africa

  • COP26: “Esperamos obligaciones más estrictas bajo el principio de responsabilidad común pero diferenciada”

    Charles WanguhuEn vísperas de la 26ª Conferencia de las Partes de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (COP26), que tendrá lugar en Glasgow, Reino Unido, entre el 31 de octubre y el 12 de noviembre de 2021, CIVICUS está entrevistando a activistas, líderes y personas expertas de la sociedad civil acerca de los desafíos medioambientales que enfrentan en sus contextos, las acciones que están llevando a cabo para abordarlos y sus expectativas para la próxima cumbre.

    CIVICUS conversa conCharles Wanguhu, activista social y coordinador de la Plataforma de la Sociedad Civil de Kenia sobre el Petróleo y el Gas, un foro donde las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (OSC) participantes comparten información, planifican y elaboran estrategias comunes para llevar a cabo una labor de incidencia conjunta, se vinculan con organismos gubernamentales, empresas y medios de comunicación, e informan y concientizan a la ciudadanía.

    ¿Cuál es el problema medioambiental de su país en el cual está trabajando?

    La Plataforma de la Sociedad Civil de Kenia sobre el Petróleo y el Gas es una organización de membresía sin ánimo de lucro que trabaja por la sostenibilidad del sector del petróleo y el gas en Kenia y por transiciones energéticas justas. Con el descubrimiento de petróleo en el condado keniano de Turkana, nuestro trabajo pasó a incluir la incidencia en favor de marcos políticos y legales que garanticen la justicia medioambiental y las consideraciones climáticas en el desarrollo del petróleo. Hacemos este trabajo a través de la revisión de políticas y normativas y el desarrollo de capacidades para que las comunidades locales puedan participar de forma efectiva en los procesos de evaluación del impacto ambiental y social (EIAS) y así salvaguardar su entorno. 

    También participamos directamente en la revisión de las EIAS, abogando siempre por la inclusión de las consideraciones relativas al cambio climático y la protección del medio ambiente a nivel de proyecto. Por ejemplo, a medida que el proyecto petrolero de Turkana se fue acercando a la fase de producción, hemos participado en los foros de consulta con las partes interesadas del proyecto, donde hemos planteado la necesidad de que la EIAS del proyecto incorpore evaluaciones de impacto en materia de cambio climático. También hemos abogado por la transparencia en el sector mediante la divulgación de los acuerdos y licencias petroleras para que la ciudadanía pueda entender las obligaciones de las empresas petroleras en materia de medio ambiente y cambio climático, lo cual redundará en una mayor rendición de cuentas por parte del Estado y de estas empresas.

    ¿Han enfrentado reacciones negativas por el trabajo que hacen?

    La reducción del espacio cívico sigue siendo un desafío en el entorno en que trabajamos. Los grupos de la sociedad civil enfrentan reacciones negativas del gobierno cuando se refieren a temas de actualidad. Las restricciones suelen consistir en la denegación de permisos para realizar protestas o celebrar reuniones relacionadas con los proyectos de su interés. En algunos casos, organismos gubernamentales como la Junta de Coordinación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales y la autoridad impositiva de Kenia han sido utilizados para atacar a las OSC.

    También enfrentamos restricciones por parte de las empresas, tales como la exclusión deliberada de las OSC de eventos de participación pública. Aquellos de nuestros miembros que han expresado su preocupación o se han hecho oír en cuestiones relacionadas con la extracción de recursos gasíferos y petroleros se han encontrado con que ya no se les invita a participar o no se les permite hacer comentarios en las audiencias públicas.

    ¿Cómo se vinculan con el movimiento internacional por el clima?

    Estamos desarrollando un programa panafricano para una transición justa que implicará la colaboración con otros grupos regionales e internacionales para garantizar que la transición energética mundial sea justa para África y refleje los impactos de la crisis climática en el continente.

     

    ¿Qué esperanzas tiene en relación con la COP26, y qué utilidad considera que suelen tener estos procesos internacionales?

    La inclusión de consideraciones sobre el cambio climático a nivel de proyecto ya tiene un asidero legal en Kenia a través de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, el Acuerdo de París y la Ley de Cambio Climático aprobada en Kenia en 2016. El retraso en la implementación de la ley ha supuesto un desafío, pero tenemos conocimiento de varios proyectos de reglamentación que están siendo revisados para su eventual promulgación.

    En lo que respecta a la transición energética justa, esperamos que se impongan obligaciones más estrictas que cumplan con el principio de responsabilidad común pero diferenciada, el cual reconoce que los distintos países tienen diferentes responsabilidades y capacidades para abordar cuestiones transfronterizas tales como el cambio climático. Esto garantizaría que África no se quede atrás en la transición o, lo que es peor, que la transición no se produzca a sus expensas.

    Los procesos internacionales han sido útiles en la medida en que han facilitado en parte la domesticación de los marcos legales y políticos sobre cambio climático, pero ciertamente esperamos un mayor compromiso por parte de los Estados.

    ¿Qué cambio le gustaría que ocurriera para ayudar a resolver la crisis climática?

    Quisiéramos que se acelerara la implementación de los marcos jurídicos y las obligaciones en materia de cambio climático, a nivel tanto local como internacional. Además, quisiéramos que los países desarrollados del norte global se comprometieran y cumplieran sus promesas de financiamiento para el clima realizadas en el marco del Acuerdo de París. Esto será muy útil para financiar transiciones energéticas justas en África.

    El espacio cívico enKenia es calificado comoobstruidopor elCIVICUS Monitor.
    Póngase en contacto con la Plataforma de la Sociedad Civil de Kenia sobre el Petróleo y el Gas a través de supágina web y siga a@KCSPOG y a@CharlesWanguhu en Twitter. 

  • COP26: “Esperamos que las palabras se traduzcan en compromisos que cambien las conductas”

    En vísperas de la 26ª Conferencia de las Partes de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (COP26), que tendrá lugar en Glasgow, Reino Unido, entre el 31 de octubre y el 12 de noviembre de 2021, CIVICUS está entrevistando a activistas, líderes y personas expertas de la sociedad civil acerca de los desafíos medioambientales que enfrentan en sus contextos, las acciones que están llevando a cabo para abordarlos y sus expectativas para la próxima cumbre.

    CIVICUS conversa con Theophile Hatagekimana, Secretario Ejecutivo de la Organización para la Concientización Medioambiental de Ruanda (REAO), una organización de la sociedad civil ruandesa que trabaja para crear conciencia acerca del cambio climático y los problemas medioambientales y promueve la implementación de políticas sólidas de gestión ambiental.

    Theophile Hategekimana

    ¿Cuál es el principal problema medioambiental de su comunidad en el que está trabajando?

    Trabajamos en la resiliencia y la mitigación del cambio climático con respeto de los derechos humanos. En los últimos años hemos empezado a colaborar con los esfuerzos del gobierno para reducir la cantidad de combustible utilizado para cocinar en los hogares. Hemos unido fuerzas en esta y otras iniciativas porque el gobierno ruandés está siendo muy proactivo en el tema de la mitigación del cambio climático.

    En el marco de este proyecto, enseñamos a personas vulnerables, incluidas mujeres jóvenes, mujeres pobres, madres solteras adolescentes y víctimas de abusos sexuales, a utilizar métodos mejorados para cocinar, tales como estufas, en lugar de leña, lo cual no solamente salva de la tala a muchos árboles y reduce la exposición de estas personas a emisiones tóxicas en sus hogares, sino que también les ahorra mucho tiempo. Las animamos a que destinen el tiempo que esto les ahorra a actividades de autodesarrollo, educativas y de interacción social, y a que realicen actividades generadoras de ingresos.

    También plantamos árboles para restaurar los bosques y plantamos y distribuimos árboles agroforestales, que hacen que el suelo sea más resistente y pueda hacer frente a fenómenos climáticos extremos tales como sequías y lluvias torrenciales, además de proporcionar alimento, forraje, materias primas industriales, madera, combustible y mantillo, ayudando a diversificar las dietas y los ingresos. Uno de nuestros proyectos se centra en la compra de semillas y su siembra en las escuelas, en el marco de un programa que incluye la alfabetización ecológica, la demostración de los principios medioambientales mediante el desarrollo de prácticas verdes en la vida cotidiana, y el desarrollo de una ética medioambiental.

    Aunque pueda parecer que solamente trabajamos en la protección ambiental, en realidad nos preocupa mucho la dimensión de derechos humanos de la protección del medio ambiente, por lo cual nos oponemos a la práctica de desplazar gente sin la debida compensación. Concientizamos a la población sobre los derechos que les reconoce la ley y la apoyamos para que los reclame cuando sea necesario. Un ejemplo es el de los indígenas batwa, que a menudo son expulsados de sus tierras, por lo que les proporcionamos las herramientas necesarias para que conozcan sus derechos, tal y como los enuncian el derecho internacional y la ley ruandesa.

    ¿Cómo se vinculan con el movimiento internacional por el clima?

    Muchos activistas, entre los cuales me incluyo, mantienen conexiones personales con organizaciones internacionales y con pares de todo el mundo. Pero también a nivel organizativo intentamos conectarnos con otros grupos que tienen una misión similar a la nuestra y participamos en redes y coaliciones climáticas y medioambientales. REAO es miembro de la Red de Cambio Climático y Desarrollo de Ruanda, una asociación nacional de organizaciones defensoras del medio ambiente. A nivel internacional, trabajamos en red con otras organizaciones que se dedican a la protección y mitigación del cambio climático, y hemos colaborado con la Unión Internacional para la Conservación de la Naturaleza y el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, entre otros.

    ¿Qué esperanzas tiene de que la COP26 logre algún avance en la mitigación del cambio climático?

    Acogemos con satisfacción todos los esfuerzos internacionales encaminados a tomar decisiones coordinadas para proteger el medio ambiente y mejorar el bienestar de las comunidades, y tenemos la esperanza de que la COP26 dé lugar a la adopción de medidas concretas para hacer frente al cambio climático y a la degradación del medio ambiente. A nivel discursivo, por supuesto, todo lo que dicen los líderes de los países en el escenario global es exactamente lo que queremos escuchar; nada de eso va en contra de nuestra misión, visión y valores. Esperamos que en la COP26 esas palabras se traduzcan en compromisos que den lugar a un cambio positivo en el comportamiento de sus países en materia climática.

    ¿Qué cambio le gustaría ver -en el mundo o en su comunidad- para ayudar a resolver la crisis climática?

