democracy
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Are women the last line of defence against Brazil’s authoritarian shift?
By Ana Cernov, human rights activist and Inés Pousadela, Senior Research Specialist at CIVICUS
In a matter of days, 2.5 million Brazilian women had gathered on Facebook to discuss how to best present their case against Bolsonaro and how to take their action offline and organise themselves locally.
Read on: Open Democracy
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ARGENTINA: ‘Citizens must be able to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them’
CIVICUS speaks with Mariela Belski, Executive Director of Amnesty International Argentina, about the potential human rights effects of changes introduced by Argentina’snew government led by President Javier Milei.
Founded in 1961, Amnesty International is the world’s largest international human rights organisation.
What are the main measures taken by Javier Milei’s government, and what are the problems with them?
As soon as he took office, President Milei issued a decree of necessity and urgency (DNU) to legislate on a large number of issues that will affect people’s lives. Although the National Constitution establishes that the president can only issue decrees when exceptional circumstances prevent the government following ordinary legislative procedures, decrees have been used often for decades. What’s new in this case is the number and magnitude of the changes included in the DNU, in sharp contrast with the executive’s argument that this is an emergency.
In addition, the government sent to Congress an ‘omnibus law‘ that covers numerous issues not included in the DNU, such as tax reforms. Although it is also justified with arguments related to the context of emergency and economic instability, the bill pushes forward on issues that far exceed the emergency.
Many changes included in the DNU and the omnibus law raise concerns about their impact on rights in areas such as employment, health, housing and freedoms of assembly and expression. Contrary to international rights standards, through deregulation and the withdrawal of the state, both pieces of legislation will have a negative impact on people’s ability to exercise their rights.
For instance, medical insurance companies will be able to increase their fees as they like, and are already doing so. If they receive complaints about their service, the state will not impose sanctions. Drug prices will also be deregulated.
In the area of labour, a series of regressive measures is being introduced regarding severance pay, overtime pay and the extension of probationary periods, among other things. The injunctions that courts have already granted to stop the implementation of these changes have only benefited some specific employment sectors.
On housing, the DNU repeals the rent law and leaves contractual terms, amounts and the currency rent is paid in up to negotiation between landlords and tenants, allowing the landlord to impose whatever conditions they wish.
According to the omnibus law, the updating of pensions will no longer be governed by a formula set by law, but left to the discretion of the executive branch.
The bill also conceives of protest as a crime rather than a right to participation and expression of dissent. It establishes, for instance, notification requirements for any public meeting or demonstration involving three or more people. Although statements have been made that this measure would be reversed, this has not yet happened. In addition, the bill establishes the role of the ‘organiser’ to allow for the identification and eventual sanctioning of protest leaders.
In the area of security, the bill expands the circumstances in which a police officer can be considered as acting in self-defence, weakening standards of police accountability designed to prevent abuses. Given Argentina’s high rates of police brutality, this goes in the opposite direction to what’s needed.
The environment will also be affected by the DNU, which amends the forestry law to further enable deforestation, the glaciers law to permit more mining and the fires law to allow more burning. These provisions put natural resources at risk and could aggravate the climate crisis in Argentina.
In terms of gender policies, both the bill and the DNU remove any reference to diversity and gender. In particular, the omnibus law introduces changes to what’s known as the ‘1,000 days law‘, approved alongside the law on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to support those who decide to carry a pregnancy to term.
The instrumentalisation of the economic emergency to subjugate the autonomy of women, who are viewed exclusively as mothers, and the incorporation of figures such as that of the ‘unborn child’ reveal an attempt to bring about a strong regression on sexual and reproductive rights. In a country where every year more than 300 women are murdered, the real emergency should be to design effective policies against gender-based violence.
How does the new ‘anti-picket’ protocol affect freedom of expression and the right to protest?
Amnesty International believes that guidelines for police and state action set out in the Protocol for the maintenance of public order in the face of roadblocks violate freedoms of assembly, association and expression. The powers vested in police and security agents to intervene aren’t aligned with international standards on the use of force and risk escalating violence and social conflict, endangering people’s lives and physical integrity.
The protocol must reconcile the objectives of preserving ‘public order’ and ‘freedom of movement’ with the state’s obligations to respect and protect the physical integrity of individuals and the right to freedoms of assembly and expression, which are protected by the National Constitution and international human rights instruments. Both the protocol and the omnibus law seek to criminalise protesters and impose sanctions, including financial sanctions, that in practice could lead to the disappearance of collectives and organisations.
Argentina’s regulatory system doesn’t establish an order of priority between rights: neither free transit nor the right to protest take precedence over the other. The banning of demonstrations because of the possible disruption of free movement contradicts domestic norms.
The Argentine state must comply with its international human rights obligations, particularly regarding the right to protest, freedoms of assembly, association and expression and the use of force by its police and security agents.
Do you view these measures, and the way they are being taken, as a danger to democracy?
Amnesty International is concerned that a bill that will impact on numerous key aspects of people’s lives is being pushed through against the clock and during extraordinary congressional sessions.
In just three weeks the executive has proposed, through the DNU and the omnibus law, massive changes in legislation and regulations that were part of a consensus built over the past 40 years. The essence of democracy lies in citizens’ ability to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them. The extremely fast-paced discussion of these policies raises serious doubts about the integrity of the deliberative process.
Argentina’s context of economic and social crisis does call for profound reforms. Poverty over 40 per cent and exorbitant inflation rates demand a change of course. Reforms, however, must be carried out within the existing institutional and constitutional framework.
The omnibus law seeks a delegation of powers to the executive on a scale never seen before, in all spheres. Further, it establishes that the regulations issued in the exercise of this delegation will be permanent, except when the nature of the measure determines its transitory character and this is expressly stated.
Congress should carry out this process in an appropriate manner, following the principles set out in our constitution. Decisions that so significantly affect people’s lives should not be made in haste, but through public debate and following established procedures.
What initiatives is Amnesty International developing on these issues?
Regarding the protocol for the maintenance of public order we have presented an analysis with input and comments based on national and international standards. Our aim is to contribute to developing public policies that respect people’s rights.
Regarding the DNU and the omnibus law, we are organising meetings with officials and colleagues from various areas to jointly analyse the legislation and evaluate next steps.
Finally, we are preparing a document analysing the first 100 days of Milei’s government from a human rights perspective. In the same vein, we will be monitoring Congress closely.
Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Amnesty International Argentina through itswebsite or itsFacebook, Instagram, TikTok orTwitter accounts, and contact Mariela Belski through herInstagram orLinkedIn accounts.
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ARGENTINA: ‘Milei’s victory expresses the rejection of the previous governments’
CIVICUS speaks with Yanina Welp, researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, about the results of Argentina’s runoff presidential election, won by a far-right outsider.
How do you explain the victory of Javier Milei, an outsider with no party structure?
Milei’s victory, like that of any other candidate, cannot be explained by a single reason. There are at least three main explanations for his victory.
First, there’s the economic situation. On top of a high level of poverty – 40 per cent and growing – Argentina has very high inflation, and the economy hasn’t grown for many years. And the same goes for formal employment. There are a lot of informal workers and many people experience high levels of uncertainty.
Second is the inability of the political class to respond to these demands. Most recently, those in power have acted arrogantly. Insecurity, corruption scandals and the passivity of the authorities in the face of all these have increased. Milei’s leadership came to embody people’s rejection of the situation. Many people voted for him because he expresses well the rejection of recent administrations, and not necessarily because they approve of or adhere to the policies he has proposed to implement.
Third, there’s the role of political leadership, and specifically of the incumbent, for doing nothing in the face of this threat and even encouraging Milei’s candidacy with the aim of dividing the opposition’s vote and therefore having a better chance at winning. This was done first by Peronists, in the run-up to the first round, and by former president Mauricio Macri ahead of the runoff, which put his Together for Change coalition in crisis.
Do you think the electorate has leaned to the right?
Unlike almost all the other candidates, who only had vague and general proposals, Milei ran on a strongly ideological platform, which he kept putting forward throughout the campaign.
However, when analysing people’s attitudes, there are contradictions, first and foremost because there is no universal notion of what is supposed to be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. For instance, polls show growing concern about rising insecurity, and it would be very elitist to think that having this concern makes you right-wing. The rise in crime shows that it is a real concern.
It is true that in this election campaign positive perceptions of the private sector have increased compared to perceptions of the public administration, possibly as a result of Milei’s discourse but also because the image of the state has deteriorated considerably under recent administrations. In this sense, it could be said that voters have indeed moved towards the right. But Milei’s victory with almost 56 per cent of the vote shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that more than half of the electorate have ideologically leaned rightwards, or even embraced the radical right, because many voted for him because he embodies the reaction to the status quo rather than because of his ideological proposals.
During the campaign it was argued that democracy was at stake. Is Argentina’s democracy in danger?
Democracy is not in imminent danger, as was the case with military coups, which wiped democracy away overnight. There are signs of democratic erosion – but these have been there for years. There has been both progress and setbacks, including attempts to co-opt the judiciary, the misuse of state resources and clientelistic practices.
Generally speaking, Argentina’s democratic institutions work. Despite the opposition’s complaints about the electoral system, the elections took place normally and the results were out very quickly.
However, we have seen a huge setback in terms of public debate. Intolerance and verbal violence have increased. Supporters of different parties can hardly talk to each other. There is a lot of aggression on social media. These are all medium-intensity warning signs that, if not addressed, will only pave the way for more violence and authoritarianism.
How will Argentina’s political scene change following this election?
Since 2003, with Néstor Kirchner’s election to the presidency, a system of two broad coalitions formed, which since 2007, under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has been maintained by the introduction of open, simultaneous and compulsory primary elections. These served to avoid party fragmentation but had the negative effect of eroding programmatic or ideological differences. The two coalitions that formed as a result included their own right and left wings, blurring the ideological debate and replacing it with a divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This ended up encouraging affective polarisation with very watertight alignments where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground.
The fact that the presidential elections were won by a party that until a couple of years ago did not exist will force the two big coalitions of recent decades, the Peronist ruling party and the opposition Together for Change, to profoundly reconfigure themselves.
Within Peronism, former president and current vice-president Cristina Kirchner was the big loser of this election. In recent times she has been absent from the political scene, leaving Peronism without clear leadership. Peronism has strong roots in trade unions and social organisations that are highly dependent on the state. These organisations have incentives to negotiate, should the new government open up that space. However, Milei’s initial discourse has pointed in a completely different direction, insisting that he will take shock measures.
What are the main challenges the new government will face?
The new government should tackle three major challenges. The first is to stabilise the economy by stopping inflation and putting the exchange rate in order. The second is to introduce reforms to increase productivity and solve the crisis in formal employment. And the third is governance. Argentina has very strong social organisations, which has both positive and negative aspects, but in any case, it is a strongly organised society that is very predisposed to conflict.
These three challenges must be tackled in a coordinated and consistent way, which is quite difficult.
Do you think Milei’s government will be able to tackle them?
I have serious doubts that the new government will be able to meet these challenges, not only in the area of stabilisation and structural reforms, but also and above all in the area of governance. Many of the proposed measures, such as adopting the US dollar as the currency, could be found unconstitutional. Other measures require legislative majorities that the new government won’t have. Its only prospect of obtaining substantial legislative support was through Together for Change, but the division of the opposition coalition leaves Milei without even a congressional quorum.
Milei has not one provincial governorship and almost no mayorships. However, Argentina’s sub-national powerholders have always been accommodating and pragmatic. Still, some key measures would go directly against the interests of the provinces, such as the elimination of co-participation, the system through which the federal state distributes public resources from national taxes to the provinces. And then there is the potential confrontation with the province of Buenos Aires.
Milei could try to rule by decree, but this would cause an instant crisis, and in case of an impeachment trial the vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, would take over. This would not ensure any positive change but would rather imply some additional negative elements.
Milei was elected with a very large majority, so he has great popular legitimacy. But this majority could be inflated, as is often the case in runoffs, and is compounded by the volatility and impatience of a large part of Argentina’s electorate. If he succeeds in implementing his ultra-liberal programme, a global rarity, the social costs will be extremely high. And if he fails to do so, people’s disenchantment with politics could increase and their support for democracy could be called into question.
Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Yanina Welp via herwebsite and follow@Welpita on Twitter.
