East Asia

  • Disinformation research reveals how governments hijack & weaponize narratives to serve their political agenda

    HijackingWeaponizingTheNarrative

    Disinformation campaigns are on the rise in East Asia as states use false information to shape self-serving narratives.

    The newly launched DisinformationCounter.com sets out to contribute to public knowledge and understanding of disinformation, especially how governments use it in ways that negatively impact civic space and democracy in East Asia. The platform launches with a research project to map the regional disinformation landscape. Case studies focused on the Philippines, Mindanao, Indonesia, West Papua, Hong Kong, and Cambodia, but are indicative of a larger, systemic issue across the region. This research is, therefore, to be seen as part of the rising call from East Asian civil society for greater transparency and freedom of information.

    Accompanying the research, the ARTSvsDISINFORMATION project brought seven artists together to explore creative, accessible, and public ways of responding to and resisting disinformation. It is also hoped that the research and artistic responses will inspire and empower civic, academic, and creative responses towards disinformation.

    Both projects are hosted on the newly launched DisinformationCounter.com.

    "Disinformation erodes democracy. It undermines fundamental freedoms. It stokes hate and violence while polarizing societies along the lines of race, religion, ideology, class, and gender. It destroys lives. In a crisis that is on a scale we’ve never seen before, disinformation kills. East Asia has been witness to this and more, much like the rest of the world.”

    – Tess Bacalla, Editor

    HIJACKING & WEAPONIZING THE NARRATIVE: Disinformation Amid Rising Repression in East Asia examines the specific ways by which states have become a major player in the spread of disinformation and how these narratives influence state policies and the use of state resources. Written and edited by well-known journalists and writers on disinformation in the region, this research project maps the disinformation landscape in the Philippines, Mindanao, Indonesia, West Papua, Hong Kong, and Cambodia.

    Why we should be concerned

    CIVICUS Asia Pacific Researcher Josef Benedict says, “Across the Asian region we are seeing governments deploy disinformation tactics to spread pro-government narratives, mount smear campaigns against their political opposition and civil society, and to divert conversations away from critical issues facing people’s lives. This critical report exposes these manipulation campaigns and empowers civil society to challenge both states and non-state actors to not only refrain from conducting and sponsoring disinformation, but to address it in a manner that respects human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.”

    Narrative is power

    Creating and pushing narratives that distort otherwise meaningful public conversations has become an integral, albeit destructive, component of the strategies that have been used by governments for ages. Today’s technologies have ramped up these efforts, ushering in a new world disorder that has governments hijacking and weaponizing narratives. Talk about the ‘new normal’ in the digital age!

    “Narrative, after all, is power, especially when used – calibrated and weaponized – to manipulate people to advance specific agendas, especially of those in power,” writes Tess Bacalla in her introduction to the research.

    Muting counternarratives

    These reports lift the veil on how repressive governments in the region are increasingly using disinformation to rein in dissent while perpetuating power. These on the whole are reeling under the burden of aggressive campaigns against the dissemination of truthful accounts of public governance issues and events that impact people’s lives while muting counter voices, often with the use of brute force, draconian legislation, and other forms of repression.

    Why this research matters

    When asked why this research project is important to the region, Tess responded with this remark, “To say that there is extreme urgency to train the spotlight on the unrelenting scourge of disinformation – this, as states and other political actors wantonly manipulate information to suit their political agendas while harming the public interest – is to belabor the obvious.

    “This series of reports is a step in that direction – and a plea for action.”

    -End-

    To view the collection of seven artworks, click here.

    To read the series of disinformation reports, click here

    About CIVICUS

    CIVICUS is a global alliance of civil society organisations and activists dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world.

    We were established in 1993 and since 2002 have been proudly headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa, with additional hubs across the globe. We are a membership alliance with more than 10,000 members in more than 175 countries.

    Our definition of civil society is broad and covers non-governmental organisations, activists, civil society coalitions and networks, protest and social movements, voluntary bodies, campaigning organisations, charities, faith-based groups, trade unions and philanthropic foundations. Our membership is diverse, spanning a wide range of issues, sizes and organisation types.

    For further information or to request interviews with CIVICUS staff and contributors to this project, please contact Josef Benedict: 

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    • MONGOLIA: ‘The government makes decisions without proper consultation’

      CIVICUS speaks with two civil society activists, who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons, about restrictions experienced by civil society in Mongolia and proposed new laws affecting civil society.

