Civil society in modernising Russia
CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Russia was prepared by the research team of the Centre for Study of Civil Society and the Non-for-Profit Sector of the National Research University “Higher School of Economics”, with support from CIVICUS researchers and programme advisors. The project was funded by National Research University “Higher School of Economics”

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The Centre for Studies of Civil Society and the Non-for-Profit Sector (CSCSNS) of the National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE) in Moscow was the Russian partner for the 2008–2010 Civil Society Index (CSI) project run by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The report contains the results of its research, including a description of the strengths and weaknesses of Russian civil society and the environment in which it develops, as well as recommendations on strengthening civil society in Russia.

Carried out around 40 countries, the CSI is based on applied research about the state of civil society which aims to contribute new knowledge about civil society and its development. CIVICUS is undoubtedly one of the most authoritative platforms for international cooperation in the field of civil society research and development. The CSI project is based on principles of participation and includes a wide range of stakeholders, including active members of civil society, state employees, journalists and others. In implementing the project and disseminating the results, a real contribution can be made in achieving mutual understanding between various interested parties towards strengthening civil society. We hope that this holds true in the case of Russia.

The authors of this report hope it will inform discussions in both expert and wider public circles. Alongside the CSI research methodology, the analysis is informed by empirical data collected on the basis of monitoring Russian civil society since 2006. A few years ago, Russian scientists L. Proskuryakov, E. Vandysheva, N. Belyaeva, E. Bychkova and colleagues attempted to join the CSI project, but found no reliable information which would be representative for the country. However, monitoring carried out since 2006 has been the basis for the expert judgements, conclusions and recommendations featured here.

The report draws a very complex, and in many respects inconsistent, picture. The condition of civil society in Russia is not subject to unequivocal judgements in terms of ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The breadth and variety of the information allows us to depart from simple, sometimes speculative perceptions about Russian civil society. A sincere interest in civil society can tempt us to make too many a priori assumptions, but when the empirical base is rich enough, it is impossible to draw black and white conclusions. The authors of this report felt obliged to inform international audiences not so much about their own points of view as about empirical facts and expert judgements.

Certainly, the picture is not complete. As will be shown, the research tools capture different aspects of the development of civil society unevenly. Nevertheless, the data obtained are sufficient to assert with confidence that Russian civil society is in the difficult process of development, and it has considerable, if yet unrealised, potential. The report analyses this process, and the CSI methodology allows this analysis to be comparative and to be visually represented in the Civil Society Diamond.

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The authors express sincere gratitude to the fundamental research programme of the HSE. It is necessary to distinguish the special role of the Rector of the university, J. Kuzminov, who several years ago initiated a programme of civil society monitoring and made an essential contribution to its methodology. Gratitude is also owed to the organisations that carried out the field stages of information gathering: the Public Opinion Foundation, the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, Public Opinion Research Centre Glas Naroda, Market Up Consulting group and the Limited Liability Company Public Media Research.

Finally we would like to express gratitude to the representatives of CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. They are Tracy Anderson, David Kode, Andrew Firmin, Jacob Mati, Megan MacGarry and Mark Nowottny, who rendered inestimable methodological and organisational support. We hope to continue to work with them in the future.
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### List of Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSCSNS</td>
<td>Centre for Studies of Civil Society and the Non-for-Profit Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Civil Society Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSE</td>
<td>National Research University “Higher School of Economics”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUB</td>
<td>Russian Ruble/Rouble</td>
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</table>
The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) is a participation-oriented, action-research project that assesses the state of civil society across a wide range of countries with the aim of strengthening civil society and creating a knowledge base. The index is initiated and realised by and for the good of civil society organisations (CSOs). The Russian CSI partner is the Centre for Study of Civil Society and the Non-for-Profit Sector of the National Research University “Higher School of Economics”.

The significant economic, social and political changes of the last 20 years have essentially transformed Russian civil society. Despite this, civil society still lacked an adequate conceptual definition and description or a nuanced assessment of its status. Within the scope of the CSI project in Russia a working definition was used which understood civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests. This definition underlines both the institutionalised order of civil society and the informal nature of its formation.

The CSI assessment of civil society was carried out with respect to five key dimensions, with a total of 28 sub-dimensions which encompass 67 separate indicators. A wide range of research methods and analytical tools were used in this assessment, including three surveys, five case studies, focus group discussions and other consultation activities, as well as diverse secondary data sources.

The CSI measures the following five core areas:
(1) Civic Engagement: the level of individual participation in social and political organisations and fields.
(2) Level of Organisation: the degree of institutionalisation that characterises civil society.
(3) Practice of Values: the extent to which civil society is seen to internalise and model positive values.
(4) Perception of Impact: the perceived social and policy impact of civil society, according to both internal and external perceptions.
(5) External Environment: the status of socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural conditions which influence the scope of activity of civil society.

These measurements are plotted graphically in the CSI Diamond, which is one of the best known elements of the project. The size of the diamond offers an empirical picture of the state of civil society in Russia. The external environment is visually presented in a circular form because it is not considered as a part of civil society’s status but rather as an external factor which remains a crucial element for its well-being.

The diamond shows a relatively high score for the level of organisation of civil society. This proves that it is relatively institutionalised and stable, offering civil society a reasonable platform on which to do its work. However, the research also tells us that CSOs do not achieve a high degree of impact or significantly contribute to socio-political change in Russia, not least because of the lack of systematic interaction with authorities. This report therefore recommends that state authorities expand their interaction with CSOs and legislate to improve civil society’s environment.
The research tells us that participation in civil society activities is not a typical behavioural practice for citizens of Russia. Civic participation in Russia is limited and there are low levels of trust in CSOs. Therefore strengthening this sphere is recommended, through the use of modern methods of encouraging participation, promoting civil society work more widely, and raising awareness of the best practices of CSO activity. Civil society in Russia is also found not to be a reliable conductor through which society’s issues reach the elite and elite decisions find a way to feedback to society. It is recommended that this problem be addressed by an expansion of civil society interaction with authorities.

More encouragingly, the report finds that there is currently governmental interest in and therefore opportunity for strengthening the influence of CSOs. In the light of this, it is necessary for all interested parties (CSOs, authorities and business) to collaborate towards the encouragement of this positive trend and to make the most of the opportunity it presents for the all-around development of civil society in Russia.
1. Project background

The CSI first emerged as a concept over a decade ago as a follow-up to the 1997 New Civic Atlas publication by CIVICUS, which contained profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (Heinrich and Naidoo, 2001). The first version of the CSI methodology, developed by CIVICUS with the help of Helmut Anheier, was unveiled in 1999. An initial pilot of the tool was carried out in 2000 in 13 countries1. The pilot implementation process and results were evaluated, leading to a revision of the methodology. Subsequently, CIVICUS successfully implemented the first phase of the CSI between 2003 and 2006 in 53 countries worldwide. This implementation directly involved more than 7,000 civil society stakeholders (Heinrich, 2008).

Intent on continuing to improve the research-action orientation of the tool, CIVICUS worked with the Centre for Social Investment at the University of Heidelberg, as well as with partners and other stakeholders, to rigorously evaluate and revise the CSI methodology for a second time before the start of this current phase of CSI. With this new and streamlined methodology in place, CIVICUS launched the new phase of the CSI in 2008 and selected its country partners, including both previous and new implementers, from all over the globe to participate in the project. Table I.1 below includes a list of implementing countries in the current phase of theCSI.

1 The pilot countries were Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Wales.
I. THE CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT

2. Project approach

The current CSI project approach continues to marry assessment and evidence with reflection and action. This approach provides an important reference point for all work carried out within the framework of the CSI. As such, CSI does not produce knowledge for its own sake but instead seeks to directly apply the knowledge generated to stimulate strategies that enhance the effectiveness and role of civil society. With this in mind, the CSI’s fundamental methodological bedrocks which have greatly influenced the implementation that this report is based on, include the following:

- **Inclusiveness**: The CSI framework strives to incorporate a variety of theoretical viewpoints, as well as being inclusive in terms of civil society indicators, actors and processes included in the project.
- **Universality**: Since the CSI is a global project, its methodology seeks to accommodate national variations in context and concepts within its framework.
- **Comparability**: The CSI aims not to rank, but instead to comparatively measure different aspects of civil society worldwide. The possibility for comparisons exists both between different countries or regions within one phase of CSI implementation and between phases.
- **Versatility**: The CSI is specifically designed to achieve an appropriate balance between international comparability and national flexibility in the implementation of the project.
- **Dialogue**: One of the key elements of the CSI is its participatory approach, involving a wide range of stakeholders who collectively own and run the project in their respective countries.
- **Capacity development**: Country partners are firstly trained on the CSI methodology during a three day regional workshop. After the training, partners are supported through the implementation cycle by the CSI team at CIVICUS. Partners participating in the project also gain substantial skills in research, training and facilitation while implementing the CSI in-country.
- **Networking**: The participatory and inclusive nature of the different CSI tools (e.g. focus groups, the Advisory Committee, the National Workshops) should create new spaces where very diverse actors can discover synergies and forge new alliances, including at a cross-sectoral level. Some countries in the last phase have also participated in regional conferences to discuss the CSI findings as well as cross-national civil society issues.
- **Change**: The principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, the CSI framework seeks to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed and to generate information and knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

### Table I.1: List of CSI implementing countries 2008–2011*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Albania</th>
<th>14. Ghana</th>
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<td>2. Argentina</td>
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<td>9. Croatia</td>
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<td>10. Cyprus</td>
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<td>12. Democratic</td>
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<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>26. Mexico</td>
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<td>13. Georgia</td>
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<td>30. Russia</td>
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<td>38. Ukraine</td>
<td>39. Uruguay</td>
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<td>40. Venezuela</td>
<td>41. Zambia</td>
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*Note that this list was accurate as at the publication of this Analytical Country Report, but may have changed slightly since the publication, due to countries being added or dropped during the implementation cycle.
These dimensions are illustrated visually through the Civil Society Diamond (see Figure I.2), which is one of the most essential and well-known components of the CSI project. To form the Civil Society Diamond, 67 quantitative indicators are aggregated into 28 sub-dimensions which are then assembled into the five final dimensions along a 0–100 percentage scale. The Diamond’s size seeks to portray an empirical picture of the state of civil society, the conditions that support or inhibit civil society’s development, as well as the consequences of civil society’s activities for society at large. The context or environment is represented visually by a circle around the axes of the Civil Society Diamond, and is not regarded as part of the state of civil society but rather as something external that still remains a crucial element for its wellbeing.

3. CSI Implementation

There are several key CSI programme implementation activities as well as several structures involved, as summarised by the figure below. The major tools

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For a detailed discussion on each of these steps in the process, please see J Mati et al (cited in footnote 2).

![Figure I.2. CSI diamond](image-url)

![Figure I.3.1. CSI project implementation stages](image-url)
and elements of the CSI implementation at the national level include:

- Multiple surveys, including: (i) a Population Survey, gathering the views of citizens on civil society and gauging their involvement in groups and associations; (ii) an Organisational Survey measuring the meso-level of civil society and defining characteristics of CSOs; and (iii) an External Perceptions Survey aiming at measuring the perception that stakeholders, experts and policy makers in key sectors have of civil society’s impact.
- Tailored case studies which focus on issues of importance to the specific civil society country context.
- Advisory Committee meetings made up of civil society experts to advise on the project and its implementation at the country level.
- Regional and thematic focus groups where civil society stakeholders reflect and share views on civil society’s role in society.

