transparent elections were held.

Civil society initiatives included the setting up of digital platforms to facilitate communication and citizen mobilisation. Civil society formed groups to voice citizens’ concerns and influence political decisions. It organised forums to raise awareness and mobilise the population to ensure the electoral timetable was respected and the election was transparent.

In addition, civil society organised meetings with presidential candidates to ask them questions and hear their proposals. It also helped to inform the public by publishing press articles and sharing information on electoral issues.

In addition, civil society interacted with stakeholders in sensitive spheres such as religious leaders to promote a climate of peace and stability during the election period. It also facilitated the hosting and coordination of the local, regional and sub-regional structures responsible for overseeing the election, thus ensuring effective and transparent monitoring of the electoral process.

What are civil society’s expectations of the new government?

Civil society has a number of expectations and is advocating several policy measures to protect civic space and human rights and promote good governance.

According to the information available to me, there has not yet been any formal request from civil society. However, it is clear that the restriction of civic space remains civil society’s greatest concern.

Among the political measures advocated are the passing of a press code to provide a better framework for the exercise of journalism and the publication of implementing decrees, as well as the revision of article 80 of the Constitution concerning offences against the head of state. Civil society is also calling for the adoption of a law to protect whistleblowers and human rights defenders, as well as the publication of reports by the Court of Audit and the prosecution of offenders.

Civil society calls for institutional change in the governance of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and for the establishment of a financial prosecutor’s office with broad responsibilities.

Finally, the fight against corruption and for better governance is a major concern for civil society, which hopes that the new government will take effective measures in this direction.

Civic space in Senegal is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CONGAD through its website.

CIVICUS speaks with Myriam Correa, director of Collective Aid, about the situation of migrants across the Balkan migration route.

Initially under the name BelgrAid, Collective Aid was established in 2017 in response to the changing needs of migrants and refugees in Serbia. It currently has offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, France and Serbia. It provides services to cover aid gaps and improve the lives of people on the move.

What effects have recent policy changes had on migration along the Balkan route?

In early 2023, we witnessed an increase in migration along the Balkan route, particularly in Bosnia and Serbia, even though migrants were staying for a shorter time. This posed challenges for organisations like ours in locating and assisting people. Increased movement and rapid turnover made migrants harder to reach and rendered the phenomenon less visible – just as the authorities wanted. However, from a humanitarian standpoint, this only heightened risks.

On 25 October, Serbia initiated a military operation along its border with Hungary, targeting areas with high levels of border crossings. This led to the closure of refugee camps in the north and the forced relocation of migrants to centres in the south. Military presence escalated tensions, making access to migrants even more challenging. Arms proliferated and we observed instances of violence, including mistreatment of our personnel by the police.

The subsequent absence of migrants in previously bustling areas indicated that the authorities had achieved their aim. However, some traces of migration still lingered, albeit in reduced numbers, with Bosnian camps experiencing a notable influx.

The exact forms of migration are now unclear. Recent actions by the Serbian government, such as the temporary closure of southern camps, add to the uncertainty surrounding future migration patterns. As we continue to navigate these challenges, it is imperative for humanitarian efforts to remain adaptable and responsive to the evolving dynamics along the Balkan route.

What routes are migrants taking to reach western Europe?

Migrants travel from Turkey to the Aegean Islands or Evros and then enter Greece. After Greece, there are various routes. Some people take flights, but others cannot afford air travel. Some take shortcuts. Some enter Bulgaria directly from Turkey, while others enter the country from Greece. As a result needs are increasingly high in Bulgaria.

Several organisations currently focus on Bulgaria. We recently conducted a location assessment covering the border between Serbia and Bulgaria, the capital, Sofia, and the border between Bulgaria and Turkey. Significant numbers of people are crossing and have a pressing need for basic humanitarian services such as food, water, sanitation and hygiene services.

Local organisations lack government support to advocate against human rights violations. This means there is a crucial advocacy need in Bulgaria. One notable town is Harmali, near the border with Turkey, which has camps for asylum seekers and is heavily militarised. Sofia also has a significant migrant population, expected to increase due to Romania’s inclusion in the Schengen area. This makes Sofia a potential hotspot.

Further along the border with Serbia, Ragueman serves as a major crossing point. This region hosts several camps, primarily in southern Serbia near the Bulgarian border. The journey continues through Bosnia and Croatia into the European Union (EU). However, there are challenges in crossing the Bosnia-Croatia border, particularly at Hajj, due to reported pushbacks. Our organisation monitors border violence, mostly reported from the Croatian side, with Sarajevo serving as a refuge for those pushed back, particularly during harsh winters.

Bulgaria has become a gateway to the rest of Europe. But specific points like Seredets and road 79 pose dangers, with smugglers providing stimulants to keep migrants awake during crossings, leading to fatal consequences. Both Bulgaria and Serbia have seen severe instances of violence, with reports of brutal treatment by border authorities, including mutilation and burning. Such atrocities are alarming and demand immediate attention.

In contrast, Bosnia is emerging as a relatively safe passage, providing temporary respite for migrants. The living conditions in Bosnian camps have improved, though challenges persist during winters due to inadequate insulation, a lack of essential items and low maintenance standards.

Overall, the journey is perilous, with varying experiences based on financial resources and geographical factors. But despite the hardships, migrants persevere, hoping for a better life in Europe.

What’s the situation of migrants from conflict-affected regions travelling along the Balkan route?

The short answer is that these migrants experience an unbearable amount of traumatisation. Most people who traverse this route are fleeing conflict – including genocide, ethnic oppression, religious persecution and collapsing regimes. They come from countries such as Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria. They are not economic migrants. They are seeking safety in Europe. It is shocking that they have to endure such trials, particularly considering that while Bosnia and Serbia are not EU countries, they are still in Europe. And the fact that Bulgaria and Croatia are part of the EU raises thorny questions about why such hardships persist.

The initial reaction is often shock, followed by a profound sense of hopelessness. It is disheartening to realise that safety remains a distant dream and the journey ahead is bleak. People are aware that their lives remain at risk but have limited knowledge about the challenges they will face. Misinformation and reluctance to share the full extent of their suffering with loved ones exacerbate the situation.

Regardless of migrants’ origins, the challenges they face are consistent. They endure rough living conditions, sleeping in tents, bushes, forests or abandoned buildings. The emergence of white supremacist sentiments in Europe adds another layer of vulnerability, making them easy targets for violence.

It is important to note that most people crossing the Balkan route are single men, with few women and families. While there are some families on the road and a family camp in Sarajevo, most migrants are single men. This is a reflection of the perilous conditions along the route, which are unsuitable for women and children.

Smuggling gangs are streamlining the process, making crossings more efficient, but at the cost of safety. Migrants are left at the mercy of criminals who view them as a mere source of income and are indifferent to their wellbeing. Many disappear without a trace.

Survivors face immense psychological trauma. They endure sexual, physical and psychological violence, compounded by environmental hardships and homelessness. The perpetual threat triggers a constant fight-or-flight response, hindering cognitive functions and deteriorating mental health. Chronic stress, reflected in elevated cortisol levels, poses severe health risks.

Hygiene-related issues, such as scabies, exacerbate the already dire situation. Lack of access to proper sanitation and healthcare amplifies the suffering, turning minor ailments into life-threatening conditions. The lack of awareness of and attention to these issues perpetuates the cycle of suffering, highlighting the urgent need for comprehensive solutions and compassionate action.

In sum, the refugee experience in Europe is a harrowing journey marked by trauma, violence and despair. It is imperative to address the underlying issues and provide adequate support to those in need, ensuring that every person is treated with dignity and compassion.

What support do civil society organisations working along the Balkan route need for their work?

The most obvious, yet the truest, answer is funding. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attention and empathy have understandably shifted towards Ukraine and its people. However, grassroots organisations working on the frontlines with other migrant groups continue to face significant challenges in fundraising. For instance, Collective Aid used to easily raise €15,000 to €30,000 (approx. US$16,200 to US$32,400) twice a year, but now struggles to raise as little as €5,000 (approx. US$ 5,400). This has taken a massive toll on these organisations.

The redirection of donor funding to other areas, such as Lebanon and the Middle East, has further compounded the issue. The recent crises in Gaza, Sudan, Syria and Turkey have also diverted attention and resources away from the ongoing migrant crisis within European borders.

Lack of financial support is the biggest obstacle faced by grassroots organisations, pushing them to their limits as they struggle to support migrants on the ground.

Get in touch with Collective Aid through its website or Facebook page, and follow @collective_aid on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Michal Piško, Director of Transparency International Slovensko, about Slovakia’s recent first-round presidential election and the upcoming runoff.

Transparency International Slovensko is a Slovak civil society organisation aimed at increasing institutional transparency and combatting corruption.

What’s at stake in this presidential election?

Slovakia’s presidency holds limited powers, although it has strong legitimacy arising from its direct popular election. Its most significant powers include vetoing laws – which a parliamentary majority can relatively easily overcome – and appointing some key state positions, such as constitutional judges.

However, it can become a key player in critical junctures, as seen at the beginning of 2024. The governing coalition pushed for a harmful amendment to the Criminal Code in a fast-track legislative procedure. The new rules would have complicated the investigation and punishment of serious corruption cases by significantly shortening penalties and statutes of limitations. The current president, Zuzana Čaputová, challenged the amendment in the Constitutional Court, which partially suspended it coming into effect.

The role of the president is also crucial beyond their formal competencies, particularly in significant public debates.

What are the main campaign issues and the candidates’ positions? 

The first round of the presidential election was held on 23 March. Čaputová decided not to run for re-election. Ivan Korčok, a pro-European former foreign minister who emerged as a civic candidate that was later backed by opposition parties, challenged Prime Minister Robert Fico’s ally and current speaker of parliament, Peter Pellegrini. Representing the opposition and the government coalition respectively, they will now compete in the runoff that will take place on 6 April.

The central campaign Issue is the role of the president: whether they are meant to be closely aligned with the government or provide a counterbalance. Given that the current administration is led by a four-time Prime Minister known for his aggressive rhetoric and actions undermining the rule of law, it has been key to have a critical president playing an active role. If Pellegrini wins, it would bolster the government’s capacity to implement its controversial policies.

How free and fair has the election process been so far?

Transparency International Slovakia, a well-known anti-corruption organisation, has been actively monitoring the transparency and fairness of election campaigns and financing for a long time.

Unfortunately, the current campaign cannot be considered transparent or fair, particularly because of Pellegrini’s failure to disclose donor information and the significant lack of information on his campaign expenses.

The process has also been marred by negative campaigning orchestrated by politicians or hidden sources targeting Korčok, portraying him as a war promoter. It has also been distorted by the parallel election campaign for the European Parliament, in which both coalition and opposition parties indirectly support or criticise presidential candidates.

What can we expect in the runoff?

In the first round, pre-election opinion polls generally underestimated voter turnout and Korčok’s performance. Despite expectations, first-round voter turnout exceeded 50 per cent, a notable increase compared to previous years. Another surprise was Korčok’s relatively significant result, with more than 42 per cent of the vote and a 5.5-point lead over Pellegrini. Most pollsters expected more balanced results.

However, the situation could still change in the runoff, as Pellegrini may receive the support of third-placed candidate Štefan Harabin’s anti-west and anti-system voters.

Right now, both candidates seem to have fairly balanced chances of success. While Pellegrini is primarily targeting his messaging at anti-system voters, Korčok is attempting to mobilise pro-European voters.

It is still unclear which candidate most Hungarian voters, who make up almost 10 per cent of Slovakia’s population, will support. Historically, they have leaned towards pro-European and democratic politicians, but their decision may also be influenced by the fact that Hungary’s authoritarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is aligned with the current Slovak government.

Despite Pellegrini not being openly pro-Russia, his victory would strengthen the current government’s position and reinforce Slovakia’s image as a problematic country with anti-democratic tendencies within the European Union. It would also intensify the existing division within the Visegrad Group, a Central European alliance of four countries, two of which – the Czech Republic and Poland – would continue leaning towards the west, while Hungary and Slovakia would further lean towards Russia.

Civic space in Slovakia is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Transparency International Slovensko through its website or Facebook, Instagram and Linkedin pages, and follow @transparencysk on Twitter and @TISlovensko on Youtube.

PORTUGUESE

CIVICUS speaks with Simão Tila, executive director of the League of NGOs in Mozambique (JOINT), about the increase in violence in northern Mozambique, its causes and civil society’s efforts to help resolve the situation.

Founded in 2007, JOINT is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to strengthen the role of Mozambican civil society and its participation in the country’s socio-economic development.

What are the causes of the conflict in northern Mozambique?

It’s a complicated question. However, many see the war in Cabo Delgado as stemming from accumulated resentment, people’s frustration at seeing natural wealth and land being exploited without – as yet – obvious benefits, lack of job opportunities for young people entering the labour market and popular revolt against the authorities’ excesses. These realities have been documented with some frequency and credibility, and it is no coincidence that, until recently, the presence of journalists in the province was frowned upon by the authorities.

However, these factors are hardly sufficient to explain the war, since in several other parts of the country similar conflicts happen, sometimes involving violent actions, caused by abuses of power, land occupation and forced displacement, among others. It is important not to confuse conflicts, even violent ones, with war, which would imply treating the government and terrorists in the same way.

A lot of research is underway, but there is still not much evidence of who is behind the attacks. What we do know is that it is a group with Islamic religious affiliations. It calls itself Al-Shabab and, in the attacks it carries out, it always displays writings related to Islam. So far, we don’t have precise information to talk about the nature of the attacks, who is responsible and who is behind them. But the truth is that the problem of terrorism in northern Mozambique began with the discovery of natural resources such as gas and precious stones, particularly rubies, among other minerals.

To some extent, this form of terrorism has ideological and civilisational characteristics, because the terrorist methods and the motivations of its protagonists are based on sectarian religious convictions inspired by groups in the Sahel. This means that, in the event of peace, other religious faiths are allowed – as long as they subordinate themselves, pay a fee and their followers don’t behave in public in a way considered un-Islamic. However, in the event of war, it is permitted to kill captives by beheading or otherwise, enslave them and use women for sexual purposes, among other practices.

The war is taking place in an environment where there is resentment at the predatory actions of businesspeople and members of the government. It has evolved from one-off conflicts since 2007 to violent actions since 2017 and, since late 2019, to an apparent war against the state and the population characterised by killings by beheading of civilians and soldiers and the destruction of state infrastructure.

How are people being affected and what assistance do they need?

The people most affected are those who live in neighbourhoods and districts that are attacked and are displaced, forced to move from one place to another. They lose their belongings and their homes, as most of them are burnt down. They flee in a hurry and are unable to recover anything. As well as losing family members, they are sometimes captured by terrorists and brutally murdered. Those who survive end up in reception centres and are then resettled in safe but deplorable conditions.

These families experience various needs, the most obvious being food and a safe place where they can rebuild their homes and restart their lives. And this is always difficult, because before being attacked and abandoning their homes, many of these displaced and resettled families lived mainly from agriculture. And in the places where they are being resettled the conditions are not always adequate for them to continue farming. It is therefore necessary to invest in other activities to allow them to continue their lives and generate income. This can include starting a business, setting up savings clubs, accessing short vocational courses and providing tools, seeds and materials for agricultural activities.