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ASEAN: ‘There is a lack of a consistent approach and political will to address the Myanmar crisis’
CIVICUS speaks with Mary Aileen Diez-Bacalso, a globally recognised human rights advocate and the new Executive Director of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), on the state of civic space in the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the regional body’s response to the human rights situation in Myanmar.
In March 2023, Myanmar’s civic space was downgraded by theCIVICUS Monitor to the worst category, closed, in response to developments including the detention of thousands of activists and protesters, many of them convicted by secret military tribunals in unfair trials and given harsh sentences including thedeath penalty. Some have been tortured or killed. The ruling military junta has also systematically targeted journalists andforced civil society organisations (CSOs) to shut down and their leaders to go into hiding or flee the country. The junta has committed war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, including unlawful attacks, killing and injuring civilians through the use of extrajudicial executions, artillery shelling and banned landmines and cluster munitions.
What is the state of civic freedoms in ASEAN member states?
In recent years, there has been a discernible trend in ASEAN toward democratic regression and shrinking civic space.
In Cambodia, as an election draws near, there is an ongoing assault on civic space and an increasingly violent campaign of repression and harassment against union activists, environmental campaigners, opposition politicians and media workers.
In Myanmar, the path toward democracy, which began in 2011, was dismantled and civic space has closed. The junta’s nationwide crackdown has spread beyond cities into rural and ethnic minority areas, where resistance has grown. There is a climate of fear and insecurity, characterised by extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence and other atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity. But ASEAN leaders have been unable to respond uniformly, and the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) they reached in April 2021 has miserably failed to address Myanmar’s crisis.
In Singapore, civil liberties are curbed through the prosecution of journalists, protesters and harassment of activists. Civil space has been further limited by repressive laws such as the 2019 Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act and the 2021 Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, which include vague provisions that allow for executive discretion in interpretation and implementation.
Overall, civic space in ASEAN countries has deteriorated. But in the midst of this darkness, the results of recent elections have cast a ray of hope that could have an impact at the regional level. Election results in Malaysia in November 2022 and Thailand in May 2023 have brought hope and a breath of fresh air after years of regression of fundamental freedoms. ASEAN’s youngest member state, Timor-Leste, is unique in that it has committed to consolidating democracy and held a free, fair and transparent election on 21 May 2023, allowing voters to cast their ballots peacefully, thus making their voices heard.
As the current ASEAN chair, has Indonesia made any efforts to engage with civil society and protect human rights?
Indonesia became ASEAN chair amid a lot of expectations regarding its potentials to address the Myanmar crisis, following the lack of progress under its two predecessors, Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia – and possibly on the assumption that no further progress will happen under its successor, Laos.
Led by Indonesia, ASEAN managed to adopt several Leaders’ Declarations related to human rights, including one on combating trafficking in persons caused by the abuse of technology and one on the protection of migrant workers and family members in crisis situations, adopted at the 42nd ASEAN Summit in May 2023. These represented a crucial step toward protecting rights. However, questions of implementation and domestication have long plagued the ASEAN region.
Progress made at the regional level is not necessarily reflected by domestic developments. For example, ahead of the 2023 ASEAN summit, held in Labuhan Bajo, the Indonesian police summoned two residents, Viktor Frumentius and Dominikus Safio, over a planned protest regarding compensation for houses and land clearing for a road project. The criminalisation attempt happened a few days after the police issued a warning letter for local people not to conduct actions that could ‘create incitement’ during the summit. This incident came on top of ongoing attacks on civil liberties in Indonesia.
Regarding engagement with civil society, unfortunately the Indonesian government failed to respond to civil society’s request to conduct an interface meeting during the summit. Taken together, this and the attempted criminalisation of protesters reveal the government’s exclusionary approach to critical voices.
Did the summit’s outcomes include any commitment on human rights?
The summit’s outcome document highlighted the commitment to strengthen efforts to combat human trafficking and protect migrant workers. Human trafficking is indeed a serious and systemic violation of human rights in Southeast Asia, with the pandemic exacerbating the already precarious situation of marginalised people who might end up in hands of human traffickers.
Regarding Myanmar, however, disappointment continues. On 11 May, despite expressing concerns over the continuing violence in Myanmar, specifically in light of the recent attack against a convoy carrying ASEAN diplomats in Myanmar on the eve of the summit, Indonesia released a statement that said that ‘the 5PC remains our main reference’. It basically ignored the calls from civil society groups and the wider international community to move beyond the 5PC.
Unfortunately the issue of shrinking civic space was not discussed at the summit, which reveals continued neglect by ASEAN member states and a lack of consensus about the importance of the fact that civic space is deteriorating across the region.
Has there been progress in strengthening the role of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)?
Since its inception, the AICHR has been criticised as nothing more than a front for ASEAN member states to comply with their duty to put human rights on the regional agenda. It is not surprising that ASEAN finds it difficult to promote human rights at the regional level, given that its membership includes several authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies.
Civil society groups have done what we could to strengthen the AICHR, leading to incremental progress in its institutional strength and its relations with civil society. In 2019, FORUM-ASIA and its partners called for a review of the AICHR’s Terms of Reference to make it more independent and give it a protection mandate, among other things. ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to this, but the process hasn’t kicked off. Still, other positive changes happened, such as the inclusion of civil society in various AICHR activities and growing opportunities for the AICHR to meet with civil society in a variety of settings.
For example, recently and for the first time ever, FORUM-ASIA and other CSOs with AICHR consultative status were invited to meet with AICHR representatives at the 37th AICHR Meeting. The question remains whether this practice can be sustained and institutionalised. The AICHR has also recently demonstrated increased engagement with national human rights institutions, its natural national partners. This also needs to be maintained and strengthened.
Additionally, the current AICHR mechanism for handling human rights complaints needs to be assessed for it to become more transparent and responsive to rapidly deteriorating civic space conditions. But because the issue of shrinking civic space has not been met with consensus among AICHR member states, progress has been minimal. However, FORUM-ASIA keeps engaging with the AICHR in the knowledge that it will take years of effort to build a mechanism that lives up to our aspiration of holding states accountable for human rights violations. We are willing to engage in discussions with the AICHR about how to strengthen its complaint mechanism to contribute to enforcing states’ human rights obligations at the national level.
Why hasn’t there been any progress in implementing the 5PC to address the situation in Myanmar?
The 5PC has failed due to the fact that ASEAN has engaged with the military junta – the perpetrator of grave human rights violations with no commitment whatsoever to human rights – rather than with the legitimate representatives of Myanmar’s people, the civilian National Unity Government (NUG).
As of today, the junta has not only failed to implement any of the plan’s provisions but has also increased its brutality against the civilian population. The deadly airstrike conducted in April was a glaring manifestation of the junta’s refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue and cooperation.
Another issue is ASEAN members’ lack of a consistent approach and political will to address the Myanmar crisis. Only a few ASEAN countries openly condemned the junta’s human rights violations, while others, such as Cambodia, the ASEAN chair in 2022, even met with the junta chief and allowed the international community to interpret this approach to the crisis as recognition of the military regime.
Finally, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference has been a major obstacle to effectively addressing the Myanmar crisis. ASEAN has moved away from this principle by becoming more assertive in certain cases, such as on economic and humanitarian cooperation, but this has not been mainstreamed.
How has civil society responded to ASEAN’s failure to address the situation in Myanmar?
Despite numerous challenges, civil society has remained active. It is working to ensure that Myanmar does not fall off the radar or is forgotten as a result of conflicts and emergencies erupting in other parts of the world.
Along with reputable Myanmar CSOs and other regional and international organisations, FORUM-ASIA recently released a position paper calling for a review and reframing of the 5PC. This paper provides five counterpoints of action that ASEAN leaders must immediately take to prove the bloc’s commitment and capability to resolve the Myanmar crisis effectively.
The first point calls for the immediate adoption of an action plan for civilian protection and cessation of violence. The second emphasises the need to convene inclusive and meaningful consultations with legitimate Myanmar stakeholders, including the NUG, its advisory body the National Unity Consultative Council, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – a group of ousted parliamentarians – and ethnic resistance organisations. The third stresses the need to amend the mandate of the ASEAN Special Envoy’s term to three years with authority, independence and resources to take effective action. The fourth calls for the provision of direct support to frontline humanitarian responders in Myanmar and along ethnic borderlands, including Myanmar’s western borders. And the fifth point calls on the Special Envoy to immediately open formal communications and engage with civil society and other key stakeholders from Myanmar’s Spring Revolution.
What should the international community do to push ASEAN to protect human rights and address the situation in Myanmar?
International civil society and the international community must push ASEAN to immediately move away from the 5PC and embrace more robust and tangible actions to stop the military junta’s violence and atrocity crimes. They must refrain from legitimising the junta and must recognise the NUG as the democratically elected government and enter into dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, cut bilateral ties, including economic ties, and impose a full arms embargo on the Myanmar armed forces, and call for suspension of the export and transport of aviation fuel to Myanmar.
They should also work closely with the United Nations, particularly the Security Council and Secretary-General, to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. They should set up a clear mandate for the Special Envoy, grounded in human rights principles, justice and accountability. The role must be full-time, lasting more than a year, and the appointed Special Envoy must engage with all relevant stakeholders, not just the military junta.
Civic space inMyanmaris rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with FORUM-ASIA through itswebpage or itsFacebook page, and follow@forum_asia on Twitter.
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Backsliding on civic space in democracies
By Mandeep Tiwana
It’s no secret that democracy is facing a global stress test. Divisive politicians are creating a chasm between the majoritarian impulses of electoral democracy and the inclusive strands of constitutional democracy. The former emphasises a simplistic ‘winner takes all’ mentality to advance partisan political agendas while the latter accommodates dissent and minority voices through checks and balances. Notably, civil society activists and organisations speaking truth to power and seeking inclusion in decision making are facing severe hurdles as civic space appears to be backsliding in several democratic countries.
Read on: Open Democracy
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BAHRAIN: ‘The government uses public relations to mask human rights violations’
CIVICUS speaks withDrewery Dyke of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR) about closed civic and democratic space in Bahrain as the state prepares to host the Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU Assembly takes place in the capital, Manama,from 11 to 15 March 2023.
Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, and also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.
We last spoke on the eve of the parliamentary election held in November 2022. How has civic space in Bahrain evolved since?
The government of Bahrain held the November 2022 parliamentary election under the same, highly restrictive, 2018 Political Rights Law used in the 2018 elections. It banned scores of people from being able to vote or stand for election on spurious grounds such as affiliation to a banned political party or having a criminal record.
Bahrain’s international partners, United Nations (UN) human rights bodies and civil society all decried the banning of political parties, as it flew in the face of international standards and simply deprived many people of having a voice. The court cases, too, dating from the 2011 unrest, were grossly unfair. In November 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee denounced both the Political Isolation Law and the Law on Associations
And yet there seems to be a small opening for civil society and greater freedoms. The regional mood music appears to be changing, with the governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates normalising relations with Qatar, and the Bahraini government having set out a 2022-2026 National Human Rights Plan.
Bahrain’s government appears to have signalled that it is minded to undertake some reform but civil society remains highly sceptical. Many of us are concerned that the government is once again using public relations initiatives to project an image of the country that masks longstanding, unresolved human rights violations for which there has been no accountability.
Is change possible? Yes, to some degree, it appears so. But civil society needs to remain vigilant and sceptical. Action will speak louder than words. An amendment of existing laws on political and civil society organisations is now a must.
How does Salam DHR manage to work in such a restrictive environment?
Current legislation makes it impossible for our organisation to register and openly carry out any research or advocacy in Bahrain. That has been the case since 2013. And yet at least one woman human rights defender who is linked to Salam DHR and other human rights CSOs has remained active inside Bahrain. She walks a tightrope on a daily basis, taking action to support individuals, notably prisoners of conscience. Lawyers, political and civil society activists and others from all walks of life continue to contact us but we cannot discuss their identities to protect their safety. It is a challenge.
In November 2022, however, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights obtained accreditation to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, which means it can now formally participate in UN meetings and events. This important step could help prise open the space for civil society just that little bit more. We will see.
Why do you think the Bahraini government offered to host the IPU Assembly?
