

THE EXPLOSION OF CSOs AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION:

An Assessment of Civil Society in South Korea 2004

CIVICUS CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX REPORT FOR SOUTH KOREA

Seoul 2006

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CIVICUS Civil Society Index

**An international action-research project coordinated by CIVICUS:
World Alliance for Citizen Participation**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Civil Society Index (CSI) research team for South Korea, from the Third Sector Institute is grateful for the valuable support and contributions made by many individuals and organisations. Without them, and the voluntary contribution of their time, this CSI report on South Korea would not have been possible. Of course, any findings presented in this final report remain the sole responsibility of the Third Sector Institute and do not express the views of any one individual.

We would like to first thank the **Korea Research Foundation**, which has provided long-term financial support over the past four years. The CSI project was carried out as a part of the first stage (2002-2004) of the research project titled, "[The] Development of Korean Civil Society and the Role of NGOs." We would also like to thank Kumi Naidoo, Secretary General of CIVICUS, for suggesting implementing the CSI project in 2001, when he attended a seminar held by the Third Sector Institute at Hanyang University, Seoul, and the CIVICUS CSI team, particularly Volkhart Finn Heinrich and Navin Vasudev for their kind support throughout the project.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the CSI National Advisory Group (NAG), for the time and energy they put into making the CSI possible in South Korea: Myong-Jae Cha (Ph.D., Professor, Asian NGO Information Centre, Songkonghoe University), Seung-Chang Ha (Secretary General, Citizen's Action Network), Gyu-Ho Jeong (Ph.D. Research Advisor, Korea Dialogue Academy; former Christian Academy), Youn-Koung Jung (Director, GK), Hyeong-Woog Kim (Senior Fellow, Presidential Committee on Ageing and Future Society), Jong-Seung Kim (Director, Korea Council on Social Welfare), Jung-Bae Kim (Ph.D. Director, Korea Youth Development Institute), Chang-Ho Lee (Vice Director, Centre for Civil Society, Joongang Daily Newspaper), In-Kyung Lee (General Manager, Solidarity Network Korea), Jung-Su Lee (Secretary General, Green Future), Kang-Hyun Lee (Ph.D., Secretary General, Volunteer21 Korea), Young-Seon Park (Secretary General, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), Hong-Soon Park (Director, Community Partnership Centre) and Yong-Hee Yang (CEO, Non-profit Network System & Communication; Professor, Department of Social Welfare, Hoseo University).

As director of the CSI project, I would particularly like to thank research professors, Seonmi Lee and Youngjae Jo, who undertook the painstaking process of the CSI research: collecting data, conducting community surveys, arranging NAG meetings and regional stakeholder consultations and writing and editing papers.

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
LIST OF ACRONYMS

CC	Chamber of Commerce
CCEJ	Citizen's Coalition of Economic Justice
CS	Civil society
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSO	Civil society organisation
FKI	Federation of Korea Industries
FKTU	Federation of Korean Trade Unions
GK	Green Korea
GKU	Green Korea United
KCTU	Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
KEF	Korea Employers Federation
KFEM	Korea Federation of Environmental Movement
KFTU	Korean Federation of Trade Unions
KWAU	Korea Women's Associations United
NAG	National Advisory Group
NCO	National Coordinating Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NPO	Non-Profit organisation
NVM	New Village Movement
PSPD	People's of Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
SACT	Social Compact on Anti-corruption and Transparency

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) uses 74 indicators to measure the state of civil society. These indicators are grouped together into four overall dimensions, and their scores on the scale of 0 to 3 are shown in the Civil Society Diamond for South Korea (figure 1) representing the current state of civil society in South Korea. In short, the current state of South Korean civil society is characterised by an imbalance among four dimensions. The scores for values and impact dimensions are moderate, while those for structure and environment reveal relatively weak levels of development.

FIGURE 1: South Korean Civil Society Diamond



(Structure 1.5/ Environment 1.6 / Values 2.3/ Impact. 1.9)

Civil society's strengths are a consequence of the fact that, over the past two decades, Korean civil society organisations (CSOs) have focused their time and energy on advocacy activities, such as holding the state and business sector accountable and transparency. Korean CSOs have tended to utilise 'nationwide solidarity' strategies of agenda setting and political mobilisation, which have been extremely effective and efficient so that advocacy CSOs were for some time the most trusted institutions among all major public and social institutions in South Korea. Their activities were also widely covered in major newspapers and TV stations. 'Nationwide solidarity' movements depended heavily on direct actions, such as campaigning, petitions, boycotting and demonstrations. These were successful since they united hundreds of CSOs to advocate on social and political issues.