How is civil society working to respond to this situation?

Civil society has allied itself with the group that is part of the Humanitarian Country Team and has developed range of activities to support displaced people. In recent times, the concept and approach of ‘localisation’ has emerged, which involves developing and strengthening national organisations with tools and capacities so they can lead processes in emergencies and humanitarian crises. This is something that deserves praise, particularly for the United Nations agencies and other partners who are leading this localisation process to empower local organisations and provide them with the necessary tools so they can themselves intervene. We are living in a context of reduced funding, which makes it even more crucial for local organisations to take the lead.

In addition, Mozambican authorities receive international support to help victims, as well as for the efforts of the Disaster Management Institute, and to deal with the problems of communities arising from terrorism in the north. It is also important to highlight the positive role of international organisations, which provide a significant contribution to improving livelihoods and developing other capacities to enable communities to continue their lives as normal.

What are the biggest obstacles to peace in the region?

We have faced access problems due to the lack of ease of movement. Whenever we try to access these sites, we must consider security issues. Although we have teams dedicated to security, it’s not always safe to work there, as attacks can occur at any time. In addition, the number of displaced people increases with each attack, resulting in a growing need for support. However, we often don’t have the necessary resources to deal with the situation.

In addition, Mozambique is facing climatic events that are affecting various regions. This results in a dispersion of resources, with the need to cater both for those affected by natural disasters and those who are fleeing the war and seeking refuge.

There are cyclones accompanied by rain that end up resulting in flooding in some regions, particularly in low-lying areas with high groundwater levels, causing the destruction of crops and creating pockets of hunger in various parts of the country. These situations require support to deal with the destruction of homes, the evacuation of people from flooded areas and the subsequent provision of temporary shelter. Generally, accommodation centres for these people are set up in schools, which also means the school term must be interrupted because people are now living in these facilities. These climatic events also cause soil erosion problems.

I would therefore like to call on the international community, particularly cooperation partners, to invest significantly in localisation efforts. This means strengthening institutions and CSOs in Mozambique to provide them with the necessary resources and tools. It is crucial for these CSOs to work closely with international emergency and humanitarian aid agencies to share knowledge and experience on the ground.

What space does Mozambican civil society have, what constraints does it face and what international support does it need?

Mozambican civil society plays crucial roles. Even in the face of war, it has dedicated itself to promoting peace and to efforts aimed at reconciliation and making a significant contribution to ending the conflict. However, to continue this work it needs more support and spaces for intervention, as well as the opening up of the state and recognition of the role civil society plays. Civil society needs to be recognised so it doesn’t remain passive in its relations with the authorities. It needs to reach out to communities, raise awareness and bring about a change in mentality so they too become involved in the fight for peace, particularly in the areas affected by conflict. This requires resources and recognition. In addition, it is essential to provide the necessary means for civil society to carry out its work effectively.

Further, it is important to establish processes to exchange experiences with civil society in other countries facing similar challenges so we can better learn from the experiences of others and find more effective solutions adapted to our reality and context.

Civic space in Mozambique is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with JOINT through its website.

CIVICUS speaks about the potential approval of a Law on Foreign Representatives that would further restrict civil society in Kyrgyzstan with Murat Karypov, Project Coordinator of the legal programme of Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan.

Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan is a human rights organisation and one of Kyrgyzstan’s oldest and largest civil society organisations (CSO). Founded in 1999, it works to protect and promote human rights and freedoms, particularly freedoms of association and expression. It provides legal help to civic activists, people from excluded groups and torture victims. It also promotes human rights through arts, including through its annual International Documentary Film Festival on Human Rights.

How is civil society changing in Kyrgyzstan?

Civil society in Kyrgyzstan has changed significantly in recent years. More and more young people are involved in processes to protect and promote human rights and freedoms, and young activists are particularly interested in raising the level of legal consciousness, awareness of international law and international treaties and agreements to which Kyrgyzstan is a party. A large number of young people are interested in improving the situation in the country and openly talk about their proposals and ideas for the socio-economic and political development of Kyrgyzstan. Projects by international organisations aimed at promoting women’s leadership and increasing the level of participation of local communities in decision-making processes at the national level are gaining popularity.

Since 2018, Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan has successfully implemented a study in partnership with the Global Association for Disaster Risk Reduction on promoting the voices of local communities to decision-makers from local to global and reducing gaps between communities. The resulting methodology was effectively applied by Bir Duino to train women community deputies to increase their participation in decision-making processes.

Today, civil society realises the importance of joint actions to protect rights and freedoms in Kyrgyzstan. Activists are more united.

What is the Law on Foreign Representatives?

A new law on CSOs, the Law on Foreign representatives, is making its way through parliament. Its main purpose is to increase the national authorities’ monitoring and evaluation of CSOs.

It’s a version of laws adopted in different countries known as foreign agents’ laws. It’s much like the law in Russia. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law did a comparative analysis and found that these two laws are very similar.

Already all CSOs regularly provide many mandatory reports in electronic and written form, every month and annually. So the requirement to provide some additional reports is not a challenge for us. But the main issue is how the law will be implemented, and whether it leads to more control over CSO activities.

Some members of parliament say the main reason for this new law is because a lot of CSOs don’t provide sufficient information about their activities, particularly their budgets. They further accuse CSOs of hiding their real purposes, saying some are involved in political lobbying and creating political instability.

As a CSO, we’re responsible for every dollar we receive from international donors. We’re open to providing any kind of information about activities within a funded project. International donors are very strict in their requirements about how funding should be used. I think it’s almost impossible to spend even one dollar for other purposes. That’s why for our organisation and a lot of CSOs, we’re absolutely sure we’re transparent and accountable for any kind of funding we receive from international donors.

How could the new law affect civil society in Kyrgyzstan?

The question is still open. Will this law be accepted or not? Because even after the results of the third stage of consideration, we have some hope the president will use his veto power to refuse this law.

Even after the acceptance of this law, our organisation and partners, and a lot of other CSOs, will go on with our activities and our project implementation, but it will definitely affect our activities, particularly those on human rights. A lot of activities could be classed as political activities, meaning they will be restricted.

Activists have joined efforts to inform international organisations and financial institutions about the need for the president to veto the law due to its inconsistency with human rights principles and standards under the key UN guidelines and the Aarhus Convention, an environmental rights treaty.

Joint appeals on this bill were made on behalf of local CSOs, international organisations and international financial institutions. Domestically, almost 100 local CSOs issued a statement on their position, and over 30 international CSOs published a statement on the new law, including some from the Russian Federation as well as other European countries. They are showing solidarity with our position.

The next steps are to wait for the president’s final decision. There is nothing more the international community can do in this matter.

How might international donors respond?

Even if international donors can no longer implement projects that are seen as political, there are many fields of work they can support. If human rights funding is going to be limited, attention could be given to implementing projects, for example, in the sphere of education, public health or environment.

For example, our organisation closely and actively works with local communities in distant and mountainous regions. People at the local level are not very well informed about the activities of international donors. That’s why their opinions can be manipulated. More conservative groups will tell them that international donors or CSOs are involved in political issues. It can be difficult for us to change their mind and explain we are not involved in political issues. But just imagine if, for example, an organisation supports the construction of a hospital or school of some kind, or reconstruction work, then people in the community will understand that international donors provided support. And nobody will have opportunity to say it’s a political issue or some kind of foreign influence.

Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan has been targeted for pressure and discrimination by conservative groups. Nevertheless, we continue to work to engage with local communities, raise their awareness of the importance of advancing international principles of human rights and freedoms, along with disaster risk reduction, and promote community voices to local to global decision makers.

Civic space in Kyrgyzstan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan through its webpage or Facebook page, and follow @birduino_kg on Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks about the passing of a new security law and the state of civic space in Hong Kong with Patrick Poon.

Patrick is currently a visiting researcher of the University of Tokyo. He is an advisor for the UK-based ‘The 29 Principles’, which supports human rights lawyers in China and Hong Kong, a board member of Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and advisor for the Tokyo-based Asian Lawyers Network.

Patrick was a researcher with Amnesty International’s International Secretariat from 2013 to 2020, mainly covering human rights defenders in China and human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. He was also a board member of Amnesty International Hong Kong from 2009 to 2013 and the executive secretary and a board member of the Independent Chinese PEN Center from 2009 to 2013.

CIVICUS speaks with Eva Lia Colombo, Project Leader Climate & Gender at WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform, about the state of the feminist movement in the Netherlands amid the rise of the far right and the cancellation of a feminist march on 10 March.

WO=MEN is the preeminent Dutch platform striving for worldwide gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. It monitors policy, shares knowledge, joins forces and connects and mobilises people.

Why was the 10 March Feminist March cancelled?

To give some context, on the morning of the Feminist March, there was a separate protest. In Amsterdam, people protested against the visit of the Israeli president, who was invited to open the National Holocaust Museum. This led to clashes with the police during the morning march. The Feminist March foundation, which has organised the Feminist March for several years, first postponed the march that day and then later announced its closure as an organisation. This left us without much information. It mentioned on its website that it cancelled the demonstration due to safety concerns after conflicts with the police earlier that day.

Looking ahead, I am unsure about next year’s plans for International Women’s Day. While we may not be officially affiliated with the Feminist March organisation, we joined them each year together with various members of our platform. However, I want to emphasise that the Feminist March is just one of many activities organised by the women’s rights and gender equality movement around International Women’s Day. Our movement remains strong and I think there will always be demonstrations and marches, whether one foundation leads it or there are multiple organisations and initiatives.

What recent achievements has the Dutch feminist movement made? What have been its biggest challenges? 

There are many achievements at the national level, such as the removal of the mandatory five-day period before abortions. This was a requirement to wait five days to reflect on the decision, but that’s no longer compulsory. Additionally, the #MeToo movement in the Netherlands raised awareness about gender equality and inappropriate sexual behaviour. This led to the appointment of a female Commissioner in April 2022 to research and raise awareness about these issues in society.

We are more focused on international policies. One significant achievement I would like to highlight is the implementation of a feminist foreign policy by the Dutch government in 2022. This policy aims to strengthen the rights and positions of women and girls in various international policies, including asylum, climate, defence, development cooperation, migration, peace, security and trade.

The policy is based on four principles: rights, representation, resources and a reality check. It focuses on protecting women’s rights, involving women in policymaking, providing funds for women’s organisations and analysing policies for potential negative impacts on women and girls. It is not just about women but includes other excluded groups and has an intersectional approach. We've published a magazine with evidence-based stories to support this policy.

Dutch civil society has advocated for this policy and WO=MEN has been instrumental in this, by consolidating and coordinating advocacy messages and facilitating consultation sessions among partners and members for the Minister for Foreign Affairs and members of parliament. The government also involved civil society in developing tools to implement the policy.

As a project lead on climate and gender, I also observed how the Netherlands actively promoted inclusiveness and gender equality during the COP28 climate summit in the United Arab Emirates last year and gave visible attention to the link between gender and climate in public social media statements.

Unfortunately, this has not yet led to the integration of gender in many negotiating topics, partly due to the huge pushback on gender from conservative countries. A lot of work needs to be done yet, but these are the small achievements we should celebrate.

In the Netherlands, despite the country being seen as a pioneer in gender equality, anti-rights movements are gaining ground, posing challenges to progress, particularly regarding political participation and issues like abortion. In light of these challenges, it is crucial to continue working toward permanent changes and foster a better understanding of feminism within broader society for systemic change and inclusivity. There is a need for greater gender equality in decision-making  positions to structurally address social norms that perpetuate inequalities.

How do you think conditions for activism, and specifically for feminist activism, will change under a new government resulting from the November election?

I believe that if we end up with a far-right  coalition, it will likely lead to increased polarisation, a shrinking space for civil society and challenges in making progress on gender equality and women’s rights.

One concerning trend already emerging in the Netherlands is the discussion around the right to protest. Amnesty International’s 2022 report highlighted this issue, and recent debates in parliament underscore its importance. For instance, following protests against the visit by the Israeli president, there were calls for a review of the right to protest. This debate was fuelled by claims that protests disrupted official ceremonies, leading to heightened scrutiny of the right to dissent.

Another issue gaining traction in political discourse is the right of organisations to hold the government accountable in the courts. This debate emerged following a legal victory by the organisation Urgenda, which compelled the government to take action on climate change. Conservative parties have questioned the legitimacy of such organisations and their ability to represent public interests, signalling a concerning trend that undermines democratic principles.

These developments are troubling because they erode trust in democracy and the rule of law. The notion that organisations and citizens can challenge government actions through legal means is fundamental to a functioning democracy. Yet there is a growing sentiment that some groups, particularly those critical of the government, should not have the right to hold it accountable.

Additionally, there’s a bureaucratic burden placed on civil society organisations, with increased demands for transparency and accountability in the allocation of funds. This administrative burden detracts from our ability to focus on our core work and raises concerns about ongoing financial support for our initiatives.

We strongly believe in a diverse platform within the feminist movement, which  is resilient and united in the face of these challenges. We are committed to ensuring that gender equality remains a central focus in both policy and practice.

How does WO=MEN connect with the regional and global feminist movements?

We are a platform consisting of members from various Dutch civil society organisations, all working towards women’s rights and gender equality. Our members include gender and women organisations, trade unions, diaspora organisations, international development and peace groups and humanitarian agencies, among others. Our role is to connect these diverse groups, ensuring they work together effectively rather than lobbying independently on separate issues. We facilitate connections between different fields, such as sustainable peace, climate justice  inclusive trade and sustainable support for women human rights defenders.

Our members directly engage with women and girls globally through local partners, translating their concerns into lobbying efforts at the national, European and United Nations (UN) levels. For example, some focus on UN climate negotiations while others work on the Commission on the Status of Women.

We also work on  specific topics. One focuses on advocating for sustainable support for women’s rights activists worldwide, lobbying for funding and protection for excluded groups. We prioritise those facing shrinking space or threats in their regions. We also work within international feminist consortiums, like Count Me In! and Our Voice Our Futures, which focuses on strengthening feminist social movements by supporting structurally excluded women and girls.

We also take part in marches, give lectures, write articles and engage on social media to raise awareness. We strive to amplify the voices of excluded women and girls from the global south in all our activities.

Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with WO=MEN through its website or Facebook page, and follow @genderplatform on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks about ongoing anti-government protests in Croatia with Oriana Ivković Novokmet, Executive Director of Gong.

Gong is a think-do tank whose work focuses on promoting democratic processes and institutions and developing a democratic political culture in Croatia.

What triggered recent protests?

On 17 February, thousands of people took the streets of the capital, Zagreb, to demand early parliamentary elections. Organised by 11 left and liberal opposition parties, this massive anti-government demonstration was triggered by the appointment of former judge Ivan Turudić as the new state attorney amid media reports linking him to corruption. The opposition fears this appointment will further deteriorate the already compromised reputation of the Croatian judiciary.

According to a report by one of the most influential Croatian newspapers, Jutarnji list, between 2016 and 2020, Turudić, then the president of the Zagreb County Court, exchanged messages with the then state secretary of the ministry of justice, accused in another corruption case. The messages clearly showed they had a romantic relationship. Opposition members argue that Turudić lied to the Parliamentary Committee for the Judiciary when questioned about the meetings they had, claiming their relationship was superficial.