The Bahraini government invited the IPU to hold its 146th Assembly in order to project an image of a democratic country and boost its international standing. The IPU’s catchphrase on its website is ‘For democracy. For everyone’. The government seeks to own this message in a situation where democracy does not exist.
The theme of the 146th Assembly is ‘Promoting peaceful coexistence and inclusive societies: Fighting intolerance’. Yet by limiting freedoms of association and assembly and the right to peaceful religious expression, Bahrain’s government promotes exclusion and intolerance.
Possibly to foster its mission, the IPU accepted the Bahraini government’s offer to hold its meeting in Manama. Is that problematic? In some ways, yes. But it is upon us to promote – peacefully – democratic change that advances adherence to international human rights standards. And parliamentarians from around the world attending the IPU Assembly could help chip away at deeply rooted discrimination and the fact that so many in civil society are deprived of having a voice or are afraid to use it.
Links between Bahraini parliamentarians and civil society are uneven. Some have few if any links while others have better connections and communication with their electorate, including civil society. Some seek to hold government action to account, albeit timidly.
The IPU Assembly may be an opportunity for Bahraini members of parliament to learn how their counterparts in other parts of the world engage with their electors and effectively represent their concerns. Parliamentarians are a building block of a free civil society. We need them to step up during the Assembly to make that a reality in Bahrain.
How could this whitewashing attempt become an advocacy opportunity?
The IPU Assembly will be a pivotal opportunity for advocacy. Visiting parliamentarians must make it so. They must reject baseless hype and propaganda depicting Bahrain as a land of freedom and democracy.
In a recently published brief, Salam DHR is urging attending parliamentarians to join with other parliamentarians from across the globe to call on the government of Bahrain to rescind all provisions that restrict parliamentary life and freedom of expression and association of Bahraini members of parliament. We want them to call for the government to resolve two outstanding cases the IPU’s Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarianshas lodged with the government of Bahrain, and examine the cases of 15 former parliamentarians targeted with arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trial and imprisonment and arbitrary stripping of citizenship. We’re also asking parliamentarians to urge the government to implement all recommendations arising from human rights treaty obligations and as many as possible of those made by UN Special Procedures and arising from Bahrain’s 2022 UN Universal Periodic Review.
We urge visiting parliamentarians to inform themselves of other widely shared human rights concerns in relation to Bahrain, including the denial of political rights and women’s rights, the use of the death penalty and the tactic of revoking citizenship as punishment, and to meet with human rights activists and others in civil society while in Bahrain.
How can the international community better support Bahraini civil society and activism for democracy?
Civil society in and engaged with Bahrain needs the international community to listen and speak with us, to hear our experiences and work with us. There is a narrative and experience that differs from the public relations whitewashing by the government.
We are saying that there are longstanding problems that need to be addressed, in terms of law, practice and accountability. But we are also saying that we believe that Bahrain’s international partners – from varying states, including European Union member states, the UK and USA, and the UN and its human rights bodies – and now parliamentarians can all work together, in unison, to erode the climate of repression that denies respect for human dignity, in order to empower Bahraini civil society and gradually build a more open and rights-respecting country.
Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Salam DHR through itswebsite and follow @SALAM_DHR and@drewerydyke on Twitter.
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BAHRAIN: ‘This election is make-believe: its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy’
CIVICUS speaks about the election being held today in Bahrain withJawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).
Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) founded in 2012 to undertake research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.
Jawad Fairooz is a former Bahraini parliamentarian. In the 2010 election his political group, al-Wefaq, won 18 out of 40 seats, becoming the largest group in the Council of Representatives. They all resigned in repudiation of the repression of protests in 2011, and Jawad and another parliamentarian were arrested, tortured and ill-treated in detention. In November 2012, while he was visiting the UK, the government withdrew his citizenship, making him stateless. He became a campaigner against statelessness and for the rights of the stateless and founded Salam DHR in 2013.
What is the significance of today’s election?
Elections matter, or at least they should. In Bahrain, elections for municipal councils and the 40-seat parliament, the Council of Representatives, are held every four years, with possible runoffs where no candidate obtains a majority.
Between 2002 and 2010, these elections were carried out in a context where civil society had become relatively more vibrant. They continued – even if only just – to carry the promise that parliament would take an increasingly larger and more responsible role in deepening democracy and freedoms and ensuring the continuing existence of civil society.
Far more than now, they showed elections are a pivotal moment for social and political renewal – for those who will shape society to engage with civil society and to accommodate differing social and political views. Elections can create a sense of shared ownership, and in a context of tolerance and acceptance they can foster a vibrant and responsible civil society. They can help build a culture of human rights.
But that is not the case with today’s election.
This one reflects an ever-shrinking civic space. Parliamentarians’ institutional power has weakened, as they too operate under limited civic space. The government is inclined to seek less qualified parliamentarians whose conduct it will be able to control. To further weaken and subordinate parliament to the government’s will, the King recently issued a decree giving more power to parliament’s chair, a government loyalist, to determine the body’s workings. This will further extend government writ and further chill civic space.
This election, like those of 2014 and 2018, is controlled or stage managed in a way that makes it clear that its only role is to provide a veneer of democracy. It’s make-believe.
But let’s be clear: it is also an opportunity for us to get back to work on our own renewal, to locate openings and fissures and pry them open, and to chip away at walls enclosing us, in Bahrain, in the Gulf and across the region. An opportunity to look forward.
Flaws notwithstanding, we need to engage with the new parliamentarians. Will the government let them engage with independent civil society? It looks unlikely, but we will try, both through bilateral parliamentary visits and in the context of the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s General Assembly, which will be held in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023. We need to start organising now so that global parliamentarians can help carry our voices and those of international civil society to the heart of Manama.
We also need to plant the seeds for civil society activism around COP28, which will take place a year from now in neighbouring United Arab Emirates, where civic space is non-existent. We just can’t stop now, however bleak the situation of Bahrain or the Gulf may seem. This cycle of unfair elections is done, but our task to continue to look for avenues of engagement and activism continues apace. We are looking forward.
Have further restrictions been imposed on civic space in the run-up to the election?
Not really, as most of the damage was already done.
In December 2014, the authorities imprisoned Ali Salman, the leader of al-Wefaq, the largest political association. He was arrested for protesting against the parliamentary elections, which al-Wefaq boycotted because promised reforms had not been implemented. In 2015 he was sentenced to four years in prison on charges such as inciting hatred, disturbing the peace and insulting public institutions, but he was acquitted of the most serious charge, of inciting political change, which could carry a life sentence.
He appealed, but so did the prosecutor, who demanded a stricter sentence, and in 2016 his prison sentence was increased to nine years. Further charges were subsequently added and in 2017 he was accused and tried for the crime of ‘spying for Qatar’. For having tried to mediate in Bahrain’s conflict with Qatar, the authorities handed him a life sentence.
In July 2016, a court in Bahrain dissolved and banned Al-Wefaq after accusing it of fostering violence and ‘terrorism’. In May 2017, the main non-sectarian political association, Wa’d, was shut down as well, also under accusations of advocating violence, supporting terrorism and inciting crimes.
In advance of the 2018 parliamentary election, the government amended the NGO law, extending restrictions on who could establish or be on a CSO board, irrespective of the organisation’s nature – this applies even to organisations working on sports, working with the community or providing charitable services. It also forbade all those linked to banned political parties from engaging with CSOs.
In addition, anyone sentenced to more than six months’ imprisonment, even if subsequently pardoned by the King, convicted in error or provided with a ‘no objection certificate’, is now deprived for life of voting rights and the right to stand for election. Likewise, all those who for whatever reason did not take part in the previous election have been banned from taking part in the next.
Having crushed civic space for years, in the run-up to the 2022 election the authorities only needed to ensure that calm persisted. To that effect, in September the Ministry of Municipalities Affairs issued vaguely worded regulations that appeared to link electioneering and religion. Among other things, these regulations banned the holding of meetings in public religious centres and other public places such as educational facilities. They appeared aimed at the majority Shi’a community for whom such centres have often become the only places where they – we – are allowed to gather.
What are the conditions for civil society like in Bahrain?
In Bahrain, the very existence of a civil society – let alone an independent one – depends on the political will and whim of the government: the Ministry of Labour and Social Development controls the licensing of all CSOs.
The newly amended NGO Law redefined who could establish and run a CSO and prohibited members of banned political bodies from setting up a CSO. These new rules were applied in January 2022 to forbid two peaceful women activists, Zainab al-Durazi and Safia al-Hasan, taking up the board positions to which they had been freely elected in a women-focused CSO. The two women had been linked to the banned group Wa’d.
Do some of the activities of CSOs whose directors are demonstrably loyal to the state help and support society’s needs? Of course they do. We need them and we commend such organisations. But they are not independent.
Those perceived as not personally loyal to the government and its leaders do not get licences to operate any CSO and are not allowed to be on supervisory boards, in any sector, in total contravention to international law and practice, and completely against the wishes of Bahraini people. A thorough vetting process ensures this remains the case.
All CSOs must obtain permission to engage in any way with non-Bahraini bodies such as foreign or international human rights groups or to meet with foreign Bahrain-based diplomats. If they get permission and the meeting takes place, the government requires the participation of a Foreign Ministry representative and the preparation of notes for the meeting, subject to approval. If this is not done, the representative of the CSO risks criminal charges or the closure of the organisation.
The absence of an independent civil society means that any consultation that does take place is performative – just for show. The authorities don’t typically take the limited civil society that is loyal to the government into account, so independent voices are simply not even in the picture.
If the government only consults those of whom they approve, and even then, only barely, how will that shape government policy? How can it capture the concerns and wishes of the wider population? How is this sustainable? Well, it isn’t. It is unwise and risks creating conditions similar to those that resulted in a national crisis in 2011.
What would it take to build democratic institutions in Bahrain?
Recent history has shown that democratic institutions are difficult to build and easy to lose. In Bahrain and the Gulf, the human rights movement does not call for removal of X so that they be replaced by Y. Instead, we build case studies from each country to show the inequities of laws and practices, and we campaign on that. The reform of specific practices, in certain areas – the administration of justice, the freedom of assembly – is achievable if the authorities in Bahrain and across the Gulf actually engage with human rights groups and United Nations human rights bodies.
We need the Bahraini authorities to provide some genuine representation of the people by the people. We are ready to have a real, genuine dialogue with the authorities, but there needs to be a level playing field. If, despite the restrictions placed on them, the parliamentarians elected in this election step up, then we will have a chance to make a difference going forward. But just as we dare to dream and act, they need to do so too.
What kind of support does Bahraini civil society need from the international community?
We need more engagement. We need states and friends in international civil society to step up and explain the character and vision of the democratic society that the majority of Bahrainis seek; to explain that it does not represent a threat but rather an unlocking of potential.
We need international civil society counterparts to engage in international fora, not only to reflect and project our voice but also to emphasise the role and inherent legitimacy of Bahraini civil society to the Bahraini authorities.
We need our international partners to put pressure on the government’s human rights oversight bodies – the Ombudsman’s office, the Special Investigative Unit and the National Institution for Human Rights – to provide real rather than cosmetic redress, accountability and reform. Some of these oversight bodies have helped migrant workers facing abuse, but even then, their scope has been limited as they have failed to address underlying unjust laws or practices.
We need help and expertise to collate evidence to mount realistic claims for accountability in jurisdictions that have provisions for sanctioning, such as the Global Magnitsky Act that the US government uses to sanction foreign government officials deemed to be human rights offenders,
We need international civil society to press the government of Bahrain to explain why it has failed to adhere to the international conventions to which it has acceded, or why it has not acceded to additional standards such as optional protocols, or been clearer about imposing a moratorium on the death penalty.
Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through their website and follow @SALAM_DHR and@JawadFairooz on Twitter.
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BANGLADESH: ‘The government is banishing the opposition in the run-up to the election’
CIVICUS speaks with Zaman Ashraf about the current pre-election crackdown in Bangladesh.
Zaman is a Bangladeshi human rights defender who advocates for the rights of survivors of torture and victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and seeks stronger legal protections for human rights in compliance with international law. He currently lives in exile in Hong Kong, since human rights activism has become increasingly risky in Bangladesh.
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BANGLADESH: ‘This is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be’
CIVICUS speaks with Dr Mubashar Hasan about the ongoing crackdown on dissent in Bangladesh ahead of 7 January general elections.