    A nivel mundial, queremos que los países que más contaminan actúen para reducir sustancialmente sus emisiones. Países como China, India, Estados Unidos y otros deben tomar decisiones claras y actuar en materia de cambio climático, o todos padeceremos las consecuencias de su inacción. Esperamos que los grandes contaminadores paguen las soluciones climáticas y la cuenta quede saldada.

    A nivel local, esperamos que las condiciones de vida de las comunidades menos favorecidas mejoren y logren adaptarse al cambio climático con el apoyo de políticas públicas adecuadas y financiamiento de los gobiernos.

    El espacio cívico enRuanda es calificado como “represivopor elCIVICUS Monitor.
    Póngase en contacto con la Organización para la Concientización Medioambiental de Ruanda a través de susitio web y su página deFacebook. 

  • COP26: “Una prioridad clave es abordar la vulnerabilidad a nivel comunitario”

    Mubiru HuzaifahEn vísperas de la 26ª Conferencia de las Partes de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (COP26), que tendrá lugar en Glasgow, Reino Unido, entre el 31 de octubre y el 12 de noviembre de 2021, CIVICUS está entrevistando a activistas, líderes y personas expertas de la sociedad civil acerca de los desafíos medioambientales que enfrentan en sus contextos, las acciones que están llevando a cabo para abordarlos y sus expectativas para la próxima cumbre.

    CIVICUS conversa con Mubiru Huzaifah, de la Organización Cristiana Ecológica (ECO) de Uganda, una organización de la sociedad civil (OSC) que trabaja para asegurar medios de vida sostenibles a los grupos marginados, desatendidos y vulnerables de Uganda. Sus iniciativas en curso se centran en la gobernanza de los recursos naturales, la resiliencia y la adaptación al cambio climático y la gestión y restauración de los ecosistemas.

    ¿Cuál es el problema climático en el cual actualmente se centra su trabajo?

    El tema que más nos preocupa son los altos niveles de vulnerabilidad que el cambio climático está generando en los sistemas humanos. El cambio de largo plazo de los elementos climáticos con respecto a los niveles previamente aceptados está provocando cambios en los sistemas medioambientales y humanos. Según los informes sobre el estado del medio ambiente publicados por la Autoridad Nacional de Gestión Medioambiental de Uganda, los principales problemas relacionados con el cambio climático son la contaminación industrial, la quema indiscriminada de vegetación, el uso ineficaz de los combustibles y la mala planificación de las redes de transporte, todo lo cual genera altos niveles de emisiones.

    ¿Existen iniciativas gubernamentales para mitigar el cambio climático?

    Hay un proyecto de mitigación que está implementando el Ministerio de Agua y Medio Ambiente, denominado Mejoramiento de los Ingresos Agrícolas y Conservación de los Bosques, que reparte gratuitamente plántulas que son plantadas para mejorar la capacidad de absorción del suelo. También está el Plan de Subvenciones a la Producción de Aserrín, cuyo objetivo es aumentar los ingresos de la población rural mediante la plantación de árboles comerciales por parte de las comunidades locales y de medianas y grandes empresas, lo que al mismo tiempo contribuye a mitigar los efectos del cambio climático mediante la reforestación intensiva. También hay varios proyectos de energía solar en los distritos de Mayuge, Soroti y Tororo, que han aumentado la producción de energía solar del país, y un proyecto de humedales apoyado por el Fondo Verde para el Clima, que busca conservar los humedales y detener su degradación.

    Otras intervenciones relevantes son la puesta en marcha de sistemas de flujo de agua por gravedad para facilitar el suministro de agua sin utilizar fuentes de energía; el desarrollo de carreteras con canales de drenaje de agua y luces solares y el desarrollo de redes de carreteras libres de atascos que permitan un tráfico fluido y ayuden a reducir las emisiones de los automóviles; y la adopción de motocicletas eléctricas o libres de emisiones para reducir aún más las emisiones resultantes del uso de combustibles fósiles, tema en que el Ministerio de Energía está trabajando junto con el sector privado.

    ¿Qué tipo de trabajo realiza ECO en estos temas?

    El trabajo de ECO apunta a aumentar la resiliencia de las comunidades frente a los impactos del cambio climático, a reducir los riesgos de desastres, a mejorar la gobernanza y la gestión de los recursos naturales, especialmente en el sector extractivo, y a promover la gestión y restauración de los ecosistemas.

    Por ejemplo, en el marco de un proyecto que busca promover y apoyar a las zonas conservadas por las comunidades en la cuenca del lago Victoria, hemos prestado apoyo a prácticas de pesca legal, desarrollado e impartido formación sobre la promoción de la agricultura sostenible y apoyado buenas prácticas de gobernanza de los recursos locales. Tenemos otro proyecto que busca aumentar la transparencia, la inclusión social, la rendición de cuentas y la capacidad de respuesta de las empresas mineras en la región de Karamoja.

    En estos y en muchos otros proyectos en que trabajamos, siempre buscamos impulsar el cambio poniendo en el centro a las personas en riesgo y aprovechando los recursos y conocimientos locales y tradicionales. Intentamos vincular los ámbitos de la acción humanitaria y la labor de desarrollo centrándonos en los medios de subsistencia. Trabajamos para garantizar una planificación adaptativa, tratando de vincular las realidades locales con los procesos globales e integrar disciplinas y enfoques para abarcar diferentes riesgos. Para ello trabajamos en conjunto con comunidades, OSC, organismos gubernamentales, universidades e institutos de investigación, entidades del sector privado y medios de comunicación.

    ¿Cómo se vinculan con el movimiento internacional por el clima?

    Nos vinculamos con el movimiento climático global a través de la Red de Acción Climática-Uganda, que incluye a más de 200 OSC nacionales. Actualmente nosotros la presidimos. Esto nos permite participar como observadores en las reuniones de la COP.

    También participamos en las reuniones consultivas previas a la COP organizadas por el gobierno ugandés para preparar las negociaciones internacionales sobre el cambio climático. En estas reuniones, ayudamos a evaluar los avances realizados en la lucha contra el cambio climático y en materia de cumplimiento de nuestras contribuciones determinadas a nivel nacional.

    Convertimos nuestras lecciones aprendidas en acciones de incidencia que pueden adaptarse a los foros internacionales sobre el cambio climático. Algunos problemas locales pueden alimentar la agenda nacional, convertirse en acciones de política pública y pasar a influir en las políticas internacionales.

    ¿Qué esperanzas tienen de que la COP26 produzca avances en materia de mitigación del cambio climático?

    Esperamos que de la COP26 surja una nueva plataforma de comercialización para el comercio de emisiones que sustituya al Mecanismo de Desarrollo Limpio, que permitía a los países con un compromiso de reducción o limitación de emisiones en virtud del Protocolo de Kioto poner en marcha proyectos de reducción de emisiones en los países en desarrollo. También esperamos que se comprometan más fondos para acelerar la difusión de energías renovables.

    Estos procesos internacionales son relevantes siempre que contribuyan a la financiación de los esfuerzos de mitigación del cambio climático y produzcan estrategias de financiación novedosas, como el Fondo Verde para el Clima y el Fondo de Adaptación y su programa piloto para fomentar la innovación en las prácticas de adaptación de los países vulnerables. Viniendo de un país en vías de desarrollo, creo que es fundamental aumentar inmediatamente el financiamiento de medidas de adaptación, ya que los impactos perturbadores del cambio climático sobre los sistemas humanos ya son evidentes.

    ¿Qué cambio le gustaría ver -en el mundo o en su comunidad- que ayudaría a resolver la crisis climática?

    Una prioridad clave es abordar la vulnerabilidad a nivel comunitario. Nuestra visión es la de una comunidad con mayor capacidad de adaptación para hacer frente a los impactos del cambio climático y sus efectos ulteriores. Esto puede hacerse aumentando el acceso a tecnologías y proporcionando financiamiento para la mitigación y la adaptación a través de estructuras comunitarias.

    El espacio cívico enUganda es calificado como “represivopor elCIVICUS Monitor.
    Póngase en contacto con la Organización Cristiana Ecológica a través de susitio web o su página deFacebook, y siga a@EcoChristianOrg en Twitter.

  • Corruption in Zambia: 42 fire trucks for $42m

    By Teldah Mawarire and Laura Miti

    The African Union (AU) will host a heads of state summit in Mauritania on June 25, under the theme Winning the Fight against Corruption: A Sustainable Path to Africa's Transformation. Zambia's President Edgar Lungu will also be at the summit, showing support for its cause. Yet on the very same day his country will be moving further away from the anti-corruption ideals of the AU. As Lungu sits down with other African leaders to talk about possible ways to eradicate corruption, six Zambian activists will sit in a dock in Lusaka to be prosecuted for protesting against corruption.

    Read on: Al Jazeera

  • Could the annulment of Kenya’s election set a precedent for African civil society?

    By David Kode

    The ruling by Kenya’s Supreme Court strengthens the independence of the judiciary and places this institution as a key player and arbiter in future elections and on issues that affect peace and security in Kenya. Future rulings on elections – either in favour of or against a political party or coalition – can be received as the final outcome and prevent conflict.

    Source:Pambazuka

  • CSO's Letter to the African Union Commission about the State of Human Rights in Egypt

    by H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat 

    We write to you in your capacity as the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the secretariat of the continental organisation responsible for driving the political agenda and development of the people of Africa. As Chairperson of the AU Commission, we are assured of your mandate to promote the objectives of the AU. The undersigned organisations work to advance human rights in Africa and write to express deep concerns about the situation of human rights in the Republic of Egypt. In particular, this letter highlights some systematic violations of human rights in Egypt. While we acknowledge that you may well be aware of certain issues raised in this letter, we bring them to light due to the appalling situation and gravity of the violations.

    Beyond hosting the Africa CUP of Nations (21 June- 19 July) which brought a lot of excitement to the people of Africa, human rights in Egypt face serious threats. Our concerns span from interference with the system of administration justice, enforced disappearances, attacks against human rights defenders and attacks against the independent media. Moreover, we are concerned about the use of systematic torture, lengthy pre-trial detention, the shrinking civic space and other related violations as detailed below.

    Interference with the system of administration of justice and violation of fair trial rights

    In April 2019, the Constitution of Egypt was amended to give the executive branch excessive powers to control the judiciary. Thus, in the amended constitutional articles 185, 189 and 193 the president has powers to appoint the head of judicial bodies including the chief of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Public Prosecutor. Moreover, in article 200 the executive, and particularly the military, is attributed powers to “protect the constitution and democracy, and safeguard (…) individual rights and freedom”. Categorically, these amendments violate the notion of separation of power known for ensuring checks and balance between the arms of the government. Unless a proper system of checks is put into place, there are huge risks that, working under the military, the judicial arm of the government will not play its role effectively as it ought to do.

