East Africa

• ‘Due to closed civic space, it is difficult to build the resilience of communities inside the country’

  CIVICUS speaks with Helen Kidan, executive member of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR), about 20 years of crackdown by the Eritrean government and continuing human rights violations.

  Founded in 2003, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at raising awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promoting the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.

  What human rights violations are committed by the Eritrean government?

  Eritrea has one of the worst human rights records in Africa and is rated one the worst countries in the world for press freedoms:Reporters Without Borders’ 2022 index ranks it 179th out of 180 countries. There is no space for civil society, as there are no freedoms of association, peaceful assembly or expression.

  Thereport of the United Nations commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea, published in 2016, details a number of human rights violations by the regime, with crimes including genocide, sexual slavery, extrajudicial killing, forced disappearance, torture, forced labour and indefinite national service, which many have considered akin to slavery.

• Appel à une enquête indépendante sur la mort du chanteur rwandais Kizito Mihigo

  Lettre ouverte à tous les chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth

  Des organisations de la société civile à travers le monde demandent aux autorités rwandaises d’autoriser une enquête indépendante, impartiale et efficace sur sa mort en détention du chanteur populaire de gospel et activiste pour la paix Kizito Mihigo. Alors que vos gouvernements marquent Commonwealth Day aujourd’hui et s’apprêtent à participer au sommet des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth à Kigali en juin, nous vous écrivons pour vous demander de vous engager auprès de vos homologues du gouvernement rwandais afin de soutenir cet appel.

• BURUNDI: ‘Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly anymore’

  CIVICUS speaksabout the repression of civil society and human rights defenders and LGBTQI+ rights in Burundi with Carina Tertsakian, co-founder of the Burundi Human Rights Initiative (BHRI).

  Active from mid-2019 until December 2023, the BHRI was an independent initiative that worked in cooperation with a range of people inside and outside Burundi todocument the human rights situation and advocate for human rights.

  Has there been any improvement in the human rights situation in Burundi?

  Burundi’s overall human rights record has remained largely unchanged since President Évariste Ndayishimiye took office in 2020. Back then people had high hopes because the new president had a less bloody past than his predecessor. But there’s been little progress in the protection of civil and political rights. The authorities have continued to arrest, prosecute, ill-treat and sometimes torture people for political reasons. Those arrested have included activists, journalists and opposition members.

  Even though the most serious forms of rights violations such as political killings and enforced disappearances have decreased, human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists have been arbitrarily arrested simply due to their involvement in human rights activities or their affiliation with independent civil society organisations (CSOs). They are typically accused of undermining internal state security or territorial integrity, among other baseless charges.

  What are the conditions for LGBTQI+ people in Burundi?

  In August 2023, 24 people were arrested for their alleged involvement in organisations that help LGBTQI+ people. While some were acquitted or released, others faced sentencing. One activist who was acquitted passed away before being released. The case is ongoing, drawing attention to the larger underlying issue that homosexuality is still criminalised in Burundi.

  It’s nearly impossible to identify openly as an LGBTQI+ activist in Burundi. While some organisations engage in activities to support LGBTQI+ people, they avoid explicitly identifying as LGBTQI+ organisations. The 24 people who were arrested, for instance, had participated in training on awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS.

  In his recent year-end speech, President Ndayishimiye vilified LGBTQI+ people, labelling homosexuality as a sin and encouraging public stoning of those perceived as ‘homosexuals’. This horrifying statement has further fuelled hateful rhetoric online. On a positive note, a Burundian CSO and several prominent activists in exile strongly criticised Ndayishimiye’s statement, something that is extremely difficult to do inside Burundi.

  To what extent is it possible for human rights organisations to work in Burundi?

  In 2015, a significant political and human rights crisis unfolded in Burundi, marked by a violent crackdown on civil society, particularly on critics and those suspected of opposing the government. As a result, leaders of major human rights organisations fled the country and remain in exile. Some faced charges and were convicted in absentia, including to life imprisonment.

  Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly in Burundi anymore. Ever since 2015, activists addressing politically sensitive issues face direct threats and can’t work freely inside the country. Even those previously affiliated with human rights organisations that no longer operate in Burundi continue to face arrests.

  Activists advocating for economic and social rights experience comparatively less pressure. Some CSOs working on anti-corruption and good governance issues have been more or less allowed to function, although the government has occasionally impeded their activities, for example, by disrupting or prohibiting press conferences.

  Have Burundian activists found safety in exile?

  Exiled activists based in Europe or Canada are relatively safe, whereas those in Rwanda may encounter additional pressure. In 2015, as many HRDs and journalists fled, the government in Burundi banned or suspended their organisations and shut down several independent radio stations. Some exiled journalists established radio stations abroad, mainly in Rwanda.

  The Burundian government has taken advantage of recently improved relations with Rwanda and pressured the host country to silence these journalists or hand them over. The Rwandan government gave some of these journalists an ultimatum to either remain silent or leave, forcing some to halt operations from Rwanda and relocate again. Some of these journalists were among a broader group, including other HRDs, who were tried and sentenced in absentia.

  What are your key demands for the Burundian government?

  Burundi’s civil society demands that the government lift civic space restrictions, enabling HRDs, journalists and other independent voices to express themselves freely without harassment. We support these demands.

  First of all, the government must release Floriane Irangabiye, a journalist sentenced to 10 years in jail in May 2023. Five other HRDs were charged and tried earlier, in April. The government targeted them because of their association with an international organisation the regime dislikes and accused them of illegally receiving funds. Although released after two months thanks to international pressure, some have been given a suspended sentence, so we call for all charges against them to be dropped.

  The safety of exiled activists must also be ensured before they can return, which requires the lifting of their sentences. As long as HRDs continue to face convictions in absentia, there will be significant impediments to any form of human rights activism in Burundi. We further urge the government to revoke the bans and suspensions imposed on CSOs since 2015.

  Despite the government’s claim that Burundi is a democracy, it is certainly not. If it were, it would allow people to voice criticism and the activities of HRDs wouldn’t be criminalised.

  What support do Burundian human rights activists receive from international allies, and what further do they need?

  When European Union countries, the USA and other governments raise concerns about blatant human rights violations in Burundi, particularly through their embassies in the country, it really makes a difference. Although it may take years to secure the release of an HRD, intensified international pressure has proven effective.

  There are too few independent human rights groups left in Burundi, and it’s difficult to provide international support to virtually non-existent entities. Those still active are mostly individual activists, so it is challenging for donors to support them. One notable exception is the independent newspaper Iwacu, which, despite facing constraints, continues its work. We encourage donors to sustain their support of the media outlet, which represents one of the few remaining independent voices in Burundi.

  Human rights organisations operating from exile need ongoing support, and could expand their work if they had more sustainable funding. It’s hard to work from abroad. After several years in exile, activists begin to feel disconnected and demotivated as they don’t see things change.

  ---

  Civic space in Burundi is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

• BURUNDI: ‘Our right to be recognised and represented as an Indigenous community is being violated’

  CIVICUS speaks about Indigenous peoples’ rights in Burundi with Severin Sindizera, Global Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples Global Forum for Sustainable Development (IPGFforSD).

  IPGFforSD is a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Burundi and monitors the implementation of the Sustainable Development Gaols (SDGs) in relation to Indigenous peoples at the national and international levels.

  What is the situation of Indigenous people in Burundi?

  The Batwa Indigenous people represent approximately two per cent of Burundi’s population. The context is disheartening because most of our rights are not recognised. Most Batwa people live in extreme poverty and are marginalised and discriminated against. They are often excluded from access to basic resources such as public services, education, land and healthcare. One common issue affecting Indigenous people across the globe is lack of access to land and decision-making bodies. 

  The Batwa people are not exempt from this, as our land rights are not recognised in Burundi. We need land to survive – to build our houses, grow our crops, graze our animals and preserve our culture.

  Batwa people are not well represented in decision-making processes, which explains why development strategies rarely cater to us and our needs. We have been excluded from the economic, social, political and cultural development of our country. It is quite unfair to have people make decisions on our behalf without consulting with our community. When projects are implemented, we are often sidelined. It would seem the government is trying to make people think it is helping Indigenous people while we are not really receiving the help we need.

  The SDGs aim to eradicate many problems affecting societies globally, but their implementation in Burundi has not been inclusive of Indigenous people. The government must understand that our place in society is already under threat, so it needs to approach the SDGs in an intersectional manner to serve all people of Burundi equally.

  The international community has also shown a lack of a solid plan to address the rights of Indigenous peoples during implementation of the SDGs. We want to know how international organisations aim to promote Indigenous peoples’ development through the SDGs. I had the privilege of attending the Forum on Financing for Development (FfD) in New York, but was disappointed I was the only member representing Indigenous peoples.

  What are the main rights violations experienced by Batwa people in Burundi?

  Batwa people in Burundi do not have access to education, healthcare and proper legal services. Many people have suffered and died due to being denied access to healthcare facilities in their communities. When we try to get legal help to hold accountable those responsible for negligence in healthcare centres, we do not qualify to receive it. We hope this will change one day and the Batwa people of Burundi will be inclusively integrated in their communities.

  But Batwa people currently face serious discrimination. We are often called names such as witches and made feel unwanted by the wider society. Our dignity is looked down upon and we are forced to take a lesser place in society. Without access to good jobs, Batwa people have a high prevalence of poverty.

  Batwa people are disproportionately affected by arbitrary arrests and rights violations, as well as by land grabbing from the government and international stakeholders. People take advantage of us because they know that the majority of us do not have identity cards, making it difficult for us to access justice. Whatever laws have been put in place to protect us are not really working.

  Our right to be recognised and represented as a community is being violated. We need members of our community to advocate for our rights independently, without being associated with any political party. The history of this country should inform policymakers about the importance of cultural recognition. No one should be left behind because of their identity. We have a right to participate fully in public life without facing rights violations.

  Has any progress been made in terms of representation in policymaking processes?

  The Burundian government has launched an initiative to include Indigenous people in some governmental positions. There are now a few Batwa people in parliament. However, the fact that participation in public affairs requires association with a political party makes us uncomfortable. This restricts many Indigenous people from speaking out about their rights because they are controlled by their political parties.

  Political representation is an opportunity for our needs to be heard but our people who are actively participating in public affairs do not necessarily speak on our behalf. Participation of ethnic minorities in Burundi still has a long way to go despite the efforts of the government. Batwa women are inadequately represented in political positions.