Mubashar is a Bangladesh-born academic and social justice activist. He is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway.
What’s the current political climate in Bangladesh?
The political climate in Bangladesh is tense. The election is being organised under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the world’s longest-serving female head of government. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has said it’s not going to participate in an election held under this administration, arguing that there isn’t a level playing field for parties to compete freely and fairly.
Judicial harassment is rife. In September, the New York Times reported that 2.5 million opposition activists faced judicial cases, with each facing multiple cases and some up to 400. Journalists have found that many cases against the opposition were fabricated. The police have even reportedly filed cases against BNP activists who were long dead or living abroad.
On 28 October 2023, the opposition organised a massive rally. To stop this becoming a full-blown people-led movement, the government aggressively repressed it. A few opposition activists retaliated and then the government blamed the violence on the opposition. At least 15 people were killed, including two police officers. More than 20,000 opposition activists have been incarcerated since late October.
This election-related violence is largely the result of state violence. Human Rights Watch recently described the ongoing developments as an autocratic crackdown. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are being restricted and forcefully violated, affecting the legitimacy of the election process. Extremely politicised state institutions are being used as an extension of the ruling party, a trend many argue could lead to the materialisation of a totalitarian state.
Is there any space for civil society to operate in Bangladesh?
The space for civil society in Bangladesh is closed. Civil society organisations are free to operate only as long as they don’t challenge the ruling system.
Just as in any autocratic country, there is an increasing activism going on in the diaspora. There are many Bangladeshi activists living in Australia, as well as in Malaysia, Sweden, the USA and elsewhere. BNP leader Tarique Rahman lives in exile in London.
People in the diaspora are using the leverage that comes with living under democratic governments to spread information about what happens in Bangladesh. Those diaspora activists argue that it is their duty to expose what is going on back home.
There are also key investigative journalists working from exile. A site called Netra News runs out of Malmö in Sweden, and it is still quite influential in exposing serious illegal acts by the government. There are several emerging YouTube commentators and analysts who have been very courageous. They have millions of followers.
How big a problem is disinformation in Bangladeshi politics?
Disinformation has always been a problem. Authoritarian governments don’t like the free flow of information. They want to control information and seek to discredit independent voices, just as Trump did in the USA, trashing fact as fiction and making fiction fact. And he was the authoritarian leader of a democratic country, which Bangladesh is not.
Partisan elements within the government of Bangladesh and ruling party members treat those who dare challenge the official narrative as enemies. As I mentioned in one of my recent articles for the Diplomat Magazine, the government is the dominant force promoting political disinformation. The main opposition party has also promoted disinformation in some instances but independent factcheckers have concluded that the volume of political disinformation promoted by the opposition is miniscule compared to the government.
There has been recent reporting by the Financial Times focused on how the Bangladeshi ruling party is using AI-driven disinformation to disrupt the upcoming election. But this is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be. In this election voters do not have real choice. Why the ruling party is promoting AI-driven disinformation is therefore a mystery.
What are your expectations for election day and its aftermath?
Many things will unfold in the coming days. Voter turnout will most likely be low. The government will deploy military forces nationwide, perhaps even putting them in charge of distributing ballot boxes and election materials.
There will be some violence, probably by the opposition, followed by arrests. The opposition will persist in demanding a free and fair election and the resignation of the government. Some loss of life is sadly to be expected.
This election is also taking place within a wider geopolitical context. China, India and Russia are strongly supportive of the Bangladeshi government, whereas the USA keeps talking about free and fair elections, which puts it on the side of Bangladeshi people.
At this point, not much is in the hands of Bangladeshi people. Without effective external pressure towards democracy, change is unlikely. Civil society’s work will only become more challenging in Bangladesh as the government steps up its repression.
Civic space in Bangladesh is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Mubashar through hiswebpage and follow@mh23rights on Twitter.
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BELARUS: ‘Despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day’
CIVICUS speaks with Marina Kostylianchenko of Viasna about the closure of civic space and criminalisation of activism in Belarus.
Viasna (‘Spring’) is a Belarusian human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that provides assistance to political prisoners and their families. It was founded in 1996 in response to large-scale repression of protests by the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. In 2003 it was shut down by the government and subsequently persecuted for operating as anunregistered organisation. Repression increased in reaction to 2020 protests that followed a presidential electionwidely seen as stolen. Viasna founder Ales Bialiatski was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. In 2023 he wassentenced to 10 years in prison and Viasna was declared an ‘extremist group’.
What tactics of repression have the authorities used against Viasna?
Ever since it was established in 1996, Viasna has been under scrutiny. It was able to operate officially for only a very short period, as the Supreme Court dissolved it as early as 2003. Successive attempts to secure legal status have been unsuccessful so we have continued working without official approval. Just like other people in Belarus, we have faced repression, including detentions, fines and imprisonment for our human rights activism.
A big shock came in 2011 when Viasna founder and leader Ales Bialiatski was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison on fabricated charges of tax evasion. He was unexpectedly released under an amnesty nearly three years later.
An unprecedented peak in repression followed the 2020 mass protests. This had a profound impact on the operation of human rights organisations. For example, Viasna expanded its scope to include a hotline for people to seek advice and report detentions and other human rights violations. We also started collecting information about politically motivated criminal prosecutions and recognising detainees as political prisoners, documenting instances of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and ultimately launching the #FreeViasna campaign for the release of imprisoned human rights defenders.
In 2021 the government focused on dismantling civil society. Security forces conducted home and office searches and issued arrest orders targeting Viasna staff and staff of other CSOs and independent media. On 14 July, 15 Viasna members and volunteers were detained nationwide, including Ales Bialiatski, his deputy Valentin Stefanovich and lawyer Vladimir Labkovich, who are still in custody. In 2023 they were sentenced to 10, nine and seven years in jail respectively, along with substantial fines, for allegedly smuggling money and financing protests. The coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service, Marfa Rabkova, and volunteer Andrei Chepyuk, also remain in prison, with sentences of almost 15 and six years respectively.
In August 2023, Viasna was declared an extremist organisation, which in line with recent amendments to the Criminal Code means that any staff member could be criminally prosecuted and sentenced in absentia. Anyone might also face criminal liability for providing information or contributing to Viasna’s work in any way.
The authorities are trying to erect a barrier between us and the people we help. But despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day.
In what conditions does Viasna currently work?
We operate in exile. Most members of Viasna had to leave Belarus in 2021 to avoid prison and be able to continue their human rights work.
Forced relocation has implications, as over time a gap inevitably emerges between those who left and those who remain in Belarus.
Moreover, new challenges and areas of work have arisen. For instance, an increasing number of people are being released after completing their sentences and require medical care, rehabilitation and help with adjusting back into society. Those who left Belarus face difficulties in adapting to a new environment and struggle with getting legal status, employment, housing and everyday matters.
Even though the coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service has been imprisoned for over three years, our work with volunteers both inside Belarus and among the diaspora has never ceased. Volunteers are mainly engaged in research and data collection, translation of texts into multiple languages and the creation of illustrations and designs. They also assist at events we organise or participate in.
Do imprisoned activists face further pressure while in jail?
In 2023, all our colleagues were transferred to reformation colonies to serve their sentences. The conditions there are particularly harsh, primarily due to severe restriction of communication with the outside world. Unlike in pretrial detention facilities, where human rights activists could receive letters, parcels and money transfers from sympathisers, now only close relatives, usually only one or two people, are allowed to call or send mail and parcels. Even then, calls are limited to a maximum of 10 minutes a week and parcels to one or two per season.
Another form of pressure exerted on political prisoners is confinement for 10 or more consecutive days in cold punishment cells where they are not allowed to have warm clothes or other belongings, including books and pens. Inmates are punished for any reason, such as not adhering to the prescribed greeting procedure, failing to fasten a button or neglecting to shave. If a political prisoner commits several such violations, they are classed as a ‘persistent violator of internal regulations’, which justifies further pressure.
All prisoners, except older ones and those with disabilities, are required to work, usually in hazardous industries or cold rooms for eight or more hours a day. Wages are symbolic: after subtracting various payments for their maintenance in prison, only tiny amounts are transferred to prisoners’ personal accounts, which are then used to pay off fines.
We practically have no information about our imprisoned colleagues’ health conditions, but we know barely any medical care is provided in prison facilities.
How have you organised to support your imprisoned colleagues?
In 2021, in collaboration with Amnesty International, Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights, Libereco, Ostgruppen and other partners, we initiated a solidarity campaign to advocate for the immediate release of our imprisoned colleagues.
We’re continually exploring new modes of engagement with Belarusian civil society and other communities to advance our cause. For instance, on 8 December 2023 we unveiled an art installation, ‘Unbreakable’, in the heart of Vilnius, depicting the faces of five Viasna political prisoners and featuring descriptions in three languages – Belarusian, Lithuanian and English. We participate in any event available to speak about the plight of our colleagues criminalised for their commitment to human rights.
Several international awards have significantly bolstered attention for our cause. In 2022 Viasna was honoured with the Tulip of Human Rights award from the Dutch government, and Ales Bialiatski became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate alongside the Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties and the Russian organisation Memorial. As a result of the Nobel Prize people in other countries found out who Ales is and why he is in prison, and expressions of support and solidarity increased.
What support do you receive from the international community, and what further support do you need?
A coalition of international human rights organisations has repeatedly issued joint statements urging the immediate release of Viasna’s political prisoners. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Parliament and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have also been vocal about the more than 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus.
Unfortunately, we haven’t yet identified the leverage that would foster the immediate release of Viasna activists. At the same time, the authorities are doing everything to isolate our colleagues and make them believe they’ve been forgotten. That’s why it’s so important to show support by sending them letters and postcards, helping their families and friends, signing petitions and holding solidarity actions around the world. For example, Libereco activists stage monthly rallies in Berlin and Zurich and organise solidarity races to raise awareness.
Every show of support matters. We urge people to join our initiatives, spread information as widely as possible and come up with new forms of solidarity actions. To this end, we have created free-of-charge designs for printing on T-shirts, posters, leaflets, stickers and postcards. We would also appreciate support for our activities and our incarcerated colleagues through a subscription on Patreon or a one-time donation via Stripe.
Civic space in Belarus is rated ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Viasna through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@Viasna onTwitter. Contact the#FreeViasna campaign through itswebsite and follow@FreeViasna onTwitter.
The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: ‘Civil society has failed to spark people’s activist side’
CIVICUS speaks about deteriorating civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) withAida Daguda and Dajana Cvjetkovic, director and programme manager atthe Centre for Civil Society Promotion (CPCD).Founded in 1996, CPCD is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to strengthen civil society and citizen participation in BiH and the Western Balkans through capacity development, advocacy and campaigning.
What are civic space conditions like in BiH?
In our nearly three decades working in civil society in BiH and the Western Balkans, we have never witnessed such a rapid deterioration of civic space. Our organisation, along with other CSOs, is deeply concerned about two new pieces of legislation introduced in Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities that make up BiH.
The first bill, already adopted, reintroduced criminal defamation into the legal system. The second, currently under parliamentary debate, is a ‘foreign agents’ bill that would criminalise CSOs that receive foreign funding or assistance for ‘political activities’ and give state institutions the power to shut them down. This would be just another tool to further restrict civil society in the hands of government authorities, who already use the mechanisms in place to oversee the work of CSOs and exert pressure and threaten us. Over the past year there have been more inspections of CSOs than ever before, specifically targeting smaller and more vocal organisations.
By silencing independent media and civil society, RS President Milorad Dodik seeks to eliminate public scrutiny and criticism in an entity marred by criminal activities and corruption and undergoing a difficult economic situation. The government is resisting democratic oversight and trying to eliminate all forms of critical thought among the public.
Moreover, in April 2023 the Sarajevo local government proposed amendments to local public order laws that would penalise the spread of ‘fake news’ and criticism of state authorities. Although the draft bill was withdrawn in June due to the public outcry it caused, the authorities have expressed their commitment to reintroducing a modified version of the bill.
These are all signals that the situation for civil society is rapidly worsening in RS and in BiH as a whole, with severe limitations being introduced on freedoms of association and expression.
How has Bosnian civil society organised against the restrictive bills?
