The Impact of Non-State Actors (NSAs) on Civic Space in Bangladesh, Palestinian Territories and Zimbabwe: How Do Resources Influence NGO Resilience?

Literature Review

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CIVICUS is a global alliance of civil society organisations and activists dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society around the world. We strive to promote marginalised voices, especially from the Global South, and have members in more than 175 countries throughout the world.
Abstract
Increasing evidence suggests that restrictions on NGO advocacy activity are on the rise. Although state restrictions have attracted some attention in academia, restrictions on NGO activity by Non-State Actors (NSAs) have received surprisingly little attention. Why is it that some NGOs can resist this pressure when others reduce activity? This research looks at NSA actions on human rights NGOs and tests whether different NGO resources drive variation in resilience outcomes. Using collective action theory, it argues that restrictions impose "costs" on the NGO resources: people, networks and finances. Drawing on field work and case evidence from Bangladesh, Palestine and Zimbabwe it adopts a comparative approach using process tracing.

Introduction
On the 25th April 2016, six masked men broke into a flat in downtown Dhaka, Bangladesh (Hammadi and Gani 2016). Wielding machetes, the assailants quickly located the flat’s owner (CIVICUS 2017a). By the end of the evening, Xulhaz Manan lay dead on his living room floor. The perpetrators - although never found - were alleged to be members of a religious-extremist group operating in Bangladesh (PEN America 2016). Their motivation was to prevent the spread of secularism and immoral values. It later transpired that Xulhaz Manan was targeted for his work as a human rights activist. More specifically, as an activist working on LGBTI issues (Amnesty International 2017). In fact, Manan was the editor of Bangladesh’s only LGBTI magazine, a publication called *Roopban*. He was also prominently involved with the only human rights group focussed on defending LGBTI rights in the country: Boys of Bangladesh (Article 19 2016).

Yet, the work of violent religious extremists in Bangladesh cannot be viewed in isolation. At the time, Bangladeshi authorities were orchestrating their own crackdown on critical voices. Between 2013 - 2016, the government of Bangladesh summoned and detained over 100 critical journalists on various fabricated charges (PEN America 2016). It was not only journalists who were harassed. In 2012, the government cancelled the registration of 6,000
NGOs (Human Rights Watch 2012). Many of the most critical human rights groups were forced to close and never reopened. The signal was clear: speak out on contentious issues and face the consequences. In this context, religious groups like the ones who murdered Manan quickly stepped up their activities. Their methods were brutal. The ensuing bloodshed left 39 bloggers, journalists, activists and academics hacked to death in towns and cities across Bangladesh (Anand and Manik 2018). Their machete attacks placed the international spotlight on the situation for Bangladeshi human rights defenders (Odhikar 2016). Yet, amidst the violence, the authorities did little to stop the bloodshed. In fact, police in Dhaka failed to submit an investigation into Manan’s death on nine separate occasions (CIVICUS 2017a). The same story was repeated in many of the other investigations into the machete attacks. Despite a wide-reaching police crackdown including 11,000 arrests (Human Rights Watch 2016), many of the 39 murders remain unsolved.

In 2019 and defying the odds, Boys of Bangladesh continues to operate. In fact, it is still recognised as the oldest and only human rights network focused on LGBTI issues in Bangladesh. Despite unimaginable hardship and loss of prominent activists like Xulhaz Manan, the group continues undeterred. How is this so?

We seek to understand this puzzle. To do so, this project is split into two parts: on the one hand, we will explore how and why non-state actors (NSAs), perpetrate restrictive actions against human rights NGOs. In particular, it will explore if NSAs like transnational corporations or armed extremist groups exploit state aggression on NGOs to further their own objectives. On the other, it seeks to understand how the resources of finances money and people influence NGO resilience to these threats. We argue that NGOs with high resources are the most resilient to restrictions on their activities.

To theorise this dynamic relationship between NSAs and NGOs we use Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action. Collective action theory links the provision of public goods, group size and participation outcomes (Hansen, Mitchell, and Drope 2005). This project views restrictions on NGO activity as costs which are imposed on NGO resources. We argue that in the context of state hostility, NSAs step-up restrictive actions against NGOs. Therefore, state restrictions are selective incentives for NSAs to impose further cumulative costs on NGOs.
For NGOs, aggression from any source takes its toll. More specifically the NGO resources of finances, people and networks carry the burden of aggression from both states and NSAs. Consequently, for NGOs, restrictions raise the cost of participation in human rights activism.

Restrictions on civil society are attracting increasing attention (United Nations 2016; CIVICUS 2017b; European Parliament 2017; International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL) 2018). Despite this attention, it is surprising that studies investigating the role of NSAs in restricting the operation of NGOs are notably lacking. This study sits at the forefront of a new discussion in both academia and policy fora. While emerging time-series datasets in academia document the scale of state restrictions imposed on civil society (Smidt, Bakke, Mitchell, and Perera 2018). Little is known about how NSAs exploit this rising tide of state aggression to choreograph their own restrictions on civil society.

**Dialogue and Dissent Theory of Change**

The focus throughout this project is human rights NGOs, namely those unafraid to advocate for the rights of others. We choose human rights groups as they play a “representational role” (Kamstra and Knippenberg 2014), whereby these groups challenge or monitor the state and act as a countervailing power. This literature review hopes to assist in gaining a theoretical understanding of the dynamic relationship between NSAs and NGO response. It will do this by zooming in on the threats faced by NGOs from states and non-state actors and theorising explanations for variation in outcome. In particular, it hopes to assess the assumption that NGOs need political space to perform political roles.

This study comes at a moment when a burgeoning body of evidence highlights that restrictions on civil society are increasing across the world. In this context, little is known about stories of adaption or resistance strategies used by NGOs when faced with aggression from a variety of sources. To situate this project in the context of the Dutch MFA’s “Dialogue and Dissent” framework, we seek to unpack and investigate how the actions of non-state actors impact NGO resources. Our contribution, therefore, rests in a) understanding how and why these groups come into conflict with NGOs b) how their actions influence or impact

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1 For example UCL’s data coding state department restrictions between 1994 – 2014.
the NGO resources of finances, networks and people and c) how various NGO resources influence an NGOs capacity to resist restrictions from non-state actors.

Yet, the theoretical centrality of the state is omnipotent. Given the state’s monopoly on repressive and bureaucratic power, the relationship between the state and NSA is an unavoidable factor in this study. Thus, a focus on the sequence of events is essential. How do state restrictions and NSA restrictions differ? What is the sequence of events? A key objective of this research will be to examine the sequence of events before, during and after the imposition of restrictive actions by NSAs. More specifically, it intends to view this relationship through the prism of NGO advocacy. In particular, it will assess the ability of the NGOs being studied to publicly conduct campaigns on human rights issues. To test this theory, we will collect evidence from three cases: Bangladesh, Palestine and Zimbabwe. We choose these cases as they have variation on our independent variable, types of NSA and their actions. As well as on the dependent variable, NGO resilience.

This literature review is split into two distinct sections. The first section presents our theoretical argument which theorises the hypothesised causal processes and mechanisms which underpin our study. In the second section, we turn our attention to the case specific literature on the factors and attributes of civil society and their confrontations in Bangladesh, Palestine and Zimbabwe.

We proceed as follows. Firstly, we begin by offering an overview of literature relevant to civil society and explanations of their confrontations in society. Secondly, we place our attention on the role of advocacy as a vehicle for participation and resistance. Thirdly, we survey literature to theorise the signalling process between states and NSAs while attempting to assess state complicity using collective action theory and principle agent theory. Fourthly, we turn our attention to the role of resources in influencing the operation of NGOs drawing heavily from literature on resources mobilisation. Fifthly, we asses and consider the types of restrictive actions that NSAs can impose on NGOs. We also draw from literature on pro-government militias to explore the feasibility of state complicity in NSA restrictions on NGOs by anti-rights or conservative civil society. We conclude this section with a brief synopsis of key findings.
In the second section, look at dynamics within civil society for the time period assessed in each of the cases. Firstly, we assess Bangladesh. We then assess Palestine. Finally, we look to understand key confrontations in Zimbabwe.

**Civil Society and Confrontations**

Civil society has attracted considerable research attention in academia (Mann 1984; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Vakil 1997; Anheier 2002). One group in this patchwork quilt of actors has outshone all others, NGOs (Banks, Hulme, and Edwards 2015). Since the end of the cold war, the proliferation of NGOs has spawned countless theories on their role in influencing states (Frantz 1987; Putnam 1993; Vakil 1997; Coston 1998; Mann 2008). From the provision of public goods and services, to vehicles for participation, NGOs have been at the forefront of an associational revolution (Salamon 1994). While the universe of NGOs is vast, this project focusses on human rights advocacy NGOs. This critical subsection of civil society is vital in holding states to account (Sikkink 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999). By monitoring states' bad behaviour, local advocacy NGOs are essential for human rights progress (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013). As advocates, their role in naming and shaming has proven a potent force (Franklin 2008; Krain 2012). Information from local groups is the lifeblood of human rights progress (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005; Meernik, Aloisi, Sowell, and Nichols 2012; Smidt et al. 2018).

This research focusses on human rights NGOs. As a mobilising force, the maturity of the global human rights movement has foreshadowed the explosion of NGOs (Wong 2012). The enshrined universality of human rights has enabled emerging NGOs to work within a uniform framework of shared norms and values (Jochnick 1999; Ron et al. 2005; Murdie and Peksen 2014). In fact, the foundational respect for dignity and rights of the individual has become the bedrock for a multitude of social, economic and philosophical struggles. Consequently, local human rights NGOs occupy “pride of place” in the mosaic of global activism (Ron et al. 2005). These local human rights NGOs are defined by their “anti-politics” wherein they openly criticise the state for failing to uphold human rights or prevent non-state actors from abusing the rights of others (Ron and Crow 2015). The beacon of human rights is a central
organising principle. Local human rights NGOs are at the forefront of activism across the world.