    The death of Egypt’s former President Mohamed Morsi on Monday 17 June 2019, is yet another shocking event that exposes Egypt’s violation of fair trial rights. Morsi died in a defendant courtroom while attending a session in his trial on espionage charges.[1] Reports say that his death could be linked to negligence by Egyptian authorities to provide him with adequate medical treatment for diabetes, liver and kidney malfunction.[2]  

    Enforced disappearances, mass arrest and attacks against activists

    Security forces have used enforced disappearances to instil fear among the population in the country. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented 1,530 cases of enforced disappearances in Egypt between July 2013 and August 2018. We are particularly concerned that enforced disappearances and mass arrests were used against rights activists and political opponents of President El-Sisi. This has occurred in an attempt to wipe out opposition in the country. The victims of such arrests include political activists such as rights defender Wael Abbas (now released); Shady al-Ghazaly Harb, a surgeon; Haitham Mohamadeen, a lawyer; Amal Fathy; and Shady Abu Zaid, a satirist.[3] Other persons affected include Hoda Abdelmonem, a 60-year-old lawyer and rights defender and Alaa Abdel Fattah (also released, recently). As of 1 November 2018, Ezzat Ghonim, Executive Director of an organisation called Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF), was reported missing for several months.[4]

    Attacks against the media

    The 2018 law regulating the media provides overly broad powers to the Council of the Media to block websites, shut down television channels and other publishing forums without a judicial order to that effect. The law also places personal media accounts under the supervision of the Media Council. It means that one can be arrested for publishing fake news on their personal account, even if the publication was done as satire. The situation is exacerbated in a context where media experts such as journalists are detained. To mention a few, Mahmoud Abu Zeid (Shawkan) a photo-journalist was jailed for 5 years, Abdullah Elshamy, also a journalist was sentenced to 15 years in absentia simply for conducting his work, he also undertook a hunger strike in prison. Not so long ago, Hisham Gaafar, a journalist and human rights defender, and Director of an NGO that focuses on media studies was also detained. Gaafar was held for 3 years and only released in April 2019. We submit that the clampdown on media has negatively affected the enjoyment of the rights of freedom of expression and access to information. It is our view that if these rights are to flourish in Egypt, the authorities must seek to improve the country’s human rights record by allowing media freedom and by implication the right to access to information. The Egyptian authorities should also refrain from attacking media professionals.

    Torture

    The 2017 Committee against Torture report on Egypt noted that the practice of torture is “habitual, widespread and deliberate” in Egypt. It adds that torture appears to occur frequently following arbitrary arrests and is often carried out to obtain a confession or to punish and threaten political dissenters. Torture is perpetrated by police officers, military officers, national security officers and prison guards. Prosecutors, judges and prison officials also facilitate this ill practice by failing to curb practices of torture, arbitrary detention and ill-treatment, or to act on complaints.[5]

    Pre-trial detention

    Egypt’s Criminal Procedural Code[6] entrenches provisions that have overly vague grounds for pre-trial detention. This has led to lengthy detention of journalists and political activists who have been bold enough to criticize the system of governance in the country. Case in point includes the prolonged detention of Egyptian journalist Mahmoud Hussein Gomaa Ali, who was arrested for more than two years without charges. It is suspected that Mahmoud’s punitive pre-trial detention is a message from the government of Egypt to journalists who dare to speak openly against the ruling authorities.

    Closing civic space

    The 64th Ordinary Session of African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, held in Sharm El Sheikh in Egypt, was marred with daunting reports about restriction of civic space. Many delegates of civil society organisations operating in the continent faced serious difficulties obtaining entry visas. Participants from Ghana, Malawi, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania were unable to obtain visas to attend the session. Indirect restrictions further included exorbitant fees for hosting side events led by civil society actors and the intentional miscommunication on logistics for events. Registration for the session proved difficult and some participants reported what appeared to be intrusive harassment by security agents. The above scene leads one to think about the challenges faced by rights groups based in Egypt.

    Your Excellency, in 1984, Egypt ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), an instrument that compels member states to respect, protect and fulfil all the human rights recognized in the Charter. Moreover, Egypt is a member state and current chair of the AU and expected to lead as a human rights champion in upholding the human rights principles set out in AU’s Constitutive Act. Your Excellency, the on-going violations of human rights in Egypt are not in keeping with the country’s obligations and domestic laws, including the constitution and major international and regional human rights instruments ratified by Egypt. It also violates objectives 3(g) and (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU which enjoins AU member States to promote popular participation and human and people’s rights, respectively. Recalling the role of the AU as the lead regional institution tasked to better the lives of the people of Africa, and particular the Egyptian citizens, we respectfully ask you to take measures to ensure that the government of Egypt restores respect for the rule of law, ensures ample protection of human rights and aligns its practice to ratified international and regional human rights standards including the Constitutive Act of the AU and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. We respectfully ask you to consider including the situation of human rights in Egypt as a point for discussion in the agenda of the next Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU with recommendations for the Summit to deliberate on asking the government of Egypt to:

    1. Take steps to ensure full compliance with international and regional human rights standards;
    2. Respect separation of power by refraining from interfering with the system of administration of justice;
    3. Halt enforced disappearances, investigate and punish perpetrators of enforced disappearance;
    4. Investigate and punish perpetrators and stop attacks against political opponents, peaceful protesters and journalists;
    5. Respect the right to access to information and freedom of the media. In particular, lift the ban against independent press and media;
    6. Investigate and take actions to punish perpetrators of torture and ensure assistance and reparations to the victims;
    7. Address lengthy pre-trial detention and release all detainees who are being held in pre-trial detention without proper charges. and
    8. Promote a culture of dialogue and participation and comply with internationally and regionally recognised standards on the rule of law and civic space.

    In addition, we request you to recommend the AU to:

    1. Ask Egypt to report on measures and progress achieved in the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.

    Signed by

    1. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS);
    2. Centre for Human Rights Education Advice and Assistance (CREAA);
    3. Freedom Initiative;
    4. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa;
    5. International-Lawyers.org;
    6. MENA Rights Group;
    7. Pan African Human Rights Defenders Network;
    8. Southern African Christian Initiative (SACHI);
    9. Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (SAHRDN);
    10. West African Human Rights Defenders; and

     

    [1] The Wall Street Journal at https://www.wsj.com/articles/egypt-s-ousted-islamist-president-mohammed-morsi-has-died-11560789900.

    [2] Middle East Monitor report available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180331-morsis-health-has-deteriorated-severely/amp/.

    [3] Human Rights Watch Report - 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/egypt#f95966.

    [4] See details at https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egyptian-security-forces-arrest-19-rights-activists-and-lawyers.

    [5] Para. 69 of the UN Committee against Torture report on Egypt, available at file:///C:/Users/mandlate/Downloads/G1717367.pdf (Doc A/72/44).

    [6] The UN Working group on Arbitrary Detentions (WGAD) criticized Egypt severely for having vague laws on pre-trial detention. For further details see https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Detention/Opinions/Session80/A_HRC_WGAD_2017_83.pdf.

  • CSOs call for the Council’s urgent attention to Ghana's anti-gay draft bill

    Statement at the 48th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

    General Debate – Item 4

    Madam President,

    In the spirit of Agenda Item 4, we would like to call the attention of the Council to the Human Rights situation of LGBTI persons in Ghana in light of the recent Anti-LGBTI draft bill being discussed in the country. As expressed jointly by eleven Special Procedures of this Council, the draft legislation is “a recipe for violence”1.

    The bill being discussed not only attempts to criminalise same-sex conduct, but also promotes harmful practices such as unnecessary medical interventions on intersex children2 and so-called conversion therapies. This bill also enables the state to prevent human rights defenders from organising themselves to defend LGBTI people, and absolutely prohibits public debates that advance the protection or promotion of the rights of LGBTI persons. Ultimately, this bill legitimises state and societal violence.

    The provisions contained in the draft legislation not only criminalise LGBTI persons but anyone who supports their human rights, shows sympathy to them or is even remotely associated with them3.

    Human rights defenders or anyone registering, operating or participating in an activity to support an organisation working on LGBTI people’s rights could face up to 10 years of imprisonment. The Bill also criminalises any production and dissemination of so-called LGBTI “propaganda” with imprisonment between 5 to 10 years.4

    The discussion of such draft legislation has already significantly and alarmingly promoted a rise in discrimination and violence against LGBTI persons in Ghana.

    The adoption of this bill has major implications on the already marginalised and vulnerable LGBTI community. It will exacerbate existing economic, legal, societal and public health inequalities which will make it more difficult for the community to exist safely in society. Adopting such a bill would be a direct infringement to core international human rights as dignity, equality and non-discrimination, the rights to freedom of expression, association and privacy, and the absolute prohibition of torture.

    We urge the Ghanaian Government to take all measures to protect LGBTI persons from violence and discrimination and refrain from adopting any legislation that will violate the human rights of this community and those who defend their rights. We also call on this Council, UN Member States, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and all relevant stakeholders to remain seised of this matter.

    Thank you.

    List of organisations co-sponsoring this statement:

    1. Amnesty International
    2. Article 19
    3. CIVICUS
    4. Human Rights Watch
    5. International Commission of Jurists
    6. International Lesbian and Gay Association
    7. International Service for Human Rights
    8. International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR)
    9. OutRight Action International

    List of organisations supporting this statement:

    1. LGBT+ Rights Ghana
    2. Pan Africa ILGA
    3. Solace Initiative

    1OHCHR: Ghana: Anti-LGBTI draft bill a “recipe for violence” – UN experts.
    2OHCHR. Communication OL GHA 03/2021.
    3OHCHR: Ghana: Anti-LGBTI draft bill a “recipe for violence” – UN experts.
    4Amnesty International: Ghana: Anti-LGBTI Bill Stirs Up Hatred, Persecution And Discrimination.

    Civic space in Ghana is rated as narrowed by the CIVICUS Monitor

  • CSW66: ‘Grassroots environmental defenders are highly underrepresented in decision-making’

    interview MALAWI CSW66CIVICUS speaks about women’s rights and the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) with Joy Hayley Munthali and Dorothy Kazombo Mwale of the Green Girls Platform.

    Founded in 2018, the Green Girl Platform is a female-led civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for climate justice for women and girls in Malawi by building capacity, providing leadership skills and promoting sexual and reproductive health rights.

    What are the main women’s rights issues in Malawi, and how does Green Girl Platform work to address them?