A part of RS’s civil society is well organised and experienced in advocacy and campaigning. But overall, there are fewer than 10 CSOs that are strongly committed to their human rights mission and vision, while the rest maintain links with the government that make them less vocal against repressive laws. We provide support with expertise and funding to independent CSOs in RS, but we must be discreet because we are based in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other entity that composes BiH, and our help tends to be misunderstood by both politicians and the public in the RS.
Unfortunately, many Bosnian CSOs remain silent due to fear. In RS in particular, people are afraid for their safety and that of their families. Unlike in Georgia, where people took to the streets to defend freedom of association, people in Bosnia aren’t motivated, partly due to media narratives portraying civil society as being paid by the international community to act against the government.
We are using all available tools to raise awareness about repressive legislation within the country, at the European Union (EU) level and through communication with various civil society networks, including CIVICUS. The government argues that these laws are necessary to prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering, but we view these as excuses.
We have informed opposition members of parliament about the potential negative consequences of the ‘foreign agents’ law but have made no impact. Our outreach to the public has been hindered by lack of media support.
However, we remain hopeful that this crisis may turn into an opportunity for Bosnian civil society to revive the sense of solidarity that we’ve lost over the past decade. These days, we constantly think in terms of projects and donors and tend to see each other as competitors when we most desperately need to be united.
How would you describe the current political climate in BiH?
Our region has historically bordered with empires, and this location has come at a price. The threat of RS’s secession has risen in recent years, posing a security problem for the entire region. Due to BiH’s location and rich natural resources and potential for energy production, many fear that its fate depends on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the interests of major powers such as China, the EU, Russia, Turkey and the USA. The people of BiH are the ones with the least influence on the decisions that will affect them.
While secession may not be imminent, the threat of it significantly impacts on people’s wellbeing. We experience a pervasive feeling of insecurity that contributes to an anxious atmosphere. This makes people easier to manipulate. Many people are considering leaving, mostly because of their sense of insecurity and the widespread corruption.
Fear is our main currency. Past experiences of police surveillance leading to arrests of protesters have deterred people from participating in demonstrations. People are losing hope that things will improve. During the war we experienced between 1992 and 1995, we had a very strong feeling of hope that when the war ended we would recover a normal life and rebuild our country. Now we have peace but we don’t have hope anymore.
How do you work to strengthen civil society in BiH, and what obstacles do you face?
Our organisation was established right after the war, so it has existed for 27 years. We were the first ones to connect CSOs from different parts of the country and our network currently includes over 350 organisations.
In 2004, we launched the first initiative of institutional cooperation between government and civil society. At that time, civil society was thriving. But over the past decade or so, the situation has steadily worsened. Civil society faces a shortage of human resources, and people hold rather negative views about civil society. We seek to change such perceptions by consistently communicating the purpose and results of our work to the public and beneficiaries of our services and activities.
We also lack strong connections with the media, which should serve as a channel between us, the government, the international community and, most importantly, our society. To show what we’re doing and what we are trying to achieve, instead of just following donors’ visibility guidelines we have established our own portal in which we collect inspiring stories of civil society’s impact in improving people’s lives.
But our biggest problem is lack of local ownership. For many years the international community did things for us, so we aren’t used to solving problems by ourselves. People aren’t used to activism; they complain and wait for others to resolve their problems. That’s one of the failures of civil society: we have implemented many projects, but never managed to spark people’s activist side.
What challenges do you face in cooperating with international partners?
International agencies implement large projects in BiH and many funds come from the international community, but we don’t see results. One of the reasons is that local civil society is pushed aside. When we inquire with donors about supporting local organisations or networks, they argue that small organisations lack the capacity to successfully implement large grants. It has become their mantra.
This hampers the development of civil society as the true democratic force our country urgently needs. We must engage in dialogue with the government to devise solutions for the numerous problems we face. We need to move past the ‘projectisation’ of civil society and focus on the long term.
This also applies to the government, which is also forced to work within the project framework, executing short-term tasks requested by the EU or other international institutions. For instance, the government, jointly with the European Commission, invested around €1 million (approx. US$1.06 million) to fulfil a request to establish a register for CSOs, but once international partners left the country, the register ceased to function. There was a failure to recognise that civil society could have created, managed and overseen the register, which could have been instrumental in developing a common civil society strategy.
This year we established an informal group of donors who support local civil society in Bosnia. We hope the international community will consistently convey the message that they must prioritise local ownership and sustainability. We don’t want to see civil society becoming a mere service provider for larger international agencies. We need to organise around genuine shared interests rather than form networks to satisfy the criteria of calls for proposals. It is time for us to think strategically about who we are and what our role is.
Civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rated ‘narrowed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor. Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently on theCIVICUS Monitor Watchlist, which draws attention to countries where there is a serious and rapid decline in respect for civic space.
Get in touch with CPCD through itswebsite or itsFacebook page, and follow@cpcdba on Twitter.
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BRAZIL: ‘If Bolsonaro continues as president, it is a threat to the Amazon and therefore to humanity’
CIVICUS discusses the state of environmental activism in Brazil with Daniela Silva, a socio-environmental educator and co-founder of the Aldeias Project, an education, art, culture and environment project for children and young people in the municipality of Altamira, in the Brazilian state of Pará.
What inspired you to become an environmental activist?
I live in a territory that has suffered great social and environmental impacts following the establishment of the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant on the Xingu River. And like thousands of people, including riverbank dwellers, fishers, Indigenous people, farmers, boat people, women and young people, my family and I also had our lives strongly impacted on by the project.
We lived in a neighbourhood called Aparecida, in a community where neighbours supported each other and children and young people played in the streets without fear. When a mother went out, she would leave her children in the custody of her neighbour. One of my best memories is our backyard. It looked like a farm: we had many fruit trees. We didn’t need to spend money to eat fruit. Solidarity was strengthened by a sense of community, which I think was intrinsically linked to the sense of belonging to a territory. All this was destroyed by a ‘development’ approach that disregards the subjectivity of peoples and populations.
The displacement caused by the construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant pushed families far away from the Xingu River and separated communities that had lived together for decades. It fragmented community ties. A negative consequence of these impacts on the territory and people’s sense of self was their disconnection from nature and the loss of the Amazonian sense of belonging. Not feeling part of the Amazon is dangerous, because generally speaking, people only defend what they love, what they know and what they feel a part of.
Before the construction of the dam, my father worked as a potter. Together with my mother, who worked as a civil servant, they raised eight children. This was all over when the dam was built. My father became unemployed and so did my brothers. My father began to fight for the right to a ridiculously small pension. My brothers were forced to look for odd jobs around town. It was a difficult time! I realised that adapting to an imposed reality is one of the worst forms of violence against human dignity.
I am an activist for socio-environmental rights and against racism. Since adolescence I haven’t had much choice but to fight. We are one with nature, so we need to fight for nature to ensure a better present and future for ourselves and our children.
How is Brazilian civil society mobilising on behalf of the environment and what challenges does it face?
There are many environmental movements in the Amazon mobilising to denounce the environmental crimes of the government of President Jair Bolsonaro, but unfortunately our country’s judicial institutions have not been functioning according to the law, and have left us in a vulnerable position.
There are many civil society organisations that have been working for a long time in the Amazon and other areas that face great challenges to sustain themselves since there is little availability of financial resources. Most of those that manage to survive do so with international funding, since there is little incentive in Brazil to mobilise resources for civil society. Financial suffocation is one of the tactics used by the current government. In addition, we live in a very unstable and negative economic context, with high inflation and a fall in real wages. The fact that Brazil is a country lacking a culture of giving makes it even more complicated. It all results in a shortage of resources for the sustainability of organisations and the security of environmental defenders.
Even so, new groups and collectives – including the one I lead, Aldeias Project – continue emerging to defend the Amazon. There are many young people in leadership positions in the movements to defend their territories.
Our challenge is to create a safe space, since we are under constant threat. To be able to carry out our work, we have established partnerships with more experienced organisations that are able to advise us on best practices for taking care of our staff, partners and the communities we serve. Networking helps us see the big picture and build powerful links.
What do you think about the recent verdict by the Brazilian Supreme Court to recognise the Paris Agreement as a human rights treaty?
The Paris Agreement is undoubtedly an important legal instrument, and it is good that, as a human rights treaty signed by the Brazilian state, it has acquired constitutional status. But like all of Brazil’s legal documents, including the Federal Constitution, it must be fully implemented, especially by public managers who keep on violating human and environmental rights regardless of what is stated in the Brazilian Constitution.
For the Paris Agreement to be implemented and make an impact on the daily life of Brazilians, it must be disseminated among the people who suffer the climate crisis the most: Indigenous populations, riverside dwellers and Black communities in city outskirts. It is also important for the international community to take decisive action and put pressure on the Brazilian government for it actually to fulfil the agreement.
Will the result of the upcoming election make any difference to your struggles?
The October elections are perhaps one of the most important in Brazil's history. There is a lot at stake when it comes to the Amazon region. Bolsonaro, the incumbent, has unleashed uncontrolled deforestation, land grabs and illegal mining on Indigenous lands. He is also encouraging violence against human and environmental rights defenders in the Amazon.
With Bolsonaro there is no possibility of dialogue or engagement of organised civil society in decision-making on environmental matters. If Bolsonaro continues as president of Brazil, it is a threat to the Amazon and its peoples, and therefore to humanity. We are experiencing a global climate crisis and we need world leaders focusing on working alongside civil society, scientists and the international community to put together short, medium and long-term solutions to tackle it.
The advances of deforestation in the Amazon should be a key factor driving a Bolsonaro defeat in this election, but unfortunately it is not. Brazilian society remains very oblivious to the reality of the Amazon. Brazil’s large urban centres do not recognise the everyday reality of the forest and its peoples. The consequence of their ignorance is their lack of active concern about the current ecocide being committed by the Bolsonaro government. Fortunately, many Amazonian environmental movements are trying hard to pierce their bubble so Brazilian society gets to know what is happening and takes a stand.
Now, while acknowledging the utmost importance of defeating Bolsonaro in the upcoming election, we also have strong criticism of his main rival, the Workers’ Party (PT). Like right-wing governments, PT governments, led by the current PT candidate, Lula da Silva, and his successor as president, Dilma Rousseff, also pushed initiatives that were environmentally destructive: the Belo Monte project was built under PT administrations, without any respect for the law and international agreements on human and environmental rights.
However, we believe that with Lula we would be able to have a dialogue and there could be more space for civil society engagement in environmental decision making.
What do you think should happen at the forthcoming COP27 climate summit, and what do you think will happen?
Firstly, I think it is very important that COP27 is taking place in Africa, because African nations are among those that are suffering the most due to a climate crisis that has been caused by a small powerful group of white millionaires. They now have the opportunity to have a greater involvement at COP27 and demand more assistance from the richer nations that have caused the climate crisis. I hope that this edition of COP27 will enable the implementation of the promises and targets already agreed upon. And that women, children and adolescents will play an active role in this struggle for social and environmental justice.
Although that is what I hope for, we all know that COPs are a space where difficult conversations must take place and the governments of big nations lack the will to face the reality of climate change, especially when it comes to financial investments and taking it upon themselves to counter the damage their developmentalist approach continues to cause. So we will be closely watching the negotiations and agreements. We are at a critical point regarding climate, and there is no time to lose.
What kind of support do Brazilian environmental activists need from the international community?
The international community is our ally in our struggle for climate, social and racial justice. One way to help is by shedding light on activists’ work and directly and indirectly supporting their struggles. Another is to put pressure on genocidal and ecocidal governments such as Bolsonaro’s so that they respect human and environmental rights. Be aware of our struggles and listen to the voices of those on the ground in the countryside, on the peripheries of cities and on the forefront of this war we wage on a daily basis.
Civic space in Brazil is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Daniela throughLinkedIn and follow@projetoaldeias on Instagram.
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BURKINA FASO: ‘For a major segment of civil society security is a more urgent concern than democracy’
CIVICUS speaks about therecent military coup in Burkina Faso with Kop'ep Dabugat, Network Coordinator of the West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network (WADEMOS).
WADEMOS is a coalition of West African civil society organisations (CSOs) that mobilises civil society around the defence of democracy and the promotion of democratic norms in the region.
What led to the recent coup in Burkina Faso, and what needs to be done for democracy to be restored?