Following this in-depth research and the extensive collection of information, the findings are presented and debated at a National Workshop, which brings together a large group of civil society and non-civil society stakeholders and allows interested parties to discuss and develop strategies for addressing identified priority issues.

This Analytical Country Report is one of the major outputs of the CSI implementation process in Russia, and presents highlights from the research conducted, including summaries of civil society’s strengths and weaknesses as well as recommendations for strengthening civil society.
II
CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

1. The concept of civil society in Russia

Research on civil society in Post-Soviet Russia is characterised by a variety of disciplinary and methodological approaches. Russian social scientists emphasise that the concept of civil society lacks theoretical clarity (Andronova, 2004; Volodin, 2000; Kapustin, 2011; Mezhuev, 2008; Savinkov, 2007) and that there is no single understanding of the nature of its institutions. The meticulous researcher could count tens or even hundreds of definitions of civil society (Motroshilova, 2009: 14).

Within the framework of the CSI project, the functional CIVICUS definition is used. According to this definition, civil society is understood as the arena outside of family, state and market which is created by means of individual and collective activities and by organisations and establishments for advancing common interests. This definition emphasises the institutional order of civil society and the informal character of its formation.

2. History of civil society in Russia

The history of Russian civil society can be considered in four stages. The first stage of the institutionalisation of Russian civil society (1760–1860) was marked by the creation of public organisations related to science, literature, the arts, leisure and charitable activities. One of the largest scientific societies established during this time was the Russian Geographical Society (1845), devoted to the study of the lands, peoples and resources of the Russian empire. The Society organised a series of geographical expeditions, conducted statistical work and in the years of Alexander II’s reforms, its members were at the heart of the structural transformation of Russian statehood, the social system and the legal system.

The second stage (1861–1917) was distinguished by professionalism, democratisation, and expansion of the activity of Russian civil society. The reforms of the 1860s ending serfdom in Russia and changing the legal system gave basic civil rights to people and delegated powers in the areas of local governance and justice. When members of scientific and education societies offered aid to starving peasants in the famine of 1891 to 1892, they took on characteristics of modern social movements which were accepted by government.

Civil society’s development was based on rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, the ‘westernisation’ of Russian cities, and development of communication media which accelerated information exchange and the translation of cultural achievements. The industrial revolution and extension of the railways throughout Russia led to the growth of scientific and technical societies. Examples include the Russian Technical Society in St Petersburg and the Society of Distribution of Technical Knowledge in Moscow. The demand for the development of public health services and a national education system led to an explosion of medical societies, educational societies and teachers’ organisations at the end of the 19th Century (Tumanova, 2008: 45–47).

Relations between public organisations and public authorities during the pre-revolutionary period developed on the basis of complementary systems. Early civil society organisations addressed social services such as social security, education, science and public health, which the state did not provide or provided poorly. These organisations engaged in social security through rendering financial aid (granting of loans, grants and pensions to members who
lost work capacity) and intellectual aid (establishing libraries, arranging performances, concerts and evenings) to the representatives of various professional groups: traders, craftsmen, doctors, medical assistants and teachers among others (Tumanova, 2010: 104–105).

In the early 20th Century, Russian civil society experienced qualitative development as laws on the formation and activity of public organisations were introduced, and the importance of public initiative and self-organisation was recognised by the state. On the basis of new regulations, between 1906 and 1909, about 4,800 societies, unions and organisations were formed (Anufriev, 1917: 39). However, neither institutionalised forms of civil activity nor the willingness of the state to respond to society were sufficient to meet the mood of public protests that developed in the run-up to the October Revolution in 1917. This led to the establishment of the revolutionary parties.

The third stage of the institutionalisation of Russian civil society (October 1917 to the mid-1980s) was characterised by the nationalisation of civil society institutions. The state required state-oriented CSOs which were to drive the foundation of socialism. Resources were granted for voluntary activity in ideologically neutral areas, such as environmental protection (Yakobson and Sanovich, 2009: 23). In particular the 1920s saw the growth of organisations, societies and unions in areas where there were no state bodies, such as sports, radio and civil aviation. Unions of creative practitioners were established in the first years of the Soviet government, and the social base of organisations expanded: intellectuals joined trade unions and proletarian representatives joined scientific organisations. Organisations attracted attention to important social issues, such as literacy and education, alcoholism, the environment and civil rights. They offered alternative ways of solving social problems. But many initiatives did not receive state support as the Soviet authorities doubted the utility of voluntary movements and the reliability of their participants. The basis for the continuation of organisations’ activity was their recognition of Soviet power and the supervising role of the Communist party, as well as submission to the rules of the new system and re-registration of statutory documents.

In the late 1920s and 1930s, the number of organisations fell dramatically. The societies, associations and unions of creative professionals were shut down. New societies were created without independence or voluntary characteristics; rather they became part of the government machine. Eventually, only the Red Cross and Children’s Friend remained from the original social assistance societies (Korzhikhina, 1997: 288). Among the pre-revolutionary societies, prestigious scientific organisations such as the Russian Geographical Society continued their work.

During the Soviet period, priority was given to development of new types of mass organisations, pseudo-CSOs such as the Osoaviakhim (Union of Societies of Assistance to Defence and Aviation-Chemical Construction of the USSR), the Union of Atheists, and the Society of Friends of the Soviet Cinema. Mass societies encompassed around ten million citizens. Their existence and activity depended on support from the authorities, and the supervising structures of the Party and these organisations were merged. All these features were typical in the new Soviet republic (Kiselyova, 1998: 204).

With the beginning of the thaw of the 1960s, public activity in science and culture grew and civil society activity increased considerably, as did its impact on all areas of political life. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, 40 new unions emerged, including unions of veterans, designers and children (Korzykhina and Stepanski, 1988: 406).

A fundamentally new phenomenon was the dissident movement which would play a prominent role in shaping post-Soviet civil society. It included various forms of resistance to the communist regime. Its members wrote and distributed artistic, journalistic and academic works criticising the regime, and established philosophical and religious circles. Attempts made to create political and human rights organisations were met with severe persecution by the authorities. Indeed, any form of participation risked imprisonment. Being under constant harassment, the dissident movement remained small, but received sympathy from educated sections of society and had considerable impact on the political atmosphere. Rejection of the communist regime united people with different, sometimes diametrically opposed, views. The dissidents became the forerunners not only of more or less liberal-oriented social movements of the post-Soviet period but also, for example, of religious fundamentalists in some former Soviet republics.

The fourth stage of institutionalisation took place between the end of 1980s and the present. Under conditions of economic stagnation and a crisis of legitimacy of power, ideas were posed about whether it was necessary for the state to intervene so much in economic and social life.
From the middle of the 1980s, organisations were characterised by rapid development (Korzhykhina and Stepanskiy, 1988: 431). By the end of the 1980s there were dozens of ecological societies and hundreds of teenage and family clubs. According to some calculations, 7–8% of the urban population over 14 years old was involved in such initiatives (Zhukov et al., 1988: 97). In the 1990s the sharp fall in living standards necessitated the creation of many organisations and self-help groups. Fewer state resources for welfare encouraged the creation of public associations to support culture, art, science and education. Preferential policy for various types of associations, such as associations for people with disabilities, acted as a stimulus for their establishment. The adoption of the Soviet law on public associations, and of the laws of the Russian Federation regulating activities of public associations and charitable organisations, promoted the creation of CSOs.

In the 1990s, foreign donors supported civil society. They not only gave funds, but also facilitated the cultural transfer of a Western, primarily American, model of civil society by means of training programmes. The role of the state was reduced to benevolent non-interference; state budgetary support for CSOs was insignificant (Yakobson and Sanovich, 2009: 26). If the early 1990s saw a dependence of imported models of civil society, the second half of the decade saw a process of ‘import substitution’ of institutes and resources. Financing CSOs became a domestic role which weakened the influence of foreign donors, and both citizen self-organisation and philanthropic business activity increased (Yakobson, 2007).

3. Mapping of Russian civil society

Our definition of civil society contains the concept of the basis of civil society, which refers to the people already engaging in social practices of civil society and people who are the focus of such engagement (Mersiyanova, 2009). According to the research (see source 7 in Annex 4), the basis of Russian civil society makes up not less than 90% of the adult population and consists of four groups, depending on the extent of civic engagement.

The first group, called the ‘core’ of civil society consists of 7.7% of adult Russians who reported the following: membership or engagement in activities of associations, civil initiatives and other non-state, non-commercial organisations; involvement in voluntary work or philanthropy; a readiness to unite with other people for joint actions where their ideas and interests coincide; and a certain level of knowledge of civil initiatives and organisations of civil society.

Nearly every fourth adult Russian (26.6%) belongs to the second group, called ‘the satellite’ – those who do not participate in CSO activity or civil initiatives, but are ready to unite with others for joint actions, are engaged in charity in a broad sense, and are informed about CSOs and civil initiatives.

The third group represents the intermediate link between the core and the periphery: this ‘buffer’ group is made up of 26.5% of Russians. These people are potentially ready to unite for joint action, but do not really participate, are not engaged in private charity or voluntary work and are not well-informed about the work of existing organisations.

At the ‘periphery’ of the social base are 30.4% of adult Russians not ready to associate with others to achieve collective goals, but who still tend to engage in charitable activity and know about the existence and activities of CSOs.

Finally, the group of ‘outsiders’ includes 8.8% of those showing no sign of belonging to the above described basis of civil society.

Opportunity for the development of Russian civil society lies with the expansion of the two core groups, by encouraging movement by members of the ‘buffer’ group.

The institutional structure of Russian civil society is represented by non-governmental, non-commercial organisations. According to the Russian Statistics Committee, the total number of non-governmental, non-commercial organisations in the Russian Federation as of 1 January 2009 was about 360,000. According to calculations, the share of functioning
CSOs in the total number of officially registered organisations does not exceed 38% (Mersiyanova and Yakobson, 2007). Therefore, civil society in Russia is estimated to include approximately 136,000 active CSOs. The classification of CSO by activity contains 24 groups (see Annex 5).

The development of civil society in Russia is influenced by a number of factors reviewed below, including state policy, the economy, communication practices and education levels.

In the opinion of the authors of this report, state policy on civil society is represented by legal frameworks, the contribution of state resources, and the formation of channels of communication between the state and civil society. In the last 10 to 15 years fundamental changes in the attitude of the state to civil society have been observed. In many ways, this relationship remains contradictory and in essence, is really just being formed.

Since 2005, the authors believe, there has been a shift from state indifference toward selective support for a limited circle of organisations, and from suspicion of organisations receiving funds from abroad towards some attempts at constructive interaction. Among the most noticeable manifestations have been the creation of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, the implementation of state-supported monitoring of the condition of civil society, the introduction of state grants for CSOs, revision of legislation regulating the activity of CSOs (cancelling unreasonable restrictions), and the inclusion of well-known human rights activists in the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights. These developments are partly motivated by desires to harness the resources of civil society to help solve Russia’s social problems, and partly stem from the authorities’ aspiration to continue building a legal democratic state. The state’s changed approach has improved conditions for the development of civil society, while not resolving tensions that occur around political actions, such as human rights activities or advocacy on pressing social issues.