    In Malawi, women and girls are highly affected by the effects of climate change and environmental degradation due to their role in society. Girls are expected to help fetch firewood and get clean water for their households. Due to the effects of climate change, including erratic rains and depletion of natural resources, women and girls often have to walk long distances to find clean water and firewood. Because of these challenges, most girls are forced into early marriages and some drop out of school.

    The vulnerability of women and girls to environmental degradation, as well as to sexual violence and exploitation and gender-related violence, is on the rise. This is happening due to a lack of understanding of the implications of climate change for their lives, lack of information, lack of leadership skills, low participation in governance structures, limited women-led climate-related platforms and a lack of understanding and application of their rights.

    Women and girls are left out of decision-making processes although they are the ones who are most affected. The Green Girls Platform was founded to address the violence against women and girls that emanates from climate change and increase the number of women and girls engaged with climate change issues.

    The Green Girls Platform is working to ensure that gender and women’s rights are placed on the local, national and global environmental and climate change agendas by advocating for gender-responsive governance and policies. We conduct capacity-building workshops and training on climate change to equip girls with skills and knowledge on climate justice and all it encompasses. Through our initiatives, we have been able to reach around 5,000 young women and girls in Malawi, increasing their active participation in addressing climate change.

    What issues did you try to bring into the CSW agenda this year?

    As an organisation we noticed that there is underrepresentation of young women and girls in decision-making processes. Their participation and active engagement in climate change governance structures is minimal. Structural changes are needed so that more women are included in decision-making bodies.

    Climate change is affecting young women’s access to education, and we need to come up with adaptation strategies that work for girls and young women in their specific contexts. Strategies have to be sustainable and demand-driven to build the adaptive capacity of women and girls and enhance their access to education.

    We are aware of the violence that girls and young women environmental defenders face either within their homes or in their communities. We would like to see the adoption of measures to protect the rights of adolescent girls and young women from climate-related violence. Civil society donors could help us navigate these challenges.

    What were your expectations, and to what degree were they met?

    Our expectations were that our concerns would be listened to and we would collectively come up with solutions to some of the overarching challenges. Although our needs were met to a good degree, we were not highly impressed by the output. But we are positive that things will improve.

    In terms of access, we faced some challenges. Only one of our staff was able to attend the CSW sessions in person, and she did so for only three days due to insufficient funding. We also attended some online events, mainly side events, but we had issues accessing main events due to time differences and late notices, and because some of them were not open to civil society.

    Do you think that international bodies, and specifically the UN, adequately integrate women in their decision-making processes?

    UN Women has taken steps in the right direction in terms of integrating women into decision-making spaces. However, we still have challenges getting all voices represented at the table. Women and girl environmental defenders working at the grassroots level are highly underrepresented in decision-making spaces, even though they are the ones working at the local level and facing the adverse impacts of climate change. Access to climate financing for girls and young women working on climate issues is still minimal and inaccessible, leading to more issues falling through the cracks and not reaching decision makers.

    Civic space in Malawi is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with the Green Girl Platform through itsFacebook page and follow@GirlsPlatform on Twitter.

  • CSW66: ‘UN member states should make efforts to honour their commitments at home’

    Eucharia AbuaCIVICUS speaks about women’s rights and the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) with Eucharia Abua, Senior Programme Officer on Gender and Reproductive Justice at African Girls Empowerment Network (AGE Network).

    Founded in 2015, AGE Network is a young feminist civil society organisation (CSO) committed to advancing gender equality in girls’ education and promoting young women’s bodily and economic rights and leadership in Nigeria. It works to end child marriage and keep girls in school, and provides support to rape survivors, teenage mothers, victims of domestic violence and female genital mutilation, LGBTQI+ women, sex workers, women and girl refugees from Cameroon, internally displaced women and girls, and other economically disadvantaged and vulnerable women and girls.

    What do you see as the main women’s rights issues in Nigeria, and how does AGE Network work to address them?

    One of the main issues is women’s right to pregnancy by choice. In Nigeria, there’s an imbalance in the sexual and reproductive health and rights of women and adolescent girls. This is evident in the country’s discriminatory abortion law, which only allows medical abortion under certain circumstances. This strict law, alongside shame, social stigma and a lack of access to timely and non-judgemental information about safe, self-managed medical abortion and legal support, steers young women towards unsafe abortions.

    Many young women with unintended pregnancies, particularly those in vulnerable settings and displaced communities who are pregnant as a result of sexual violence, rape or incest, and those with critical medical conditions who cannot carry a pregnancy to term, seek unsafe abortions from quack doctors in hideouts and become vulnerable to irreparable harm or death. This has contributed to the current maternal mortality ratio of 512 per 100,000 live births, according to a 2020 report by the Federal Ministry of Health.

    To address this situation, AGE launched the #BellebyChoice campaign, an initiative to advance women’s and girls’ bodily rights and autonomy by securing their rights to pregnancy by choice, not by chance. The campaign seeks to curb unintended pregnancies by improving access to and uptake of family planning and modern contraception and end unsafe abortions through the provision of timely and non-judgemental information and legal support so that women can access safe and self-managed medical abortions. We have a dedicated hotline and use local and pidgin languages to address communication barriers in accessing sexual and reproductive health services among women and adolescent girls.

    Additionally, since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, AGE has stood in solidarity with vulnerable young women, including female sex workers, and has helped them access timely sexual and reproductive health services. We partnered with Women First Digital and incorporated their AllyChatBot for safe abortion via WhatsApp into our campaign. So far they have supported our efforts to end abortion stigma and help young women access non-judgemental sexual and reproductive health information and care through their mobile phones.

    In the face of COVID-19, we have also advocated with the Nigerian government to relax the discriminatory abortion law. We have campaigned and engaged with key stakeholders to call on the government to set aside laws and policies that restrict access to safe abortion and allow the use of telemedicine and self-managed abortions in line with the guidelines put forward by the World Health Organization.

    Why do you think the Nigerian government is not sufficiently responsive to women’s rights demands? 

    Here is where another major women’s rights issue comes in: there’s a great imbalance in female representation and too many obstacles prevent women from having effective political participation. Inclusive governance is still a pending issue in Nigeria, and it continues to face strong resistance. For instance, just this March, Nigeria’s Senate and House of Representatives rejected proposed bills to grant additional legislative seats to women and other forms of affirmative action.

    This is also apparent in the area of climate justice and environmental protection: rural women form the majority among farmers, but they have not been fully integrated or carried along in the process to develop the national climate change mitigation and adaptation action plan.

    What issues have you tried to bring into the CSW agenda this year?

    This year AGE has called for climate justice, in the form of a more inclusive climate change mitigation and adaptation action plan. This was the official theme for International Women’s Day 2022 (IWD 2022), to which the priority theme for the CSW’s 66th edition (CSW66) was closely aligned.

    We carried out an online campaign, joined our civil society partners’ side events at CSW66 and hosted a virtual summit to commemorate IWD2022, in which we reflected on climate change and its disproportionate impact on women and girls, reviewed the progress made so far in mitigating climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa, celebrated women’s achievements, raised awareness of gender bias, engaged leading feminists working on climate justice and environmental protection in both government and the private sector in discussion and called for investment in Nigeria’s renewable energy sector.

    Against all odds, women in Nigeria have played a key role in addressing the impacts of climate change and advancing climate justice. However, in spite of their contributions, women and girls – and particularly those in vulnerable settings and displaced communities – are still being disproportionately affected by the lack of climate action.

    What were your expectations of CSW and to what degree have they been met?

    Our expectations were to be able to connect, collaborate with and learn from women’s rights organisations and activists from around the world, joining together in a unified call for climate justice.

    We re-echoed the achievements and contributions of our women, reviewed the reality and impacts of climate change on women, and called for a more level playing field and gender-responsive climate change mitigation and adaptation for a sustainable future for all.

    But we were unable to participate fully due to internet connection problems and time zone differences during most of the events.

    Do you think that international bodies, and specifically the UN, adequately integrate women into their decision-making processes?

    As the leading international body, the UN has created an enabling environment for women’s participation in leadership and decision making and inclusive governance, including through Sustainable Development Goal number 5 on gender equality. However, UN member states should match this with efforts to honour their commitments at home, reducing gender inequalities, tackling human rights violations, and upholding the rule of law.

    Civic space in Nigeria is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with the African Girls Empowerment Network through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@TheAGENetwork on Twitter.

  • Decisive leadership needed from SADC to address DRC crisis

    By David Kode

    The announcement of a date for general elections in a country roiled in political conflict and ruled by an unpopular leader should be regarded as a positive move. But not so in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    Read on: Pambazuka 

     

  • DRC: ‘Civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller’

    Bahati_Rubango.jpgCIVICUS speaks with Bahati Rubango, country coordinator at the Women’s International Peace Centre (WIPC), about conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

    WIPC is a feminist organisation seeking to catalyse women’s leadership, amplify their voices and deepen their role in peacebuilding. It started out in 1974 as Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange, and in 1994 it moved from Geneva to Uganda and deepened its focus on the women, peace and security agenda.

    What’s the security situation in the DRC, and how is civil society working to address it?

    In the DRC, and particularly in Kivu and other parts of eastern DRC, including Beni, Bunagana, Masisi and Rutshuru territories and Ituri and South Kivu provinces, the situation is dire due to ongoing conflict. The prominence of the M23 rebel group exacerbates the crisis. The DRC’s government has accused Rwanda of supporting M23, with these claims substantiated by United Nations (UN) reports. The region is also plagued by the presence of over 120 other armed factions, foreign and local, some of which receive backing from Uganda, further complicating the situation.

    This has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe, characterised by widespread displacement, killings, rape, plundering of natural resources, instances of sexual violence and severe limitations on access to education and healthcare, worsening the suffering and vulnerability of millions of civilians.

    Despite the deployment of various regional and international peacekeeping missions, the violence persists. The peacekeeping efforts of MONUSCO, the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC, have fallen short. The conflict has regional and global dimensions beyond the DRC’s borders, impacting on peace and security across multiple countries.

    There is a complex interplay of local and international dynamics, including economic interests that perpetuate the conflict. The conflict’s economic dimension has been illustrated by the fact that rebel groups are mainly located where there are strategic natural resources.

    Efforts to quell the insurgency by national militia groups such as the Wazalendo movement find obstacles in the challenging terrain and the firm grip of rebel groups on strategic areas. As a result, access to Goma and other conflict-affected regions is primarily limited to air travel and boats across Lake Kivu, which impedes humanitarian aid and peacekeeping efforts.