      Mongolia protest

      Mongolian youth protest in Sukhbaatar Square (Photo Credit: Anand Tumurtogoo)

      What’s the problem with the Associations and Foundations bills, currently under discussion in Mongolia?

      The drafts of the bills on associations and foundations have been under discussion since 2019 and were submitted by the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs to parliament in November 2021. The bills are meant to govern the work of civil society organisations (CSOs), including the processes for registration and reporting and the types of activities allowed, among other issues.

      If passed, these bills will impose undue burdens on CSOs, particularly regarding the ways they will have to report to meet government requirements. It is estimated that more than 90 per cent of CSOs, three-quarters of which are non-membership CSOs, may have to stop operating because of failure to comply with various undue burdens. These include increased and burdensome reporting criteria that apply to all CSOs regardless of their size, capacities and activities as well as internal requirements related to management and organisational structures that are not suitable for many informal groups.

      The provision establishing a Civil Society Development Support Council, an independent body to oversee CSOs, is also problematic because it comes with sweeping powers to dissolve organisations arbitrarily and allocate funding among CSOs, deciding which get government funding. This carries the potential of shrinking funding opportunities for many CSOs, particularly those working to further rights. The risk of arbitrary deregistration is also high, given the vast powers conferred on the Council and the broad and vague provisions on prohibited activities.

      How has civil society reacted?

      CSOs have tried to review and refine the bills several times to ensure they uphold fundamental civic freedoms, but to no avail. The attempt now is to block the laws.

      In November 2021, Mongolian civil society, together with several international CSOs, launched a campaign calling for the bills to be scrapped immediately, given there had been no consultation with civil society and there was no time or space to do so. The campaign managed to halt the progress of the draft bills and parliament announced that further discussions would be held.

      As of April 2022, it seemed likely the bills would be postponed and undergo further consultation. However, the speaker of parliament issued a decree to establish a working group to draft an alternative bill, the Professional Associations Bill.

      This draft had also been circulated in 2019 and was deemed problematic because it would tarnish the independence of CSOs by requiring CSO workers to have professional licences. At the moment, the discussion of this bill is suspended.

      What can the international community do to support Mongolian civil society?

      Although parliament has said the bills are currently suspended, there is no guarantee they will be dropped. Past experience shows the government often makes decisions on policy matters without proper consultation. Therefore, continuous scrutiny, including at the regional and international levels, would be very helpful.

      Access to resources and connection to international platforms such as the United Nations system would also be useful to help local civil society continue its struggle. 

      Civic space in Mongolia is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. 

    • TAIWAN: ‘China has tried to intimidate voters and pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations’

      brian-hioe.pngCIVICUS discusses Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election with Brian Hioe, one of the founders of New Bloom Magazine.

      New Bloom is an online magazine that covers activism and youth politics in Taiwan and Asia and the Pacific. A former fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Brian is currently a non-resident fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub.

      What’s at stake in the 2024 election?

      Taiwan’s elections consistently capture global attention due to the anticipation surrounding China’s response. Typically, elections feature two candidates representing the two major parties. One of them, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), is historically pro-independence and the other, Kuomintang (KMT), is historically pro-unification. This pattern persists in the current election, although there are other parties in the race.

      Traditionally, Taiwanese voters opt for what they perceive as the safest choice in terms of safeguarding their hard-earned democratic freedoms. The overarching concern is to avoid actions that might trigger backlash from China.

      Now it looks like the centre-left candidate of the ruling DPP is going to win because the pro-unification camp is very divided. But with multiple candidates running, fragmentation is to be expected, potentially affecting the outcome.

      What are the most relevant domestic campaign issues?

      There is a lot of dissatisfaction with the current government’s inability to address pressing economic issues. Young people’s salaries are very low, working hours are among the world’s longest and most people cannot afford to buy a house. We also have a declining birthrate and a growing older population.

      Dissatisfaction has translated into some support for the pro-China party. The KMT is the historic Chinese nationalist party and was the ruling party during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, from 1949 to 1987. Its campaign centres on deepening economic relations with China, promising to bring back the good old days of economic success.