Economic factors contributing to the development of civil society in Russia include the gradual growth of individual and corporate philanthropic resources, new practices of corporate social responsibility and voluntary work. State support is available for civil society work in social arenas; but large specialised foundations providing resources for civil society activities, independent of the state or leading corporations, do not yet exist. Any further strengthening of the resource base of civil society will be closely connected with the general condition of the national economy, including the ability to modernise from a growth model based on raw materials extraction. The global economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 demonstrated the vulnerability of the resource base of Russian civil society.

The high education level of the Russian population is potentially a factor in developing civil society. In higher education institutions there is professional training for CSOs, while the theory and practice of CSO-state interaction forms part of state and municipal government training programmes. However, considerable work needs to be done to develop moral citizenship, civil competence and engagement in practices of charity and voluntary work in the context of continuous education.
III
ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

1. Civic Engagement

The Civic Engagement dimension of the CSI has indicators for public involvement in CSO activities, community engagement and individual activism. Civic Engagement is defined as the extent, depth and diversity of public involvement in both socially-based and politically-based activities. The CSI Population Survey (source 1 in Annex 4) is the primary data source for these indicators. The total value for this dimension is rather low, at 33.7%.

Table III.1. Civic Engagement dimension scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic Engagement</th>
<th>33.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of socially-based engagement</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth of socially-based engagement</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of socially-based engagement</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of political engagement</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth of political engagement</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of political engagement</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.1. Extent of socially-based engagement

Indicators for the extent of public engagement show the level of involvement of the population in social activities and with socially-oriented CSOs, such as religious, sports, recreational, art, musical, educational and charitable organisations. Three indicators are used: 1) The percentage of Russians who are members of socially-oriented organisations; 2) The percentage of Russians volunteering in these organisations; 3) The percentage of Russians involved in local community activities. The overall value is just 13.9%.

The share of the population participating in the activities of socially-oriented organisations is 8.8%.

1.2. Depth of socially-based engagement

The most common activities are those of sports and recreational organisations (65%), while much lower percentage are activities with art, musical and educational organisations (22%) and religious organisations (21%). Only 6% of respondents participate in the activities of charitable organisations or foundations.

Only 4.6% of the population take part in CSO activities as volunteers. Among these, every second person volunteers in a sports or recreational organisation (49%), every third is a member of a religious organisation (33%), approximately every fourth person volunteer with a musical, art or educational organisation (23%), while only every tenth volunteer is a member of a charitable organisation or fund (10%).

The share of people involved in the local community (measured by time spent socially at sports clubs or voluntary/service organisations) (28.3%) is about three times higher than the share of those involved in socially-based CSO activities. It is quite possible that the people who do so are the ones most likely to become volunteers or participants in CSO activities in the future.

Figure III.1.1. Extent of socially-based engagement
III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

bers of more than one such CSO; 2) The share of volunteers in socially-based organisations who volunteer at more than one organisation; 3) The share of people participating in the activity of their local community who do so more than once a month (see figure III.1.2)\(^4\). Together these indicators give a score of 35.9%.

\[\text{Figure III.1.2. Depth of socially-based engagement}\]

15.4% of the population participating in the activity of CSOs do so with more than one CSO. Most of these participate in art, musical and educational organisations.

The figures tell us that the vast majority of volunteers are involved in the work of only one organisation. However, half the volunteers engaged with charitable organisations and foundations are involved in voluntary activities with other organisations.

At least 75% of citizens participating in local community activities do so at least once a month.

1.3. Diversity within socially-based engagement

The indicator for diversity within socially-based engagement compares the share of representatives of typically marginalised social groups (women, people with low incomes, ethnic minorities, people living in rural areas) among respondents participating in the activity of socially-orientated CSOs with their distribution in the adult population as a whole.

The value is 81.3%, meaning that in the overwhelming majority of cases, distribution of specified groups among participants in socially-based activity coincides with their distribution in the population as a whole. This suggests there are few significant barriers for citizen engagement in socially-based activity.

Women are generally more active than men as members and volunteers in socially-oriented organisations. Near gender balance is noted only among active members of sports and recreational organisations (47% women and 52% men); otherwise the share of women reaches nearly 70% of the active members of other organisations.

However, background research conducted for the civil mapping exercise reveals that people who belong to the group labelled the ‘core’ of civil society tend to live in large cities, have a high educational level and reasonable income levels. It seems safe to assume people of low income levels may be under-represented in civic activities. Furthermore, figures here may be skewed by complex notions of ethnicity in Russia, where ethnic Russians are in the minority in some regions. Ethnic identities are also one of the identities that people sought out when they strove for post-soviet identities (Offe, 1996).

1.4. Extent of political engagement

Indicators for the extent of political engagement demonstrate the degree of involvement in politically-oriented activities or activities of organisations engaged in protecting and advancing the rights and freedoms of citizens. According to the CSI methodology, such politically-oriented organisations include trade unions, political parties, environmental organisations, professional associations and consumer societies. Three indicators are used: 1) The share of people who are members of politically-oriented CSOs; 2) The share of people who are volunteers in such organisations; 3) The share of people involved in political activism, such as signing open letters or petitions or engaging in boycotts or demonstrations (see Fig. III.1.3).

\[\text{Figure III.1.3. Extent of political engagement}\]

The overall score is just 6.8%. The share of respondents who are members of politically-oriented organisations is 7.9%. Three quarters of these participate in activities of trade unions, 15% in political parties and 10% in professional associations. Less than

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\(^4\) The values of the given indicators are calculated as percentages of the number of people participating in the activity of at least one CSO with a social orientation.
3% of respondents participate in activities of ecological organisations or consumer rights organisations.

According to the CSI Population Survey a mere 2.9% of the population volunteer in politically-oriented CSOs. Among these, 59% volunteer with trade unions, 27% with political parties and 12% with professional associations. Only every tenth volunteer participates in activities of charitable organisations and funds.

9.5% of respondents demonstrated political activity in the past five years. It is interesting to note that there are no discernible social and demographic differences between these people and the general sample. This implies that the level of political activism could be scaled up.

1.5. Depth of political engagement

Depth of political engagement is calculated through three indicators: 1) The share of the politically-engaged who are members of more than one politically-oriented organisation; 2) The share of volunteers who volunteer for more than one politically-oriented organisation concurrently; 3) The share of politically-active citizens who took part in more than one kind of political activity for the past 5 years (see figure III.1.4).

![Figure III.1.4. Depth of political engagement indicators](image)

The overall value for the depth of political engagement is a low 8.6%. This is constituted as: 9.5% of respondents take part in the activity of more than one politically-oriented organisation, 5.2% are volunteers in such organisations, and 11.1% participated in at least two kinds of political practices for the past five years.

1.6. Diversity of political engagement

The diversity of political engagement indicator shows the share of representatives of typically marginalised social groups including, for example, women and people with low incomes within the total sample of respondents participating in the activities of politically-oriented organisations in comparison with their distribution in the adult population as a whole.

The value of the indicator is 55.8%, meaning more than half of the time the distribution of the specific groups among the participants in politically-oriented activities coincides with their distribution in the population. This suggests there are no major barriers preventing citizens in these specific groups from engaging politically. However, the above caveats on diversity of social engagement with regard to urban, educated, wealthier people also apply here.

Conclusion

As a whole, the value for the CSI civic engagement dimension Diamond is 33.7%. This means that civic engagement is quite low, and in the view of participants in the research several reasons can be advanced for this.

One reason may be a lack of public trust in CSOs. Just one third of the people surveyed in the Geo Rating Survey (see source 5 in Annex 4) trust CSOs of at least one kind; only 4% trust CSOs of more than five kinds.

In addition, low levels of trust in political institutions in general could cause low levels of political involvement. In particular, political parties have a negative trust rating among Russians: the share of those who do not trust them exceeds the share of those who do by 16%. The largest party, United Russia, is closely connected to the state. The most powerful opposition party, the Communist Party, is strongly compromised by its past.

Moreover, the authors of the report observe a few negative phenomena in Russia. Firstly, there are servile organisations built from above by the party in power or other political groups that are focused on discrediting political opponents in rather dubious ways. Neither founders nor members of these organisations are interested in public recognition of their activities. Secondly, there are coalitions of opposition groups which arise quickly and disappear just as fast, being established only for short-term political goals. Thirdly, there are strikes arranged by informal unions, the full extent of which is not captured in official statistics. Fourthly, there are various sorts of extremist, nationalist, and sometimes semi-criminal associations focused on goals which are obviously
not directed at public well-being but which indirectly or directly impact on the formation of political tendencies. The most vivid example of this is represented by the disorder in Manezhnaya Square in Moscow.5

However, while there are low levels of involvement in formal voluntary work connected with CSO activities, a more positive picture emerges if volunteering outside formal CSO structures is examined. The Geo Rating Survey asked respondents: “Have you been engaged for the past two to three years, in addition to your primary activity, with non-compulsory and unpaid work for the benefit of other people (without taking family members and close relatives into consideration)? If you have, how often?” Nearly two thirds of respondents said that they had not (63%), while one third of people reported that they had worked for the benefit of other people (33%). There is also a differentiation of involvement of Russians in voluntary activity according to the regions (see figure III.1).

However, deeper research investigating volunteering in Russia conducted by the CSCSNS in 2009 (see source 6 in Annex 4) shows that volunteer engagement is much more widespread. This study showed that 61% of Russians took part in at least one kind of voluntary activity during the past year; 37% participated in one or two kinds of activities; every tenth – in three; every fourteenth – in four kinds of activities.

Furthermore, despite a generally low level of formal voluntary activity, increased activity is evident in periods of crisis. When natural fires spread across Russia in 2010, CSOs showed their capabilities as catalysts of constructive public activity under emergency conditions. It is possible that the level of public activity in stable periods is sufficient, but that it is capable of mobilising quickly under conditions of instability.

2. Level of Organisation

The Level of Organisation dimension allows us to understand the level of institutionalisation of Russian CSOs. Indicators reflect internal governance, resources, sectoral communication and international contacts and are largely based on data from the CSI

5 Moscow saw a virtual race riot, which broke out on Manezhnaya Ploshchad on 11 December 2010, during a memorial rally held by 5.000 football fans and nationalists for Spartak fan Yegor Sviridov, who was killed in a fight with North Caucasus representatives. http://www.themoscownews.com/politics/20101213/188276816.html.
Organisational Survey (OS) (see source 2 in Annex 4). The overall value is an average 51.4%.

**Table III.2. Level of Organisation dimension scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Organisation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal governance</td>
<td>87.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral communication</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resources</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial and technological resources</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International linkages</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.1. Internal governance

The internal governance indicator shows the percentage of organisations having a board of directors or other formalised collective management body.

Among the CSOs sampled, 87.4% have collective management bodies. On average, these bodies include 11 persons including founders, heads of organisations, employees and advisors. Women make up 46% of the membership of these bodies.