Given their role as catalysts for “anti-politics”, it comes as no surprise that national human rights groups come into conflict with states (Ausderan 2014; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2016; Popplewell 2018). This is especially true for those exposing and mobilising around human rights abuse. The work of human rights NGOs often engenders confrontation (Forst 2016), or worse, physical danger for activists affiliated with critical NGOs. This assertion accounts for the increase in restrictions on NGOs. As NGOs shine a light on human rights abuses, some states have taken steps to derail their activities (Smidt et al. 2018). Restrictions prevent NGOs from drawing attention to states’ non-compliance with human rights obligations.

Restrictions thus, have interrupted the informational role of local human rights groups. Local advocacy is important. Local NGO advocacy, when conducted with influential transnational allies, is an even more powerful approach (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Cardenas 2004; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Information from local groups drives this chain (Smidt et al. 2018). But, naming and shaming is also risky for national NGOs (Brechenmacher 2017). It drives coercion and restrictions by states wishing to silence criticism. Restrictions on local NGOs obstructs this flow of critical information to transnational networks of other human rights NGOs and multilateral institutions. States, thus, have a vested interest in restricting their critics. Stopping criticism by local NGOs preserves their international reputation (Bob 2005; Hendrix and Wong 2013), or prevents international meddling (Murdie and Peksen 2014). From documenting disrupted protests, to exposing genocides, local NGOs broker information to international groups to "shame" states globally (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Krain 2012; Ausderan 2014). Evidence from local human rights NGOs is the thread that links the local with the global.

It is not only states that restrict NGOs. An increasing body of evidence highlights that NSAs also perpetrate human rights abuses (Sikkink 1986; Paust 1992; Thomas and Beasley 1993; Jochnick 1999; Brysk 2005). Legal examinations of NSAs and human rights note the
contestation between a subsection of these actors. Clapham (2006) proposes that “…corporations, mercenaries, international organisations, criminal organisations, and terrorists.” (pg. 43) have the capacity to violate human rights. The acknowledgement of these actors’ power moves away from the traditional focus on the state. Instead it magnifies the intersection and distribution of power outside of the state. Tilly (2007) highlights that it is vital to “examine the coalitions, rivalries, and confrontations among major political actors outside of the state.” (pg. 13). The emphasis on NSAs shifts attention away from state’s ability to control these actors (Mann 1984) by recognising the state’s malleability to a panoply of non-state groups (Migdal 1994). It means that NSAs can co-opt elements of the state (Tilly 2007; van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014).

Intuitively, if these groups are capable of orchestrating human rights violations, one does not need to stretch the imagination too far to envisage them repressing human rights NGOs. In the same way that an NGO can impose costs on a state through advocacy, the same logic applies to NSAs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Regardless of the target, it is clear that advocacy by NGOs drives this chain of events.

**Advocacy**

Scholars in political science have long viewed advocacy as political. NGO advocacy and mobilisation tactics can manifest in numerous ways (Swidler 1986; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Minkoff, Aisenbrey, and Agnone 2008; McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015), from quiet diplomacy to outright naming and shaming campaigns (Gordon 2008; Barakso 2010). NGOs have choices: cooperation or confrontation with states.

This is not a zero-sum game. Work on human rights advocacy reminds us that varying tactics are vital (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). Variety in advocacy type enables small NGOs to take on powerful actors. Adaptability and innovation applies pressure through as many avenues as possible (Busby 2007; Carpenter 2007). National NGOs leverage connections and channels to influence the state (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Elkins and Simons 2005; Murdie 2014). If these domestic channels close, national groups look internationally (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bob 2010). Thus, the characteristics of the state inadvertently influence NGO advocacy strategy (Bloodgood 2010). States receptive to NGO activity may welcome
cooperation from civil society. Others, sensitive to criticism, may close spaces for critical advocacy. A confrontational approach by states may force a confrontational response from NGOs (Coston 1998).

It is important to recognise that this research will be taking place in countries where civil society does not fully enjoy the support of the state. In fact, in Bangladesh, Palestine and Zimbabwe are all states that are rated as “Repressed” in the CIVICUS Monitor (CIVICUS 2018c). The CIVICUS Monitor, is an online portal which rates the conditions for civil society in every country in the world. It does this by assessing a variety of sources, including members of CIVICUS’ extensive membership (CIVICUS 2018a). CIVICUS clarifies the rating of “Repressed” (CIVICUS 2018b), by explaining it as:

“Civic space is significantly constrained. Active individuals and civil society members who criticise power holders risk surveillance, harassment, intimidation, imprisonment, injury and death. Although some civil society organisations exist, their advocacy work is regularly impeded, and they face threats of de-registration and closure by the authorities. People who organise or take part in peaceful protests are likely to be targeted by the authorities through the use of excessive force, including the use of live ammunition, and risk mass arrests and detention. The media typically reflects the position of the state, and any independent voices are routinely targeted through raids, physical attacks or protracted legal harassment. Websites and social media platforms are blocked, and internet activism is heavily monitored.”

Drawing on this finding, it is plausible to expect that in 2019, civil society in all three cases face significant challenges. It is therefore logical to argue that government may not be receptive to civil society inputs. This is particularly true if NGOs advocate on politically sensitive issues such as human rights issues. If this is the case, NGOs may attempt to mobilise other stakeholders other than the state.

Some approaches highlight that states are not always the target of advocacy (Brysk 1996; McCarthy, Mcadam, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 2005). Instead, an NGO may seek to mobilise the general population in the hope of spurring them into action (Tilly 1978; Frantz 1987;
Wapner 1995). Be it through boycott or protest, their aim is to inspire others to join the struggle (Granovetter 1978; Lichbach 1987). These perspectives view public cooperation as essential in building support towards policy change. Audience is thus a key factor in influencing NGO advocacy tactics. Some contemporary studies point to political context or geographic location (Stroup 2012; Stroup and Murdie 2012). These echo sentiments about the characteristics of the state in influencing NGO behaviour. As such, they overlook resources as a key determinant of advocacy. Indeed, they diverge from long-standing literatures that argue resources influence civic actions (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978).

This research takes into consideration the numerous theoretical and empirical contributions on advocacy. However, it adopts a simpler theoretical lens. It views NGO advocacy strategies in two ways.

**Table 1: NGO Advocacy Choices**

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<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>NGOs campaign on an issue in support of an aggrieved community with limited access to decision making structures. In doing so, they confront or compete with the state as a countervailing political force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>NGOs leverage their connections with the government or dominant political forces to create policy change. In doing so, they use the state’s decision-making structures to instigate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proactive</td>
<td>NGOs act to further an issue or claim without prompt. In doing so, they set the agenda for debate and discussion which frequently manifests in scrutinising the state or demanding an answer for a course or proposed course of action. These tactics</td>
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are used to prise open or reclaim political spaces.

| Defensive | NGOs find themselves under pressure and are forced to defend themselves. In this instance the state or another external actor sets the agenda or issue for contestation in a manner in which NGOs are forced to campaign or use counter narratives to ensure survival in closing political spaces. |

How then do restrictions on NGO activity fit into this puzzle? Only a handful of studies document this phenomenon (i.e. Beswick 2010 in Rwanda; Dupuy et al. 2016 in Ethiopia; Wood 2016 in Kenya). Despite identifying different experiences, these studies’ conclusions are comparable. Coercive state restrictions were found to be a method of silencing dissent or preventing criticism from NGOs. Rather than being linear, restrictions were imposed in waves (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). States altered the scale and severity of restrictions on dissident organisations and activists. Their targeted approach illuminated the boundaries of dissent. Restrictions drew a line in the sand for vocal NGOs: speak out and face the consequences. This approach silenced vocal critics and discouraged other would-be dissenters. States closed space for NGO advocacy. Restrictions, thus, are a way of controlling confrontational and critical NGOs.

It is logical to suggest that these restrictions influence NGO behaviour. The most in-depth academic study of NGO responses documents events in four countries, Guatemala, Honduras, the Philippines and Indonesia (van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014). This study finds that when faced with pressure, NGOs have two choices. Proactive strategies which reclaim space for operation or defensive measures which ensure survival (van der Borgh and Terwindt 2012). This means two options, dig-in and fight or retreat and survive. A more recent study expands this study of NGO responses to repression. Looking at Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia, Brechenmacher (2017) offers an expanded typology of NGO responses. Her approach moves away from van der Borgh and Terwindt’s (2012) binary interpretation of NGO responses. Instead, she evidences the dynamism and innovation in both NGO and state
adaptation. NGOs adapt, innovate and push the boundaries of dissent when faced with restrictions. They campaign when they can, but also make tactical concessions where necessary. States also adapt and innovate. They impose restrictions in waves of increasing severity to stamp out dissent. Agitation and confrontation between NGOs and states is unending.

This finding is not necessarily new. Contentious politics theorises this cyclical relationship between agitator and state (McCarthy et al. 1996; Mcadam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). This relationship is dynamic, interactive and iterative (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1994). Social change demands constant tactical innovation and concession (Gurr 1974; Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996). Agitator and state are in an ever-evolving battle to outfox and outflank each other.

For agitators, tactical innovation challenges power. With limited resources, challengers innovate to offset their powerlessness (Mcadam 1983). Evolving repertoires of collective action force concession through disruption (della Porta and Tarrow 1986, 2005). Clearly, these disruptive tactics can vary in severity and danger. For the individual, tactical innovation is about costs of participation (Granovetter 1978). As restrictions on dissent increase, the cost of participation rises (Henderson 1991; Khawaja 1993; Lawrence 2017). Consequently, I view restrictions on NGOs as a tool to raise the cost of further dissent. As restrictions clampdown on challengers, tactical innovation and disruptive tactics become increasingly dangerous. For those challenging power, continuing confrontation means taking risks.