  Our government focuses on development but fails to promote it in an inclusive manner. It recently setup a national strategy for Indigenous people, highlighting issues we are dealing with and stating its plan to advance Indigenous people’s rights. We hope that they will consult with members of our community and Indigenous leaders about our needs so the strategy actually benefits us.

  How can Indigenous groups across the world work together to promote Indigenous people’s rights?

  Indigenous groups must have regional and international forums to collaborate towards the achievement of our human rights, economic and social development, as well as civil and political rights. We must partner with international organisations that have experience with working on Indigenous people’s rights so that they can help us with our advocacy work and share strategies to make our work more effective.

  Our organisation, IPGFforSD, works for Indigenous rights through international advocacy and innovative initiatives. We work in collaboration with Indigenous groups an encourage them to create and enhance their platforms in their respective countries from across the globe who face similar issues. We focus on monitoring SDG implementation because the rights and needs of Indigenous people are currently not well represented when SDGs are implemented. We have worked with the United Nations (UN) mechanisms, including the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), to raise awareness of the plight of Indigenous people and the need to recognise them in both national and international policies. We advocate for national governments and international organisations to implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

  We also work to sensitise our leaders about Indigenous rights through workshops and seminars. Our aim is for them to be well informed so they can, we hope, help us in the battle of getting our rights recognised in Burundi.

  Civic space in Burundi is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with IPGFforSD through itsFacebook page and follow@IIpgfforsd on Twitter. 

• Call for independent investigation into Rwandan singer Kizito Mihigo’s death

  Open letter to all Commonwealth Heads of Government

  Civil society organisations around the world are calling on the Rwandan authorities to allow an independent, impartial, and effective investigation into the death in custody of Kizito Mihigo, a popular gospel singer and peace activist. As your governments mark Commonwealth Day today and prepare to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kigali in June, we are writing to ask you to engage with your counterparts in the Rwandan government in support of this call.

• COP26: ‘A key priority is to address vulnerability at the community level’

  In the run-up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow, UK between 31 October and 12 November 2021, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are undertaking to tackle them and their expectations for the upcoming summit.

  CIVICUS speaks with Mubiru Huzaifah of Uganda’s Ecological Christian Organisation (ECO), a civil society organisation working for sustainable livelihoods for marginalised, under-served and vulnerable groups in Uganda. ECO’s current initiatives focus on natural resource governance, climate change resilience and adaptation, and ecosystems management and restoration.

   

  What's the key climate issue in your country that you're working on?

  The issue that most worries us is the high vulnerability levels that climate change is causing in human systems. The long-term change of climatic elements from previously accepted means is causing environmental and human systems to change. According to state of environment reports issued by the Ugandan National Environmental Management Authority, the main issues related to the changing climate include industrial pollution, widespread bush burning, the inefficient use of fuel and poorly planned transport networks, all of which result in high emission levels.

  Are there any government initiatives on climate change mitigation?

  There is a mitigation project being implemented under the Ministry of Water and Environment – Farm Income Enhancement and Forest Conservation – which gives out free seedlings to be planted to enhance the absorption capacity of the soil. There is the Sawlog Production Grant Scheme, aimed at increasing the incomes of rural people through commercial tree planting by local communities as well as medium and large-scale businesses, which at the same time helps to mitigate climate change effects through intensive reforestation. There are also several solar projects in the Mayuge, Soroti and Tororo districts, which have increased the country’s solar production, and a wetland project – supported by the Green Climate Fund – supporting wetlands conservation and addressing wetland degradation.

  Other relevant interventions include the implementation of gravity water flow schemes to enable water supply without use of energy sources; the development of highways with water drainage channels and solar lights and congestion-free road networks that will enable the smooth flow of traffic and cut down on emissions from automobiles; and the adoption of electric or emissions-free motorcycles to further reduce emissions from fossil energy sources, which the Ministry of Energy is working on alongside the private sector.

  What kind of work does ECO do on these issues?

  ECO’s work is aimed at enhancing the resilience of communities to the impacts of climate change, strengthening disaster risk reduction, enhancing good governance and management of natural resources, especially in the extractives sector, and promoting ecosystems management and restoration.

  For instance, as part of a project aimed at promoting and supporting community-conserved areas in the Lake Victoria Basin, we have provided support for legal fishing practices, promoted and provided training on sustainable farming promotion and supported good local resource governance practices. Another project is aimed at increasing transparency, social inclusion, accountability and responsiveness among those responsible for mining in the Karamoja region.

  In these and in many other projects we are working on, we always seek drive to change by putting people at risk at the centre and building on local and traditional resources and knowledge. We try to link the humanitarian and development domains by focusing on livelihoods. We work to ensure adaptive planning, trying to link local realities with global processes and integrate disciplines and approaches to encompass different risks. We partner with communities, civil society organisations, government agencies, universities and research institutes, the private sector and the media.

  How do you connect with the broader international climate movement?

  We connect with the global climate movement through the Climate Action Network-Uganda, which encompasses over 200 national CSOs. We currently chair this. This allows us to participate in COP meetings as observers.

  We also participate in the pre-COP consultative meetings organised by the Ugandan government in preparation for international climate change negotiations. In these meetings, we help assess progress in dealing with climate change and complying with our nationally determined contributions.

  We turn our lessons learned into advocacy actions that can be adapted for international climate change forums. Some local problems can feed into the national agenda, be turned into policy actions and go on to influence international policy actions.

  What hopes, if any, do you have for COP26 to make progress on climate change mitigation efforts?

  We hope that COP26 will come up with a new marketing platform for emission trading to replace the Clean Development Mechanism, which allowed countries with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to implement emission-reduction projects in developing countries. We also hope it will result in the commitment of more funds to accelerate the scaling up of renewable energies.

  These international processes are relevant as long as they contribute towards the financing of climate mitigation efforts and produce novel funding strategies, such as the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund, and its pilot programme to foster innovation in adaptation practices in vulnerable countries. Coming from a developing country, I believe that it is critical to increase adaptation funding immediately, since the disruptive impacts of climate change on human systems are already apparent.

  What one change would you like to see – in the world or in your community – to help address the climate crisis?

  A key priority is to address vulnerability at the community level. Our vision is that of a community with enhanced adaptive capacity to address climate change impacts and its subsequent effects. This can be done by increasing access to working technologies and providing mitigation and adaptation funding through community structures.

  Civic space inUgandais rated as ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Ecological Christian Organisation through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@EcoChristianOrg on Twitter.

• COP26: ‘In response to pressure from below, COP26 should develop interventions for just climate action’

  In the run-up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow, UK between 31 October and 12 November 2021, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are undertaking to tackle them and their expectations for the upcoming summit.

  CIVICUS speaks with Caroline Owashaba, team leader at Action for Youth Development Uganda and volunteer coordinator of the Girls Not Brides Uganda Alliance.

  

  What is the key environmental issue in your country that you are working on?

  A key issue in Uganda is the use of large quantities of single-use plastic bags, which have extreme environmental effects. Plastic bags take many years to decompose; they release toxic substances into the soil and, if burned, into the air; they block drains and may cause flooding; and they kill animals that eat them confusing them for food or that get entangled in them.

  A measure to ban the manufacture, sale and use of plastic bags was passed back in 2018, but manufacturers lobbied hard to get more time before the ban went into effect, and as a result its enforcement has been slow and largely ineffective. So earlier in 2021, the government decided to enforce new measures to that effect, alongside a bigger package of environmental measures. 

  While the government works to enforce the ban on single-use plastic bags, we are working on an initiative to produce alternative, eco-friendly and biodegradable materials. This is quite urgent, because right now, if the ban on plastic bags was actually enforced, the supply of biodegradable packaging options would by no means be enough.

  Action for Youth Development Uganda (ACOYDE) is implementing a project named CHACHA (Children for Alternative Change), which uses banana fibre to produce a variety of useful items, such as door and table mats, pillows, interior decorative items and, of course, bags. The waste generated from the banana fibre extraction and the manufacture of these items is recycled to produce high-quality charcoal briquettes that are used as a heat source by young people and women involved in the project in both their homes and workplaces, reducing consumption of fuel while increasing their household income. 

  The whole community takes part in the production process, because they are the major suppliers of banana stems. And the project enables young people, and especially young women, to earn a living for their families. There are possibilities for its expansion, as the emergence of eco-hotels has created an increased demand for eco-friendly products 

  How do you engage with the broader international climate movement?

  We have engaged with the international movement through regional climate change exchanges such as Africa Climate Change Week and as part of the Climate Smart Agriculture Youth Network. We also follow the discussions of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group on adaptation, mitigation and financing.

  It has also worked the other way around: ACOYDE has supported efforts to domesticate the international climate framework and fed into the National Climate Change Bill, which was passed in April 2021. The new bill gave the force of law to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, to which Uganda is a signatory. We then worked to localise the bill. It is key for it to be effectively implemented at a local level because it will help us overcome the climate change injustices in our communities.

  We also connect with the broader climate movement from a gender perspective. I am personally interested in the intersections between gender and climate change. In previous COPs, I was able to contribute to the Gender Action Plan (GAP) that has guided and influenced issues of women and youth in UNFCCC negotiation processes. I participated in GAP progress discussions on gender balance, coherence, gender-responsive implementation, monitoring, and reporting. I have also been active in the Uganda National Gender Working Group and other national climate change processes to ensure the domestication of global standards of gender and financing consistent with the Paris Agreement, including by reporting on the implementation of the GAP provisions in Uganda.

  What hopes, if any, do you have for COP26?

  COP26 should offer spaces to take gender issues to the global level and provide further opportunities for discussion. It should increase women’s participation, undertake gender mainstreaming and ensure GAPs are implemented. It should help amplify the voices of women in climate change negotiations. Women are doing much of the heavy lifting at the grassroots level, but they get too little in return, not just because too little goes to their pockets but also because they continue to be underrepresented and therefore their voices go unheard.

  International forums such as COP26 should provide spaces for grassroots participation and, in response to those pressures from below, COP26 should develop strong interventions for just climate action that are respectful of human rights, including Indigenous people’s rights and the promotion of gender equality. 

  Civic space inUgandais rated as ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Action for Youth Development Uganda through itswebsite andFacebook page.

• COP26: ‘We hope that at COP26 words will translate into commitments that will change behaviours’

  In the run-up to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow, UK between 31 October and 12 November 2021, CIVICUS is interviewing civil society activists, leaders and experts about the environmental challenges they face in their contexts, the actions they are undertaking to tackle them and their expectations for the upcoming summit.

