

An Assessment of Civil Society in Taiwan (2005)

Transforming State-Society Relations: The Challenge, Dilemma and Prospect of
Civil Society in Taiwan

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CIVICUS Civil Society Index

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FOREWORD

The Civil Society Index-Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) was implemented in Taiwan by the Center for International NGO Studies (CINGOS) at National Sun Yat-sen University. CINGOS was established to increase public awareness of the work undertaken by international non-profit organizations (INGOs), and to assist Taiwan's local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with getting involved with international affairs and global civil society. The centre also functions as a research centre by bringing the resources and talent of the academic world to the growing field of INGO study, as well as serving as a mechanism to promote the interaction between local Taiwanese NGOs and global INGOs. In addition, the centre works to promote the role of Sun Yat-sen University, as Taiwan's premier institute in the field of INGO research, and enhancing Taiwan's reputation in the field.

The activities and influence of civil society has been an important factor in Taiwan's democratization process, and continues to play an important role in society today. The next step in the development of Taiwan's civil society is spreading awareness about the function and activities of civil society. Implementing the CIVICUS CSI-SAT in Taiwan, not only helps to provide a better understanding of the current state of Taiwan's civil society, but creates a valuable body of relevant knowledge that can be shared with government, academia and other civil society stakeholders. It is our hope that scholars, when conducting research, NGOs, when conducting their strategic planning and civil society stakeholders in general will use this assessment when reviewing their relationship with the government or public.

The CINGOS research team, who served as the backbone of this project, was headed by CINGOS director, Teh-chang Lin and four CINGOS employees, Dan-chi Huang, Ya-ting Chang, Adam Fields and Jessica Liao. The National Youth Commission of the Executive Yuan, Republic of China, funded the project.

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The Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) was carried out by the Center for International NGO Studies (CINGOS) at National Sun Yat-sen University, in cooperation with the National Youth Commission of the Executive Yuan, Republic of China. The project's approach and research methodology was developed by the international non-governmental organisation (NGO) CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

A Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) was established to guide the project's implementation process and provide input into the research. The SAG met on two occasions, with several follow-up conference calls, and helped to evaluate the extensive information gathered on civil society organizations (CSOs) in Taiwan. The SAG was composed of individuals who represent a diverse range of CSOs and civil society stakeholders, and whose background and experiences helped prevent the information from being interpreted from only one perspective. The time and effort of those who took part in the introductory meeting and the scoring workshop is gratefully acknowledged. For a list of the SAG members please see appendix 1.1

I would also like to thank the CSI team at CIVICUS for their support and understanding throughout the project.

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
LIST OF ACRONYMS

CFCT	Consumers' Foundation Chinese Taipei
CINGOS	Center for International NGO Studies
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSI-SAT	Civil Society Index-Shortened Assessment Tool
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
FPG	Formosa Plastic Group
GONGOS	Government Organized Non-governmental Organizations
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
JRF	Judicial Reform Foundation
KMT	Kuo Min Tang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MPCA	Marine Pollution Control Act
NAPCU	National Association for Promotion of Community Universities
NCO	National Coordinating Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPO	Non-profit Organization
NYC	National Youth Commission
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SAG	Stakeholder Assessment Group
SAR	Search and Rescue
TADHR	Taiwan Association for the Development of Human Rights
TDF	Taiwan Democracy Foundation
THKU	Taiwan Home Keepers Union
THRF	Taiwan Health Reform Foundation
TTO	Taiwan Transparency Organization
WFDA	World Forum for Democratization in Asia
WVS	World Values Survey

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the course of 2005, the CIVICUS Civil Society Index project Shortened Assessment tool (CSI-SAT) collected information and secondary data on the state of civil society in Taiwan. Using a comprehensive framework of 74 indicators, and drawing on the extensive data collected by the project team, the project's Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) assessed the overall state of civil society in the country, which can be summarized in a visual graph (see figure 1), the Civil Society Diamond for Taiwan. The diamond which emerged is well balanced in three of its four dimensions, with the

FIGURE 1: Taiwan's Civil Society Diamond



structure dimension lagging well behind environment, values and impact. The CSI-SAT project brought to light many new insights on Taiwan's civil society. These highlights are briefly summarized below.

The current state of Taiwan's civil society is strongly related to its historical background, as many of Taiwan's current CSOs were created during the struggle for democracy and against one party rule during the era of martial law. Before martial law was lifted in 1987, civil society was under strict government control and mostly operated for charitable purposes, with democracy and human rights groups generally prohibited and only operating in a clandestine manner. After 1987, civil society activities and CSOs, especially those promoting environmental protection, democracy and human rights, began to develop rapidly. This has led to democracy and human rights becoming important values within Taiwan's civil society arena and among CSOs. Once relations between government and civil society normalized in 1987, civil society began to gain more power and started promoting various community activities, organizing groups and supervising governmental activities. Civil society's newly acquired civic power, combined with its growing political force, led to a substantial increase in civil society's impact on government and society, and improved civil society's environment, which provides better soil in which civil society can flourish.

The CSI assessment found that the structure of Taiwan's civil society is seriously lagging behind the other three dimensions. Further analysis of the six subdimensions under structure shows that the extent and depth of citizen participation is limited to certain CSOs or certain social groups,

and, on the whole, various forms of civic engagement are relatively weak. However, there are a large number of CSOs within Taiwan representing a diverse range of issues, and while there is no formal communication mechanism linking them together, interrelations between them has been growing. It is also apparent that the level of organization of Taiwan's civil society is weak and a solid cooperative system and infrastructure for CSOs still needs to be built. Thus, Taiwan's civil society needs to strengthen its internal structure, including increasing citizen participation in its activities and to further institutionalize and link the various elements of civil society. Only when its internal structure is well built, can Taiwan's civil society work on expanding its reach to increase its social power, in order to act as an effective counterweight to government.

The environment, values and impact dimensions, each receiving a score of 2.2, are each at a relatively advanced stage, indicating that the foundation for civil society in Taiwan is relatively positive, thanks in part to the rapid increase in CSOs over the past decade and the strong values and enthusiasm that carried over from the democratization era. The environment dimension shows that while the macro-environment in which Taiwan's civil society operates is fairly strong (i.e. freedoms, rights and rule of law), relations between the private sector and CSOs is relatively weak and in need of improvement. The values dimension can be linked to the historical development of Taiwan's civil society, as the roots of many of Taiwan's current CSOs are in the struggle for democracy and human rights, which took place during the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, these values have become a driving force for Taiwanese CSOs today. However, transparency, received a markedly lower score within the values dimension, which can be related to the historical development of CSOs within the Chinese world, where secrecy, close-knit groups or clans and an aversion to outsiders was often the norm. From the impact dimension, it is apparent that, while civil society's impact has been growing, its lack of maturity and a sometimes indifferent public has prevented it from having a wider impact on Taiwanese society.

While the structure of Taiwan's civil society is still rather undeveloped, its environment, values and impact have all grown at an even pace. Hopefully, as Taiwan's civil society arena continues to mature, its influence within Taiwan and its presence within the international community will grow as well.

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the results of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index-Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) in Taiwan, carried out from March to July 2005, as part of the international CSI project coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Since 1999, CIVICUS has been working on the Civil Society Index (CSI) project. The CSI is a comprehensive participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society actors at country level, which is currently implemented in more than 50 countries around the world.

The CSI is an international comparative project conceived with two specific objectives: (1) providing useful knowledge on civil society and (2) increasing the commitment of stakeholders to strengthen civil society. The first objective inherits a certain tension between country-specific knowledge and knowledge comparable cross-nationally on a global scale. CIVICUS sought to resolve this tension by making it possible to adapt the methodology and the set of more than 70 indicators to country-specific factors.

In 2004, CIVICUS developed the CIVICUS Civil Society Index – Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT). The CSI-SAT is a shorter, less comprehensive and less resource-intensive process to assess the state of civil society, and is based on the original CSI design. In each country the CSI-SAT is implemented by a National Coordinating Organisation (NCO), guided by a Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) and the CSI project team at CIVICUS. The NCO, Centre for International NGO Studies (CINGOS) in Taiwan, collected and synthesized data and information on civil society from a variety of secondary sources. This information was employed by the SAG to score the 74 CSI indicators, which together provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society in Taiwan. The findings are then finalized and a final report is published to publicise the CSI-SAT report. The international CSI project team at CIVICUS provided training, technical assistance and quality control to the NCO throughout the project implementation.

Structure of the Publication

Section I, “The CSI-SAT Project Background & Approach”, provides a detailed history of the CSI-SAT, its conceptual framework and research methodology.

Section II, “The Development of Civil Society in Taiwan”, describes the use of the civil society concept in Taiwan and the definition employed by the CSI-SAT project.

Section III, “The History of Civil Society in Taiwan”, provides a background on civil society in Taiwan.

Section IV, “Analysis of Civil Society”, is divided into four parts – Structure, Environment, Values and Impact – which correspond to the four dimensions of the CSI. The presentation of the results according to individual dimensions and subdimensions is intended to act as a catalogue, and readers looking for an overall interpretation of the report should refer to the conclusion.

The conclusion, in Section V, maps the Civil Society Diamond and offers an interpretation of the report’s implications for the overall state of civil society in Taiwan.¹

¹ ¹ The Civil Society Diamond is a visual tool developed by CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier, Director of the Center for Civil Society at the University of California, Los Angeles, which presents the overall findings of the CSI study in form of a Diamond-shaped graph.

I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX SHORTENED ASSESSMENT TOOL

PROJECT BACKGROUND & APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the New Civic Atlas containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the New Civic Atlas, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept (Anheier 2004). The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1 below).

This project was implemented in Taiwan between March to July 2005 by the Center for International Nongovernmental Organization Studies (CINGOS), National Sun Yat-Sen University in Taiwan. The project was completed according to the guidelines set out by CIVICUS and with considerable input from the civil society stakeholders, in the form of a stakeholder assessment group (SAG). The purpose of this project is to provide an analysis of the current state of civil society, as well as provide some practical recommendations on the future direction of Taiwanese civil society. The result of the project will not only have scholarly value, but will also give the general public and CSOs an insight into the historical development, current state and future trends of civil society in Taiwan, based on the existing knowledge and assessment by civil society stakeholders. In addition to the participation of civil society stakeholders, made up of various CSO representatives from across Taiwan, in this project, it is hoped that, upon completion, the results will inspire a new wave of interest in civil society and CSO activities among a wide range of actors.

Taiwan can improve its image in the world by participating in projects such as the CIVICUS CSI-SAT. Through actively participating in the CSI-SAT project, Taiwan has an assessment of the state and character of Taiwanese civil society, which can be shared internationally to enhance the world's understanding of Taiwan's civil society and the rapid economic development and maturation of Taiwan's democracy. More importantly, this report, which will be available in both

Mandarin and English, will be the first bilingual, comprehensive study of civil society in Taiwan. The hope is that this report will serve as a vital reference tool for the Taiwanese government, and NGOs, in their effort to further civil society's development.

Table I.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005²

1. Argentina	19. Germany	37. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Ghana	38. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Greece*	39. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Guatemala	40. Russia*
5. Bulgaria	23. Honduras	41. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Hong Kong (VR China)	42. Serbia
7. Chile*	25. Indonesia	43. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Italy	44. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Jamaica	45. South Korea
10. Croatia	28. Lebanon	46. Taiwan*
11. Cyprus ³	29. Macedonia	47. Togo*
12. Czech Republic	30. Mauritius	48. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Mongolia	49. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Montenegro*	50. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Nepal	51. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Nigeria	52. Vietnam*
17. Gambia	35. Northern Ireland	53. Wales*
18. Georgia*	36. Orissa (India)	

Under the auspices of globalization, the activities of non-state actors are playing an increasingly important role in global society. In many developing and transitioning countries civil society organisations (CSOs) are becoming an important group of stakeholders in governance and development. When taking a close look at the development of CSOs in Taiwan, it is important to note that rapid economic development and the maturation of Taiwan's democracy have helped build a thriving civil society and serves as the foundation for the rise of a great number of Taiwanese NGOs. Although NGOs vary nation to nation, playing a multitude of roles with various functions, it is noteworthy that global civil society, as a whole, tends to pursue the same vision; a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world.

* Indicates countries where the CSI-SAT was implemented.

² This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted as of January 2006.

³ The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

Today, CSOs are playing constructive and influential roles, which would have been unimaginable 50 years ago. NGOs currently play roles in many areas which were once solely in the realm of government, such as the distribution of humanitarian aid to disaster areas, international economic development, human rights, education, issues facing the youth, women's rights, animal protection, environmental protection and international health care. These new roles have made NGOs a powerful force in society. When compared with the dwindling role of government in civil affairs, and the difficulty that often exists for multinational cooperation on these issues, CSOs have done a remarkable job building a cooperative international network. If Taiwan wants to further align itself with the emerging global civil society, it must first understand the specific characteristics of civil society in Taiwan, in order to enhance their coordination and cooperation mechanisms. It is also imperative that Taiwan creates and maintains links between Taiwanese NGOs and their counterparts around the world. This experience of cooperating with a host of international NGOs will eventually help Taiwan's CSOs to become established members of global civil society.

2. PROJECT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The CSI-SAT uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a structured framework to collect comprehensive data on the state of civil society on the national level. At the core of the CSI lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of subdimensions, which again are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI-SAT data collection process. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by a Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG). The CSI-SAT project approach, conceptual framework and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.⁴

In 2004, CIVICUS developed a new CSI methodology called CIVICUS Civil Society Index – Short Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) in which the assessment is completed in less time and with fewer resources, but also on the basis of a smaller information base as compared to the full CSI. The CSI-SAT has two objectives: First, to generate and share useful and relevant knowledge on the state of civil society. Second, to provide civil society with a tool to conduct such an assessment based only on existing information, which can therefore be regarded as a preparatory activity to a full CSI implementation, which then involves primary research and extensive consultations with civil society stakeholders.

⁴ For a detailed description of the CSI approach, see Heinrich (2004).

2.1 Conceptual Framework

How to conceptualize the state of civil society?

To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state, as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

The CSI-SAT is an action-oriented project based on a scientific research method and structure. In order to collect consistent information on civil society in each country, the project follows the same method and structure when implemented in various countries around the world. The CSI is designed to assess and score four different dimensions of civil society: structure, environment, values and impact in order to evaluate and compare the development of civil society across many different nations. Each dimension is composed of several “subdimensions” and, in turn, each subdimension is composed of an even larger number of individual “indicators”. The process of implementing the CSI-SAT focuses on carrying out research and analysis on each of these indicators within the four dimensions. These indicators are also the basic blueprints of the project’s assessment group as they may use it to help them with their deliberation and evaluation when creating the civil society diamond. This chapter will explain the CSI-SAT in greater detail, explaining its purpose, conceptual structure and its research and assessment methods.⁵

How to define civil society?

Given that the concept of civil society is inherently complex, it is obvious that any process used to define the concept, identify its important characteristics and develop policy and action-oriented strategies, as the CSI sets out to do, is not an easy task. In order to better assess the current state and development of civil society in different nations, CIVICUS created a research method based on a comprehensive conceptual framework. Despite widely different historical backgrounds, National Coordinating Organizations (NCOs), the CSOs implementing the CSI in their respective countries around the world, believe that collective citizen action is a common principle inherent in any nation and society and a core principle of global civil society. One of the most important

⁵ For a detailed description of the CSI approach, see Heinrich (2004).

concepts in the CSI research method is the necessity that each NCO adapts this universal principle of civil society to their specific country context. The concept, as well as the reality, of civil society varies from nation to nation, depending on the specific situation of each country. Thus, since the CSI is a global project, its conceptual structure must take into account the different structures and functions of civil society across a vast array of cultures. The CSI attempts to do this by avoiding a western bias in its approach and by respecting the various characteristics of civil society in different countries, while making sure that some common definitions and concepts are applied in all countries participating in the CSI. In this regard, it is important to note that every indicator suggested by CIVICUS is given as a suggestion. Every country's CSI team can remove or add their own indicators should they feel it is necessary to better capture the specific situations in their respective country.⁶ The CSI also attempts to include many different scholarly theories and ideas in the project, in order to include a diverse range of actors and characteristics of civil society in its assessment. In order to ensure this goal, CIVICUS adopted a multi-disciplinary approach using resources from the development, democracy and governance discourses to analyze the definition, characteristics and actors within civil society.

When discussing the context of civil society, some scholars have stated that its actors must be democratic and look out for public interests, or at least maintain a minimal standard of social responsibility.⁷ Although these definitions and concepts help define an ideal civil society, they limit analysis, when looking at the realities of civil society in any given country. The purpose of the CSI is to assess the actual state of civil society. If the CSI discounted non-ideal elements within civil society, it would inevitably come to a positive conclusion. Therefore, the CSI adopted a practical view, admitting that the positive, as well as negative, peaceful, as well as violent, elements are all a part of the civil society arena. Consequently, civil society is regarded as a complex arena where many different values, interests and actors compete for influence, sometimes even violently.⁸

The name, Civil Society Index, itself implies that the term "civil society" is at the core of its conceptual framework. CIVICUS defines civil society as "the arena outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests." This definition is different from other definitions of civil society and has two unique characteristics. First, this definition does not follow the traditional, inflexible view of civil society. Instead it includes things like informal meetings and groups in its definition. Second, while civil society is often viewed as

⁶ Jan W. van Deth, "Equivalence in Comparative Political Research," in *Comparative Politics: The Problem of Equivalence*, edited by Jan W. van Deth (London: Routledge, 1998), 1-19.

⁷ Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, no 5, (1994): 4-17. Barry Knight and Caroline Hartnell, "Civil Society: Is It Anything More Than a Metaphor for Hope for a Better World?" *Alliance*, no 6 (2001): 6.

⁸ Alan Fowler, "Strengthening Civil Society in Transition Economies- from Concept to Strategy: Mapping an Exit in A Maze of Mirrors," in *NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies*, edited by Andrew Clayton (Oxford: INTRAC, 1996), 12-33.

a force that promotes positive activities and values, the CSI attempts to include those activities that are considered negative social forces in its research. As a result, this concept of civil society includes charitable organizations, environmental groups and welfare association, as well as violent or radical forces. The CSI-SAT assesses a wide range of factors contributing to civil society, including degree of democracy within a country and the level of tolerance promoted by CSOs, to internal practices of CSOs with regards to tolerance and non-violence. It is the responsibility of the NCO to assess whether positive values are practiced within CSOs and how/if civil society as a whole promotes these values to the public at large.

In describing the concept of civil society as an arena, the CSI emphasizes that civil society plays an important role, providing a public arena in which different social values and interests interact. Specifically, it implies a space in society, where people can gather together to discuss, debate and meet, in an effort to seek more influence on the society around them, whether locally or globally. The assumption that this arena is different from other areas of society, such as the market, state and family, is excluded from the definition. Due to the fact that the main goal of the CSI is to enhance civil society, the civil society arena is mostly described in political terms. This political view of civil society leads the CSI research to spotlight issues of power among civil society actors, the state and the private sector, since politics within a country is generally related to issues of distribution of power among different elements within the state.

In practice, it is difficult to clearly distinguish the arenas of civil society, the state, the market and the family. Hence, the CSI recognizes that there is overlap and ‘fuzzy boundaries’ among these different areas. Likewise, the CSI uses a functional rather than an organizational view when attempting to identify members of civil society. That is, civil society actors in the context of the CSI are able to move between different arenas depending on the particular function they are performing at any given time. A private enterprise that earns profit obviously belongs to the market arena. However, if the same enterprise also raises money for charity, it can also be called an actor in civil society. This structure does not emphasize organization, but rather broadly places emphasis on the function and role of organizational activities and collective public action. It is believed that only by following this definition, identification through function and action, will NCOs be able to consider the full range of civil society actors when deciding which to include in the assessment.

Due to the fact that the CSI is interested in collective community action, families, which are personal in nature, cannot be viewed as a member in civil society. That said, the CSI does recognize the public role families and clans can play in society, and the CSI includes these units when they perform public activities. The state is of course excluded from the civil society arena, even though it has substantial powers over society, most notably the authority to use weapons against its citizens. Some semi-governmental organizations with regional authority can be viewed

as part of civil society, such as regional organizations governed by citizens and organizations based on traditional culture, even if these organizations perform the function of a state.

The market is another arena in society where the individual focuses on pursuing his/her own interest in the pursuit of profit. The pursuit of self-interest and profit obviously excludes the market from the civil society arena, but it does not mean that market-based organizations cannot sometimes participate in the civil society arena. As is pointed out above, it is the function and not the form of an organization that dictates whether or not it is a part of civil society. When market-based organizations are engaged in public affairs and non-profit or charitable activities, they can be considered a part of civil society. Also, foreign trade and business associations can be viewed as a member of civil society because the goals of these organizations are to cooperatively pursue common goals within their particular fields.

2.2 Analytical Framework

The CSI-SAT is designed to assess and score four different dimensions of civil society:

- (1) Structure: What is the internal make-up of civil society? How large, vibrant and representative is civil society in terms of individuals and organizations?
- (2) Environment: What is the political, socio-economic, cultural and legal environment in which civil society exists? Are these factors enabling or disabling to civil society?
- (3) Values: Does civil society practice and promote positive social values?
- (4) Impact: What is the impact of civil society? Is it effective in resolving social, economic, and political problems, and in serving the common good?

These four dimensions are made up of several subdimensions, with each subdimension consisting of individual indicators. The entire assessment is thus based on these indicators, which are used to analyze the state of civil society. Each indicator is used to measure what is considered an important specific aspect of the state of civil society.⁹ In selecting and designing the indicators, the following guiding principles were applied:

- (1) *Relevant*: The CSI aims to assess the state of civil society in a comprehensive manner. There are an almost endless number of issues, questions and features that one could potentially be interested in regarding the state of civil society. However, the CSI seeks only to assess the centrally relevant features of civil society. Principles of both practical manageability and scientific parsimony demand a focus on a limited number of crucial issues.
- (2) *Measurable*: Indicators must focus on issues that are measurable. There are features of the


⁹ Concerning the detail of all the indicators, please see appendix 1.

state of civil society that are relevant, but not observable in reality and/or on which it is difficult to gather data (particularly features related to evaluations and internal CSO issues). In designing the CSI indicators it is necessary to take into account that relevant information must be attainable within reasonable time and resource limits.

- (3) *Clearly defined*: The CSI's goal of cross-country comparability necessitates that all indicators be clearly defined with a view to minimizing ambiguity and leaving as little room as possible for subjective interpretation. In order to establish universal benchmarks, it was particularly important to define the meaning of indicators (i.e. the qualitative score descriptions) in precise and "real-life" terms.
- (4) *Actionable*: The indicators and other data gathered by the study provide information on civil society's strengths, weaknesses and, subsequently, action points for strengthening civil society. Therefore, indicators were chosen which are amenable to 'change' (i.e. on which specific interventions can be designed to improve the indicator score and thereby the state of civil society).