**Signalling: The Gloves are Off**

A variety of authors have focussed on studying the relationship between repression and dissent (Lichbach 1987; Henderson 1993; Moore 1998, 2000; Carey 2006, 2010). The overarching consensus highlights that dissent drives repression (Ritter and Conrad 2016). I argue that that state restrictions on NGOS starts a signalling process for NSAs.

In these literatures, repression is defined as any legal, extra-legal, violent or non-violent action which prevents participation in governance processes (Nordås and Davenport 2013;
Sullivan 2016). Restrictive actions on NGOs are a form of repression. This research seeks to understand the sequence of events taking place between repressive NSA actions and NGO responses. Given this starting point, a central piece of the puzzle lies in the signalling used by states against critical NGOs. An emerging body of evidence highlights that concerns over state restrictions on NGO activity are on the rise globally (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; CIVICUS 2017b; International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL) 2018; Smidt et al. 2018). Aligning to the theory, we explain this phenomenon through the assertion that NGO dissent drives state restrictions. We view these restrictions as part of a signalling process. It is plausible to argue that not only do states restrict NGOs, NSAs also repress their critics. As such, we argue that NSAs exploit state aggression against NGOs to orchestrate their own campaigns of restriction and violence.

This study seeks to interrogate the veracity of a specific causal sequence. This can be explained as follows: NGO advocacy activity which provokes state restriction, which in turn emboldens NSAs to further restrict NGOs. This provokes an NGO response dependent on resource strength.

To explain this process, we seek a theoretical framework to help explain participation. Thus, we use collective action theory. Olson's (1965) seminal contribution in The Logic of Collective Action challenged the notion that individuals with similar interests will automatically work together for a common goal (p. 2). Olson does this by linking group size, public goods and participation outcomes (Hansen et al. 2005). Collective action theory (Olson 1965) views participation in terms of costs and benefits. Costs refer to the “burdens involved in achieving the group’s objective” (p. 2) and benefits are the result of “further[ing] the interests of group members” (p. 6). Thus, Olson interrogates the conditions under which individuals with similar interests organise to pursue a common objective.

Olson’s theory can be distilled to a basic assertion: without coercion, why absorb costs, if others can pay the price? If an individual cannot be excluded from enjoying a good, there is little incentive to voluntarily contribute anything towards achieving it in the first place. This is collective action’s central dilemma. The theory predicts, those who can, will do nothing while enjoying the benefits. Olson's (1965) terms this action free-riding (p. 76). This central
assertion has cast a long shadow in academia, by inspiring a variety of authors to contest, build upon or test his theory (Granovetter 1978; Ostrom 1990; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Tarrow 1994). Yet, Olson’s theory posits, those who can, will free-ride.

Crucially, collective action theory views the relationship between costs and benefits through the lens of group size. Olson starts from the assertion that smaller groups are better at working to promote common interests than large ones (p. 2). Smaller groups are able to share both the benefits of collective action, and the costs of achieving them more effectively (pp. 22:23). Individuals are incentivised by the knowledge that their share of collective goods will be high, even if they must endure costs to gain them. Olson draws on long standing social theorists to contend that small groups are also bound by kinship links (Parsons, Bales, and Shils 1953; Parsons and Bales 1955). These are groups where associations have been formalised through face to face interaction. They are likened to family. Due to these strong ties, small groups can sustain collective action if collective goods outweigh costs.

Alternatively, larger groups are prone to challenges. These are groups where individual may not know each other and are not bound by kinship links (Parsons et al. 1953; Parsons and Bales 1955). As a result, Olson (1965) identifies three distinct yet cumulative problems faced by larger groups (p. 48). These problems can be described as follows. In large groups, rational individuals acting in the interest of others will inevitably be poorly rewarded for furthering the group’s interest. Why provide collective good for inactive members? Thus, the group’s collective interests are hindered due to inaction. Secondly, the abundance of collective goods in larger groups is, by definition smaller. Even if a dedicated individual did decide to work in the interest of a larger group, the reward would be too small for carrying such a burden. As a result, poor distribution of collective goods drives benefits down. Finally, organising collective action in larger groups is more burdensome, so coordination becomes a cost. Organisation even among a subset of the group may, at the very least, prove challenging. In consideration of these factors, Olson argues that larger groups are less efficient than smaller groups (p. 28).
Yet, Olson (1965) offers the provision of selective goods as a counterbalance to this assertion. Selective goods sustain collective action in large groups by incentivising participation (p. 133). These are benefits which discourage freeriding. We argue that selective benefits are essential for NGOs, as they help large civic groups navigate Olson’s free-rider problem. I use this theory to posit that state restrictions on NGOs are selective incentives for NSAs in repression. These state actions signal that “the gloves are off”. They encourage and incentivise participation in restrictive actions against persecuted state critics.

Investigations into the use of state restrictions on NGOs highlight that when faced with aggression, NGOs quickly adapt. They shift focus to prevent further hostility, rebranding or quietly reframing activities to guard against reprisal. However, investigations into the effectiveness of these restrictions have also highlighted the dynamism of this relationship (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014; Smidt et al. 2018). They find the effectiveness of restrictions is contingent on the severity of repression and cumulative impact of restrictions. So, restrictions are part of a dynamic game wherein NGOs and their aggressors constantly revaluate the costs and benefits of participation.

In keeping with this notion, others have expanded collective action theory, arguing that decision making is far from a static process (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1978). In fact, individuals constantly assess and reassess the costs and benefits of participation (Granovetter 1978; Schelling 1978; Marwell and Oliver 1993). Some have looked to the tactical choices of fellow participants as well as the distribution of power among the group (Siegel 2009, 2011; Moe 2014). Yet, the same dilemma appears. Olson's theory predicts, that for large groups, even in favourable conditions, free-riding hinders collective action. The trade-off between “free-riding” or active participation is omnipotent. How then can Olson’s framework explain the phenomenon at the centre of this study? How does his contribution on collective action help explore NSA actions and NGO resilience?

We start our study from the assumption that state restrictions have been unsuccessful in completely eradicating NGO activities. Rather, NGOs have endured state aggression and have been forced to rethink their activities. In this context, NSAs with converging interests step up repressive activities against NGOs. We draw from these assertions to devise our first
testable hypothesis. Drawing from the above theory it is plausible to expect NSA increase actions against critical NGOs after state restrictions (H1).

Resources

NGOs are far from passive actors. Studies also highlight that some NGOs choose to dig-in and fight while others quickly fold under pressure (van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014; Brechenmacher 2017). How then can we explain this variation? So far, we have focused on a theorised sequence of events. We then used Olson’s (1965) collective action theory to argue that state restrictions create selective incentives for NSAs to increase activities against NGOs. We now outline how these restrictions impact NGOs by assessing their resources. In summary, we argue that restrictive activities - regardless of their origin - impose costs on NGOs resources. These costs then influence an NGO’s advocacy output.

The use of collective action theory to assess NGO activity is not new (Johnson and Prakash 2007; Henderson 2010; Lecy, Mitchell, and Peter Schmitz 2010). However, its use in conjunction with restrictions is. Thus, we use Olson’s (1965) theory to argue that restrictions are an added cost of advancing group objectives. As NGOs face restrictions, this pressure increases the propensity of individuals to free-ride. If confrontation between state and NGO escalates after advocacy, participation becomes dangerous. This in turn encourages freeriding and collective action falters. Restrictive NSA actions against NGOs are thus a selective disincentive to continue work.

Olson’s theory is applicable on two levels. Firstly, collaboration between NGOs is a hallmark of the sector (Wapner 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hadden and Jasny 2017). Especially if confronting the state, there is strength in numbers. Be it to leverage networks, to gather information or to share resources. NGOs working in coalition increase their visibility and attract further participation. It is thus possible to expect that restrictions would alter alliance behaviour. If restrictions target an NGO, it raises the cost of collaboration between NGOs. Other NGOs may be reluctant to absorb these costs leading to less collective action. An NGO facing aggression may find itself quickly alone in a hostile world.
Collective action theory is also applicable on an individual level. Globally, many key players in the human rights NGO movement use membership as a resource. Membership-based human rights groups have come to dominate the global NGO landscape (i.e. Amnesty International, CIVICUS; International Freedom of Expression Exchange; International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association & Association for Women’s Rights in Development). These global memberships are an intimidating asset. Bigger memberships mean more money, greater legitimacy and political clout. Locally the same logic applies. National NGOs with members make groups accountable to constituents (Anheier 2002; Wapner 2002). Numbers mean strength, especially when advocating on sensitive issues. Strength means it is harder to silence voices in speaking numbers (Walker 1983). As stakeholders, members use decision making structures to influence decision making (Hansen 1985; Schneider 2007). Given this, our focus on an NGO’s provision of selective goods is important. Given their role as a counterbalance to the problem of free-riding, members constrain NGOs to keep providing selective benefits (Olson 1965). Restrictions are selective disincentives to stop contentious activities. As such, there is a tension. Theory would suggest that incentives to members would factor highly in NGO decision making (Hirschman 1970), even if those advocacy decisions come with costs. This is especially true when faced with escalating state restrictions. These groups have an incentive to dig in and fight. Thus, we argue that NGOs with a strong and vibrant membership are more resilient to state coercion.

People are a key attribute for NGOs, but it is also clear that an NGO cannot run solely with the support of people. To theorise the other resources available to NGOs, we look to literature on resource mobilisation. Resource mobilisation has attracted considerable attention in academia (Tilly et al. 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McCarthy et al. 1996). From this strand of literature, we derive two other key resources for NGO operation: networks and finances. We now outline the resources of networks and finances.