      Environmental issues, and particularly air pollution, also weigh heavily on voters. The question of Taiwan’s future energy needs is key, as a balance is sought between maintaining a stable energy supply and minimising pollution. There is heated debate around nuclear energy. Taiwan’s environmental movement is anti-nuclear, as is the DPP, unlike the KMT. There are concerns about what to do with nuclear waste. People are worried that the frequent earthquakes that hit Taiwan could cause a potential catastrophe, as happened in Fukushima, Japan in 2011.

      Past elections also featured debate on culture-war issues such as same-sex marriage, which the DPP pushed for but the KMT opposed. But these have now taken a back seat to economic and environmental issues.

      However, the defining matter remains the cross-strait issue – the question of what kind of relations Taiwan will maintain with China.

      What are the positions of the main candidates?

      DPP candidate Lai Ching-te, the current vice president and expected winner, previously served as mayor of Taiwan’s historical capital Tainan and Taiwan’s premier. He is perceived as more conservative than the incumbent and is strongly pro-independence, although as he has climbed in the polls he has tempered his position in fear that strong rhetoric could provoke a reaction from the military or China. Despite his comparatively conservative background, he has signalled openness to progressive ideas, notably by becoming the first presidential candidate to participate in the Pride parade this October.

      KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih is the current mayor of New Taipei and a former police chief with a record of involvement in the arrest of political dissidents during the authoritarian period. He is more moderate than other KMT candidates on unification issues, which is perceived to improve the KMT’s chances. However, his choice of running mate signalled a potential shift towards a more dogmatic position on unification.

      The third candidate is former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, the leader of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a new party leaning towards unification. He has gained some support from young people, who tend not to support the KMT. He has a populist style, often making gaffes or misspeaking. He has faced criticism for making misogynistic and homophobic comments, but this hasn’t affected his popularity.

      How do young people feel about this election?

      There seems to be a notable decrease in enthusiasm and engagement with the election process. The 2020 election came around the same time of the protest wave in Hong Kong, which gave many young people a glimpse of what the future could look like for Taiwan if it were to become part of China.

      Now the context is different and what prevails among people is dissatisfaction with the DPP due to challenging circumstances, which has resulted in the rise of the third-party anti-establishment candidate. Ko Wen-je is, ironically, a candidate opposed to progressive causes such as LGBTQI+ rights, but many young people are still attracted by his anti-establishment message.

      In contrast, the DPP is perceived as the status quo and despite its recent progressivism under the Tsai administration has not managed to win over young people. Broadly, while millennials may still support it, Gen Z does not.

      What role are foreign powers playing in the election process?

      China’s persistent efforts to interfere in Taiwan’s political processes have resulted in recent arrests of people accused of operating in favour of China to influence the election, with efforts made to stiffen sentences for espionage. Ten military officials have, for example, been arrested in connection with these interference attempts.

      A tactic employed to influence the election is paint the DPP as overly provocative towards China or overly reliant on the USA, suggesting that this may lead to adverse consequences. The DPP has indeed strengthened relations with the USA, while the KMT, once the US-backed authoritarian ruling party, has shifted its position. The KMT now argues that growing too close to the USA might provoke China, questions arms sales and civic exchanges and disseminates conspiracy theories regarding fictional US plans to destroy Taiwan in the event of a war.

      The other side of the political aisle attacks the KMT for being too close to China and criticises its attempts to revive trade agreements such as the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), opposition to which led to the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

      Have there been any concerns about the integrity of civic space?

      Taiwan is the only country in Asia rated by the CIVICUS Monitor as having open civic space. There are questions about how civil society engages with both major political parties and concerns about potential co-optation. Civil society faces the challenge of balancing relations with political parties and maintaining a critical position without being perceived as partisan. Civil society is often closer to the DPP, because it is more centre-left and suspicious of China.

      But there haven’t been government attempts to restrict civic space. The government does take actions to curb Chinese influence but to date has not infringed on civil society rights.

      China in contrast has tried to pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly those focusing on cross-strait issues. Five years ago, a Taiwanese CSO worker was arrested in China on vague national security charges, in what seemed aimed at sending a warning to Taiwanese civil society not to meddle with China.

      China has also tried to intimidate voters. In a recent example, a person who purchased a book on the possibility of a Chinese invasion received a suspicious phone call from someone impersonating a customer service representative asking them about it.

      What are your expectations for the post-election period?

      Unless something unexpected happens, a DPP victory is the likeliest outcome. China is unlikely to take any drastic actions before the election, as such moves might inadvertently strengthen support for the DPP.