For last two decades, South Korean civil society has been undergoing a comprehensive

process of dynamic development. Particularly the last decade saw an explosion of civil society organisations (CSOs) and their growing political impact (Han and Song, 2004; Ha, 2001). Assisted by the spread of the Internet, the influence of not only organised CSOs but also ordinary unorganised citizens on public opinion and political processes has increased dramatically. However, as the CSI study shows, it seems that the explosion of citizen participation during the last decade has contributed neither to improving the environment of civil society, nor to the structural development of CSOs and their impacts on socio-cultural transformation. In particular, the socio-cultural environment (e.g. tolerance, trust), legal environment, and relationship between civil society and private sector are still not conducive to activities of CSOs. Even though citizens are increasingly active in non-partisan political action, volunteering and giving, the resources of the CSOs remain limited.

The **structure** dimension examines the make-up of civil society, in terms of the main characteristics of individual and associational participation and the relationships among civil society participants. The findings reveal that the structure of South Korean civil society is of limited strength and scope. The most critical weaknesses constitute the lack of adequate financial and human resources, followed by the limited depth of citizen participation and limited leader diversity within CSOs. However, civil society's overall level of organisation and interrelations as well as the breadth of citizen participation are quite strong. For example, both the reach and effectiveness of umbrella organisation or solidarity networks among CSOs were assessed as quite positive. Regarding the extent of citizen participation, the following forms show rather high percentage of citizen involvement: non-partisan political action, CSO membership and volunteering. However, a closer look at CSO membership reveals that it is concentrated on recreational associations, which are not likely to contribute to strengthening the public sphere where people come together to discuss social issues. The vibrancy of citizen participation in South Korea is therefore not so much driven by organisational membership, but rather by common political actions and widespread volunteering, which seems to reflect the segregation of advocacy-oriented and service-oriented activities in South Korean civil society.

The **environment** dimension considers how enabling the external environment is for civil society and examines political, social, cultural, economic and legal factors as well as the attitudes and behaviour of state and business actors towards civil society. Among the seven subdimensions, the legal and socio-cultural contexts in South Korea are the most unfavourable for civil society. The legal context is a rather disabling, as election and national security laws restrict advocacy activities and tax laws limit the benefits of tax exemption and fundraising activities. Low levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness (socio-cultural

norms) also pose a hindrance to the development of South Korean civil society.

The **values** dimension received the highest score among the four dimensions and reflects that South Korean civil society practices and promotes positive values to a significant extent. In particular, the promotion of values, such as environmental sustainability, transparency and gender equality are recognised as accomplishments of South Korean civil society. However, the role of civil society in promoting the values of tolerance and non-violence is rather limited.

The **impact** dimension shows a rather healthy state of South Korean civil society. The sector's role in influencing public policies is remarkably well developed. Showing the highest score among the subdimensions of impact, civil society's public policy impact covers five policy fields (i.e. political reform, environmental protection, anti-corruption, gender equity, human rights protection), while only the field of social welfare received a lower rating. However, South Korean civil society has been not active in meeting societal needs directly, building social capital, and educating/informing citizens. While civil society is strong in holding the state accountable, its efforts towards the private sector receive only a moderately positive result. This difference seems to reflect the fact that the political democratisation has so far not been accompanied by a similar process in the economy.

Thus, the CSI shows that the improvements of the state of civil society should focus on strategies to strengthen the structure of civil society and the environment in which it exists. Civil society leaders and external stakeholders unanimously suggested the government play a more active role in these efforts. Above all, the government should amend certain regulatory laws, including: the "Contribution Collection Law" and the "NPO Supporting Law", so that CSOs can become financially stable and sustainable with increased support from the government as well as citizens.

Another suggestion concerned the role of citizens in supporting efforts to strengthen CSOs. A major problem is that the current growth of citizen participation does not appear to contribute to the structural development of CSOs, but focuses on once-off individual activities. Also, the depth of citizen contributions through charitable giving, volunteering and membership activities for public-benefit organisations remains still marginal.

As citizens begin to emerge as the heart of democracy in South Korea, the long-term development of South Korean civil society needs to keep pace with the rising contributions of ordinary citizens, which will help CSOs to achieve financial and political independence from government and business. A variety of forms of citizen participation, including a recent series

of "candlelight" demonstrations and online advocacy activities, rapidly became 'conventional' in South Korea. Online *netizens* are becoming important agents of formulating public opinion and setting public agendas and a wide variety of their networks begin to play significant roles in South Korean civil society. Active citizens with Internet connections are becoming the building blocks of a new civil society of "Dynamic Korea," a symbol of the national brand power of South Korea. One of the main challenges for South Korean civil society is connecting these explosive, but highly fluctuating forms of citizen participation with continuous, stable citizen organisations.

INTRODUCTION

The Civil Society Index (CSI) project was the first attempt in Korea to bring leaders and civil society stakeholders together to discuss and assess the strengths and weaknesses of Korean civil society, through the application of an empirical tool kit.