Networks are the lifeblood of social existence and an NGO's organisational relationships are vital, especially when assessing advocacy decisions (Ron et al. 2005; McIlwaine 2007; van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014; Hadden and Jasny 2017). NGOs influence other NGOs. Thus, NGOs are in simultaneous competition and cooperation with each other (Wapner 1995; Bob
They copy, learn, adapt and reinforce their peers’ strategies. This is even more applicable to local NGOs. National alliances are an important asset for local human rights groups (van der Borgh and Terwindt 2012; Brechenmacher 2017). Current policy perspectives stress the need for coalition building among groups under pressure (Stephan 2017). Conventional wisdom is simple. As confrontation escalates, it is best to stick together (Granovetter 1978; Lichbach 1987). Working in coalition can help leverage further resources, or allows them to share financial, legal or other expertise to adhere to new restrictions (van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014). Campaigning together can also reach new and untapped parts of society. These untapped communities can then add to a broad support for policy objectives. We will measure an NGO’s membership of national, regional and international alliances.

But it’s not all positive. Studies exploring transnational collaboration underscore the poor attention spans of international actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bob 2001, 2010). Local actors are in constant competition to mobilise their powerful global allies (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). Connections to transnational allies may also indicate disloyalty to sensitive states. This may both catalyse and impede collective action. NGOs pull together to protect each other, yet face further restrictions as critical advocacy increases (van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014; Popplewell 2018). The flipside to this approach is reputation. Reputation is a key factor in determining NGO network collaboration (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 2003). Thus, an NGO with a poor reputation may lack these protective networks. It may find itself vulnerable to state aggression. While NGOs may have duplicitous relationships with each other, when faced with pressure, networks are important. Networks are thus a vital resource to increase NGO resilience.

Although useful, this approach fails to capture how formalised civil society organisations work. Groups like NGOs need money. These professionalised entities need financial resources to operate. McCarthy and Zald's (1977) economically focussed approach to resource mobilisation is useful. This approach views a movement’s finances as integral to success. Money matters. It enables NGOs to provide public goods and selective benefits to members (Bebbington 2005). The expansion of donor-dependent NGOs has raised concern over legitimacy (Bob 2001). Scholars have questioned if money divorces NGOs from
constituents (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004; Kindornay, Ron, and Carpenter 2012; Ron and Crow 2015). Studies looking at this issue paint a confusing picture. NGOs receiving money see both an increase and decrease in trust from constituents (Ron and Crow 2015; Wilson 2016). The key variable is the donor.

Resource "dependency" has become a dirty word in the NGO world (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Donors are far from passive actors. As such, fears of so-called "brief-case" NGOs epitomise this trend (Fowler 1992). These are NGOs who pursue a narrow set of objectives determined by a donor (Gordon 2008; Banks et al. 2015). They lack connections to members to guide their work. As a result, they carry out the whims of the donor rather than the needs of an aggrieved population (Fowler 2000; Hearn 2007; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Given this assertion, these NGOs are easily smeared by aggressive states (Beswick 2010; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015; Laufer 2017). States can dismiss their work as proxy agents of international puppet masters. This is particularly damaging for advocacy groups who expose violations perpetrated by states. It negates the credibility of their documentary evidence (Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin, and Glasius 2008; Brechenmacher 2017). Given these debates, we will measure the level of financial support and diversity of donors. While this resource carries risks, money is still vital. Advocacy NGOs need money to work.

We draw from the resource mobilisation literature to theorise resources. These resources can be sorted into three distinct categories: people, finances and networks. We describe these resources in table 1.

Table 2: NGO resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>Finances</th>
<th>Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A CSO’s human resource matters. From its staff, to its members, to its constituents. People give a CSO legitimacy and enable it to operate.</td>
<td>Finances enable formalised groups to operate. From running projects to employing staff, finances enable</td>
<td>Domestic and international connections to other CSOs enables the transfer of solidarity, information and expertise between groups; an organisation’s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
People, finances and networks help advocacy NGOs to operate. Following Olson's (1965) theory, we argue that while small groups may be more efficient, costs weigh more heavily on participants. There are less people to share the costs of restrictions. As restrictions increase, staff, members and supporters in small groups feel the burden. Free-riding among these constituents may increase. The same applies to NGOs with low national and international connections to other NGOs. Therefore, when faced with sequential restrictions, there are fewer organisations to share the costs of continued advocacy. There are fewer protective networks to call upon. Groups with low finances may feel the brunt of restrictions more quickly than richer colleagues. Their lack of financial reserves may prevent them from leveraging further resources. As a vital resource for formalised advocacy groups, the depletion of finances may quickly cause advocacy output to fall. In consideration of this, we argue that high resources enhance NGO resilience when faced with restrictions. If advocacy falls, so do selective incentives to members. The theory would thus expect this to encourage free-riding. Thus, we use Olson's (1965) theory to argue that groups with low resources are the most vulnerable. The costs of restrictions stall collective action faster. We expect that:

**when faced with restrictions, NGOs with high resources are least likely to disband (H2).**

To this point, we have stated that our dependent variable is NGO resilience. At this juncture, the concept of resilience needs grounding in literature. Resilience is a notoriously muddy concept (Cutter 2016). Measuring resilience has proven difficult, complex and inconclusive (Adger 2000; Magis 2010; Lin and Polsky 2015). Viewed as a hallmark of existence, resilience implies the ability to manage threats and challenges (Robinson and Carson 2015). Resilience in our project is about resistance through advocacy. It is an NGO's capacity to continue advocacy rather than reducing activity. As rational actors, NGOs will only take risks if the chances of a pay-off are high.
Poorly resourced NGOs lack the capability to continue resisting. As a result, restrictions may quickly reduce their output. At the other end of the scale, NGOs with high resources are most resilient. Equipped with the tools, their advocacy output may naturally be higher. Given this, they are able to withstand restrictions and absorb the costs. Thus, they maintain or increase advocacy when facing aggression. They can take the risk. High resources enable them to continue being vulnerable, yet confident.

**Restrictive Actions**

Restrictions are neither linear nor static. They also can vary in target, severity and threat. Given the lack of work looking at restrictions on civil society, there is no theory which we can draw on. As a result, we look to the target of restrictions. In doing this, we separate restrictions which target organisations from those which target individuals. As such, we separate physical integrity violations (della Porta and Tarrow 1986, 2005) from bureaucratic restrictions. Individual restrictions inflict damage on people. From arrest, to torture or even death, they place activists in harm’s way. These are different from bureaucratic restrictions, which target NGOs as organisations. Bureaucratic restrictions impede an NGO’s operational structure. While problematic for advocacy output, they may leave activists unharmed. we offer indicative examples of both organisational and individual restrictions in table 2.

**Table 3: Organisational and Individual Restrictions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Targeting Organisations</th>
<th>Action Targeting Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Increased competition for funding from GONGOs</td>
<td>• Personal harassment/intimidation (including family of activists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legal challenges over NGO activity or bureaucratic restriction i.e. the revocation or suspension of existing licenses as a result of NSA activity</td>
<td>• Travel ban/restriction of access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-optation of civic actors/vocal CSO staff by NSA</td>
<td>• Threats and smears/public vilification/incitement to hatred or violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Project sanction by NSA i.e. SLAPP</td>
<td>• Criminal defamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Internet/ communication restriction /censorship</td>
<td>• Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Office raid/destruction/NGO equipment confiscated</td>
<td>• Illegal detention of activists/abduction/kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Torture and ill-treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Violent physical attack on activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Killing/death of activist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Threats and smears/public vilification of organisation
• Criminal defamation of organisation
• NSA’s surveillance of organisation

• Sexual and other gender-based assault /harassment

This distinction in restriction type is important. Our research will capture the variation in types and targets of restrictions on NGO activity. Thus, we will aim to investigate which type of restriction is most effective.

To this point, the attributes of non-state groups have been largely overlooked. It is clear that we aim to evaluate a variety of different actors under the umbrella of NSA (Sikkink 1986; Jochnick 1999; Clapham 2006). A key contribution of this study will be to document and highlight the types of NSAs that come into conflict with NGOs as well as their repertoire of actions. Drawing from the existing literature, we identify several types of NSA who are likely to impose restrictions on NGOs. These are outlined in table 3.

Table 4: Indicative NSAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of NSA</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Transnational) Corporation</td>
<td>A profit driven entity, which may operate in multiple countries</td>
<td>Garment manufacturer/Agribusiness/Internet service provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational Organisation</td>
<td>An organisation that exists in multiple countries which includes international governance or quasi-governance organisations.</td>
<td>The UN/The IMF/International Peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Network</td>
<td>A fluid structure which uses illicit or illegal strategies achieve profit or political ends.</td>
<td>The mafia / drug smuggling cartel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups (local or foreign)</td>
<td>Violent extremist groups that advocate, engage in, or otherwise support ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives. Violent extremist groups can also engage in terrorist activities but not necessarily always.</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaida and Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Armed Faction/Paramilitary

An armed political opposition group or militia which may or may not be affiliated with political parties/state security apparatus.

Free Syrian Army; paramilitary groups; mercenaries, private security companies (Blackwater)

Political Party/Group

A political organisation that subscribes to a certain ideology and seeks to attain political power through representation in government.

Awami League / Zanu-PF / The Labour Party

Government Controlled/Supported NGOs (GONGOs)

State affiliated civil society groups or groups created/supported by security apparatus to undermine credible CSOs.

GONGOs affiliated with political parties or governments

Multinational (civil society)

Groups operating independently in the space between the market and the state.

NGOs / INGOs / Faith Based Groups / Trade Unions

Yet, it impossible to theorise how these groups operate without assessing the role of the state. The state’s monopoly on coercion and repression is vital in understanding the types of groups which are able to operate within its borders. To do this, the key variable is state capacity (Englehart 2009). The level to which NSAs can execute these repressive campaigns is largely contingent on the power of the state to police and control these groups (Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1985; Mann 2008).

The inclusion of additional repressive actors does not mean that the state responsibilities can be forgotten. Rather, as the duty bearer of human rights, the state finds itself simultaneously occupying two positions (Donnelly 2013). On the one hand, it is the principal threat to human rights. On the other, it is the protector of human rights within its territory. The state thus both protects and endangers. Given this dual role, scholars have highlighted that if states fail to enforce human rights standards, NSAs can exploit state inaction to further their own interests through illicit actions (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Englehart 2009). If the state fails to police and uphold human rights, NSAs can increase repressive activities with little fear of consequence or reprisal (Migdal 1988).