  CIVICUS speaks with Theophile Hatagekimana, Executive Secretary of Rwanda Environment Awareness Organisation (REAO), a Rwandan civil society organisation that works to create awareness about climate change and environmental issues and to promote sound environmental management policies.

  

  What’s the key environmental issue in your community that you’re working on?

  We work on climate change resilience and mitigation with respect for human rights. In recent years we have started collaborating with government efforts to reduce the amount of fuel used for cooking at the household level. We have joined forces with the Rwandan government in this and other initiatives because they are being very proactive in the area of climate change mitigation.

  Within this project, we teach vulnerable people, including young women, poor women, adolescent single mothers, and victims of sexual abuse, how to use improved cooking methods such as stoves instead of firewood, which not only saves trees and reduces their exposure to toxic emissions in their homes, but also saves them a lot of time. We encourage them to allocate the time saved in the process to self-development activities including education and social interaction, as well as to engage in income-generating activities.

  We also plant trees to restore forests and we plant and distribute agroforestry trees, which make the soil more resilient and able to tackle extreme climatic events such as drought and torrential rain, as well as providing food, forage, industrial raw materials, lumber, fuel, and mulch, helping diversify diets and income. One of our projects focuses on purchasing seeds and planting them in schools, within the framework of a programme that includes ecological literacy, the demonstration of environmental principles by developing green practices on a day-to-day basis, and the development of environmental ethics.

  Though it might seem that we work only on environment protection, we are in fact very concerned with the human rights dimension of environmental protection, so we oppose the practice of displacing people without proper compensation. We raise awareness among the public about their rights as provided in law and support them to claim them when necessary. A case in point is that of the Batwa Indigenous people who are often expelled from their land, so we provide them the tools so that they will know their rights as provided in international and Rwandan law.

  How do you connect with the broader international climate movement?

  Many activists, including myself, maintain personal connections with international organisations and peers around the world. But also at the organisational level, we try to connect with other groups that have a similar mission to ours and take part in climate and environmental networks and coalitions. REAO is a member of the Rwanda Climate Change and Development Network, a national association of environment defenders’ organisations. At the international level, we network with other organisations that work on climate change protection and mitigation, and we have worked in partnership with the International Union for Conservation of Nature and the United Nations Development Programme, among others.

  What hopes, if any, do you have for COP26 to make any progress in climate change mitigation?

  We welcome all international efforts aimed at making coordinated decisions to protect the environment and improve the wellbeing of communities, and we are hopeful that COP26 will result in the adoption of concrete measures to address climate change and environmental degradation. At the discursive level, of course, all that national leaders say on the global stage is exactly what we want to hear; none of it goes against our mission, vision and values. We hope that at COP26 those words will translate into commitments that will result in positive change in their countries’ behaviour on climate issues.

  What one change would you like to see – in the world or in your community – to help address the climate crisis?

  On the global level, we want to see action by the countries that are the biggest polluters aimed at reducing it substantially. Countries like China, India, the USA and others should take clear decisions and act on climate change issues or we will all face the consequences of their inaction. We hope that big polluters will pay for climate solutions and the bill will be settled.

  At the local level, we hope to see the living conditions of less advantaged communities improve and adapt to climate change with the support of government policies and funding.

  Civic space inRwandais rated as ‘repressed’by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Rwanda Environment Awareness Organisation through itswebsite andFacebook page. 

• EAST AFRICA: ‘The pipeline project would open up critical ecosystems to commercial oil exploitation’

  CIVICUS speaks about the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project and its potential impacts on the climate and on the health and livelihoods of local communities with Omar Elmawi, coordinator of the Stop the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (#StopEACOP).

  #StopEACOP is a global online campaign that seeks to raise awareness of the effects of the project and calls for its cancellation.

  What is EACOP, and what is wrong with it?

  EACOP is a project to extract and transport crude oil from Uganda to Tanzania, led by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and French energy conglomerate TotalEnergies alongside the Uganda National Oil Company and Tanzania Petroleum Development Cooperation.

  If it goes on, EACOP would have disastrous consequences for local communities, for wildlife and for the entire planet. In other words, it will affect humans, nature and climate. It threatens to displace thousands of families and farmers from their land. It poses significant risks to water resources and wetlands in both Uganda and Tanzania – including the Lake Victoria basin, which over 40 million people rely on for drinking water and food production.

  Additionally, EACOP would increase the severity of the global climate emergency by transporting oil that, when burned, will generate over 34 million tonnes of carbon emissions per year. The pipeline would also open up critical ecosystems in the landlocked regions of Central and Eastern Africa to commercial oil exploitation.

  It would also rip through numerous sensitive biodiversity hotspots and risk significantly degrading several nature reserves crucial to the preservation of threatened species, including elephants, lions and chimpanzees.

  How are you mobilising against EACOP?

  Civil society came together under a global campaign that we have called #StopEACOP, aimed at sharing news related to the pipeline project and distributing resources to help people organise and take action against it.

  #StopEACOP is led by an alliance of local groups and communities and African and global civil society organisations (CSOs). Over 260 CSOs have endorsed it and are working towards realising the campaign’s objectives through public mobilisation, legal action, research, shareholder activism and media advocacy.

  Since environmental licences have been awarded for the pipeline and associated oil fields in Kingfisher and Tilenga, several cases have been filed against the EACOP pipeline, including at the East African Court of Justice and in French courts against TotalEnergies, under the duty of vigilance law.

  We hope that our campaign will put enough pressure on the companies and governments involved so that they will put an end to the pipeline project and prioritise the wellbeing of people and the environment.

  How have the governments involved responded to the #StopEACOP campaign?

  The governments of both Tanzania and Uganda are committed to seeing this project through despite the fact that each will receive only 15 per cent of the proceeds from the crude oil going through the pipeline. TotalEnergies and CNOOC hold 70 per cent of the pipeline’s shares, so they will be the ones pocketing 70 per cent of the proceeds from crude oil.

  Additionally, TotalEnergies and CNOOC both get tax benefits, including a waiver on payment of corporate tax for 10 years once the pipeline becomes operational and on the value-added tax on imported products and materials needed for the pipeline. They are required to pay only five per cent in withholding tax instead of the required 15 per cent.

  We haven’t stopped trying to engage the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments, although some of our members, and especially community partners, have been arrested and detained, had their offices raided or been threatened with the deregistration of their organisations. The government has had a part to play in most if not all these challenges, but we have continued to engage and use all legal mechanisms and processes available to make sure our community partners are protected.

  What kind of support do you need from international civil society and the wider international community?

  Allied organisations, activists and regular people are welcome to visit our website and click on our action page, which suggests a variety of actions addressed at the companies involved and governments and their funders and insurers. Please take as many of the actions listed as you can, prioritising those targeting insurance companies and banks. This is key because the EACOP project will need multi-billion-dollar loans to proceed, as well as numerous insurance policies covering every component of the project.

  People can also donate to the cause. All the resources we receive are shared with our community partners and support any security and legal needs that may arise, including legal representation fees.

  You can follow us on our social media pages to get updates on the campaign and subscribe to receive email updates on the progress of the campaign and upcoming actions that you can endorse or take part in.

  Civic space in bothTanzania andUganda is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with #StopEACOP through itswebsite or its Facebook and Instagram pages,and follow @stopEACOP on Twitter. 

• ERITREA: ‘When the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact’

  CIVICUS speaks with about civil society work in Eritrea’s context of closed civic space with Helen Kidan, chairperson of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR).

  Founded in 2003 and based in South Africa, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that raises awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promotes the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.

  What’s the situation for civil society in Eritrea?

  Eritrea has never truly implemented its 1997 Constitution and until Eritrea it is run by the rule of law, human rights abuses will continue with no recourse to justice. This includes completely closed civil society space, with no semblance of rights of association, assembly and expression.

  Since Proclamation No. 145 of 2005 went into effect nearly two decades ago, there has been no independent civil society in Eritrea. According to this law, the only way CSOs can implement programmes is in partnership with government agencies, which restrict the areas, themes and focus of the projects that can be implemented. There are obviously very few CSOs present and active in Eritrea.

  The only way to start creating any space for independent CSOs in Eritrea would be to have Proclamation 145/2005 revoked.

  What is EMDHR doing to try to improve the situation?

  EMDHR advocates against the ongoing human rights abuses in Eritrea as well as for the rights of Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. Our mission is to promote and defend human right values as established in international legal instruments and advance democratic change, rule of law and constitutionalism in Eritrea, with the ultimate aim of building a society in which people exercise their basic rights and live in peace, dignity and prosperity.

  We provide training, sustain networks and produce and disseminate information to create awareness of the situation of Eritreans. We have made several presentations at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in Geneva, and in July 2022 we made a presentation at the UN in New York.

  We are currently working with African CSOs to bring the ongoing crisis in Eritrea to the African level and get support for Eritrean refugees. We have also commissioned a report on the state of Eritrean CSOs that makes recommendations to the international community.

  In early September 2023 we co-organised the Africa Civil Society Organisations Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Through a joint project with Africa Monitors, Eritrean Satellite Television and Eritrean Diaspora for East Africa, a CSO based in Kenya, we have provided training to Eritrean human rights activists, including on digital activism, and created a space for Eritrean CSOs and activists to be able to work together.

  In 2019 we provided in-person training in a workshop held in Uganda. In 2017 we co-organised a conference in Brussels on the ongoing Eritrean refugee crisis, with which we tried to elicit a reaction from members of the European Parliament, commissioners and CSOs from across Europe. And in 2015 we campaigned and got asylum for Eritrean footballers in Botswana.

  What’s it like to be a diaspora activist? How do you connect with activists within Eritrea?

  It’s extremely frustrating because it makes our work less effective. Connecting with people inside Eritrea is very hard as internet penetration in Eritrea is only two per cent. The government basically controls all media: all independent media ceased to exist in 2001. This is why most information is brought to us by people who have recently left the country. But while the work is challenging, it is still possible to get information. And when the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact.

  A lot of funders provide funds to African organisations only when they operate in their home country. The fact that we are not able to operate inside Eritrea means we also suffer financially and hence a lot of Eritrean CSOs are forced to sustain themselves on the basis of voluntary work.

  Additionally, the work remains emotionally and psychologically draining, as many Eritrean activists in the diaspora are threatened with harm to family members still living in Eritrea for speaking out against the regime back home.

  As Eritrean human rights defenders, even if you are operating outside the country, the government will always discredit your work. All those that don’t agree with them are seen as traitors. The government uses social media as a means of trolling and tries to attack websites and other social media channels.