Additionally, President Zoran Milanović accused Turudić of meeting as president of the Zagreb County Court with Zdravko Mamić, a football manager sentenced for tax evasion and embezzlement who is currently a fugitive in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mamić allegedly met with Turudić while a suspect and later when he was under investigation, as noted by the Security Intelligence Agency.

In a context of increasing frustration with the government of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party, which is plagued with corruption accusations, the February protests helped the opposition gain momentum. It subsequently announced plans to stage further protests in several major cities on 23 March.

What’s the state of democracy and civic freedoms in Croatia?

Turudić’s appointment was yet another example of Prime Minister Andrej Plenković’s habit of capturing independent institutions, which he’s done since reaching office. The longer the HDZ and Plenković remain in power, the weaker the rule of law and liberal democracy become. Plenković vowed to reform the HDZ but he has failed to change his party and also reversed progress made in upholding the rule of law in Croatia.

Under Plenković, Croatia is drifting away from the principles it adopted on joining the European Union. During his two terms, institutions such as the Commission for the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest have been significantly weakened. The Commissioner for Information was appointed as a fig leaf so the justice minister could hide the real authors of the Law on Constituencies, which redrew the boundaries of electoral districts to suit the ruling party. This key electoral law was crafted by the HDZ without involving experts, civil society or the opposition. Arbitrary district boundaries were traced on the basis of an unreliable voter registry. This move has undermined public trust in elections and could also result in an even lower voter turnout.

Are protesters able to voice their demands freely?

The government has imposed restrictions on protest rights, including by closing St Mark’s Square, home to key government institutions. Full access to the square is now restricted to government and parliamentary staff, and the area where people are allowed to protest is demarcated with fences. Recent demonstrations like the one on 17 February, however, have ​​seen an expansion of the available space for protesters.

Plenković reacted to these protests by accusing the opposition of being pro-Russian, despite the fact that its only reference to Russia was to mourn Alexei Navalny’s death. On its official Facebook page, the HDZ insulted the opposition and people who supported the protest by labelling them ‘backward leftists’, ‘rampant angry revolutionaries’, ‘Russophiles’, ‘Putinophiles’ and ‘destructive and anti-patriots’. Many members of the government also endorsed this hostile narrative. In this crucial electoral year, Gong’s analysis revealed the use of numerous bots – automated programs that mimic human activity – supporting insults against the opposition on Facebook and attempting to manipulate citizens.

Plenković has tried to silence the media and their sources by adding provisions to the Criminal Code to criminalise leaking of information during the non-public phase of criminal proceedings. The bill however triggered protests by journalists and in response the government amended it to clarify that leaks deemed to be ‘in the public interest’ wouldn’t be criminalised. What is or is not in the public interest will however be determined by judges and Turudić.

What’s at stake in the 2024 elections?

President Milanović shocked Croatia when he announced he would run in parliamentary elections, scheduled for 17 April, as the Social Democratic Party’s (SDP) prime ministerial candidate, entering the ring against Plenković. The Constitutional Court says Milanović can only run for prime minister if he resigns as head of state first. Milanović called them gangsters and continued the campaign with the slogan ‘The rivers of justice are coming’. The SDP’s support grew strongly in the polls, but it now has a furious rhetorical populist at its head, openly saying he will not respect the Constitutional Court.

Campaigns will likely be plagued by offensive speech, contributing to the erosion of democratic values and the integrity of the electoral process. The HDZ is still by far the strongest party, but people are increasingly dissatisfied with the direction of the government and the constant corruption scandals. With Milanović’s entry into the race, the election result has become uncertain.

What are the main challenges for civil society?

Croatian civil society organisations (CSOs) operate in a context marked by a backsliding in liberal democracy, with attacks on activists, the media and independent experts, and challenges to the rule of law. Civic space has significantly contracted, and CSOs face administrative burdens, financial constraints, overwork and underpayment. As a result, many organisations are retreating from the public sphere, decreasing their engagement and doubting if they should continue to question those in power.

Moreover, changes in 2020 to the Council for Civil Society Development reduced the participation of CSOs in decision-making processes, undermining the legitimacy of the body and leading to the government outvoting CSOs and completely dominating law-drafting working groups. We have warned the public and the European Commission (EC) about token CSOs being used to shape anti-corruption laws. Instead of consulting widely with civil society, the government includes these CSOs that have been established to support its agenda rather than promote the public interest. 

In this challenging environment, Gong is set on remaining an active democratic watchdog, using a range of strategies to achieve social impact and foster positive change. These include analysis, research, proposing democratic innovations, advocacy, education, networking and collaboration with diverse stakeholders, including the academic community, civil society, media, politicians, government institutions and society in general.

A recent successful advocacy effort involved the EC unveiling new guidelines for the participation of its members in elections. This initiative was prompted by Gong’s report on EC President Ursula Von Der Leyen’s involvement in a pre-election campaign video for the HDZ. Gong raised this issue with both the EC and the European Ombudsman during Croatia’s 2020 parliamentary election.

For doing this work, we are constantly targeted with defamation campaigns by politicians, particularly those in power. This raises concerns for our safety and must immediately stop.

Civic space in Croatia is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Gong through its website or Instagram page, and follow Gong and Oriana Ivković Novokmet on Facebook, and @GONG_hr and @OrianaIN on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about recent restrictions on freedom of expression in Sri Lanka with Darshatha Gamage, Head of Programmes at Hashtag Generation.

Hashtag Generation is a movement led and run by a group of young tech-savvy, socially conscious Sri Lankans advocating for the meaningful civic and political participation of young people, particularly women and those from minority groups. It mobilises social media and new media tools to encourage dialogue on key social issues, advocates for the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities and raises awareness about the importance of cybersecurity and countering disinformation and online hate speech.

What’s the situation of human rights and civic freedoms in Sri Lanka?

The state of human rights in Sri Lanka has long been concerning. Over the past two years, a deep economic crisis and social unrest have brought intensified human right violations. The president is taking extraordinary measures to restrict dissent with the aim of ensuring anti-government protests remain minimal. Activists and protesters have been arrested often for exercising their right to protest. Journalists have been intimidated or arrested for doing their work.

Civic space is being further restricted through a series of new draconian laws and bills. The Bureau of Rehabilitation Act, passed in February 2023, gives the armed forces authority to run ‘rehabilitation centres’ – military-operated detention camps in which political opponents and government critics can be incarcerated.

Online freedom of expression has been particularly affected. People expressing dissent online, including political activists, satirists and comedians, have been arrested under various charges for the content they post. Even laws such as the 2007 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act, modelled after the international covenant of the same name, has been historically misused to curtail freedom of expression through arbitrary arrest and detention.

In September 2023, the government introduced the Online Safety Bill, aimed at giving legal cover to the curtailment of rights to free expression. A newly tabled Anti-Terrorism Bill has also raised concerns due to its broad definition of terrorism that encompasses statements made through electronic and print media that are considered as inciting acts of violence. The bill would grant the president the authority to ban organisations, impose restrictions on movement, declare specific locations as prohibited areas and introduce new procedures related to curfews.

Why did the government push through these additional restrictions?

The government had a clear intention to curtail online expression critical of democratic deficits and entrenched governance issues. Digital spaces were widely used to mobilise communities and express dissent during the peak of the crisis in 2022, and these protests resulted in the resignation of the sitting president. 

The new Online Safety Act, passed in January 2024, is aimed at regulating online content. Under this law, jail sentences can be imposed on those posting material deemed illegal and social media companies are held liable for content posted on their platforms. The law created a five-member Online Safety Commission charged with deciding which online speech is false or harmful and when to remove content, limit internet access and prosecute users.

The passage of the Online Safety Act indicated that the government was acutely aware of ongoing discontent and intended to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation to prevent people expressing collective dissent by mobilising.

How has civil society reacted to the Online Safety Act?

Civil society has expressed numerous concerns. It highlighted that the Act wasn’t developed through a consultative process. No technical or human rights experts were consulted, which means the law is not only draconian but also practically unworkable. However, it can and will be selectively enforced by the Online Safety Commission, something civil society has also pointed out with concern.

Civil society expressed major doubts about the vague and overly broad terminology used, the disproportionate punishments imposed and the independence of the proposed Commission.

In several key instances, the Act uses very vague terminology. It includes no criteria to identify what is a false statement and no protocol to follow globally accepted standards to verify whether a statement is true or false. Any statement could be considered false if a proper investigation is not conducted. Further, a statement of opinions, which cannot be fact-checked, can be easily deemed a false statement if it’s an expression of dissent.

As for the proposed Commission, civil society has criticised the fact that its members are to be appointed at the president’s discretion and therefore will likely engage in politically influenced decision-making. They will have sweeping powers to enforce the law and interpret its vague terminology, undermining principles of due process and judicial independence. These provisions are likely to be used to target political opponents and activists, particularly during the upcoming election, to be held in late 2024.

Civil society also noted that the law restricts the right to online anonymity by criminalising some forms of anonymity. It is feared this will undermine essential safety measures adopted by activists, whistleblowers and citizens in general.

Sri Lankan civil society consistently advocated against the bill with parliament and the courts. Various civil society groups, including Hashtag Generation, submitted over 45 petitions to the Supreme Court. These resulted in some amendments but didn’t substantially change the nature of the bill. 

There are still ongoing discussions of potential amendments to the Act. However, the government hasn’t approached civil society groups, human rights leaders or technical experts to request their input to improve the Act and hasn’t ensured concerns were properly addressed.

What support does Sri Lankan civil society need from international partners?

International civil society should facilitate dialogue among local partners working on human rights issues and encourage the creation of a unified front. To ensure that rights of Sri Lankans are protected, advocacy needs to be carried out at the global, regional and local levels. It is also important for international civil society organisations to avoid providing support to local organisations that endorse regressive legislation or human right violations. Further, it is important for international partners to develop more inclusive technology-related policies by involving partners and experts from the global south.

Civic space in Sri Lanka is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Hashtag Generation through its website and follow @generation_sl on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Francesca Borg Costanzi, Advocacy Officer at the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, about the recently adopted European Union (EU) Anti-SLAPP Directive and its importance in preventing abusive lawsuits against public watchdogs.

Established to seek justice for murdered journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation is a civil society organisation that advocates for press freedoms and liberal democracy and combats populism, corruption and impunity worldwide.

What are SLAPPs, and why are they a problem?

SLAPPs, short for strategic litigation against public participation, are, as defined by the EU Committee of Ministers’ draft recommendation on countering the use of SLAPPs, ‘legal claims, proceedings and other actions brought in relation to public participation and expression on matters of public interest that have as their main purpose to prevent, restrict or penalise the exercise of rights associated with public participation’.

In other words, they are a means for the powerful to weaponise the law to harass, intimidate, warn and dissuade people from exercising their rights. The claimants’ strategic aim is to silence criticism. SLAPPs suppress the civic freedoms of assembly, association and expression, and undermine the public’s right to know. They supress information that is in the public interest and inflict financial and psychological harm on defendants due to prolonged and costly court battles and the burden of intimidation that comes with legal action.

Concerningly, the use of SLAPPs is on the rise. According to the 2023 SLAPP report published by the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE) in May 2023, the number of SLAPPs across Europe jumped from 570 in 2022 to 820 in 2023. Early indications suggest the upward trend continues in 2024.

What is the Anti-SLAPP Directive?

The EU Anti-SLAPP Directive was adopted by the European Parliament on 27 February to set out minimum standards for anti-SLAPP laws that member states must now transpose into their national legislation. The directive covers SLAPP cases with a cross-border element, irrespective of where the plaintiffs and defendants are based.

When the directive was first launched by the European Commission in April 2022, the Commission’s Vice-President for Values and Transparency Věra Jourová referred to it as ‘Daphne’s Law’, in honour of murdered journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, who at the time of her death in 2017 faced 48 criminal and civil libel suits, most of which her family inherited. The package of measures was a fulfilment of a promise the Commission made to Daphne’s family and broader civil society to protect public watchdogs including journalists, human rights defenders and activists working to hold the powerful to account.

The directive was accompanied by a recommendation for member states that came into effect at the time of its launch, urging complementary measures including legislative steps to address purely domestic SLAPPs and providing training for the judicial and legal profession.

How were you involved in negotiations?

The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation is a founding member of CASE, which has been actively involved in shaping the Anti-SLAPP Directive at every stage. Our experts prepared a policy brief that was used in advocacy efforts with rapporteurs from the three parliamentary committees involved and civil society representatives.

Members of our national working groups engaged with EP members to advocate for CASE’s proposed amendments and discuss implementation at the national level. This collaborative effort resulted in key committee opinions that included most of CASE’s proposed amendments.

The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation contacted all EU member governments to explain the importance of anti-SLAPP measures, and the Foundation’s director, Matthew Caruana Galizia, held individual meetings with the ministers of justice and permanent representatives of several EU member states to advocate for the EU’s proposed directive and recommendation.

When the EP drafted its final opinions and the responsibility passed to the EU Council to draft a compromise text, CASE members organised meetings with permanent representations and ministers of justice from key countries to push for them to include CASE’s amendments in their final text.

Despite some proposals being excluded in the EU Council’s compromise text, CASE continued its advocacy efforts during negotiations in July 2023. We prepared a document outlining which institution’s version of each article would be the strongest and used this document in advocacy meetings with those involved in the negotiations. We also drafted briefing notes on the three most important components of the Anti-SLAPP Directive: its early dismissal mechanism, its definition of what constitutes cross-border and its provisions of remedies. These were sent to key stakeholders in the three EU institutions involved in the negotiations.

CASE’s advocacy was made possible by the consistent work of experts and the relationships established and maintained with key stakeholders in EU institutions.

To what extent did the recently adopted draft respond to civil society’s concerns?

The adopted text addresses some of civil society’s concerns and has moved forward considerably from the EU Council’s original compromise text adopted in June 2023, particularly considering some of the key components of the final text, such as the early dismissal mechanism, the cross-border definition and compensatory damages.

CASE welcomed the adoption of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, emphasising it as the minimum standard for protecting public watchdogs against SLAPPs. It is now up to member states to go beyond these parameters and transpose them into national legislation to effectively safeguard journalists, human rights defenders and activists working to hold power accountable.

The Council of Europe’s Anti-SLAPP Recommendation further complements anti-SLAPP measures by setting out important guidelines for anti-SLAPP legislation that also cover Council of Europe countries, not just EU member states. Civil society will be able to monitor the introduction of anti-SLAPP legislation in various countries and ensure these provide the maximum possible protection.

What else needs to be done to safeguard civil society’s watchdog role in the region?

Member states must introduce national anti-SLAPP legislation to protect public watchdogs. CASE will advocate for the proper transposition of the EU Directive by liaising with civil society members engaged in national advocacy. We will also focus on ensuring the adoption of the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation and adherence to it by Council of Europe member states when drafting anti-SLAPP legislation. Our attention is now shifting to the national level, particularly jurisdictions where there is considerable resistance to the anti-SLAPP Directive. Transposition of the directive will remain our focus for the immediate and foreseeable future.