It is intuitive to suggest that states who are unable to police their borders or control their agents are more likely to witness human rights abuses. Therefore, weak states create
conditions where a NSAs can conduct illicit activities (Jochnick 1999; Englehart 2009). This is because the state lacks the capacity to control and prosecute powerful actors who break the law (Clapham 2006). This manifests in a variety of ways. For example, a weak judiciary prone to corruption may open the door to powerful corporate interests, which repress worker rights. Others highlight that weak state infrastructural capacity can encourage the formation of armed non-state actor groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The synopsis of this literature is simple: if the state lacks power others will step in to fill the void.

This is not always the case. An independent judiciary, strong respect for the rule of law or even independent media tie states’ hands (Powell and Staton 2009; Conrad and Moore 2010). These institutions make the state’s use of its own repressive capacity challenging. This is especially true if a state is sensitive to both domestic and international shaming campaigns, which have the potential to bring a state into disrepute. Independent domestic institutions highlighting the state’s bad behaviour can inflict costs on a government. Which evokes a more sinister explanation to explain NSA activity. State and NSA collusion. The use of principal agent theory has been used to explain human rights abuses (Mitchell 2004). These approaches examine the role of the state in utilising agents to carry out their dirty work. The principal - in this case the state - may instruct an NSA to commit crimes on its behalf. This in turn leads to two explanations which explain human rights abuse. On the one hand, states may use human rights violations as a policy. In this scenario, they may encourage their agents to carry out violations while simultaneously denying culpability. This may take the form of “artificial information asymmetry” whereby the state overlooks what their agent is doing (Mitchell 2004). Instead, it holds its nose and looks the other way, safe in the knowledge their proxy is carrying out their will, no matter how violent. The other, is that a state loses control of its agent. The principal-agent argument would term this agency loss (Ross 1973; Moe 1984). Conflicting incentives or information asymmetry may lead an agent to perpetrate abuses beyond the scope of work initially envisioned by the agent.

Collusion between states and NSAs is clearly a plausible explanation into explaining repression against NGOs. A state may be keen to outsource violence to silence its critics. Therefore, the focus on the sequence of events will be important in understanding the level of collusion between state repression and NSA actions. To align with the theory, NSAs may impose harsher, more brutal restrictions (individual restrictions) after the state has imposed
bureaucratic restrictions (organisational restrictions). We will understand where in the sequence of events the costs of advocacy became too high for NGOs to bear.

We will do this by looking at restrictions. We argue that restrictions on NGO activities impose costs. This theory is honed by arguing that these costs are imposed on the variables of finances, networks and people. We split the types of restrictions that an NSA can impose on an NGO into two categories: organisational and individual restrictions. This project will measure and test the causal implications or costs on these variables. We contend that an NGO’s advocacy choices are influenced by its ability to absorb these costs. As restrictions increase in severity and number, NGO resources endure costs. Different restrictions impose costs of varying severity. Even well-resourced NGOs have their limits. This research argues that costs explain why some restrictions are likely to be more effective than others. However, due to the lack of work in this area, little is known about the effectiveness of these different restrictions. We seek to investigate this phenomenon. As such, we formulate two contrasting hypotheses. Firstly, *restrictions that increase selective disincentives of members and staff to participate are the most effective in reducing NGO shaming activities (H3a).* Secondly, *restrictions that reduce organisational capacity are the most effective in reducing NGO shaming activities (H3b).*
Overview of literature findings:

- The maturity of the human rights movement has spawned a variety of NGOs who work within universally acknowledged legal framework. As vehicles for participation, these groups working on human rights issues have emerged as a powerful countervailing political force. Especially when working in transnational networks, local NGOs play an essential role in brokering information that holds states to account.
- The naming and shaming tactic has proven a potent force for human rights progress. Evidence highlights that states are sensitive to shaming events by non-governmental organisations, especially when these groups expose non-compliance with human rights commitments on an international stage. Restrictions on local NGOs, have been hypothesised as a way of controlling and reducing this flow of critical information.
- Yet, it is not only states who restrict NGOs. While understudied, non-state actors can also restrict NGOs. This panoply of actors collides and contests around the state, leading some question how power relationships with the state influence these actors’ decision-making. Little is known about the sensitivity of these groups to naming and shaming by NGOs.
- As advocates, NGOs have tactical choices: cooperation or confrontation. These choices can be taken through proactive strategies which seek to prise open or reclaim political space or defensive strategies which are used to defend themselves against aggression. In practice, strategic advocacy choices are fluid, dynamic and interactive.
- Restrictions impose costs on NGOs, which stalls collective action. As costs increase, under resourced are unable to endure the costs of continued confrontation and are forced to reduce activities. A survey of the resource mobilisation literature finds several resources which are vital to the operation of NGOs. These are: finances, networks and people.
- Restrictive actions imposed on NGOs can be split into two categories: actions which target individuals and actions which target organisations. These restrictions can be imposed in waves and have a cumulative effect on NGO activity. Both state and non-state restrictions fit into these categories, but NSAs may be freer to impose harsher restrictions. NSAs have been shown to exploit weak state capacity to orchestrate human rights abuses, or work with the state to target NGOs. Drawing from literature on pro-government militias, states may use NSAs, especially stated-aligned NGOs or conservative movements to smear or discredit critical NGOs.
- Little is understood about the sequence of events directly after states impose restrictions on NGOs. In fact, even less is known about the nature and sequence of restrictions imposed by states and NSAs, especially by NSAs in close proximity to the state.

**Bangladesh**

In this section we will provide a synopsis of the key literature relevant to the issues facing civil society in Bangladesh.
Social service in Bangladesh has its roots in the history of the sub-continent, where land owners and ‘Nawabs’ and the rich have made endowments for education and religious instruction, run free kitchens for the poor, built schools for education of the girl child and carried out other such charitable activities. The missionaries did their part too. In 1800 the Christian Missionary Hospital was established and as people became more politically engaged and socially aware, societies, clubs and institutions mushroomed that were ‘involved in educational development, social empowerment and community advancement.’

Women were active as well, setting up various societies for women’s advancement and providing vocational training to poor women.

After Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971, foreign aid agencies and NGOs assisted in rebuilding the war damaged country and providing disaster relief and rehabilitation activities. With them, local social development agencies were born ‘founded by professionals with a social conscience and included various economists, sociologists and others.’ When the rehabilitation and relief measures were in place and the threats to these diffused, foreign aid did not stop. In 1974, Bangladesh was hit with a famine the government could not tackle on its own and accepted foreign aid and the assistance of international NGOs and homegrown ones too. The influx of foreign aid seemed to have encouraged the growth of local NGOs who were better placed to used the funds at the grassroots level. ‘The country probably has the more NGOs than any other country of the same size in the world’.

In order to regulate the activities of the hundreds of NGOs working in Bangladesh and to monitor their projects and source of foreign funding, in 1990 the Government of Bangladesh created the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB), which was and still in, under the control of the Prime Minister’s Office. According the NGOAB website, ‘NGOs much certify in the project proposal that they receive foreign donation or contribution from legal sources. Sources

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3. Ibid.
4. Bangladesh was fortunate to have some visionary leaders at the head of some of the most successful NGOs, such as Nobel Laureate Prof. Muhammad Yunus of Grameen Bank, Sir Fazle Hasan Abed of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Dr. Zafurullah Chowdhury of the Gonoshasthya Kendra.
could be foundation, trust, government, education institution, or even individuals. As part of enforcing Anti Money Laundering Act 2012 and Combating financing of terrorism bureau has the responsibility to make sure that money being channelized by NGOs is from legal sources. The Bureau also realizes government revenue—both tax (income tax, VAT etc) and non-tax (registration fee). Bureau always coordinates with NGOs, line ministries, different state agencies and development partners in discharging its duty as the regulatory authority. Here the spirit is to facilitate the NGO activities, not to regulate them only. Director General represent bureau in different committees where NGO issues are involved.6

Although local level NGOs in Bangladesh commenced their activities by providing microcredit and focusing on the aspects of economic rights, activities soon expanded into other sectors, namely health, education, women’s empowerment, child rights, environment, skill training and disaster management. Several also provide legal aid and assistance and quite a small number focus on civil and political rights such as elections and more sensitive matters such as torture, extrajudicial deaths and enforced disappearances. According to data of June 2015 from the NGOAB there were a total of 2143 local NGOs registered under it7 and according to the NGOAB current statistics (till March 2019), there are 2666 NGOs currently registered under it8—according to this data, there has been an increase of 523 NGOs in three years.

NGOs in Bangladesh are registered under different laws, depending on their activities, services and even on which registration process is the least complicated. These various laws are the Societies Registration Act 1860, the Trust Act 1862, the Companies Act 1913, the Cooperative Societies Act 1925, Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Regulation and Control Ordinance) 1969, The Wakf Ordinance 1962, Hindu Religious Welfare Trust Ordinance 1982, the Christian Religious Welfare Trust Ordinance 1983, the Buddhist Welfare Trust Ordinance 1983, the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Ordinance 1982. Some are

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even registered as joint stock companies. All NGOs, however, have to also be registered under the NGO Affairs Bureau in order to get their projects approved and foreign funds cleared.

On October 5, 2016 the National Parliament passed The Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Bill 2016 with a provision (Section 14) that says it is an offence for foreign-funded NGOs to make "inimical" and "derogatory" remarks on the constitution and constitutional bodies. The Bill also stated that if any foreign-funded NGO engages in anti-state activities and finances or patronizes extremism and terror activities⁹, those would be considered as offences, and the NGO and its officials concerned would be tried under the country’s existing laws. It also empowered the NGO Affairs Bureau to cancel or withhold the registration of a foreign-funded NGO or ban its activities for committing the offences. This Bill came under heavy criticism from NGOs and civil society in Bangladesh and abroad¹⁰. However, despite such criticism and fears of abuse, the Bill was enacted in 2016 with no amendments.