  What sparked recent protests by Eritrean refugees in Israel, and how has the Israeli government responded?

  Those protests appeared to have been organised by a new group called Brigade N’Hamedu, which is trying to overthrow the regime. Their members hold demonstrations across the world, and they particularly attack the festivals that the regime holds abroad, which they view as a means of raising funds for the regime and spreading its propaganda. They are tired of government interference and intimidate Eritreans who have left their country but still support the Eritrean government. They want all Eritreans who claim asylum but express support for the Eritrean government to have their asylum revoked.

  This is a movement of young Eritreans but a lot of veterans and older members of the community support them, as they see them as the most plausible means of removing the regime. Although they have succeeded in mobilising Eritreans, however, there seems to be no clear strategy and this could be a stumbling block. They are very unlikely to succeed.

  In response to these protests, and using their unprecedented violence as an excuse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he wants all Eritreans removed from Israel. The predicament of Eritreans in Israel was already dire, but this has now opened the doors for the far-right government in Israel to deport all Eritreans. However, the UN, Israeli human rights groups and other human rights groups outside Israel are asking that genuine refugees whose lives are at risk not be deported to Eritrea.

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  Civic space in Eritrea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with EMDHR through itswebsite or Facebook page,and follow @emdhrorg on Twitter.

• Eritrea: Extend UN Special Rapporteur mandate, help end generalized impunity

  To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, Switzerland

  Excellencies,

  Ahead of the 38^th session of the UN Human Rights Council (“HRC” or “the Coun­cil”), we write to you as a cross-re­gional group of non-governmental organizations to share our serious concerns over the sys­te­ma­tic, wide­spread and gross human rights violations that continue to be committed with impu­nity in Eritrea.

  We urge your Govern­ment to support and co-sponsor at the upcoming session a streamlined reso­lution that accurately reflects the gravity of the situation on the ground, renews the man­date of the Special Rapporteur under the Council’s agenda item 4, and sets out a framework for need­ed reforms to improve the human rights situation in the country and advance ac­count­ability.

  At the Council’s last regular session, during an enhanced interactive dialogue on Eri­trea held in March 2018, Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Kate Gilmore noted:

  “In 2016, the Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea found reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity, namely, enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, other inhumane acts, per­secution, rape and murder, had been committed since 1991. The Commission noted that despite the State’s increased engagement with the international community, there was no evidence of progress in the field of hu­man rights. I regret to report that this state of affairs remains unchanged.”[1]

  In her most recent statement to the Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on Eritrea, Sheila B. Keet­ha­ruth, similarly detailed violations per­tain­ing to the right to life, including deaths in custody for which responsibility “falls squarely on Gov­ernment authorities,” the right to liberty and security of the person, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedoms of expression, assembly and as­so­ciation, and freedom of religion or belief, inc­lu­­ding the harass­ment, mis­treatment, torture and detention of members of unrecognized religions.[2] These continuing violations present a systematic character, meaning, in the words of the Special Rap­porteur, that “they cannot be the result of ran­dom or isolated acts by the autho­rities” and that they occur in a country ruled “not by law, but by fear.”[3]

  Since Eritrea was first considered by the Council, the Government has refused to cooperate with the mechanisms the Council set up, including the Special Rapporteur and the Commis­sion of In­quiry (CoI). At the March 2018 enhanced interactive dialogue, Eritrea was not present to take the floor as the con­cer­ned country.

  Eritrea’s cooperation with other international bodies, mechanisms or agencies has been extremely selec­tive. While the Government recently invited the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Hu­man Rights (OHCHR) for a short-term technical assistance mission, the Deputy High Commissio­ner under­lined that “the test of the merits of our engagement with Eritrea – like Eritrea’s commitments at the international level – lies in whether or not they produce concrete human rights improvements for the people of Eritrea.” She concluded that there had been no measurable progress to date.

  Eritrea has consistently denied UN Special Procedures, including the country-specific Special Rap­por­teur, access to the country. At the time of writing, pen­ding visit requests by Special Procedures included requests from the Spe­cial Rapporteurs on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (request in 2005; reminders in 2007 and 2010); freedom of religion or belief (request in 2004; reminders in 2005 and 2006); extrajudicial, sum­mary or arbitrary exe­cu­tions (request in 2010); the right to food (request in 2003); and freedom of opi­nion and expression (request in 2003; reminders in 2005 and 2015).

  Eritrea has also attacked, intimidated and threatened human rights defenders and independent UN ex­perts, including the Special Rapporteur and members of the CoI. When the latter presented their report in 2015, they noted that “[they] were followed in the streets and in [their] hotels and vilified in blogs on line where the words of [their] report have been twisted and misquoted.” The Com­mission’s Chair added: “Of course this is trivial compared to the day to day experience of people in Eritrea itself, but it is indicative of a determination on the part of the authorities to control anyone they perceive as a critic.”[4]

  The gravity, scale and nature of the continuing violations call for justice. Victims, including those who live inside the country and those who have fled it, deserve redress. As domestic avenues for such red­ress are non-existent, the international community must continue to act with a view to en­ding the gene­ra­lized impu­nity that prevails in the coun­try. The Deputy High Commissioner remin­ded the Coun­cil that, as advi­sed by the Special Rapporteur, there could be “no sustain­able solution to the refugee out­flows until the Government complied with its human rights obligations.”[5]

  In view of the ongoing crimes under international law and violations of human rights and fun­da­mental freedoms committed in Eritrea, the Special Rapporteur’s mandate remains an indispensable mechanism to advance the protection and promotion of human rights in the country. The mandate holder continues to fulfil an invaluable role by monitoring the dire situation in the country, shining a light on violations, providing a crucial platform to help amplify the voices of victims, and offering Eritreans an opportunity to find long-lasting solutions for the respect of their human rights.

  Consistent with its mandate to address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, the Human Rights Council should continue to address the situ­ation in Eritrea. We urge your dele­gation to actively support and co-sponsor a resolution that:

  • Recalls the reports of the Commission of Inquiry and the Special Rapporteur and continues to ex­press its deep concern over the findings contained therein;
  • Condemns the reported systematic, widespread and gross human rights viola­tions and abuses that have been and are being committed by the Government of Eritrea in a climate of genera­li­zed im­punity;
  • Reiterates that all perpetrators of such violations and abuses should be held ac­countable;
  • Extends the mandate of the Special Rap­porteur and invites the mandate holder to continue to fol­low up on the findings of HRC mechanisms, including on accountability;
  • Invites the Special Rapporteur to assess and report on the Eritrean Government’s degree of enga­ge­ment and cooperation with the Council and its mechanisms, as well as with OHCHR, and whe­re feasible to develop benchmarks for progress on human rights and a time-bound action plan for the imple­mentation of these benchmarks;
  • Calls on all states to urge the Government of Eritrea to co-operate with the Special Rappor­teur and other UN bodies and mechanisms, including Special Procedures, implement the recommen­da­­tions these bodies and mechanisms made over the years, and allow unfettered ac­cess to the coun­try, including detention centers and training facilities.

  We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and are available to provide your delegation with further information as required.

  Sincerely,

  Africa Monitors

  Amnesty International

  ARTICLE 19

  Asian Legal Resource Centre

  Central Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (REDHAC)

  Christian Solidarity Worldwide

  Citizens for Democratic Rights in Eritrea (CDRiE)

  CIVICUS

  DefendDefenders (the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)

  Eritrean Diaspora in East Africa

  Eritrean Lowland League

  Eritrean Law Society

  Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights

  FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights)

  FORUM-Asia

  Human Rights Concern – Eritrea

  Human Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA)

  Human Rights Watch

  International Fellowship of Reconciliation

  International Service for Human Rights                        

  PEN Eritrea

  Release Eritrea

  Reporters Without Borders

  Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (SAHRDN)

  West Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (WAHRDN/ROADDH)

  ---

  [1] The meeting summary can be found at: www.bit.ly/2Fc69BX

  [2] www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22821&LangID=E

  [3] www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16055&LangID=E

  [4] www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16731&LangID=E The Special Rapporteur herself has faced personal attacks during an interactive dialogue that was held in June 2017, when she was referred to as a “naked Empress with no clothes” and was accused of carrying out a witch-hunt against Eritrea. See www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/8032/2018/en/

  [5] See footnote 1 above.

• Ethiopia: international scrutiny must continue to ensure peace and stability in the country

  Statement at the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council

  Interactive Dialogue with the Commission on Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia

  Delivered by Sibahle Zuma

  Thank you, Mr President,

  CIVICUS and its partners in Ethiopia welcome the renewal of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia’s mandate at the 51^st Human Rights Council Session. We also welcome the signing of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan authorities on the 2^nd of November 2022. This is a critical moment to end all atrocities and the suffering of millions of civilians.

  For the past two years, Ethiopia’s human rights situation has been marred by extrajudicial killings, rape and sexual violence, unlawful shelling, airstrikes and pillage. Freedom of expression has particularly been restricted in the past two years. Journalists and media actors have faced detentions, arrests, and censorship from both Ethiopian and Tigrayan authorities. On the 7^th of September 2022, the founder and editor of the Voice of Amhara was arrested by authorities at his home. He was accused of having ties with the TLPF and attempting to terrorise the public by disseminating information that supports the rebel group. No formal charges were laid against him.

  In the same month, Abay Zewdu, the chief editor of a privately owned satellite and YouTube-based broadcaster, Amara Media Centre, was arrested by Ethiopian authorities. He was accused of disseminating false information and organising students from the Amhara ethnic group to commit violence. He remained in detention even after he had posted bail.

  We call on the Ethiopian government to respect the right to freedom of expression and to cease all forms of intimidation and harassment of journalists and other media actors. We urge the UN Human Rights Council and the Commission of Experts to continue scrutinising the situation in Ethiopia to ensure peace and stability in the country.

  We thank you.

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   Civic space in Ethiopia is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor. 

• Ethiopia: Stop violence against protesters and lift internet restrictions

  (Johannesburg 2 July 2020) CIVICUS calls on the authorities in Ethiopia to stop using violence to disperse ongoing protests and to lift internet restrictions that have been imposed across the country.

  At least 80 people have been killed since protesters started demonstrating against the brutal assassination of prominent musician Hachalu Hundessa on 29 June 2020. Hachalu, whose songs reflected the challenges of the Oromia people during anti-government protests from 2014 to 2018, was killed by unidentified gunmen in Addis Ababa.