    Civil society organisations play a crucial role in peacebuilding, monitoring human rights violations and advocating for justice and security sector reforms. Civil society highlights the need for justice for victims and the involvement of women and young people in peace processes. Despite challenges, including threats to human rights defenders, civil society strives to raise awareness, combat hate speech and protect vulnerable populations.

    How much space is there for civil society action in the DRC?

    The situation has been tumultuous since May 2021, with the declaration of a state of siege in conflict areas that has subsequently been renewed. Under the ongoing state of siege, the military displaced civilian authorities and assumed control. This shift resulted in a significant curtailment of civic freedoms, particularly for public demonstrations and speech. Military justice has taken precedence over civilian law, raising ethical concerns and contributing to lack of accountability.

    Problems have been compounded by the questionable level of training and education in the army. There have been reports of inadequately trained people being integrated, including former rebel fighters with no regard for human rights principles, approaches or values. This has led to a rise in criminal activities and violations committed by security forces, further restricting civic space.

    Human rights defenders and journalists critical of the government have faced persecution. Arrests and criminalisation under baseless charges have become commonplace. Despite legislative efforts to protect activists, implementation has been lacking, exacerbating the erosion of civic space. An example is Lucha (Lutte pour le changement – Fight for Change), an organisation of young activists, several of whom spent four days under arrest simply for signing a declaration urging the state to stop war.

    Advocacy at national, regional and global levels is needed to address the challenges of conflict. However, entrenched power dynamics in the DRC, including the dominance of the ruling party, pose significant obstacles to meaningful reform. Urgent action is needed to reverse the trend of declining civic space, because civil society action is needed more than ever, but the space in which it can undertake it is getting smaller.

    What’s the likelihood of tensions between the DRC and Rwanda escalating into a regional conflict?

    Rwanda’s involvement in destabilising the DRC is concerning, especially considering its history of aggression in the region, but it won’t necessarily lead to a regional conflict. Despite Rwanda’s attempts to exert influence, the DRC has demonstrated significant military strength in defending its territory against its aggression in the past.

    Rwanda’s diplomatic prowess and hidden support from foreign countries – often driven by economic interests around mineral resources – contribute to its ability to manipulate regional dynamics. Rebel groups such as the M23 and the Allied Democratic Forces exploit the porous borders between Rwanda and the DRC, seeking refuge in and support from Rwanda to evade accountability for their actions. This exacerbates tensions between the two countries.

    But the likelihood of the conflict escalating into a full-blown regional war is mitigated by mutual interests and dependencies. Both countries rely on resources derived from the DRC, which acts as a deterrent to all-out warfare. Regional initiatives like the Nairobi Process, brokered by the East African Community in November 2022, seek to address underlying tensions and promote peacebuilding efforts. However, the effectiveness of such initiatives is undermined by external influences dictating the terms of engagement and providing support to conflicting parties.

    Civil society plays a crucial role in advocating for peace and stability, but its efforts are hindered by external interference and power dynamics that dictate the trajectory of the conflict. While regional organisations, notably the African Union, are theoretically focused on addressing conflict in the continent, external influences and interests often compromise their effectiveness.

    Ultimately, it will require a concerted effort from regional and global players committed to peace and stability in the Great Lakes region to prevent the escalation of the conflict and resolve it for good.

    How can the international community support peacebuilding efforts in the DRC?

    There is a pressing need for support from the international community to assist internally displaced people in desperate need of essentials such as food and shelter. Efforts are also needed to document atrocities to ensure accountability further along the road. This includes highlighting the responsibilities of perpetrators and using this information to ensure justice is served, even if it takes years. Support for civil society groups involved in peacebuilding processes is crucial, particularly since the state lacks adequate resources.

    Although it may not generate enthusiasm in all quarters of the international community, security sector reform requires attention. Fortunately, there are promising initiatives funded by international donors.

    Another critical need is justice reform, which should include mechanisms for transitional justice. This will be vital to address the immediate effects of conflict and the long-standing grievances and cycles of violence that have plagued the region for decades. Access to justice for victims is paramount to break the cycle of impunity and prevent further atrocities. There’s a need for collective and individual reparations for victims, as well as guarantees that such violence will not be repeated. This includes addressing psychological trauma and providing survivors the support they need to rebuild their lives.

    Both local and international engagement will be needed to ensure that peacebuilding agreements are fully respected and implemented, including by holding all parties responsible and accountable. Civil society activists, academics and journalists will have a crucial role in monitoring and advocating for these agreements to be fulfilled.

    Finally, it’s essential to recognise that the conflict in the DRC is not isolated but has regional and global implications. Efforts to address the crisis must consider its broader context and involve stakeholders at all levels, from local communities to international organisations. Only through a holistic and inclusive approach can lasting peace and stability be achieved in the region.


    Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with the Women’s International Peace Centre through itswebsite and follow @TheWIPCentre and@BRubango on Twitter.

  • DRC: ‘Civil society is targeted by politicians who see it as an obstacle to their power’

    JonathanMagomaCIVICUS speaks with journalist and human rights activist Jonathan Magoma about recent elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

    Jonathan Magoma is Country Programme Director and interim Executive Director of Partnership for Integral Protection (PPI), a civil society organisation that works for peace and the protection of human rights defenders in the DRC and the region.

    How free and fair were recent elections in the DRC?

    The presidential election of 20 December 2023 was held so as to show the world that the government conducted it within the constitutional deadline, but it was marred by fraud and irregularities.

    The electoral process was neither free nor fair. In several districts, rebel groups imposed their choices. In the province of Ituri, in the northeast of the DRC, the Chini ya Tuna armed group forced people to vote for a candidate from their community. The militias even took away two voting machines so they could enter the votes themselves.

    Towards the centre of the country, in Sankuru province, the brother of a Congolese dignitary set up a militia to disrupt the election and commit violence against agents of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), simply because he couldn’t line up as a national deputy candidate when his party failed to reach the required threshold. His armed men quietly took away election kits as observers looked on helplessly.

    Candidates also distributed gifts in polling centres to influence voters in their favour. Some candidates or their representatives were caught distributing money to voters on election day, which is illegal. In some centres some were arrested by the police, while others were not apprehended.

    In the Kabare district of South Kivu, for instance, electoral materials were transported to polling centres in the vehicles of a political party that was a member of the presidium of Sacred Union of the Nation (USN), the coalition backing the candidacy of President Félix Tshisekedi. Observers and voters at the centre cried foul.

    What were the basis of the opposition’s fraud allegations?

    The allegations of fraud made by the opposition are legitimate. They are based on the fact that a number of politicians close to the government kept full electoral kits in their homes in order to vote fraudulently. Voting machines were discovered in private homes containing ballot papers already signed and filled out. As a result, in most polling centres there was a shortage of voting machines, leading people in some districts to revolt.

    On 31 December, CENI published the provisional results of the presidential election, proclaiming Tshisekedi, the incumbent seeking a second term, as the winner. But five days after this, on 5 January, CENI invalidated the votes received by deputy candidates who had run in the national and provincial legislative elections and the municipal vote held on 20 December. Their candidacies were voided following numerous accusations of illegal possession of voting machines, fraud, destruction of electoral material, ballot box stuffing and incitement to commit acts of violence against CENI agents. The excluded candidates include three serving ministers, four provincial governors, six senators and a member of the bureau of the National Assembly. Almost all were USN members.

    At the same time, the electoral commission announced the annulment of the election results in the districts of Masimanimba in Kwilu province and Yakoma in North Ubangi province on the grounds of ‘massive and exaggerated fraud’. Unfortunately, the decision had nothing to say about the highly contested presidential election. But how could such irregularities have occurred at all other voting levels and not at the presidential election that was held on the same day and with the same ballot papers?

    This question gave rise to debate within civil society and, within the political opposition, it prompted several demonstrations to contest this ‘sham’ election and demand its annulment. But it was in vain: on 20 January, Tshisekedi was sworn in by ‘his’ Constitutional Court as president of the DRC.

    How did civil society, and PPI in particular, try to make the election free, fair and peaceful?

    In the run-up to the election, we launched awareness campaigns to promote a peaceful vote. We held advocacy actions with election stakeholders, getting them to adhere to democratic values guaranteeing fair, free, transparent and inclusive elections and to the need to guarantee civic space before, during and after the elections. We also trained civil society groups and journalists in election observation and media coverage.

    We observed the polls and contributed to the resulting civil society report. However, this report was not taken into account by the relevant bodies.

    I personally carried out observation in a village about 35km north of the town of Bukavu, where what are viewed as ‘observers in waistcoats’ are more or less respected and most CENI agents knew me. But for no reason, I was forbidden to spend more than 15 minutes in a polling station. In neighbouring centres, people complained about lack of access to polling stations. Some observers also complained. In my polling station, the voting machine was supposed to start at 6am but was not put into operation until after noon, which made voters angry.

    We continue to monitor the situation closely and assist human rights defenders, journalists and others who have been threatened or prosecuted for playing important roles or exposing irregularities during the elections. PPI is currently supporting two journalists and a civil society activist who are being prosecuted by the prosecutor general’s office in South Kivu province for denouncing electoral fraud perpetrated by a politician close to the government. PPI provides activists under threat with legal and judicial assistance, along with psychosocial support and advice on physical and digital security. Where necessary, medical or financial assistance, or even support for relocation, is offered to activists at risk.

    It must be noted that we are still in an election period, as elections for senators and governors have not yet taken place. Originally scheduled for February, CENI has postponed them and they will now take place in late March and early April. Meanwhile, civil society continues to be targeted by politicians who see it as an obstacle to their power.

    What were the demands of protesters on election day, and how did the government respond?

    On 20 December, some people in Beni and Goma could not stand the wait. When they arrived at polling stations early in the morning, they could not find their names on the lists posted outside. What’s more, some polling stations were not yet open. In some centres, only two polling stations out of 10 were open, or one out of eight. Rumours circulated about some candidates’ illegal possession of voting machines. All this led to spontaneous demonstrations, particularly in Beni, where one centre was vandalised.

    In several districts, voting continued beyond closing time. The government acknowledged ‘logistical difficulties’ but praised CENI for the ‘successful’ organisation of the elections. Obviously, CENI was not up to the task of managing the logistics of the elections. It was then announced that voters would be allowed to cast their ballots the following day, and voting resumed in almost every centre in the DRC. In Bas Uélé province, voting lasted three days, from 20 to 22 December.

    What are your expectations for the post-election period?

    I remain pessimistic because I am convinced that the elections were not transparent, free, credible or independent. What’s more, less than half of potential voters turned out. This is a strong message for a president who has supposedly been elected with more than 73 per cent of the vote among those who are said to have voted.