Get in touch with the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation through its website or Facebook and LinkedIn pages, and follow @FrancescaBorgC2 and @daphnefdtn on Twitter.

PORTUGUESE

CIVICUS speaks about the results of Portugal’s 10 March election with Ana Carmo of Akto, a Portuguese civil society organisation that promotes human rights and democratic values through advocacy, campaigning and education.

What were the key election campaign themes and the main parties’ proposals?

Parties’ campaigns for the 10 March election focused on issues such as housing, health, economic growth, education, social protection – particularly pensions – and the fight against corruption. During debates, other issues were also addressed, such as negotiations with the police – who held some protests and covertly threatened to boycott the election, the formation of coalitions, an issue that arose based on polling data, and the country’s governability.

This election campaign was very atypical and perhaps because of this, equal attention was given to all parties with parliamentary representation, something unusual in Portugal, where competition has been mostly bipartisan, between the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Discussion of political coalitions forced us to think about politics in ideological terms, with major contenders placed on the left, right and far right.

The contest for the prime minister position was between Pedro Nuno Santos of the PS and Luís Montenegro of the PSD as part of the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition. Nuno Santos’ main proposals placed him as the continuation of the incumbent government with a focus on strengthening public investment on all of the campaign’s focus areas. His strategies to deal with the key issues included negotiation, strengthening institutions and greater public investment in public policy. Luís Montenegro, in comparison, centred his campaign on strengthening and stimulating the private sector, establishing public-private partnerships and reducing personal income tax and corporate income tax rates to encourage investment.

It’s important to note that the campaign saw little discussion of proposals or in-depth analysis of political programmes. The pitch-style debates didn’t take us beyond the headlines, creating some confusion as it was hard to tell the political programmes of the different parties apart. Following the debates, the over-abundance of commentary on all TV channels, each with its own bias, also contributed to the confusion of ideas. Even so, and contrary to what was expected due to the presence of a populist party, the debates and the other parties’ campaigns managed to maintain a good level of cordiality and political seriousness.

What led to the AD and PS winning almost the same number of seats?

The wear and tear of the PS government became very apparent during the campaign. Despite Nuno Santos’ great effort to disassociate from former Prime Minister António Costa and present himself as the party’s new face, many people were unhappy and didn’t trust the PS.

According to polls, the number of undecided voters increased as election day approached. The media’s excessive and sensationalised coverage may have contributed to this. With so many people undecided, confused and saturated, an expression of a desire for change was to be expected.

However, it’s important to remember that two years ago the PS won an absolute majority in an election that came about because the Left Bloc rejected the state budget. But it subsequently failed to satisfy people’s major needs, and for the second time its government fell, leading to elections. Nuno Santos’ political ability and perceptions of him, the other parties’ campaigns, leaning mainly towards the right, the influence of mainstream and social media and the European and international context all contributed to a paradigm shift. The fact that, as a result, the PS went from 120 parliamentary seats to around 76 has far-reaching implications.

What are the consequences of this tie?

As a result of the technical tie between the AD and PS, the climate of uncertainty that dominated the campaign continues. If parties are faithful and uncompromising with their positions and their word, it’s very likely that there will be another election in November because the state budget won’t get approved. If this happens, another highly likely scenario is that the far-right Chega party will continue to gain ground and further strengthen its position in parliament.

So this is a critical moment and a window of opportunity for Portuguese democracy to prove its strength – or weakness. Will political parties be able to engage in dialogue for the sake of political stability? What will their approach be to dealing with a populist party that has become a solid third political force? Will the centre bloc be maintained?

If these elections have reminded us of anything, it is that democracies are fragile and imperfect. We’ll see what capacity we have to adapt to democracy’s new contours.

How worrying do you find Chega’s performance?

Chega’s performance has been similar to that of its counterparts in other countries: Donald Trump’s Republican Party, Jair Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally and Matteo Salvini’s Northern League. Its growth is not surprising – it’s even predictable. This is a party that feeds on fear, disinformation and revolt, and follows the growth of similar parties across Europe. Its tactics are no different from those used by other far-right parties.

Chega attracts historical revanchists, xenophobes and racists, the angry and the disaffected. The Algarve region, a district won by Chega, is an example of a region that resents the way it’s been treated by successive governments. This is a region that’s very much affected by seasonal changes and experiences constant failures in dam management, leading to water shortages. Its feeling of being abandoned may explain the election result.

The growth of a populist party is always worrying, as history can attest. It’s all the more concerning given that Portuguese democracy is still young. Just as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 25 April Carnation Revolution when our democracy was born, we are faced with narratives and behaviours that go against the principles of our democracy and our rights and freedoms. The growth of a far-right party is particularly concerning when it comes to the most excluded people: women, the lower and lower-middle classes and young people. That’s why the majority of its voters are male.

How did civil society engage with the elections and how has it reacted to the results?

Despite the high percentage of undecided voters, abstention appeared to decrease. Abstention has always been a concern, hovering around 40 per cent, but historic figures are not accurate due to the unusual number of non-habitual residents and newly registered voters. In these parliamentary elections, abstention was around 34 per cent, but turnout wasn’t up significantly from previous years.

Until the new government takes office, it’s difficult to gauge civil society’s reaction to the election results. There is indeed great concern about the growth of the far right, but if these were protest votes, to what extent can we deduce that voters are satisfied with the result? There is a desire for change, but we don’t know if the desired change will materialise.

When will a new government be formed, and what role might Chega play in it?

It’s not certain there will be a coalition government. Montenegro repeated several times during and after the campaign that he will not enter into a coalition with Chega, and for the PS it doesn’t pay to form a coalition with left-wing parties, as the number of right-wing MPs remains higher or the same. Chega has said on a number of occasions that it would never enter into a coalition, but we are talking about a party that says everything and its opposite, and after the elections it has been pushing for a coalition with AD and says it’s willing to govern together.

Chega’s role will depend more on how the other parties deal with its existence than on its own actions. The other parties have created a firewall around Chega, which has ended up strengthening its presence, and they have shown there’s no desire for this party to be part of a political solution. The PS is focused on being the leader of the opposition. Whether it succeeds in doing so and how effectively will determine the Portuguese political scene.

Would a government that includes the far right pose a real danger to fundamental rights and freedoms?

It depends on how it is included and with what intentions. If AD coalesced with Chega and adopted its ideological line, there would be a real risk.

It’s not desirable for there to be a reactionary force with racist, xenophobic, sexist and revanchist discourse in parliament, but there are ways to mitigate this. Portugal lived through 41 years of dictatorship and has been a democracy for 50 years. It is because of the nature of our past dictatorship experience that our constitution forbids fascist parties and recalls the overthrow of the fascist regime in its preamble.

Portuguese political history shows that there has been more progress in guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms with left-wing socialist governments in power than with right-wing social democratic governments.

When we consider the speeches and proposals of the far right, fundamental rights and freedoms are called into question. However, as a democratic country, there is room for a party like this to exist, just as there are many other parties in opposition that are fiercely in favour of extending these fundamental rights and freedoms. It is up to democracy to demonstrate that it defends these rights and freedoms.

Civic space in Portugal is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Akto through its website or Facebook page, and follow @Akto_org on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about press freedoms in Lesotho with Kananelo Boloetse, chairperson of the Lesotho Chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA Lesotho).

Established in 1996, MISA Lesotho is a civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations and promoting media freedoms and the freedom of expression through research, advocacy, collaboration and capacity development.

CIVICUS speaks about the prospects following the inauguration of a new government in Tuvalu with Kiali Molu, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Affairs at the University of Bergen in Norway and at the University of the South Pacific.

Kiali is a native Tuvaluan and his research, currently funded by the government of Norway, focuses on Tuvalu’s strategies to maintain its statehood and sovereignty as its territory is threatened by sea-level rise.

CIVICUS speaks with Wangechi Wachira, Executive Director of the Centre for Rights, Education and Awareness (CREAW), about recent protests demanding justice for femicide victims and policy changes to combat gender-based violence (GBV) in Kenya.

Founded in 1999, CREAW is a national feminist women’s rights civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to protecting and promoting women’s and girls’ rights and addressing systemic gender inequalities, oppression, exploitation and discrimination.

Why did protest recently erupt in Kenya?

On 27 January, thousands of women and men took the streets to protest against femicides. The protests were triggered by 14 cases in January alone, and their primary objective was to demand accountability from state agencies, particularly law enforcement and the judiciary, in prosecuting perpetrators of femicide and ensuring justice for the victims. The case of John Matara, accused of killing Starlet Wahu, highlighted the failures of the legal and judicial systems, because he had been previously reported for GBV multiple times but had remained free.

Femicide Count reported 48 cases in January and February 2024, compared to 152 cases during 2023, which itself was the highest number in the past five years. Data from Africa Data Hub indicates that over 500 women were killed in acts of femicide from January 2016 to December 2023. It also acknowledges the number is likely much higher, with many killings of women not properly categorised as femicide.

The protest also aimed to raise awareness about the issue, as many people, including those in public office, do not fully understand the severity of femicide as the most extreme form of GBV. A 2021 report by the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime revealed that 56 per cent of all female homicides globally are committed by intimate partners or family members.

Protesters sought to educate the public on victim-blaming, which empowers perpetrators and deters survivors from reporting abuse. By addressing the victim-blaming and shaming associated with GBV, the protests challenged societal norms and encouraged survivors to seek support and justice.

What were protesters’ demands to the government?

We urged the president to issue a declaration recognising GBV and femicides as a national crisis requiring an emergency response. Such a declaration must be accompanied by annual reports provided during the State of the Nation address, outlining measures taken to combat the problem.

We also urge the government to establish a national public inquiry and official review of events or actions ordered by a government body for all femicide cases to track and ensure accountability.

Given the lack of integrated official data, we also demand the government improves data collection on femicides and GBV, aligning it with international frameworks. This data is crucial for evidence-based policymaking and effective criminal justice responses.

Additionally, we call for increased funding for GBV prevention programmes and demand an inclusive appointment process for all public positions, ensuring representation from grassroots feminist organisations and youth groups.

How big a problem is GBV in Kenya, and what are its root causes?

GBV is pervasive in Kenya, mirroring global trends. It exists in several forms, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse. According to the 2022 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, over 40 per cent of women have experienced physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some point in their lives. GBV also manifests in harmful practices such as female genital mutilation and child marriages. Femicides are a frequent occurrence and appear to be on the rise.

The roots of GBV are found in patriarchal underpinnings of our society, which promote harmful social and cultural practices often reinforced by religious beliefs. Power is concentrated in men’s hands and women have little to none. Such unequal dynamics cannot but foster violence.

Economic factors such as poverty help perpetuate GBV by pushing women to stay in abusive relationships due to lack of financial independence. They also push families in famine-hit areas to marry off young girls for economic gain, and specifically to be able to acquire livestock in return.

Conflict, crises and displacement leave women and girls especially vulnerable to violence. A recent example is the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw an 80 per cent increase in intimate partner violence in 2020.

How does civil society work to address GBV in Kenya?

Civil society plays key roles in addressing GBV. CREAW specifically has a workstream focused on ending violence against women and girls. Over the years, we have provided free legal aid and psychosocial support to over 20,857 GBV survivors. We are among the few CSOs that offer these services. We collaborate closely with state-sponsored legal aid programmes, such as the National Legal Aid Service, to ensure integrated, efficient and timely GBV service delivery. Our work is enhanced by strategic partnerships with various GBV working groups, Court User Committees, relevant health institutions, parts of criminal justice system and community dispute resolution mechanisms.

CREAW actively engages with legislators and policymakers at both national and county levels to advocate for the development and implementation of regulatory frameworks on GBV. Our advocacy contributed to the passage of the 2006 Sexual Offences Act, 2013 Matrimonial Property Act, 2014 Marriage Act and the 2015 Protection Against Domestic Violence Act.

The aim of the Sexual Offences Act is to set out what constitute sexual offences, provide ways to prevent illegal sexual acts and protect all people from them. The Matrimonial Property Act sought to provide clear rules for what belongs in a marriage’s matrimonial estate and provide a legal framework for the ownership, management and distribution of matrimonial property that would apply to all types of unions. This was a monumental achievement because it recognised rights women didn’t previously have, such as owning and buying land.

The Marriage Act consolidated various laws on marriage, provided procedures for separation and divorce and regulated the custody and maintenance of children in the event of separation or divorce. The Protection Against Domestic Violence Act provides avenues for victims and survivors of violence to report their circumstances to relevant authorities, seek legal redress and receive justice.

CREAW also supports the county governments of Kilifi and Meru, the Kenya Police Service and the Kenyan judiciary in strengthening their mechanisms for implementing existing GBV laws and policies.

CREAW’s commitment to supporting survivors extends to financial inclusion. Since 2020, we have implemented a programme, the Jasiri Fund (‘bold’ in Swahili) that provides GBV survivors with quality financial services to mitigate the effects of GBV and enable economic empowerment. To date, the project has supported around 1,000 survivors with a total of US$400,000, leading to the establishment of at least 878 women-owned enterprises. The Jasiri Fund offers complementary support, including access to justice, psychosocial support, shelters, business grants and case management grants, accompanied by financial training and business development support. Its success led to its scaling up to cover more counties and support more survivors.

We are also part of the National Gender Based Violence working group, coordinated by the National Gender and Equality Commission and the National Women’s Steering Committee, and of the National Council on the Administration of Justice Working Committee on GBV.

CREAW served as a co-convener of the Kenya Chapter of the Africa Unite campaign against GBV. We are also members of the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals Group. We contribute to various campaigns such as Gender is My Agenda and globally contribute to the Generation Equality Forum commitments.

Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CREAW through its website or its Facebook or Instagram pages, and follow @CREAWKenya and @Wwangechi_leah on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Anjali Bhardwaj, founding member of the Society for Citizen Vigilance Initiatives (Satark Nagrik Sangathan, SNS), about recent electoral reforms and civil society efforts to ensure the quality of India’s upcoming election.

Established in 2003, SNS is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote government transparency and accountability and foster active citizen participation.

What recent changes have been made to rules on campaign financing?

On 15 February, the Supreme Court ruled the electoral bond system currently used to finance election campaigns unconstitutional. This is a positive change, with a potential to bring transparency to campaign financing.

Introduced in 2018, the electoral bond scheme allowed people and organisations to buy designated bank bonds ranging from 1,000 to 10 million rupees (approx. US$12 to US$120,000) to donate to political campaigns in a completely anonymous way. When it introduced this system, the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) presented it as a measure to combat corruption and increase transparency in political financing.

Before the bond system was introduced, political parties could receive funds in cash or through the banking system, but large corporate donations were often made in cash. All cash donations below 20,000 rupees (approx. US$240) were anonymous under the Income Tax Act. So to hoodwink the system, parties often reported large cash donations as multiple donations of amounts smaller than 20,000 rupees.

The electoral bond scheme was presented as a measure to increase transparency but the anonymity it ensured had the opposite effects. The opacity it enabled allowed single donors to provide unlimited funding. It hasn’t allowed people, CSOs, opposition political parties or even the Election Commission of India to track the flow of money in politics. It has compromised the public’s right to information, as voters are unable to discern the extent or sources of funding political parties receive. This limited people’s democratic right to make informed voting decisions.