  “The Ethiopian authorities have a long history of using brutal force to quell protests, and the ongoing repression of protesters has once again opened divisions and provoked violence among the different ethnic groups. The shutting down of the internet and arrest of prominent political figures bring back memories of the human rights violations perpetrated by previous governments. The authorities should lift restrictions on the internet and implement UN guidelines on managing protests to avoid a further escalation of violence,” said Paul Mulindwa, Advocacy and Campaigns Officer, CIVICUS.

  Background

  More than 80 people have been killed as protesters condemn the killing of popular musician Hachalu Hundessa. The Ethiopian government has failed to provide assurances that those responsible have been identified and will be brought to justice. The number of deaths may be higher as internet restrictions imposed by the authorities in cities affected by the violence make it impossible to obtain credible information on the extent of the unrest. Prominent political figures, including former political prisoner and journalist Eskinder Nega, have also been arrested. CIVICUS is concerned that the government’s violent response may intensify this volatile situation.

  For more information on civic space violations, visit the Ethiopia country page on theCIVICUS Monitor.

  To arrange an interview with CIVICUS or activists in Ethiopia please contact:

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• HORN OF AFRICA: ‘De-escalation must be the primary objective’

  CIVICUS speaks with Mengistu Assefa, Program Manager at the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), about a port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the possibility of it escalating into an armed conflict with Somalia.

  CARD is an Ethiopian civil society organisation that advocates for democracy and human rights through citizen empowerment.

  What’s the relevance of the recent port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland?

  Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked nation, placed in a challenging position for international trade. Since then, Djibouti has emerged as its primary access point to the sea, handling over 95 per cent of its trade volume. This dependence comes at a cost, with Ethiopia paying more than US$1 billion annually in fees to Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure. With its estimated population of 126 million, the second largest in Africa, Ethiopia views sea access as critical for its economic, political and demographic future.

  To achieve this, on 1 January 2024 the Ethiopian federal government signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on commercial port access with Somaliland, a self-proclaimed autonomous territory that is internationally recognised as part of Somalia.

  While this MoU is not a legally binding agreement, it carries significant implications for the region because it walks a tightrope between cooperation and recognition. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a potential step towards international recognition of its de facto autonomy. Although the agreement’s full details remain undisclosed, it also reportedly grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast, potentially including a military base. Ethiopian authorities have not been explicit about Somaliland’s recognition, saying the MoU allows for an ‘in-depth assessment’ of Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

  Somalia vehemently rejects the MoU, viewing it as a violation of its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. It is actively mobilising diplomatic pressure against the deal. Somali president Hassan Sheik Mohamed has visited Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s long-standing competitors, seeking support. Additionally, the Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has denounced the MoU. Egypt’s leader, already locked in negotiations with Ethiopia over a Nile dam project, has assured Somalia of potential support if requested, further escalating regional tensions.

  What’s the political status of Somaliland?

  Somaliland, with an estimated population of five million, broke away from Somalia and declared its independence in 1991 after 30 years of civil war. It fought for its independence based on the argument that it had a distinct historical heritage. Somaliland was a UK protectorate, while Somalia was under Italian control. For Somalilanders, this is enough argument to prove they are different territories. Moreover, in June 1960 Somaliland was briefly recognised as an independent state by around 35 nations for a span of five days, before it relinquished its sovereignty to reunite with the Somali Republic.

  Somaliland declared its independence more than three decades ago but Somalia has never recognised it. Neither has any international organisation. Even so, Somaliland has managed to become a stable, functional state. It established its own army and democratic institutions and has held six elections with peaceful transitions of power.

  In late 2022 and early 2023, a local armed movement, the Dhulbahante militias, rose against Somaliland’s government, declaring its intention to rejoin Somalia. This uprising posed significant political and security challenges to the Somaliland government, partly contributing to the postponement of 2023 elections. It cast a shadow of instability over Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, which hinges on its ability to demonstrate long-term stability and democratic institutions.

  Could the port deal lead to international recognition of Somaliland’s independence?

  Somaliland has made clear that a binding legal agreement could only be signed once it is officially recognised as an independent nation state. But the Ethiopian side of the story is quite different. Ethiopia hasn’t ruled out the possibility of that happening but hasn’t explicitly said it would take a stance on the recognition of Somaliland. The signing of a binding legal international agreement with Somaliland would however result in Ethiopia’s de facto recognition of its independence.

  Looking at the bigger picture, this deal could affect the regional security architecture, particularly when it comes to fighting Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group based in Somalia and allied with Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is perceived as a global security threat and has explicitly targeted Ethiopia. Consequently, Ethiopia is engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia alongside the Somali army. If Ethiopia recognises Somaliland, Somalia will likely force Ethiopia to pull out its troops. However, as Somalia cannot take charge of its security on its own, Ethiopia could use it as leverage to force Somalia to back down from a strong reaction.

  Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland carries significant implications. Located in a strategically crucial area along the Gulf of Eden, where Houthis and pirates constantly attack international ships, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline attracts interest from various countries seeking a potential military base. Ethiopia’s explicit recognition of Somaliland could trigger a domino effect, with other countries following suit, although recognition would likely face significant hurdles at the African Union (AU).

  The AU adheres to the principle of respecting colonial borders and has expressed concerns about setting a precedent for secessionist movements in other African states, including Morocco and Nigeria. Ethiopia will likely weigh this carefully before explicitly recognising Somaliland’s independence. However, the rapidly shifting landscape of international interests suggests that it’s not an impossibility. This possibility is further amplified by the growing involvement of great and emerging powers in the Red Sea region, driven by economic and security interests.

  Could tensions escalate into a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia?

  Ethiopia and Somalia have had difficult relations in the past. In 1964, they clashed in a three-month border conflict. This initial skirmish foreshadowed a larger and bloodier conflict that erupted between 1977 and 1978. During this period, Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the intent of annexing the Ogaden region, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The conflict quickly became a proxy war for the contenders of the Cold War, with the western bloc supporting Somalia and the Soviet Union backing Ethiopia. Ultimately, Ethiopia repelled the Somali army.

  In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group aiming to unite all Somalis across Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland under Islamic rule, gained control of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. This development raised concerns in Ethiopia, which perceived it as a threat to its national security and regional stability. Supported by the USA in the context of the ‘war on terror’, Ethiopia militarily intervened in Somalia and removed the ICU from power.

  Several years later, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a bilateral agreement aimed at stabilising the region. This agreement facilitated the deployment of Ethiopian security forces to assist the Somali National Army in its fight against Al-Shabaab and support the ongoing Somali transition process. It’s important to note that these Ethiopian troops are currently integrated into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, a peacekeeping mission.

  Since October 2023, Ethiopia has declared its intention to gain access to the sea by peaceful means. In exchange for access Ethiopia has offered Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia land-swaps and stakes in a successful state-owned business such as Ethiopian Airlines, Africa’s biggest and most successful airline, and even in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. But none of these countries accepted Ethiopia’s offer, leaving Somaliland as a seemingly more amenable option.

  Somalia viewed Ethiopia’s signing of the port deal with Somaliland as betrayal. It reacted strongly and aggressively because it considers it an encroachment on its territory and an act against its sovereignty.

  Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence could open a Pandora’s box. In fear that it could lead to regional and global recognition, Somalia said that if Ethiopia moved forward in implementing the agreement, consequences would follow.

  This all brings us to the final and crucial point: where will this take the region? While the possibility of conflict cannot be entirely dismissed, it’s important to consider various factors and perspectives to assess its likelihood.

  First, military capabilities and intentions play a role. While Somalia’s military power is not comparable to Ethiopia’s, the potential for escalation and regional instability cannot be ignored. Additionally, Ethiopia’s stated commitment to peaceful resolutions needs to be weighed against its historical engagements and potential strategic calculations.

  Second, the international community’s role matters. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region are already grappling with complex conflicts and any further instability would have significant repercussions. International pressure and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and promote dialogue will be crucial in preventing conflict.

  Further, Somalia’s response to the MoU adds another layer of complexity. Its seeking of support from Ethiopia’s historical competitors, such as Egypt and Eritrea, as well as regional entities such as the Arab League, could potentially lead to increased diplomatic pressure against Ethiopia. This, in turn, could further strain relations between the two countries for the foreseeable future.

  Finally, the MoU is likely to ignite discussions about the status of Somaliland, both within the AU and at the United Nations Security Council.

  What should the international community do to address this potential crisis?

  The international community plays a crucial role in navigating the complex situation surrounding Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access and its MoU with Somaliland. It is essential to engage with all stakeholders, particularly the Somali government and Somaliland’s authorities. It should be a top priority to facilitate negotiations to find a lasting solution that ensures both peaceful coexistence and normalised relations, as people in the Horn of Africa are ultimately bearing the brunt of this disagreement.

  Regardless of the outcome, be it Somaliland’s reunification with Somalia or its international recognition as a separate state, the two countries must establish a mutually agreeable arrangement for peaceful coexistence. The international community can play the role of facilitating a genuine conversation between the two. This is of course easier said than done, given the historical complexities of their relationship and the vested interests of various states and organisations, including western nations and other international players, who prioritise their security and economic interests in the region.

  International involvement should also aim to support Ethiopia and Somalia in reaching a mutually agreeable solution. This requires careful diplomacy to avoid exacerbating existing tensions or creating new problems. It’s also essential to urge those with vested interests in the region to avoid exploiting this situation for their agendas. De-escalation must be the primary objective.

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  Civic space in bothEthiopia andSomalia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CARD through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CARDEthiopia and@mengistu_dadi on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘Holding police officers accountable for killings in a court of law will be the main deterrent’

  CIVICUS speaks about police brutality in Kenya with Joseph Kariuki, Communications and Media Lead of International Justice Mission and editor of the Missing Voices project. Missing Voices Kenya is an initiative of a group of civil society organisations (CSOs) aimed at filling the evidence gap regarding police brutality, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It layers victims’ testimony with consolidated quantitative data and tracks processes to hold those responsible legally accountable.

  What is Missing Voices Kenya trying to do?

  Missing Voices was launched in August 2018, by a coalition of partners working on police reform. The main aim of the project was to produce a database of police killings and enforced disappearances in Kenya. This was critical since efforts by most CSOs to share their individual statistics proved untenable because of the different numbers each organisation had. This created confusion and gave the government a window to deny what seemed to be a systematic trend of extrajudicial killings.

  Our production of verified data was in itself a big success, considering the efforts put into denying this reality. Missing Voices has so far released two annual reports, in 2019 and 2020, and has held campaigns both online and offline to advocate for the end of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances in Kenya.