### 2.2. Support infrastructure

The support infrastructure indicator shows the percentage of organisations that are members of any kind of umbrella organisation or network. The overall value is 32.2%, which is a low score compared to results from other countries. The percentage is higher in the case of associations of legal bodies, religious organisations and public organisations (37–39%) than in the case of independent non-commercial organisations, non-commercial partnerships and funds.

In an additional question added to the standard CSI OS, the overwhelming majority (87%) of CSOs with experience of membership of associations and networks reported that they consider them effective to a greater or lesser degree, and nearly half consider them ‘certainly effective’. Only 8% consider them ineffective to a greater or lesser degree.

### 2.3. Sectoral communication

The sectoral communication indicator shows the percentage of organisations that in the past three months held meetings or exchanged information with other similar CSOs. The results show that a little more than half (54.8%) did so, again a relatively low score compared to other CSI results. On average, each organisation that did so met eight other CSOs. Public and religious organisations were most commonly involved in interaction with other CSOs.

### 2.4. Human resources

The human resources indicator shows the percentage of organisations with stable personnel, defined by CSI as no more than 25% of the resource base being made up of volunteers. 27.3% of CSOs sampled reported stability in their human resources. The majority of CSOs (76%) use volunteers. 40% have no permanent employees (see figure III.2.1).

The share of volunteers and permanent employees differs across different types of organisations. About 25% of sports CSOs have a steady structure of human resources as do nearly 50% of the organisations working on education. Business and professional organisations as well as unions also generally have steady human resources. The organisations in which volunteers are used more actively include those working in the field of social services, public health services or environmental protection as well as philanthropy. In more than 90% of environmental protection organisations, volunteers make up over 25% of the total number of employees.

According to additional questions added to the CSI Organisational Survey (OS), as part of a joint project with Center for Civil Society Studies, John’s Hopkins University, in 2008 volunteering accounted for 3.02% of the economically active population.

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6 The economically active population means people from 15 to 72 years old (in accordance with the methodology of the International Labour Organisation). http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c1e.html.
average, volunteers work 26 hours per month, which means that recalculating for full employment, volunteer manpower is equivalent to 0.42% of the economically active population. If the work of volunteers was remunerated at the same level as the work of hired employees of CSOs, then the cost of voluntary work would be RUB 16.4 billion (US$ 542 million) annually.

According to additional questions in the OS, 1.13% of the economically active population of Russia work for CSOs on a full-time or part-time basis. 79% of CSO employees work a full working week (40 hours). Part-time employees work an average of 16.8 hours per week. Recalculating this to reflect a 40-hour week, the share of Russians working in the civil society sector is 0.89% of the economically active population.

2.5. Financial and technological resources

The financial and technological resources sub-dimension consists of indicators on financial stability and access to technology.

To assess the financial stability of CSOs, subjective estimates of expenditure and incomes from the OS are used. According to estimations by the heads of CSOs for the period 2008–2009, the income of almost 40% of organisations increased, while expenditure increased at almost the same rate. Approximately every third organisation reported a decrease in income for the past year. The situation can be partially explained by the fact that CSO financing is based, along with membership fees (which 44% of CSOs receive), on variable income sources such as voluntary payments and private donations (33%). Figure III.2.2 shows the frequency of other sources of financing of Russian CSOs.

According to responses, the economic crisis of 2008–2009 did not significantly affect the financial stability of CSOs. Over 68% of respondents estimated the economic condition of their organisation had not changed in comparison with the previous year. However, only 4% of respondents said that the economic situation had improved in the past year.

Certain types of organisations were more financially stable than others: 50% of trade unions, 40% of professional and business associations, and over 50% religious organisations said that they had sufficient funds for all, or nearly all, projects.

Accessing a diversity of funding sources remains a challenge. 32% of CSOs have just one source of financing, 42% have two or three and only 21% have more than four. While membership fees are common, these sources generally do not provide sufficient financial resources for project activities. Funds from government authorities are not widely distributed, even though more than half of the heads of CSOs surveyed in the Organisational Survey are confident that they should work as partners with the authorities. In practice, 77% of Russian CSOs cooperate with the authorities in one form or another, but these are mainly non-financial forms of cooperation.

Opportunities for accessing other sources of funding are underused. Often the barrier would seem to be an insufficiently high skill level on the part of employees and heads of CSOs. Only 17% of the heads of CSOs reported in the Organisational Survey that they offer good opportunities to increase the qualifications of employees in fields such as strategic and financial management, bookkeeping and fund-

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7 The information on labour and voluntary resources comes from a Comparative Non-profit Sector Project carried out between CSCSNS and the Center for Civil Society Studies, John’s Hopkins University.
raising. This can be assumed to lead to an inability to convince potential partners, the public and mass media of the importance of their activities, and an inability to attract new human, material and financial resources. More generally, a considerable number of the heads of CSOs require additional training on management beyond that available in the education system.

The second indicator in this sub-dimension describes the level of provision of various technological resources necessary for carrying out CSO activities. The results show a considerable level of access to resources, for example internet access (70%) and telephone facilities (90%).

2.6. International linkages

The international linkages indicator compares the number of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in Russia to the total number of INGOs in the world. The score for Russia is 23.4%, which means there is almost a 1:4 ratio of INGOs in Russia to the global total. The figure is almost certainly lower than it was in the 1990s as economic growth has eased some of the problems foreign donors were concerned with. Expanding national resources, along with more urgent development issues in other countries and regions, caused many INGOs to reduce their activity in Russia. Moreover, a law came into force (17 April 2006) which introduced a number of restrictions on the activity of INGOs in Russia, although it has since been revised to take account of the requirements of Russian CSOs.

Conclusion

The overall value for the Level of Organisation of civil society is 51.4%. This is the highest value among the dimensions, but it still suggests Russian civil society is in a difficult period of organisational formation. Among the relative strengths of Russian civil society is internal organisational management. The majority of CSOs have collective management bodies; more than half have a non-appointed management body making decisions. Moreover, women are not excluded from the governance of CSOs: the OS reports that 46% of members of collective management bodies are women. Russian CSOs increasingly interact with the organisations of similar profile and across sectors in order to develop coordinated positions in their dialogue with the authorities.

The key negative factor in this dimension is the instability of human resources. CSOs have small staffs of permanent employees, and the share of volunteers considerably varies depending on the type of organisation. The most unstable organisations, as established by the CSI measure of ratio of paid staff to volunteers, are those engaged in the field of philanthropy, public health services and environmental protection, over 90% of which have a high percentage of volunteers.

3. Practice of Values

The Practice of Values dimension is based on information from the CSI Organisational Survey (see source 2 in Annex 4). The overall value is calculated from five indicators: principles of democratic decision-making in organisations; application of labour relations; existence of a code of conduct of employees and transparency of financial information; existence of an environmental policy; and the perception of values of civil society as a whole. The overall value for this dimension is a low 39.8%.

Table III.3. Practice of Values dimension scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice of Values</th>
<th>39.8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic decision-making governance</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour regulations</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of conduct and transparency</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental standards</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of values in civil society as a whole</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 Compared to the mid 1990s, numerous institutional bodies have been established to maintain dialogue between the state and civil society. At the federal level the President of the Russian Federation’s Council for the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, along with Ministries’ Civic Councils and All-Russian Civic Forums (the first was set up in 2001) were instituted. At the regional and municipal level civic councils and platforms were founded, and these give CSO representatives an opportunity to offer expertise to the authorities and advocate to influence decisions.
3.1. Democratic decision-making governance

The democratic decision-making governance indicator shows the percentage of organisations in which decisions are made by elected management bodies, members, staff or other means which are considered democratic.

61.2% of CSOs surveyed can be classified as adhering to the principles of democratic decision-making. In 38% of organisations sampled, an appointed head or management body made decisions. Decisions were seldom made by the members of an organisation (5%) or by employees (2%).

The share of organisations adhering to democratic decision-making principles varies considerably by type. For example, elected management bodies are more common for public organisations and organisations engaged in international or religious activities; they are less frequent for public health organisations. There are some types of organisation for which individual decision-making by appointed heads is more usual; these include funds and public health organisations. An elected head most often makes the decision in network organisations of CSO members and in organisations engaged in education and research.

3.2. Labour regulations

The labour regulations indicator shows the share of organisations applying various aspects of labour regulation, such as an equal opportunities policy, level of trade union membership, training for new employees in labour rights, or other policies on labour norms and standards. According to the CSI methodology, the availability of such documents and mechanisms means that there are fair and transparent labour policies in CSOs, consistent with progressive values.

The total value for labour regulations is 45.3%, and figure III.3.1 shows the sub-values for each indicator. As a whole, the provision by Russian CSOs of policies on labour rights can be described as average.

68% of surveyed CSOs have policies in which the equal rights and opportunities of women are affirmed, including the right to equal payment for equivalent work.

Trade union membership is not common among the employees of Russian CSOs. Only 15.4% of paid employees are members of trade unions. The picture differs according to organisation type. Membership is higher in organisations engaged in the field of culture and recreation, organisations providing legal assistance, charitable organisations and business associations (24–30%). Membership tends to be lower in CSOs engaged in the fields of education and research, environmental protection organisations, religious organisations and organisations with an international focus.

52.5% of surveyed CSOs do not carry out special training or instruction with new employees about their labour rights. 50.4% have a policy or guidelines defining norms and labour conditions. Among those that do not have such documents, about 75% did not believe that they should be adopted and made openly accessible. One reason for such low levels of attention to labour rights could be the elaborate Russian Federation’s labour code according to which all organisations in Russia operate, as well as availability of inspectors to monitor fulfilment of the labour legislation.

3.3. Code of conduct and transparency

The code of conduct and transparency indicator shows the transparency of CSOs based on whether they make their code of conduct for employees and financial information accessible to the public. The overall value of the indicator is 34.1% (see figure III.3.2).

Having a publicly accessible code of conduct is most common among organisations engaged in education, research and religion.
42% of CSOs already make their financial information openly accessible. Over half (57%) of those making their financial information accessible do so in their annual report. Another 17% place such information on their websites, and 16% in mass-media publications.

In total, 76% of surveyed CSOs demonstrated different types of transparency in their activity, including arranging press conferences, publishing in mass media (28%), providing information by phone and online (28%), publishing annual reports (25%), using a website (22%), arranging independent audits of financial activity (19%), and publishing annual financial reports (16%).

3.4. Environmental standards

The environmental standards indicator shows the percentage of organisations which have an environmental policy and have made it accessible. Results show that only 18% of CSOs have done so. Naturally, CSOs engaged in environmental protection are the ones most likely to have done this. The majority of organisations which do not have an environmental policy have no plans to devise and publish one in the future. This may correspond to the predominant type of attitude towards the environment in Russia, which is characterised by the adaptation of environmental behaviour to modern life and a distancing of most of the population from participating in solving ecological problems.

3.5. Perceptions of values in civil society as a whole

The fifth indicator looks at the sector as a whole, and invites it to reflect on its own values, specifically: the use of violence in civil society; the role of civil society in advancing democratic decision-making processes; and the frequency of corruption inside civil society. The overall value is 40.2% (see figure III.3.3).