I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT AND APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index (CSI) originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept (Anheier 2004). The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1.1).

TABLE I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005¹

1. Argentina	19. Germany	38. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Ghana	39. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Greece	40. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Guatemala	41. Russia
5. Bulgaria	23. Honduras	42. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Hong Kong (VR China)	43. Serbia
7. Chile	25. Indonesia	44. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Italy	45. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Jamaica	46. South Korea
10. Croatia	28. Lebanon	47. Taiwan
11. Cyprus ²	29. Macedonia	48. Togo
12. Czech Republic	30. Mauritius	49. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Mongolia	50. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Montenegro	51. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Nepal	52. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Netherlands	53. Vietnam
17. Gambia	35. Nigeria	54. Wales
18. Georgia	36. Northern Ireland	
	37. Orissa (India)	

In South Korea, the CSI project was initiated as a part of the research project, “(The)

¹ This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted, as of July 2006.

² The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

Development of Korean Civil Society and the Role of NGOs” in July 2002, funded by the Korea Research Foundation. In March 2003, the CSI Project application for South Korea was accepted by CIVICUS and implemented from July 2003 to September 2005 by the Third Sector Institute.

2. PROJECT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The CSI uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and wide range of research methods. At the core of the CSI lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of subdimensions, which again are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI data collection, which includes secondary sources, a population survey, regional stakeholder consultations, a media review and a series of case studies. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by a National Advisory Group (NAG). The research and assessment findings are discussed at a gathering of key stakeholders, whose task is to identify specific strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations on key priority actions to strengthen civil society. The CSI project approach, conceptual framework, and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.³

2.1 Conceptual Framework

How to define civil society?

At the heart of the CSI’s conceptual framework is obviously the concept of civil society. CIVICUS defines civil society as the space between the family, state and the market, where people come together to pursue their interests (CIVICUS 2003). In this respect and different from most other civil society concepts, the CSI has two interesting features. Firstly, it aims to go beyond the usual focus on formal and institutionalised CSOs, and to take account of informal coalitions and groups. Secondly, while civil society is sometimes perceived as a sphere in which positive activities and values reign, CIVICUS seeks to also include negative manifestations of civil society in the assessment. The concept therefore covers not only charitable associations or environmental organisations but also groups such as skinheads and aggressive sports fans. The CSI assesses not only the extent to which CSOs support democracy and tolerance, but also the extent to which they themselves are intolerant or even violent.


How to conceptualise the state of civil society?

To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these four dimensions is divided into a set of subdimensions which contain a total of 74 indicators.⁴ These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report. The indicator – subdimension - dimension framework underpinned the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report, the NAG’s assessment of South Korean civil society and the presentations at the National Seminar. It is also used to structure the main part of this publication.

FIGURE I.1.1: Civil society diamond tool



To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool (see figure I.1.1 for an example).⁵ The Civil Society diamond graph, with its four extremities, visually summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society. The diagram is the result of the individual indicator scores aggregated into subdimension and

then dimension scores. As it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about how civil society looks like in a given country. As the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot and should not be used to rank countries according to their scores on the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore

lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time as well as compare the state of civil societies across countries (Anheier 2004).

2.2 Project Methodology

This section described the methods used to collect and aggregate the various data used by the CSI project.

2.2.1 Data Collection. The CSI recognised that, in order to generate a valid and comprehensive assessment of civil society, a variety of perspectives and data should be included – insider, external stakeholder and outsider views, as well as objective data ranging from the local, regional to the national level. The CSI therefore includes the following set of research methods: (1) Review of existing information, (2) Regional stakeholder consultations, (3) Population survey, (4) Media review and (5) Fact-finding studies.

It is believed that this mix of different methods is essential to generate accurate and useful data and information, but also to accommodate the variations of civil society, for example in rural vs. urban areas etc. Also, the CSI seeks to utilise all available sources of information to avoid ‘re-inventing research wheels’ and wasting scarce resources. Lastly, the research methodology is explicitly designed to promote learning and, ultimately, action on the part of participants. Besides feeding into the final national-level seminar, data collection processes also aim to contribute to participant learning. This is done, for example, through group-based approaches that challenge participants to see them as part of a “bigger picture”, think beyond their own organisational or sectoral context, reflect strategically about relations within and between civil society and other parts of society, identify key strengths and weaknesses of their civil society and assess collective needs. It is important to note that the CSI provides an aggregate need assessment on civil society as a whole and is not designed to exhaustively map the various actors active within civil society. Yet, it does examine power relations within civil society and between civil society and other sectors and also identifies key civil society actors when looking at specific indicators under the structure, values and impact dimensions.

2.3 Linking Research with Action

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is not a strictly academic research project. Its declared objective is to involve the actors of civil society in the research process, to contribute to discussions about civil society and to eventually assist in strengthening civil society, it falls into the category of action-research initiatives.