In order to present the results of CSI-SAT clearly and simply, the score of each indicator was added and averaged to find the subdimensional score, then averaged once again to find the dimensional scores and, finally, put together into the civil society diamond (see figure I.2.1).¹⁰ Explaining and analyzing the structure of the graph will help in analyzing the strength and weakness of Taiwan's civil society. **FIGURE I.2.1: CIVICUS Civil Society Diamond**

Although the diamond graph is a rather simple depiction of a complex reality, it offers a basic shape of the state of civil society and suggestions for its future improvement and development. It is important to point out that the total scores of the four dimensions are not used to measure the performance of civil



society and, should therefore, not be a standard used to rank each nation's civil society. The diamond graph should only be used to describe the state of civil society within a specific country, although, if analyzed correctly it can be a powerful tool in looking at civil society across many different countries.¹¹

¹⁰ The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier 2004).

¹¹ Helmut K. Anheier, *Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy* (London: Earthscan, 2004).

2.3 Project Methodology

Recently, there have been a number of books in the subject of civil society, but most of these works lack a solid analytical framework that systematizes and organizes the specific components of civil society within a specific country into an entire sector. The Civil Society Index – Short Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) attempts to offer a framework that utilizes the existing wealth of information on civil society and analyzes it using a standardized framework.

Following a period of extensive desk research, the secondary data collected by CINGOS was organized into a draft report based on the CSI indicators put forward by CIVICUS. The civil society stakeholder assessment group (SAG) was then charged with the task of scoring each indicator based on the knowledge and data collected by CINGOS.¹² During this scoring meeting, the SAG was asked to decide on a score from zero to three for each indicator, in which the group followed a ‘citizen jury approach’ in deciding on each score, debating the information and then voting on a final score.¹³ The scoring process followed the following procedures: (1) the research team collected a plethora of secondary data from both national and international sources; (2) the SAG read and familiarized themselves with each indicator and (3) during the scoring meeting the facilitator lead the group in discussing and voting on the indicators, and then calculated the total score of each subdimension and dimension. During the scoring of the 76 indicators, 18 were decided almost unanimously and 58 were decided by a majority. Following the indicator scoring process, the scores for the subdimensions and dimensions were calculated and the civil society diamond was formed. Before the final diamond was drawn up, the group first had a final discussion and explanation session regarding the scores for the dimensions in order to insure that the group was able to agree on the final shape of Taiwan’s civil society diamond. Finally, the group reflected on the results of the civil society diamond and subsequently provided suggestions and recommendations for the future development of Taiwan’s civil society.

Since the CSI-SAT relies on the assessments of the SAG, which is made up of a diverse group of civil society experts and stakeholders, the evaluation results might not be the same as an academic research project. From the onset of this project, the SAG helped guide the direction of the research and gave input on how to revise or improve the analytical framework to better suit the conditions of Taiwanese civil society. The research team was then able to assemble the secondary data based on this revised framework, while continuing to integrate the SAG’s advice into the execution of the project.

The project’s sponsor, the National Youth Commission of the Executive Yuan (NYC), will hold a press conference in conjunction with CINGOS to announce the results of the CSI-SAT assessment,

¹² As to the list of the Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG), see appendix 1.

¹³ Jefferson Center, *The Citizen Jury Process*, 2002. http://www.jefferson-center.org/citizens_jury.htm.

in which the assessment group members and CINGOS staff will be present.

2.4 Project Outputs

The CSI-SAT implementation in Taiwan yielded the following products and outputs:

- A comprehensive country report on the state of civil society;
- The publication of several articles on the CSI in civil society journals as well as the mainstream media and
- A possible press conference will be held to which members from the government, civil society, and the media will be invited.

II THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TAIWAN

1. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Within state-society relations, civil society can be defined as an autonomous force outside of the state, which is made up of many independent organizations, such as familial groups, churches, newspapers, electronic media, schools, political parties, interest groups, charities and volunteer organizations, that all play an important role mediating between individuals and the nation.¹⁴ However, it is important to note that the autonomy of civil society in any country must be established under the following two conditions: 1) a civil consciousness and civil culture that were formed after a long period of development and not thrust upon a society and 2) the existence of a firmly interlocked social movement network.

The formation of a civil consciousness is a process of socialization. It must be a public movement, carried out through citizen organizations that exist in an area different from the state, market or family.¹⁵

Professor Charles Taylor describes civil society as an autonomous network of social groups, different than those governing the country, which are regulated by common laws, and have the ability to influence the government's public policy.¹⁶

In the study of civil society, one of the most important phenomena encountered by scholars is the apparent connection between economic development, democracy and civil society. In Eastern European countries and some countries in the global south, social democratization often has some of the same goals and principles of market liberalization. The end of the cold war and the collapse of communism caused a strengthening of democratic values throughout the world, and the fact that many former socialist countries moved to embrace market economics, helped ideas of liberalism become mainstream economic thinking around the world. Thus, in recent years, democratic principles and free market economics have become two very important principles in the study of civil society. Since the market has become such a powerful force in our everyday lives, in order to understand the true definition of civil society, it is important to carefully distinguish the differences between a market society and civil society.

¹⁴ Percy Allun, *State and Society in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 55-56.

¹⁵ Ching-yu Chung, "Global Governance and Civil Society: Participant in International Society of Perspective of Non-Governmental Organization in Taiwan" in *Political Science Review*, Vol. 18, 2003 Jun: 22-52

¹⁶ Charles Taylor "Invoking Civil Society" in Working Paper (Chicago: Center for Psychosocial Studies, 1990) - Reprinted in (1) his *Philosophical Arguments*, pp. 204-24; (2) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) : 66-77.

In order to avoid strong forces, such as the market or corporations attaining a monopoly over social activities, the building of a fully functioning civil society should be based on the existence of a 'civil culture', with the core values of equity, democracy and autonomy. Under this type of monopoly, the development of civil society would be twisted with public consciousness and the concept of 'the citizen' would be ignored. Corporations are also a network of people working towards a similar goal, but these connections are not built with 'the citizen' or public policy in mind, and they therefore cannot be considered part of civil society. For example, in many Asian countries, many interest groups are built through interpersonal and familial relationships, often related to market functions, thereby limiting their autonomy and inclusion in the definition of civil society.

Michael Walzer sees civil society as an area where citizens and organizations are not restricted by the government and are able to form groups and networks without interference.¹⁷ At the same time, civil society cannot exist without the state or market, with interaction between the three being heavily influenced by national politics, economics and historical conditions. Thus, the development of civil society is a dynamic process, and is different from region to region since every country has its own special conditions that influence its social development.

A healthy civil society, outside the state and market, should theoretically have numerous non-profit and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These organizations, while fundamentally different from the state and market, are still able to maintain good relationships with the first and second sectors, and ideally their functions should complement each other. CSOs serve to convert personal interests into group or public interests and also as an arena for governmental and societal actors to interact. An ideal CSO must be financially independent from the state and market, open to citizens to join and participate at will and able to operate without excessive restrictions. Ideal CSOs should also help promote public spiritedness and encourage citizens to actively participate in community activities.¹⁸

Although CSOs are quite diversified, they have formed a specific social structure that sets principles for the volunteerism of its members, pursuing public goals, and a set of norms for interacting with the state and market. Through this social structure, there are identifiable characteristics and patterns that can be found when analyzing civil society development.¹⁹

¹⁷ M. Walzer, "The Concept of Civil Society." In M. Walzer(ed.), *Toward a Global Civil Society* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1995).

¹⁸ John A. Hall, *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Tai-Lok Lui, Chan Kin-man, "Between Family and State: The constitution of Civil Society in Honk Kong". Paper presented at *Between Family and State*, second workshop, Han. 14-15, 2001, Hong Kong.

¹⁹ Percy Allun, *State and Society in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995):.55.

Non-profit and non-governmental organizations, which are highly specialized and autonomous social organizations, make up the bulk of CSOs, or the third sector. In western countries NGOs represent many different kinds of social issues and often serve the function of monitoring state power and educating the public on various social issues.

In terms of its function and objectives, Clark classifies CSOs as various types of relief and welfare agencies, technical innovation organizations, public service contractors, development agencies, grassroots development organizations and advocacy groups and networks.²⁰ CSOs generally receive funding from private sponsorship and usually rely on volunteerism in conducting their activities. Their ability to operate within a democratic environment, where citizens have sufficient protection of human rights, freedom of assembly and freedom of speech is also important to the development of CSOs. As discussed above, the development of civil society is directly related to a country's political, economic and social environment. Each country has its own unique background that determines the character of its civil society although the strengthening of democracy, a sustainable development plan, and numerous NGOs will help in the positive development of civil society as a whole.²¹

State-NGO interaction is extremely important to the development of civil society, and from the viewpoint of the state, five different models of interaction are identifiable:

1. The state takes a hostile stance towards NGOs. The state regards NGOs as anti-governmental groups and often adopts the ways of suppressing them.
2. The state adopts an indifferent attitude towards NGOs.
3. The state cooperates with NGOs, in an attempt to gain more resources and enhance their control.
4. The state expects to achieve its policy goals with the assistance of NGOs, and expects to enforce its legitimacy or fulfil important policies by in-actively accepting NGOs.
5. The state cooperates with NGOs or attempts to build collaborative relationships with them.

Using these different interaction models it is possible to see how the different political environments in North and South America, Asia, the Mid-East and Africa contributed to different patterns of CSO development. From the NGO's viewpoint, there are three patterns of state – NGO interaction:

1. NGOs have no relation with or restrictions from the state.
2. NGOs interact with the state through advocacy activities.²²
3. NGOs conduct collaborative field projects with the state and maintain a substantial

²⁰ J. Clark, *“Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations”*, (London: Earthscan, 1991), 40-41.

²¹ Teh-Chang Lin, *Civil Society, Democracy and Sustainable Development: The Study on the Strategies of NGO Development in Taiwan* (Taipei: Taiwan Democracy Foundation, 2004 Oct), 2.

²² This interaction implies both conflict and non-conflict.

partnership.²³

Based on the above interaction models there are three ways in which NGOs play an important role in the social development process. First, they enhance the ability of citizens in developing countries to participate in the national decision making process. Second, they force the state to be more accountable to its citizens, and third, they enhance democratic politics and public education on various social issues. Over the past decade, rapid economic development, a more diversified society and the deepening of democracy have undoubtedly been the most important driving force behind the development of the civil society in Taiwan.

2. STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

The origin of the concept of civil society is firmly grounded in discussions on the relationship between state and society. The literature on civil society mainly views civil society as an effort to stop the state from intruding on, or manipulating citizens. Consequently, the independence of civil society can be gauged by the lack of state intervention in societal affairs and the amount of power, within the civil society arena, to perform independent democratic functions.

In discussing the relationship between state and society, the state-centred perspective focuses on how capable states can work to change society, but admits that society could become a political force, either for or against the state, when policy changes are underway. According to this perspective, the state has the authority to impose its preferred policies upon the public, whether or not they face a challenge from society, but during policy formation, society has the potential to impact the autonomy of the state.²⁴ Eric A. Nordlinger proposed the following four modes of state-society interaction.²⁵

1. *Malleability*: A state with full autonomy from society can easily change its public policies. Malleability of the state is defined as a government that is influenced by all kinds of factors within society while public policy is being formed.
2. *Vulnerability*: The vulnerability of state autonomy is mainly due to the failure or unsuccessful outcome of its public policy. A vulnerable state that faces many different kinds of societal forces, which threaten its public policy will be forced to consider non-authoritative ways to implement its public policies.

²³ Teh-Chang Lin, *Civil Society, Democracy and Sustainable Development: The Study on the Strategies of NGO Development in Taiwan*, 7-8.

²⁴ Eric A. Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in *Understanding Political Development*, ed., by Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 355.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 373-384.

3. *Insulation*: The independence of a state can be identified by how much it needs support from non-state actors within the country. If the influence of societal actors is minimal, an ‘insulated’ state is able to implement public policy even at the expense of the public good. Thus, the centralization school favours a centralized state since it can help the country undertake a smooth market transition before the implementation of political reform. Compared with western nations, a centralized country needs less support from society and is better able to promote policy against the public will.²⁶

4. *Resilience*: If the state can free itself from the pressures of society, it is able to gain more autonomy. Resilience is the ability of a state to comprehend and recognize pressures from society in the formation and implementation of its public policies. A state with high resilience has the capability to respond to societal pressures and adjust its policies accordingly.

Nordlinger’s study on state-society relations was primarily an observation of the pressure that state planning policies and actions have on society, while Joel S. Migdal points out that a strong state, from the perspective of state-society relations, is a test of capabilities between the two actors fulfil their obligations to the citizens of the country.²⁷

In examining the state’s influence or control over society, one school of scholars emphasises how the state influences society via a certain group or class.²⁸ Bureaucratic authoritarianism is an attempt to explain how the state manages conflicts among many different kinds of social groups within society. This school advocates the state to penetrate and take advantage of the resources within society such as imposing taxes on foreign investment.²⁹

Another school of scholars thinks that the driving force of societal change is derived from society itself, while others feel that international economic forces are the leading cause of these changes. These two schools of thought are based on the perspective of the weak state.³⁰ The

²⁶ Jose Maria Maravall, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage,” in *Reform and Democracy*, ed., by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 13-14.

²⁷ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4-5.

²⁸ Eric A. Nordlinger, “Taking the State Seriously,” 353-390.

²⁹ James M. Malloy, “Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern,” in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed., by James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 4.

³⁰ The scholars who stand for the strong-state school include Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert, eds., *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982); Guillermo O’Donnell and others in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979) and James M. Malloy, “Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern,” in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed., by James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).

leadership of a weak state often encounters difficulties while it conducts relations with society.³¹ This dual concept of the state, strong or weak, is an important analytical concept when conducting in depth research on the development of civil society.

There are four main approaches used by a state when attempting to influence social transition or reform. First, the leadership will adopt rigid control over society with military or police power. Second, the state sets its preferred policies to reform the society. Third, the leadership, realizing the differences in the composition of society, creates specialized institutions to better manage its citizens. Fourth, the state attempts to coordinate various societal actors in an effort to better achieve its policy goals.³²

Michael Mann sees the power of the state over society as the infrastructural power of despotic state elites, in which elites are authorized to take actions towards society without negotiating with the social groups. Infrastructural power refers to a state that is able to penetrate civil society and dominate its political power.³³ Mann also notes that the state has four functions that society consistently relies on: domestic stability, military defence, traffic and infrastructure maintenance and the macro management of the economy.³⁴

There are differing methods in which a state exerts control over society. A centralized country will set up a bureaucratic ruling system meant to control society, while a democratic country tends to give this authority to CSOs.

In order to better understand social development, it is necessary to first discuss organizations exerting influence over the behaviour of the people. These formal and informal organizations, ranging from the household, community and company to governmental institutes, all use the stick and carrot method to induce people to follow the rules of the game. Migdal proposed three indicators to help examine the level of state control over society.³⁵

1. *Compliance*: The power of state is mainly gauged by whether or not people follow the state policies. The state use of control tools such as the military, resources, service and distribution also influence the extent to which people comply with state policies.
2. *Participation*: For the state, its goals in regards to society are to not only attain the compliance

³¹ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 8.

³² Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), -17 & Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: System, Process and Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 286.

³³ Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," in *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, ed., by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1977), 67-68.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 69.

³⁵ Joel S. Migdal, "A Model of State-Society Relations," in *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, ed., by Howard J. Wiarda (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 49-50.

of its citizens, but to also see that they participate in implementing state policies. In socialist countries, a good example is the willingness of its citizens to work in state-owned companies and institutions.

3. *Legitimizing*: Even more important to a state than the compliance and participation of its citizens in implementing state policies is the maintenance of its own legitimacy. Compliance and participation of a country's citizens is often the result of the stick and carrot game, or the reciprocal relationship between the state and society, while legitimacy represents the willingness of the people to accept an entire ruling regime.

Once a state loses its capability to mobilize the public, it will face two challenges. First, the state will lack a strong political foundation to compete with opposition parties or other units within society, and second, may be forced to bestow great social clot upon its opponents.³⁶ Thus, a weak state lacking in power to mobilize its citizens is at risk of being overthrown, and a centralized state that begins to seek support from the public is a clear sign that it is becoming weaker.³⁷

The study of civil society presents state-society relations from the perspective of society. Gordon White views civil society as independent from the state, with a high degree autonomy, and protecting the interests and values the public.³⁸ White also stresses that members of civil society are mainly focused on the relation between the individual and the state. This view forces a focus on the balance of power between the state and society and how the public uses their power to protect themselves from the centralization tendencies of the state.³⁹ There are basically three characteristics that can be seen in modern civil society: 1) civil society does not belong to the government or state; 2) civil society is politically and financially independent and 3) actors are involved in civil society on a voluntary basis such as members of non-governmental or non-profit organizations. B. Michael Frolic in his work "State-Led Civil Society," in *Civil Society in China* presented four important concepts of civil society.

1. *Civil Society and Greek Polis*: In the 1970's, civil society in Eastern Europe developed through the appeals of dissatisfied members of society. This group of people tried to establish a social structure, similar to the concept of "polis", or beyond the state system. The appearance of civil society in Eastern Europe occurred as a result of the loss of state control over society, as the public rose up to oppose a communist regime they felt was not meeting their needs. According to this school of scholars, civil society was the driving force behind the peaceful transition from a

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 52.

³⁷ Xiaonong Cheng, "Breaking the Social Contract," 108.

³⁸ Gordon White, "Civil Society, Democratization and Development," *Democratization*, Vol. 32, no 3 (Autumn 1994): 375-390.

³⁹ Gordon White, "The Dynamics of Civil Society in Post-Mao China," in *The Individual and the State in China*, ed., by Brian Hook (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 197.

one-party communist system to a pluralistic democracy.⁴⁰

2. *Civil society and the identification of the citizen*: The early idea of civil society is very similar to Greek polis in which good virtues and citizenship were considered governing principles and societal and political realms were able to peacefully coexist. As Edward Shils pointed out, civil society is a mechanism that combines the state and citizen into an arena that advocates good virtues and citizenship, taking care to put the public good on the same level as the private good.⁴¹

It is important to note that there are two kinds of citizen identification, individualistic in the west and communitarian in many traditional Asian countries. From the perspective of a western country, communitarian citizens lacks free will, mutual trust and the security of law, where as in traditional societies, the west is seen as lacking the ability to combat the state. and power is mostly thought of in terms of the well-being of the group.⁴²

3. *The development of civil society and politics*: From the perspective of political development, civil society represents the transformation of state-society relations. During the process of political modernization, interaction between the state and society is necessary, as individuals have to identify their relationship with the state. Thus, civil society serves as the platform for interaction and functions as a way to transform political participation.

4. *State-led civil society*: State-led civil society is composed with various kinds of organizations and groups in the society where CSOs are regarded as pillars of the state's mechanism of interaction with society. Another function of the CSOs in this system is to provide a mechanism of coordination and participation in which to expand the influence of the state control. Heath B. Chamberlain sees the state as a positive actor during the formation of civil society, with many civil society and non-governmental organizations in the third world following this model of development.⁴³

Based on the previous analysis, it is clear that civil society is often born out of necessity when a country is undergoing economic and social transition, with CSOs serving an important function while at the same time not invading the authority of the state. In general, a civil organization seeks their interests under a stable social environment and is not looking for a weak state that is unable to maintain its commitments to its citizens or is in danger of collapse.

⁴⁰ David Kelly and He Baogang, "Emergent Civil Society and the Intellectuals in China," in *The Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems*, ed., Robert Miller (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992): 28.

⁴¹ Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 26, no 1 (1991): 16.

⁴² B. Michael Frolic, "State-Led Civil Society," in *Civil Society in China*, ed., by Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 52.


⁴³ Heath B. Chamberlain, "On the Search for Civil Society in China," *Modern China*, Vol. 19, no 2 (April 1993): 209.

III THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TAIWAN

1. SPECIAL FEATURES OF TAIWANESE CIVIL SOCIETY

The development of civil society in Taiwan has its own unique historical, social, political and cultural background. When studying the development of Taiwanese CSOs, it is important to first understand their historical foundations. The primary cultural factor influencing the development of CSOs in Taiwan is the “culture of relationships” or ‘guanxi’ which exists in Chinese culture. This basically refers to any persons’ or groups’ network of contacts and is related to the prominence of organizations, such as guilds, underworld gangs and clans.

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Throughout Chinese history, folk organizations were based either on kinship or interpersonal relationships, causing these groups to have a strong sense of privacy. Given the traditional family-orientation of these organizations, people were unwilling to trust social organizations other than those made up of their own clan. Hence, in pre communist China, folk organizations existed without a public character, thus preventing the development of community values and a public civil society.

From 1949 to 1987, during the period of Martial Law, the Kuo Ming Tang regime (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party enacted the Special Civil Society Organization Law, which forbade two organizations of the same nature from existing in the same area. This severely limited the development of foundations in Taiwan.⁴⁴ Also during the Martial Law period, the public did not have the right of association or to form social groups, further limiting CSO development. Thus, the earliest CSOs in Taiwan came from abroad, such as the Red Cross, World Vision, the Christian Children’s Fund and other religious groups.⁴⁵ Other types of ‘transplanted’ organizations were social clubs, such as the Rotary and Lions Clubs. Although there were many limitations on the

⁴⁴ Chia-Cheng Lin, *The social transition and movement* (Taipei: Liming Publishing, 1991).

⁴⁵ Yu Lin, *The Analysis of Taiwan’s Foreign Aid with Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) towards Southeast Asia*, The dissertation of the Institute of Economics in National Chengkung University, 2004.

existence and activities of CSOs, prior to the late 1970s, the fact that these international NGOs established branches in Taiwan served as a solid foundation for the explosion of local CSOs beginning in the late 1980s.

In the 1980s, due to rapid economic development, the rise of social campaigns, a thaw in cross-strait relations, Mainland China's open door and reform policies and the decline of the KMT regime, Taiwan began to transform itself into a democratic country. Democratization led to the rise of a plethora of service and local non-profit organizations, such as the Consumer's Foundation, Taiwan Taipei, the Awakening Foundation and the Public Opinion Survey Foundation.

During the 1980s and 1990s, and in response to the growing influence of globalization, Taiwanese CSOs began to focus on issues, such as domestic human rights, aboriginals, foreign labourers, humanitarian assistance, the environment, women's rights and urban and rural culture. This, thereby, extended their scope beyond traditional issues in an effort to learn from international NGOs.