About half of the heads of the CSOs surveyed (53%) thought there were public organisations and movements using violence to express their interests or liable to resort to aggression or physical force. Representatives of religious organisations (63%) and organisations engaged in public health services (75%) were the ones who most often indicated the existence of such elements in Russian civil society. The representatives of foundations (61%) and those engaged in international activity (65%) were most likely to deny that such elements exist. More than half the respondents who thought there were such aggressive forces considered them to be small and isolated groups regularly resorting to violence (39%) or occasionally resorting to violence (26%).

As far as the role of civil society in modelling democratic decision-making is concerned, 49% of the surveyed heads of CSOs consider civil society’s role to be insignificant; including 16% who consider it extremely insignificant. The representatives of organisations engaged in environmental protection were most likely to affirm civil society’s role in advancing democratic principles of decision-making. The heads of organisations engaged in public health services or international activity were least likely to do so.

The third indicator reflects the perception of corrupt practices in civil society. 45% of the heads of surveyed CSOs think that corrupt practices often take place in civil society, including 14% who believe them very frequent. However, almost as many (11%) are at the other end of the spectrum, believing them to be extremely rare. Those engaged in religion and public health services are most likely to perceive corrupt practices among CSOs. Those engaged in international activity are least likely to.

The fourth indicator reflects the perceived presence of racist and discriminatory forces in of civil society. 50.9% of respondents do not know or cannot give examples of the presence of such forces, whereas 11.8% do and can.

The fifth indicator reflects civil society’s condemnation of violence and its isolation of groups that
use it. According to the survey results 66.2% CSOs claim that such forces are isolated, and 25.7% think such forces are completely isolated within civil society. However, 30.7% believe that such forces are significant actors within civil society.

The last indicator reflects the role of civil society in promoting non-violence and peace. 46.1% of the CSO heads surveyed think that civil society has a role in promoting ideas of non-violence and peace. Heads of CSOs engaged in education, research or environmental protection are most likely to affirm civil society’s role in this. Those engaged in international activity and philanthropy are most likely to say that civil society’s role here is insignificant.

Conclusion

The total value of the Perception of Values dimension is 39.8%. Considering that a modern civil culture is still developing, it would be difficult to expect a much higher value in Russia. Encouragingly, more than half of the organisations can be described as using democratic principles of decision-making, and in the same manner, more than half of the organisations have policies regulating labour relations. The majority of organisations surveyed to some extent publish their financial information.

The indicators however show significant failures in Russian civil society. For example, the trade union movement cannot be seen as significant in CSO employer-employee relations, as the majority of those working in civil society are not the members of trade unions. Traditional trade unions have changed slightly since Soviet times, but can be seen to still have neither authority nor trust among employees, while new alternative trade unions are perceived as weak.

CSO policies in the field of labour rights and environmental protection are not widespread, with only a few organisations making these documents accessible to the general public. The overwhelming majority of organisations do not have these policies, and have no plans to adopt and publish them in the future.

According to the research, tolerance, non-violence, and internal democracy are the most highly expressed values. On the other hand, corrupt practices are a considerable problem, with only 15% of organisations not encountering corrupt practices. The generally unfavourable situation around corruption in Russia often compels organisations to interact on the basis of personal contact, with corrupt practices often the only way of survival.

4. Perception of Impact

The fourth CSI dimension shows citizens’, CSOs’ and experts’ perceptions of the impact of civil society. The 17 indicators across seven sub-dimensions reflect internal and external perceptions of civil society’s response to social issues, its social impact and its policy impact (see figure III.4). The results come from the CSI Population Survey, the Organisational Survey and the External Perceptions Survey (see sources 1, 2, 3 in Annex 4). The overall value obtained is a rather low 34.4%, a similarly low level to the civic engagement dimension.

### Table III.4. Perception of Impact dimension scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Impact</th>
<th>34.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness (internal perception)</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social impact (internal perception)</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy impact (internal perception)</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness (external perception)</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social impact (external perception)</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy impact (external perception)</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of civil society on attitudes</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Response to social issues](image)

**Figure III.4. Perception of impact**

### 4.1. Responsiveness (internal perceptions)

The first sub-dimension shows CSOs perceptions of their responsiveness to two of the most important social issues identified in the Population Survey: 12

12 Respondents were asked the question: “Which issues of your town (or village, community) trouble you most of all?” The issue of hard drinking and alcoholism troubles 40% of Russians, the issue of drug addiction 17%, and the issue of municipal improvements and cleanliness of cities 16%. Even more respon-
municipal improvements and hard drinking, alcoholism and drug addiction (see figure III.4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue of municipal improvement</th>
<th>37.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue of heavy drinking, alcoholism, drug addiction extension</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure III.4.1.** Internal perceptions of civil society responsiveness

37.9% of surveyed CSO leaders think that CSOs respond to municipal improvement and community cleanliness issues to an average or a high degree; 18% are of opinion that they do not.

32.5% think that CSOs respond (to a varying degree) to hard drinking and alcoholism issues. However, every fifth respondent thinks that they do not.

**4.2. Social impact (internal perception)**

This sub-dimension reflects CSO perceptions of civil society’s general social impact and impact on the same two social issues (see figure III.4.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General social impact</th>
<th>44.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social impact of own organisation</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure III.4.2.** Internal perception of civil society social impact

In the judgment of CSOs, civil society has had an impact on the following: aid to the poor and underprivileged (36%), education and enlightenment (36%), social development (22%), employment (12%), health protection (11%), housing and community services (9%), humanitarian aid (4%), food (2%), and other issues (17%).

The degree of civil society’s impact on social issues is assessed more highly by heads of CSOs concerned with philanthropy, and less highly by those concerned with international activity, education or research. The respondents most likely to assess their own CSO’s impact as high were CSOs concerned with philanthropy and religion; while CSOs concerned with international activity and environmental issues were more likely to consider their impact less.

**4.3. Policy impact (internal perceptions)**

This sub-dimension shows CSO heads’ perceptions of civil society’s general policy impact, and the estimated impact of their own organisations on political activity and policy (see figure III.4.3).

According to the Organisational Survey, 47.6% of CSOs felt civil society’s general impact on the process of development and political decision-making in Russia, was low. 15% of respondents do not recognise any impact here. 31% consider the degree of civil society impact as medium, and only 3% as high.

The respondents most likely to perceive a medium or high degree of civil society impact were CSOs concerned with philanthropy, education and research. Religious CSOs are most likely to perceive an absence of any impact. A key observation is that CSOs which do not have experience of interacting with local authorities tend to perceive an absence of civil society impact. Organisations which have such experience tend to perceive some policy impact.

In the last two years, only 26% of CSOs surveyed reported advocating for any political decision or policy. Those most likely to have done so were CSOs concerned with philanthropy, education and research. Religious CSOs are most likely to have done so. According to CSOs, in 80% of cases where they backed such policies or decisions, they were accepted. Also 69% of citizens surveyed supported CSO participa-
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In addition to governmental bodies, civil society is involved in social security, education, healthcare, science and cultural issues. Moreover, 55% think that the government’s declared goal of transforming Russia into a leading world power depends directly on CSOs (see source 6 in Annex 4). During the last few years, there were several famous cases that can be considered as best practices of advocacy in Russia. For example, ecologists managed to prevent the irresponsible laying of oil and gas pipes in the vicinity of Baikal Lake. Significant efforts are being made by environmental organizations to change the Forestry Code and to introduce state forest conservation. A Gazprom tower construction project which could have irreparably harmed the architectural character of St.-Petersburg was stopped. In addition, CSO activity influenced several legislative initiatives, including immigration policy being altered and Russian citizenship legislation being changed; new laws on non-military service and penal institutions were adopted; an ombudsman for children was introduced; and a process for humanising criminal procedures was established.

4.4. Responsiveness (external perceptions)

This sub-dimension concerns the perceptions of civil society responsiveness held by people outside civil society but considered knowledgeable about it. The CSI External Perceptions Survey is the source of the data (see source 3 in Annex 4) (see figure III.4.4).

A clear majority (75.7%) of experts assess the responsiveness of CSOs to problems related to hard drinking, alcoholism and drug addiction as weak or non-existent; only 24.3% rate it as medium or strong. However, respondents from the government, including the legislative, executive and judiciary branches, and law-enforcement authorities, assess this responsiveness more highly on average than respondents from international and charitable organisations.

4.5. Social impact (external perceptions)

Civil society’s responsiveness to the second issue – municipal improvement and cleanliness of cities and other settlements – is scored higher by the experts surveyed. Nearly half of this group considered it medium or strong (48.1%), and just over half weak or non-existent (50.9%). Respondents from public authorities (as well as private companies and governmental enterprises) assess it as higher while representatives of international and charitable organisations perceive it as lower.

According to the external experts surveyed, CSOs are mostly active in the fields of charity and philanthropy, including aid to the poor and other unprotected categories of people and humanitarian aid in general. This is the opinion of more than a half (54%) of the respondents13. Among representatives of science and mass media, as well as international and charitable organisations, this proportion accounts for 61%. Regarding the assessment of efficiency and effectiveness on aid to the poor and humanitarian aid, civil society’s impact is assessed as high or medium by a total of 55% of the respondents who mentioned this field in the EPS.

The second ranked field of activity is education (26% of EPS respondents indicated this). The effectiveness of civil society here is assessed as high or medium by more than half (53%) of respondents who mentioned this field.

The activity of civil society in the field of housing and communal services was mentioned in third place.

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13 In this case, calculation of percentages was performed considering joint question design – in other words, respondents had the opportunity to give more than one answer.
by the external experts, and scored in third place, scoring significantly lower than the first two (only 16% of respondents mentioned this field). Only 32% of those gave civil society’s impact a high or medium appraisal.

The impact of CSOs on specific social issues is strong in places but civil society’s impact on the development of the social sphere in general is weak. Only 21% of respondents gave a high or medium appraisal of the impact of CSOs on the state of Russian society, and 76% thought that impact was low or absent. It is significant that impact is rated more highly by authorities (29%), business and governmental enterprises (38%), than by representatives of mass media and science (11%). Among respondents from international and charitable organisations, none rated civil society’s social impact as high or medium.

4.6. Policy impact (external perceptions)

This sub-dimension demonstrates perceptions of the impact of civil society on the policy-making process as a whole, as well as on specific policies (see figure III.4.6).

![Figure III.4.6. External perception of civil society policy impact](image)

Overall, almost half (47.3%) of external stakeholders surveyed perceive civil society as having an impact on specific policy areas and 16.5% see an impact on policy as a whole. More specifically, according to the EPS respondents, CSOs are most active in the following spheres:

1) Protection of civil, political rights and freedoms – 25% stated this was the most active sphere;
2) Participation in elections at all levels – 22% thought this was the most active sphere;
3) Assertion of rights and interests of certain social groups, for example, pensioners, military personnel, and young persons – 18% believed this was the most active sphere.\(^{14}\)

Carrying out political activity such as actions against terrorism and corruption, environmental action, and participation in the creation and development of legal frameworks for CSO activity were mentioned less frequently. A few respondents (5%) mentioned the political apathy of civil society. Representatives of international and charitable organisations (11%) indicated this most often.