In recent times, the government of Bangladesh has passed/amended other laws gagging freedom of speech and expression online. This has an adverse impact on NGOs, particularly those working in the areas of civil and political rights, who are not only the voice of the deprived and victimised, but who also depend on social media and websites to publish information, create awareness and network. The media, ‘dissenters’, critics of the present regime (that has been in power since 2009) and bloggers have also been targets of persecution under such laws, namely the Information and Communication Technology Act 2006 (amended in 2013) and the even more repressive Digital Security Act 2018.

Mapping of NSAs in Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of NSA</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>BANGLADESH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

⁹ What constitutes anti state activities, extremism and terror activities are not defined in the Act.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Transnational) Corporation</th>
<th>A profit driven entity, which may operate in multiple countries</th>
<th>Garment manufacturer/ International buyers/BGMEA/Internet Service Providers/ Security and Surveillance/ Agribusiness (GMO, Fertilizer) / Chemical Co./ Coal and Tobacco Co. (Bangladesh American Tobacco etc)/ Unilever/ Nestle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supranational Organisation</td>
<td>An organisation that exists in multiple countries which includes international governance or quasi-governance organisations.</td>
<td>The UN / International Peacekeepers/ DFID/ JAICA/ WB/ USAID/ UKAID etc: where there has been an affect on human rights issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Network</td>
<td>A fluid structure which uses illicit or illegal strategies achieve profit or political ends.</td>
<td>Drugs/ Arms/ trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups (local or foreign)</td>
<td>Violent extremist groups that advocate, engage in, or otherwise support ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives. Violent extremist groups can also engage in terrorist activities but not necessarily always.</td>
<td>New JMB/ HUJI/ Ahsanulla</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** these both categories might overlap but where it is not the case should be separated - for example there can be violent extremist groups who do not necessarily engage in terrorist activities as such but in radicalisation and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Faction</td>
<td>An armed political opposition group or militia which may or may not be affiliated with political parties/state security apparatus.</td>
<td>UPDF/ Jumma Land/ ‘Left’ organisations (Maoists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party/Group</td>
<td>A political organisation that subscribes to a certain ideology and seeks to attain political power through representation in government.</td>
<td>Awami League/ BNP/ their factions and wings (especially student and youth wings)/ CPB/ Gono Shonghoti Andolon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Controlled/Supported NGOs (GONGOs)</td>
<td>State affiliated civil society groups or groups created/supported by security apparatus to undermine credible CSOs.</td>
<td>CRI/ BOAN/ Suchinta/ Centre for Natural Resource Studies/ JANIPPOP/ Digital Bangladesh Foundation/ Paribartan Bangladesh/ BHRC/ CP Gang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational (civil society)</td>
<td>Groups operating independently in the space between the market and the state.</td>
<td>Observer Research Foundation/ CPD/ TIB/ BRAC/ Chamber of Commerce, ‘think tanks’: whoever has affected human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-Based/Religious Organisations</td>
<td>Groups based on religion and faith, and/or faith-inspired groups, which</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
operate as registered or unregistered non-profit institutions THERE ARE 67 ‘ISLAMIC’ NGOs operating in Bangladesh. (for some reason I cannot write in the next cell)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Other NSA not mentioned above</th>
<th>Private TV channels/ Professional groups – journalists, engineers associations/ Ghatok DalalDNirmul Committee/ National Human Rights Commission/ Shommelito Shangskritik Joyte/ Hackers/ Bloggers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Palestinian Territories

In this section we will provide a synopsis of the key literature relevant to the issues facing civil society in Palestine.

Mapping of NSAs in the Palestinian Territories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSA</th>
<th>Relationship to the state &amp; Motivation</th>
<th>Areas of Operation, Location</th>
<th>Actions Impacting Civic/democratic space/Actors</th>
<th>When?</th>
<th>Evidence, e.g. statements, news reports</th>
<th>Impact on CSO/Democratic space/actor’s resources (human, financial, networks, capacity to continue working) with examples</th>
<th>NGOs/CSO responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Business groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 SANAD Construction company</td>
<td>Part of the Palestinian Investment fund (PIF) which very influential in decision making</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza Strip</td>
<td>Mobilizing the official bodies against activists</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/1QSRZXV">https://bit.ly/1QSRZXV</a></td>
<td>Incitment and pressure on official environmental authority to stop the campaign</td>
<td>Affected Groups: the local people will be effected by proposed cement factory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSA</th>
<th>Relationship to the state &amp; Motivation</th>
<th>Areas of Operation, Location</th>
<th>Actions Impacting Civic/democratic space/Actors</th>
<th>When?</th>
<th>Evidence, e.g. statements, news reports</th>
<th>Impact on CSO/Democratic space/actor's resources (human, financial, networks, capacity to continue working) with examples</th>
<th>NGOs/CSO responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Working with local people to make social pressure and to make people voice heard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. pharmaceutical company</td>
<td>Very influential on decision makers</td>
<td>West bank</td>
<td>Incitement and accusing the NGO as collaborator with international funding agency To stop the water</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Leaflet and brochure distributed during the night to the local people Using social media</td>
<td>Reduction of credibility and reputation</td>
<td>Affected groups: the three village councils Response: preparing very professional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>treatment plant to provide water treated waste water for agriculture and improving the environment</td>
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<td>technical report</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Palestine Development and Investment, Ltd. (PADICO HOLDING)</td>
<td>The largest holding in palestine ö very close to the state</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Industrial zone in Jalama without taking into consideration the environmental impact</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>reports and media</td>
<td>Incitement against environmen tal NGOs</td>
<td>Affected Groups: local social movement Responses: technical report and</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. Israeli Industrial companies in west Bank</td>
<td>Illegal industrial zones moved from Israel to west bank</td>
<td>West bank</td>
<td>Environmentally danger and prevented to operate in Israel moved to west bank</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Reports</td>
<td>Preventing NGOs to monitor and watching the violation of human rights</td>
<td>Affected: local community Respond: national campaigns against it organised by NGOs. Production reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Israeli settlers Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Israeli settlers groups (pay the cost groups)</th>
<th>Link with Israeli army</th>
<th>West bank</th>
<th>- Preventing CBOs and NGOs demonstrat</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Media and ay witness testimony</th>
<th>• Preventing them to</th>
<th>Affected Groups: residents in south of</th>
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<td>ions against suspected Nuclear waste and restrict the access to take water and soil samples - opposition activists.</td>
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<td>take evidence To use it for legal issues hence Arresting active persons</td>
<td>Hebron and another Informal sector organisations</td>
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</table>

**Responses:**
Mobilize the international community by arranging for diplomatic missions

**Political Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Hamas de-facto authority</th>
<th>Controlling power in Gaza strip</th>
<th>Gaza strip</th>
<th>Closing NGOs, invasion, monitoring</th>
<th>2006-present</th>
<th>Media reports Testimonies</th>
<th>Closing offices, invasions</th>
<th>Affected CSOs: people who receiving</th>
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<td>Closing bank accounts.</td>
<td>NGOs/CSO responses</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Alfateh (Palestinian liberation movement)</td>
<td>Close to the Palestinian authority</td>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>- Creating Parallel NGOs</td>
<td>2006- Present</td>
<td>Registry of NGOs</td>
<td>Dilution the concept of civil society</td>
<td>Affected CBOs strong, opposite and left NGOs Responses: networking, forming Coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. International NGOs (INGOs)</td>
<td>Strong connection with Donors</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>- Replacement Local NGOs</td>
<td>Since 2010</td>
<td>Number of implanted project by INGOs</td>
<td>- Competition for fund, for local NGOs</td>
<td>- Effected: small NGOs, Local CBOs and</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>9. UN Agencies</td>
<td>Strong relation with authority and donors</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza and Jerusalem</td>
<td>- Competitio n with NGOs , Accusing the local NGOs</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Some UN agencies instead working with local NGOs started to be direct</td>
<td>- Website s of UN agencies and number of - Beneficiar ies - <strong>Respond</strong>: networkin g, coalition among Local NGOs</td>
<td>- <strong>Effected Groups</strong> - Local communit y by allocated</td>
</tr>
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|     |                                       |                             |                                             |       | implementation Agency               | projects implemented by UN agencies And field observations                      | the large % of projects to the admin cost.  
|     |                                       |                             |                                             |       |                                     | - Respond: dialogues with Donors                                                |                  |
| 10. USAID And International donors | High influence on the decision making | West Bank and Gaza and Jerusalem | - Putting political conditions and imposing political statements | Ongoing | Sample of agreements | - websites, sample agreements | - Effected Groups  
|     |                                       |                             |                                             |       |                                     | - Democratic NGOs  
<p>|     |                                       |                             |                                             |       |                                     | - Social movements                                                         |                  |</p>
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<td></td>
<td>- creation parallel NGOs</td>
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<td>- Response: Boycott USAID fund</td>
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<td>- unfair vetting system</td>
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<td>- unfair vetting system</td>
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Zimbabwe

In this section we will provide a synopsis of the key literature relevant to the issues facing civil society in Palestine.