    In such a context, the legitimacy of the government will inevitably be called into question. Moreover, in December, former CENI president Corneille Nanga initiated a political-military movement allied with the M23 terrorist movement, which is supported by the Rwandan government and waging war in the east of the country.

    In the post-electoral period, serious human rights violations are likely to occur, as was documented during Tshisekedi’s first five-year term, even though he had promised to make respect for human rights and democracy his priority.

    Now that the ruling coalition has claimed an absolute majority in parliament, it is quite possible that it will start changing laws for its benefit, and even constitutional articles that were considered untouchable. This would create chaos and torpedo our hard-won democracy.

    What should be done to strengthen democracy in the DRC?

    At present, civic space in the DRC is repressed to the extent that it is virtually closed. Political rhetoric contradicts developments on the ground. Opponents are prosecuted and imprisoned for their opinions. Protesters are put down in a bloody way. Journalists such as Stanis Bujakera, Blaise Mabala, Philémon Mutula and Rubenga Shasha and many activists are persecuted and imprisoned for doing their job. We are intimidated, sometimes threatened and people are murdered.

    If we are to have any hope of strengthening democracy in the DRC, we will have to hold the government to account for its internal and external commitments. The fourth cycle of the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, due later this year, is a great opportunity for Congolese leaders to renew their commitment to democracy and respect for fundamental rights.

    Global civil society and the human rights community must stand shoulder to shoulder with Congolese activists in the quest for democracy. This can be achieved through joint advocacy and lobbying activities, as well as capacity development and exchanges of experience.


    Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Contact PPI through itswebsite and follow@PPIREGIONALE and@JonathanMagoma on Twitter.

  • DRC: ‘The United Nations’ peacekeeping mission has failed’

    CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing protests against the United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MONUSCO, with social activists Espoir Ngalukiye and Sankara Bin Kartumwa.

    Espoir and Sankara are members of LUCHA (Lutte Pour Le Changement), a civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for human dignity and social justice in the DRC. It has played a role in peaceful protests against MONUSCO.

    LUCHA Lutte Pour Le Changement

    What triggered the anti-MONUSCO protests?

    The eastern region of the DRC has faced security issues for over three decades. People are protesting for MONUSCO to leave because its strategy to maintain peace has failed.

    MONUSCO was deployed to restore peace in the DRC by protecting civilians, facilitating safe electoral processes and fighting rebel groups. But it has been in the country for close to 20 years and the opposite has happened: the number of armed groups has risen, people continue to live in unsafe conditions and innocent lives are being lost despite the presence of MONUSCO.

    It was the peacekeeping mission’s job to prevent that happening, but it has not served us diligently and has proven to be useless. Right now, extremely high levels of violence are causing many people to migrate in search of safety. This alone is evidence enough that the peacekeeping mission has failed.

    Many people in local communities do not have a good relationship with MONUSCO because they believe the mission has not taken up its role to protect them. Civilians’ lack of trust, in turn, makes it challenging for MONUSCO to carry out its mandate. But if it was effective, people would not be protesting against it.

    How have the authorities responded to protesters’ demands?

    The immediate response has been violence by both MONUSCO and the Congolese authorities. We have seen people injured and killed just because they were part of the protests. People are angry because security issues have been ongoing for years, and MONUSCO should have seen this coming: it was only a matter of time before people started acting on their anger towards the mission. MONUSCO should have come up with ways to deal with the situation without people having to lose their lives. 

    As for the Congolese authorities, they have arrested people unlawfully. Most people who have been detained are facing terrible conditions in prison and our concern is that they all get justice. We do not want them to be tortured for fighting for their rights.

    The UN Secretary-General has condemned the violence and called for the Congolese government to investigate it. But the demand for MONUSCO’s departure has not been addressed, and protesters say they will not stop demonstrating until MONUSCO leaves.

    Unfortunately, the Congolese authorities have not addressed our concerns either. From our standpoint, they will be the next to be targeted because they have been elected and are paid to protect us. If they cannot live up to their responsibilities, we will hold them accountable. They must join their voice to ours and ask MONUSCO to leave.

    What is civil society in general, and LUCHA in particular, doing to help improve the situation?

    LUCHA is a CSO that advocates for change in a non-violent manner. We have tried to show people it is possible to advocate for change without using violence. Our members have participated in protests against MONUSCO, which we believe are legitimate and constitutional, so we also demand non-violence and respect for the law on the government’s part. Our country has a violent history, and we would like to change that narrative.

    We are an organisation led by young people who have experienced war and conflict and want to see a better society emerge, and a better future for all. We struggle for Congolese people and their right to have access to basic needs, starting with living in a safe environment. We have members on the ground in the areas where the protests are happening, and their role is to monitor the situation and report on the events taking place.

    LUCHA is using our social media accounts to inform people in and outside the DRC about the situation and how it is impacting on so many innocent lives. We hope this will create awareness and push the authorities to address our demands.

    Our monitors on the ground also work to ensure protesters do not employ violence, but this has proven to be a challenge because most people are tired and at this point they are willing to do whatever it takes to get MONUSCO to leave, even if it means using violence.

    What should the international community do to help?

    The international community has been hypocritical and has always prioritised their own needs. It is unfortunate that the recent events are happening in a mineral-rich area of our country. Many powerful people have interests there and are willing to do anything to ensure they are protected. That is why so few countries are speaking up against what is happening.

    Geography also puts us at a disadvantage. Maybe if we were Ukraine our voices would have mattered but we are the DRC, and international players only care about our resources and not our people. But the people who are getting killed in the DRC are human beings who have families and lives and dreams just like the ones being killed in Ukraine.

    The international community must understand that we need peace and security, and that MONUSCO has failed to deliver and needs to leave our country. It must listen to the voice of the people who are sovereign. Listening to the people will be the only way to stop the protests. Trying to stop them any other way will lead to more violence and more deaths.

    Civic space in the DRC is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with LUCHA through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@luchaRDC on Twitter. 

  • DRC: Ongoing restrictions on civic freedoms must be addressed and accountability ensured

    Statement at 48th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

    Item 10: Enhanced Interactive Dialogoue on the High Commissioner's report on the Democratic Republic of Congo

    Delivered by Lisa Majumdar

    Thank you, Madame President, and thank you High Commissioner for your report. We share your concerns on ongoing restrictions on civic freedoms. Journalists and HRDs continue to face threats, harassment, intimidation and arbitrary arrests, while protests have been at times met with disproportionate force.

    In the past few months, under the state of emergency laws in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, three journalists - Joël Musavuli, Héritier Magayane and Barthelemy Kubanabandu Changamuka – were killed, and numerous others have received threats. Actualite.cd journalist Sosthène Kambidi was arrested by military officers last month on accusations of “criminal conspiracy, rebellion and terrorism” for being in possession of a video of the murder of two UN monitors in 2017. Kambidi was involved in a media investigation on the circumstances of those murders.

    Protests are too often met with disproportionate force on the part of security forces. An opposition protest to demand the depoliticization of the national electoral commission in September 2021 was violently repressed by police officers in Kinshasa, who also beat and assaulted journalists who were covering the protest, including RFI correspondent Patient Ligodi.

    Human rights defenders have been subjected to arbitrary detention and judicial harassment for their peaceful activism. LUCHA activists Elisée Lwatumba Kasonia and Eric Muhindo Muvumbu were arrested in April while calling for a strike to protest increasing insecurity. They were charged with “civil disobedience” and “threatening an attack” and released under stringent bail conditions in July. Other LUCHA activists, Parfait Muhani and Ghislain Muhiwa, have been charged with defamation, among other charges, and await trial before the Military Court.

    We call on the Tshisekedi administration to ensure that fundamental freedoms are respected, including by reviewing all restrictive legislation, decriminalising press offences, and as a matter of urgency ensuring the protection of human rights defenders and journalists.

    To ensure sustained improvements, ending impunity for rights violations, including those against civil society, must be a priority. To this end, we call on the Council to maintain critical ongoing efforts towards accountability, including that of the team of international experts on Kasai. We further ask the High Commissioner how members and observers of this Council can best support those on the ground to prevent further civic space violations.

    We thank you.


    Civic space in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is rated as "repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor

  • EAST AFRICA: ‘The pipeline project would open up critical ecosystems to commercial oil exploitation’

    OmarElmawiCIVICUS speaks about the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project and its potential impacts on the climate and on the health and livelihoods of local communities with Omar Elmawi, coordinator of the Stop the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (#StopEACOP).

    #StopEACOP is a global online campaign that seeks to raise awareness of the effects of the project and calls for its cancellation.

    What is EACOP, and what is wrong with it?

    EACOP is a project to extract and transport crude oil from Uganda to Tanzania, led by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and French energy conglomerate TotalEnergies alongside the Uganda National Oil Company and Tanzania Petroleum Development Cooperation.

    If it goes on, EACOP would have disastrous consequences for local communities, for wildlife and for the entire planet. In other words, it will affect humans, nature and climate. It threatens to displace thousands of families and farmers from their land. It poses significant risks to water resources and wetlands in both Uganda and Tanzania – including the Lake Victoria basin, which over 40 million people rely on for drinking water and food production.

    Additionally, EACOP would increase the severity of the global climate emergency by transporting oil that, when burned, will generate over 34 million tonnes of carbon emissions per year. The pipeline would also open up critical ecosystems in the landlocked regions of Central and Eastern Africa to commercial oil exploitation.

    It would also rip through numerous sensitive biodiversity hotspots and risk significantly degrading several nature reserves crucial to the preservation of threatened species, including elephants, lions and chimpanzees.

    How are you mobilising against EACOP?

    Civil society came together under a global campaign that we have called #StopEACOP, aimed at sharing news related to the pipeline project and distributing resources to help people organise and take action against it.

    #StopEACOP is led by an alliance of local groups and communities and African and global civil society organisations (CSOs). Over 260 CSOs have endorsed it and are working towards realising the campaign’s objectives through public mobilisation, legal action, research, shareholder activism and media advocacy.

    Since environmental licences have been awarded for the pipeline and associated oil fields in Kingfisher and Tilenga, several cases have been filed against the EACOP pipeline, including at the East African Court of Justice and in French courts against TotalEnergies, under the duty of vigilance law.

    We hope that our campaign will put enough pressure on the companies and governments involved so that they will put an end to the pipeline project and prioritise the wellbeing of people and the environment.

    How have the governments involved responded to the #StopEACOP campaign?

    The governments of both Tanzania and Uganda are committed to seeing this project through despite the fact that each will receive only 15 per cent of the proceeds from the crude oil going through the pipeline. TotalEnergies and CNOOC hold 70 per cent of the pipeline’s shares, so they will be the ones pocketing 70 per cent of the proceeds from crude oil.