Assessments of the impact of CSOs on specific spheres of politics are relatively high. Two thirds (66%) of respondents thought that CSO policy motions are under discussion, have gained acceptance or received approval. Negative reactions – that proposed policies had been ignored – were mentioned by 29% of respondents.

Notwithstanding this comparatively high assessment of CSO activity and efficiency on certain political issues, CSO influence on the process of making political decisions is seen as less profound. According to just 16% of respondents, it is significant or palpable, while 82% think that impact is limited or absent. Representatives of authorities, business and governmental enterprises tend to appraise the political importance of CSOs slightly higher on average than respondents from international and charitable organisations.

4.7. Change in attitudes between members and non-members of civil society

This sub-dimension shows the difference in levels of trust, tolerance and cultural attitudes between members of the Russian population who participate in CSO activities and those who do not, as well as public trust in civil society (see figure III.4.7).

![Figure III.4.7. The impact of civil society on population attitudes](image)

In the CSI Population Survey (source 1 in Annex 4), respondents were asked: “Generally speak-
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ing, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Two answers were offered: “most people can be trusted” and “you need to be very careful”. The percentage of those who participate in CSO activities who think that most people can be trusted is 27%, whereas those not taking part in CSO activities is 18%. The difference suggests that participation in a CSO is making a contribution to social capital generation by helping to foster progressive values and building public trust.

The second indicator evaluates the difference in tolerance levels between those participating and those who are not participating in CSOs. Respondents were questioned about the prospect of living next door to various groups of people: drug addicts, people of another race, people with HIV/AIDS, immigrants/foreign workers, homosexuals, people of other religions, hard drinkers, unmarried couples and people speaking other languages. According to the CSI Population Survey data, there is no significant difference in the level of tolerance for the specified groups among Russians who participate and who do not in activities of CSOs. The tolerance level in both groups does not exceed 67%.

The third indicator examines differences in value systems between members and non-members of CSOs. As indicators of ‘public spiritedness’, four examples were used: attitude of respondents to travelling on municipal public transport without paying fares, receiving benefits to which they are not entitled, evading tax and accepting bribes. On the whole, the level of acceptance of these behaviours is low – on average more than 80% of respondents stated that they do not approve of them to a lesser or greater degree. However, respondents who participate in activity of CSOs intriguingly demonstrate a lower level of the public spiritedness than those who do not.

The final indicator reflects the level of trust in CSOs. According to the CSI Population Survey data, only 8.9% of respondents have high level of trust in civil society, which is a very low figure.

Conclusion

The overall value for this dimension is 34.4%. The general image of civil society is not equal from internal and external points of view. CSOs themselves rate their social and political impact as higher than the scores given by external experts. This surely raises questions of efficiency and communications, when possibly the lack of promotion of civil society activity can lead to lower external perceptions of value.

Participation in CSO activities does not appear to make people more tolerant or public-spirited, though it is associated with higher interpersonal trust. This can be considered as a positive signal, as trust can be hypothesised as one of the most important attitudes which influence people’s participation in civil society.

Most Russians do not trust CSOs, a situation which can only hinder their work. Distrust in institutionalised segments of civil society can be supposed to be one of the drivers behind the kind of informal voluntary work and philanthropy that is harder to capture in the variables included in the CSI. This was demonstrated in 2010 with the spontaneous voluntary response to the unprecedented summer fires in Russia. According to the report of Perm Civic Chamber15, the rapid increase of such informal citizenship initiatives of high ‘social quality’ demonstrates not only effective civil self-organisation, but also self-regulation and actual self-government. For the first time for many years, as part of the response to the fires, society and the state became complementary forces and coordinated joint actions. The atmosphere of working for a common cause was unique in modern Russia.

Thinking back to the first two dimensions, one direction of civil society development is its institutionalisation, the formation of infrastructure to help people realise their needs in civil participation. But institutionalisation should not just mean registering new organisations, even though, according to Russian legislation, officially registered CSOs have more opportunities. The creation of new kinds of associations of concerned people must also include informal social networks.

5. External Environment

The fifth CSI dimension reflects the external economic, social, political and cultural situation. The value is the largest recorded (53.3%) which suggests some potential for civil society development within existing realities. This dimension is formed by three indices and 12 indicators derived from the Population Survey and Organisational Survey, as well as a number of other inputs, including the Social Watch Basic Capabilities Index, the Transparency Interna-

ational Corruption Perception Index, the Gini coefficient and the World Bank Development Indicators.

**Table III.5. Environment dimension scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>53.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic context</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-political context</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural context</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5.1. Socio-economic context**

The Social Watch Basic Capabilities Index is a scale from 0 to 100 which reflects countries’ achievement of social development. This looks at education, children’s health and reproductive health. The higher the score is, the higher the level of social development. Russia scores quite well at 98.5. However, there are many weaknesses. To name a few, the availability of pre-school education is low: more than 1.7 million children have to wait for a kindergarten. The number of children in social orphanages is unacceptably high as a result of inadequate child protection. The number of children in social orphanages is unacceptably high as a result of inadequate child protection. The levels of drug addiction and alcoholism appear to be out of control.

Access to free high quality medical care depends on people’s place of residence, social status and personal relations. There are outrageous disparities in resourcing for healthcare: the difference between regions can be up to 6.5 times. The rights of patients and doctors are not sufficiently protected. According to Civic Chamber report, one third of hospitals and out-patient departments are in disrepair. Corruption is high according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The Transparency International results suggest that corruption is a heavy burden not only for business but also for families, with the most underprivileged and least protected citizens suffering most. According to data from law enforcement authorities for 2003-2009, the numbers convicted of corruption multiplied by 2.5.

According to popular perceptions, corruption is most common in the spheres of law enforcement, healthcare and education. People deemed corruption severe in various registration bodies, including those responsible for land and property regulation. In 2008, a growing number of Russians had to pay a bribe to get a service which is supposed by legislation to be provided to them. Only 7% of those facing bribe demands decided to appeal against the actions of public officials. The outlook for reducing corruption is bleak, as 63% of Russians think that bringing corrupt officials to account is pointless. But, from the same source, it is worth noting that half of respondents are ready to support a business which does not use bribery or

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22 The survey for the Global Corruption Barometer 2009 was held in Russia for Transparency International by Gallup International national branch within the scope of Voice of the People in November 2008. 1.500 men and women aged over 15 were polled. Within the scope of the poll they were asked nine questions related to practices of corruption encountered as well as citizen’s perceptions of levels of corruption in various spheres of Russian society.http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.

other corrupt practices. In other words, the consumer is ready to pay for clear and fair business.

Different surveys show that demand for rooting out corruption is rapidly increasing. In 2009, only 7% of citizens were ready to participate in suppression of corrupt practices of public officers, but in 2010, the number of citizens disposed to report and fight against corruption increased to 52% (Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2010: 6).

The Government can be seen to be making efforts to fight against corruption. An ad hoc council was created under President Medvedev. The President’s initiative on publication of property and income declarations of high-ranking officials and their families was approved by citizens. However, the level of cooperation between government and civil society in the fight against corruption is still low.

The third indicator concerns the level of inequality in society and is based on the Gini coefficient\(^\text{24}\). The value of the coefficient for Russia shows an unacceptably vast gap between the incomes of the 20% richest and 20% poorest citizens. Families with many children and people from rural areas or regions with high unemployment rates are hard pressed. Inequality of incomes must be addressed not only across different social groups but across Russia’s regions.

The fourth indicator is based on the ratio of external debt to Gross National Product (GNP), as sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators\(^\text{25}\). During the eight years up to 2008, macroeconomic indicators in Russia were improving. In 2008, Russia’s GNP was the sixth highest in the world after the USA, China, Japan, India and Germany. According to data from the Russian Ministry of Finance, the public debt as of 1 January 2009 was $40.6 billion. In relative terms, Russian external public debt was just 2.4% of GNP. In comparison, after the financial and economic crisis of 1998, Russia’s external debt was 146.4% of GNP.

5.2. Socio-political context

The socio-political context indicators examine the following contextual factors: political rights and freedoms; rights of association and assembly; the rule of law; legislative regulations and state efficiency (see figure III.5.2).

These results show the presence of some restrictions in rights and freedoms, as well as scope for increasing state efficiency.

In line with CSI project methodology, data from Freedom House was used. According to Freedom House, political rights and freedoms in Russia were at a low level in 2008: 8 points on scale from 0 to 40 (Freedom House, 2008).

Within the sphere of rule of law, Freedom House finds serious divergence between laws and their practical realisation, as well as an insignificant degree of independence of the judiciary from the legislature and executive. A score of 4 points out of 16 leads Freedom House to classify Russia as a ‘non-free country’. It must however be said that many Russian experts have doubts about the methodology and survey results of Freedom House; there are questions about the approach to formation and interpretation of quantitative assessments which seem to be excessively subjective and sometimes seem to reflect political sympathy or antipathy to particular countries.

According to the CSI Population Survey (source 1 in Annex 4), half of Russians surveyed think that citizens’ rights and freedoms are observed to the same degree as two or three years ago (54%). Only every tenth respondent thinks that rights and freedoms

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\(^{24}\) http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/147.html. The Gini coefficient is scored where a value of 0 represents absolute equality, and a value of 100 absolute inequality. Therefore CSI reverses the scores, creating a new scale of 0–100, where 0 represents absolute inequality and 100 represents absolute equality.

\(^{25}\) External Debt/GNI Ratio, World Bank Development Indicators http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0, contentMDK:20535285–menuPK:1192694–pagePK:64133150–piPK:64133175–theSitePK:239419,00.html. External debt over GNI (Gross National Income) results in scores that are interpreted as the higher the score, the bigger the debt compared income and therefore the worse the economic context. Further this ratio has unlimited possibilities of answers with no set maximum score (for example DRC: 142.9, Kazakhstan: 103.7, Liberia: 442.1). Therefore, to fit the CSI diamond’s scale of 0–100, CSI recodes these scores by capping the scores at 100, where any score over 101 is changed to 100. Finally, each score is subtracted from 100 in order to reverse the scale to be consistent with other CSI indicators (where the higher the score, the more favourable the context for civil society development, 0 being no potential for civil society and 100 being perfect).
have improved, while 21% of respondents think that they are now worse. Most consider the most important rights to be social rights. Every second respondent mentioned the right to work and the right to free healthcare (53% and 52% respectively), 44% asserted the right to free education, 42% the right to social security in old age, 35% the right to life and 37% the right to property. The least important reported are political rights and freedoms: freedom of assembly is considered to be important by only 1% of respondents, and the right to associate and to participate in is mentioned by 3%.

There is a gap between the rights and freedoms people hold to be important and an assessment of the actual possession of these rights. This gap can be noticed particularly in the following social rights: right to obtain free healthcare, right to have free education, right to receive social support after retirement. Social studies (see source 4 in Annex 4) also indicate, however, that the level of enforcement of rights and freedoms as a whole is assessed by citizens of the Russian Federation as low.

There are encouraging signs. Firstly, Russia has ratified Protocol No. 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Secondly, a Constitutional Court decision has placed a moratorium on capital punishment in Russia. These would appear to show some governmental interest in supporting human rights and in defining space for civil society operation.