The democratization process in Taiwan in the late 1980s has been one of the most important social transitions in the history of Taiwan. During this transition, CSOs played a key role in challenging authoritarianism. This eventually helped build a strong civil society, independent of the state and market, and is providing the basis for the development of a new set of social values.⁴⁶ In 1992, the KMT government revised the restrictive laws governing CSOs and created a new set of rules under the social organization law, which transformed CSOs leading protests and social campaigns into regular NPOs and NGOs. This was an effort to integrate them into a more normalized type of state – society relationship. In terms of state – society relations, the rise of civil society, following the end of Martial Law in 1987, not only forced the government to give up its control over society, but also caused the government to seek help from many CSOs to deal with various social issues, such as environmental protection, disaster relief and social welfare.⁴⁷

Understanding the historical development of CSOs in Taiwan is important when analyzing the current state of Taiwan's civil society.⁴⁸ Civil society emerged through the struggle against authoritarianism and the transition to democracy, which remain the defining features of its values and activities today. Since a normalized (and legal) civil society has only existed for a relatively

⁴⁶ Cho-Fen Tsai, *the Agenda setting of NGO- A Case Study on FMPAT (Foundation of Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan) to advocate Taiwan Joining WHO*, The dissertation of the Institute of Journalism in Chengchi University, 2004.

⁴⁷ Ta-tung Wei, *A Brief Research on the Job Creation cooperated by NGO and Government*, The dissertation of the Institute of Labour Studies of National Chengchi University, 2003.

⁴⁸ Chung-Hwa Ku, "The Structural Transformation of Civic Association and the Development of NPOs in Taiwan" in *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, Vol. 36, 1999:123-145; Hei-yuan, Chiu, *Sociology and the Society in Taiwan* (Taipei: Chu-liou Publishing, 2000)

short period of time in Taiwan a mature sectoral infrastructure and a system of self-regulation has not yet developed.

Within the past decade, the growth of CSOs in Taiwan has become quite commonplace and has coincided with the strengthening of Taiwanese civil society. Since civil society is based on humanism, meaning that only when a person gains a sense of community does he or she begin to pursue goals for the public good, civil society is inevitably connected with the promotion of certain concepts, such as human rights, sustainable development and democracy. The gradual formation of civil society in Taiwan has not been due to the leadership of the state, but was rather a spontaneous force that originated among the general public. Currently, there are more than 20,000 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Interior, and among these, more than 2,000 have cooperated in some way with an International NGO (INGO).

There are many factors influencing the environment for civil society in Taiwan, both internal, such as politics, economics, society and culture, and external factors, such as international status and diplomacy. Due to the 'special' relationship between Taiwan and China, the traditional diplomacy of Taiwan is restricted to a few nations, severely limiting its "international breathing room". As a result, there has been a growing trend of 'people diplomacy' in Taiwan, where CSOs serve to represent Taiwanese society abroad, and in some cases even carry out 'diplomatic functions'. The problem is that while Taiwan's NGOs actively cooperate with many different INGOs, as well as governmental organizations, they still cannot completely replace the role of government.

In Taiwan, the present status of politics, the economy and society have created a positive environment for the development of CSOs and civil society. However, the development of CSOs and civil society has just begun, and, compared to other countries, lacks connections with international society, as well as systematic methods for cooperation and coordination among domestic organizations, the government and the people. These defects are a primary hindrance to the further development of civil society in Taiwan and have prompted some within academia and the government to seek ways to further facilitate cooperation and communication between all areas of society.

Compared to western countries, the development and capacity building of Taiwanese NGOs are still in their infancy. It is therefore necessary for Taiwanese civil society, through the aid and assistance of the government, to study western countries' civil society systems and experiences. This is sometimes difficult, as Taiwan's access and experience within international society is limited, due to the current constraints of the political situation. Taiwanese NGOs still have a long way to go in learning the rules and operations of international society; therefore, building relationships with western NGOs is seen as a necessary step if Taiwan's civil society is to expand

its knowledge of international civil society and increase its presence on the international stage.

Beginning in the late 1990s, and coinciding with an extended period of economic growth, Taiwanese NGOs began to reach out to the international community. In January 1999 local CSOs went to Macedonia to provide humanitarian assistance during the Kosovo crisis. Following the United States' invasion of Iraq and the 2004 tsunami in South Asia, numerous Taiwanese CSOs travelled to these two regions to provide assistance, and joined together with other INGOs to offer aid. Some of these organizations include: Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation Taiwan, World Vision Taiwan, Taiwan Fund for Children and Families, Buddha's Light International Association Republic of China, Field Relief Agency, Chinese Association for Human Rights—Taipei Overseas Peace Service and the Ming Daw Culture Centre. Some scholars have pointed out that this new Taiwanese presence within international civil society has helped to deter Beijing from using force or excessive threats against Taiwan, as the work of Taiwanese CSOs has helped increase Taiwan's international status.

It is important note that while these organizations have numerous international connections, exchanges between them are infrequent. In response to this dilemma, in April 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to hold tri-monthly meetings entitled "Conference on coordinating civil resources and diplomatic affairs", which was later converted into a coordination meeting called "Conference on international humanitarian relief". These meetings were meant to better allocate the resources of Taiwan's CSOs to provide a more organized response in the even of a natural disaster.

On 27 January 2000, under the leadership of International Organizations section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first meeting of the "Taiwan Civil Union of Foreign Aid" was held. Twenty-five domestic NGOs participated in the meeting, representing a wide range of civil society actors.⁴⁹ Among the many CSOs in attendance, the assembly chose Tzuchi, World Vision Taiwan, Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corps, Eden Social Welfare Foundation, Field Relief Agency and the Centre for International NGO Studies as its assembly commissioners.⁵⁰ Together

⁴⁹ The participants included: Chinese Association For Relief And Ensuing Services , The Red Cross Society of The Republic of China, Chinese Association for Human Rights—Taipei Overseas Peace Service, Buddha's Light International Association, Republic of China, Lions Clubs International Foundation, MD300 Taiwan, Taiwan District of Kiwanis International, Rotary International Taiwan, Junior Chamber International Taiwan, Eden Social Welfare Foundation, Taiwan Fund for Children and Families, Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation Taiwan, World Vision Taiwan, International Cooperation Development Fund, Compassion International, Field Relief Agency, Ming Daw Culture Center, Vajra-guru ChihMin & Vajra-guru HueiHwa Foundation, Taiwan Zigen Form, ACRP Certification in Taiwan, Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corps, Taiwan Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association, Taiwan Catholic Mission Foundation, Cengta Social Welfare Foundation, The Children Charity Association and The Supreme Master Ching Hai International Association, which are all engaged in humanistic assistance and international development.

⁵⁰ Teh-Chang Lin, "The Analysis on the Strategies of Taiwan NGO to participate the International Activities" in *Taiwan's NGOs and Their International Linkages*, edited by Teh-Chang Lin (Kaohsiung : Center for INGO Studies NSYSU: 2003):244-245.

they were responsible for the establishment of the Taiwan Civil Union of Foreign Aid and were tasked with drawing up a constitution for the assembly. This union was supposed to be tasked with creating a resource and coordination centre for Taiwanese CSOs that wanted to participate in international development, humanitarian aid and relief projects. Unfortunately, even after a detailed discussion among all those in attendance, the goal of establishing a civil society foreign-assistance system was not reached. The reasons for their failure are as follows: the independence and exclusiveness of certain NGOs, lack of bilateral communication and cooperation and a change in personnel at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Over the past three decades, Taiwan's civil society has undergone dramatic changes. From its roots in the underground social movements of the 1970s and 1980s to the struggle against one party rule, Taiwan's civil society has now become a legal and powerful force within Taiwanese society. In the latest stage of this transformation Taiwanese CSOs are now beginning to broaden the scope of their work to include issues not only affecting Taiwan but the international community as well.

2. THE ANALYSIS OF TAIWANESE SOCIETY AND THE FORCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The social forces analysis carried out by the SAG, as part of the CSI-SAT project, examines influential actors within Taiwanese society and the relationships between them. It is divided into two parts. The first part entails mapping Taiwanese society and the second part maps civil society, with the aim of distinguishing and analyzing the important actors within Taiwanese society and the relationships between them. Social forces in this section are defined as a particular actor's considerable influences on either society or civil society.

In mapping the influential actors within Taiwanese society, the SAG identified the Legislative Yuan, political parties, the mass media, celebrities, think tanks, educational institutions, religious groups, syndicates, the court, trade unions, social welfare groups, environmental protection groups, gangs and the president. This shows that in Taiwan the state still plays a powerful role in society, while civil society actors, although influential, still cannot compete with the influence of the state. In order to study the different ways these actors influence society, the group divided them into four different categories according to level of influence: most influential, influential, somewhat influential and least influential. (table III.2.1)

TABLE III.2.1: Influential actors within Taiwanese society

Most influential	Influential	Somewhat influential	Least influential
1. Legislative Yuan 2. Mass Media 3. Educational Institutions 4. Syndicates 5. Court 6. The President	1. Political Parties 2. Religious Groups	1. Think Tanks 2. Trade Unions 3. Social Welfare Groups 4. Environmental Protection Groups 5. Gangs	1. Celebrities

In the following table, the SAG further classified the influential actors into three different areas: state, market and civil society. It is evident from the table that the most influential actors belong to the state and market, with state actors being more influential than market actors. When viewed in terms of state–society relations, the state still wields great influence over society, with the market also being an important force. The fact that Taiwan’s civil society is still in the beginning stages is evident by the fact that civil society actors are the least influential of the three.

TABLE III.2.2: Influential actors within Taiwanese society classified according to sector to the Taiwanese society classified according to sector

Most influential	Influential	Somewhat influential	Least influential
1. Legislative Yuan (state) 2. Mass media (market) 3. Educational Institutions (state) 4. Syndicates (market) 5. Court (state) 6. The president (state)	1. Political parties (CS)* 2. Religious Groups (CS)	1. Think tanks (CS) 2. Labour Groups (CS) 3. Social Welfare Groups (CS) 4. Environmental Protection Groups (CS) 5. Gangs (CS)	1. Celebrities (CS)

* Civil society (CS)

As a whole, the three sectors, state, market and civil society, have had a profound influence on Taiwan’s social development. Historically, political-commercial relations, or the interaction between the state and market, have been much more important to Taiwan than that of state-civil society relations. Interaction between the market and civil society has until recently been minimal with concepts like corporate social responsibility still relatively unknown in Taiwan.

In mapping the influential actors within civil society, the SAG determined the following actors (table III.2.3) to be the most influential within Taiwan’s civil society.

TABLE III.2.3: Influential actors within Taiwanese civil society

Most influential	Influential	Somewhat influential	Least influential
1. Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu-Chi Foundation Taiwan	1. Awakening Foundation 2. World Vision 3. Eden Social Welfare Foundation 4. International Cooperation Development Fund 5. Red Cross 6. National Association for the Promotion of Community University 7. Taiwan Medical Association 8. Judicial Reform Foundation 9. Taiwan Fund for Children and Families 10. Community Empowering Society R.O.C. 11. Asia Foundation Taiwan 12. YMCA/YWCA 13. The Humanistic Education Foundation 14. Homemaker's Union and Foundation 15. The Garden of Hope Foundation	1. The League of Welfare Organization for Disabled R.O.C. 2. Green Citizens' Action Alliance 3. National Union of Taiwan Women Association 4. Union of Journalist 5. United Fund, Taiwan 6. Taiwan Association for Human Right 7. Himalaya Foundation	1. The League of Welfare Organization for Elder R.O.C. 2. The League of Taipei Social Welfare 3. Child Welfare League Foundation, R.O.C. 4. Taiwan Health Reform Foundation

According to table III.2.3 above, the most influential actors within Taiwan's civil society are the religious organisations, Tzuchi and the Presbyterian Church, and the Taiwan

Farmers'/Fishermen's Association and Consumer's Foundation. Tzuchi and the Presbyterian Church are both religious organizations with large memberships, whose main purpose is to provide humanitarian assistance and carry out development programs. The Presbyterian Church has a political background and maintains a close interaction with Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, and thus can easily be defined as one of the more influential actors. Taiwan Farmers'/Fishermen's Association, which has traditionally been a powerful actor in local politics, has had considerable influence on civil society's development in Taiwan. The Consumer's Foundation is a consumer advocacy organization and is influential in that they are often the main initiators of new social policies affecting the average citizen. The other three groups, of less influential actors, offer specialized services that aim to serve a specific group of people and therefore operate on a smaller scale than the CSOs mentioned above.

IV ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY


Section IV presents and analyses the bulk of the data collected on Taiwan's civil society. The data is analysed based on the individual indicators, subdimensions and dimensions. Section IV is broken down into four sections, **Structure, Environment, Values and Impact**, which make up the CSI Diamond.

At the beginning of each section, a graph provides the scores for the subdimensions on a scale from 0 to 3. Findings for each subdimension are then examined in detail. A separate box also provides the scores for the individual indicators for each subdimension.

1. STRUCTURE

A large number of different scholarly studies have been undertaken to operationalise the concept of civil society's structure, which looks at the actors within civil society, their character and the relations among them.⁵¹ This dimension includes six subdimensions and 21 indicators. Taiwan scored 1.4 out of 3, indicating that its civil society has only reached about half of its full development potential in this dimension.

FIGURE IV.1.1: Subdimension score in structure dimension



⁵¹ Lester Salamon, et al., *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999); Michael Bratton, *Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa*, IDR Report 11, 6 (Boston: Institute for Development Research, 1994).

1.1 Breadth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension assesses the level of citizen participation, and includes five indicators; non-partisan political action, charitable giving, CSO membership, volunteering and collective community action. It received a score of 0.8, with the indicator on CSO membership receiving the lowest score. The current efforts to actively encourage CSO membership are apparently not enough. Now even the government, which is familiar with this problem, has begun to actively promote CSO membership through projects such as ‘community building’.

TABLE IV.1.1: Indicators assessing the breadth of citizen participation

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.1.1</u>	Non-partisan political action	<u>1</u>
<u>1.1.2</u>	Charitable giving	<u>1</u>
<u>1.1.3</u>	CSO membership	<u>0</u>
<u>1.1.4</u>	Volunteer work	<u>1</u>
<u>1.1.5</u>	Community action	<u>1</u>

1.1.1 Non-partisan political action. The following table uses data from the 1995 World Values Survey (WVS) and the 2003 East Asia Barometer survey.⁵² It shows the degree to which Taiwanese have, or are willing to, participate in non-partisan political action.⁵³

TABLE IV.1.2: Non-partisan political action in Taiwan

Non-partisan political action	Have Done (%)	Might Do (%)	Never (%)
Signing petition	11.1%	35.8%	53.1%
Lawful Demonstration	2.5%	35.8%	61.7%
Joining a Boycott	3.0%	32.6%	64.4%
Strike	0.3%	11.7%	88.0%
Occupying Building or Factory	0%	5.2%	94.8%
Percent of population who has participated in any type of action.	11.8%	N/A	88%

⁵² East Asia and Democratic Consolidation: A Comparative Studies of New Democratisation Countries in East Asia 2001 by Yu-tzung Chang sponsored by National Science Council.

⁵³ This report uses the data from a long-term (1981-1990-1995) project conducted by the World Value survey (WVS). Because some of the data is ten years old we sometimes relied on the secondary information and opinions from the assessment. The WVS website is: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/services/index.html>

TABLE IV.1.3: Attitudes of Taiwanese towards political participation

Attitudes of Taiwanese towards political participation	Yes (%)	No (%)
People like me don't have any influence on state's behaviour.	64.6%	29%
Only a few people control State, the common person can't really influence it.	55.5%	36.4%

The SAG tended to agree with the data finding that around 10% to 30% of the population have participated in some type of non-partisan political action. The SAG felt that Taiwanese citizens have become more politically active within the past decade. This percentage must be seen with the perspective that the Taiwanese have only recently begun to participate in political activities, and with a more open society, these type of activities have been growing.

1.1.2 Charitable giving. According to the Social Trends Report for 2003, conducted by the statistical bureau of the Executive Yuan, over the past year, 37.6% of Taiwanese have given to some type of charity, out of which 26.5% donated directly to an NGO, 17.5% donate goods and 1.8% purchased charitable goods. In addition, 88% of these donors gave a similar amount of money last year, 8.4% of them gave more than last year, while 9.8% gave less than last year. The study found that most donors are consistent in their charitable giving, and that 54.3% of them, meaning 2.4% of overall population, are regular donors.⁵⁴

The SAG stated that one of the main characteristics of charitable giving in Taiwan is that most donations go to faith based organizations. However, further observation shows that the proportion of donations to faith based organizations has been declining gradually, while donations to health and charitable groups are growing, with a 6% growth rate over the past four years. Thus, aside from looking for spiritual fulfilment, the concern of people in Taiwan is beginning to shift towards society as a whole. Research conducted after the powerful earthquake on 21 September 1999 found that the share of individual donors in Taiwan rose by 68.1% during the year following the quake.⁵⁵ In addition, Taiwan's donations following the tsunami disaster in 2004 were comparable with that of countries in the West and Japan. From these findings a strong growth trend is apparent in the amount of charitable giving in Taiwan.

1.1.3 CSO membership. Drawing from the same data source as the indicator above, it was found that only 28% of people in Taiwan are a member of at least one CSO, while over 70% of people have never joined any association or group.⁵⁶ When looking at associations, due to their

⁵⁴ Social Index Report, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics Executive Yuan, Central Region Office <http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/society/>.

⁵⁵ This is a follow-up project to the 1999 survey. Due to the 921 earthquake the survey staff decided to expand their research to include changes following the earthquake.

⁵⁶ Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. <http://www.stat.gov.tw/public/Attachment/51101123917.doc>.

membership system rules, which state that they must have at least 50 members in order to register, it was found that CSOs have quite different membership structures as is shown in the following table.

TABLE IV.1.4: Membership structure of Taiwanese associations

Number of Members	Percentage
200 or below	50%
200~499	23%
499~1000	6%
1000 and above	21%

Another research study on CSOs in Taipei found that 60% of CSOs had members who were ‘skilled workers’ or mid to upper level professionals indicating greater interest in civil society among the middle class.⁵⁷ The study therefore reflects that the percentage of those who are a member of at least one CSO to be under 30%, but it is generally agreed that the deepening of Taiwan’s democracy and social diversity will lead to growing CSO membership.

1.1.4 Volunteering. Using the same data source as above it was found that 14.5% of the population volunteered during 2003, and, of those, 67.5% volunteered regularly (monthly). A total of 9.79% of the population could be classified as ‘regular volunteers’ during 2003. Of those who have never volunteered before, 18.2% expressed a willingness to participate in social service projects in the future.⁵⁸

There has been a marked rise in volunteerism within the last few years, especially since the enactment of the Voluntary Service Act on 20 January 2001. This act encourages volunteerism by offering training to people interested in social service, giving out awards to people who have accumulated substantial hours of volunteering and offering ‘social service licenses’ to people

⁵⁷ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang, “Chinese on the development of civic organizations in the individual societies- case studies of Taipei, Xianggang, Guangzhou and Xiamen”, in *The Journal of The Third Sector Studies*, Vol. 1, 2004 March:5-6. This is a monograph based on "Small Government, Big Society Revisited" by Kin-man Chan, "The Social Educational Role of NGOs: The Case of “Community College Movement in Taiwan” by Min-hsiu Chang, "Autonomy, Advocacy and Impact: The Civic Organizations in Taipei" by Michael H. H. HSIAO, "A Comparative Study of Civic Groups in Taiwan and Hong Kong" by Hsin-chi Kuan, "Between Family and the State: The Case of Hong Kong" by Hsin-chi Kuan, Tai-lok Lui and Kin-man Chan, "International Relief and Taiwan's Social Development: A Historical Analysis of the Role Played by Non-governmental Organizations" by Yu-yuan Kuan, "Between Family and the State: The Structure of the Civil Society in Hong Kong" by Tai-lok Lui and Kin-man Chan, "Trade Organizations in Guangzhou" by Haixiong Qui, "Mainland China Taiwanese Business Associations and Their Role in Civil Society in China" by David Schak, and "A Preliminary Study of Civic Groups in Xiamen" by Guozhen Yang and Shunli Huang and presented at Workshop on the Comparative Study of Civil Organizations in Chinese Societies hold by Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies in The Chinese University of Hong Kong on January 14-15th 2000.

⁵⁸ Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C.
<http://www.stat.gov.tw/public/Attachment/51101124871.doc>

who are interested in conducting full or part-time volunteer programs. Since the act was passed, the Department of Social Affairs within the Ministry of the Interior has recruited nearly 400,000 people to participate in its voluntary service teams. Some members of the SAG agreed on these findings, while others stated that the definition of ‘volunteer’ needed to be broadened to include students, women and the elderly who participate in unrecorded types of community volunteering, both regular and irregular. For example, educational authorities have encouraged students who participate in social service causing the proportion of student social activities to rise in recent years.

1.1.5 Collective community action. Using the same report as above, some general data on collective community action in Taiwan was gathered. The study found that 36.2% of Taiwanese have offered volunteer assistance to the community. This figure however neglects to show the disparity between the northern and southern parts of Taiwan. Community action in Southern Taiwan is generally much more robust than in the north, which is most likely due to the fact that southern Taiwan is still more of an agricultural society with stronger ties to the community.

1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

It is important to assess the depth of citizen participation, meaning, the extent of people’s participation in civil society activities and the ways in which they participate, in order to understand the magnitude of citizen involvement in civil society. This subdimension focuses on how much people give to charity, how much time they dedicate to volunteering and the number of people who are members of more than one CSO.

TABLE IV.1.5: Indicators assessing depth of citizen participation

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.2.1</u>	Charitable Giving	<u>1</u>
<u>1.2.2</u>	Volunteering	<u>1</u>
<u>1.2.3</u>	CSO membership	<u>1</u>

1.2.1 Charitable giving. The research team was unable to find data on average donations as a percentage of personal income, so several different data sources were combined for the analysis. According to a statistical report, the average annual value of a charitable donation in Taiwan (including goods) in 2003 was NTD 7,969 (USD 253).⁵⁹ During the same year, per capita income was NTD 407,393 (USD 12,933), putting the annual charitable giving at 1.96% of personal income. Further research broke down charitable giving according to annual income and in terms of individual gifts as the following: (all monetary values are stated in USD. USD 1 = NTD

⁵⁹ Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan Central Region Office, R.O.C. <http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/society/community-92/index.html>.

31.5).⁶⁰ The basic findings of table IV.1.5 tend to indicate that Taiwan's middle class gives the greatest proportion of their income to charitable organizations.

TABLE IV.1.6: Estimate of donation as a percentage of annual income (in USD)

Annual income(USD)	Non-monetary donation	Monetary donation	Total donation
Under 6,349	2.98%	8.60%	11.58%
6,349 – 9,523	4.28%	9.20%	13.48%
9,523 – 12,698	14.66%	18.19%	32.85%
12,698 – 19,047	35.65%	32.28%	67.93%
19,047 – 25,396	43.01%	27.23%	70.24%
25,396 – 31,746	54.09%	32.73%	86.82%
Over 31,746	201.07%	88.03%	289.1%

Other studies have also shown that women are much more likely to donate to charity than men, and of these female donors, most are between 21 and 30 years old. The majority of respondents stated that their reason for giving was out of compassion and of their own free will.⁶¹ It is important to point out that Taiwan's economy has had slow growth in recent years and this may have an impact on the rather low amount of charitable giving.