    Additionally, TotalEnergies and CNOOC both get tax benefits, including a waiver on payment of corporate tax for 10 years once the pipeline becomes operational and on the value-added tax on imported products and materials needed for the pipeline. They are required to pay only five per cent in withholding tax instead of the required 15 per cent.

    We haven’t stopped trying to engage the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments, although some of our members, and especially community partners, have been arrested and detained, had their offices raided or been threatened with the deregistration of their organisations. The government has had a part to play in most if not all these challenges, but we have continued to engage and use all legal mechanisms and processes available to make sure our community partners are protected.

    What kind of support do you need from international civil society and the wider international community?

    Allied organisations, activists and regular people are welcome to visit our website and click on our action page, which suggests a variety of actions addressed at the companies involved and governments and their funders and insurers. Please take as many of the actions listed as you can, prioritising those targeting insurance companies and banks. This is key because the EACOP project will need multi-billion-dollar loans to proceed, as well as numerous insurance policies covering every component of the project.

    People can also donate to the cause. All the resources we receive are shared with our community partners and support any security and legal needs that may arise, including legal representation fees.

    You can follow us on our social media pages to get updates on the campaign and subscribe to receive email updates on the progress of the campaign and upcoming actions that you can endorse or take part in.

    Civic space in bothTanzania andUganda is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.
    Get in touch with #StopEACOP through itswebsite or its Facebook and Instagram pages,and follow @stopEACOP on Twitter. 

  • EGYPT: ‘Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families’

    AhmedAttalla

    CIVICUS speaksabout the ongoing repression of dissent in EgyptwithAhmed Attalla, Executive Director of the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR).

    Founded in 2017 and registered in the Czech Republic, EFHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights in Egypt, with a specific focus on criminal justice, through advocacy, research and legal support.

    What are the conditions for civil society in Egypt?

    Civic space in Egypt has remained highly restricted for the past decade, with the authorities consistently targeting civil society activists, journalists, political dissidents and human rights advocates.

    The 2019 NGO law restricts the rights of CSOs. It mandates their registration and enables the government and security forces to interfere in their operations and order the cessation of activities deemed sensitive by the government, such as monitoring human rights conditions and denouncing violations. Organisations registered under this law may also face funding restrictions.

    Some CSOs had to shut down because the authorities targeted them with counter-terrorist measures or prosecuted their directors in Case no. 173 of 2011, commonly known as the ‘Foreign Funding Case’. In some instances, the directors of these organisations were prohibited from leaving the country and their assets were frozen. Some courageous organisations have persisted in their work even in the face of attacks against their directors and staff.

    In September 2021, the government launched the National Human Rights Strategy, a propaganda tool aimed at concealing the human rights crisis ahead of hosting the COP27 climate summit in 2022. As part of this initiative, it took steps to release some political prisoners and engaged in a national dialogue that contained a broader spectrum of political actors, including civil society representatives.

    How has Egyptian civil society organised in the face of repression?

    Civil society has adapted to the ongoing repression in various ways. Many CSOs have decided to limit their public engagement and abstain from taking to the streets or limit their work to the provision of legal aid while refraining from undertaking research and international advocacy, especially with international human rights mechanisms. Other organisations have been forced to relocate their operations abroad to safeguard their staff and ensure the continuity and integrity of their work, which has had the opposite effect of facilitating their advocacy efforts with international mechanisms and among European Union (EU) member states.

    In response to the continuous pressure, many organisations have started collaborating more closely. In 2019, EFHR coauthored a joint report with eight other CSOs for the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and participated in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session in which Egypt’s human rights record was examined. In 2023, we jointly submitted another report for Egypt’s UPR. We have also engaged in joint campaigns and participated in the formation of coalitions aimed at addressing specific challenges. Egyptian CSOs are increasingly recognising the importance of working together to amplify their impact and advocate for change.

    How does EFHR work in such a repressive context?

    When it was founded in 2017, EFHR was officially registered in the Czech Republic with affiliates in Egypt, where our team of researchers and lawyers provides crucial legal support by attending daily court hearings and working directly with victims of prosecution. We have successfully coordinated work between our overseas office and our colleagues based in Egypt. Our work focuses on issues that are ignored by the Egyptian authorities, including issues concerning criminal justice, detention conditions and gender-based violence.

    We take various security measures to protect the identities of our staff. For instance, our research publications don’t include author names or contact details, and we maintain the anonymity of our legal team. These precautions give us some space to work and leverage our findings and expertise with international mechanisms, by engaging with UN Special Rapporteurs and working groups and collaborating with EU diplomats.

    However, we have also faced some challenges. Three of our lawyers have been implicated in state security cases, facing accusations of affiliating with terrorist groups and potentially engaging in the use of force. We have managed to relocate other at-risk colleagues to ensure their safety. The same is happening to other Egyptian human rights organisations, whose members either managed to flee the country or were arrested and remained in prison for least two years.

    How do you support Egyptian activists under threat?

    We provide legal assistance to those who have been arrested or targeted by the authorities and take measures to ensure activists’ digital security and protect their anonymity, enabling them to continue their work. We collaborate with partners and foreign embassies to put pressure on the Egyptian government, but sometimes this doesn’t work.

    Within Egypt, there are a few tools available to protect our colleagues at risk. Even political parties cannot protect their members in Egypt, so they also face regular detentions. Parties often attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to release arrested politicians but after releasing them the government arrests other members of the same organisations.

    Are Egyptian activists safe in exile?

    Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families. For example, the Egyptian-American human rights advocate Mohamed Soltan, who filed a case against former prime minister Hazem el-Beblawi, saw his five family members harassed and arrested as a result of his activism. A German resident, Alaa Eladly, was arrested upon landing in Cairo just because his daughter, Egyptian activist Fagr Eladly, criticised President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi president over human rights abuses at a 2015 press conference between the president and then German chancellor Angela Merkel . The father of Belgium-based journalist and human rights advocate Ahmed Gamal Ziada has recently been detained and accused of misuse of communication, spreading false news and joining a banned group. This strategy aims to silence activists and impose an even higher personal cost for doing their work.

    What can the international community do to support Egyptian civil society?

    To gain a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Egypt it is important to listen to the perspectives of local human rights defenders. Our international allies and partners must exert pressure on the Egyptian government to open civic space, stop targeting journalists, civil society activists and political figures and filing trumped up charges against them, and release all political prisoners detained for defending the fundamental rights to freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression.

    EU member states must revise their terms of cooperation with Egypt to prioritise human rights. For instance, they should include human rights considerations as a conditionality for providing financial aid. It is imperative to strike a balance between the interests of governments and the demands of Egyptian civil society. It is also essential to sustain financial support for Egyptian CSOs, especially now that the economic crisis has also hit civil society.


    Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with EFHR through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@egyptian_front onTwitter.

  • EGYPT: ‘There's been severe deterioration in the rule of law & respect for human rights’

    CIVICUS speaks about recent protests in Egypt and their repression with a woman activist and protester who, for security reasons, asked to remain anonymous. The space for civil society in Egypt is severely restricted: laws limit legitimate civil society activities and detention and intimidation are routinely used to silence human rights defenders and journalists. The protests that took place in September 2019 resulted in mass arrests and the criminalisation of protesters.

    egypt protest 1024x683

    What were the main drivers of the September 2019 protests in Egypt?

    The trigger for the September 2019 protests came in the form of a series of viral videos shared by the Egyptian actor and construction contractor Mohamed Ali, in which he accused the authorities and the armed forces of corruption and the squandering of public funds. While President Abdul Fattah El-Sisi ultimately addressed the videos in some form, more videos by Ali and others  followed; a broader conversation on the role of the military in Egypt’s economy also ensued.

    On 20 September, and partly in response to Ali’s call for demonstrations against Sisi, hundreds took to the streets in the capital, Cairo, and Alexandria, Suez and other cities. As part of this wave of demonstrations, more protests took place on 20, 21 and 27 September. They occurred within a broader context in which many Egyptian citizens were also bearing the brunt of austerity measures and subsidy cuts and were increasingly affected by an escalating crackdown targeting independent, peaceful expression.

    What was the response of the government to the protests?

    Immediately following the protests and for days afterwards, the Egyptian authorities carried out a widespread arrest campaign that not only targeted people who were present at the demonstrations, but also lawyers, political activists and advocates more broadly. Local civil society organisations (CSOs) estimate that at least 3,763 people were arrested. Many of these people were ordered into pretrial detention in cases involving alleged charges of belonging to a terrorist organisation and spreading false news; a number of them remain in detention.

    In the wake of the protests, Netblocks reported restricted use around Facebook Messenger, BBC News and social media CDN (content delivery network) servers. In Cairo, the authorities blocked some roads and temporarily closed some metro stops, particularly those close to Tahrir Square.

    What has been the state of democracy and human rights in Egypt under the current regime?

    Increasingly since 2013, there has been a severe deterioration in the rule of law and respect for human rights in Egypt. Authorities are using the law to consolidate authoritarianism. This is reflected in new legislation that restricts rights and re-writes the relationship between civilians and the state; the prosecution of peaceful advocates using overly broad anti-terrorism legislation; and the introduction of amendments to the constitution allowing executive influence and interference in the functioning of what are meant to be independent state institutions, including the judiciary and the prosecution.

    The use of extended pretrial detention periods as a punitive measure, the sentencing of individuals in mass trials, and a spike in death penalty sentences continue to take place. Detention conditions remain poor; instances of torture and deaths in detention as a result of inadequate access to medical care abound.

    The situation of minorities leaves much to be desired. Though the authorities passed a Church Construction Law in 2016 and built the region’s largest church in the New Administrative Capital, Egypt’s Christian minority population continues to suffer from sectarianism, finds it difficult to access justice amid reconciliation sessions that favour the majority faith, and often faces obstacles in building and licensing churches in the areas in which they actually reside. While the state has made some initial attempt to compensate the ethnic Nubian minority, their constitutionally recognised right to return to their ancestral lands remains unfulfilled.

    Although Egypt is performing better on a number of economic indicators, austerity policies and subsidy cuts have impacted on the economic and social rights of particularly marginalised civilians, affecting key issues such as housing, education, health and work.

    How has the new NGO law impacted on the freedom of association?

    In August 2019, Egypt’s new NGO Law went into effect. However, its implementing regulations have not yet been issued, which is making it difficult to understand the degree to which the law is in force – and if it is not, which law and implementing regulations are – and to assess the implementation of the law and its impact on civil society. According to the law, implementing regulations were required to be issued within six months, but this deadline passed in February 2019. Media reports suggest however that the regulations are now expected to be issued in mid-March 2020.