What was the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision?

The Supreme Court first addressed this issue as early as 2019, acknowledging the bond system’s potential harm to democracy but allowing it to continue while it analysed the substance of the case. But even back then, it emphasised the deepened information imbalance created by a system that allowed the ruling party to access information about donors and donations through the government-controlled bank while leaving opposition parties and the public in the dark.

In its recent ruling, the Supreme Court stressed that electoral bonds infringe article 19 of the constitution because without the right to information in electoral matters, the rights to free speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 cannot be fully realised.

Voters in India predominantly support parties, rather than individual candidates. When large corporations contribute generous funds to political parties, there is the presumption that they do so in the expectation of receiving favours in return once parties become part of governments. When favours are returned, policy is guided not by promises made to voters or by people’s needs but by the interests of funders. This is why funding transparency is crucial for informed voting. Without this information, voters cannot know what to expect when parties access government.

Electoral bonds exacerbated corruption through anonymous funding that gave free rein to large corporations to influence policy. They also made the playing field even more uneven, as the BJP consistently received a substantial share of electoral bonds.

The Supreme Court judgment declared the scheme and associated amendments unconstitutional, emphasising the importance of the right to information. The court prohibited further transactions and mandated disclosure of past transactions, marking a significant move towards restoring transparency and fairness in India’s electoral process.

How has civic space evolved under Prime Minister Narendra Modi?

Regrettably, since the beginning of the Modi government in 2014 we have seen a significant contraction of civic space, due to systematic attacks on the crucial right to dissent, a cornerstone of any democracy.

The essence of democracy lies in people’s right to question those in power. But in India, this right has been under attack in three primary ways.

First, those who express dissent, criticise government policies or challenge legislation are labelled as anti-national. The governments files legal cases against them, leveraging draconian laws, terror-related legislation and money laundering statutes to silence them.

Second, the government has deliberately weakened the laws that empower citizens. The Indian Right to Information Act, lauded as one of the world’s most progressive, has been amended twice in the last five years. Regressive amendments have severely affected people’s right to access information and question the authorities. Similarly regressive amendments to other laws, such as the Representation of People Act and the Income Tax Act, along with the electoral bonds, have further curtailed people’s right to access vital information to hold the authorities to account.

The government has also undermined the independence of institutions responsible for upholding fundamental rights, including the right to free expression and protest. This has eroded the constitutional protection people should enjoy when expressing dissent. Protesting and questioning the government have therefore become increasingly difficult.

The cumulative effect of these developments has dealt a severe blow to civic space in India.

Are there enough guarantees for a free and fair election?

India has needed electoral reform long before the current administration. For decades civil society has advocated for changes to strengthen the electoral process. While India takes pride in conducting relatively free and fair elections, concerns over the quality of elections have increased over time.

Civil society has repeatedly expressed alarm over issues including the influence of money over elections, the security and reliability of electronic voting machines and manipulation of the voter roll.

Regarding the undue influence of money over elections and consequently over policymaking, electoral bonds have long been a matter of major concern. Civil society has also expressed apprehension about glitches in and tampering with electronic voting systems, prompting debate and ongoing legal challenges in the Supreme Court. Alarms were also sounded by recent elections that saw arbitrary deletions and additions to voter lists.

Civil society continues to bring attention to these issues, urging authorities to find solutions. The resolution of these challenges is essential for India to genuinely claim it conducts free and fair elections.

Who are the major contenders in the 2024 election, and what are the main issues the winner will need to tackle?

India has numerous political parties that actively participate in elections. The BJP and its allies have successfully formed a government twice and are currently strong contenders to secure a third term in office. The opposition landscape includes the Indian National Congress, historically prevalent prior to the BJP’s rise. But there are many other national and regional parties that contribute to the diversity of the political spectrum.

As a developing country, India, faces multifaceted challenges. Among the most significant are deep-seated socio-economic inequality and high incidence of poverty, with a small number of families holding a substantial portion of the country’s wealth and a substantial percentage of the population living below the poverty line. There is much need for policies to uplift those on the margins of society and reforms to the structures that perpetuate inequality.

Equally crucial is the protection of civic freedoms, particularly for those who criticise the government, including through peaceful protests. Those who express dissent and demand accountability must be protected rather than criminalised.

The next government should prioritise these issues, addressing inequalities and working to create an environment where citizens can freely express themselves and participate fully in the democratic process.

Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the SCVI through its website or Facebook page, and follow @sns_india  on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Mauro González, Senior Researcher at the Centre for Climate Science and Resilience, (CR)², about fires that recently spread through Chile’s Valparaíso region.

(CR)² is a research centre that brings together researchers from various disciplines in the natural and social sciences, and from the University of Chile, the University of Concepción, Universidad Austral de Chile and other academic institutions, to study the impacts of climate change on Chilean ecosystems and society.

What’s the reason for the increase in fires?

Over the past decade Chile has been experiencing fires of increasing size and severity. The area burned during the 2016-2017 season reached more than half a million hectares, 10 times more than the annual average. It was very similar in 2022-2023, and most recently, in February this year, we had catastrophic fires in Valparaiso. These were less extensive, but their impact was considerable because they occurred in urban-forest interface areas with a high population density.

Some of the factors that could explain this increase in fires are more favourable climatic conditions, such as heatwaves, and the increased susceptibility of vegetation, associated with the drought that Chile has experienced since 2010. In recent years we have observed the drying out, also known as browning, of sclerophyll forests, caused by the lack of water. This affects biodiversity, leads to loss of stored carbon and facilitates the spread of fires. Further, in south and central Chile, the extensive and homogeneous forest plantations of Eucalyptus globulus and Pinus radiata favour, under extreme weather conditions, the spread of large fires.

Humans are largely responsible for the origin of fires, as more than 95 per cent of these are provoked, either accidentally or intentionally. Intentionality has various motivations, which need to be understood sociologically and psychologically to address prevention adequately.

In what other ways is climate change affecting Chile?

The main impacts of climate change in Chile are visible in the increased frequency of extreme weather events such as heatwaves, storm surges, tornadoes, floods, fires and prolonged drought. Although we have historically faced floods, earthquakes and fires, drought represents a unique situation for Chile given its extent and intensity. Much of the country is being affected by drought, with many rural communities lacking adequate water supply and demanding solutions from the state.

Particularly in the semi-arid areas north of Santiago, communities are experiencing a critical lack of water, which affects their traditional activities. Many people have lost their water sources for crops and livestock, affecting their economic activities and livelihoods, and are beginning to migrate. The capital and other cities are also facing major problems in the supply of water for human consumption.

With the succession of extreme weather events, the community recognises climate change as an obvious reality. However, the need for the state to take responsibility and provide responses only arises in extreme situations, in contexts of catastrophe. Otherwise, communities seem to adapt or resist in one way or another.

What have been the impacts of the fires, and how has the government responded?

Large fires affect the productive sector, including agricultural and forestry companies, but also local communities and society in general. The biggest impacts of fires are the loss of life and the destruction of thousands of homes and livelihoods. Added to this are emotional, psychological and medical problems, as air pollution increases respiratory diseases. These are problems that have not yet been adequately assessed. In certain areas, there is constant smoke during the summer, which undoubtedly affects human health.

In addition, fires have a negative impact on biodiversity. They result in the loss of native forests, endangering many species with conservation problems. They also affect the viability of fulfilling our commitment to achieve carbon neutrality, as we are not increasing the vegetation cover that sequesters carbon. On the contrary, we are losing forests and releasing large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.

The Chilean state has gradually been confronting this problem and taking measures. In recent years, successive governments have come to understand more fully the impact of climate change, pushed forward legal initiatives such as the Framework Law on Climate Change, and made important changes to the institutional framework for disaster risk prevention, in which the National Disaster Prevention and Response Service plays a fundamental role. In addition, a Fire Law is currently being discussed in Congress that aims to strengthen prevention strategies and landscape management as a mitigation measure, particularly in wildland-urban interface areas.

What more should be done to prevent and control fires?

Although in Chile the budget for fire prevention and control has increased in recent years, it is important to note that even in global north countries with more equipment and budget, such as Australia, Canada and the USA, governments don’t manage to put out fires of the characteristics and under the weather conditions in which they currently occur. Prevention is therefore key, as is the configuration and management of the forest landscape.

In south and central Chile, where the existence of extensive monoculture tree plantations contributes to the spread of fire, the state has a key role to play in encouraging, through appropriate instruments, greater diversification of the landscape and the restoration of burned or degraded native forests.

In terms of human responsibility, we must be aware of the impact of our actions, whether accidental, negligent or intentional. Prevention is key, along with preparing communities to deal with fires, just as we do with earthquakes and tsunamis.

The responsibility of property owners is fundamental when it comes to prevention and landscape management. Landowners must take responsibility for their land, implementing, with the assistance of the Forest Service, appropriate mitigation measures such as fire breaks and fuel reduction, particularly if they border human communities. Land management should not solely be the responsibility of the state. Each person must contribute to maintaining their environment, and forestry companies must ensure their assets are properly managed so as not to affect neighbouring communities. Co-responsibility is a crucial element that should be reflected in future legislation to tackle wildfires.

Civic space in Chile is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with (CR)² through its website or Facebook page, and follow @CR2_uchile on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the situation of human rights and women’s rights in Afghanistan with Ehsan Shayegan, founder and president of the Porsesh Policy Research Institute (PR).

Initially founded in 2015, and re-established in the USA in 2022, PR is an independent, nonprofit policy research think tank focusing on excluded communities and human rights and working to counter disinformation, misinformation and lack of systematic information. Formerly based in Afghanistan, it was forced to leave the country after the 2021 Taliban takeover and is now based in the USA.

What’s the current human rights situation in Afghanistan?

Afghanistan’s human rights situation is extremely concerning. Recent reports indicate a return to traditional Taliban practices, including public executions in stadiums. These executions have occurred in various regions such as Ghazni in southern Afghanistan and Sheberghan in the northern region. Additionally, there have been reports of numerous members of former government forces being killed or disappearing at the hands of the Taliban.

Arbitrary arrests are rampant, with widespread surveillance through social media and Taliban local intelligence networks. Freedom of speech and expression are not protected under Taliban rule, leading to the imprisonment or silencing of activists advocating for democracy and human rights.

It is exceedingly challenging to conduct human rights work in Afghanistan. The Taliban persecutes people who oppose their ideology and interests, regardless of the legitimacy of their activism. The level of restrictions and surveillance imposed on activists, journalists and researchers is staggering.

The situation is particularly dire for women. Misogyny is systemic and women’s access to education and healthcare is severely restricted. The Taliban’s hostility and brutality towards women exacerbate existing patriarchal social structures. Harassment and rapes perpetrated by the Taliban often go unreported due to threats and stigma.

This is a disturbing reality that the global community should be aware of. It is essential for the international community to take action to address these atrocities.

How is PR working to address these issues?

PR originated in the challenging environment of 2015 Kabul, and was established to address the pervasive issues of misinformation, disinformation and the lack of systematic information regarding Afghanistan’s excluded ethnic groups and communities.

Throughout Afghan history, critical decisions and policies were often based on inaccurate or biased data, serving the interests of political elites. The government and its affiliated institutions exerted significant control over information and lacked genuine commitment to principles of democracy and fairness. As a result, civil society voices, particularly those of minorities, were deliberately excluded across various realms, including education, history, literature and policymaking.

PR aimed to provide an impartial, community-driven perspective within Afghanistan’s highly politicised information landscape. Despite evolving and expanding our strategic focus areas and geographical coverage, PR remains steadfastly committed to prioritising community needs. In an era marked by rapid advancements in information technologies, PR recognises the importance of maintaining a human-centred and community-centred approach to information.

Traditional research institutions often focus solely on decision-making centres, but PR believes that in the age of democracy and information, data and research must be shared with the public and decision-makers alike. By using virtual public spaces, PR aims to facilitate the generation and dissemination of information, ultimately fostering a more democratic and informed society.

As civil society, it is our responsibility to produce and share evidence-based studies of the realities on the ground in Afghanistan and advocate for Afghan people, particularly those most vulnerable under Taliban rule.

What’s it like to have to work from so far away?

Working on Afghanistan from a distant location presents significant challenges, primarily because there’s a constant risk of overlooking crucial local perspectives. However, we are fortunate to maintain strong connections with communities in Afghanistan and rely on our local researchers, who we consider the unsung heroes of our work. They assist us in coordinating data collection efforts on the ground. In instances where the safety of our local collaborators is at risk, we use secure virtual means to reach research participants.

We closely monitor developments in Afghanistan through various channels, including mass and social media, along with insights from our local informants. We rely extensively on our local researchers and informants to gain insights into realities on the ground and verify facts. We maintain daily communication with them to stay updated on unfolding events.

However, it’s important to note that the Taliban takeover significantly disrupted the flow of information. It requires a deep understanding of Afghanistan’s social dynamics to navigate restrictions and risks. Fear makes it challenging for people to share information freely, so effective data collection requires the establishment of trustful relationships within communities. Overall, working on Afghanistan remotely demands a nuanced approach and a thorough understanding of the risks involved.

What should be done to keep the attention of the international community on Afghanistan?

While there has been a noticeable decline in international interest, particularly amid ongoing crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, it’s challenging to imagine Afghanistan fading from global consciousness. The plight of roughly 40 million people subjected to one of the most brutal tyrannies on the planet cannot simply be overlooked.

The international community is also partly responsible for Afghanistan finding itself in such dire circumstances in the first place. The collapse of Afghanistan represents a failure of collective action. As someone born in Afghanistan and engaging with it professionally, I firmly believe that if it’s left unattended, its problems will continue to haunt the international community indefinitely.

The risks posed by Taliban rule – ranging from radicalisation to the flourishing opium trade, human rights violations and geopolitical alliances with radical authoritarian governments – are too grave to ignore.

It’s crucial for the international community to recognise the stark misalignment between Taliban ideology and human rights values. This is often overlooked. Following the US-Taliban Doha agreement in 2020, some believed that a second Taliban rule would be more moderate on issues concerning women’s rights and civil society. But many local activists and researchers remained sceptical, viewing such optimism as based on a misleading, politically motivated narrative.

The current reality demonstrates they were right. The Taliban continue to hold the entire country hostage, with minimal acceptance of genuine civil society presence or meaningful human rights activism. The international community must listen to authentic local voices and ensure they are included in discussions and decision-making.

Civic space in Afghanistan is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Porsesh Policy Research Institute through its website or Facebook page, and follow it on Instagram and Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Access Now about their forensic investigation that exposed the use of Pegasus spyware to target activists and journalists in Jordan. Access Now is an international civil society organisation that works to defend and extend the digital rights of people and communities at risk.

What restrictions do Jordanian journalists and activists face?

Over the past four years, the Jordanian government has dialled up its crackdown on the rights to freedom of association, expression and peaceful assembly. Journalists, human rights defenders, labour unions and activists are routinely harassed, detained and prosecuted under vague and draconian laws. In late 2022 and throughout 2023, several lawyers, journalists and activists were arrested in connection with protests or for their social media posts.