Mapping of NSAs in Zimbabwe

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<td>Sino Zimbabwe / Sam Pa (A Chinese Business person)</td>
<td>Business deals on diamonds, Off-book government expenditure and financing of the CIO operations on surveillance</td>
<td>Transnational, Harare</td>
<td>Off book financing of state and ZANU-PF Proxies: For instance, Sam Pa and Sino Zimbabwe are involved in Diamond mining in Zimbabwe and allegedly provided off budget funding to the central intelligence organization and ZANU-PF cohorts for activities targeting CSOs and other pro-democracy actors.</td>
<td>2006-2012-2014</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/1QSRZxV">https://bit.ly/1QSRZxV</a></td>
<td>Increased and Improved state surveillance of CSOs: The funding improved state and nonstate ZANU-PF allied groups surveillance abilities and is suspected to have led increased cellphone hacking, office visits, disruption of CSO meetings which hinders the work of democratic actors.</td>
<td>Affected Groups: largely Governance, and Human rights groups + groups working on mining and community beneficiation e.g. CNRG, ZELA, Environmental lawyers. Responses: CSOs tried to improve physical and online security through trainings. For instance, ZLHR and</td>
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LOCAL & TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Sino Zimbabwe / Sam Pa (A Chinese Business person) Business deals on diamonds, Off-book government expenditure and financing of the CIO operations on surveillance Transnational, Harare Off book financing of state and ZANU-PF Proxies: For instance, Sam Pa and Sino Zimbabwe are involved in Diamond mining in Zimbabwe and allegedly provided off budget funding to the central intelligence organization and ZANU-PF cohorts for activities targeting CSOs and other pro-democracy actors. 2006-2012-2014 https://bit.ly/1QSRZxV Increased and Improved state surveillance of CSOs: The funding improved state and nonstate ZANU-PF allied groups surveillance abilities and is suspected to have led increased cellphone hacking, office visits, disruption of CSO meetings which hinders the work of democratic actors. Affected Groups: largely Governance, and Human rights groups + groups working on mining and community beneficiation e.g. CNRG, ZELA, Environmental lawyers. Responses: CSOs tried to improve physical and online security through trainings. For instance, ZLHR and
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<td></td>
<td>Blocking off NGO Access to Diamond Mining areas in conjunctions with state security apparatus (Military and Intelligence)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hampering Access to areas of high human rights violations</td>
<td>other groups has run physical and internet security workshops for CSO leaders, there have been trainings on ABC of human rights defenders to increase the vigilance of actors. Collaborations with CBOs and other community structures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC)**

- Displacement of civilians,
- Attacks against citizens
- Interference with CSO documentation efforts

ongoing

**Affected groups:** CNRG

**Response:** litigation
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<tr>
<td>Internet Service Providers (Econet Wireless, Telecell Zim, TelOne,)</td>
<td>Most ISPs are private companies except for Tel One which is a Parastatal, partly owned by government.</td>
<td>National</td>
<td><strong>Internet shutdown, social media sites blocking</strong> at the instigation of the state. Complying with government directives to intercept and monitor communications (from as early as 2007)</td>
<td>January 2019 + 2007 to date</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2U7X1FO">https://bit.ly/2U7X1FO</a></td>
<td>Hampered social and labor movements ability to communicate with and mobilize citizens around planned protest actions. Also hampered effective interventions by CSOs offering legal, medical and other support to affected activists through limited information flow, as well as financing for some activities given the online nature of the bulk of transactions in Zimbabwe.</td>
<td>Affected Groups: ZCTU, This flag, NGO Forum members</td>
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<td><strong>Responses:</strong> CSOs and activists attempted workarounds using VPNs, but this was not widespread as most were facing this situation for the first time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banking sector (Most Banks in operation between 2008 and 2019)</td>
<td>Mostly notionally private entities, although some have links to the state (e.g. CBZ, ZB Bank, Agribank etc).</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Implementation of the state’s foreign currency regime at different points over the last decade. These made transacting difficult and forced some entities towards borderline illegal activities.</td>
<td>2008 to date</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2VCYYvq">https://bit.ly/2VCYYvq</a></td>
<td>Often resulted in CSOs either losing money (e.g. ZimCodd, NANGO in 2009) or not accessing their free funds in forex or at real market value due to forex shortages. Financial resource access challenges translated to implementation challenges for NGOs, affecting activities, staff remuneration and support to beneficiaries. Resultant solutions increased</td>
<td>Affected groups: Multiple, e.g. ZimCodd in 2009 &lt;br&gt; Responses: NGOs opening offshore accounts and avoiding to the extent possible local banking arrangements.</td>
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<td>transaction costs for NGOs and placed security risks on them as well as creating opportunities for fraud and illegal forex exchange.</td>
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**CRIMINAL NETWORK:**
A fluid structure which uses illicit or illegal strategies achieve profit or political ends.

**Chipangano**
Controlled by senior ZANU-PF officials with links to Police and Military intelligence for violence activities

Harare especially Suburb of Mbare although can be sent to other suburbs for its

- Disruption of lawful CSO meetings
- Extorting public transport operators and informal traders.
- Terrorizing perceived political opponents mostly CSO and opposition activists.

Has been in operation since early 2002

- [https://bit.ly/2v3gCgg](https://bit.ly/2v3gCgg)
- [https://bit.ly/2UwVC0K](https://bit.ly/2UwVC0K)

- Difficulties in conducting lawful civic education work
- Development projects disturbed
- Local CSO offices closed
- Meetings held in City center and hence Mbare participants bussed to other venues -

**Affected Groups:**
CHRA and other residents associations, Aqua Healing, ZICHIE, VISET and another Informal sector organisations

**Responses:**
- litigation
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<td>Rank marshals</td>
<td>- Controlled by ZANU PF youth league</td>
<td>Public transport (kombi) pick up</td>
<td>Illegal Collecting of daily fees from public transport operations up to $16 000 a day to</td>
<td>2002-date</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2IetxES">https://bit.ly/2IetxES</a> <a href="https://bit.ly/2JpUHro">https://bit.ly/2JpUHro</a></td>
<td>Increasing financial costs for NGO work, as well as increasing security risks for work especially in Mbare</td>
<td>- negotiating and incentivizing to allow meetings to proceed. - Engaging Chipangano at a local level, and - doing activities within church (catholic church) premises, Cancellation meetings and moving activities to city center. activities - exposing the group activities through name and shaming</td>
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<td>points mainly in greater Harare, Gweru, Chitungwiza, Bulawayo</td>
<td>fund activities of Chipangano and ZANU-PF youth league activities - Available as a human resource to Chipangano</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2Z69vBz">https://bit.ly/2Z69vBz</a></td>
<td>democratic actors</td>
<td>sustainable action is taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al Shabab - Kwekwe</td>
<td>Linked to President Emmerson Mnangagwa and Minister of State Security Owen “Mudha” Ncube</td>
<td>Midland Province</td>
<td>Similar modus operandi to Chipangano</td>
<td>2005 to date</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2UdhRDG">https://bit.ly/2UdhRDG</a> <a href="https://bit.ly/2DcPoYY">https://bit.ly/2DcPoYY</a></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physical threats to persons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queen Bee – Kudakwashe Tagwirei – CEO of Sakunda Holdings</td>
<td>Lucrative deals with government in Energy, Agriculture and Mining – Motivated by patronage interests</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>- Massive state capture and control of Zimbabwe reserve bank, Judiciary and Min of Finance for personal gain  - Undermine democratic and public institutions  - Support specific candidates against will of the population to win elections for purposes of power retention</td>
<td>Unclear but since 2010</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2IcgpQo">https://bit.ly/2IcgpQo</a>  <a href="https://bit.ly/2VEWKMd">https://bit.ly/2VEWKMd</a></td>
<td>Queen B is rumored to be opposed to national dialogue and therefore funds covert operations by the military to interfere with NGO work and broad democratic actors</td>
<td>Mainly exposure of the linkages between state capture, corruption and illicit activities by Queen Bee network</td>
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|     |                                   |                               | - controlling fuel and energy sector for personal gain and forcing price hikes that led to demonstrations and subsequent deaths  
     |       |                               | - Capture of the military                  |       |                                  |                                                                                 |                  |
| Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups (local or foreign):|

**ARMED FACTION**

|                                                      |         | - Engage in violence including killing |
|                                                     |         | Mainly after 2000 |
|                                                     |         | They progressively eliminated through killings activists aligned in the rural areas and created no go zones |
|                                                     |         | ZPP, ZCTU; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, ZLP and others  
<p>|                                                     |         | - Formation of an alternative war veterans association as a counter |</p>
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<th>Impact on CSO/Democratic space/actors’ resources (human, financial, networks, capacity to continue working) with examples</th>
<th>NGOs/CSO responses</th>
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<td></td>
<td>responsible for their affairs. ZNLWA- has pledged fealty to ZANU-PF, consider themselves a critical element of the party, and a Reserve army for the state. Motivated by political power, historical ties, and ideological convictions from the war and patronage gains from the state.</td>
<td>perceive enemies of the state - Using their links in government and security to disrupt and interfere with CSO work(<a href="https://bit.ly/2DaEX8y">https://bit.ly/2DaEX8y</a>)</td>
<td>When?</td>
<td>Evidence, e.g. statements, news reports</td>
<td>Impact on CSO/Democratic space/actors’ resources (human, financial, networks, capacity to continue working) with examples</td>
<td>hegemonic project that contests at the same level of ideological authority – Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP) - Documenting and exposing the violent and illegal activities of the war veterans - Rapprochement/working together, e.g. 2016 to 2017.</td>
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<td>Boys on leave</td>
<td>Suspected military intelligence members, who constitute a crack</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Illegal Surveillance of CSO actors by tracking them, Ongoing (with specific incidents)</td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2X96dMb">https://bit.ly/2X96dMb</a></td>
<td>- Destroyed and led to closure of CSO offices</td>
<td>Affected Groups: ZPP, OUS Movements, New Social movements,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>unite responsible for surveillance, abductions and extra-legal killings.</td>
<td></td>
<td>bugging phones and home visits</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2IschHS1">https://bit.ly/2IschHS1</a></td>
<td>Others CSO have for periods failed to operate or go to their offices</td>
<td>heal Zimbabwe, ZimRights, Crisis in Zimbabwe coalition, CSU,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Elimination through killings, torture and beatings of known activists</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2IsDD4c">https://bit.ly/2IsDD4c</a></td>
<td>- Introduce and nature fear among communities making it difficult for CSO to operate</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Infiltration and destabilization activities of local and international CSO activities</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2GcAlItJ">https://bit.ly/2GcAlItJ</a></td>
<td>- Infiltrated organizations are disabled and sometimes fight within</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Crack teams to disturb CSO activities, run character assassinations and abductions of activists</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2Dap1Db">https://bit.ly/2Dap1Db</a></td>
<td>- Targeted character associations through fake stories</td>
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</table>
A political organisation that subscribes to a certain ideology and seeks to attain political power through representation in government. (think ZANU-PF or any other party and specific organs – Youth militia, vanguard?)