  Our website is meant to showcase victims’ stories and provide a platform for their families to agitate for justice. Every confirmed story is published on our website, including the name and photograph of the victim, along with any information that can help resolve their murder or discover someone’s whereabouts in case they are missing and still alive. We have seen cases being reopened right after they were published on our platform.

  In what ways has the COVID-19 pandemic and the enforced curfew worsened human rights in Kenya?

  The Missing Voices Kenya report ‘The Brutal Pandemic’ documented 157 cases of police killings and an additional 10 cases of enforced disappearances during 2020. Not all the cases were the result of COVID-19 containment measures, but some – around 23 – were the direct result of these.

  The measures put in place increased the prevalence of police brutality, which has been a systemic issue in Kenya for years. Most families, especially those living in poor neighbourhoods, bore the brunt of the measures after police officers were given orders to use force if necessary to ensure the 7pm curfew was enforced. Most families were caught unawares after public transport vehicles were ordered to carry half their maximum load, which meant there was a shortage of transport to get back home before the curfew.

  Why is police brutality targeted at young people in informal settlements, and what can be done about this?

  The fact that young people in poor neighbourhoods are the primary targets of police brutality can at least partly be explained by the high crime rates in such areas and the police strategy of using force to fight crime. This has worsened by the trend of arbitrary arrests of young men leaving their workplaces for home late at night. In informal settlements there seems to be a permanent curfew in place, since well before the pandemic.

  There are police squads that move around in unmarked cars arresting young men, many of whom have been killed. This has led to distrust between the public and the police. Lack of trust has hampered efforts to fight crime, because police depend heavily on the public for tips on criminal activity and perpetrators.

  This bad blood can be prevented if police officers stop looking at young men as suspects of crime and start moving around in marked cars. Poverty is still the leading cause of conflict between police and the public, so the government should put in place measures to empower and improve the opportunities for young people. And above all, the main deterrent will be if police officers are held accountable for killings in a court of law.

  What challenges has Missing Voices Kenya faced in ensuring accountability?

  The biggest challenge has taken the form of threats to victims or their families, which has deterred many from following up on their cases in court. Cases of police killings take a long time to investigate and even longer to process through the judicial system, which often leads to discouragement and apathy in the community.

  In response to this, in June 2021 the Missing Voices coalition ran a campaign on delayed justice, which highlighted cases that had taken a very long time to resolve but had eventually resulted in justice being served.

  Have there been other citizen responses to police brutality?

  A number of protests have been held against police brutality and we have also organised public dialogues in which we have shared the statistics we have collected and urged for an end to the violence. Our Brutal Pandemic report was handed to the Senate and another report was released in November 2021 making a number of recommendations. During the pandemic, our campaigns forced the government to condemn police brutality. It must be noted that before this the government had denied anything was wrong, so this kind of acknowledgment is a welcome first step.

  How can international civil society best support Kenyan civil society efforts to bring an end to these human rights abuses?

  More advocacy is needed for the government to accept that police brutality, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are systemic issues that need addressing. There is a need to empower local justice centres and survivor groups so that people can count on safe spaces and are enabled to speak up more about these issues. And there is need for bigger capacity to take witnesses into the witness protection programme, without which we are unlikely to make much additional progress.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Missing Voices through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@MissingVoicesKE and@kariukimwangi on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘People are discouraged from voting when they think that voices do not matter’

  CIVICUS speaks about the recent presidential election in Kenya with Ken Ogembo, programme manager of Siasa Place.

  Siasa Place is a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2015 with the aim of promoting youth participation in politics. It educates people about the importance of voting and how the government can be held accountable.

  Did you observe an increase in civic space restrictions around the 9 August election?

  We observed several civic space restrictions during the election. The media did not provide fair coverage to all candidates, and the most popular candidates had a clear advantage because everything they did was widely covered and they got a lot of propaganda. Media are powerful tools that can be used to influence the views of people and in this case were used to promote some parties and bring down others. Social media was also used to spread misinformation that influenced many people’s voting decisions.

  Further, there was violence in some counties, which we believe was organised to spark fear. As a result, people no longer felt comfortable attending campaigns for some candidates because of fear they could be attacked. 

  There were also cases of candidates being attacked. Some female politicians were attacked and assaulted; unfortunately not much was done to protect them or follow up on their cases. William Ruto, announced as the winner of the election, was also attacked in Kisumu. His vehicles were destroyed but fortunately he was not hurt. 

  There was also a situation in Kakamega county between the two main coalitions, Kenya Kwanza and Azimio la Umoja: they were fighting over access to a stadium and a number of people got hurt in the process.

  However, I do not believe violence was serious or widespread to the point that we could say it was what marked the electoral process.

  Why was there such low voter turnout?

  There are a number of factors that could have possibly contributed to it, but I think it is first and foremost about people being demotivated from voting because they do not see any change happening as a result of elections. Government corruption is pervasive no matter who is in the government, and economic performance is consistently poor. Public services are of very low quality: there are not enough healthcare facilities, doctors are often going on strike, markets are dirty. Youth unemployment continues to be very high, and most people don’t think this will change, so many do not see any reason for voting.

  We also need to look at how candidates are nominated. Presidential candidate Raila Odinga’s party, Azimio la Umoja, did not conduct democratic internal processes in most of its strongholds and often nominated people who had long been in power and had performed dismally. People are discouraged from voting when they think their voices do not matter.

  I would also say it is also ignorance that drives young people away from the polls. They should understand that regardless of whether they get out to vote, a government will get elected and will rule over them. The fact that they did not vote takes away their moral authority to question those in power. Of course they still have a constitutional right to do so, but their questioning will lack substance and they will not have any alternative to offer.

  Through our engagement with young people, we have noticed they lack confidence in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IBEC), the institution that manages elections, which many consider unable to deliver free and fair elections. They view it as pointless to go out and vote if the IBEC can’t ensure their votes will count.

  This is probably a mistake, because there have been improvements in the electoral process, including by making it clear that the results received from voting stations are final. However, the IBEC still has a lot of work to do make people trust the electoral process.

  Finally, I think the government played a huge role by not providing any civic education. It only started doing the basics when it was already too late, as most people who didn’t vote had already made up their minds not to. And when the government did, the content was not of the right kind, in the sense that would make people understand why voting is important and how to play their role as citizens.

  Has civil society been able to play its role in the electoral process?

  Civil society’s role has been somewhat restricted. Many CSOs would need more support and resources to play their full range of roles during elections. During this election we saw many CSOs unable to provide civic education programmes because of lack of funding and government support.

  Our job as civil society is to advocate on people’s behalf, inform them about the process and raise awareness of their rights. But most of us were denied the right to do our work due to lack of resources. My organisation, Siasa Place, played a key role in the previous election because it received the required resources in time. But this year the support we needed came about two months before the elections, which is rather late for us to start doing our work at the community level. This affected our role, but we hope things will improve in the coming years. We need government and civil society to work together to inform people around elections so they know what they are doing.

  There were also cases of CSOs being instrumentalised by political parties to influence voters. That defeats the whole purpose of having an active civil society. We urge the concerned CSOs to remember their original goals and mission and refocus on them. We should be the voice of marginalised people and communities, not of political parties. It is our duty to hold political parties accountable, not root for them at elections.

  Given the very close result, do you think there could be a recount or even an election re-run?

  If the defeated candidate can convince the court that there have been irregularities so gross that they have affected the outcome, then the court could nullify the results. But if votes are recounted and the result comes out the same, there won’t be a need for a rerun.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Siasa Place through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram pages, and follow@siasaplace on Twitter. 

• KENYA: ‘Protests against femicides encouraged survivors to seek justice’

  CIVICUS speaks with Wangechi Wachira, Executive Director of the Centre for Rights, Education and Awareness (CREAW), about recent protests demanding justice for femicide victims and policy changes to combat gender-based violence (GBV) in Kenya.

  Founded in 1999, CREAW is a national feminist women’s rights civil society organisation (CSO) dedicated to protecting and promoting women’s and girls’ rights and addressing systemic gender inequalities, oppression, exploitation and discrimination.

  Why did protest recently erupt in Kenya?

  On 27 January, thousands of women and men took the streets to protest against femicides. The protests were triggered by 14 cases in January alone, and their primary objective was to demand accountability from state agencies, particularly law enforcement and the judiciary, in prosecuting perpetrators of femicide and ensuring justice for the victims. The case of John Matara, accused of killing Starlet Wahu, highlighted the failures of the legal and judicial systems, because he had been previously reported for GBV multiple times but had remained free.

  Femicide Count reported 48 cases in January and February 2024, compared to 152 cases during 2023, which itself was the highest number in the past five years. Data from Africa Data Hub indicates that over 500 women were killed in acts of femicide from January 2016 to December 2023. It also acknowledges the number is likely much higher, with many killings of women not properly categorised as femicide.

  The protest also aimed to raise awareness about the issue, as many people, including those in public office, do not fully understand the severity of femicide as the most extreme form of GBV. A 2021 report by the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime revealed that 56 per cent of all female homicides globally are committed by intimate partners or family members.

  Protesters sought to educate the public on victim-blaming, which empowers perpetrators and deters survivors from reporting abuse. By addressing the victim-blaming and shaming associated with GBV, the protests challenged societal norms and encouraged survivors to seek support and justice.

  What were protesters’ demands to the government?

  We urged the president to issue a declaration recognising GBV and femicides as a national crisis requiring an emergency response. Such a declaration must be accompanied by annual reports provided during the State of the Nation address, outlining measures taken to combat the problem.

  We also urge the government to establish a national public inquiry and official review of events or actions ordered by a government body for all femicide cases to track and ensure accountability.

  Given the lack of integrated official data, we also demand the government improves data collection on femicides and GBV, aligning it with international frameworks. This data is crucial for evidence-based policymaking and effective criminal justice responses.

  Additionally, we call for increased funding for GBV prevention programmes and demand an inclusive appointment process for all public positions, ensuring representation from grassroots feminist organisations and youth groups.

  How big a problem is GBV in Kenya, and what are its root causes?

  GBV is pervasive in Kenya, mirroring global trends. It exists in several forms, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse. According to the 2022 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, over 40 per cent of women have experienced physical or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some point in their lives. GBV also manifests in harmful practices such as female genital mutilation and child marriages. Femicides are a frequent occurrence and appear to be on the rise.

  The roots of GBV are found in patriarchal underpinnings of our society, which promote harmful social and cultural practices often reinforced by religious beliefs. Power is concentrated in men’s hands and women have little to none. Such unequal dynamics cannot but foster violence.