Repression has deepened as a result of the new cybercrime law adopted in August 2023. This law threatens online freedom of expression on the basis of ambiguous and overly broad provisions about ‘spreading fake news’, ‘promoting, instigating, aiding or inciting immorality’, ‘online assassination of personality’, ‘provoking strife’ and ‘undermining national unity’. The law is now being weaponised to quash pro-Palestinian protests and activism in Jordan. Since 7 October 2023, hundreds of protesters expressing solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza have been detained and many others prosecuted under this draconian law.

Our recent forensic investigation into the use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware in Jordan has revealed an additional layer of repression, with at least 35 people being targeted for no reason other than their peaceful political dissent and human rights advocacy.

How’s spyware used, and who’s using it?

In January 2022, Access Now and Front Line Defenders revealed that Pegasus spyware had been used to hack prominent Jordanian human rights lawyer Hala Ahed. Hala was hacked in March 2021, and it was an isolating and traumatic experience for her. Access Now then joined Citizen Lab to further investigate the use of Pegasus spyware in Jordan.

Our joint forensic investigation uncovered a terrifyingly widespread use of Pegasus to target Jordanian media and civil society. We found traces of Pegasus spyware on the mobile devices of 30 activists, journalists, lawyers and civil society members. Further forensic analysis by our partners Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International’s Security Lab and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project identified five more Pegasus victims, bringing the total to 35.

This is the largest pool of Pegasus victims uncovered in Jordan so far, but we believe actual numbers are much higher. We don’t know exactly who is behind these attacks because spyware manufacturers such as NSO Group make the identification of perpetrators of cyberattacks very hard.

The NSO Group blatantly claims its surveillance technologies are crucial for governments to fight crime and terrorism. Conveniently, this is the same pretext used by dictators and repressive regimes to criminalise the work of journalists and activists and prosecute them under draconian counterterrorism and cybercrime laws. It’s a match made in hell, as a result of which activists and journalists are hacked, prosecuted, jailed, tortured and killed merely for exercising their rights or doing their job.

What can activists and journalists do to protect themselves?

Unfortunately, given their stealthy nature, there’s no bulletproof protection against spyware attacks. Zero click spyware doesn’t require any interaction between the software and the user of the hacked device. It basically exploits a vulnerability in the device’s software to infect it without the user’s knowledge.

Still, there are some basic protection measures everyone should implement. For example, every time a vulnerability is discovered, Apple patches it, which means it’s important for users to ensure their device’s operating system is always up to date, otherwise the patch won’t apply. Activists can also enable the Lockdown Mode feature on their Apple devices, which seems to be helping protect at-risk users.

How does Access Now hold governments and companies accountable?

For years, Access Now and broader civil society have been campaigning for a global moratorium on the export, sale, transfer, servicing and use of targeted digital surveillance technologies until rigorous human rights safeguards are put in place. Commercial spyware that enables digital repression and abuse worldwide, such as Pegasus, must be completely banned. We are not there yet, but this is our baseline to rein in the surveillance tech industry.

There have been some positive steps toward holding spyware companies accountable. For instance, a number of Israeli spyware outfits including NSO Group, Candiru and four Intellexa entities were added to a list of the US Department of Commerce that includes entities engaging in activities contrary to the USA’s national security or foreign policy interests. The latest addition to the list was the Canada-based firm Sandvine, blacklisted for enabling digital repression in Egypt. In February 2024, the US State Department also announced a new visa sanctions policy that will deny visas to anyone involved in, facilitating or deriving financial benefit from the misuse of commercial spyware around the world.

Civil society plays a vital role in exposing how these shady companies profit from facilitating human rights abuses around the world and demanding accountability for violations and reparation to spyware victims. Its continued work is key to holding governments and spyware companies accountable.

Civic space in Jordan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Access Now through its website or Facebook and Instagram pages, and follow @accessnow on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Karin Van Boxtel, Co Interim Director of Both ENDS, about the farmers’ protests happening across Europe.

Both ENDS is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the Netherlands that works jointly with environmental groups in African, Asian and Latin American countries towards a sustainable, fair and inclusive world. It seeks to strengthen civil society globally so it can gain critical influence over decisions and activities that affect people’s rights and the environment.

Why are farmers protesting in several European countries?

First of all, it is essential to recognise the diversity within the farmers’ community, because they are not a homogeneous group. Some are frontrunners and champions of sustainability and others aspire to be but face systemic obstacles, including lack of access to funding and land, challenges posed by the trade system and competition from imports. And then there’s a smaller group of farmers who simply resist change, but their influence is huge. We should focus on supporting the first two groups – helping frontrunners maintain their status and facilitating the transition for those aspiring to be frontrunners.

The reality for these farmers across Europe is similar to farmers globally: current policies do not adequately support them. Both ENDS works with pioneering civil society and farmer organisations that connect with other farmers to join their efforts on, for instance, agroecology and food forests. Policy efforts globally have historically centred on the third group of farmers, instead of the first two. This started to shift in recent years, but caused discontent and insecurity among farmers most resistant to change, as well as among companies invested in the current system.

The existing system fails to reward the right behaviours and doesn’t offer any long-term security through a combination of misdirected finances and improper trade rules. In the EU these trade rules lead to competition from cheap imports coming from countries with lower production and labour standards. In African, Asian and Latin American countries, environmental damage is done with the production of fodder inputs or food for export to the EU. One example is the production of soy, which leads to deforestation and land rights violations in Brazil. This system has led to a rise in production costs in the EU while prices have remained stagnant or fallen, and environmental impacts elsewhere are not integrated in the prices.

Farmers’ protests are therefore revealing a systemic problem. Farmers are battling a system that doesn’t provide the right incentives and doesn’t reward those who are pioneers in sustainability. They also feel they aren’t receiving the recognition they deserve.

How are climate policies impacting on farmers?

Farmers are being negatively affected because governments are adopting measures that are beneficial for the climate but forget to include people. A climate transition is not enough – what’s needed is a just climate transition. This means a just energy transition and, equally importantly, a just food transition.

Achieving a just food transition requires an analysis of the food system on a global scale, because this is a system that operates globally. Take for instance the implementation of deforestation regulations, a key measure to combat climate change. In principle this is a commendable measure – however, it poses challenges for many farmers, particularly small-scale farmers in countries in Asia or Latin America. In these regions, only larger farmers can meet the requirements of deforestation laws, which reveals that this measure, while part of much-needed climate action, lacks justice.

This is the core of the issue. When formulating trade policy or negotiating trade agreements, states tend to overlook the perspectives of the farmers who are not necessarily at the forefront of sustainable practices but aspire to be. This applies not only to the Netherlands and other European countries but also to Brazil or Indonesia, among many countries in the global south.

When designing climate measures, it is crucial to listen to and consider the needs of frontrunner and aspiring frontrunner farmers. This is different from prioritising the interests of agricultural giants, such as companies producing animal feed or those engaged in trading agricultural products.

How is the far right politicising these tensions, and with what results?

The far right is exploiting farmers’ perceptions of current climate measures as unjust. It is capitalising on the gaps in solutions identified by civil society, transition thinkers and frontrunner farmers all over the world.

We realise many climate measures are having unfair effects. The challenge lies in ensuring that money financing the climate transition reaches farmers, particularly frontrunners, rather than the same companies that have so greatly contributed to the problems those measures are trying to address.

A key element of the far right’s appeal is that they offer false hope to those who are reluctant to transition and reject any change. They offer simplistic solutions that don’t address the issue at its root, and are therefore not real solutions.

What’s civil society’s position?

Regarding the protests, civil society’s standpoint has been that peaceful protests should be allowed. The context is of growing criminalisation, particularly in countries where the far right is in the government. This is not unique to Europe but is a global concern. In some countries governments tend to tolerate agricultural protests more due to the economic significance of agriculture and its impact on food security, but overall, civic freedoms are increasingly under threat, with protesters –particularly climate protesters – facing detention or restrictions.

As for the substance of the issue, civil society believes that a real solution requires a power shift, a systemic change in the trade and financial systems. This idea unites farmers’ organisations currently protesting in Europe and worldwide. Notably, despite apparent differences in viewpoints, in the Netherlands Extinction Rebellion supported farmers’ protests. This is because they also recognise the need for a structural power shift.

It's worth noting the ongoing collaboration between CSOs and partner organisations, both locally and globally. Last year in the Netherlands, civil society joined forces with CSOs globally, Dutch farmer organisations, academics and private sector to address the Dutch agricultural agreement under negotiation. It raised concerns about its impact on farmers and communities in the global south and called for an agreement that both benefits Dutch farmers and considers the perspectives of farmers globally. The manifesto highlighted the need to change the trade system, fostering the regionalisation of food systems, prioritising farmers over companies and ensuring funds reach frontrunners. This collaborative effort is a strategy to bring about systemic change.

Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Both ENDS through its website or Facebook page, and follow it on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Renate Schroeder, Director of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), about the European Media Freedom Act, the first integrated legislation that protects freedom of expression and media independence and pluralism in the European Union.

The EFJ is the largest organisation of journalists in Europe, fighting for decent working conditions and defending the right to freedom of expression.

Why was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) needed?

The European Commission (EC) produced the draft EMFA in September 2022, in a context of growing disinformation and threats to media independence and journalists’ safety across Europe. The Vice President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, understood the dangers of media capture and political manipulation. With her help and a lot of research by European institutions, we were able to show media freedom was declining in the European Union (EU), despite the bloc’s historical commitment to this principle.

That’s why the EC came up with a proposal to ensure the right of all citizens to receive plural and editorially independent information. This had never been formally addressed before. The EMFA is rooted in the need to create clear rules to level the playing field across the EU, addressing issues such as media capture, the independence of public service media, editorial independence, transparency in media ownership and state advertisement.

What regulations does the EMFA introduce?

The EMFA seeks to safeguard media freedom and integrity. It includes provisions to protect journalistic sources, ensuring confidentiality. This is particularly crucial for investigative journalism given the growing use of spyware to target journalists’ sources, as seen in countries such as Greece and Hungary.

The Act also addresses state control over public service media. Rather than state broadcasters, what the ecosystem needs is independent, strong, public service media systems free of state influence or control over funding.

In addition, the EMFA recognises readers’ right to know who’s behind what they read, so it includes an article on transparency in media ownership and another on editorial independence to prevent journalism being used for political or economic interests or propaganda. This is based on the acknowledgment there are people such as politicians or foreign business leaders who own media outlets and use them for their agendas. They don’t view journalism as a public good but as a tool for propaganda.

Another issue the Act deals with is content moderation. Journalists are no longer the gatekeepers of information – platforms are. Recognising this, the EMFA requires platforms to consult media service providers and journalists before removing content.

Finally, the Act establishes a board composed of independent regulatory authorities tasked with overseeing compliance with the EMFA and other related legislation such as the Audiovisual Media Service Directive.

What were the main points of contention during the process?

At the beginning, several stakeholders were against the EMFA. Germany raised one significant point of contention. It has a federal system where states have their own independent regulatory media systems, and they were concerned about potential interference from Brussels.

Publishers also presented a challenge. They showed little interest in any transparency or editorial regulation and had concerns about a European board having a say on that.

However, with the support of a group of media freedom organisations, digital rights advocates and other civil society groups, we overcame most of these obstacles. While the initial draft was not as good as we would have liked, the European Parliament emerged as our ally and helped strengthen transparency rules and reinforce provisions related to public media service and source protection.

One particularly contentious issue during negotiations with both the European Parliament and European Council was the protection of sources and safeguards against spyware. Some states, such as France, argued for exemptions based on national security considerations. These risked compromising the protection of journalists’ sources and transforming the EMFA into a surveillance tool. Thanks to efforts of supportive countries such as Spain, these proposals were rejected, preserving the EMFA’s integrity.

Does the final draft fully address civil society concerns?

While the final draft addresses some concerns raised by civil society, there are areas where our partners feel it could have gone further.

For instance, on the issue of transparency of media ownership, civil society groups wanted to establish a European database, but this provision didn’t go through. We also wanted to include a stronger article addressing concentration of media ownership and requiring a public interest test for mergers. The language in the final agreement is often too principled, which may cause problems when implemented at the national level.

Even so, we understand that drafting regulations at the European level, where you deal with multiple and diverse states, is not easy. The current rise of right-wing governments is only making it harder. Even traditionally supportive states such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been cautious in their approaches.

We knew it was now or never, so we are very happy the EMFA got adopted, even if some articles are not worded as strongly as we would have liked. With right-wing movements on the rise, there was a lot of pressure to agree a final text and have it passed right away, even if it wasn’t perfect, because the June European Parliament elections will likely result in a more right-wing Parliament.

What happens next?

The next step is for the European Parliament’s Plenary session in Strasbourg on 11 March to formally vote on the provision agreement, which the Council of the EU under the current Belgian presidency will officially adopt. The Act needs a three-fourths majority, and only Hungary is certain to vote against. It will enter into force a year afterwards, with some articles taking effect earlier, at six months, and others later, at 15 months. And then it will get implemented and have direct effects at the national level.

There will likely be a testing period in which civil society and journalists’ organisations will play a vital role in ensuring effective implementation and taking legal action if necessary. For instance, if media providers fail to comply with transparency rules, civil society may need to challenge them in court.

However, it is still unclear how this process will work. For instance, if a civil society organisation in Hungary believes there’s a lack of plural access to media and decides to take legal action, it may face challenges in Hungary’s judicial system and may need to escalate the issue to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, a process that could take several years.

I am also worried about how the article on the protection of sources will be implemented. Even though safeguards are in place, this article may be misinterpreted. At the end of the day, national security issues are always defined at the national level. That’s a limitation of all EU treaties and some states may end up finding clever ways to circumvent these protections.

Having this legal framework in place is a big step forward, but it will also be crucial for states to take it seriously.

Over the last five years, the EC has made significant progress in regulating the information ecosystem, with initiatives such as the Digital Service Act, Digital Markets Act, Artificial Intelligence Act and now the EMFA. The main challenge will be the effective implementation of all these measures. We hope the EC will prioritise implementation and sanction states that fail to comply. We also hope the EMFA will receive sufficient funding for the board to deal with monitoring and implementing it. Without proper enforcement, no regulation will be of any help.

What further reforms are needed?

We are worried about the use of generative AI to promote disinformation and deep fakes. Voluntary guidelines are not enough. We need stronger measures that balance freedom of expression with human control over AI systems. While AI can be a great tool for journalists it can also be misused.

The EU is at a crossroads. The European Parliament has always been on the side of media freedom, and for the first time we risk losing this support. Young voters will play a vital role in the upcoming elections. Their engagement, informed vote and understanding of the role of the EU and what is at stake may change the course of the elections. And for that facts are needed, and a healthy information ecosystem with limited disinformation circulating in social media.

Get in touch with the European Federation of Journalists through its website or Instagram and Facebook pages, and follow @EFJEUROPE and @renatemargot on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Carlos G Guerrero Orozco, a Mexican lawyer and co-founder and president of Human Rights and Strategic Litigation-Mexico (DLM Mexico), about a recent victory of Mexican civil society in defence of civic space.

DLM Mexico is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights and the strengthening of the rule of law in Mexico by providing strategic litigation advice and promoting accountability.