1.2.2 Volunteering. The depth of volunteerism in Taiwan is still relatively low. Data from the statistical bureau shows average voluntary service per month at around 2.16 hours, and that long working hours and high-pressure jobs area major barrier to increasing volunteerism.⁶²

1.2.3 CSO membership. There is no official data on the number of people who are members of one or more CSOs, so the researchers relied on the discussion of the SAG for the assessment of this indicator. The sag found itself split on the subject. The majority of SAG members felt that a minority (30% to 50%) of CSO members belonged to more than one CSO. They stated that although overall CSO membership in Taiwan was low, it was common for people, who belonged to various social groups, to also belong to local temples or religious organizations as well.

⁶⁰ Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan Central Region Office, R.O.C.
<http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/society/community-92/index.html>

⁶¹ Hwe-wen Chi, "The donating behaviour and the marketing activities of NGOs", the dissertation of the Graduate School of Cooperative Economics in National Taipei University, 2002 June: 108-111

⁶² Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C.
<http://www.stat.gov.tw/public/Data/54816405571.xls>

1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants

The concept of civil society describes an arena in which different interests and views are able to compete with each other for influence. Therefore, observing the degree of diversity within civil society has important implications for getting an overall picture of the shape of a country's civil society. The purpose of this subdimension is to assess the level of participation of various social groups, such as women, minorities and other social groups within CSOs and CSO leadership roles. It also examines the geographical distribution of civil society in order to find out if rural and other regional groups have full representation. Unlike the previous subdimension, due to lack of data, the scoring of the following indicators relied less on statistical information and more on the interpretation of data, and the personal knowledge and experience of the SAG members.

TABLE IV.1.7: Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.3.1</u>	Representation of social groups among CSO members	<u>2</u>
<u>1.3.2</u>	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	<u>2</u>
<u>1.3.3</u>	Distribution of CSOs around the country	<u>2</u>

1.3.1 CSO membership. The following table, using data collected from the Ministry of the Interior, gives a breakdown of the type and number of foundations in Taiwan.

TABLE IV.1.8: Taiwan's foundations categorized by mission and purpose

Mission and purpose	Number	% of Total
Cultural and educational	2,126	70.5%
Social welfare and charitable	479	15.9%
Medical and healthcare	119	3.9%
Agriculture	43	1.4%
Transportation	41	1.4%
Economic development	33	1.1%
Media	30	1.0%
Environmental protection	29	1.0%
Others	114	3.8%
Total	3,014	100.0%

Based on these statistics it is unclear whether or not various social groups are represented in civil society. However, a recent study of the top 50 foundations in Taiwan may help to shed some light on the subject. The study found that 'cultural and educational' and 'social service and charity' organizations were the most common type of groups, while CSOs dealing with women's issues,

farmers and aboriginals are a close second.⁶³ Members of the SAG, based on this data and their own experiences, felt that most social groups are represented by CSOs in Taiwan, although some within the group pointed out that foreign brides, foreign labour and aboriginals are still underrepresented in CSO membership, leading to a lower score for this indicator. It should be noted that foreign brides are an important and growing demographic in Taiwan. More and more Taiwanese men have been marrying women from other Asian countries, especially Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Mainland China.

1.3.2 CSO leadership. This indicator deals with the representation of social groups in CSO leadership. Based on the discussions within the assessment group, the SAG concluded that CSO leadership represents most of the important social groups in Taiwan. However, like with the previous indicator, the group pointed out that foreign brides, foreign labour and aboriginals are still underrepresented in CSO membership, leading to a lower score for this indicator.

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs. Data from the Ministry of the Interior shows that among the 29,032 registered CSOs in Taiwan, 15.9% were located in the Taipei area and 10.4% were located in the Kaohsiung area, with the distribution of CSOs throughout the rest of Taiwan pretty much in line with the population density of its various areas.⁶⁴ Generally speaking, one can conclude that CSOs are evenly distributed throughout Taiwan, and tend to play an active role in local affairs, even though the majority of resources available to CSOs are concentrated in urban areas. The assessment group agreed with the findings of the secondary data, but also felt that the remote and mountain areas were still underrepresented.

1.4 Level of Organization

This subdimension analyzes the basic infrastructure of civil society, specifically looking at its stability, maturity and internal structure. The indicators under this subdimension assess the existence and effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies, civil society's capacity for self-regulation and the performance of its supports structure and international linkages.

⁶³ Mu-Lan Hsu, Chien-Hsun and Jin-tien Shu, "The Development of Taiwan's Top 50 Foundations" in *The Journal of The Third Sector Studies*, Vol. 1, 2004 Mar.

⁶⁴ Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C.
<http://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/index.asp>

TABLE IV.1.9: Indicators assessing level of organization

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.4.1</u>	Existence of umbrella bodies	<u>0</u>
<u>1.4.2</u>	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	<u>2</u>
<u>1.4.3</u>	Self-regulation within civil society	<u>1</u>
<u>1.4.4</u>	Support infrastructure	<u>2</u>
<u>1.4.5</u>	International linkages	<u>2</u>

1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies. CSO umbrella bodies play a very important role in the development of civil society. In the United States, the Independent Sector and the American Council for Voluntary International Action (Interaction) are the two prime examples of CSO umbrella bodies. In Taiwan, some umbrella bodies, such as the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) and Union of Promotion of Senior Welfare, groups that are made up of CSOs with similar objectives, operate independently and similarly to professional associations. Other examples of CSO umbrella bodies, such as Catholic Charities International, are quite successful in integrating their member organizations.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, the mechanism for horizontal integration among Taiwan's CSOs is still in an immature stage. The SAG felt that this mainly had to do with the immature nature of Taiwan's civil society and the lack of mechanisms that facilitate networking among CSOs. The assessment group also pointed out that, while it is difficult to find western style umbrella bodies for CSOs in Taiwan, such as CONGO, CIVICUS or WANGO that bring together CSOs who focus on multiple issues, networks of groups of CSOs with similar goals are much more common. Since resources for CSOs in Taiwan are limited, it has been much more likely for groups with similar interests to come together to pursue their interests. These groups are quite different than umbrella bodies in that they are generally single-issue focused, lack a central secretariat and are of temporary nature. Some of the SAG members thought that some CSOs, functioned as umbrella organizations, even though they did not explicitly state that this was their function. They specifically mentioned the Union of Disabled Persons, the Green Citizen's Action Alliance, National Union of Taiwan Women Associations, National Associations of Hospitals, United Way Taiwan and the Association of Community Colleges in Taiwan as being influential forces that integrate CSOs and facilitate resource and information exchanges among CSOs working in the same field. The SAG felt that while these unions were powerful forces within certain issues, Taiwan still lacks an umbrella body that brings together CSOs who focus on different issues.

1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies. Since there are no CSO umbrella bodies that fit the western definition in Taiwan, it was decided to view the examples given above as functioning

⁶⁵ National Youth Commission of the Executive Yuan. <http://site.nyc.gov.tw/part3/c421b.htm>

pseudo-umbrella bodies instead. The entire SAG expressed a positive attitude towards the effectiveness and influence of the many different CSO networks as described above, many of which have been operating in Taiwan for many years. The contribution of the various CSO unions in Taiwan is obvious, but in the area of creating national umbrella bodies, there are still numerous problems that need to be addressed, such as the fact that Taiwanese CSOs generally do not like to cede control over to a larger authority and are generally unwilling to share their limited resources with a larger organization. Another obstacle that should be considered when creating national umbrella bodies in Taiwan is the strong sense of regionalism, specifically the distinction between north and south. It may be easier to create umbrella bodies within a particular region, but setting up cross-regional organizations may be more problematic.

1.4.3 Self-regulation. According to a survey of CEOs, whose organizations are subsidized by the United Way of Taiwan, nearly 99% felt that it is extremely important to promote a self-regulation movement within Taiwan's civil society. The SAG felt that the main reason for this was the fact that CSOs realize that, in order for them to expand, they need to encourage charitable donations. The best way for CSOs to achieve this is to become more accountable and hence increase public trust. Self-regulation would be a good first step in achieving this goal. However, while there is a consensus of the need for self-regulation, there are still many differing opinions on whether or not it is necessary to pass national laws on the subject. Most CSOs feel that establishing a supervisory organization would be the most effective way to self-regulate, but a solid agreement is still a long way off as can be seen from the situation that occurred following the 9/21 earthquake.⁶⁶ A large amount of donations poured into the affected areas, both domestic and international, but the management of these funds were sometimes suspect and these funds were sometimes misused and they failed to follow self-regulatory principles leading to a loss of faith and confidence within the donor community.⁶⁷

In September 2005, various Taiwanese CSOs sought to establish the Union of Charity and Self Regulation. This union is the product of a movement among certain Taiwanese CSOs to promote a rigid standard of self-regulation, including due diligence checks, financial transparency and efficient CSO service and management.⁶⁸ The assessment group concluded that self-regulation among CSOs in Taiwan has not yet reached maturity, although within certain CSOs or CSO unions there have been some concrete steps in this direction.

⁶⁶ Joyce Yen Feng, "The Establishment of the Self-regulation for social service groups" presented at The International Conference on Social Welfare of Cross-Strait Four Chinese Societies 2002. The survey had been conducted between January and June 2002 in Taiwan via the internet. It targeted the CEOs of 453 social service groups and was funded by United Funding. 110 CEOs responded with 100 valid survey samples. For details please see <http://www.ccswf.org.tw/taiwan/2B3.doc>

⁶⁷ Hwei-ru Chen, "The Inspection of the Public Funding of NGO from the experience of 921 Earthquake, in Journal of Accounting Research, March 2000.

⁶⁸ http://www.unitedway.org.tw/activate/newactivate/news_detail.asp?id=166 □

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. The development of civil society requires a sufficient supportive infrastructure. For CSOs in Taiwan, the government has played an important role in providing resources, information, establishing an environment conducive to development and professional training. After the Martial Law was lifted, some governmental departments, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Youth Commission, Ministry of Education, Department of Social Affairs of the Ministry of Interior and the International Cooperation and Development Fund, ROC, began to offer support for the development of domestic CSOs. In addition, CINGOS at NSYSU and the 333-Research Centre at NCCU are academic units that act as a scholarly support infrastructure for civil society. The assessment group felt that, while there are not as many grant making foundations in Taiwan as in western countries, the support infrastructure for civil society has nonetheless been rapidly expanding. The group noted that support infrastructure for CSOs began to appear following the end of Martial Law, but it was the election of the DPP government in 2000 which prompted the development of this type of infrastructure, as CSOs have long been their strongest political constituents. This can be seen in the formation of the NGO Affairs Council within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NGO Division within the National Youth Commission following the 2000 elections.⁶⁹ In terms of CSOs providing this type of infrastructure, the group pointed out the Asia Foundation and the Himalaya Foundation as the most prominent CSOs providing support to CSOs.

1.4.5 International linkages. The Yearbook of International Organizations 2001-2002 indicates that there are 2,074 international organizations in Taiwan involved in different fields. In addition, the NGO Affairs Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was established in 2002 with the purpose of counselling and assisting local NGOs in attending international governmental or non-governmental conferences. The committee has worked with 1,613 different CSOs, 278 of which regularly participate in international affairs.⁷⁰ The 2004 annual MOFA report states that there have been 1,529 international conferences.⁷¹ It also reports that there have been 277 international activities that Taiwan's CSOs have attended.⁷²

Since 2000, the newly elected DPP government has promoted linkages between Taiwan's CSO and international civil society. However, due to Taiwan's unique international situation Taiwanese civil society faces more obstacles than usual when trying to participate in international activities. This is due to Taiwan's political situation vis a vis China, as the Mainland's policy of preventing Taiwan from participating in international organizations and activities has also extended to CSOs.

⁶⁹ The National Youth Commission funded this study

⁷⁰ Michel Ching-long Lu, "The International Participation of the local NGOs in Taiwan: A perspective from the government" in *Taiwan's NGOs and Their International Linkages*, edited by Teh-Chang Lin (Kaohsiung : Center for INGO Studies NSYSU: 2003):215.

⁷¹ 96 conferences were in Taiwan, 670 in the Asia Pacific Region, 387 in North America and 329 in the European Region.

⁷² <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/public/Data/93static/93.pdf>

Thus, Taiwanese CSOs often find themselves excluded from international conferences or prevented from participating in international activities. Most recently, Taiwanese CSOs were not permitted to help in the relief effort following the earthquake in Kashmir, as Taiwanese citizens were not issued Pakistani visas unless they first received a letter of support from Beijing. The assessment group tended to think that a moderate number of CSOs in Taiwan have developed international linkages, although there was some debate within the group before arriving at this consensus. The main reason for this difference of opinion was that there are numerous small CSOs serving the local community that have no need to form international linkages. Coming to a decision based on the number of CSOs with international links is not the best way to gain the most accurate picture of this indicator, rather looking at some of the linkages that major CSOs have built with organizations abroad will provide a more accurate picture. However, the entire assessment group was confident that Taiwanese CSOs would be able to build more international linkages in the future.

1.5 Inter-relations within Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the degree of information sharing and alliance building among CSOs by analyzing two different indicators: communication and cooperation among civil society.

TABLE IV.1.10: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.5.1</u>	Communication between CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>1.5.2</u>	Cooperation between CSOs	<u>2</u>

1.5.1 Communication. Cooperation and the exchange of information between CSOs helps CSOs accumulate more resources within civil society and encourages actions that seek to improve the quality of civil society. Recently, a few CSOs in Taiwan have developed some formal and informal platforms to facilitate communication and information exchange, with the results being quite remarkable. The Taiwan Philanthropy Information Center, a website launched and maintained by the Himalaya Foundation, with the goal of developing mutual trust and sharing among Taiwan's CSOs, is an example of a successful public forum where civil society actors can communicate and share their experiences.⁷³ Even though it is difficult to deny the fact that there are many mid or small scale CSOs that lack regular communication with each other, it has been encouraging to see major CSOs leading this trend. Most of the SAG felt that there was a moderate level of communication between CSOs in Taiwan, but that it was sometimes limited due to the fact that Taiwan's civil society arena is still immature.

⁷³ Hwe-lin Tsou, *The Knowledge Management Applied on NGO- A Case Study on Himalaya Foundation*, the dissertation of the Institute of Public Administrative in National Chengchi University: 123-124.

1.5.2 Cooperation. Although communication between CSOs still needs improvement, the cooperation between them is alive and well, with the Community Universities across Taiwan serving as a good example. Wenshan Community College in Taipei has begun cooperative programs with a large number of foundations and associations.⁷⁴ These colleges have presented a unique opportunity for CSOs to come together to increase public awareness by helping educate people on various social issues. These colleges are important, because they are CSOs themselves, which are supported by and made up of various CSOs from around Taiwan. Another area of cooperation between CSOs, primarily in Taipei and Kaohsiung, has been in the staging of political rallies, both for and against government policies.⁷⁵ These rallies are often characterized by a lack of focus and cohesion, sometimes leading people to lose confidence in the effectiveness of CSOs.⁷⁶

However, there are limitations to this cooperation. A recent research study found that CSOs were more likely to cooperate if their work was in a similar field.⁷⁷ Another survey of CSOs in Taipei found that nearly 80% seek to cooperate with other organizations and the government if possible, in order to achieve their goals, showing the tendency of CSOs to cooperate with each other when it is within their own area of expertise.⁷⁸ From the findings of this study, it can be inferred that cross-sectoral CSO alliances and cooperation are currently not well developed in Taiwan. Cooperation among CSOs in Taiwan is still limited to a particular issue or region, while national multi-issue CSO alliances are still very few.

Broadly speaking, the assessment group members were of the opinion that there was wide spread cooperation among CSOs in Taiwan in areas of mutual interest, with recent trends showing the rise in cross-sectoral cooperation, especially within Taiwan's community colleges.

1.6 Civil Society Resources

This subdimension assesses the extent to which CSOs have sufficient access to financial, human and technological resources, and the ways in which they are able to utilize those resources.

⁷⁴ Min-Hsiu Chiang edited, *The Management of Non-profit Organization* (Taipei: Best-wise Publishing, 2002): 389.

⁷⁵ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao edited, *INGO and the Operation* (Taipei: Chu-liou Publishing, 2000): 120-121.

⁷⁶ Chien-Hui Tsai, *Lobbying Strategy of the NGO*, the dissertation of the Institute of Public Administrative in National Chengchi University, 1998:91-92.

⁷⁷ Yu-Chin Chiou, "The Analysis on Resource Connection of the NGOs in Taichung City- A Social Network Perspective" in *The NCCU Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, 1999 Oct: 121.

⁷⁸ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang: 12-13.

TABLE IV.1.11: Indicators assessing civil society resources

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.6.1</u>	Financial resources	<u>2</u>
<u>1.6.2</u>	Human resources	<u>1</u>
<u>1.6.3</u>	Technical and infrastructural resources	<u>1</u>

1.6.1 Financial resources. A survey undertaken on the revenue sources of CSOs in Taiwan found that in the case of foundations, interest from their endowment and fixed assets was their main sources of income, followed by donations and then fundraising programs. For associations, membership fees were their main source of funds, with donations and fundraising coming in second and third.⁷⁹ The following table shows the results of a nationwide survey that asked associations if they were able to achieve their yearly budget goals. The survey found that about 70% had enough financial resources to complete their work.

TABLE IV.1.12: Taiwanese associations that achieve their budget goals

Percentage of budget goal achieved	Percentage of total CSOs surveyed (%)
Achieve over 80% of budget goal	47.2
Achieve 60~80% of budget goal	23.2
Achieve 40~60% of budget goal	15.4
Achieve 20~40% of budget goal	5.7
Achieve bellow 20% of budget goal	4.1

The SAG felt that, in general, CSOs have enough financial resources to achieve their goals, but they admitted that their annual goals are usually established based on their projected budget for the year.

1.6.2 Human resources. A research study conducted on CSOs (both foundations and civil associations) in the Taipei area found that human resources are in short supply, and that the number of professional CSO workers is in decline, causing considerable problems for CSOs.⁸⁰ The most serious of these problems is the fact that it is common for CSO workers to take on one or more individuals jobs, and due to financial constraints, their average salary is much lower than in the business sector leading to a loss of professionally trained employees. This has led to the phenomenon that some CSOs are still technologically underdeveloped as they are short of computer-literate staff. The SAG felt that, in general, there were not enough human resources to

⁷⁹ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang, "Chinese on the development of civic organizations in the individual societies- case studies of Taipei, Xianggang, Guangzhou and Xiamen", in *The Journal of The Third Sector Studies*, Vol. 1, 2004 March.

⁸⁰ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang.

meet the requirements of CSOs, although there was some debate before reaching this decision. This difference of perspective and divergence from the data is the result that some within the group felt that small CSOs, which are the majority in Taiwan, only need a minimal staff to run daily tasks, but find themselves short of people when they undertake large projects or events. These group members pointed out that this situation does not necessarily mean that CSOs are short of human resources, as they can easily find temporary volunteers to help out for large projects.

1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources. One online resource found that foundations in Taiwan lack sufficient marketing strategies, which they felt was mainly due to insufficient technological resources.⁸¹ On the other hand another report stated that among CSOs in Taipei, 25% already have a website. The study also found that nearly 40% of all foundations in Taiwan have their own website, which is 10% higher than the percentage of civil associations with websites.⁸² Most of the SAG felt that CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals but they did stress that the standards for determining sufficient resources in this area should be judged in a much different manner than the business sector, as CSOs are more flexible in finding alternative methods to meet their needs and achieve their goals should they find a shortage of certain resources.

Conclusion

Taiwanese civil society scored 1.4 within the structure dimension, showing that it has only reached about half of its full development potential in this area. However, overall, the structure of Taiwanese civil society is slightly weak. The subdimensions with the lowest scores were breadth of citizen participation (0.8), depth of citizen participation (1.0) and resources (1.3 points). Both the secondary information, including official and scholarly data and the SAG scoring, show that the degree of civic participation in and donations to civil society are not sustainable or substantial enough to contribute to a stable foundation for the further development of civil society. When looking at the resource subdimension it is apparent that, due to a lack of public participation and giving, CSOs are short of sufficient financial, human and technological capital. This is a serious obstacle to the long-term sustainability of civil society. The fourth lowest score was that of organization (1.4 points), showing that civil society still lacks institutionalization and established coordination mechanisms among CSOs. However, it was also found that the diversity (2 points) and inter-relations (2 points) subdimensions were quite strong, showing that the activities of civil society are rather open and vibrant. As a whole, the long-term vitality of Taiwan's civil society will depend on its ability to mobilise public participation in social affairs and on its commitment to establish a useful self-regulation system for CSOs.

⁸¹ Yi-fang Yen, *A Content Analysis of Nonprofits' Homepages The Case of 300 Major Foundations in Taiwan*, the dissertation of the Institute of Business Management in National Chengchi University, 2002.


⁸² Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang.

2. ENVIRONMENT

The CSI's environment dimension stresses, not only the importance of legal factors, but looks more broadly at civil society's political, socio-economic and socio-cultural context.⁸³ This dimension discusses how the external environment for civil society (politics, society, culture and economy) influence and shape the civil society arena. Whereas the environment dimension is not an actual part of civil society, it is essential to include it in an assessment of the state of civil society, as a healthy external environment is imperative to the strengthening of civil society. There are seven subdimensions and 23 indicators in this dimension in which politics, constitution, society, economy, culture and law and the behaviour of government and business towards civil society are evaluated.

The score for the environment dimension was 2.2, out of a possible 3, showing that while not quite up to the standards of the most advanced countries, the environment for the development of civil society in Taiwan is relatively enabling.

FIGURE IV.2.1 Subdimension scores environment dimension



2.1 Political Context

This subdimension examines the extent to which the political environment in Taiwan is conducive to the development of civil society. It includes six indicators; political rights, political competition, rule of law, corruption, state effectiveness and decentralization.

⁸³ Lester Salamon and Stefan Toepler, *The Influence of the Legal Environment on the Development of the Nonprofit Sector*. Center for Civil Society Studies Working Paper, No. 17 (Baltimore: Center for Civil Society Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 2000).

TABLE IV.2.1: Indicators assessing political context

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.1.1</u>	Political Rights	<u>3</u>
<u>2.1.2</u>	Political competition	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.3</u>	Rule of law	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.4</u>	Corruption	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.5</u>	State effectiveness	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.6</u>	Decentralization	<u>2</u>

2.1.1 Political rights. This indicator looks at the rights of the general public to participate in political affairs through fair and free elections and the formation of political parties. According to the 2005 Freedom House report on freedom around the world, Taiwan is considered a free society, with a score of two (on a 1-7 scale – 1 being most free and 7 being least free).⁸⁴ Although there is the occasional report of bribery, most of these cases are at the local level and not significant enough to affect the political freedom of Taiwan as a whole. The assessment group members agreed that people in Taiwan have the full freedom to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in the political process.