      Following the election, however, China is expected to respond with intimidation tactics, possibly through military exercises, to signal its opposition to a new DPP administration. The intensity of these exercises may be influenced by China’s relations with the USA at the time.

      In terms of civic space, should the DPP continue in power, civil society may need to broaden its outreach, both regionally and internationally, to build resilience and avoiding being sucked in by the two-party dynamics.

      However, were the KMT to win, civil society would likely refocus on domestic concerns. It may regroup to resist, particularly in the face of potential attempts to reintroduce trade agreements such as the CSSTA.

      If the status quo is maintained, Taiwan will continue strengthening ties with the USA and the west while actively reaching out to southeast Asian countries, a strategy aimed at reducing economic reliance on China and diversifying political ties.

      The geopolitical landscape will play a crucial role in shaping Taiwan’s future, and the actions and reactions of both China and Taiwan will be closely watched on the international stage.

       


      Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

      Get in touch with New Bloom Magazine through itswebsite, contact Brian Hioe through hisFacebook page and follow @brianhioe onTwitter orInstagram.

      The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

    • TAIWAN: ‘China will do to us what it did to Hong Kong, and what it has long done to Tibetans and Uighurs’

      MinHsuanWuCIVICUS speaks about the situation in Taiwan withMin-Hsuan Wu, known as ttcat,a social movement activist and campaigner and co-founder and CEO of a Doublethink Lab.

      Founded in 2019, Doublethink Lab is a civil society organisation (CSO) focused on researching malign Chinese influence operations and disinformation campaigns and their impacts, bridging the gap between the democracy movement, tech communities and China experts, and facilitating a global civil society network to strengthen democratic resilience against digital authoritarianism.

      What is the story behind Doublethink Lab?

      Doublethink Lab was founded three years ago, in September 2019. Four years ago, we experienced a tremendous amount of disinformation influencing our 2018 local elections. After these elections, there were lots of signals and leads of information-related, mostly disinformation campaigns – all affiliated with or supported by China.

      We realised that to tackle the challenge of strengthening and safeguarding our democracy we needed people to combine their talents and diverse professional backgrounds into a project focused on digital defence.

      Our main mandate is to produce a better understanding of how Chinese external propaganda functions and effectively influences political processes and public opinion elsewhere, including in Taiwan.

      Our strategy to combat disinformation differs from the usual fact-checking initiatives. Our work isn’t published in fact-checking reports. Instead, we follow the disinformation to try to understand who is spreading it and whether it is being spread by our citizens dynamically or by other kinds of actors funded by the Chinese state. Often, when analysing social media posts, it is possible to see the huge structure made up of Chinese bots liking, sharing and retweeting disinformation.

      What is the likely outcome of rising Chinese aggression toward Taiwan?

      It’s not news that tensions between Taiwan and China are increasing. China is increasingly using ‘grey zone’ tactics to push boundaries, increasing pressure and influencing people. Through various means, China is threatening Taiwanese people. This clearly increases the chance of the whole situation leading to China invading Taiwan.

      Most military experts would agree that this won’t happen right now, with Xi Jinping having just secured his third term as chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and awaiting confirmation of a third term as president of China. Some say an invasion could occur in 2025 or 2027, but I think it will depend on how strongly the Taiwanese people can defend themselves from now on: if our resistance increases, the costs of an invasion for China increase accordingly. Our resistance might therefore postpone the crystallisation of China’s wishes for a bit longer.

      On the other hand, China’s tactics may be backfiring: as China escalates militarily against us, the Chinese narrative is becoming less and less popular in Taiwan. More and more people have realised China is not a good neighbour. It is no longer thought of as a business opportunity for us but as a potent threat to our ways of life, our livelihoods and our lives. China’s aggressive attitude is pushing Taiwanese people towards embracing defence tactics to protect our country, which is a positive thing for us. We are much more aware of the need to build strong national and civil defence now.

      Did the recent visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi make any difference, for better or worse?

      Pelosi’s visit didn’t complicate the situation, but whether we see it as helpful or not depends on the perspective we look at it from. Her visit in August 2022 was meant as a show of support to Taiwan, and happened despite China’s threats of retaliation. It was the first visit by a US House Speaker in a quarter of a century. From a democracy or human rights perspective, it was quite beneficial. Pelosi spoke up against China’s human rights violations and the challenges posed by totalitarian regimes. Her presence brought visibility to our country’s situation regarding China. It put a spotlight on it, and now people see how China treats us and what a destabilising factor it is for the region. It clearly bothered China, judging by the way it reacted to it on the international stage.