The current head of Burkina Faso’s ruling junta, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, cited persistent insecurity as a reason for the military takeover – as did his predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Attacks by armed groups are said to have greatly increased in the months following the first coup led by Damiba, in January 2022. According to analysts, Burkina Faso is the new epicentre of conflict in the Sahel. Since 2015, jihadist violence by insurgents with links to al-Qaeda and Islamic State has resulted in the death of thousands of people and displaced a further two million.
The coup also revealed the presence of a schism in the Damiba-led junta. It was orchestrated by military officers who were part of the coup that installed Damiba as head of state, but who now claimed that Damiba did not focus on reorganising the army to better face security threats, as they had expected. Instead, he stuck with the military structure that led to the fall of the government under President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, and began to display political ambitions.
The security question remains the first challenge that needs to be addressed to make Burkina Faso a democratic state. The foremost role of a state, and more so of a democratic one, is to guarantee the safety of its citizens. A united Burkina Faso army will be necessary to achieve this.
The other thing that must be done is to see through the existing transition programme for the country to return to civilian rule by July 2024, to which the new junta has agreed.
Beyond the transition, the need to build a strong state and political institutions cannot be overemphasised. The challenges of corruption and economic marginalisation should be tackled in earnest. The need for stronger institutions is not peculiar to Burkina Faso: it is familiar to all the region, and particularly to those countries that have recently come under military rule, notably Guinea and Mali.
What was civil society’s reaction to the recent military coup?
In line with the disunity that characterises civil society in Burkina Faso, the civil society response to the coup has been mixed. But a notable section of civil society seemed to welcome the most recent coup because they saw the Damiba-led junta not only as authoritarian but also as aligned with politicians from the regime of President Blaise Compaoré, in power from 1987 to 2014. They saw the real possibility that those politicians could regain power and shut all doors on victims of the Compaoré regime ever seeing justice.
As a result, the view of the recent coup as a significant setback for the democratic transition agenda is not unanimously held among civil society. Additionally, for a major segment of civil society security appears to be a more urgent and priority concern than democracy, so the element that prevailed was the seeming incapacity of the Damiba-led junta to address the security situation.
The effort of the traditional and religious groups that negotiated a seven-point agreement between the Damiba and Traoré factions of the military, ending violence and forestalling further bloodshed, however, deserves commendation. That effort seems to have established a baseline of engagement between the Traoré-led junta and civil society. Such constructive engagement with the new government seems to have continued, with the notable participation of civil society in the 14 October 2022 National Conference that approved a new Transitional Charter for Burkina Faso and officially appointed Traoré as transitional president.
What is the situation of human right CSOs?
Burkinabe CSOs in the human and civil rights space have grown increasingly concerned about the victimisation of politicians and members of the public perceived to be pro-France as well as by the marked upsurge of pro-Russian groups demanding that France and all its interests be kicked out of the country.
On top of their concern about the raging jihadist insurgency, human and civil rights CSOs are also concerned about the stigmatisation and victimisation of citizens of Fulani ethnicity. This victimisation stems from the fact that many terrorist cells recruit Burkinabe people of Fulani extraction. There have been reports of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of Fulani people due to their alleged complicity in terrorist violence. Besides these two, no other notable cases of human rights abuses threatening civilians have been identified besides the ones already mentioned. Hence, even though it is still early in the Traoré-led government, it may be safe to rule out any consistent pattern of heightened human rights abuses under its watch.
How has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the military coup?
In accordance with the letter of its 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the initial response of ECOWAS was to condemn the coup strongly and unequivocally, calling it an unfortunate and retrogressive development, especially in light of the progress made with the Damiba-led junta in preparing the ground for elections and democracy. ECOWAS also called for the junta to guarantee human rights and ensure stability.
Despite the ongoing sanctions against the country, following his meeting with Traoré, Mahamadou Issoufou, the former president of Niger and mediator sent to Burkina Faso by ECOWAS, said he was satisfied and that ECOWAS would remain by the side of the people of Burkina Faso. In what is the ECOWAS way to respond to military governments, ECOWAS will work closely with the junta to restore democratic order. The timeline stands and the deadline remains July 2024.
How have other international institutions reacted, and what should they do to support civil society in Burkina Faso?
Other international institutions have reacted similarly to ECOWAS. The African Union condemned the coup and said it was unfortunate in light of the progress already made towards the restoration of democracy. The coup was similarly condemned by the United Nations and the European Parliament.
If the international community wants to assist CSOs in Burkina Faso, what it first and foremost needs to do is support the junta’s efforts to stamp out the jihadist insurgency that continues to hold the country hostage. It should also assist the authorities in tackling not only the current refugee crisis but also the challenge of climate change, which is a contributing factor not just to the refugee crisis but also to the spread of terrorist violence.
The international community must also continue to mount pressure on the junta to deliver on its promise to adhere to the agreements the former junta reached with ECOWAS, to put an end to the victimisation of people on account of their political affiliations and ethnicity, and to set free anyone who has been imprisoned for political reasons.
Civic space inBurkina Faso is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch withWADEMOS through itswebsite or its Facebook page, and follow @WADEMOSnetwork on Twitter.
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BURUNDI: ‘Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly anymore’
CIVICUS speaksabout the repression of civil society and human rights defenders and LGBTQI+ rights in Burundi with Carina Tertsakian, co-founder of the Burundi Human Rights Initiative (BHRI).
Active from mid-2019 until December 2023, the BHRI was an independent initiative that worked in cooperation with a range of people inside and outside Burundi todocument the human rights situation and advocate for human rights.
Has there been any improvement in the human rights situation in Burundi?
Burundi’s overall human rights record has remained largely unchanged since President Évariste Ndayishimiye took office in 2020. Back then people had high hopes because the new president had a less bloody past than his predecessor. But there’s been little progress in the protection of civil and political rights. The authorities have continued to arrest, prosecute, ill-treat and sometimes torture people for political reasons. Those arrested have included activists, journalists and opposition members.
Even though the most serious forms of rights violations such as political killings and enforced disappearances have decreased, human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists have been arbitrarily arrested simply due to their involvement in human rights activities or their affiliation with independent civil society organisations (CSOs). They are typically accused of undermining internal state security or territorial integrity, among other baseless charges.
What are the conditions for LGBTQI+ people in Burundi?
In August 2023, 24 people were arrested for their alleged involvement in organisations that help LGBTQI+ people. While some were acquitted or released, others faced sentencing. One activist who was acquitted passed away before being released. The case is ongoing, drawing attention to the larger underlying issue that homosexuality is still criminalised in Burundi.
It’s nearly impossible to identify openly as an LGBTQI+ activist in Burundi. While some organisations engage in activities to support LGBTQI+ people, they avoid explicitly identifying as LGBTQI+ organisations. The 24 people who were arrested, for instance, had participated in training on awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS.
In his recent year-end speech, President Ndayishimiye vilified LGBTQI+ people, labelling homosexuality as a sin and encouraging public stoning of those perceived as ‘homosexuals’. This horrifying statement has further fuelled hateful rhetoric online. On a positive note, a Burundian CSO and several prominent activists in exile strongly criticised Ndayishimiye’s statement, something that is extremely difficult to do inside Burundi.
To what extent is it possible for human rights organisations to work in Burundi?
In 2015, a significant political and human rights crisis unfolded in Burundi, marked by a violent crackdown on civil society, particularly on critics and those suspected of opposing the government. As a result, leaders of major human rights organisations fled the country and remain in exile. Some faced charges and were convicted in absentia, including to life imprisonment.
Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly in Burundi anymore. Ever since 2015, activists addressing politically sensitive issues face direct threats and can’t work freely inside the country. Even those previously affiliated with human rights organisations that no longer operate in Burundi continue to face arrests.
Activists advocating for economic and social rights experience comparatively less pressure. Some CSOs working on anti-corruption and good governance issues have been more or less allowed to function, although the government has occasionally impeded their activities, for example, by disrupting or prohibiting press conferences.
Have Burundian activists found safety in exile?
Exiled activists based in Europe or Canada are relatively safe, whereas those in Rwanda may encounter additional pressure. In 2015, as many HRDs and journalists fled, the government in Burundi banned or suspended their organisations and shut down several independent radio stations. Some exiled journalists established radio stations abroad, mainly in Rwanda.
The Burundian government has taken advantage of recently improved relations with Rwanda and pressured the host country to silence these journalists or hand them over. The Rwandan government gave some of these journalists an ultimatum to either remain silent or leave, forcing some to halt operations from Rwanda and relocate again. Some of these journalists were among a broader group, including other HRDs, who were tried and sentenced in absentia.
What are your key demands for the Burundian government?
Burundi’s civil society demands that the government lift civic space restrictions, enabling HRDs, journalists and other independent voices to express themselves freely without harassment. We support these demands.
First of all, the government must release Floriane Irangabiye, a journalist sentenced to 10 years in jail in May 2023. Five other HRDs were charged and tried earlier, in April. The government targeted them because of their association with an international organisation the regime dislikes and accused them of illegally receiving funds. Although released after two months thanks to international pressure, some have been given a suspended sentence, so we call for all charges against them to be dropped.
The safety of exiled activists must also be ensured before they can return, which requires the lifting of their sentences. As long as HRDs continue to face convictions in absentia, there will be significant impediments to any form of human rights activism in Burundi. We further urge the government to revoke the bans and suspensions imposed on CSOs since 2015.
Despite the government’s claim that Burundi is a democracy, it is certainly not. If it were, it would allow people to voice criticism and the activities of HRDs wouldn’t be criminalised.
What support do Burundian human rights activists receive from international allies, and what further do they need?
When European Union countries, the USA and other governments raise concerns about blatant human rights violations in Burundi, particularly through their embassies in the country, it really makes a difference. Although it may take years to secure the release of an HRD, intensified international pressure has proven effective.
There are too few independent human rights groups left in Burundi, and it’s difficult to provide international support to virtually non-existent entities. Those still active are mostly individual activists, so it is challenging for donors to support them. One notable exception is the independent newspaper Iwacu, which, despite facing constraints, continues its work. We encourage donors to sustain their support of the media outlet, which represents one of the few remaining independent voices in Burundi.
Human rights organisations operating from exile need ongoing support, and could expand their work if they had more sustainable funding. It’s hard to work from abroad. After several years in exile, activists begin to feel disconnected and demotivated as they don’t see things change.
Civic space in Burundi is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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BURUNDI: ‘The election of new leaders is not synonymous with democracy’
CIVICUS speaks about the recent elections in Burundi with a civil society activist who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons.
Presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections were held in Burundi on 20 May 2020, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March, two months before the elections, the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Burundi launched an appeal to the international community, including the UN Security Council and regional institutions, to join forces to encourage the government of Burundi to reopen democratic, civil and political space. On the day of the elections, the president of the Commission of Inquiry stated that the conditions to perform credible and free elections were not met. Asreported by the CIVICUS Monitor, opposition members faced death threats and physical attacks, as well as administrative hurdles, as several candidacy applications were rejected. The leader of an opposition party was murdered and other candidates were arrested on bogus charges. Independent reporting was systematically impeded through the arrest of journalists and the blockage of social media platforms.
Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images
Has the government of Burundi’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic further restricted the space for civil society?
Civic space in Burundi has been closed since April 2015, due to the political unrest caused by the decision of former President Pierre Nkurunziza, recently deceased, to run for a controversial third term. This led to widespread violence that left at least 1,200 people dead and forced 400,000 to flee the country. Surprisingly, in March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic was spreading in almost all African countries, the Burundian authorities opened space for political campaigns to be held ahead of the May presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections. But one can conclude that civic space is still closed in terms of being able to express any open criticism about how the country is politically run, including criticism regarding the way the government handled the pandemic during the electoral period.
What were the views of civil society about holding elections during the pandemic?
The decision of the Burundian authorities to allow election campaigns to proceed during a period in which many other African countries were taking measures of confinement to stop the spread of COVID-19 was viewed as denial of the reality of the pandemic to save the political interests of the ruling party, the CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy), to the detriment of the public’s health.
Despite fears of mass COVID-19 contamination, the elections were rushed, at least in part, due to the opportunity to hold an electoral process in the absence of a sizeable number of independent and international observers who could denounce any irregularities. By doing so, given that the National Independent Electoral Commission was mostly composed of members of the ruling party, the government ensured that it could manipulate the election results as much as it wanted.