What constraints does civil society experience in Mexico, and how is it working to preserve civic space?

Historically, Mexican civil society has been a retaining wall against government malpractice. For playing this role, which the authorities can find uncomfortable, it has been subjected to restrictions, particularly denial of legal recognition of organisations and their functions.

The state has reacted to the work of civil society by limiting its ability to act as a monitor, watchdog and check on power. In the legal area, it has sought to limit its capacity to undertake legal processes and generate accountability. One way of doing this is by disregarding the legal standing that allows CSOs to initiate appeals for protection and other proceedings to protect rights.

Under Mexican law, CSOs whose mission is to defend the human rights of groups such as children, Indigenous people, survivors of gender-based violence, victims of corruption or public mismanagement and people deprived of their liberty can claim legal standing by virtue of these groups’ special situation with the legal system.

DLM Mexico provides advice to CSOs, collectives, citizen groups, citizen participation committees and human rights defenders involved in strategic litigation cases, providing them with tools to strengthen their capacities in court and overcome obstacles they may face in proving their legal standing in the case.

Another way of constraining civil society is to target CSO authorities and hold them criminally liable for actions taken in the course of their work. This is what happened with a recent reform of the Mexico City Penal Code. The reformed code’s article 256 equated CSO leaders with public officials and specified that public servants – and therefore also CSO leaders – could be liable for corruption offences. By including CSO directors and managers in the definition of ‘public servants’, it extended to them the criminal liability public servants are under.

A particular concern was about the broad and imprecise wording of the definition of the crime of corruption as the conduct of anyone who ‘performs or fails to perform what the law requires them to perform or refrains from performing what the law forbids, in order to obtain an undue advantage of any nature, including financial, for themselves or for a third party’. This undoubtedly opened the door to arbitrary treatment.

The publication of the reformed Penal Code brought concern from various quarters, but particularly civil society, which issued a joint communiqué expressing its alarm.

DLM Mexico filed a request with the Mexico City Human Rights Commission to exercise its power to challenge laws deemed unconstitutional. Days later, the Human Rights Commission filed an action of unconstitutionality before the Mexican Supreme Court.

How was the case resolved, and what do you think its impact will be?

This month the Supreme Court discussed and resolved the case, declaring article 256 unconstitutional and void.

The Court established that, according to article 108 of the Constitution, it is not permissible to extend the definition of public servant to people who do not hold a position within the structure of the state. It also considered that the classification of CSO directors and managers as public officials was potentially prejudicial to their rights and freedoms because it created undue criminal consequences for private individuals. It clarified that the fact they receive public funds does not justify extending the penalties applicable to public servants to private individuals who manage CSOs.

This decision safeguards the rights of CSO leaders and ensures they can continue their work without fear of unfair criminal repercussions.

Although the case focused on Mexico City’s legislation, the ruling put a brake on other states’ intentions to include in their legislation sanctions against CSO staff for their activities, used to silence the voices of civil society. This is particularly relevant in a country where the judiciary is neither robust nor independent.

The Court’s decision is testament to the power of civil society advocacy and the importance of protecting civic space. It is a reminder of our collective ability to challenge and overturn laws that threaten our democratic freedoms.

What other issues are on civil society’s agenda when it comes to the rule of law and democratic freedoms?

Unfortunately, under the current administration there have been several issues that both civil society and the private sector have had to address. The president and members of his party use aggressive discourse towards civil society that is openly restrictive of civic space and hostile to judicial independence and autonomous bodies. The government has restricted access to public information, de-emphasised the protection of personal data, undermined the National Anti-Corruption System and downplayed Mexico’s crisis of enforced disappearances at the hands of organised crime.

DLM Mexico’s agenda has focused on strengthening the National Anti-Corruption System by addressing the problem of underreporting of corruption, calling for registration and transparency of beneficial ownership of companies and training officials to better investigate acts of corruption in civil and administrative matters.

Civil society’s reaction to defend against institutional erosion and the deterioration of the separation of powers was recently seen on the streets when many people mobilised in Mexico City and other cities across the country in the ‘March for Democracy’. A few weeks before the start of the June presidential election campaign, people mobilised against the government’s attacks on the National Electoral Institute, in defence of the independence of the judiciary and autonomous bodies and against the president’s undue influence on the electoral competition and his polarising attitudes.

Although there was no shortage of opposition politicians who tried to exploit it for political gain, the mobilisation was basically a defensive reaction by civil society to government abuses. Before marching, protesters presented a list of demands. However, far from providing any response, the government has hardened its positions even further.

Fortunately, Mexico still has strong institutions, as well as strong private and social sectors that take an interest in public issues. This tempers the risks to our democracy regardless of which party’s candidate wins the presidential election.

Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with DLM Mexico through its website and follow @DLM_Mx on Twitter and @dlmx on LinkedIn.

CIVICUS speaks about Greece’s recent legalisation of same-sex marriage with Giorgos Keratsas, Communications Officer of Positive Voice-Greek Association of People Living with HIV.

Founded in 2009, Positive Voice is a civil society organisation focused on tackling the spread of HIV/AIDS, defending the rights of HIV-positive people and more broadly advocating for LGBTQI+ rights in Greece.

What was civil society’s role in achieving the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Greece?

Greek LGBTQI+ groups have advocated for marriage equality and the legal recognition of all families for many years. In 2015, civil partnership arrangements were made available to same-sex couples. This marked a historic victory for LGBTQI+ and human rights in Greece but left a large part of the LGBTQI+ community unsatisfied, because there were several important issues the law didn’t cover, including adoption rights. As a result, LGBTQI+ activism has continued to demand true equality in all laws and regulations concerning interpersonal relations.

Our main argument concerns the discriminatory character of laws that exclude LGBTQI+ people, same-sex couples and diverse families from access to the rights that are afforded to cisgender straight people and heterosexual families. The fact that citizens don’t have the same rights and obligations is proof that we are not truly equal, and a state cannot be considered fully democratic when it has first-class and second-class citizens.

LGBTQI+ organisations have therefore urged legal change, pointing to the example of so many European countries that have recognised marriage equality. The road hasn’t been easy. It involved a lot of struggle, disappointments and persistence. We fought for many years until the change we demanded – initially viewed as impossible, and therefore ignored – was eventually deemed necessary. The recent passage of this law was a civil society victory that proves, once again, that when we take action together, change can happen.

How has Positive Voice contributed to the campaign?

Positive Voice was consistently dedicated for years to the sometimes frustrating work of increasing the visibility of LGBTQI+ people and educating the public on LGBTQI+ rights when the state wasn’t doing anything about it. On the basis of the recognition of the strong association of HIV with social vulnerability, we have focused on the social rather than purely medical side of things.

For over a decade, Positive Voice has been a staunch advocate of LGBTQI+ rights. We have continuously raised the urgent need for equality with government officials. We have been active participants of Pride festivals, consistently supported the demands of LGBTQI+ people, co-signed advocacy letters and statements, endorsed campaigns such as ‘Say Yes’ and hosted impactful exhibitions. A recent one was ‘Where Love is Illegal – Exhibition in a Box’, which shares real stories of LGBTQI+ people in countries where they are not allowed to be themselves or love freely.

We can proudly say that Positive Voice has been one of the strongest advocates for social change in Greece. The building that accommodates Athens Checkpoint, a sexual health and prevention centre that offers free rapid HIV and hepatitis B and C testing and is our project that’s made the biggest impact, is one of the very few in Athens flying the rainbow flag. The flag has stayed despite the fact that in 2019 the building suffered an arson attack motivated by homophobia and transphobia.

Have you encountered backlash?

Partly thanks to consistent civil society campaigning, in recent years public attitudes towards LGBTQI+ people have started to shift. However, homophobia, biphobia and transphobia remain very strong, and hate speech and violence against LGBTQI+ people, and transgender people in particular, are now on the rise, in a very alarming trend that unfortunately is not limited to Greece. Our recent legal victory is obviously a very positive step in the right direction, but we still have a lot of work to do until we are genuinely equal and fairly treated.

The far-right parties that have significantly grown in recent elections, as well as church representatives, have strongly opposed same-sex marriage. They contend that it infringes upon and destroys the concept of marriage and traditional family values and state that family is by definition the result of a union between a man and a woman. They also argue that the right to marriage should not be regarded as a human right, on the basis of which they claim that the LGBTQI+ community is not being deprived of any fundamental rights. Most importantly, they argue that children raised by same-sex parents will not have a healthy psychosocial development. From their perspective, it is children’s rights that would be violated.

Concerningly, in the months prior to the law being passed, LGBTQI+ people were exposed to incredible amounts of abusive public discourse, particularly on TV. In show after show, for weeks politicians, journalists, artists, influencers and others were asked whether they agreed with marriage equality, as if human rights were to be subjected to the verdict of public opinion. Hundreds of particularly abusive and discriminatory statements were given airspace and therefore heard and absorbed by millions of people. It is hard to even imagine the negative impact this rhetoric has possibly had on young queer kids across the country.

How do you connect with the regional and global LGBTQI+ movements?

We constantly follow their work, participate in events, undertake joint action and take advantage of just about any networking opportunity with other LGBTQI+ organisations. It is a fact that numerous European – and also several non-European – countries are more advanced in claiming respect for LGBTQI+ rights than we are, in terms of legislation and everyday practices and social attitudes. They set an example for the rest of us.

LGBTQI+ organisations worldwide are doing amazing work and they truly inspire us. And when any of us experiences blatant human rights violations, we all stand up for each other regardless of geography. What unites us is much more powerful than anything that could set us apart.

Civic space in Greece is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Positive Voice through its website or Facebook page, and follow it on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Rizky Argama, Executive Director, and Violla Reininda, Programme Manager at the Centre of Indonesian Law and Policy Studies (PSHK), about the results of Indonesia’s 14 February presidential election – the world’s biggest single-day election, in which over 200 million people were eligible to vote.

Founded in 1998, the PSHK is a research and advocacy institution focusing on legal reform.

Was the 14 February election free and fair?

It is difficult to say the election was free and fair. Long before election day, indications of a very unequal competition emerged at various levels.

The biggest irregularity was the Constitutional Court’s decision to allow presidential and vice-presidential candidates under 40 years of age to run as long as they have experience as regional heads, a requirement tailor-made to pave the way for outgoing President Joko Widodo’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, current mayor of Surakarta, to become a vice-presidential candidate alongside Prabowo Subianto, a former opponent of Jokowi, as the president is called, and now his defence minister. The decision was highly problematic ethically and legally, partly because the chief justice of the Constitutional Court, Jokowi’s brother-in-law, had a conflict of interest in examining and deciding on the case.

The government also created three new provinces in Papua, where Jokowi and his endorsed presidential candidate receive much support, for political advantage. Jokowi also took advantage of vacancies of regional heads – governors, regents and mayors – to appoint trusted figures as acting regional heads to secure an electoral process that would tilt in his favour.

Unfair practices also marred the campaign, including Gibran’s endorsement by his father, leading to the use of state funds for his campaign, including for social assistance given to constituents as gifts. Ministers also campaigned openly, breaching expectations of neutrality.

Several mass media outlets reported biased attitudes from civil servants, both at the central and regional government levels. Officials showed favouritism towards Prabowo, referring to him constantly as Jokowi’s successor, as if the election was a done deal.

Although the Election Law requires government officials to take leave when campaigning, ministers and regional heads blatantly campaigned while carrying out their duties, which they took advantage of for electoral gain. For example, the minister of trade distributed basic necessities such as oil and rice to people he visited, claiming the aid came from Jokowi and urging them to vote for a candidate who would continue his programmes.

Shortly before election day, Jokowi and his ministers paid numerous visits to the regions and provided social assistance packages in the form of cash or food items such as rice. Sometimes he provided social assistance to people in locations close to campaign areas visited by other candidates, particularly Ganjar Pranowo. Tempo mass media reported that Jokowi asked his minister of finance to continue increasing the budget allocation for social assistance until election day, including by reallocating funds from other ministries and government agencies.

Such covert campaigning actions are punishable under the Election Law, but the Election Supervisory Board, which has the authority to investigate such violations, did not take much action.

Academics from notable universities who spoke up about the need for Jokowi to act as a political leader above the dispute faced criticism from his cabinet members, who accused them of representing foreign interests. They received threats and some had their social media accounts or phones hacked. This created unfavourable conditions for activists and civil society to voice criticism.

The documentary film Dirty Vote, directed by investigative journalist Dandhy Laksono, outlined the tactics used to manufacture a comfortable win for the Prabowo-Gibran pair. Featuring three highly respected independent legal experts, the film was launched on YouTube three days before the election and immediately gained the attention of more than 13 million viewers. It provided insight into how Prabowo would amass almost 60 per cent of the vote.

What were the main campaign issues, and what were Prabowo’s promises?

There were hardly any structured ideas coming from the Prabowo-Gibran campaign. Whether in debates or campaign events, they basically just focused on the need to boost nutrition with free school lunches and milk for kids. In the official debates organised by the Election Commission, candidates were more focused on getting a rise out of their opponents than putting forward original ideas. They even tried to trip up other candidates by using technical terms or uncommon abbreviations.

They also tried to present themselves as the successors of Jokowi and sold the idea of a new, modern capital city – over two hours by plane from the current capital, Jakarta – that would kickstart development of Kalimantan Island, known for being underdeveloped but rich in natural resources, particularly minerals and coal.

These were all very expensive promises. Prabowo was criticised for not explaining where the funding would come from. There were also doubts about his understanding of corruption, which he seemed to think was solely the result of financial struggle. His solution was therefore to promise to increase the salaries of state officials and law enforcement officers without addressing the root causes of the problem. Notably, he never mentioned the need to strengthen the Corruption Eradication Commission or human rights protections, drawing significant criticism.

Why did Prabowo win?

The Prabowo campaign made very effective use of social media, particularly TikTok. The image crafted by the Prabowo-Gibran duo caught the attention of young voters, who make up the majority of the electorate. This year, around 54 per cent of voters were from generations Y and Z. Prabowo, a retired general suspected of serious human rights violations, played up a cute grandpa image, doing dances at every campaign stop. The lack of historical awareness among younger voters greatly helped him. Meanwhile, Gibran showed off his youthfulness by being cool but dispassionate in front of journalists and on social media.

Additionally, Prabowo and Gibran are part of an anti-intellectual movement that’s gaining momentum. Many people disregard academics and scientists and prefer leaders who are perceived as doing less talking and taking more tangible action. There is a perception that intellectuals only engage in abstract talk without substantial action, and voters favour leaders who are seen as more action oriented. This sentiment was reinforced by the candidates’ performance in the presidential and vice-presidential debates.

Prabowo’s campaign style was similar to that of Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr in the Philippines. He used the exact same recipe. There were even reports suggesting he had hired the same political consultant who advised Bongbong, although there’s no evidence for this claim.

But the main factor behind Prabowo’s victory was the full support of Jokowi. Although Jokowi never explicitly stated his support for Prabowo, all his actions and policies revealed he was the force behind him. Jokowi’s support included efforts to engineer court decisions by appointing his brother-in-law as the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, mobilising regional leaders for the campaign and channelling state funds for social assistance in the run-up to the election.