According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Russia was ranked below average in 2007, scoring 42% (World Bank, 2008).

5.3. Socio-cultural context

This sub-dimension assesses the socio-cultural context for civil society development in terms of interpersonal trust, tolerance and public spiritedness (see figure III.5.3).

The trust indicator reflects the percentage of population who think that most people can be trusted. According to the CSI Population Survey, 18.9% of respondents trust other people. There is a small gender difference: among those who do trust people, 40% are men and 60% are women; this is compared to the sample’s ratio of 45% men and 55% women. The percentage of trustful people who come from rural areas (31%) is slightly greater than their representation in the overall sample (27%).

The second indicator concerns people’s tolerance of particular social groups – people of a different race or ethnicity, people practising another religion, immigrants or foreign workers, people with HIV/AIDS and homosexuals.

Most respondents are tolerant of members of other religions: 91.5% would be willing to have them as neighbours. Nearly as many would be prepared to live next door to people from another country (87.5%). 80% have no objection to living next to immigrants or foreign workers. But respondents are less tolerant of people with HIV/AIDS (54%) and homosexuals (42%).

As discussed earlier, the third socio-cultural indicator, public spiritedness, concerns social attitudes about such things as avoiding a fare on public transport, cheating on taxes, claiming illegitimate government benefits, or accepting bribes. The high score of 82.6% reflects the fact that most respondents state that they do not approve any of these behaviours. Older people, people on low incomes and rural people are the least inclined to approve of such behaviour.

Conclusion

The overall value for the external context dimension is 53.3%. The majority of the population does not approve of corruption, cheating on taxes, and so on. These positive social attitudes can potentially catalyse civil society development. However, the low level of trust in CSOs is likely to constrain this effect.

The socio-economic situation in Russia is relatively stable. However, there are problems that affect the context for civil society development. Russia faces the difficulties of a transition from natural resource-driven growth to a modern economy. There is still a

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26 The Worldwide Governance Indicators are based on many other indicators from other international financial institutions (Asian Development Bank), World Bank surveys (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey etc.) and the work of research and analytical organisations (Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Insight, Gallup and others).
III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

high amount of poverty, with many children living in difficult conditions. Social security expenditure has doubled in five years, yet popular satisfaction in the social sphere is low according to our results (see source 6 in Annex 4). Only every tenth respondent thinks that state-provided education, health, science, culture and social security are in a good condition. About 40% of respondents say these are in a more or less satisfactory condition and almost the same percentage assess them as expressively negative. Concern about state health services and social security is the most clearly pronounced; 53% and 56% of citizens say these spheres respectively are in a bad condition.

The socio-economic context then presents Russian society with a number of serious challenges which require CSO activity in the social sphere. At the same time, the political sphere is in a complex process of development. As we saw in the Perception of Impact dimension, CSOs are generally not effective in asserting political rights and freedoms in Russia. While some respondents noted some successes of civil society in political context, 5% of them thought civil society was entirely inactive in this sphere. Such inactivity is caused not only by the government’s lack of interest in or blocking of CSO political activity. Too many CSOs are, like the population at large, indifferent to political rights and freedoms.
IV
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

Strengths

- Civil society scores relatively highly for its level of organisation, which suggests a good degree of institutional sustainability. The highest values within this dimension were for internal management, with a high percentage of organisations having a board of directors or other collective executive board.
- Most existing CSOs adhere to principles of democratic decision-making and have formal structures reflecting these principles.
- At critical junctures, civil society in Russia is able to organise itself to undertake joint action. For example, the CSO community mobilised to force important amendments to legislation on non-commercial organisations that had been criticised for discriminating against CSOs. Civic engagement was also demonstrated during the summer forest fires of 2010, when many people helped to extinguish fires and provided assistance to victims. The monetisation of social benefits was also attended by organised protests in 2005.
- CSOs cooperate in dynamic ways, holding joint meetings, exchanging information, developing best practices and otherwise joining together to achieve results.
- The government has increasingly taken public pressure into account in solving policy problems.

- There is demand within society for CSOs to be empowered.

Weaknesses

- Russian citizens do not typically participate in CSOs’ activities. This is true both when it comes to working in CSOs and taking part in voluntary activities more broadly.
- CSOs tend to be active within the social field only.
- Although CSOs aim to conform to standards and be open, most do not publish their financial reports and do not have policies regulating such areas as personal conduct and environmental impact.
- The general impact of civil society in Russia is weak according both to CSOs themselves and external experts.
- Most CSOs do not engage with decision-making by authorities: most of those surveyed have never tried to influence policy-making.
- Corruption is a significant issue for CSOs. Only a minority have never encountered corruption in civil society.
- Civil society in Russia cannot therefore be said to be a conductor by which society’s values reaches the elite or by which elite decisions feed back into society.
- Civil society in Russia is not advancing positive cultural attitudes; perceptions of levels of corruption, tolerance and trust among those involved in CSO activity do not differ from those who are not.
- The low level of trust in CSOs means civil society in Russia is often very informal, with informal voluntary work and unorganised donations.

27 Until 2005, certain groups of people in Russia (retired people, people with disabilities, veterans, children and students among others) had numerous social benefits, remaining from the Soviet Union period, such as free public transport, free medication and reduced housing payments. The new law, passed in 2005, replaced all such social benefits with monetary compensation: people have to pay for all goods or services, and then can ask for financial recompense from the state. As the compensation size was limited, it led to numerous protests.
In contrast to businesses, civil society has weak relationships with the government, so politicians often consult business interests but not those of citizens.

CSO funding is unstable. Most organisations cite membership fees as their main funding source; few have a diversified funding system. Many CSOs do not take advantage of the funding bodies that are ready to award grants. The main reason is a lack of training for CSO managers in fundraising skills.

Notwithstanding the Government’s declared support for the role of CSOs in providing services to citizens, at a local level, dialogue with authorities is often difficult, and at higher levels cooperation is often not genuine.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to CSOs

1. Build consensus on civil society’s position on key aspects of development and unite in asserting basic political, humanitarian and general civil values. Use this solidarity to work towards a new level of cooperation with government authorities on the basis of equal partnership.

2. Develop processes of internal self-organisation and internal democracy.

3. Work towards a new level of citizen control over the activities of government bodies at all levels.

4. Contribute to the foundation of a permanent mechanism for public appraisal of important legislative acts.

5. Use more modern methods for informing supporters and partners. Learn how to present activities in interesting ways using the mass media and involving creative professionals as allies in order to promote the development of public service advertising.

6. Ensure maximum transparency in order to gain public trust in the social usefulness of CSO activity.

7. Develop strategic guidelines for the CSO community by consolidating available expert resources; develop a system for identifying best practices.

8. Extend the scope of CSO activity that is required to raise living standards, improve social well-being, increase educational levels, promote tolerance and provide legal training.


10. Cooperate with secondary and higher education institutions to develop civil education of students and adults; offer students experience of participation in civil society activities; help integrate subjects of public civil education in curriculums at all levels.

Recommendations to power-holding officials

1. Create conditions favourable to the development of a civil society able to have an impact on political and socio-economic processes. This includes developing a strategy for cooperation, passing the necessary legislation on the bases of cooperation, ensuring state/municipal funding for CSO programmes and monitoring and assessing programmes in partnership with CSOs.

2. Build confidence amongst and a favourable environment for CSOs as a basis for effective interaction and partnership for solving various social problems.

3. Establish a forum/network for interaction and feedback based on principles of dialogue. This could facilitate public initiatives and harness the intellectual, creative, and emotional energy of people and organisations.

4. Continue the joint process on improving and systematising legislation on CSOs

5. Establish a permanent mechanism for the public and CSO experts to appraise socially important legislative acts.

6. Develop a grant competition mechanism for supporting socially important projects.

7. Use all means to support charitable work: providing resources, a grant competition mecha-
nism, tax remissions, interaction with organisations, and mass media publicity.

8. Develop non-resource-intensive forms of government support for CSOs. For example, these could include providing information support to CSOs, developing a culture and mechanisms for governmental bodies to interact with CSOs, offering moral incentives, or including state awards.

9. Develop quality standards for CSO provision of social services to the population, especially where it concerns the lives and health of children, and enforce standards through licensing.

10. Use legislation to consolidate local self-government.

11. Involve CSOs in processes of modernisation, anti-corruption efforts, reform of law-enforcement bodies and the legal system, education, ecology and health protection, regional and national policy-making.

Recommendations to mass media

1. Provide regular coverage of social issues with the aim of motivating citizen participation in solving problems and behaving responsibly.

2. Promote public understanding of the vital roles played by CSOs, volunteers and active citizens in solving social issues.

3. Help promote best practices for CSO participation in providing social services and in sectoral communication.

Recommendations to business organisations and donor associations

1. Develop a three-way ‘state-society-business’ partnership to balance interests on labour relations, environmental protection and other key issues.

2. Help establish resource centres for supporting the development of institutions, information and educational programmes that will further develop the human resources of civil society.

3. In addition to providing charitable funds, allocate resources to finance the operating expenses of CSOs.

4. Support the development by CSOs and communities of long-term, target-oriented programmes in all spheres of activity, including the assertion of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.
VI
CONCLUSION

As a result of the surveys conducted for this project, it can be noted that in Russia, as has been noted in many other countries, civil society plays an increasingly important role in relation to socio-economic development and public administration. These findings have therefore proved that positive dynamics are observed in the development of CSOs that work in the sphere of providing social services. A constructive dialogue is gradually being organised between this segment of civil society and the government. Although the outline of a constructive social-governmental partnership is appearing, there is much to do to make the position of CSOs better in Russia. There is a need to continue work amongst experts and activists of the civil sector, jointly with government representatives, on improving and systematising legislation for the function of the non-commercial sector, including legislation and resource provision, governmental/municipal funding of CSO programmes within the social sphere, as well as monitoring and assessment of realisable programmes of partnerships between authorities and CSOs. A desire to involve the potential resources of civil society in addressing social problems in Russia will require government movement to collaborate with civil society.

Meanwhile governmental policy is still inconsistent. Outside the socio-economic sphere, the relationship between government and civil society structures, particularly the outer environment of Russian civil society, are still complicated. Here we mean those aspects of civil activity which more closely border the policy sphere, encompassing the development of public movements, social advocacy on environmental issues, campaigns on town planning decisions, local development and others, human rights activity and other forms of legitimate participation of civil society structures that seek to limit the activities of authorities and involve the assertion of citizens’ interests, rights and freedoms. Government is still distrustful and suspicious in relation to politically active CSOs. It is necessary to continue intensively trying to form spaces for real rather than formal processes of interaction, dialogue and feedback on issues which arise from modernisation, including on matters of policy.

What is more, there is a necessity to promote and broaden the active work of CSOs and citizen participation by using modern methods of promoting participation, publicising civil society work and drawing attention to the best practices of CSO activity. Doing so will help to widen and broaden trust in CSOs.

While research shows a sufficiently high level of organisation of Russian civil society, it also shows that CSOs are not adequately connected with society as a whole and that the base of civil society (civic engagement) is not broad and still under developed. Non-institutionalised spontaneous self-organisation is weak, situation-specific, not sustainable and not always constructive. A gap between rather safe, but quantitatively rather limited institutionalised development, and the relatively rare wide public initiatives is observed.