      From a geopolitical and military perspective, Pelosi’s visit didn’t produce any benefit. It didn’t – couldn’t – bring any kind of peaceful dialogue. China’s vision and military exercises won’t change. But Pelosi’s visit didn’t complicate the situation; it just brought it under the spotlight so more Western media are paying attention to Taiwan. This kind of attention is somehow opening up many windows of opportunity for Taiwan to collaborate with other countries and agencies. No one knows what will come out of this, but from what I’ve seen so far, increased opportunities of international collaboration may improve our chances of safety.

      What would it take to bring peace and stability to the region?

      That’s a huge question. For me, the ultimate solution would be the opening up of civic space and the democratisation of China, Russia and other totalitarian regimes in Southeast Asia. However, we know this is too big a hope and it’s not really up to us.

      There used to be a civil society in China, but under Xi’s rule civic space has been continuously shrinking for 10 years. More and more activists are getting arrested. We all saw what happened recently in Hong Kong: China cracked down hard on civic movements and arrested people for even having a podcast –regular citizens were sent to jail just in case. China shut down all forms of civic expression, including news agencies. China will do to Taiwan what it did to Hong Kong, and what it has long done to Tibetans and Uighurs within China.

      If you ask me, I would say peace would require the demise of the Chinese Communist Party, but people think I am crazy when I put it this way. But from our perspective, this is the only forever solution. If you have an aggressive, expansionist neighbour trying to invade you, attaining peace is quite hard because it is not up to you. There can’t be peace unless your neighbour changes.

      Without justice there won’t be any peace. I’m not sure which kind of peace people wish to see: I think they are wrong if they define peace as just the absence of war. It that’s what they want, they can move to Hong Kong. Hong Kong is peaceful now – there are no mobilisations, no protests, no disorder. But is this really peace? It’s just an illusion: people are quiet because they lost their rights and freedoms. This is not the kind of peace we want for Taiwan.

      We need to find a way to open up civic space and bring democracy to the region – that is the only way forward.

      How is Taiwanese civil society working to make this happen?

      Lots of Taiwanese CSOs are working to limit China’s influence in the region, especially in Taiwan. There is an organisation called Economic Democracy Union that conducts serious research about Chinese influence on our economy; their work show how Chinese collaborators pretend to be Taiwanese companies and penetrate very sensitive industries such as electronics or e-commerce – industries that capture lots of personal data. Economy Democracy Union brings these issues to the surface with the aim of promoting new regulations to protect us from these influence-seeking tactics.

      There are also many CSOs working to strengthen civic defence, which isn’t just war-related, but rather focused on preparedness for disaster or any kind of military operation; their goal is to teach citizens how to react in these cases.

      Right now, Doublethink Lab is doing an investigation on China’s information operations. We do election monitoring and try to disclose disinformation campaigns or far-fetched narratives flooding into Taiwanese media. We are building a global network to bridge the gap between academia and civil society on a global scale. We want people to know what Chinese influence looks like in different countries, the channels it travels through, its tactics and its final goals.

      Doublethink Lab isn’t the only organisation advocating for digital defence. There are several others focusing on Chinese media influence, disinformation campaigns, fact-checking processes and civic education to identify fake news, among other related issues.

      What support does Taiwanese civil society need from the international community?

      We need resources. Most Taiwanese CSOs are small grassroots organisations. People tend to view Taiwan as a rich country with a very prosperous economy, but the truth is that civil society movements struggle a lot. Human rights CSOs and those working to counter Chinese influence usually have fewer resources than a regular charity. CSOs need more resources to be able to recruit new talent.

      Right now is the perfect time to ask ourselves what we really need. I always ask my fellow activists what they need, and answers resemble a lot those of activists in Hong Kong or Ukraine. Something the international community can also help with is by exposing Taiwan’s struggle. We don’t want people to think our issues are disconnected from those of the rest of the world – we want to become closer and we want to be understood. We need more connections with CSOs in the rest of the world. We need all forms of help to prepare and get ready for what’s coming.


      Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

      Get in touch with Doublethink Lab through itswebsite and follow @doublethinklab and@TTCATz on Twitter.

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