2.1.2 Political competition. The majority of political scientists in Taiwan and abroad agree that Taiwan’s political system should be classified as a multi-party system, but they usually have different opinions on the level of maturity Taiwan’s political parties have actually attained. The institutionalization of political parties is one of the major issues brought up in this debate. Taiwan’s political parties and institutions still follow the idea of “ren zhi” or rule of man, in which they are governed by a strong leadership, but tend to be rather lax in creating and enforcing stable internal institutions. Freedom House considers the Taiwanese political system to be competitive, although cross-strait issues have caused a great deal of factionalism within the government. In fact, aside from issues dealing with Mainland China the domestic policies of the major political parties are quite similar.⁸⁵ Thus, during the scoring meeting, most of the SAG members agreed that Taiwan has multi-party system, but with weak institutionalization.

2.1.3 Rule of law. The World Bank’s Governance report gave Taiwan 80.9 points out of full score of 100 in the area of rule of law, a score just behind Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong in the Asian region.⁸⁶ Whereas, this points towards a strong entrenchment of the rule of law, there have been

⁸⁴ Freedom House, August 2004 Freedom House, Inc, 7 April 2005.

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryrating/taiwan.htm>

⁸⁵ Freedom House.

⁸⁶ Kaufman, D., A. Krancy, & M. Mastruzzi 2003 Governance Matters □: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, World Bank, World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 3106
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters2001.htm>.

some obstacles to improving the realization of the rule of law in Taiwan, the most prominent being a weak judiciary. According to a prominent American legal expert in Taipei “public confidence in the bench is critical if the rule of law is to take root in Taiwan and the Taiwanese public currently does not have much confidence in Taiwan’s bench”.⁸⁷ The majority of the assessment group felt that there is a moderate level of confidence in the law and violations of the law by citizens and the state are only somewhat common.

2.1.4 Corruption. Taiwan has made great strides since the end of martial law in controlling corruption and has currently worked itself to the 77.3 percentile, in terms of perceived levels of corruption globally, occupying the 35th position in the world, just behind Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong in Asia.⁸⁸ However, the 2004 CPI score of 5.6 (on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating absence of corruption), shows that corruption does still exist. In a survey conducted by Transparency International, 6 in 10 Taiwanese felt that political life in Taiwan is still affected by corruption.⁸⁹ Thus, there is still room for improvement. The assessment group tended to agree with the data stating that the perceived level of corruption in Taiwan was ‘moderate’.

2.1.5 State effectiveness. State effectiveness is another area where Taiwan has made great strides. Globally, Taiwan falls into the 82.5 percentile, once again placing it just below Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan in Asia.⁹⁰ However, most SAG members considered the state bureaucracy to be functional but incompetent and non-responsive. There were several reasons cited by the group for their negative views on state effectiveness including the numerous problems and mounting debt plaguing Taiwan’s national health insurance system, and the constant delays and scandals preventing the completion of the subway system in Kaohsiung and the cross-island high-speed rail line.

2.1.6 Decentralization. In 2005, 38.5% of government expenditure was devolved to sub-national and local governments. The remaining 61.6% was reserved for the central government and the two special municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung. In 2003, the government began work on amending the law governing the allocation of government revenues and expenditures in order to give more autonomy to local governments. Some of the changes within the proposed law would allow for local governments to have a greater share in the tax redistribution fund and be given more leeway in their expenditure decisions. Currently, the law is still being debated in the legislature and the Executive Yuan.

⁸⁷ American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, Kennedy, Brian L. “Law Raising Public Conference in Taiwan’s Judges” Topics vol. 34 no. 3 September 2004.

⁸⁸ Kaufman, D., A. Krancy, & M. Mastruzzi.

⁸⁹ Transparency International Corruption, Perception Index October, 2004 Transparency International 7 April 2005. <http://www.transparenct.org/cpi/2004.en.htm#cpi2004>

⁹⁰ Kaufman, D., A. Krancy, & M. Mastruzzi

2.2 Basic Rights and Freedoms

This dimension assesses the state of basic freedoms and rights inherent to the functioning of civil society. They include civil rights (freedom of speech, clustering and parade), freedom of the press and access to information. This subdimension assesses the degree to which these rights are protected in law and in practice.

TABLE IV.2.2: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.2.1</u>	Civil liberties	<u>2</u>
<u>2.2.2</u>	Information rights	<u>2</u>
<u>2.2.3</u>	Press Freedom	<u>2</u>

2.2.1 Civil Liberties. In 2005, Freedom House gave Taiwan a score of 1, its highest, in terms of the civil liberties available to Taiwanese citizens, although the report did find that Taiwan’s aboriginal population still faces occasional discrimination.⁹¹ Most of the assessment group felt that there were occasional violations of civil liberties in Taiwan although these were very rare. They cited the aboriginal community as an example.

2.2.2 Information rights. This indicator, dealing with public access to government documents, proved to be the most controversial of the 76 indicators during the scoring meeting. With no concrete agreement of what ‘access to information’ actually meant, it resulted in a difference of opinion when deciding Taiwan’s score. CIVICUS defines this indicator as “the extent to which public access to information is guaranteed by law and the degree to which government documents are accessible to the public.” SAG members who adopted a more narrow definition of information rights felt that the decision making process within the government on important issues is not transparent enough and that there is no law guaranteeing these rights to Taiwanese citizens.

Currently, Taiwan has no actual law allowing for public access to government documents. During the past few years, however, there has been a draft bill working its way through the executive and legislative branches of the government that would open up non-sensitive government documents to the public. In April 2005, the draft version of this law was passed by the Executive Yuan and is now ready to make its way to the legislature.⁹² In practice there is already broad access to government documents with quite high transparency levels. This is supported by some worldwide reports on the digitalization of government. According to a report conducted by the International Development Centre at Harvard University in 2002, on the development of e-governance around

⁹¹ Freedom House.

⁹² Shu-ling, Ko “Access to Information Bill Gets a Boost” Taipei Times 12 April 2005 p.4

the world, Taiwan was ranked as the second best in the world.⁹³ Brown University's report that came out the same year ranked Taiwan as seventh.⁹⁴ In order to achieve their goal of an "E-Taiwan" by 2008, the Taiwan government has made an effort to promote transparency and digitalization, and to promote new ideas such as e-Democracy, e-society and e-life.

The SAG found itself divided over this indicator although they finally agreed that since the freedom of information bill is likely to be passed soon, that Taiwan deserved a score of 2. The group also noted that even after the legislation is passed it will still be difficult to gain access to government documents.

2.2.3 Press freedoms. The constitution of the Republic of China provides for freedom of the press, and Freedom House currently ranks the Taiwanese media as 'free'. Indeed the press in Taiwan, like its economy, is for better or worse one of the most unregulated in Asia, although there is still political control over various broadcast stations, radio and television, as well as a restriction on granting broadcasting licensees to island-wide radio stations.⁹⁵ The media explosion has led to some conflicts over privacy issues with several legal cases going to the courts following the end of marshal law. A recent report conducted by the Taiwanese Citizen Association called "Fighting Against Media" found that 73% of Taiwanese feel that excessive press freedoms would have a negative impact on society.⁹⁶ Most of the SAG thought that there are isolated violations of press freedoms, but for the most part Taiwan enjoys a free press.

2.3 Socio-economic Context

This subdimension examines how the social and political situation in Taiwan influences the development of civil society. Negative factors that may influence the development of civil society could include abject poverty, civil war or conflict, serious economic or social inequality, high levels of illiteracy, or the lack of technological infrastructure. The assessment group unanimously concluded that Taiwan is not affected by any of the above factors, although they made a point that Taiwan is still classified as a developing country with an immature civil society.

TABLE IV.2.3: Indicator assessing socio-economic context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	<u>3</u>

⁹³ <http://www.cid-harvard.edu/cr/profiles/taiwan.pdf>

⁹⁴ http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Taubman_center/policyreports.html

⁹⁵ Karlekar, K.D. (ed) (2003) *freedom if the Press 2003: A Global Survey of Media Independence*. New York: Freedomhouse; Lanham; Rowman&Littlefield.

⁹⁶ The Anti-Media Alliance was started with a deep awareness of the profound impact that the media has on society and is composed of 18 social welfare service groups. <http://www.anti-media.org/phpBB/portal.php>

2.3.1 Socio-economic context. To operationalise the concept of ‘socio-economic environment’, eight indicators were selected, which represent the different means through which the socio-economic context can potentially impact on civil society: 1) Poverty; 2). Civil war; 3) Severe ethnic or religious conflict; 4) Severe economic crisis; 5) Severe social crisis; 6) Serious socio-economic inequities; 7) Illiteracy and 8) Lack of IT infrastructure.

For each of these indicators a specific benchmark was defined which indicated that the respective indicator presents a socio-economic barrier to civil society. The benchmarks and data for these eight indicators for Taiwan are presented below:

1. *Widespread poverty - do more than 40% of Taiwanese live on less than 2 US\$ a day?* No
2. *Civil war - did the country experience any armed conflict during the last five years?* No.
3. *Severe ethnic or religious conflict in the last five years?* No. There is some lingering tension between ‘native’ Taiwanese and those that recently came to Taiwan (since 1949), but this is generally not considered severe.
4. *Severe economic crisis – is the external debt more than the GDP?* No. Taiwan is not in a severe economic crisis.
5. *Severe social crisis?* No. In the last two years Taiwan has not experienced any serious social crisis.
6. *Severe socio-economic inequity ,(i.e. is the Gini-coefficient > 0.4)?* No. While there are social and economic inequities in Taiwan, its Gini coefficient in 2002 was 0.34
7. *Pervasive illiteracy - are more than 40% of the adult population illiterate?* No. Illiteracy is not widespread in Taiwan with the literacy rate around 96% for those 15 and older.
8. *Lack of IT infrastructure – are there less than 5 IT hosts per 10,000 inhabitants?* No. Taiwan has a good IT infrastructure, with around 500 hosts per 10,000 inhabitants (CIA World Fact Book 2002).

The analysis of civil society’s socio-economic environment showed that none of these socio-economic barriers is presented in Taiwan. Thus, Taiwan’s civil society is operating in a very conducive socio-economic context.

2.4 Socio-cultural Context

This subdimension describes the depth of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness among Taiwanese citizens.

TABLE IV.2.4: Indicators assessing socio-cultural context

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.4.1</u>	Trust	<u>2</u>
<u>2.4.2</u>	Tolerance	<u>2</u>
<u>2.4.3</u>	Public spiritedness	<u>2</u>

2.4.1 Trust. The following table using data from the World Values Survey 1995 shows the levels of trust (what percentage of the people feel they can trust one another) found in Taiwan compared with other countries around the world.

TABLE IV.2.5: Levels of trust in Taiwan compared with other countries⁹⁷

Country	Percentage of people who felt the could trust each other
China	52%
Taiwan	42%
Japan	42%
Australia	40%
USA	36%
Korea	30%

It is important to note that the WVS data is nearly ten years old, and Taiwan has gone through a number of divisive electoral cycles in the past decade. A political science professor speaking about the 2004 presidential election stated that, “social trust [had] been completely destroyed during this period”.⁹⁸ Another report however, conducted by the Taiwan government found that of people over fifteen years old, 56.7% thought that most people in their community were trustworthy, and 36.2% would accept assistance from their neighbour if they became sick.⁹⁹ The SAG mostly agreed that there is a moderate level of trust among Taiwanese, similar to the results reached by the WVS

2.4.2 Tolerance. The following table using World Values Survey data shows the levels of (in-)tolerance Taiwanese show towards different people within society by asking them which one of these marginalized groups they would not like to have as a neighbour.

⁹⁷ World Values Survey, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/services/index.html> 16 April 2005

⁹⁸ Gluck, Caroline “Taiwan Fears Over Poll Divide” BBC News 29 March, 2004
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3578239.stm> 16 April 2005

⁹⁹ Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan Central Region Office, R.O.C.
<http://www129.tpg.gov.tw/mbas/society/community-92/index.html>

TABLE IV.2.6: Intolerance towards different social groups in Taiwan

Social groups	Percentage of respondents who showed intolerance
Homosexuals	71%
AIDS patients	71%
Immigrants	24%
Different religion	17%
Different race	15%

The average score for Taiwan on the tolerance scale is 2.2, making it a moderately tolerant society.¹⁰⁰ Since the survey was conducted in 1996 Taiwan has become a more diverse and tolerant society due to increasing economic and social changes. There are now annual gay pride parades in Taipei, same sex marriage may soon be legalized and there have been numerous campaigns to educate the public on the issues surrounding HIV/AIDS. In addition, one of the SAG members has been working with WVS on completing an updated survey for Taiwan and stated that the 1996 score is already outdated and that Taiwan has become more tolerant over the past decade. Therefore, the assessment group decided to give Taiwan a score slightly higher than that found in the 1995 WVS

2.4.3 Public spiritedness. Drawing on the same WVS data, it is possible to measure the level of public spiritedness in Taiwan by looking at three different survey questions that asked if the respondent felt that it was acceptable to; claim government benefits, avoid a transport fare, and to cheat on their taxes. All answers were given on a scale of 1-10, with one being never and ten being always. The average scores for Taiwan are shown in the following table.

TABLE IV.2.7: Public spiritedness in Taiwan

Public spiritedness	Average score
Claim government benefits to which you are not entitled	2.58
Avoid paying a transport fare	2.09
Cheat on Taxes	1.98

Based on this data, Taiwan's average score for public spiritedness is 2.21. Most of the assessment group felt there was a moderate level of public spiritedness in Taiwan, a score between 1.5 and 2.5 on the WVS scale, although there was some debate within the group when deciding the score. The main reason for the divergence of opinion was the input of one SAG member that is working on an updated version of the WVS in Taiwan who felt that Taiwan's score in this area has moved higher over the past decade.

¹⁰⁰ World Values Survey.

2.5 Legal Environment

This subdimension looks at the effects of the legal environment on civil society development. The following indicators include an evaluation of the CSO registration process, the range of allowable advocacy activities, tax laws favourable to CSOs and tax benefit for philanthropy.

Generally speaking, the legal environment in Taiwan is quite friendly to civil society, with the assessment group giving it a score of 2.3. This score shows a generally supportive legal environment, although the secondary information and opinions of the assessment group point out that there are still flaws in regulations governing CSOs, which could endanger a healthy interaction between civil society and the government.

TABLE IV.2.8: Indicators assessing legal environment

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.5.1</u>	CSO registration	<u>2</u>
<u>2.5.2</u>	Allowable advocacy activities	<u>3</u>
<u>2.5.3</u>	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>2.5.4</u>	Tax benefits for philanthropy	<u>2</u>

2.5.1 CSO registration. CSO registration in Taiwan is a somewhat complicated system consisting of three different steps and with no single governmental authority overseeing the process. There is also a distinction under the law between foundations and membership associations. Basically the three steps involve: 1) getting permission from the government agency related to the work of the CSO; 2) setting aside an endowment which can range anywhere from USD 16,000 to USD one million (for foundations only), depending on the supervising government agency and 3) registering with the district court closest to the CSO headquarters. For membership associations there is no endowment requirement, but a minimum of 30 members is required at the time of establishment. Registration with the district court is the same for all NPOs and is usually done in a timely manner.¹⁰¹ Registration with a supervising government agency can differ from CSO to CSO and is left up to the discretion of the government agency, and is usually completed within one month. Appeals are available if an application is denied. It should be noted that regulations for temple registration fall under a different set of laws. In addition, the different government agencies responsible for CSO registration all have different rules for different categories of CSO.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Joyce Yen Fang, Taiwan, in *Philanthropy and Law in Asia* 315-336 Thoman Silk, ed, 1999

¹⁰² Yu-Yuan Kuan, Andy Kao & Marie-Claude Pelchant, paper presented at "Governance, Organizational Effectiveness, and the non-profit sector", Asia-Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, Makati City, Philippines, 5-7 September 2003.

This indicator is assessed using five criteria. Is the CSO registration process 1) simple, 2) quick, 3) inexpensive, 4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied? According to the experience and the perception of the SAG members, there have been major improvements in the CSO registration process, especially in the speed and ease of the application process. Most of the group said that the CSO registration process should be considered as relatively supportive, with only one of the above characteristics, consistently applied regulations, being absent. The reason stated for the inconstant application of registration regulations is due to the fact that CSOs must register with different government agencies depending on the type of work they are involved in and therefore different CSOs may be subject to the different rules of various government ministries.

2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities. Taiwan's laws do not restrict CSO activity, but section 2 of the Civil Organization Law states that "no NPO can advocate communism or separation of the country", although these laws are never enforced.¹⁰³ Taking an historical view of state-civil society interaction, it is apparent that there has been tremendous change in the depth and scope of the advocacy agenda of various CSOs. All of the stakeholders believe that CSOs are now permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of the government.

2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs. Tax laws are generally favourable to CSOs. Article 4(13) of the ROC Income Tax Law states that educational, cultural, public interest and charitable organizations, established in accordance with law, are exempt from income tax. There are certain laws that CSOs must comply with in order to qualify for tax-exempt status, the most important of which is that they must spend 80% of their interest or income on their stated objectives. One drawback to the law is that CSOs must qualify for their tax exemption every year through their supervising government agency.¹⁰⁴

2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy. Article 36, item II, of the ROC income tax law states that a for-profit business can give to legal NPOs 10% of its net income before tax. (This law only applies to domestic enterprises) Article 17 of the income tax law, states that an individual can make a deductible donation of up to 20% of their annual gross income or NT 200 million.

2.6 State-civil Society Relations

This subdimension evaluates the characteristics of state-society relations by examining the autonomy, dialogue, cooperation and support between these two actors.

¹⁰³ Joyce Yen Fang.

¹⁰⁴ Joyce Yen Fang.

TABLE IV.2.9: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.6.1</u>	Autonomy of CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.2</u>	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.3</u>	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	<u>2</u>

2.6.1 Autonomy. This indicator examines the extent to which civil society can exist and function independently from the state, and whether any government oversight is reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests. Most of the assessment group felt that the state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but that CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.

A report on civil society in Taipei found that most CSOs think that the central government shows a great deal of respect for the positions of CSOs. Poor regulations, mutual mistrust and excess oversight were generally found at the local level rather than with the central government. CSOs generally have more autonomy when cooperating with the central government, although financial support from the government may also serve to reduce CSO autonomy.¹⁰⁵ Another study, which conducted in-depth interviews with six CSOs (working in the religious, social-education, labour, social-welfare and environmental fields) further explains this issue and also the reason why half of the assessment group found that there was some ‘reasonable oversight’ in regards to CSO autonomy in Taiwan. Generally speaking, CSOs participating in the study felt that they had a great deal of autonomy in running their operations, but in their effort to expand their operations it was sometimes necessary to accept projects that are funded by and in conjunction with the state. Most of these CSOs shared the experience of having some conflict or difficulties while operating joint projects with the state, almost to the point of limiting their autonomy. However, those CSOs whose funding is mostly from their members or public donations, stated that they are in a much better position to negotiate with the state when operating joint projects. SAG members stated that they also have had similar experiences and felt that occasional intervention by the state was unavoidable, but since joint projects with the state are still relatively few, the problem is still not very serious.

2.6.2 Dialogue. This indicator examines the extent to which the state engages in dialogue with civil society. In general, CSOs in Taiwan still lack faith in the state while the state still does not fully trust them around certain issues as cross-strait relations. However, there has been growing dialogue between the state and civil society in areas of mutual interest. A good example is the realization on the part of the state that because of Taiwan’s limited diplomacy vis a vis China,

¹⁰⁵ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang: 11.

CSOs can play a vital role in conducting ‘people’s diplomacy’ on behalf of Taiwan. Beginning in 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a regular “ODA coordination meeting” in order to utilize the resources and energy of Taiwan’s CSOs in development projects. In 1999, MOFA assembled a “Rescue Team for Macedonian Refugees”, in which CSOs involved in humanitarian relief were assisted in travelling to Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis. In 2000, the Taiwan Civil Union of Foreign Aid was created under the leadership of MOFA, in which 25 local CSOs agreed to hold regular meetings to exchange ideas and resources regarding international humanitarian projects. Domestically, the department of social affairs uses a similar mechanism for incorporating NGOs into natural disaster response plans. The National Youth Commission has had a regular system of dialogue with CSOs regarding youth related issues and has asked numerous CSOs to assist in NYC sponsored projects such as implementing campus job fairs, training courses on international affairs and local community participation. Even when the state and civil society find themselves with similar goals and objectives, they still have a divergence of opinion on how to achieve those objectives.¹⁰⁶ One example is that while the state supports grassroots projects of certain environmental groups, it is wary that some of these activities might conflict with some of its economic development plans, such as new factories or the construction of nuclear power plants. Thus, while CSOs have their own goals and policies, it is natural for the state to want to divert their activities to those more in line with their own goals and objectives. Another phenomenon limiting state – civil society dialogue is the fact that CSOs in Taiwan operate with a great deal of independence, causing some to try and avoid dialogue with the state altogether so as to prevent any limits to their autonomy. Several previous studies of CSOs in Taiwan found that mistrust and conflict exist between the state and CSOs, with the major grievances of CSOs in regards to the state being lack of access to information, a burdensome bureaucracy and too many restrictions on the depth to which CSOs are allowed to get involved in the affairs of the state.¹⁰⁷

The majority of the SAG felt that the state engages in dialogue with a broad range of CSOs, but only on an ad hoc basis, although as Taiwan’s civil society arena matures so will the extent and quality of state-civil society dialogue.

2.6.3 Cooperation / support. This indicator examines the range of CSOs that receive financial resources from the state in such forms as grants or contracts. While there has been no overall study on the amount of state resources received by CSOs, a study comparing the level of financial autonomy of CSOs in southern and northern Taiwan can serve as a useful guide. The study found that CSOs (both foundations and civil association) in Taipei (southern Taiwan) have more

¹⁰⁶ Min-Hsiu Chiang, Sheng-Fen Cheng, “the Social Capital and Its Development Strategy From the Experience of Interaction Between Government and Third Sector” in *Theory and Policy*, Vol.17, No.3, 2004: 47.