What were civil society’s reactions to the election results?

Prabowo is hardly a new face: he has been running for president since 2009, and civil society and human rights activists have consistently called on voters not to vote for perpetrators of human rights violations.

Before the election, a civil society coalition formed to supervise the vote and gathered reports of irregularities from the public during the voting and counting processes. The collected data is being processed for reporting.

The Election Commission will only announce the election’s final results in mid-March, and even then there will be legal proceedings to dispute them in the Constitutional Court. However, results are unlikely to change significantly, and Prabowo will solidify his victory before mid-year.

The outcome of this year’s election was particularly predictable due to the strong interference and support of the current government to perpetuate its authority through Prabowo and Gibran.

Civil society needs to anticipate the possibility of new laws or regulations that further restrict civic space, and must remain vigilant against the potential use of defamation laws against people or organisations critical of the authorities.

Do you have concerns about the future of democracy and human rights in Indonesia?

Democratic decline has been evident over the past five years under the Jokowi administration, and Prabowo’s victory is unlikely to improve the situation. It may worsen it. Prabowo has displayed unfriendly attitudes towards journalists on several occasions, raising concerns about press freedom. Freedom of expression is also at risk, as members of Prabowo’s campaign team have a history of using draconian laws to silence government critics.

Freedoms of association and peaceful assembly are under threat. The Jokowi administration has opened the door to the dissolution of civil society organisations without due process, and several organisations deemed to oppose the government have been disbanded. The situation is unlikely to improve under Prabowo.

Prabowo’s victory represents the worst-case scenario for the future of human rights in Indonesia. Not only does he lack perspective and commitment to human rights, but he was also involved in the abduction of activists in 1998 when he was the commander of Indonesia’s special military forces. The longstanding efforts of Indonesian civil society to push for the resolution of various cases of serious human rights violations will be further from materialising when Prabowo leads the country.

Moreover, Prabowo also lacks a clear track record or vision on the protection of excluded groups, including women and gender minorities. During official debates, when discussing women’s rights, Prabowo said that the key to empowering women was to provide nutrition for pregnant women. Such a response demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the complexities of the rights violations faced by women, including violence and lack of opportunities in education and political participation.

Last but not least, Prabowo and Gibran seem more focused on economic development and their own businesses than democracy. This is just not a priority for them. In a recent discussion on shrinking civic space in Indonesia, Prabowo’s spokesperson said there were no issues with Indonesia’s democracy, which caused significant backlash. He basically chooses to disregard everything wrong with our democracy.

Civic space in Indonesia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the PSHK through its website or Facebook page, and follow it on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks about struggles for LGBTQI+ rights and a recent legal setback in St Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) with Jeshua Bardoo, founder and Executive Officer of Equal Rights, Access and Opportunities SVG (ERAO SVG).

ERAO SVG is an intersectional human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes equality and non-discrimination in SVG. It conducts research and monitors human rights and social justice issues affecting women, children, LGBTQI+ people and people with disabilities. It carries out public awareness campaigns, advocates with local and national authorities, as well as in regional and international rights forums, convenes like-minded organisations, organises consultations and provides training on human rights issues affecting its target populations.

How do LGBTQI+ organisations in SVG, including ERAO SVG, defend and promote the rights of LGBTQI+ people?

Human rights advocacy, particularly for LGBTQI+ rights, has limited visibility in SVG. There are few organisations working for LGBTQI+ rights, and ERAO SVG is among the main ones. Other groups, such as VincyChap and Care SVG, work on HIV/AIDS and contribute indirectly to supporting LGBTQI+ people. Notably, VincyChap participates as an interested party in consolidated court cases challenging anti-LGBTQI+ laws. ERAO SVG, while not involved at the inception, now supports the case.

Focusing on education and awareness, ERAO SVG conducts in-person and online events to sensitise people on queer rights and focuses on tackling stigma. Last year we organised historic Pride celebrations alongside the Resident British Commissioner’s Office. Events included a Pride SVG reception, workshop, panel discussion and a social media campaign.

Despite the challenges and risks, our efforts seek visibility for LGBTQI+ people in SVG. Collaborations with local, regional and international organisations enhance our impact. As part of our commitment to bringing about change, we worked with Human Rights Watch to produce a report that highlights the community’s challenges and issues a series of recommendations.

Have you experienced backlash?

I have faced significant backlash in my activism for LGBTQI+ rights, both online and offline. Negative reactions, to the point to trigger depression, intensified in 2019 after I published an article, ‘Do black LGBTQ+ Vincentian lives matter?’. Despite the discouragement, I went back to writing and advocating for human rights and queer rights.

Public events, especially Pride celebrations, always trigger backlash, particularly from members of the Thusian Seventh Day Adventists, a Christian group, who continuously publicly call me out on social media. Also, someone on the radio called for my arrest following the recent court ruling that upheld anti-LGBTQI+ laws in SVG.

Social media posts warning LGBTQI+ visitors about the risks they would face in SVG helped us get some attention but also attracted criticism. Despite the online hostility, to date I have faced no actual physical harm, although the threats I received right after the court ruling made me fear I would. To protect my mental wellbeing, I now try to avoid reading negative comments I receive on social media.

The backlash and how busy I became after the recent ruling took a toll on me mentally, making me physically exhausted. I plan to take a break to recover but I remain committed to my advocacy. My experiences growing up as a queer person in a hostile environment, including discrimination in school and religious settings, have shaped my resilience. I now choose a religion that predicates love, distancing myself from past religious affiliations.

How much of a setback is the recent legal court ruling that upheld anti-LGBTQI+ laws in SVG?

It was very disappointing. In 2019, two gay Vincentians, Javin Johnson and Sean MacLeish, challenged SVG’s so-called anti- LGBTQI+ laws, sections 146 and 148 of the Criminal Code. Both petitioners live abroad. Johnson sought asylum in the UK while MacLeish lives in the USA. Their petition argued that their constitutional rights were being violated, including the rights to privacy, personal liberty and protection from discrimination. They claimed they had left SVG due to the severity of its anti-LGBTQI+ legislation, which made it impossible for them to live in the country as gay men.

CSOs such as VincyChap in SVG supported the case, while the UK-based organisation Human Dignity Trust played a role in the background.

However, on 16 February 2024 the court questioned the claimants’ standing and ruled that none of their rights had been violated. It deemed the LGBTQI+ laws justifiable, citing public health concerns related to HIV and morality. As it dismissed their claims, the court didn’t offer any remedy and ordered each claimant to pay EC$7,500 (approx. US$2,800) to the state in legal costs.

There are still other legal cases in the region awaiting decisions, and despite setbacks, civil society activists and organisations remain committed to challenging discriminatory laws.

What are the next steps following this disappointment?

After studying the ruling and the justifications it offers, the lawyers and claimants in the case will decide whether to appeal. They need to weigh whether loopholes or weaknesses in the ruling provide grounds for a potentially successful appeal. Personally, having followed the virtual court proceedings, I find many of its statements absurd and believe the case should be appealed or otherwise new cases should be filed.

We are disappointed that Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves has failed to address the issue, which I think reflects state-sanctioned homophobia. Despite past condemnations of violence against LGBTQI+ people, there has been no practical action. It is disheartening to see politicians so focused on keeping the support of Christian voters who are allegedly in the majority. It is worth noting that churches were deeply involved in the judicial case. The judge’s open expression of religious sentiments and allegiances in court raised serious doubts about her impartiality.

Governments should prioritise people’s wellbeing, and in the case of LGBTQI+ people, this requires at the very least repealing criminalising provisions. The state should also enact comprehensive legislation protecting people from discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression. There is nothing like this in SVG, so there is a lot of work to be done. As a first step, ERAO SVG will continue to advocate for the repeal of discriminatory laws as a matter of human dignity.

Civic space in St Vincent and the Grenadines is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with ERAO SVG through its website or Facebook page, and follow @eraosvg on Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Frank Slijper, Arms Trade project lead at PAX, about a recent court victory in a case brought jointly with Oxfam Novib and the Rights Forum against the Dutch government for exporting arms to Israel that are being used in the assault on Gaza.

PAX is the largest peace organisation in the Netherlands. It works to protect civilians against acts of war, end armed violence and build inclusive peace.

Why did you bring a lawsuit against the Dutch government?

We brought this lawsuit to stop our government exporting military equipment to Israel. PAX does research into the arms trade in countries that violate human rights and approaches those who finance it by appealing to their social responsibility. Oxfam and the Rights Forum share our values, so we decided to sue the government together. We had previously called on it to stop giving Israel free rein in Gaza but the government had not acted on our calls, choosing instead to continue supplying Israel with F-35 fighter jet parts despite the rapidly deteriorating situation.

No government should allow transfers of weapons to a state committing war crimes. If there was ever a clear case of why this is so, this is it.

Given the urgency of the situation we had to act quickly, and so we did, Merely four weeks after we learned about these exports to Israel, through a government leak posted by the NRC newspaper, we were in court making our case.

What did the court decide?

On 12 February, the Court of Appeal in The Hague ordered the Dutch government to stop all transfers of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel within seven days, given the clear risk of violations of international humanitarian law by Israel. The court ruled that after 7 October 2023 the minister of Foreign Affairs was obliged to reassess the licence for the export and transit of F-35 parts to Israel and that this assessment should conclude that further export and transit must no longer be permitted. In addition, the court stated that such an assessment cannot be ‘weighed’ against other interests such as potential damage to diplomatic relations or economic interests. It also made clear that any ‘general’ arms transfer licence for an indefinite period must include a reassessment trigger in case the situation changes drastically, because otherwise the very idea of arms export controls would be undermined.

The court also made clear that violations of international humanitarian law don’t need to be proved and that a ‘clear risk’ of such violations suffices. It found it ‘sufficiently plausible’ that F-35 fighter jets were involved in violations of international humanitarian law while also pointing out that there’s no requirement to prove a direct link between a specific weapons transfer and the alleged violations of international humanitarian law.

Importantly, the court rejected claims by the government that information provided by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and by United Nations (UN) special rapporteurs could not be credibly verified. Instead, it said that such sources must be taken ‘extremely seriously’.

It also reaffirmed the very important role of civil society organisations in monitoring and ensuring the implementation of state obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The government had a week to comply with the court ruling and said it would do so. Sadly, however, it didn’t agree with the Appeals Court verdict and announced it would take the case to the Supreme Court for a final decision.

Are you taking any further steps in relation with the Dutch government’s approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict?

The Dutch government claims it is taking a balanced approach, speaking to both sides, when in fact it has refused to clearly condemn Israel, voted alongside the USA against UN resolutions that condemn Israel and demand an immediate ceasefire, and has refused to stop supplying weapons to Israel. Yes, it has enabled airdrops of medical supplies, but that is nothing more than a basic humanitarian obligation.

In all the years our government has taken this supposedly balanced approach, not much has been achieved and a solution has not come any closer. More Palestinians have been forcibly displaced and illegal Israeli settlements have grown. We keep advocating for practical steps and measures to stop these violations and for an end to military cooperation between the Netherlands and Israel.

For now, we are awaiting the last part of the legal process, and we have no choice other than keep defending our case, as we have successfully done so far.

Do you expect this court ruling to have any international repercussions?

The Appeals Court’s broad analysis of states’ obligations under the ATT and the European Union Common Position on Arms Exports makes this ruling an important source for any other organisation considering litigation. This case has been incredibly important for the future of arms export control, because it is the first time Dutch judges have set out so clearly and in such detail the government’s obligations to implement export controls. Governments that export arms must ensure that their exports comply with obligations under the ATT.

Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing wave of executions in Iran with Asal Abasian, an Iranian journalist and queer feminist activist. After receiving serious threats, Asal fled Iran for Turkey in 2021. They’re currently based in Paris, France.

How has repression escalated since the 2022 protests?

Repression by the regime of the Islamic Republic has escalated with executions of protesters, aimed at creating fear to suppress any attempt at new mobilisations such as the Woman, Life, Freedom nationwide protests triggered by Mahsa Amini’s death.

Recently, four young Kurds from the western provinces of Iran were hanged on unproven charges of cooperation with the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan. Their families demanded a pardon until the last moment, but their requests went unheard.

The Islamic Republic has always been at odds with ethnic minorities. Forty-five years since the Islamic Revolution, this conflict is as alive as on the first day. If anything, it has become worse.

Of course, the death threat that comes with ramping up executions is not directed only at ethnic minorities. Every excluded group in Iran is under threat. The regime founded after the 1979 Islamic revolution was grounded on the aim of protecting the interests of Shia Muslim men. This means that everyone except Shia Muslim men is oppressed by design. This includes all women and LGBTQI+ people and sexual minorities, children and religious and ethnic minorities.

Throughout 45 years there have been several spikes in executions of people from minority groups as well as political activists opposing the Islamic Republic. This trend has been ongoing from the onset, and it was even worse at the beginning. In the first decade of the Islamic Republic thousands of young dissidents were secretly executed or shot.

On top of this, ethnic and religious minorities such as Bahais, Balochs, Kurds and Sunni Arabs experience daily discrimination and marginalisation, which sometimes cost people their lives.

Additionally, the regime of the Islamic Republic supports Hamas and other terrorist Islamic groups and has no qualms about it. It laments the killing of children in Gaza while it has killed so many during the protests that erupted in Iran in September 2022. But ideologies shouldn’t matter: the massacre of children by any regime or group is a despicable act.

Is there any space for civil society to operate in Iran?

Young people in Iran continue resisting, despite the severe economic pressure and the suppression of activism. Even if this involves making sacrifices in their careers, education or social lives, young women continue defying the mandatory hijab. Nationwide protests may have decreased, but young people continue resisting the arbitrary and inhumane laws of the Islamic Republic.

The struggle continues under the surface. Although the Islamic Republic and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps severely suppress any attempt at a protest, people have not stopped fighting. The fact that they continue embracing civil resistance despite the potentially serious costs is very encouraging.

Many of our fighters, whom I would like to mention, are in Tehran’s Evin prison with long sentences. Sarvenaz Ahmadi, Anisha Asadollahi, Keyvan Mohtadi, Sepideh Rashnu, Nasim Soltanbeygi and many others are in the frontlines of this struggle, spending the years of their youth in prison. And what cost would be higher than paying with years of your life?

I try to support their struggle by raising awareness on international platforms and amplifying their voices. But the main struggle is being carried on by young Iranians in Iran. From afar, we can only admire their struggles and broadcast them to the world.

How has the international community reacted to the escalation of repression in Iran?

Unfortunately, the international community has maintained a shameful silence and indifference. As people were being executed, the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Narges Mohammadi, and several other civil activists wrote to the United Nations (UN) on the human rights crisis that Iranians face. And still, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif recently travelled to Iran despite activists warning that this could be used as propaganda by the government.

The Iranian people will not forget the indifference and self-interest of the international community. This is as much of a historical disgrace as the silence in the face of the crimes that are being committed in Gaza.

Many members of the international community are perhaps more involved in domestic and regional interests, and it seems that, contrary to their proclaimed slogans, they are not really concerned about genocide, the killing of children and people’s oppression. This is very unfortunate.

We neither forgive nor forget.

Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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