Was the outcome of the election accepted by majority of Burundians?
On 20 May 2020, CNDD-FDD candidate Évariste Ndayishimiye was elected president with 71 per cent of the vote. The ruling party also won 72 of the 100 seats at stake in the National Assembly.
As soon as the Electoral Commission announced the results, opposition parties such as the National Council for Liberation, which came a distant second, stated in foreign media that the official numbers were not credible and were the result of massive fraud. The truth is that the elections were held in a context of continuing repression of the political opposition, independent media and civil society. No international observers were present because the government had warned that due to the pandemic they would have to be quarantined for 14 days after their arrival.
Low-key criticisms were made by others, including the Catholic Church, regarding incidents that marked the election processes. Others whispered, as it’s not easy to make open criticisms, that election results were rigged. But that was it. Powerful members of the international community such as the governments of Belgium and the USA were fast to congratulate the elected president, and the East African Community congratulated Burundi for holding a “peaceful and successful” election.
In my personal view, the outcomes of the elections were eventually accepted because many feared that bloodshed could follow if an open rejection of the election results by the opposition was followed by street protests.
How likely is that the elections result will lead to an improvement of democracy and civic space?
Some pretend to believe that the election of new leaders is synonymous with democracy. The outcome of the May 2020 elections helped Burundi change the faces of top leaders and show that the dictator who ruled us for 15 years is no longer leading the country. However, the human rights violations that took place during the electoral campaign, the appointment of officials under European or US economic sanctions for the human rights abuses they had committed and the political rhetoric describing some countries and their leaders as colonialists all show that democracy in Burundi still has a long way to go.
However, some measures to fight against corruption and others abuses that President Ndayishimiye has taken since assuming office have allowed us to believe that the impunity that some local authorities enjoyed during Nkurunziza’s administration might come to an end.
Many had argued that the plan was for former President Nkurunziza to remain the power behind the scenes. Have prospects changed as a result of his death?
Former President Nkurunziza died unexpectedly in June, before his successor had even been inaugurated. As a new president had already been elected, the Constitutional Court decided that he should be sworn in two months early.
Many believed that Nkurunziza’s passing would allow President Ndayishimiye to rule with total independence, and his inaugural speech seemed to confirm it, as he vowed to enter into dialogue with anyone, on any issue. It is too soon to say whether the fact that Nkurunziza is out of the equation will allow the new administration to open up civic space and whether the new president will seize this opportunity. However, it is encouraging to see that the new president has already met with the leaders of other political parties, former Burundi presidents and Anglican and Catholic bishops, and has promised to promote dialogue. We are expectant to find out whether his words will turn into actions.
At the same time, however, the Minister of Home Affairs has recently issued a note to halt the registration of all new civil society organisations and churches and the recognition of newly elected authorities of organisations, pending a new order. Such decisions are inconsistent with the change that is being sought. If maintained, they will hinder civil society from growing and becoming a legitimate and publicly recognised sphere.
What should the international community do to help improve civic space in Burundi?
It is hard to set just a few priorities, as many things need to be put in place for Burundi to become a place of freedoms. However, it would be vital to engage the government of Burundi in multidimensional dialogue. International cooperation needs to be relaunched in a way that helps the Burundian government to end endemic poverty. The international community should advocate the repatriation of all refugees, including those who are under an arrest warrant from the Burundian government, and ensure their protection. And it also should offer its mediation to solve conflict between Burundi and its neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda, in order to facilitate the movement of people and goods and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.
If the suggested priorities are pursued, the Burundian authorities might come to realise that Burundi is not isolated and that the international community is not acting to sabotage its interests, but rather to strengthen the positive aspects of globalisation in all domains.
Civic space in Burundi is rated as ‘closed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
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CAMBODIA: ‘No free and fair election can take place in the current political environment’
CIVICUS speaks about Cambodia’s communal elections of June 2022 with Lee Chung Lun, Campaign and Advocacy Programme Officer of the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL).
Established in 1997, ANFREL is a regional civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes democratic, free and fair elections by conducting election monitoring, capacity building and civic engagement in member countries.
How free and fair were the recent local elections in Cambodia, and what were their results?
The official results of the elections for the commune and sangkat – an administrative subdivision – council held on 5 June 2022 gave the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 9,376 (80.7 per cent) of the 11,622 council seats and 1,648 (99.8 per cent) of the 1,652 positions of commune chief. The recently reactivated Candlelight Party gained 2,198 (18.9 per cent) of council seats and four commune chief positions. The remaining 48 council seats went to other small parties.
The CPP’s victory is no surprise given its tight control of politics and the pressures on the opposition, including the dissolution of the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party. In such context, the CPP won over 3,000 more seats than it did in the 2017 elections, and its popular vote surged from 3.5 million to 5.3 million.
However, it was unexpected that the Candlelight Party only managed to secure four commune chief positions despite winning one-fifth of the popular vote. The disproportionate vote-to-seat translation warrants further investigation.
Overall, Cambodia still falls short of the benchmark for free, fair and inclusive elections, as assessed in ANFREL’s pre-election assessment mission. ANFREL’s member, the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL), also noted various irregularities in the process.
The undemocratic elements of the existing legal framework continue to allow room for abuse. In recent years, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, crackdowns on the media, CSOs and the political opposition have increased. Numerous opposition candidates and members of opposition parties, most notably from the Candlelight Party, became the target of harassment and intimidation throughout the election period. As long as threats against the opposition and civil society continue to be prevalent, there can’t be a genuine and legitimate election.
What role did civil society play in the election process?
In July 2021, a coalition of 64 Cambodian CSOs launched a list of recommendations that they named ‘minimum conditions for legitimate commune and sangkat council elections’. These included enabling a free political environment and active participation in political activities and allowing the main opposition to review and select members of the National Election Committee (NEC). They also called for greater political neutrality of military forces and independence of the courts, as well as freedom for the media and CSOs to function. Regrettably, no significant changes have been made since then.
CSOs such as COMFREL recruited, trained and deployed citizen observers to monitor the election process. The NEC’s accreditation standards, however, are questionable, given that 93 per cent of the 74,885 accredited election observers came from organisations closely linked to the CPP. More than half of them came from the Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia and Cambodian Women for Peace and Development, led by Cambodian prime minister’s son Hun Manet and deputy prime minister Men Sam An, respectively.
Cambodia is virtually a one-party state and now has a mostly closed civic space as a result of ongoing attacks on CSOs, independent media and the political opposition. Since 2017, the government has arrested, imprisoned, and harassed hundreds of activists, opposition figures and journalists. Some flee the country out of fear of retaliation.
The draconian provisions outlined in the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations continue to be in effect. The law forbids unregistered organisations from carrying out any activity and grants sole authority over the registration process to the Ministry of the Interior, while registered organisations must adhere to a broadly defined ‘political neutrality’ requirement. CSOs are frequently required to go through informal approval processes with local authorities to carry out their work on the ground, even though the law does not require them to do so.
Do you think the results of the communal elections will be replicated in the upcoming national elections?
The results of the commune and sangkat council elections can be regarded as a predictor of the results of the next National Assembly elections, scheduled to take place in July 2023. They confirm once again that no free and fair election can take place in Cambodia’s current political environment. If attacks on the opposition and civil society continue, the CPP will retain its power in the next election.
What support does Cambodian civil society need from international organisations?
Cambodian civil society needs more attention from the international community on critical human rights violations and the dwindling state of democracy. International organisations should keep up their efforts to monitor developments in Cambodia closely and extend solidarity with Cambodian civil society, which frequently faces threats and harassment while carrying out their work. Local CSOs also need funding to continue their advocacy and campaigning on the ground.
Civic space in Cambodia is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with the Asian Network for Free Elections through itswebsite orFacebook page, and follow@Anfrel on Twitter. -
Can Democracy Stand Up to the Cult of the Strongman Leader?
By Mandeep Tiwana and Andrew Firmin
Donald Trump’s presidency, recent protests in Russia and South Africa and the referendum to consolidate presidential power in Turkey have reignited debate about an emerging form of macho conservative politics called ‘Putinism’. This new form of politics is shaping contemporary notions of democracy while undermining the international rules-based system and harming civil society.
Read on: Diplomatic Courier
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Chad’s transition to nowhere
By Ine Van Severan, Civic Space Researcher & David Kode, Lead of Advocacy and Campaigns cluster
Chad’s return to civilian rule is under threat. 15 months into a political transition that is supposed to last 18 months, the Transitional Military Council (CMT) has done little to prepare for elections and is repressing voices expressing concern. We are no closer to the possibility of Chad’s caretaker leader, Mahamat Déby, ceding the position his late father, Idriss Déby, held for over 30 years.
On 20 April 2021, when the military assumed power following the killing of Idriss Déby by Chadian rebels, the country was already facing dual challenges from inside and outside the country.
Read on African Arguments
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CHILE: ‘For the first time the extremes are inside the parliament and there are unacceptable undemocratic voices’
CIVICUS speaks with Alberto Precht, executive director of Chile Transparente, about Chile’s presidential elections and their persistent pattern of low electoral turnout. Founded 23 years ago, Chile Transparente is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes transparency in public and private institutions and the fight against corruption.
What have been the peculiarities of this electoral process?
There have been three recent votes in Chile: first, the national plebiscite held in October 2020, in which citizens were asked whether they wanted a new constitution and, if so, which body should be in charge of drafting it; then the elections of representatives to the constitutional convention in May 2021; and now, with the constitutional convention in place, the presidential elections, with the first round held on 21 November and the second round scheduled for 19 December.
These electoral processes have been quite peculiar because each of them has produced quite different results as measured on the left-right ideological axis. On the one hand, a progressive constitutional convention was elected, including a significant hardcore left-wing component. On the other, both in the primary elections and in the first round of the presidential election, a hardcore right-wing candidate, José Antonio Kast, won first place, followed by Gabriel Boric, a progressive candidate running in coalition with the Communist Party.
The political environment is quite polarised, but what is most striking is that between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of Chileans do not show up to vote. This makes the election results very uncertain. Moreover, whoever wins will do so with 13 or 14 per cent of all eligible voters. It is not surprising that there are usually wide currents of anti-government opinion, since the government never represents a majority.
Why do so few people vote?
It is paradoxical, because in the current context one would have expected a higher turnout. The 2021 election for the constitutional convention was the most important election since 1988, and turnout did not reach 50 per cent. The only vote that exceeded that threshold was the 2020 plebiscite, with a 51 per cent turnout, but that was different because it was a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. This low turnout was striking, because although no one expected a 80 or 90 per cent turnout, as was the case in the historic 1988 plebiscite that said ‘no’ to the Pinochet dictatorship, turnout was expected to be closer to 60 per cent.
It is very likely that we will see even lower participation in the second round, even though there are two very clear and distinct options, which would hopefully motivate more people to vote.
In Chile there is a structural problem of low participation. In part, this has to do with the fact that voting is voluntary, but it also has to do with the fact that the political offer is not very attractive. Although the offer has changed a lot and the latest reform in the system used to elect parliamentarians has allowed for greater pluralism, this has not been enough to motivate people to vote. The latest elections have been a rollercoaster and therefore very hard to analyse; the only certainty we have is that at least 50 per cent of Chileans do not feel represented in the electoral system.
How could people be motivated to vote?
Some legal reforms are already being introduced to that effect. The national plebiscite that will take place in 2022, where people will say whether they agree with the new constitution, is going to be a mandatory vote. Additionally, the vote is going to be organised in a georeferenced way, so that people will be able to vote at a polling place within walking distance of their residence.
This is not a minor detail: in Chile, voting places are not assigned according to place of residence, so people, especially low-income people, must take a lot of public transport to get to the polls. Even though it doesn’t cost them money, because it’s free, they have to invest the whole day in going to vote, which many can’t do. These changes will increase participation rates, but it will be very difficult for Chile to reach 80 per cent participation in the short term.
The big questions that no one has been able to answer are who the people who don’t vote are and what they think. Between the constituent convention elections and the presidential election there seems to have been a turnover of voters. Younger voters showed up to vote in the constitutional convention elections, while older voters tended to participate more in the presidential election.
What role does Chile Transparente play in the electoral process?