¹⁰⁷ Min-Hsiu Chiang, *Assessment of the theory and practice of state-NPO relations*, the study report of National Science Council in 2000, published 2001 July: 2.

financial independence from the state than CSOs elsewhere. In southern Taiwan the study found that among foundations, 80% operate using their own capital, while 32.9% of civic associations consistently rely on state funds to conduct their operations. It is important to note that, of the 3,014 foundations in Taiwan 86 received the majority of their endowment from state sources, although they are still technically independent foundations. In terms of civic association, the following table is derived from data collected from a survey of 246 CSOs (civic associations only) on the percentage of state resources in their overall revenue. It shows that most associations in Taiwan receive state resources, but that it is generally less than 20% of their overall revenue

TABLE IV.2.10: State resources in overall revenue of 246 civic associations

Percentage of State Resources in Overall Revenue	Percentage of Total
Less than 20 %	73.6%
20-40%	6.1%
40-60%	4.1%
60-80%	7.3%
Over 80%	4.9%

The assessment group felt that CSOs have generally received some degree of resources from the government, and pointed out that this has been a hot issue, as many are concerned that this may take autonomy away from CSOs. CSOs worry that the government may seek to influence their operations through its financial support. As a result of this, CSOs stress the need for the government to simply provide aid without any further involvement although some point out that should the government become solely a donor it lose interest in providing further financial assistance.¹⁰⁸

2.7 Private Sector-Civil Society Relations

There have been few research studies conducted on private sector-civil society relations in Taiwan, but the subject has been gaining some interest within academia as of late.¹⁰⁹ This subdimension mainly explores the degree of the private sector's attitude toward civil society, corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy.

¹⁰⁸ Min-Hsiu Chiang, Sheng-Fen Cheng: 48.

¹⁰⁹ Civicus, *Promoting Corporate Citizenship: Opportunities for Business and Civil Society Engagement* (Washington D.C.: CIVICUS, 1999); Christopher Yablonski, *Patterns of Corporate Philanthropy: Mandate for Reform* (Washington: D.C.: Capital Research Center, 2001).

TABLE IV.2.11: Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations

Ref #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.7.1</u>	Private sector attitude to Civil Society	<u>2</u>
<u>2.7.2</u>	Corporate social responsibility	<u>1</u>
<u>2.7.3</u>	Corporate philanthropy	<u>2</u>

2.7.1 Private sector attitude. Since the secondary information collected lacks direct evidence as to the private sector’s attitude towards civil society, the research mainly relied on the opinions of SAG members, who felt that the private sector’s attitude toward civil society was positive, but that their current involvement was somewhat limited. A good example, in which the private sector worked with civil society, was the creation of the Ba Fu union, made up of eight Taiwanese CSOs. The union worked together with Union Bank to help issue a special credit card in which a small percentage of purchases would be given to the union to be shared among its eight members, giving a chance for ordinary Taiwanese to help contribute to the community.¹¹⁰ The eight CSOs that make up the union come from all spectrums of civil society, and include a disabled persons group, children’s organization, a teen group, a battered women’s group, an organization for senior citizens, a CSO helping people with rare diseases, an aboriginal rights organization, a labour group and a CSO helping AIDS patients.

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility. According to a recent survey, conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, about two-thirds of CEOs in Taiwan (67.5%) said their companies have gradually complied with the international CSR practices or codes of conduct. The most common practices include sponsoring community activities (54.1%) and donating money or goods (44.1%). Almost half the CEOs interviewed said they have considered integrating their companies’ sustainability information into their financial annual report.¹¹¹ However, there have been numerous criticisms of this survey due to the fact that of the over two thousands corporations that were asked to participate in this survey, only 6.9% were inclined to do so. In general, the concept of corporate social responsibility has still not gained widespread popularity in Taiwan. This was reflected in the assessment of the SAG as most of its members felt that major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility.

2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy. This indicator describes the range of CSOs that receives support from the private sector. A 2004 Commonwealth magazine survey of 108 Taiwanese companies found that 90% made philanthropic contributions either through “charitable donations, grants or other gestures”.¹¹² Another survey conducted among Taiwan’s civic associations documented the

¹¹⁰ Eden Social Welfare Foundation, 2003 May 13th. <http://www.eden.org.tw/Services/ShowNews.asp?SerialNo=500>

¹¹¹ CSR in Taiwan, 2003 Taiwan CSR Survey, IDIC, 2 October 2004
<http://csr.idic.gov.tw/en/projects/files/2003TaiwanCSRSurvey.pdf>

¹¹² Pelchant, Marie Claude “Enterprising Asian NPOs: Social Entrepreneurship in Taiwan” A paper presented to the

actual amount of corporate donations as a percentage of their overall revenue. The results of the survey are shown in the following table, which shows that while most Taiwanese associations receive some resources from the private sector it is generally less than 20% of their total revenue.

TABLE IV.2.12: Corporate donations for civic associations

Corporate donations as a percentage of overall revenue	Percentage of total
Over 80%	2.8%
60-80%	3.3%
40-60%	6.9%
20-40%	13.8%
Less than 20%	69.9%


Conclusion

This dimension focuses on three different areas of civil society's external environment; government, business and the general public. It received a positive score of 2.2, reflecting the relatively enabling environment within which Taiwanese civil society operates. The analysis shows that the socio-economic environment is particularly conducive to the development of civil society in Taiwan. The rather positive scores for the political and legal subdimensions point towards a positive state environment, and a state that is willing to assist in civil society's development. These findings reflect the situation described in section III, whereby following the normalization of state-society relations the improvement in basic civil rights provided a major impetus for the growth of civil society. Relations with the private sector received the lowest score within the dimension and are a reflection of the fact that CSOs in Taiwan have yet to reach a level of maturity and influence in which private sector organizations feel comfortable entering into meaningful cooperation with civil society actors. On the other hand, there has also been a lack of interest by the private sector in the activities of CSOs, as is evident from the low score given to the corporate social responsibility indicator in this dimension. This lack of a culture of CSR is also a major obstacle to the development of private sector–civil society relations. Overall, the macro-environment is generally conducive to future civil society development, although relations with the private sector are clearly a weakness.

3. VALUES

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practiced by Taiwan's civil society. The score for the Values Dimension is 2.2, reflecting an overall positive value basis. Figure IV.3.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Values dimension. Only the low score for the transparency subdimension stands out as a problematic area.

FIGURE IV.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension



3.1 Democracy

This subdimension scored 2.5 points, and seeks to evaluate the level to which CSOs practice democracy, and to what extent they promote democracy within the civil society arena. There are three indicators within this subdimension, including democratic practices within CSOs (2.1 points), civil society actions to promote democracy, and transparency. The relative high score of this subdimension is related to Taiwan's special political situation and the history of its democratization process. Due to the political rivalry between Taipei and Beijing, the Taiwan government often flaunts Taiwan's democracy as a way to draw distinctions between itself and the government in Beijing. This has had the effect of strengthening CSOs that promote democracy and bolstering democratic values within civil society.

TABLE IV.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.1.1</u>	Democratic practices within CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>3.1.2</u>	Civil society actions to promote democracy	<u>3</u>

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs. Evaluating the democratic practices within CSOs focuses on three issues: the level of CSOs' internal democratization, the control CSO members have over decision-making, and whether CSO leaders are chosen through democratic means. The assessment group felt that over 50% of CSOs in Taiwan operate in a broadly democratic way. This perception is also reflected in studies that demonstrate that many non-profit organizations use participatory group-based methods in their policy-making processes so that members of the organization can freely share information and express their opinions.¹¹³

3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy. The assessment group stated that civil society has become an important force for the development of a democratic society, with civil society activities to promote democracy slowly gaining support among the general public. The group also stated that because CSOs generally organize grassroots activities, it can be expected that civil society will continue to gain public support of its democracy promotion activities.

The best example of civil society actions to promote democracy in Taiwan is the activities of the Taiwan Democracy Foundation (TDF). TDF is a basically a government organized non-governmental organization (GONGO) that was established with strong support from the current ruling party, the DPP. Domestically, TDF strives to play a positive role in consolidating Taiwan's democracy and fortifying its commitment to human rights. Internationally, the Foundation hopes to provide a strong link to global networks, by joining forces with related organizations from around the world. In 2005, TDF joined up with four other democracy and human rights CSOs in Asia, the Alliance for Reform and Democracy in Asia, Alternative ASEAN, Asia Forum Democracy and the Initiative for International Dialogue, in order to organize the World Forum for Democratization in Asia (WFDA). The forum hopes to help further strengthen Taiwan's democracy by learning about democratization experiences from other countries around the world as well as serve a mechanism to promote democracy in other parts of Asia.

3.2. Transparency

This subdimension looks at the internal corruption and financial transparency of CSOs and CSOs' efforts and activities to promote transparency within society at large. This subdimension's score of 1.3 is rather weak compared with other areas within the values dimension.

¹¹³ Li-Jun Zhang, *The Appliance of Team Management on NPO- example from social welfare institution*, the dissertation of Institute of Public Administrative in National Chengchi University: 2002.

TABLE IV.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.2.1</u>	Corruption within civil society	<u>2</u>
<u>3.2.2</u>	Financial transparency of CSOs	<u>1</u>
<u>3.2.3</u>	Civil Society actions to promote transparency	<u>1</u>

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society. Most of the assessment group felt that corruption could be occasionally found within civil society. The group was mostly in agreement on the type of corruption within civil society, with misappropriation of funds and embezzlement being the most common forms. The group also noted that there is the occasional case of someone setting up a false CSO for political purposes of personal gain. When looking at the environment in which CSOs operate in Taiwan it is easy to see why there is the possibility for the occasional case of corruption within the civil society arena. First, because CSOs receive such large tax breaks, it could be tempting and easy for private enterprises to use the guise of an NPO to avoid taxation. Second, many governmental foundations have taken on the CSO form and sometimes act as non-partisan public opinion institutions. Also, it is not uncommon to find a charitable foundation that has become the tool of a political party or politician. For example, politicians will sometimes use their names to set up a CSO in order to accumulate their political resources, and misuse donated money for their own purposes.¹¹⁴ The following are recent incidents of documented corruption within civil society:

1. 2005/01: Taipei City Councilman Mike Wong accused of misappropriation of NTD 30 million of funds from the social welfare foundation;
2. 2004/12: Formal legislator Hsien-chou Huang accused of misappropriation of NTD 5 million of funds from the Hi-tech Development Foundation and
3. 2004/11: Formal mayor of Nantou County Peng Pai-hsien accused of misappropriation of funds from the Nantou County Construction and Development Foundation.

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs. What percentage of CSOs open their financial information to the public? A majority of the SAG felt that 30-50% of Taiwanese CSOs open all of their financial information to the public. This shows that, in general, many of Taiwan's CSOs are regarded as lacking basic procedures of transparency and accountability, although those CSOs whose revenue comes from public donations tend to be more open than those that receive money from business or private enterprise.¹¹⁵ Although Taiwanese CSOs developed out of secretive

¹¹⁴ Ta-tung Wei, *A Brief Research on the Job Creation cooperated by NGO and Government*, The dissertation of the Graduate School of Labour Studies, 2003.

¹¹⁵ Chung-Yuan Hsu, "Uprising the responsibility and Transparency of Non-profit Organization in Taiwan- Application of Delphi Method" in *Sun Yat-Sen Management Review*, Vol.9-4, 2001, Winter: 540-566.

familial and clan based organizations, and making financial records public is generally not part of their culture, it is necessary for Taiwanese CSOs to improve their transparency polices as this is a necessary step in gaining further public trust.

3.2.3 CS actions to promote transparency. Most of the SAG thought that only a few civil society activities work to promote transparency, with the visibility of these activities low and not regarded as a serious issue by civil society or the general public. A good way to observe the extent of civil society actions to promote transparency is to look at the activities of various watchdog groups that seek to make government and business sector more open to the public.

Although the concept of transparency is still relatively new within Taiwanese civil society, there are a handful of CSOs that have been moderately successful in organizing transparency related activities within all areas of society. In October 2001, the Taiwan Health Reform Foundation (THRF) was established, whose main goal is to create a more transparent medical system based on humanitarian principles that will strive to improve the quality of medical service and level of patient's rights. The foundation hopes to gradually become a major force for reform by opening up information on doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies to the public in order to give them a better understanding of medial issues.¹¹⁶ Another CSO, the Taiwan Transparency Organization (TTO), has adopted a five pronged strategy for improving the level of transparency in Taiwan; 1) increasing public awareness, 2) establishing an anti-corruption alliance, 3) developing anti-corruption tools, 4) setting up national transparency standards and 5) monitoring corruption activities. In the future, TTO plans to form alliances with other international anti-corruption organizations, and through their local support in Taiwan, help Taiwan to participate in the global anti-corruption movement, while also continuing their work within Taiwan.¹¹⁷ These types of activities indicate that while transparency is a new concept within Taiwan's civil society, and organizations seeking to promote transparency are relatively new and immature, there is a strong trend for future development in this area.

3.3 Tolerance

This subdimension examines the balance between tolerance and non-tolerance within civil society and the extent to which civil society is a driving force for the promotion of tolerance within society.

¹¹⁶ Taiwan Health Reform Foundation. <http://www.thrf.org.tw/>

¹¹⁷ Transparency International Taiwan. <http://ti-taiwan.org/ch.files/index-1.htm>

TABLE IV.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.3.1</u>	Tolerance within the civil society arena	<u>3</u>
<u>3.3.2</u>	Civil society activities to promote tolerance	<u>2</u>

3.3.1 Tolerance within the CS arena. The SAG assessed that Taiwan’s civil society is an open arena, in which all points of views can be expressed freely, although there are some non-tolerant forces within civil society.

The few instances of intolerance within Taiwanese civil society occur for two reasons. The first is along ethnic or ideological lines, such as Taiwanese-Mainlander or Independence-Unification types of conflict. This type of intolerance is generally born out of long standing confrontations rather than outright intolerance. The second type of intolerance occurs during the early stages of the development of certain CSOs. A good example is the early women’s movement in the 1980s, where there were numerous setbacks due to the inability of various actors to show tolerance towards the ideas and views of others. As the movement matured, these CSOs began to learn how to compromise and negotiate with each other in order to gain more exposure and influence for their cause.

3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance. Within Taiwan, civil society actions to promote tolerance are mostly done through small-scale educational and academic events. One example is the “Peace Course Project” organized by Peacetime, the Pearls S. Buck Foundation, the Dharma Drum Mountain Fund and the Taipei City Teacher Association to help educate students on the importance of diversity and tolerance. Another example was the Multi-culture Studies Program organized by Academia Sinica in 2001 in cooperation with a number of universities throughout Taiwan to help promote the inclusion of more diversity and tolerance courses in the general education programs at Taiwanese colleges and universities.

There are some CSOs in Taiwan dedicated to working on this issue. For example, one of the objectives of the Human Rights Education Foundation, established in January 1994, has been to increase public awareness on human rights issues, and help educate Taiwanese citizens about values like equality and tolerance in order to help build a more peaceful and tolerant society.¹¹⁸ While these programs have been successful at a local level, they are still small-scale and in the early stages of development, but they do show a promising trend towards greater civil society involvement in this issue.

¹¹⁸ Human Right Education Foundation.<http://www.href.org.tw/intro/index-start.html>.

Although there was considerable debate within the group when scoring this indicator, the SAG felt that while there are civil society actions to promote tolerance, they have failed to garner wide public support. The main reasons cited for this limited amount of public support have to do with the small scale nature of most civil society actions to promote tolerance. Large-scale actions are usually undertaken by one of the major political parties and are often about ethnic issues. These types of actions, because of their political nature are generally not helpful in promoting tolerance throughout society.

3.4 Non-violence

Although an ideal civil society should play an important role in condemning violence, solving conflicts and establishing peace, it is sometimes the case that a few CSOs use violence to pursue their goals. This subdimension examines the existence of violent forces within civil society and to what extent civil society is a driving force for promoting non-violence within society.

TABLE IV.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.4.1</u>	Non-violence within the CS arena	<u>3</u>
<u>3.4.2</u>	CS actions to promote non-violence	<u>3</u>

3.4.1 Non-violence within the CS arena. This indicator analyses instances of violence used by civil society actors to pursue their goals. In general, the methods most often used by civil society in Taiwan for dealing with social and other issues is arranging meetings with government officials, holding discussion groups or press conferences, petitions, sit-ins, marches, voter registrations drives, lawsuits and strikes.¹¹⁹ However, there are the occasional violent incidents within civil society, but they are rare and generally condemned. A recent example is the protests that occurred following the 2004 presidential election in which there were a few small-scale cases where people destroyed public property. These violent acts were given extensive coverage in the media and denounced in numerous op-ed pieces in local newspapers.

Thus, the assessment group considered that there has been a common consensus among Taiwan's civil society actors to achieve their goals through non-violent means, and that civil society actors who use violence are rare and strongly condemned by civil society as a whole.

3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence and peace. To what extent does Taiwan's civil society act to promote non-violence? Is civil society involved on issues related to violence against women and child abuse? Most of the SAG felt that civil society is a driving force in promoting a

¹¹⁹ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang: 12-13.

non-violent society in Taiwan. One of the most prominent examples is the Taiwan Coalition Against Domestic and Social Violence. Composed of eleven CSOs and established in 2004, the coalition seeks to promote three major government policies: the Harassment Prevention Law, a revised Sex Offender Act and revised Family Violence Protection Law. With support from over 140 legislators, these bills are currently under legislative review and are expected to become laws in the future.

3.5 Gender Equity

This subdimension seeks to assess the practice of gender equity within CSOs and the activities that civil society uses to promote gender equity. This subdimension scored 2 points, showing that gender equity practices within Taiwan's civil society are flourishing.

TABLE IV.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equality

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.5.1</u>	Gender equity within the CS arena	<u>2</u>
<u>3.5.2</u>	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>3.5.3</u>	CS actions to promote gender equity	<u>2</u>

3.5.1 Gender equity within the CS arena. Before talking about gender issues within civil society, it is important to first give an overview of gender inequality in the workplace in Taiwan. According to a survey, female labourers in Taiwan sometimes experienced sexual discrimination when looking for a job. In general, there are fewer females in the workforce than males and they tend to receive less pay than their male counterparts. In addition, enterprises in Taiwan offer less on-the-job training and promotion opportunities to female employees, and offer minimal benefits for female employees wishing to get married and have children.¹²⁰ This type of gender inequality has been frequently denounced by numerous CSOs, especially the CSO Alliance, led by the Awakening Foundation, which began their campaign in the early 1990s. Through their efforts the Alliance helped create and pass into Law the Gender Equality in Employment act.

Regarding the position of women in civil society, the SAG felt that women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions. There was an interesting debate within the group, between two female directors of influential Taiwanese CSOS and a group of male directors, regarding this issue. The two female directors argued that, the practices mentioned above, regarding gender equality in the workplace in Taiwan, was also reflective of CSOs. The male directors felt that the civil society arena was more equitable than workplaces within the business sector and the government, and the fact that these two female directors were in charge of two of the most

¹²⁰ Hsiu-Yun Yu, *A Critique on Female Worker's Protection Legislation from the Perspective of Gender Equality*, the dissertation of the Institute for Labour Research in National Chengchi University, 2003.

influential Taiwanese CSOs, the Asia Foundation in Taiwan and the YWCA, was a testament to this fact.

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs. This indicator seeks to evaluate the level of gender equity practices within CSOs. Gender equality in Taiwanese society at large is far from being achieved. Since 1991, the Chinese Human Rights Association has conducted a survey on the state of women's rights in Taiwan, and found that women's rights have consistently been at sub-par levels. Although women's rights have shown improvement, they are still far from achieving the goal of full gender equality.¹²¹ Among the seven indicators in the survey, only three, social participation (78.2 points), right to healthcare (64.8 points), and rights to education (70.0 points) achieved passing scores. The other four indicators, right to political participation (58 points), right to marriage and family (52.4 points), right to personal safety (56.0 points) and right to work (50.2 points), all failed to achieve the passing scores.¹²² In spite of the increasing opportunities for females to participate in society in recent years, there is still a long way to go before Taiwan can achieve full gender equality.

Fifty percent of the SAG thought that a minority of CSOs in Taiwan operate in a gender equitable way, 20% thought that it was a small majority and another 30% stated that over 65% of CSOs in Taiwan operate with full gender equality.

3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity. Women's movements around Taiwan bloomed following the end of Marshal Law in 1987, and since then women have actively participated in the political process with the number of female MPs and cabinet members steadily increasing.¹²³ That said, gender issues often take a backseat to other issues such as constitutional reform, national identity, national defence, diplomacy, economic development, and social welfare.

There are a number of women's CSOs in Taiwan that work to promote the protection of women's rights, and have been building bridges with other similar organizations abroad. Organizations, such as New Women's Knowledge, focuses on female self-awareness, the Feminist Union tackles issues such as environmental protection, improving parent child relationships and redefining traditional female roles, while other groups, like the Self-awareness Association, focuses on creating a new set of feminine values in Taiwan. These groups serve as examples of the growing force of female CSOs within Taiwan's civil society arena, and, while still limited, they constitute a

¹²¹ To most of the developed and industrial countries, 60 point means the basic protection for women's right.

¹²² Pan, Shu-Man, A Report on Women's human right 2004, sponsored by Chinese Association for Human Rights. <http://www.cahr.org.tw/pindex01.asp>

¹²³ The agendas and movements that women's groups have been advocating in recent years include child-sex, women's work rights, anti-pornography, anti-tax combined system for married couples, anti-beauty contest, gender equity education, female political rights, monitoring legitimating of Youth Welfare Law, revising the chapter of Family Law in Civil Law, anti- sexual harassment etc.

solid base for future growth of women's CSOs.

The assessment group found that there are many civil society actions to promote gender equality but that these actions are still lacking in public support and recognition. The group cited an immature civil society arena and traditional ideas about gender relations inherent in Chinese culture that have yet to be fully addressed as the main reasons for the lack of public support on this issue.

3.6 Poverty Eradication

This subdimension seeks to examine to what level civil society actors support issues and policies that work towards poverty eradication. Thus, it is important for civil society to adopt an all-encompassing view when tackling this issue. This subdimension gained a total score of 2 points, showing that civil society actions in Taiwan to promote poverty eradication have been rather successful.

TABLE IV.3.6: Indicator assessing poverty eradication

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	CS actions to eradicate poverty	2

3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty. To what degree does Taiwanese civil society take actions to eradicate poverty? The Ministry of Interior has estimated that in 2003 there were 137 national level social welfare foundations with combined assets of NTD 21.7 billion, of which 11.6 billion was used to help eradicate poverty by giving grants and subsidies to low income children, youth, women, seniors, disabled people and immigrants. In a recent conference on child poverty held by the Taiwan Family Foundation, a group of CSOs called on the government to pay more attention to the growing population of poor children in Taiwan.¹²⁴ The foundation found that while the number of children in Taiwan has decreased from 3.81 million in 1991 to 3.52 million in 1998, the number of children slipping into poverty has increased. There are a number of CSOs devoted to the cause of poverty eradication, such as the Troubled Household Association and the Chinese Family Help association, whose main goal is to eradicate poverty and increase the living standard of people living on farms by promoting basic education and the improvement of medical care in poor counties and villages.¹²⁵ The largest poverty eradication action in 2004 was a joint nationwide project conducted by the Ministry of Interior, Eden Social Welfare Foundation, World Vision and the Taiwan Fund for Children and Families. The main focus of the project was to reach out to poor households that were vulnerable to natural disasters such as typhoons, floods and earthquakes, or those in urgent need of financial assistance. This project, focused on long-term

¹²⁴ United Daily News □ http://mag.udn.com/mag/life/storypage.jsp?f_ART_ID=8479

¹²⁵ <http://www.zigen.org/Taiwan/pam.html>

development and provided material aid such as financial assistance, low interest loans and assistance for small businesses.