    Egypt’s 2019 NGO Law does away with penalties involving jail time, as well as the National Agency to Regulate the Work of Foreign NGOs, a security and intelligence-heavy body created by the 2017 NGO Law to approve and monitor foreign funding. However, the law furthers significant restrictions on the activities of CSOs, places bureaucratic constraints on registration and creates expansive oversight and monitoring authority for government actors.

    While it may be early to report on the precise impact of the new law, there is no doubt that its passing has already contributed to some self-censorship, as CSOs have reported being uncertain regarding what legal schemes govern their work and have also raised concern about the law’s broad restrictions. The law was passed in an environment characterised by travel bans, asset freezes and the prosecution and arrest of members of civil society. These trends are only expected to continue. It is important to note that the NGO Law is not the only piece of legislation governing civil society: the media law, the cybercrime law, the counter-terrorism law and the Penal Code are all examples of laws that contain provisions potentially implicating associational activity as well.

    At this point, what can international civil society do to support civil society in Egypt?

    In some cases in the past, the Egyptian authorities have targeted CSOs engaging with international civil society and subjected them to various forms of reprisal. At other times, international connectivity, collaboration and work with networks has been a form of protection for Egyptian civil society. Accordingly, some organisations are able, willing, or well-positioned to engage with international civil society, while others may not be; this often ends up being a very contextualised and determined on a case-by-case basis.

    In cases in which international support can be of benefit to a particular Egyptian CSO, there are a number of clear needs: the creation of long-term and technical training opportunities and resources; systematic network building to expand access to decision-makers; and the provision of in-kind and financial support. Together, this programming has the potential to amplify the voices of, strengthen and provide protection for domestic CSOs that can often be under-resourced, cut off from the international community and subjected to government restriction.

    Civic space in Egypt is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

  • Equatorial Guinea: CIVICUS urges release of activists and respect for human rights

    Spanish 

    Update: Since the issuance of this release, as of 28 April Enrique Asumu has been released from jail. Alfredo Okenve is still in detention.

     Global civil society alliance, CIVICUS, is deeply concerned about the arbitrary detention of civil society activists Enrique Asumu and Alfredo Okenve, and severe restrictions on civic space in Equatorial Guinea. Enrique Asumu and Alfredo Okenve are the President and Vice President of the civil society organisation, the Centre for Development Studies and Initiatives (CEID). 

    The two activists were arrested on 16 April in the capital Malabo following activities commemorating the twentieth anniversary of CEID.  They were interrogated by the Minister of Interior for several hours before being taken to a prison in Malabo where they are detained. 

    “The government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, in power for almost 40 years has created unacceptably stifling conditions for political and civil society participation, which are an anathema in this day and age,” said Mandeep Tiwana, Head of Policy and Research at CIVICUS.

    Several members of CEID are also at risk of arrest following summons from the authorities to explain their participation at CEID’s 20th anniversary celebrations. CEID facilitates civic engagement on human rights, good governance, community and rural development. The organisation also raises awareness about the management and use of natural resources in Equatorial Guinea.

    The arbitrariness of the detention of Enrique Asumu and Alfredo Okenve is symptomatic of the political environment in Equatorial Guinea.  Earlier this year, in February 2017, CIVICUS spoke to Alfredo Okenve about the situation in the country revealing a sorry picture of public protests being violently repressed;   a majority of civil society organisations being heavily influenced by the state; close monitoring of independent civil society by the authorities; restriction of online freedoms through routine blocking of websites and social media; and the labelling of those expressing democratic dissent as ‘enemies of the state’.

    Last year, in March 2016, Equatorial Guinean authorities issued an order to suspend the activities of CEID indefinitely. They accused the organisation of violating the country’s public order law by disseminating messages aimed at inciting youth to violence and civil disobedience during its Youth Forum on tolerance and development on 29 January 2016.   In September 2016, CEID announced that it had resumed operations and has since then organised several events attended by public officials including the Prime Minister. 

    CIVICUS urges the release of the detained activists and respect for internationally guaranteed human rights standards by the government of Equatorial Guinea.

    Equatorial Guinea is rated closed by the CIVICUS Monitor.

    For more information, please contact

    Deborah Walter

    Communication Manager, CIVICUS

     

    Inés M. Pousadela

    Policy and Research Officer, CIVICUS

  • ERITREA: ‘When the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact’

    HelenKidanCIVICUS speaks with about civil society work in Eritrea’s context of closed civic space with Helen Kidan, chairperson of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR).

    Founded in 2003 and based in South Africa, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that raises awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promotes the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.

    What’s the situation for civil society in Eritrea?

    Eritrea has never truly implemented its 1997 Constitution and until Eritrea it is run by the rule of law, human rights abuses will continue with no recourse to justice. This includes completely closed civil society space, with no semblance of rights of association, assembly and expression.

    Since Proclamation No. 145 of 2005 went into effect nearly two decades ago, there has been no independent civil society in Eritrea. According to this law, the only way CSOs can implement programmes is in partnership with government agencies, which restrict the areas, themes and focus of the projects that can be implemented. There are obviously very few CSOs present and active in Eritrea.

    The only way to start creating any space for independent CSOs in Eritrea would be to have Proclamation 145/2005 revoked.

    What is EMDHR doing to try to improve the situation?

    EMDHR advocates against the ongoing human rights abuses in Eritrea as well as for the rights of Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. Our mission is to promote and defend human right values as established in international legal instruments and advance democratic change, rule of law and constitutionalism in Eritrea, with the ultimate aim of building a society in which people exercise their basic rights and live in peace, dignity and prosperity.

    We provide training, sustain networks and produce and disseminate information to create awareness of the situation of Eritreans. We have made several presentations at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in Geneva, and in July 2022 we made a presentation at the UN in New York.

    We are currently working with African CSOs to bring the ongoing crisis in Eritrea to the African level and get support for Eritrean refugees. We have also commissioned a report on the state of Eritrean CSOs that makes recommendations to the international community.

    In early September 2023 we co-organised the Africa Civil Society Organisations Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Through a joint project with Africa Monitors, Eritrean Satellite Television and Eritrean Diaspora for East Africa, a CSO based in Kenya, we have provided training to Eritrean human rights activists, including on digital activism, and created a space for Eritrean CSOs and activists to be able to work together.

    In 2019 we provided in-person training in a workshop held in Uganda. In 2017 we co-organised a conference in Brussels on the ongoing Eritrean refugee crisis, with which we tried to elicit a reaction from members of the European Parliament, commissioners and CSOs from across Europe. And in 2015 we campaigned and got asylum for Eritrean footballers in Botswana.

    What’s it like to be a diaspora activist? How do you connect with activists within Eritrea?

    It’s extremely frustrating because it makes our work less effective. Connecting with people inside Eritrea is very hard as internet penetration in Eritrea is only two per cent. The government basically controls all media: all independent media ceased to exist in 2001. This is why most information is brought to us by people who have recently left the country. But while the work is challenging, it is still possible to get information. And when the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact.

    A lot of funders provide funds to African organisations only when they operate in their home country. The fact that we are not able to operate inside Eritrea means we also suffer financially and hence a lot of Eritrean CSOs are forced to sustain themselves on the basis of voluntary work.

    Additionally, the work remains emotionally and psychologically draining, as many Eritrean activists in the diaspora are threatened with harm to family members still living in Eritrea for speaking out against the regime back home.

    As Eritrean human rights defenders, even if you are operating outside the country, the government will always discredit your work. All those that don’t agree with them are seen as traitors. The government uses social media as a means of trolling and tries to attack websites and other social media channels.

    What sparked recent protests by Eritrean refugees in Israel, and how has the Israeli government responded?

    Those protests appeared to have been organised by a new group called Brigade N’Hamedu, which is trying to overthrow the regime. Their members hold demonstrations across the world, and they particularly attack the festivals that the regime holds abroad, which they view as a means of raising funds for the regime and spreading its propaganda. They are tired of government interference and intimidate Eritreans who have left their country but still support the Eritrean government. They want all Eritreans who claim asylum but express support for the Eritrean government to have their asylum revoked.

    This is a movement of young Eritreans but a lot of veterans and older members of the community support them, as they see them as the most plausible means of removing the regime. Although they have succeeded in mobilising Eritreans, however, there seems to be no clear strategy and this could be a stumbling block. They are very unlikely to succeed.

    In response to these protests, and using their unprecedented violence as an excuse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he wants all Eritreans removed from Israel. The predicament of Eritreans in Israel was already dire, but this has now opened the doors for the far-right government in Israel to deport all Eritreans. However, the UN, Israeli human rights groups and other human rights groups outside Israel are asking that genuine refugees whose lives are at risk not be deported to Eritrea.


    Civic space in Eritrea is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

    Get in touch with EMDHR through itswebsite or Facebook page,and follow @emdhrorg on Twitter.

  • Eritrea: a real challenge to the UN system and the international community

    Statement at the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council 

    Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on human rights situation in Eritrea

    Delivered by Sibahle Zuma


    Thank you, Mr President,

    Despite being elected to the UN Human Rights Council for the period 2022-2024, Eritrea poses a real challenge to the UN system and the international community. Its continued failure to fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteur’s mandate and implement the recommendations of human rights bodies calls the credibility and integrity of the entire UN human rights system into question.

    We remain deeply concerned by reports of unlawful and arbitrary killings, forced disappearances, torture and arbitrary detentions perpetrated by the Eritrean government, indefinite military service, lack of freedom of expression, opinion, association, religious belief, and movement. 

    Over 20 journalists and politicians remain in detention since their arrests more than 20 years ago, they are the longest detained persons in the world. Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigrayan conflict significantly resulted in abhorrent human rights abuses which included the recruitment of child soldiers and the kidnapping and forced conscription of Eritreans to fight in the conflict.

    We call on the Eritrean government to release all detained journalists, civil society activists and illegally detained Eritreans from prison.

    Special Rapporteur, what should the Council do to ensure steps are taken towards meeting the five benchmarks for progress recently enshrined in the Human Rights Council’s resolution 50/2? 

    We thank you.


    Civic space in Eritrea is rated as "Closed" by the CIVICUS Monitor

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2092
Tél: +27 (0)11 833 5959
Fax: +27 (0)11 833 7997

Bureau pour l’onu: New-York
CIVICUS, c/o We Work
450 Lexington Ave
New-York
NY 10017
Etats-Unis

Bureau pour l’onu : Geneve
11 Avenue de la Paix
Genève
Suisse
CH-1202
Tél: +41.79.910.34.28