Chile Transparente has a system of complaints and protection for victims and witnesses of corruption that has been receiving complaints of misuse of electoral funds. Today we are stuck with a very important controversy involving the candidate who came third in the first round of the presidential elections, Franco Parisi. He is a neo-populist candidate whose campaign has been funded in quite opaque ways.
We also work to motivate participation and have participated in observations of local electoral processes that had to be repeated. We receive the support of the European Union for a programme called Transparent Convention, which publicises the functioning of the constitutional convention, highlighting certain issues that might seem relatively opaque and that need to be brought to the public’s attention.
We are one of the few organisations in the country that are active in transparency and anti-corruption issues and we play a very important role alongside investigative journalists.
How are these elections influenced by the protest movement?
The election for the constitutional convention fed off the strength of the 2019 protests; in fact, at one point in the Constitutional Convention came to reflect the people who were protesting. But by the time of the presidential elections, held one year later, only the hangover from the protests remained, and the results were rather a reflection of the people who had suffered the effects and were against the protests.
We need to understand that the mobilisation process has not been purely romantic, but has been accompanied by a lot of violence. Between the pandemic and the protest violence, there are people who have not been able to reopen their businesses, who cannot go to work in peace, who have lost everything. At the same time, we obviously have a debt in terms of human rights violations.
These tensions were expressed at the polls, and we will surely have a heart-stopping second round, in which the competitors are a candidate who represents a hardcore right wing, quite different from the traditional right that has governed in recent years, and a candidate who has formed a coalition with the Communist Party, until now marginal in a political game that has rather gravitated towards the political centre.
What has happened to the established Chilean party system?
There is undoubtedly a weariness with the democracy of the last 30 years, regardless of all the progress the country has made. There are large sectors that believe the centrist consensus that characterised the transition to a so-called ‘democracy of agreements’, consisting of doing what was considered to be within the realm of the possible, does not provide solutions. This has led not only to a social outburst, but also to a conservative reaction. It is a textbook situation: every revolution is followed by a counter-revolution.
On top of this there is a problem of migration management, which has caused a huge electoral shift throughout the country, especially in the north. Chile used to vote for the left and now it voted for two candidates – one from the extreme right and a populist candidate – who proposed harsher measures against migration, such as the construction of border ditches or mass expulsion: nothing could be further from a culture of human rights.
At the same time, the left has lacked any self-criticism. It has not understood how important it is to respond to people’s concerns about insecurity and to attend to the victims of violence. When there is an outbreak of violence, violence victims will vote for those who offer them order. As is well known, in Chile there has long been a major conflict with the Indigenous Mapuche people. There is also conflict with non-Mapuche sectors, often linked to organised crime, who have taken violent action. In those areas, where one would expect a vote for the left, the complete opposite has happened. In certain localities where violence has become endemic, the conservative candidate has received up to 60 or 70 per cent of votes.
What would be the implications for civil society depending on which candidate wins in the second round?
A part of the more traditional press seeks to give the impression that if Boric wins, it will be the advent of communism, while another part claims that if Kast wins, he will take us back to the times of Pinochet. However, thanks to social media and new technologies, alternative media outlets have flourished in recent years. There are more pluralistic television channels and channels with quite diverse editorial lines, which have more nuanced views.
I believe that both alternatives entail risks, because both candidates include within their coalitions people or parties that seek to limit the space for civil society, that adhere to a narrative that the press is financed by international powers, that Chile Transparente serves certain mega-powers, and promote conspiracy theories. Let’s remember that the Communist Party candidate who lost the primary elections against Boric proposed an intervention in the media. For his part, Kast has the support of hardcore Pinochetist elements.
However, in the second round, the two candidates have moved towards the centre to capture the votes they need to win. The groups that followed former President Michelle Bachelet, who initially opposed Boric, are now working with him. On the other side of the spectrum, in order to attract segments of the liberal right, Kast also has had to moderate his discourse.
Perhaps hope lies in parliament acting as a regulator of the two extremes. It is a diverse parliament where no party will have a majority, so whoever gets to govern will have to do so in negotiation with parliament. At the same time, the constituent process, which is still underway, can produce a constitution of unity that would set the conditions for the new president to govern.
The problem is that for the first time the extremes are inside parliament and there are some voices that are unacceptable from a democratic point of view. For example, two deputies elected by the extreme right recently mocked an elected candidate who is transgender. Some not very encouraging positions on human rights have also been expressed by the left. For example, the Chilean Communist Party has just recognised Daniel Ortega as the legitimate president of Nicaragua and continues to recognise Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.
Civic space in Chile is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Get in touch with Chile Transparente through itswebsite or itsFacebook andInstagram profiles, and follow@Ch_Transparente and@albertoprechtr on Twitter. -
CHILE: ‘The million-dollar question is how society will react if a new constitution does not come out of this’
CIVICUS speaks about Chile’s impending constitutional referendum with Julieta Suárez Cao, PhD in Political Science and Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the Catholic University of Chile. Julieta played a leading role in the design and promotion of an innovative electoral system that ensured a gender-parity outcome in the 2021 election for Chile’s Constitutional Convention, for which she received the American Political Science Association’s 2022 Public Engagement with Research Award.
What do you think have been the most novel elements of the Chilean constitutional process?
A novel element has been the formation of the Constitutional Convention itself. While in other parts of the world there had already been experiences such as reserving seats for Indigenous peoples and allowing non-party candidates, in Chile these two elements were combined with a third, gender parity. This had been implemented in Mexico City but had never been done at the national level.
Another novel element has to do with the fact that it this a change of constitution, not a simple reform. It is a profound change starting from scratch, without any kind of agreement having set parameters that determine what can and cannot be changed. The only predetermined things were three key procedures: the two-thirds rule for voting on the norms that would go in the constitution, the so-called entry plebiscite to enable the convening of a constitutional convention and the so-called exit plebiscite, meant to have the new constitution approved.
It is also worth noting that this is a constitutional change taking place in a democratic context, and not in a moment of transition. Although a response to the social and political crisis that Chile is going through, it has not been a hasty reaction to a fleeting situation; the discussion about constitutional reform started long before the 2019 social outburst. Former president Michelle Bachelet had already tried to carry it forward during her last term in office, from 2014 to 2018, but did not succeed. The right wing, which ruled the country under Sebastián Piñera over the following period, warned that it would shelve any constitutional reform initiative, and so it did – until the social outburst forced it to re-evaluate this position, given the need to channel social demands institutionally, by means of a constitution-making process.
What are the divides in the run-up to the 5 September plebiscite on the new constitution?
The way dividing lines have been drawn in the face of the constitutional plebiscite is very interesting. The Constitutional Convention has been extremely transparent, perhaps too transparent, because according to some literature, politics sometimes needs a certain opacity. This, on the other hand, became a sort of constitutional reality TV, a show that was broadcast every day, 24 hours a day. Clearly, the news that made it into the media tended to be about inconsequential and even ridiculous issues, so it did not represent what was really going on there. For example, one convention member proposed to dismantle all state institutions; of course, this never even made it out of the commission, but still made headlines for a long time. Such things created an adverse climate around the Convention, which I think affected the campaign.
Seen in perspective, it was a very dynamic process that in just one year managed to produce a full document for a new constitution. The process was a good one, even if it made public opinion focus on some absurd debates that were magnified by the media.
This climate of opinion ended up shaping two camps. On the one hand, the rejection camp, which includes not only the right wing, but also many centre-left personalities, including many current senators. These are people who have joined the rejection camp for several reasons, and not only because they do not agree with many of the proposed reforms.
In short, the rejection coalition ranges from the far right – which not only exists in Chile, but also reached the second round of the presidential election less than a year ago – to some individuals in the political centre. But it was the latter who became the visible face of the campaign against the constitution.
This has been the result of a good communications strategy that consisted in delegating spokespeople roles to moderate figures while keeping extremists out of sight. They have held almost no marches or public events, because in the run-up to the initial plebiscite such demonstrations included weapons, Nazi flags, swastikas and other images that provoke strong rejection.
For its part, the coalition in favour of the new constitution includes numerous former convention members, most of whom have campaigned in favour of it, deputies, senators and many popular artists. The government is not allowed to participate in the campaign or speak directly in favour of one or other option. For this reason, it only intervened by providing information: in particular, it collaborated with the printing of the new constitution, which is now one of the best-selling books in Chile.
Is Chilean society similarly divided?
Public opinion polls show that Chilean society is not polarised, unlike the elites.
What we see in Chile is asymmetric polarisation, a phenomenon that also occurs in countries such as Brazil and the USA. What creates asymmetrical polarisation is the presence of right-wing extremism. The extreme left is very small: it collects very few votes and has no media presence and no national visibility. The far right, however, has almost been normalised.
What is happening now is that it a referendum is by its very nature polarising, simply because it only provides two opposing options. If a plebiscite takes place in a context where the elites are polarised, it deepens division. For the time being, however, I think its effects have not reached deep into Chilean society.
A few months ago opinion polls appeared to show a majority in favour of approval, but now the opposite seems to be the case. Has the consensus for reform shifted?
I wouldn’t say that reformist consensus has been eroded. Practically nobody defends Pinochet’s Constitution: almost everybody who promotes rejection does so with the argument that rejection must be followed by reform. In other words, almost nobody advocates for keeping the current constitution, although if rejection wins, that is precisely what will happen, at least in the short term. Given the lack of agreement within the rejectionist coalition, its victory would open up a period of enormous uncertainty.
While reformist consensus has not been eroded, a distorted climate of opinion has been created by disinformation campaigns, presenting implausible interpretations of debates and fake news to sow doubts about the contents of the constitutional text. For example, the claim that the new constitution does not protect private property or that Indigenous people would have ‘privileges’ was widely circulated. All of this has interfered with public debate and cast doubt over the viability of the proposal.
What do think are the most positive and the most negative aspects of the new constitution?
Personally, I like the new constitution very much. It establishes a political system with less presidential powers and a better balance between the executive and legislative branches. The current constitution is an authoritarian text that is very biased in favour of the ‘strong man’.
I also like the definition of Chile as a regional state, a sort of intermediate form between the unitary and federal state. Chile is one of the most centralised countries in Latin America and the most centralised among democratic Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries.
The whole agenda of rights and the social state embraced by the new constitution also seems very positive to me. The incorporation of gender parity, a gendered perspective and multiculturalism are great advances. It was high time for plurinationality and Indigenous peoples to be recognised.
The doubts I have concern some issues that are outside my area of expertise, related to some aspects of plurinationality, such as the implementation of differentiated justice systems and Indigenous autonomies. This is also one of the issues that has highest levels of rejection among public opinion, for reasons that include racism, classism and a complex context in the south of Chile, where there is an ongoing conflict between the state and some Indigenous Mapuche communities.
But the truth is, most of these issues are only stated in the constitution and will be subject to ordinary legislation that must come from the current Congress, which has no reserved seats for Indigenous peoples. Therefore, in my opinion, positions on these issues will be tempered and there won’t be any radical changes.
Among the public, it is social rights that have the most support. Few people defend the neoliberal or subsidiary state that Chile currently has, although certain sectors of elites are concerned about the cost of changes: they wonder where the money will come from to finance all these rights, as if this were a good argument for deciding whether or not to recognise a right!
What will happen if the new constitution is approved, and what will happen if it is rejected?
If the constitution is approved the process will continue, as many provisions in the new constitution require additional ordinary legislation. In that case, a process of intense legislative activity will begin to give form to the new constitution’s mandates.
If rejection wins, much will depend on how big its win is. If it wins by a large margin, it will be more difficult for the constitution-making process to continue. If the rejectionist option wins, the government will immediately submit a bill to call for a new election to select convention members. But the approval of such a bill requires over 57 per cent of the votes in both chambers, a majority the government does not have, so it will need the right wing’s votes. The right’s willingness to sit down and negotiate will depend on its margin of victory.
If it wins narrowly, it will try to design a more inoffensive constitution-making process, with a smaller convention, a shorter mandate, no gender parity and no Indigenous peoples or very few reserved seats. If it wins by a landslide, there will be no constitutional convention, but a reform passed through Congress or designed by a commission of experts. We would be back to square one and absolutely everything would have to be renegotiated.
The million-dollar question is how society will react if a new constitution does not come out of this and the process does not continue or continues in a deficient way. I do not dare to venture an answer to this question.
Civic space in Chile is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.
Follow@jujuchi on Twitter.