3.7 Environmental Sustainability

This subdimension evaluates how actively civil society promotes environmental protection and sustainability. It received a score of 2, showing that this is another strong area within Taiwan's civil society arena.

TABLE IV.3.7: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	CS actions to sustain the environment	<u>2</u>

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment. In an effort to respond to the growing global concern over the state of the environment, in 1998, Taiwan drafted a comprehensive sustainability plan, which was finalized in April 2004 and provides strategies and recommendations for adopting a more environmentally friendly growth plan for the country.¹²⁶ In addition, after participating in the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, Taiwan stepped up its promotion of environmental protection policies and also began to provide more support to environmental CSOs in Taiwan, such as the Green Citizens Union and the Wilderness Society. The government also adopted bottom-up strategies to encourage the public to participate in more environmentally friendly actions.¹²⁷ The Taiwan Environmental Action Net (TEAN) is a CSO that actively lobbies the government and tries to motivate the general public to pay more attention to the development of environmentally sustainable activities and works to encourage Taiwan's non-government organizations to participate in these actions.¹²⁸ From this, it is apparent that while greater public support is still needed, Taiwan's civil society has the potential to be a driving force in the promotion of environmental actions and policies. The assessment group found that there are civil society actions to promote environmental sustainability but they often lack public support, mostly due to the fact that Taiwan's civil society arena is still in a growth stage and has yet to make substantial inroads into Taiwanese society.

Conclusion

The values dimension, with an overall score of 2.2, is one of Taiwan's stronger dimensions within the civil society diamond. This dimension covers seven subdimensions, including democracy,

¹²⁶ Teh-Chang Lin, *Civil Society, Democracy and Sustainable Development: The Study on the Strategies of NGO Development in Taiwan* (Taipei: Taiwan Democracy Foundation, 2004 Oct): 169-170.

¹²⁷ Teh-Chang Lin, *Civil Society, Democracy and Sustainable Development: The Study on the Strategies of NGO Development in Taiwan* (Taipei: Taiwan Democracy Foundation, 2004 Oct): 178-179.

¹²⁸ Taiwan Environmental Action Network, *Annual Report 2002-2003*.
http://tean.formosa.org/pub/workreport/02-03_report.pdf

transparency, tolerance, non-violence, gender equity, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. The findings highlight the relatively significant extent to which Taiwanese civil society practices and promotes positive values.

The positive assessments for civil society's activities, regarding democracy and environmental sustainability, scoring 2.5 and 2.0 respectively, have a lot to do with the historical conditions of the democratization process in Taiwan. While Taiwan was still under Martial Law, the environmental and democracy movements joined together in a broad coalition against the one party rule of the KMT. After Taiwan became a democracy, these groups were able to build on the energy of the democracy movement and form various CSOs throughout Taiwan. The DPP, Taiwan's first opposition party, was formed with the support of these various groups and after becoming the ruling party in 2000 has further supported civil society activities, especially in the areas of environmental protection and democracy. Tolerance and non-violence, scoring 2.5 and 3 respectively, received the highest scores for this dimension, indicating that Taiwanese civil society has grown into a democratic, diverse and peaceful arena.


Transparency, scoring 1.3, was the weakest subdimension within the values dimension. This low score is largely a result of the historical development of Taiwan's CSOs, and nascent civil society arena that has only recently begun to value the concept of transparency. Historically, Taiwan's CSOs evolved from family, clan based, and religious organizations (local temples) that were very insular and not inclined to open up their activities and finances to non-members. The concept of transparency has only become an important part of Taiwan's civil society since Taiwan became a democracy and mature mechanisms and organizations that promote and advocate transparency do not yet exist.

Within the values dimension, the factor leading to both its strengths and weaknesses is history. In terms of its strengths, historically, Taiwanese CSOs were the driving force in the struggle for democracy and human rights in Taiwan, which has led to these values being at the core of Taiwan's modern civil society. Cultural history on the other hand, the secretive and closed nature of early Chinese CSOs, can be said as one of the main factors leading to its weakest value, transparency. This lack of a 'culture of transparency' has led to a sense of exclusiveness amongst some CSOs and an aversion to opening up to new people or ideas, and may be one of the major reasons for the low score of the structure dimension. Exclusiveness prevents the whole of society from participating in civil society activities, which severely limits CSO membership, and support for CSO campaigns.

4. IMPACT

The final dimension in this assessment gauges the impact of civil society on Taiwanese governance and society. This dimension is separated into five subdimensions with 16 indicators, which mainly discuss the success and failure of CSOs in achieving their stated goals. The overall score of this dimension is 2.2, showing that, while the influence of civil society in Taiwan is strong, there are still some factors limiting its broader impact, such as a lack of understanding of CSOs by the government and general public and a media which is largely indifferent towards the activities of civil society.

FIGURE IV.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension



4.1 Influencing Public Policy

This subdimension focuses on three specific issues to evaluate civil society's influence on public policy: national budgeting process, human rights policy and social policy. A recent survey found that 30% of Taiwanese CSOs have actually participated in the government's policymaking process, indicating that civil society has become somewhat active in this area. This subdimension received a score of 2.3.

TABLE IV.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing public policy

Indicator #	Indicators	Score
<u>4.1.1</u>	Human rights impact	<u>3</u>
<u>4.1.2</u>	Social policy impact	<u>2</u>
<u>4.1.3</u>	Impact on national budgeting process	<u>2</u>

4.1.1 Civil Society's Impact on Human Rights Policy & Practice. In general, the assessment group felt that the influence of civil society in Taiwan on human rights has been very significant. Most of the assessment group felt that civil society in Taiwan has played an important role in this area with its impact widely documented.

With Taiwan's democratization process and rapid economic growth, NGOs, such as the Human Rights Foundation and the Taiwan Association for the Development of Human Rights (TADHR), among many others, have become more active in the promotion of human rights.¹²⁹ TADHR, for example, investigates cases in which there is a suspected violation of human rights and monitors the actions of the state and other powerful forces in regards to their human rights practices. The Association also promotes human rights education and helps train workers on issues related to human rights. One of TADHR's most important accomplishments was its role in the establishment of the National Human Rights Council and the Human Rights Advocacy Union in 1999.¹³⁰ After years of efforts by the National Human Rights Council, which is composed of a variety of representatives in Taiwan, the concept of the National Human Rights Commission was accepted by the government and voted for by the Executive Yuan in 2000.

4.1.2 Civil Society's Impact on Social Policy. The majority of the assessment group found that Taiwanese civil society plays an important role on influencing social policy, but because Taiwan's CSOs are still in the development stage, their impact is sometimes limited. A recent study by three social NGOs in Taiwan found that civil society has been especially strong in influencing policy and directing government attention on air pollution standards, educational reform and gender equality.¹³¹ For example, a lobbying group, led by the Awakening Foundation, Warm Life Foundation for Women-Taipei and the Taipei Bar Association, have worked on promoting the revised Family Law and the Gender Equality in Employment Law since 1990. Through their efforts, both of these laws were enacted by the legislature in 2001 and 2002. In addition, under pressure from many environmental protection groups, such as Green Party Taiwan, Taiwan Wetland Association, Foundation of Ocean Taiwan and National Taiwan Ocean University, The Marine Pollution Control Act (MPCA) was passed and enacted in 2000. Since then, the Taiwan Association of Marine Pollution Control was created as a state-sponsored CSO to oversee the enforcement of this law. Another good example is that when the National Assembly froze the minimum educational budget of 15%, which was secured by the Constitution in 1997, the Humanistic Education Foundation, National Teachers Association R.O.C., National Parents Association, the Educational Reform Foundation and other related CSOs started lobbied the legislature in an attempt to protect the education budget. In the end of 2000, the Educational

¹²⁹ Teh-Chang Lin, *Civil Society, Democracy and Sustainable Development: The Study on the Strategies of NGO Development in Taiwan* (Taipei: Taiwan Democracy Foundation, 2004 Oct): 118.

¹³⁰ <http://www.tahr.org.tw/index.php/categories/tw/>

¹³¹ Teh-Chang Lin, *Civil Society, Democracy and Sustainable Development: The Study on the Strategies of NGO Development in Taiwan* (Taipei: Taiwan Democracy Foundation, 2004 Oct): 118.

Budget Allocation and Management Act passed due to the extensive lobbying efforts of the above-mentioned CSOs.

4.1.3 Civil Society's Impact on the National Budgeting Process. One of the most important civil society activities to influence the national budgeting process was the Citizens Conference for tax reform, which was jointly organized by four community colleges, the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan. The event was co-sponsored by TDF, and the National Association for Promotion of Community University (NAPCU). The Citizens Conference was started by NAPCU in response to proposed tax reforms by the Executive Yuan and is meant to provide a platform in which Taiwanese citizens can voice their concerns on national finance and budget issues. Since its inception it has become a formal forum in which the finance ministry can have an open dialogue with Taiwanese society.

The assessment group, after considerable debate, felt that in influencing the national budgeting process procedures, civil society actions are many, but its impact is limited. The main reason for the difference of opinion on this indicator had to do with the relatively new phenomenon of CSOs acting to influence the national budgeting process. Although the Citizens Conference for Tax Reform has been a very successful example of civil society actions in this area, other groups are still few and far between, so it was difficult for the SAG to decide how much of an impact civil society actually has in this area.

4.2 Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable

This subdimension emphasizes the role that civil society plays in monitoring the activities of policy makers within the government and private corporations to insure that they fulfil their obligations to society and are held accountable for their actions that bring harm to people or the natural environment. With a score of 2, it is obvious that while CSOs have made progress in this area there is still much room for improvement.

TABLE IV.4.2: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable

Indicator #	Indicators	Score
<u>4.2.1</u>	Holding the state accountable	<u>2</u>
<u>4.2.2</u>	Holding private corporations accountable	<u>2</u>

4.2.1 Holding state accountable. This indicator seeks to evaluate how successful civil society has been in monitoring the state and holding it accountable for its actions. A recent survey of advocacy CSOs in Taiwan found that over 50% have participated in some type of governmental monitoring activity. This participation is mainly via an advisory role, offering advice, monitoring

policy implementations and proposing policy.¹³² One of the best examples is the Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF). Since 1997, it has promoted and created numerous monitoring activities and served as a watchdog for anti-corruption, anti-interference and anti-carelessness in government. It also created its own evaluation system for the police, the courts and the legal system. This CSO run monitoring mechanism has been expanding every year. Currently, the Taiwan Law Society, TAHR, Taiwan Bar Association and the Taipei Bar Association are all involved in operating this monitoring system. Although JRFs direct impact on social policy is still infrequent, the government has invited it as a consultant on various issues such as reform of judicial system, the selection of judges and evaluating the work of the Constitutional Yuan.

With broad consensus, the assessment group felt that civil society is very active in this area but its influence is still limited and that a greater effort was needed by CSOs to increase their presence in monitoring the actions of the state. .

4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable. Most data on civil society activities in holding private corporations accountable in Taiwan comes from the perspective of enterprises and thus may be biased. Currently, there are very few CSOs in Taiwan that are working in this area, although the Consumers' Foundation Chinese Taipei (CFCT) serves as one outstanding example of civil society impact in this area. Since its inception in 1979, CFCT has grown into one of the largest CSOs in Taiwan and has worked to protect the rights of the consumer, often going up against some of Taiwan's largest corporations. Within the past year CFCT has held food corporations accountable for excessively high levels of chemicals in their processed foods, and even lobbied the American Institute in Taiwan (the de-facto US Embassy) to provide better service and treatment to its visa applicants. Environmental protection groups have also been active in supervising the operations of corporations. The Formosa Plastic Group's (FPG's) mercury waste case, of 2000, in which FPG was found to be harming Cambodian farmers by illegally dumping mercury into the ground is one of the best-known examples. Green Formosa Front, Green Consumers Foundation, Environmental Quality Protection Group, Taiwan Environmental Protection Union and other groups worked both in Taiwan and Cambodia, making the public aware of the dumping, holding public protests and helping to bring Formosa Plastic Corporation to court. This action led to a turning point in Taiwan's hazardous waste management policy. In 2001, under the supervision of a special team including the above-mentioned CSOs, FPG safely processed their waste with the new equipment, meeting the new standards set out by Taiwan's Environmental Protection Bureau.

¹³² Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lo-bai Wei, Hsin-chi, Kuan, Tai-lok Lui, Chien-min Chan, Qiu, Haixiong, Guozhen Yang, and Shunli Huang: 13-14.

The assessment group felt that civil society actions to hold corporations accountable are numerous, but still have limited influence. The reasons cited for the generally low score for this section was due to the fact that in Taiwan there are still only a few CSOs working in this area, although these few have had a discernable impact on Taiwanese society.

4.3 Responding to Social Interests

This subdimension analyzes the extent to which civil society acts as a representative of social interests, looking at its efficiency in responding to social needs and the level of trust it has among the public. With an overall score of 2.5, it can be seen that civil society in Taiwan has been doing well in this area.

TABLE IV.4.3: Indicators assessing responding to social interests

Ref #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	<u>3</u>
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	<u>2</u>

4.3.1 Responsiveness. The assessment group held very positive views on the responsiveness of CSOs to issues of concern within society, with a majority of the group agreeing that CSOs' responsiveness to social issues was outstanding with its impact widely felt. For example, the Taiwan Home Keepers Union (THKU), responding to public demands for a cleaner environment, began a campaign in 1989 to encourage people to carry their own shopping bags, to use recycled paper and set 1989 as the year of "Reducing Trash" to pressure the government to start recycling resources. TKHU also worked with other groups to form the Eco-protection Alliance and the Anti-nuclear Action Alliance in an effort to increase concern over pollution and nuclear power in Taiwan¹³³ Another example of civil society's responsiveness to societal needs was the 'shell-less snail' movement of the early 1990s where civil society pressured the government to solve the problem of high housing and rent prices. With over 80% of the public supporting this campaign, the government finally decided to enact relevant policies, such as increasing government-led housing projects, increasing home loans, limiting the ability of insurance companies to buy and sell real estate and turning some planned golf courses in Taipei County into residential areas. In terms of areas of society where civil society has not taken up priority social concerns, the group identified three pressing yet underrepresented issues: labour issues, foreign workers and foreign brides. Although there are CSOs in Taiwan that work with labour as well as a few labour unions, the capitalist nature of Taiwan's society and Chinese cultural values towards work has made it difficult to encourage workers to organize and has led to a lack of CSO activity in this area.

¹³³ Dai-rong Yang, NPO Management- A Case Study of Homemaker's Union and Foundation, the dissertation of the Institute of Home Economics Education in National Taiwan Normal University, 1998.

4.3.2 Public Trust. The majority of the assessment group thought that 51% to 75% of the general public trust civil social actors, although according to a study CSOs lose this trust if they are not open or transparent.¹³⁴ The 1994 WVS data indicates that around 50% of the population felt they could trust CSOs, and as civil society has grown exponentially over the past decade, this figure is likely to have risen. One major factor influencing the level of trust that the public has for civil society is the fact that it is still a relatively new phenomenon and often is not understood by the general public.

4.4 Empowering Citizens

Civil society can empower citizens in a number of different ways. The overall score for this subdimension is 2.3, one of the stronger within this dimension, serves as one of the stronger areas within Taiwan's civil society arena.

TABLE IV.4.4: Indicators assessing empowering citizens

Ref #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	<u>2</u>
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action	<u>2</u>
4.4.3	Empowering marginalized people	<u>2</u>
4.4.4	Empowering women	<u>3</u>
4.4.5	Building social capital	<u>3</u>
4.4.6	Supporting/creating livelihoods	<u>2</u>

4.4.1 Informing/ educating citizens. The assessment group thought that civil society actions to inform and educate citizens are numerous, but their influence is limited. The SAG provided two reasons for civil society's limitations in this area. The first is due to the still immature nature of Taiwanese CSOs. They felt that although there has been steady progress in civil society development over the past few decades, CSOs were still in the process of expanding their influence within society. The second reason has to do with Taiwan's long history of one party rule and its experience under Martial Law, with a strong all-encompassing state. Although today Taiwan is a democracy, with free access to all kinds of information, the public is still used to having a strong state as its source of education and information and it has only been within the past decade that civil society has been able to break into the state's monopoly on the dissemination of information.

¹³⁴ Chung-Hwa Ku, "Issue of Publicness of Non-Profit Organization: Theory and Empirical Study" in *Taiwanese Sociology* (SINICA Publishing, 2000 July), Vol.4: 145-189.

In terms of civil society successes in this area, a good example is the Himalaya Foundation's attempt to combine resources from various public social groups to create a multi-subject awareness campaign.¹³⁵ CSOs have also been successful in educating the public on women's issues through their public campaigns to promote fair public policy, such as the 'equal work for equal pay' bill that has been presented to the legislature.¹³⁶ The many community colleges throughout Taiwan, run almost entirely by civil society actors, also serve as a venue for CSOs to educate the public on a variety of social issues, helping the public to better understand key values, such as democracy and human rights.¹³⁷

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action. Following the United States' invasion of Iraq, 19 Taiwanese NGOs came together to create a plan called "Love from Taiwan" in which local Taiwanese CSOs were given a venue in which they could come together to offer humanitarian assistance and offer advice or opinions about the situation in the region. Another example of building capacity for collective action was the coming together of the House Keepers Union and other women's groups to form the Union of Women Voters, the Union of Females from North to South and the Union of Females of the Nation to encourage greater collective action on the fight for women's rights in Taiwan.

A majority of the SAG group felt that there were many civil society actions to build capacity for collective action, but their influence is limited. Those in the group who felt that the influence of civil society was limited in this area thought that the civil society arena in Taiwan was still maturing and until CSOs become more institutionalized it would be hard to expand their ability to build capacity for collective action.

4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people. Most of the assessment group felt that civil society's impact in this area was strong, but that there were still some underrepresented social groups. However, there was considerable debate before settling on this score. The SAG members, who belong to CSOs that work with marginalized people, felt that civil society in Taiwan could do more in this area, while those that worked in other areas thought that CSOs have so far done a good job empowering marginalized people. The SAG members who felt that civil society could do more in this area pointed to aboriginals, foreign workers and foreign brides as marginalized social groups that need to be paid more attention to by civil society.

¹³⁵ Hwe-lin Tsou, *The Knowledge Management Applied on NGO- A Case Study on Himalaya Foundation*, the dissertation of the Graduate School of Public Administrative in National Chengchi University: 123-124. Himalaya Foundation: <http://www.himalaya.org.tw/index.asp>

¹³⁶ Yinglan Yeh, *How the women right groups challenge the state and market- a lesson from Awakening Foundation promoting Gender Equality Labour Law*, the dissertation of the Institute of Sociology in National Chengchi University, 2002.

¹³⁷ Min-Hsiu Chiang edited, *The Management of Non-profit Organization* (Taipei: Best-wise Publishing, 2002): 376.

There are numerous examples of CSOs in Taiwan helping to empower marginalized people. Light of Friendship AIDS Control Association, the first CSO to concentrate on AIDS prevention, was founded in 1992, to help educate the public about HIV/AIDS. A similar organization, an AIDS halfway house in Taiwan, was founded in 1993 to provide humanistic care to Taiwan's AIDS patients and their families. Other CSOs working in the area include, Persons with HIV/AIDS Rights Advocacy Association, the Garden of Hope Foundation, YWCA, Women Federation for World Peace and Taiwan Nurses Association. Another example of CSOs helping to empower marginalized groups is the work of the League of Welfare Organization for Disabled ROC, whose main goal is to protect the rights and welfare of disabled persons and lobby the legislature to pass laws enshrining these rights.

4.4.4 Empowering women. There has been a rapid growth in the number of women's groups in Taiwan over the last few years, such as CSOs providing marriage counselling, women's safety, assisting victims of abuse reclaim their lives and helping women with issues such as, self-growth, workplace issues, family issues and gender equity.¹³⁸ All of these organizations have helped women in Taiwan gain a new found sense of empowerment.

The assessment group thus assessed that civil society has played an important role in empowering women with numerous successful cases to be found.

4.4.5 Building social capital. According to studies, there are three indicators for measuring social capital: trust, norms and social networks. Through the building norms and social networks, trust can be increased, thereby increasing social capital. In solving problems among different groups mutual trust is an important component and therefore an important part in building social capital.¹³⁹ In general, CSO members are keener to trust other fellow citizens, even though this difference is not remarkable (Results for Chi-Square very moderate). See table below.

¹³⁸ Zhi-yuan Zhang, The role and function NPO plays- experience from Taiwan, the dissertation of the Institute of Non-Profit Organization Management of Nanhua University, 2003:79-80.

¹³⁹ Min-Hsiu Chiang, Sheng-Fen Cheng, "the Social Capital and Its Development Strategy From the Experience of Interaction Between Government and Third Sector" in Theory and Policy, Vol.17, No.3, 2004: 37-58.

TABLE IV.4.5: Trust among CSO and non CSO members

CSO Membership		Most people can be trusted	Need to be very careful	Total
Member	Count	182	266	448
	% within CSO membership	40.6%	59.4%	100%
Non-member	Count	106	200	306
	% within CSO membership	34.6%	65.4%	100%
Total	Count	288	466	754
	% within CSO membership	38.2%	61.8%	100%

The assessment group thought that Taiwanese civil society has done a good job building social capital, with numerous well-known cases to back up this claim. Some of the more well known examples put forward by the SAG, are the various CSO unions found within the civil society arena, indicating that there is a high degree of trust among CSOs. Some of these unions include the Enable Alliance, the League of Welfare Promotion Organization for Elders, the League of Social Welfare Promotion, League of Welfare for Children and the Buddhism Union. Another example of building social capital was the first aid rescue team formed by a consortium of faith based organizations, such as Tzi Chi, Fo Guang Shan Monastery, Presbyterian Church Taiwan and the Chinese Christian Relief Association to provide assistance following the 9/21 earthquake in 1999. Based on their experience, SAG members felt that there is enough mutual trust and social networks in the civil society arena (partly because it is still such a small arena) for CSOs to easily enact joint projects and to build social capital.