  Economic factors such as poverty help perpetuate GBV by pushing women to stay in abusive relationships due to lack of financial independence. They also push families in famine-hit areas to marry off young girls for economic gain, and specifically to be able to acquire livestock in return.

  Conflict, crises and displacement leave women and girls especially vulnerable to violence. A recent example is the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw an 80 per cent increase in intimate partner violence in 2020.

  How does civil society work to address GBV in Kenya?

  Civil society plays key roles in addressing GBV. CREAW specifically has a workstream focused on ending violence against women and girls. Over the years, we have provided free legal aid and psychosocial support to over 20,857 GBV survivors. We are among the few CSOs that offer these services. We collaborate closely with state-sponsored legal aid programmes, such as the National Legal Aid Service, to ensure integrated, efficient and timely GBV service delivery. Our work is enhanced by strategic partnerships with various GBV working groups, Court User Committees, relevant health institutions, parts of criminal justice system and community dispute resolution mechanisms.

  CREAW actively engages with legislators and policymakers at both national and county levels to advocate for the development and implementation of regulatory frameworks on GBV. Our advocacy contributed to the passage of the 2006 Sexual Offences Act, 2013 Matrimonial Property Act, 2014 Marriage Act and the 2015 Protection Against Domestic Violence Act.

  The aim of the Sexual Offences Act is to set out what constitute sexual offences, provide ways to prevent illegal sexual acts and protect all people from them. The Matrimonial Property Act sought to provide clear rules for what belongs in a marriage’s matrimonial estate and provide a legal framework for the ownership, management and distribution of matrimonial property that would apply to all types of unions. This was a monumental achievement because it recognised rights women didn’t previously have, such as owning and buying land.

  The Marriage Act consolidated various laws on marriage, provided procedures for separation and divorce and regulated the custody and maintenance of children in the event of separation or divorce. The Protection Against Domestic Violence Act provides avenues for victims and survivors of violence to report their circumstances to relevant authorities, seek legal redress and receive justice.

  CREAW also supports the county governments of Kilifi and Meru, the Kenya Police Service and the Kenyan judiciary in strengthening their mechanisms for implementing existing GBV laws and policies.

  CREAW’s commitment to supporting survivors extends to financial inclusion. Since 2020, we have implemented a programme, the Jasiri Fund (‘bold’ in Swahili) that provides GBV survivors with quality financial services to mitigate the effects of GBV and enable economic empowerment. To date, the project has supported around 1,000 survivors with a total of US$400,000, leading to the establishment of at least 878 women-owned enterprises. The Jasiri Fund offers complementary support, including access to justice, psychosocial support, shelters, business grants and case management grants, accompanied by financial training and business development support. Its success led to its scaling up to cover more counties and support more survivors.

  We are also part of the National Gender Based Violence working group, coordinated by the National Gender and Equality Commission and the National Women’s Steering Committee, and of the National Council on the Administration of Justice Working Committee on GBV.

  CREAW served as a co-convener of the Kenya Chapter of the Africa Unite campaign against GBV. We are also members of the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals Group. We contribute to various campaigns such as Gender is My Agenda and globally contribute to the Generation Equality Forum commitments.

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  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with CREAW through itswebsite or itsFacebook orInstagram pages, and follow@CREAWKenya and@Wwangechi_leah on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the upcoming elections in Kenya with Paul Okumu, head of the Secretariat of the Africa Platform (AP). AP is a pan-African civil society platform based in Nairobi, Kenya, that works to strengthen state-society relations to achieve more effective and inclusive development.

  With elections still a few months away, is it clear who the contenders will be?

  Many are unaware that Kenya has only one election day in which all political positions are filled. But although the focus is on the presidential race, the forthcoming elections will bring in 349 members of the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, including 290 elected from the constituencies, 47 women elected from the counties and 12 nominated representatives, plus 69 members of the Senate, 47 of whom are elected directly while the rest are elected to represent women, young people and other excluded groups.

  In addition, Kenyans will be electing 47 governors, the regional leaders directly responsible to county assemblies, that is, their respective regional parliaments. Kenyans will elect a further 1,450 county assembly members. So the election is a complex one.

  For the presidential race, some likely frontrunners are already emerging. The current president, Uhuru Kenyatta, is ineligible to stand for re-election after completing his second term; his deputy, William Ruto, is among the leading candidates alongside former prime minister Raila Odinga. It is worth noting that this is the fifth time Odinga is running for president, having lost his previous attempts and withdrawn once in 2017.

  By law candidacies for the presidency will be made official in mid-May, and there are currently almost 45 people who have submitted their names as possible candidates. The election body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, will have the final word on which candidates fulfil the legal criteria to run.

  The question many are likely to ask is why there are only two leading contenders. The answer is as complex as the country’s elections.

  In a bid to exercise a divide-and-rule strategy, the British colonial government divided Kenya into regional ethnic units, with people from one unit not allowed to travel to other units without the authority of the colonial government under a system known as Kipande (Identity) system. In addition, people in regions closest to where white people lived were given access to education much earlier so they could work for whites. As a result, these regions (mainly central, Rift Valley and Western) progressed much faster and became dominant in the period leading to and after independence. It helped that these regions are also the most agriculturally productive, which is part of the reason the whites chose them as their residence.

  There are about 43 ethnic groups in Kenya, but just five of them constitute over half of its population of about 50 million. Due to the combined effects of colonial boundaries, which the 2010 Constitution kept intact – a story for another day – and the numeric dominance of these few ethnic groups, the country’s politics, in a quite similar fashion to that in South Sudan, continue to revolve around five ethnic groups. Leading presidential candidates always emerge from these five. Currently, the two leading candidates represent a coalition of three and two of these largest ethnic groups.

  What will be at stake in the upcoming elections?

  The current president is seen to have spent his time investing in sections of the economy that benefited his vast family businesses. From infrastructure to hospitals to the dairy and transport sectors, most of the investments have been in areas that are perceived directly to add value or make it easy for the president’s family businesses to thrive. As a result, there is a perception that what is at stake is the protection of these investments, hence the current complex coalition supported by the president that has brought together people seen to be those who will preserve the status quo.

  But at a deeper level, the country is in a serious crisis. The economy has been in recession for over eight months now. Half of its recurrent budget is used on civil service salaries. The latest economic report by the government shows that for the first time in the country’s history, debt costs will surpass the recurrent expenditure, projected at Sh1.34 trillion (US$1.3 billion) for the coming year. The debt binge is mainly from Eurobond offerings, a package of Chinese loans and syndicated commercial loans taken in recent years. Distress levels are so high that the Central Bank has begun to ration foreign reserves, especially US dollars. Fuel prices have risen by nearly 53 per cent in the past one year, largely due to the fact that fuel has always been an easy target for taxation.

  And that is not all: European countries have always used Kenya as a trade gateway to the continent and have largely made it a multinational headquarters for European companies working across Africa. This has led to massive losses through tax evasion and avoidance and skewed double taxation agreements, and has killed countless small businesses that could not manage the massive resources and subsidies given by European development finance institutions or donor agencies (such as the CDC Group of the UK) to European corporations so they can win contracts and set up businesses in the country.

  But there is a bigger underlying fear among citizens. In 2017 the Supreme Court was forced to overturn the results of the presidential elections after it emerged that the government, through Ot Morpho, a French company fronted by the French government, had manipulated the vote counting and tallying, handing victory to the incumbent president. The subsequent repeat elections were boycotted by the opposition at the last minute on the grounds that the government had refused to make the changes demanded by the Supreme Court to ensure transparent vote counting. This massive collusion and rejection of changes proposed by the judiciary severely eroded confidence in the electoral system. It is believed to be the part of reason for the current low voter registration.

  What are the civic space conditions like in the run-up to the election?

  The executive and the political class had made attempts to water down the constitution significantly through a process known as Building Bridges Initiative, but they were stopped in their tracks by the courts, including the Supreme Court. This has preserved citizens’ freedoms and has strengthened confidence in the judiciary. Because of this there is still considerable freedom of assembly and expression.

  But the government has also tried to limit the work of civil society around the election. In July 2021, the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministry sent a confidential memo to all foreign missions and international civil society organisations (CSOs) that usually support civic education, instructing them not to put any resources, either directly or through local CSOs, into civic education and civic advocacy without the express authorisation of the government. To date, such authorisation has not been granted, and it’s not clear if partners have even requested it.

  Interestingly, foreign missions kept quiet and refused to divulge this information to local CSOs. It is not clear why the government took this drastic measure, but it is even more baffling why foreign missions have been so quick to obey it when a few years ago they defied a similar directive by the Russian government and funded civic education in that country. A possible reason lies in Kenya’s centrality, alongside Rwanda, for the politics of Africa and the economies of Europe, which these foreign countries are keen to preserve. 

  As a result of this decision, this year Kenya has had the lowest voter registration in its history and levels of civic awareness have plummeted. The denial of resources for civic education has been a massive blow for civil society, and with the elections under 90 days away, it is not yet clear what role civil society will play around them.

  The window for registration as election observers, usually played by the African Union, the Carter Foundation, the European Union and a coalition of civil society groups, is still open, and it is still possible that with alternative sources of funding, CSOs may still engage in some way.

  What is the potential for electoral violence?

  Violence is highly unlikely. Despite ethnic politics rooted in the colonial regionalisation arrangement, Kenyans are largely peaceful. Most of the post-election violence that Kenya has experienced has been mostly confined to power struggles among the five dominant ethnic groups and has never been about the entire country. Over the past five months, these five ethnic groups have formed two large coalitions, making violence unlikely.

  Of course, conflict between these two coalitions cannot be ruled out if one of them loses the elections, but if it occurs, this violence is unlikely to have an impact on the rest of the communities.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Africa Platform through itswebsite.

• KENYA: ‘The government has put all the burden of addressing homophobia on civil society’

  CIVICUS speaks about the situation ofLGBTQI+rights in Kenya and the ongoing impacts of the British colonial legacy with Stephen Okwany, programme director of Talanta Africa.

  Talanta Africa is a civil society organisation (CSO) that uses art to promote the rights of LGBTQI+ people and advocates for an inclusive society in which LGBTQI+ and young people have a say in the decisions that affect their lives.

  What is the current situation of LGBTQI+ people in Kenya?

  The Kenyan LGBTQI+ community continues to celebrate amazing gains brought by progressive organising and its focus on opening conversations around queer lived realities, discussing bodily autonomy and deconstructing cis hate.