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| ZANU-PF | Ruling party motivated by power retention. | National | Perhaps the greatest attack on civic and democratic space has come from ZANU-PF  
- Pushed policies in Government that restrict the civic space e.g. POSA, AIPPA, NGO Act  
- Abused their power to direct police to arrest and detain activists  
- Criminalised civic engagement and democratic debate  
- Co-opted the army and used it for its own power retention means. | ongoing | - ZANUPF has increased the cost of programming especially in rural areas.  
- Disrupted NGO work through frivolous court cases and disrupting NGO activities.  
- Through sustained intimidation many activists have pulled out of the civic space, killed, | Affected Groups: ZANU-PF actions, as a party and through its proxies, within and outside the state, has affected almost the entire gamut of CSOs in Zimbabwe across sectors from Humanitarian groups with some being banned like Goal and Concern World-wide, ZACH, COTRAD, to advocacy groups like the Forum, Crisis, and others, to service providers and professional groups |
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|     |                                       |                             | - Resisted any means and avenues for reforms  |       |                                          | abducted, and maimed.  
- Many democratic actors have been forced to close office space and change operating areas due to activities of ZANU-PF | like ZADHR, ZLHR, CSU, |
|     |                                       |                             | - Act as local vanguards in communities and restrict ed activities especially in rural areas that promote local democratic state.  
- Infiltration. |       |                                          | Responses:  
- CSO have sought external funding to support their actions and in promotion of their work.  
Building regional and international solidarity and support networks.  
- Engaged key wielders of influence internationally,  
- engaging other intervention of other liberation movements in the SADC region and other governments to intervene |
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| The MDCs (various formation) | none | National | - Infiltrating NGOs and attempting to have them push agendas aligned to the different formations of the party.  
- Deploying agents to occupy key positions in CSOs.  
- Disrupting and disturbing operations of NGOs key to democratisation but which the parties felt were not supportive of their agendas.  
- Bad mouthing to donors. | Especially during periods of MDC splits between 2005 and 2015 | - Affected the neutrality of CSOs.  
- Hindered effective non-partisan operations.  
- Led to income loses for some groups (especially in Bulawayo – those perceived to be aligned to MDC-T after 2008 were bad mouthed to donors by MDC-N)  
- Splitting organisations | Affected Groups: BPRA, Bulawayo Agenda, ROHR, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, ZINASU, |
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<td></td>
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<td>Penning articles that impacted CSO operations and credibility.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. ZINASU 2009)</td>
<td>Fanned infighting affecting effective operations (e.g. Crisis 2014)</td>
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**Government Controlled/Supported NGOs (GONGOs):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zimbabwe Federation of</th>
<th>Pro-state and ZANU-PF alternative labour movement</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>-Delegitimise legitimate workers’ demands as opposition</th>
<th></th>
<th>The impact of the ZFTU has been to divide workers on partisan lines. The ZCTU has continued to mobilise the working class and the</th>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Unions (ZFTU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>voices as articulated by the ZCTU - infiltration and manipulation of the legitimate body - confuse messaging and collective job bargaining that goes against interests of state and ZANUPF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ZCTU affiliated workers are largely seen as MDC while the ZFTU are ZANUPF. The main impact has been to dilute the impact of the workings people struggles and their legitimate demands on government.</td>
<td>informally employed groups. It has managed to connect with the workers struggle through consistent messaging that is in tandem with the felt needs and the conditions of the workers. ZCTU has also mobilised international solidarity and connected with other genuine labour movements. In essence grassroots mobilisation, consistent and principled messaging and programming around the felt needs</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
| Zimbabwe Federation of NGOs (ZFNGO) | affiliated to ZANU-PF, leadership comprising of former ZANU-PF officials. Formed as a counter to CSO coalitions doing Regional and International advocacy. | Harare, SADC and the AU | - Seek to regulate activities of legitimate NGOs  
- Confuse CSO message to the local citizens, diplomatic community and other key stakeholders  
- Infiltration and destabilisation of NGO legitimate voices.  
[https://bit.ly/2P5spUB](https://bit.ly/2P5spUB) | The impact of the ZFNGO is seen largely during key national processes like parliament led constitution process which involved several NGOs. They attempted have confused to confuse and dilute CSO messaging. They have also occupied key spaces of government engagements and locked out key actors from voicing real citizen concerns. | of workers has been the response. |
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<td>identifying legitimate CSOs for arrest.</td>
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<td>Impact on CSO/Democratic space/actors’ resources (human, financial, networks, capacity to continue working) with examples</td>
<td>CSOs and NGOs in Zimbabwe.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Instigating frivolous law suits/SLAAPS against NGOs (e.g. the NGO Forum) <a href="https://bit.ly/2G7npud">https://bit.ly/2G7npuD</a></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- CSOs and NGOs in Zimbabwe.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZICOSU</td>
<td>ZANU-PF sponsored Alternative National Students Union formed as a counter to ZINASU, with fiscal support from the state <a href="https://bit.ly/2GeDuOW">https://bit.ly/2GeDuOW</a></td>
<td>National - tertiary Institutions</td>
<td>Counter legitimate student action and representation at all government and interstate functions to muzzle legitimate voice of students. Politicising education and student platforms</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2Kwt82x">https://bit.ly/2Kwt82x</a></td>
<td>- usurped the platforms for legitimate student voices. - They have sponsored student leaders in campuses to campaign and occupy leadership positions.</td>
<td>Affected groups: ZINASU, SST, SCMZ,</td>
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<td>National Eye</td>
<td>unclear</td>
<td>Marang e</td>
<td>- Attacking activists investigating extractive industry</td>
<td>Witness testimonies</td>
<td>- Physical injury to human rights monitors</td>
<td>Affected groups: CNRG Responses: Litigation</td>
<td>also entrenching its relations with the MDC.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

- in support of ZANU-PF
  - Disrupting ZINASU processes.

- Hampered ZINASU operations and turned most students’ unions into docility.
- “highjacked” the student struggles and reduced their effectiveness.
- exposed student leaders to arrests and detentions and torture, working as informants for state security agents.

- Physical injury to human rights monitors
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</table>
| Varakasi | social media trolls aligned to ZANU-PF and the state | Social media | - troll and attack any dissenting voice against the state.  
- Character assassination of CSOs  
- Demonising CSOs  
Prominent handles: @matigari, @jonesmasara, @kmutisi | - Created reputational challenges in the public eye, and damaged credibility of legitimate CSO actors. | Impeding work. Affected groups: Human rights organisations and prodemocracy groups (e.g. ZESN, Crisis, Heal Zimbabwe, ZLHR) |

**Multinational (civil society):**

<p>| December 12 Movement | Publicly aligned to ZANU-PF | USA and Zimbabwe | Spreading state/ZANU-PF-aligned propaganda, Interference with peaceful demonstrations and staging counter demonstrations. | | | Affected groups: ThisFlag |</p>
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<td><strong>Faith-Based/Religious Organisations:</strong></td>
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<td>Mapostori</td>
<td>Motivated by patronage gains. They are a mobilising platform and agent of the state</td>
<td>Dotted around the country</td>
<td>Using religion to suppress dissent and paint the ZANU Incumbent as having been ordained by God. This kills freedom of expression and criminalise democratic debate and freedoms of association.</td>
<td>Operated since independence but mainly after the year 2000</td>
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<td>ZINATHA</td>
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<td>Hate speech, Inciting homophobia</td>
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<td>Affected Groups: GALZ</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Community-Based Organisations (CBO) and other grassroots organisations:</strong> A group of individuals organized by and for a particular community of people based on shared interests and/or attributes and works for serving the community interests.</td>
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<td>Partisan Local Press</td>
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<td>Herald Newspaper</td>
<td>State has shares in the holding Company</td>
<td>Harare, National</td>
<td>The Herald has been an effective propaganda machinery that continues to undermine democratic progress in Zimbabwe. They support and promote a partisan wedge among society with which the state thrives. They create falsehoods which alienate democratic voices.</td>
<td>Throughout independent Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Herald has delegitimized the voices of several CSO actors by creating false stories of corruption, of internal divisions which the public sometimes believe. They run narratives that certain individuals for example on realizing the effectiveness of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition they prolife the actors as regime change agents, they promote, through their wide reach the view that CSO and</td>
<td>Responses: Alternative media, reliance on Social Media, newsletters. CSO awards that celebrate the work of activist’s help protect actors from state character assassinations.</td>
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| Patriot | a propaganda arm of ZANU-PF | Mainly Harare | - Demonizes civil society  
- Peddles false allegations and smears target groups as unpatriotic, sell out, and imperialist sponsored.  
- Generates a pseudo intellectual and ideological attack on democratic actors, | | | opposition actors invited sanctions in Zimbabwe. This is effective in mobilizing rural voters and makes civic education difficult and costly. | BPRA, NGO Forum, CSU, ZPP, ZimRights; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, ZESN, CHRA, TIZ...  
- Clarifying truths/Counter propaganda, producing evidence-based reports and research-based advocacy. |
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<td>producing negative dominant narratives of regime change; illegal govern overthrow by legitimate CSO actors and mischaracterizing CSOs and the country’s challenges.</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://bit.ly/2UWTvCQ">https://bit.ly/2UWTvCQ</a></td>
<td>narratives approach, negative profiling individuals as unpatriotic.</td>
<td>delegitimized the paper and boycotted purchasing it which affects its revenue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


SMIDT, HANNAH, KRISTIN M. BAKKE, NEIL J. MITCHELL, and DOMINIC PERERA. (2018) Silencing Their Critics: How Effective Are Governments in Restricting Civil Society?


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