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods. There are numerous CSOs working on employment issues within Taiwan's aboriginal community, such as Tzu-chi and World Vision's large-scale career consultant centres and the small or regional centres operated by local Catholic associations or cultural and educational foundations for specific tribes. A successful example of civil society acting to support livelihoods was the creation of the employment-training centre, a project started by Chinese Cultural and Social Welfare Fund. The main purpose of the centre is to help young people gain professional skills, help them find and keep jobs, increase the quality of the labour pool and promote the development of industries.¹⁴⁰ It has been practicing over 20 years, and has cultivated numerous people, especially among the poor, with a skill or occupation to go into the work force. The majority of the SAG felt that Taiwan's civil society is active in helping to support livelihoods

140 Chinese Vocational Training Center (CVTC) is a branch operation under Chinese Culture and Social Welfare Fund. <http://www.cvtc.org.tw/>

but that its impact is limited in terms of consistency and size. Due to the financial concerns, CSOs usually cannot carry out long-term projects to support livelihoods, and are therefore not widespread enough to help the needy fully stand on their own feet.

4.5 Meeting Societal Needs

The last important role played by civil society is to help solve pressing societal needs, especially the needs of poor people and marginalized groups. This subdimension examines how civil society in Taiwan satisfies these pressing societal needs and in what ways it persuades the government to enhance social services. This subdimension received a score of 2, indicating civil society is doing fairly well in meeting societal needs.

TABLE IV.4.6: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs

Ref #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	<u>2</u>
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	<u>2</u>
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalized groups	<u>2</u>

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision. After Martial Law was lifted, many people in Taiwan got together to form various non-profit social organizations to replace or supplement the state's role in caring for labourers, farmers, women, the handicapped and aboriginals. The enthusiasm and energy of these groups helped force the government to pay more attention to issues related to social welfare services.¹⁴¹ Two of the more prominent groups, Taiwan Alliance for Conservation Ecology and Awakening Foundation, work towards pressing the government to budget more funds for social services as well as giving advice on social welfare policies.

Most of the SAG thought that civil society in Taiwan was very active in lobbying for state provision of social services, but that its influence was limited, this was mainly due to the still developing nature of Taiwan's civil society arena.

4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Following the 9/21 earthquake in Taiwan, numerous Taiwanese CSOs, such as Tzu Chi, Taiwan Root, Search and Rescue (SAR) Taiwan and Samadhi Association, immediately sprang to action to assist those in the hardest hit areas, reacting quickly to one of the most pressing societal needs in Taiwan's history. These same organizations also helped to provide service following the tsunami that devastated South Asia. According to data from the Ministry of Interior, over 70% of

¹⁴¹ Ta-tung Wei, *A Brief Research on the Job Creation cooperated by NGO and Government*, The dissertation of the Graduate School of Labour Studies, 2003.

CSOs in Taiwan are focused on providing social welfare showing that the mission of most of Taiwanese CSOs is to meet the needs of society.

The assessment group felt that civil society is active in meeting pressing societal needs, but with limited impact, although they noted that as Taiwan's civil society arena continues to develop, Taiwanese CSOs will be able to make substantial progress in this area.

4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalized groups

During the scoring meeting, the SAG reached a general consensus that Taiwan's civil society is slightly more efficient in meeting the needs of marginalized groups than the government. One example is the establishment of the University of Aborigines in Pingtung County. The university offers not only basic skills and education for Taiwan's aborigines, but also takes care to integrate tribal culture into the curriculum.¹⁴² Another successful example of meeting the needs of marginalized groups is the 170 physical and mental disabled social service organizations in Taiwan.¹⁴³ A recent case concerned a group of leprosy patients from the Japanese colonial era who have been demanding compensation from the Japanese government for mistreatment during their rule. The Taiwan Association for Human Rights and voluntary lawyer groups struggled for years to appeal to Japanese Courts, and, finally, in 2005 these patients finally got a response from the Japanese government and some compensation as well.

Conclusion

The impact of Taiwan's civil society on governance and society at large has been considerable, given the fact that CSOs have only been 'legal' since the end of Martial Law in 1987. However, as this section has shown, challenges remain and there are numerous obstacles that civil society actors will have to overcome in order to expand their influence within Taiwan. The following survey of CSOs from Southern and Northern Taiwan details the reasons why CSO members feel that their work has not been able to make a broader impact on society and can be a useful reference tool for explaining the score of some of the above indicators. The chart shows that most CSOs feel the main obstacle keeping their work from having a broader impact is somehow related to the government, whether it be indifference or a lack of understanding on the part of actors representing the state.

¹⁴² Chen Shu-Jing, *Education at the Tribe University Case Study on Pingtung Aboriginal Tribe University*, the dissertation of The Institute of Non-Profit Organization Management of Nanhua University, 2004 May:45-50.

¹⁴³ <http://disable.yam.com/index.htm>

Table IV.4.7: CSO views on factors limiting the impact of their work on society.¹⁴⁴

Factors limiting CSO impact	CSOs in the Taipei Area (Northern Taiwan)	CSOs in 7 counties and cities in Southern Taiwan
Restrictive govt. policy or laws in their governing their particular issue	24.8%	No Data
Indifference of the media towards their issue	22.9%	24.1%
Lack of understanding by government and/or politicians	22.9%	26.6%
Lack of public interest	22.2%	-
Lack of cooperation from like-minded groups or individuals	21.4%	24.1%
No problem	No Data	24.1%

Within the impact dimension, the subdimension dealing with civil society's responsiveness to societal needs, received the highest score, with 2.2, indicating its significant impact on society. Based on the research findings, it appears that Taiwanese CSOs have done an excellent job responding to issues of concern to the public. Following the 9/21 earthquake few people gave money to the government's relief fund, while the amount given to NGOs was extremely high. Taiwan's civil society has also done a good job helping empower its citizens, through informing and educating the public on social issues, empowering women, building social capital and supporting livelihoods. Through the CSO organized community colleges around Taiwan and various public interest campaigns, CSOs have been able to educate the public on issues and values important to civil society. Women's groups, such as the Awakening Foundation, the Association of the Promotion of Women's Rights, Homemaker's Union and Foundation and Warm Life for Women Foundation have worked to help empower women and ensure gender equality. Taiwan's many faith based organizations, such as Tzu Chi, Fo Guang Shan Monastery, World Vision and the Chinese Christian Relief Association have been extremely active in supporting livelihoods by assisting low-income households, the disabled and marginalized and those affected by natural disaster in finding sustainable sources of income.

The area with the worst performance within the impact dimension was civil society's ability to hold corporations accountable for their actions and meeting societal needs. In general, CSOs have done a good job holding the government accountable, but they have a lot of room for improvement in their dealings with corporations. There are a number of reasons for weakness in

¹⁴⁴ Yu-Yuan Kuan, A comparative study on the character and autonomy of non-profit organizations between the south and north Taiwan, sponsored by National Science Council 2001.


the area. First, the concept of corporate social responsibility has yet to make a widespread impact among Taiwan's corporations, and second, the media tends to neglect the actions of civil society and instead are mainly focused on political and local news. Most importantly, the lack of interaction between these three actors has led to ignorance on all three sides and a lack of interest in greater cooperation.

As Taiwan's civil society has developed and matured, its impact on Taiwanese society has grown as well. However, to further increase its impact, CSOs and civil society in general must first reach a level of maturity, in which both the state and general public can come to civil society actors as an important institution within society, instead of as a new phenomenon or a passing fad. When this occurs it will be easier for CSOs to overcome the obstacles mentioned in the above survey.

V CONCLUSION

This study of Taiwanese civil society was intended to examine the rise and development of Taiwan's civil society, and to identify and analyze the important forces affecting Taiwanese society. This study analyzed civil society in **FIGURE V.1: Taiwan's Civil Society Diamond**

Taiwan by looking at four different areas: structure, environment, values and impact. The resulting Taiwanese civil society diamond visually represents the results of this assessment. The Taiwanese civil society diamond, with the exception of the structure dimension, indicates a civil society that is well balanced and in the later stages of development. While Taiwan's civil society exhibits a slightly weak **structure**, it operates in a relatively enabling **environment**. Civil society practices and promotes positive **values** to a significant extent and its **impact** on society at large is relatively significant.



Based on the research, numerous internal and external factors affecting the civil society environment in Taiwan were found. Some of the most important internal factors include: the ending of Martial Law in 1987, Taiwan's democratization process and the end of nearly five decades of KMT rule, with the election of Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in March 2000. The deepening of democracy in Taiwan has encouraged the growth of civil society and led to an explosion in the number of Taiwanese CSOs. Economic growth is another important internal factor affecting civil society's development in Taiwan, as rising income levels and living standards transform it from a recipient of aid into a donor country. This transition created a new sense of humanitarian responsibility in Taiwan, with the establishment of many different aid and development organizations.

While economic development and democratization helped to establish Taiwan's civil society, actual development within Taiwanese civil society itself has only occurred within the last ten years. In addition, Taiwan's unique status within the international community, and the legacy of Martial Law, caused the development of its civil society to follow a much different path than that of western countries. In Taiwan, it was the relaxing of controls over society by the state that encouraged the emergence of grassroots power. This CSI-SAT assessment found that in the case

of Taiwan, the government had, and continues to have, significant influence on the creation and development of Taiwanese civil society. When conducting the social forces analysis, the SAG found that some of the actors with the largest influence on society were the Legislative Yuan, educational institutions, the courts and the president; all representatives of the state. Thus, in Taiwan, the power of the state is still much greater than that of society.

When mapping civil society, the SAG found the Presbyterian Church, Tzuchi, Farmers'/Fishermen's Association and the Consumer's Foundation to be the most influential actors. Of these four organizations, the Presbyterian Church and the Farmers'/Fishermen's Association have strong political connections, Tzuchi is a religious organization with the largest membership in Taiwan and extensive resources, and the Consumer's Foundation represents the interests of nearly the entire population. The actors within civil society with less influence were those that addressed a specific issue, such as women's issues, children, youth, religion and help for the disabled, the elderly, environmental protection, health care, human rights, AIDS or education. The main reason that these organizations do not wield greater influence within civil society is because their power is scattered and unfocused, which is a result of their lack of horizontal integration mechanisms. Attempts have been made by the government and various CSOs to establish an NGO coordination centre, but due to the independent nature of Taiwanese NGOs and immature structural conditions, the plan has yet to be implemented. In order to further civil society development in Taiwan it is imperative that horizontal integration mechanisms are established.

The SAG found the structure dimension to be the worst performing, with an average score of only 1.4. Looking deeper into the structure subdimensions, this assessment found that breadth of citizen participation, organization and resources received particularly low scores. These weaknesses within civil society's structure are the result of several factors, including:

- The low level of non-partisan political action in Taiwan;
- The low proportion of the population donating to charity and joining CSOs;
- Lack of widespread volunteerism;
- Not enough people donate to a charity on a regular basis;
- CSO umbrella bodies have yet to mature;
- Self-regulation mechanisms have not been developed and
- The human, technological and infrastructural resources available to civil society are scarce.

The environment dimension proved to be a stronger area with an average score of 2.2. The best performing subdimensions within the environment dimension were political context, basic liberties and rights, socio-economic context, socio-cultural context, rule of law and the

relationship between civil society and the government, showing that Taiwan has made a smooth transition from authoritarianism to a democratic system. This transition is embodied by the following:

- Freedom of political participation;
- Low levels of corruption and capability of fulfilling public work in the public sector;
- Full civil right and press freedom;
- CSO-friendly registration rules and
- CSO's freedom of criticizing government.

Based on the above findings, Taiwan appears to have a healthy civil society environment that is conducive to civil society development.

There were some weak points within the environment dimension, especially in the relations between civil society and the private sector. Some of the weak points in Taiwan's civil society environment include the following:

- Lacks of full confidence in the rule of law among the public;
- Need for more state-civil society dialogue;
- Lack of corporate social responsibility and
- Low levels of charitable giving by private enterprises.

Though there are many positive indicators within Taiwan's civil society environment, the influences of the state and market are still quite strong, leading to a lack of interaction between the state, the market and civil society.

Within the values dimension, the research found that democracy, tolerance, non-violence, gender equity, poverty eradication and environmental sustainability were all well developed values within Taiwan's civil society. This is shown by the following indicators:

- Practice of internal democracy among CSOs;
- Promotion of democracy ;
- High-levels of tolerance and many non-violence promotions within the civil society arena and
- A good proportion of female leadership among civil society.

The score given to the values dimension shows that Taiwan's civil society acts as an important advocate on important public issues and helps to promote a better society through non-violence, tolerance and democracy. Transparency was the only area within the values dimension that

received a low score. This assessment found that corruption within civil society still exists and that the financial transparency of many Taiwanese CSOs does not meet the standards set by CIVICUS.

Within the impact dimension, the subdimension dealing with civil society's responsiveness to societal needs received a particularly high score. Based on the research, Taiwanese CSOs have done an excellent job responding to almost every issue of concern to the public. Following the 9/21 earthquake, which took place on 21 September 1999, very few people gave money to the government's relief fund, while the amount given to NGOs was extremely high.

Taiwan's civil society has also done a good job empowering citizens, by informing and educating the public on social issues, empowering women, building social capital and supporting livelihoods. Some of the main positive findings of the impact dimension include:

- Promotion of human rights policy;
- Influencing social policy and
- Ensuring the accountability of the state.

In general, CSOs have done a good job holding the government accountable, as politics is a major part of Taiwan's civil society. However, there is significant room for improvement in their dealings with the media and corporations. There are a number of causes of the weakness in this area. First, the concept of corporate social responsibility has yet to have widespread impact among Taiwan's corporations. Second, the media tends to neglect the actions of civil society and instead focuses mainly on political and local news. Most importantly, the lack of interaction between these three actors has led to ignorance on all three sides and a lack of interest in greater cooperation.

The rapid development of Taiwan's civil society has been a new and remarkable phenomenon over the past decade. Although, compared with western countries the development and capacity-building capabilities of Taiwan's CSOs is still quite immature. This assessment has presented a clear outline of the history and current state of Taiwan's civil society development and can be used as a powerful tool in helping to understand its strengths and weaknesses, as well as offering suggestions on how to further facilitate its development. It is the hope that this assessment will contribute to the building of a healthy and vibrant Taiwanese civil society in the future.

More specifically, the results of this study will be helpful to the Taiwanese government, and people, by helping them understand Taiwan's civil society development and the success and failures involved in this development process. It can also be a useful tool in conducting a

multinational comparative analysis on civil societies of countries around the world. Finally, this assessment will be included in CIVICUS' global report and will help the international community gain a deeper understanding of Taiwan's CSOs and its civil society.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 SCORING ASSESSMENT GROUP

APPENDIX 2 THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

APPENDIX 1 SCORING ASSESSMENT GROUP

1. Center for the Third Sector – National Chengchi University, Professor Chen Qin-qun
(Will attend second meeting)
2. Taiwan Root Medical Peace Corps, Dr. Liu Chi-chun – President
3. Judicial Reform Foundation, Wang Shi-si, Permanent consular (Will attend second meeting)
4. International Cooperation Development Fund, Zhang nan-chang, International Director
(Government foreign aid organization)
5. Children Are Us Foundation, Zheng Chuan-you, director
6. The Asia Foundation in Taiwan, Shen Tai-min, CEO
7. The Himalaya Foundation, Gao Yong-xing, Ceo
8. Orbis – Taiwan, Qian Wei-jia, CEO
9. YWCA – Taiwan, Li Ping, Secretary General
10. Tzu Chi University (Bhuddist), Wan Yu-wei, Professor (Will attend second meeting)
11. Noordhoff Craniofacial Foundation, Wang Jin-ying, CEO
12. YoungSun Culture & Education Foundation, Jian Yi-tong, Secretary General
13. The Humanistic Education Foundation, Lu Ling-ying, Editor-in-Chief

APPENDIX 2. THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

1 – STRUCTURE

1.1 - Breadth of citizen participation

Description: How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engage in civil society activities?

1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

Description: What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

A very small minority (less than 10%).	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.2 - Charitable giving

Description: What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.4 - Volunteering

Description: What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A small minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A minority (31% to 50%)	Score 2
A majority (more than 50%)	Score 3

1.1.5 - Collective community action

Description: What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% -50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.2 - Depth of citizen participation

Description: How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?

1.2.1 - Charitable giving

Description: How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

Less than 1%	Score 0
1% to 2%	Score 1
2.1% to 3%	Score 2
More than 3%	Score 3

1.2.2 - Volunteering

Description: How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

Less than 2 hours	Score 0
2 to 5 hours	Score 1
5.1 to 8 hours	Score 2
More than 8 hours.	Score 3

1.2.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

Description: How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?

1.3.1 - CSO membership

Description: To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	Score 2
CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.2 - CSO leadership

Description: To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.	Score 2
CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

Description: How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	Score 0
CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	Score 1
CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	Score 2
CSOs are present in all areas of the country.	Score 3

1.4. - Level of organisation

***Description:* How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?**

1.4.1 - Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 70%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 70%)	Score 3

1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

Completely ineffective (or non-existent)	Score 0
Largely ineffective	Score 1
Somewhat effective	Score 2
Effective	Score 3

1.4.3 - Self-regulation

Description: Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Score 0
Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Score 1
Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Score 2
Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.	Score 3

1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

Description: What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 0
There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	Score 1
Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	Score 2
There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 3

1.4.5 - International linkages

Description: What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

Only a handful of “elite” CSOs have international linkages.	Score 0
A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 1
A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 2
A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.	Score 3

1.5 - Inter-relations

***Description:* How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?**

1.5.1 - Communication

Description: What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

Very little	Score 0
Limited	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Significant	Score 3

1.5.2 – Cooperation

Description: How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 0
It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 1
CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 2
CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 3

1.6 – Resources

***Description:* To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?**

1.6.1 - Financial resources

Description: How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.	Score 3

1.6.2 - Human resources

Description: How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.	Score 3

1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

Description: How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.	Score 3

2 - ENVIRONMENT¹⁴⁵

2.1 - Political context

Description: What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

2.1.1 - Political rights

Description: How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	Score 0
There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Score 1
Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	Score 2
People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.	Score 3

2.1.2 - Political competition

Description: What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

Single party system.	Score 0
Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Score 1
Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction.	Score 2
Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.	Score 3

2.1.3 - Rule of law

Description: To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	Score 0
There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	Score 1
There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Score 2
Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.	Score 3

2.1.4 – Corruption

Description: What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

¹⁴⁵ For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

High	Score 0
Substantial	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Low	Score 3

2.1.5 – State effectiveness

Description: To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).	Score 0
The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	Score 1
State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	Score 2
State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.	Score 3

2.1.6 – Decentralisation

Description: To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Score 0
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Score 1
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.	Score 2
Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.	Score 3

2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

***Description:* To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?**

2.2.1 - Civil liberties

Description: To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

Civil liberties are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	Score 1
There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Score 2
Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.2.2 - Information rights

Description: To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Score 0
Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Score 1
Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Score 2
Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.	Score 3

2.2.3 - Press freedoms

Description: To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

Press freedoms are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	Score 1
There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Score 2
Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.3 - Socio-economic context¹⁴⁶

***Description:* What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

Description: How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

<p>Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants) 	Score 0
Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 1
Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 2
Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.	Score 3

2.4 - Socio-cultural context

***Description:* To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?**

¹⁴⁶ This sub-dimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The sub-dimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

2.4.1 - Trust

Description: How much do members of society trust one another?

Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	Score 0
There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 1
There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 2
There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 3

2.4.2 - Tolerance

Description: How tolerant are members of society?

Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Score 0
Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Score 1
Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Score 2
Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).	Score 3

2.4.3 - Public spiritedness¹⁴⁷

Description: How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5).	Score 0
Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5).	Score 1
Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5).	Score 2
High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5).	Score 3

2.5 - Legal environment

***Description:* To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?**

2.5.1 - CSO registration¹⁴⁸

Description: How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

¹⁴⁷ The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

¹⁴⁸ This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for sub-dimension 3. The indicator scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	Score 0
The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent.	Score 1
The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	Score 2
The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.	Score 3

2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

Description: To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticize government?

CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	Score 0
There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Score 1
Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	Score 2
CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.	Score 3

2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

Description: How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	Score 0
The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations).	Score 1
The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	Score 2
The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.	Score 3

2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy

Description: How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Score 0
Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 1
Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 2
Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 3

2.6 - State-civil society relations

Description: What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?

2.6.1 – Autonomy

Description: To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

The state controls civil society.	Score 0
CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	Score 1
The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	Score 2
CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.	Score 3

2.6.2 - Dialogue

Description: To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	Score 0
The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	Score 1
The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Score 2
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.6.3 - Cooperation / support

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 2
The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?**

2.7.1 - Private sector attitude

Description: What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

Generally hostile	Score 0
Generally indifferent	Score 1
Generally positive	Score 2
Generally supportive	Score 3

2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility

Description: How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Score 0
Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 1
Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Score 2
Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 3

2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy¹⁴⁹

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 2
The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

3 - VALUES

3.1 – Democracy

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs

Description: To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 0
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 1
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 3

¹⁴⁹ The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy

Description: How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.2 – Transparency

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?**

3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society

Description: How widespread is corruption within CS?

Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.	Score 0
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	Score 1
There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Score 2
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.	Score 3

3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs

Description: How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?

A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 0
A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 1
A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 3

3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency

Description: How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.3 – Tolerance

Description: To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Score 0
Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	Score 2
Civil society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	Score 3

3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance

Description: How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.4 - Non-violence

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?

3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena

Description: How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Score 0
Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	Score 2
There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.	Score 3

3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace

Description: How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility	Score 3

3.5 - Gender equity

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?**

3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Score 0
Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Score 1
Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Score 2
Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.	Score 3

3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs

Description: How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

A small minority (less than 20%)	Score 0
A minority (20%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

3.5.3 – Civil society actions to promote gender equity

Description: How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.6 - Poverty eradication

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?**

3.6.1 – Civil society actions to eradicate poverty

Description: To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.7 - Environmental sustainability

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?**

3.7.1 – Civil society actions to sustain the environment

Description: How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

4 - IMPACT

4.1 - Influencing public policy

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.1.3 - Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components. ¹⁵⁰	Score 1
Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?

4.2.1 - Holding state accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2.2 - Holding private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

¹⁵⁰ The term "specific budget component" refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the *overall* budget.

4.3 - Responding to social interests

Description: How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?

4.3.1 - Responsiveness

Description: How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 0
There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 1
There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 2
Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 3

4.3.2 - Public Trust

Description: What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

A small minority (< 25%)	Score 0
A large minority (25%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-75%)	Score 2
A large majority (> 75%)	Score 3

4.4 - Empowering citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?

4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

Description: How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.3 - Empowering marginalized people

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.4 - Empowering women

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.5 - Building social capital¹⁵¹

Description: To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Score 0
Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Score 1
Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Score 2
Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.	Score 3

4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

Description: How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5 - Meeting societal needs

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

¹⁵¹ To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see sub-dimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

Description: How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Description: How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Description: To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

CSOs are less effective than the state.	Score 0
CSOs are as effective as the state.	Score 1
CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	Score 2
CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.	Score 3

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