This is a serious problem which adds urgency to the need for Russian civil society to escalate processes of internal self-organisation, internal democracy and developing systems of public reporting on the principles of CSO self-regulation. It is necessary to develop skills of citizens’ participation in public initiatives. It is important that participation is encouraged in CSO activity across a wide spectrum of public initiatives.

The CSI project has offered a complex assessment of the state of Russian civil society for international comparison. The draft of this report has already been used as material for the organisation of public and expert discussions on the state of civil society. The provision of objective information on this sphere of Russia should promote keen interest in and increased knowledge about recent developments in Russian civil society, both amongst civil society activists and other stakeholders domestically and internationally. The distribution of this report will, we hope, provoke discussion about and greater public attention to the state of Russian civil society and civic activity.
# Annex 1

## List of Advisory Committee members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation:Position:City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Alexander A. Auzan</td>
<td>President of Association of Independent Centres for Economic Analysis, Member of the Council on Support to Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights by the President of the Russian Federation, President International Confederation of Consumers’ Unions, member of the National Working Group of the Civil G8 Consultative Council, PhD in Economics, Professor (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Galina P. Bodrenkova</td>
<td>President, Russian Centre for Development of Volunteering (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Josef E. Diskin</td>
<td>Head of the Commission on Civil Society Development, Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, The Council for National Strategy, Co-chairman, PhD in Economics, Professor (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Yury D. Dzibladze</td>
<td>President, Centre for Development of Democracy and Human Rights, member of the Council on Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights by the President of the Russian Federation (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mikhail A. Zaitsev</td>
<td>Executive Director, Association of Siberian and Far Eastern Cities (Novossibirsk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Natalia G. Kaminarskaya</td>
<td>Executive Secretary, Russian Donors Forum (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Jaroslav I. Kuzminov</td>
<td>Rector, National Research University “Higher School of Economics”, member of the Council on Support to Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights by the President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Commission on Education Development, Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, Federation, PhD in Economics (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Anton M. Lopukhin</td>
<td>Manager of Department for Working with Volunteers of Sochi 2014 Organising Committee (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Tatiana I. Makhogon</td>
<td>Chairman of Committee for Local Self-Governance, Tomsk city administration (Tomsk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Elena P. Malitskaya</td>
<td>President of the inter-regional civil society foundation Siberian Centre for the Support of Civic Initiatives (Novossibirsk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Darja I. Miloslavskaya</td>
<td>Branch Director, LLC International Centre for Non-Profit Law in the Russian Federation, PhD in Philology (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Valentina I. Pestroikova</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Samara regional civil society organization Povolzhie, PhD in history (Samara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Elena S. Petrenko</td>
<td>Director for Research, All-Russian public foundation Public Opinion, PhD in philosophy (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Alexander Yu. Sungurov</td>
<td>President, St.-Petersburg Strategy Centre, PhD in political science (St.-Petersburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Elena A. Topoleva-Soldunova</td>
<td>Director of Agency for Social Information, member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Artem E. Shadrin</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Department for Strategic Planning (Programmes) and Budgeting, Ministry for Economic Development (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Vladimir N. Yakimets</td>
<td>Chief Research Analyst, Institute of Systemic Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences, PhD in sociology (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

Annex 2
Case studies

The CSI project includes not only quantitative research but also qualitative studies. Five case studies were conducted. They supplement information on each of five dimensions of the Civil Society Diamond. Case study reports are available at www.grans.hse.ru.

1. Volunteering

Researchers: Mersiyanova Irina, Cheshkova Anastasiya.

The survey describes the features of formal and informal volunteering in Russia. It uses comparative surveys conducted in 2009 together with John’s Hopkins University. It shows the distribution of volunteers by type of organisation and where they participate or would like to participate. The motivations for participation or non-participation in volunteering are also touched upon.

2. Civil Society Structure by Region

Researchers: Mersiyanova Irina, Cheshkova Anastasiya.

This case study deals with differences in the scale and characteristics of citizen participation in civil society practices by region.

3. CSO Openness and Transparency

Researcher: Proskuryakova Liliana.

This case study examines the prevalence in Russian CSOs of practices such as publishing organisation performance records and financial information. It also considers possible methods for increasing CSO transparency.

4. CSO Interaction with Federal and Regional Authorities

Researcher: Proskuryakova Liliana.

This survey examines issues related to interaction between CSOs and federal and regional authorities in Russia. Practices of advocacy are analysed and the most efficient strategies for interacting with executive bodies are considered.

5. Mass Media Monitoring

Researchers: Vlasova Marina, Cheshkova Anastasiya.

This case study examines printed press coverage of civil society in Russia. It analyses cases where civil society issues and activities are mentioned in the mass media. The image of CSOs (positive, neutral, negative) is assessed and the profile of CSOs is analysed according to the number of references to them in the printed mass media.
## Annex 3
### CSI data indicator matrix for Russia

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<td>3.2.2. Members of labour unions</td>
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<td>3.2.3. Labour rights training</td>
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<td>3.2.4. Public policy for labour standards</td>
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<td>3.3. Code of conduct and transparency</td>
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| 3.3.1. Publicly available code of conduct | 26.0 |
| 3.3.2. Transparency | 42.2 |
| 3.4. Environmental standards | 18.1 |
| 3.5. Perception of values in civil society as a whole | 40.2 |
| 3.5.1. Non-violence | 20.7 |
| 3.5.2. Internal democracy | 41.6 |
| 3.5.3. Levels of corruption | 15.8 |
| 3.5.4. Intolerance | 50.9 |
| 3.5.5. Weight of intolerant groups | 66.2 |
| 3.5.6. Promotion on non-violence and peace | 46.1 |

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<td>4.7. Impact of civil society on attitudes</td>
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<td>4.7.1. Trust: civil society members vs. non-members</td>
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### 5. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

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<td>and organisational rights</td>
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<td>5.2.4. Experience of legal framework</td>
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<td>5.2.5. State effectiveness</td>
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<td>5.2.1. Political rights and freedoms</td>
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<td>5.3. Socio-cultural context</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5.3.3. Public spiritedness</td>
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</table>
Annex 4
Empirical information

[1] The Population Survey was carried out by CSCSNS in 2009. The survey was based on a semi-structured interview. The sample included 2,000 respondents selected with regard to socio-demographic characteristics, representing the adult population of Russia by sex, age, type of community, education and socio-professional status. The statistical error of the data does not exceed 3.4%. The data was aggregated by the Public Opinion Foundation.

[2] The Organisational Survey was carried out by CSCSNS in 2009. Data was collected by Market Up LLP through semi-structured interviews with CSO heads. The sample size was 1,002: CSO heads situated in urban districts, towns and other municipal units on the territory of 33 constituent entities were questioned. The basis for the selection of constituent entities was a typology of three groups of features: the urbanisation index; an indicator of civil society development; and an index of per capita gross regional product. The basis for selecting respondents was CSO registers in these constituent entities. Selection was machine made. Not more than 2/3 of the total number of respondents in each constituent entity were questioned in its administrative centre (excluding Moscow and St.-Petersburg).

[3] The External Perceptions Survey was carried out by CSCSNS in 2009. 136 respondents were interviewed, representing 10 types of organisation with an interest in and experience of civil society development, including: the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government (federal and regional levels), law-enforcement bodies, industry and business, mass media and science, international non-governmental organisations and donor organisations. Among the respondents 46% are heads at different levels (e.g. general manager, director, chairman, editor-in-chief, head/deputy of departments) and 54% are experts. The data was collected by Public Opinion Research Centre Glas.

[4] The survey was carried out by CSCSNS in 2009. Data was collected by the Public Opinion Foundation by formalised interview. The sample was 2,000 respondents selected with regard to socio-demographic characteristics, representing the adult population of Russia by sex, age, type of community, education and socio-professional status according to principles and criteria devised by the survey programme. The statistical error of the data obtained does not exceed 3.4%.

[5] The survey was carried out by CSCSNS in 2009. Population mass surveys were carried out using Geo Rating technology. Data was collected by the Public Opinion Foundation. The survey was conducted in 83 constituent entities among people aged 18 and older. The sample size in each constituent entity was 500 respondents, totalling 41,500 respondents across Russia. In all constituent entities general principles of sample design were applied. A three-stage stratified sample of households was used: first administrative districts were selected, then communities, then households. The statistical error in each constituent entity does not exceed 5.5%. For overall results the statistical error does not exceed 1%.

[6] The mass population survey was carried out by CSCSNS in 2009. The survey sample was made up of 1,600 respondents selected with regard to socio-demographic characteristics, representing adult population of Russia by sex, age, type of community, education and socio-professional status according to criteria worked out with survey programme. The statistical error of the data obtained does not exceed 3.4%. Data was collected through formalised interviews by the Russian National Centre for Public Opinion Research.

[7] The survey was carried out by CSCSNS in 2009. Mass population surveys were carried out using Geo Rating technology. Data was collected by the Public Opinion Foundation. The surveys were conducted in 68 constituent entities among people aged 18 and older. The sample size in each constituent entity was 500 respondents, totalling 34,500 respondents across Russia. In all constituent entities the same general principles of sample design were applied. A three-stage stratified sample of households was used: first administrative districts were selected, then communities, then households. Statistical error in each constituent entity does not exceed 5.5%. For overall results statistical error does not exceed 1%.
Annex 5
CSO Classification

1. House owners associations, housing associations.
2. Gardeners’ and suburban partnerships.
3. Religious communities, organisations or movements.
4. Professional associations / creative unions.
5. Trade unions.
6. Consumer rights protection societies.
7. Societies of the disabled.
8. Women’s organisations.
10. Charitable organisations: such as aid to orphanages, victims of violence, drug addicts, refugees, homeless and foundations.
11. Environmental organisations.
12. Human rights organisations: legal assistance to victims of arbitrary rule, men called up for military service, committees of soldiers’ mothers and others.
13. Civic public self-regulation, local initiative groups on civic improvements: planting of greenery, playgrounds, playground, equipment of parking and garages, garbage disposal and more.
15. Local initiatives on the protection of property, housing, consumers’ rights and interests of inhabitants: including fighting against erection of new buildings, eviction issues, supplies, environmental issues, problems related to effects of emergencies and others.
16. Groups and bodies of school / student self-government, including student councils, councils of dormitories and others.
17. Parents’ associations: children of pre-school age, children who attend kindergartens, students and disabled children.
18. Ethnic communities, national diasporas, friendly associations of people from the same area.
19. Youth groups – informal organisations of a non-political nature.
20. Youth groups – political associations.
22. Sports, tourist, hunting, and automobile associations and clubs.
23. Cultural, regional and environmental initiatives and groups: admirers of music, cinema, painting, theatre, dancing and others, protection of landmarks, preserved areas and others, membership clubs around interests and hobbies.
24. Charitable initiatives / actions: including collecting clothes for homeless people, orphans, poor people and others.


Federal Law ‘On making changes in some legislative acts in Russian Federation’ 10 January 2006, No18-FZ.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