  This has been met with mixed reactions from different quarters. Our gains have elicited organised opposition from anti-gender and anti-rights movements highly resourced by illiberal populists and very active in the religious, cultural and legal arenas. These movements perpetrate organised rights violations against LGBTQI+ people, including by promoting conversion therapy practices, profiling LGBTQI+ people and queer activists, deliberately denying access to basic human rights such as healthcare and education, perpetrating online attacks and outing queer people, and even through the murder of queer people, the most recent case being that of Sheila Lumumba, a 25-year-old non-binary lesbian who was attacked, sexually assaulted and killed in her home on 17 April.

  How does legislation discriminate against Kenyan LGBTQI+ people?

  The Kenyan government recognises the existence of queer people in the country. However, there are still regressive laws in place that threaten the existence of the queer movement, such as Sections 162-165 of the Penal Code, which discriminate against consensual same-sex relationships and criminalise those who live on the proceeds of sex work, limiting the independence of LGBTQI+ sex workers in Kenya.

  Additionally, queer people and collectives face restrictions on their freedoms of association and peaceful assembly, as the government shies away from registering queer collectives and the police typically use excessive force to disrupt queer parades.

  The government has not put in place mechanisms to address homophobia. The burden to do so has been left to civil society. Queer survivors of deliberate homophobic attacks have been denied justice by a judicial system built upon cis hate and in violation of the provisions to integrate LGBTQI+ community members as equal participants in the Kenyan development process. No progress can be achieved if a section of the population continues to be excluded on the basis of prejudiced perceptions.

  How does your organisation work to counter those perceptions?

  Talanta Africa is an artivist collective of queer human rights defenders. We put the power of strategic communications tools such as arts, culture, media and tech at the service of queer storytelling to promote a change in narratives and improve the civic space of LGBTQI+ people.

  Our organisation is largely a strategic communications platform that convenes queer people who believe that silence is too high a price to pay in the face of injustice and inequality. We believe that conscious art and culture play a key role in shaping narratives and telling stories while also countering regressive narratives that advance cis hate.

  Not surprisingly, our work has been met with extreme opposition and has been branded as a queer ‘recruitment’ process. This has resulted in attacks on our offices, the intimidation of our artivists, the profiling of our work and intentional exclusion from activist spaces and platforms.

  How can Kenya and other Commonwealth countries work together to advance LGBTQI+ rights?

  Commonwealth countries should establish multilateral instruments to affirm and advance the bodily autonomy of LGBTQI+ people. These could provide a platform for auditing legal instruments at a country level and assessing the development and implementation of new legal frameworks to replace regressive legal provisions.

  International organisations have a mandate to raise human rights awareness, including of the human rights of LGBTQI+ people, and denounce human rights violations, including those faced by LGBTQI+ community. To do so, they must promote progressive queer narratives. They must be deliberate in resourcing queer-affirming spaces through the equal rights and equal opportunities framework.

  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
  Get in touch with Talanta Africa through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@TaAfrika on Twitter.

• KENYA: ‘We have concerns about state functions being used to dictate and define morality’

  CIVICUS speaks about LGBTQI+ rights in Kenya and the criminalisation of activism with Ivy Werimba, Communications and Advocacy Officer at galck+.

  galck+ is a national coalition of Kenyan LGBTQI+ organisations advocating for issues related to sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression and representing LGBTQI+ voices across the country.

  How significant is the recent Supreme Court ruling in favour of allowing the National Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (NGLHRC) to register? Has it brought any anti-rights backlash?

  The Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the lower court rulings was highly significant. This decision sets an important precedent for future cases involving discrimination against marginalised communities and underscores the importance of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law and protecting human rights. It was the first of its kind by the Supreme Court of Kenya. We applaud their decision to uphold the Constitution.

  There has been a lot of backlash from various societal leaders and there is now a Family Protection Bill that’s been created and awaiting being gazetted. This bill, which closely resembles the anti-homosexuality bills of Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, has given fodder to the opposition, which is rallying support for it online and continuing to spread misinformation and disinformation by tying it to other issues that political leaders refuse to address, such as the poor economy, the rise in teenage pregnancies and alcohol abuse, election violence and election violations, widespread corruption and unrest in secondary schools.

  The NGLHRC fought for 10 years to register because its name contained the words ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’. Has galck+ faced similar challenges?

  No, our struggle has been different. As a coalition made up of 18 member organisations catering to people of diverse sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics, we changed our name in 2022. We are now galck+ and our name is no longer an abbreviation. galck+ reflects the growth and intersectionality we have witnessed in the Kenyan LGBTQI+ movement, with inclusion and diversity at the heart of what we do. Our updated resolve is to create a space that doesn’t feel segmented since our fight for freedom and love is the same regardless of what makes us different from each other.

  How do you manage to work in a context where being LGBTQI+ is illegal?

  Our work in Kenya is not hindered by the illegality of being openly LGBTQI+. Although Kenya is a patriarchal, conservative and sexist state, the perception of a person’s gender or sexuality is what gets people in trouble. Through its existence and work, the LGBTQI+ community in Kenya continues to challenge conformity to societal norms that expect men to be courageous and women to be homemakers.

  There have been significant milestones in establishing laws and policies that support gender equality and social inclusion. However, several factors – including limited resources, weak links among ministries and between the national and county levels, negative pervasive norms and attitudes about inclusion – hinder the effective implementation of laws and policies.

  Despite all these tribulations, we use our work and our spaces to push back on these norms and celebrate the limited but important progress made on the rights of LGBTQI+ people in Kenya over the last 10 years. This has largely been obtained through victories in court, where Kenyan activists have challenged criminalising provisions and the treatment of LGBTQI+ people and organisations. This includes a case that established that the use of forced anal exams is illegal, a case that upheld the right of LGBTQI+ people to form and register organisations and a case that upheld the right to change gender on legal documents. The Family Protection Bill threatens to destroy all this progress and so our work continues to be a reminder that the freedoms we fight for are for all Kenyans, and not only for the LGBTQI+ community.

  Do prohibitions of ‘same-sex behaviour’ apply in practice?

  Violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ people in Kenya are a harsh reality. Despite claims that sexual orientation and gender identity are non-issues, LGBTQI+ people in Kenya experience stigma, discrimination, physical and verbal abuse, assault, harassment, eviction from their homes, loss of their jobs, suspension or expulsion from school and many other rights violations that significantly affect their wellbeing and quality of life.

  The Penal Code’s sections 162(a), 162(c) and 165 criminalise sexual activities that are perceived to be against the ‘order of nature’. While these sections apply to all Kenyans, they are selectively used to criminalise same-sex relationships. The ambiguous language used in these sections also makes it difficult to define ‘gross indecency’ since it criminalises even innocent actions like hugging or holding hands between people of the same sex. These laws also affect the transgender and intersex communities. The misguided narrative that limits people’s understanding of the difference between sexual orientation and gender identity leads many Kenyans to assume that transgender and intersex people are homosexual or bisexual.

  Although few people have been charged under these laws, they are often used to justify violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ people, creating a perception that they are criminals. This is a perception that subsets of the state and religious institutions advance to further perpetuate human rights violations and acts of violence.

  In other words, there is a connection between legal prohibitions and violence against LGBTQI+ people, even if the laws are not consistently applied. This hostility is underpinned by discriminatory laws, including the law that criminalises same-sex activities and other laws used by the state to target LGBTQI+ people.

  These laws also create a culture of fear and secrecy among LGBTQI+ people, making them vulnerable to harassment, assault and other forms of violence. In addition, the inconsistent application of these laws can lead to arbitrary arrests and prosecution, including under laws criminalising ‘loitering’, ‘solicitation’ and ‘impersonation’, to extort money or sex from LGBTQI+ people, or to deny services to LGBTQI+ survivors of violence.

  How are LGBTQI+ organisations in Kenya working to change this?

  LGBTQ+ organisations in Kenya are working to change discriminatory laws and social norms by engaging in various advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns, providing legal aid, sharing security directives with our constituents and offering healthcare services to the LGBTQI+ community. These organisations are also working to create safe spaces for LGBTQI+ people to express themselves, network and access information.

  Some of the main issues on the LGBTQI+ agenda in Kenya include the repeal of discriminatory laws such as Penal Code sections 162(a), 162(c) and 165 and the promotion of laws and policies that are intersectional for LGBTQI+ people and organisations, including the Employment Act (2007), which recognises the rights of employees to basic conditions of employment, the Sexual Offences Act (2006), which outlaws all forms of sexual violence, and the National Gender and Equality Commission Act (2011), which spells out the National Gender Equality Commission’s function, which is to promote, monitor and facilitate gender equality and freedom from discrimination in the country’s laws at the national and county levels.

  Other issues include ending violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ people, addressing the challenges faced by transgender people, and promoting education and awareness on issues affecting the LGBTQ+ community.

  Do you see your struggle as part of a bigger regional or global struggle?

  Yes, the Kenyan LGBTQI+ movement is part of the regional and global struggle to achieve various goals ratified in regional and international agreements such as Resolution 275 of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – on protecting people against violence and other human rights violations on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity – and reducing inequalities, as laid out in the Sustainable Development Goals.

  The Kenyan government has adopted legal and policy frameworks aimed at promoting gender equality and reducing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Such initiatives include the Kenya Vision 2030, which highlights the government’s commitment to reducing income inequality through economic growth, job creation and social safety nets. In addition, Kenya has adopted several legal and policy frameworks aimed at promoting gender equality and reducing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

  However, significant inequalities still exist, particularly in the wake of the pro-religious government that has been openly homophobic, inciting violence that threatens the lives of queer people. There is a lot of uncertainty regarding the new government’s impact on LGBTQI+ organising and funding, with concerns about the evangelisation of the state and state functions being used to dictate and define morality.

  Despite these challenges, the Kenyan LGBTQI+ movement remains resilient. We are mobilising together and collaborating with LGBTQI+ organisations in other countries in the region, including Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, on issues such as the anti-homosexuality bills of Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, that are now spreading to Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and many other African countries, and exchanging best practices.

  To continue doing this, we need various forms of support, including in raising awareness around the issues brought about by state and non-state-sponsored homophobia and flexible funding to respond to rising insecurity and mental health issues. We need our allies working on other thematic areas to highlight intersectionalities, showing how these regressive laws will affect sexual health and reproductive rights, children’s rights, the economy and more.

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  Civic space in Kenya is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  Get in touch with galck+ through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@Galck_ke onTwitter.