In the case of South Korea, stakeholder participation in the CSI took place on several levels.

- The National Index Team (NIT) was made up of four faculty members of the Third Sector Institute (at Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea) which was the National Coordinating Organization (NCO): NCO representative and civil society expert (Professor Sungsoo Joo, Director of Third Sector Institute) and participatory researchers (Professors Dongkun Ahn, Seonmi Lee and Youngjae Jo).
- The NIT carried out a preliminary stakeholder analysis and organised a National Advisory Group (NAG) of 15 civil society leaders and stakeholders, representing CSOs, government, media, and research. Of the 15 members of the NAG, five were women, and six were under 50 years old. The list of NAG members can be found in Annex 1
- A first NAG meeting was held in order to (i) discuss the CIVICUS CSI project methodology and a Korean project proposal concerning community survey and regional stakeholder consultation, (ii) discuss the concepts and definitions of "civil society" in Korea with comparison to the ones suggested by CIVICUS CSI, (iii) chart key forces/actors within civil society and relations between them and (iv) assist in identifying representatives for regional stakeholder consultations.
- The NAG was convened a second time to assign scores for indicators, based on the draft country report and the scoring results for four dimensions of civil society were graphically represented in a Civil Society Diamond of South Korea. The draft country report was updated to include the results of the NAG scoring meeting.
- A small scale national workshop (composed of NCO and NAG members) was held to discuss and build on the final report on the CSI of South Korea.

2.4 Project Outputs

The CSI implementation in South Korea yielded a range of products and outputs, such as:

- A comprehensive country report on the state of civil society in both of English and Korean;
- Several consultative meetings with more than 100 civil society (regional) stakeholders, discussing the state of civil society in South Korea and
- National seminars in which some significant results of the civil society survey and the Regional stakeholder survey were presented and discussed.

3. THE CSI IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The process of implementing the CSI focuses on carrying out research and analysis with regard to indicators of each of the four dimensions: structure, environment, values and impact.

The following is a brief overview of the major steps taken to implement the CSI Project in South Korea guided by the CIVICUS CSI team:

- **Secondary sources:** Secondary data were collected and reviewed by the National Index Team (NIT). The NIT began with a review of information from the many existing studies and research projects on civil society and various related subjects. This information was synthesised in an overview report on the state of civil society in South Korea. This draft overview report was then handed over to the NAG and CIVICUS for comment.
- **Regional stakeholder survey and consultations:** Five regional stakeholder consultations (with up to 20 participants each) were conducted in six major metropolitan cities of different regions of South Korea: Seoul, Busan, Daejeon, Daegu, Gwangju and Incheon. Participants responded to individual questionnaires before (or after) a consultation meeting and participated in a day-long group discussion, during the period between December 2003 and February 2004.
- **Representative population survey:** Community research was conducted to investigate the value dispositions of community members, their activities within civil society and attitudes towards and engagement with community-level CSOs. A community survey was carried out in the Seoul (Gwangjin-Gu, Seongbuk-Gu, Songpa-Gu) and four cities in the Gyeonggi Province (Goyang, Gunpo, Yongin, and Hanam). About 700 adult citizens participated as respondents.
- **Media monitoring:** A review of two major newspapers (Hankyoreh, Chosun) was conducted over six even months during 2002, to gather information on civil society activities, attitudes and values expressed by civil society and other public actors as well as to establish the media image of civil society.

II CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH KOREA

1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH KOREA

In the early 20th century, a few modern associations such as Independence Society (1896~?), YMCA(1903~). The YWCA (1922~) existed, but their activities were not significant. After the liberation from the Japanese colonial rule (1910~1945), in the following period of 3 years long Soviet (north part of the Peninsula)–American (south part of the Peninsula) military jurisdiction, many kinds of associations came into existence transiently. With the 1948 establishment of two separate nations with opposed political, economic, and social system, the history of South Korea began. The First Republic of Syngman Rhee in South Korea, arguably democratic at its inception, became increasingly autocratic until its collapse in 1960. The Second Republic was strongly democratic, but was overthrown in less than a year and replaced by a military regime. The following military dictatorships during 1961~1987 were accompanied by rapid economic growth, which however came at the expense of democracy and human rights. The voluntary associations autonomous from the government were strictly prohibited. Under the state ideology of anti-communism, those activities were punished heavily on the basis of the national security law. In this context, political shift of South Korean society in the late 1980s gave South Korean civil society new life. The emergence of civil society in South Korea was part of a global surge of the "Third Wave" of democratisation that toppled authoritarian regimes, and the June 1987 *Citizen Uprising* was a historical landmark for South Korean civil society, and for the transition process to democratic rule. The dramatic democratisation movement in 1987 ended authoritarian rule, removed oppressive laws and created major institutional changes (Beetham 2002). These changes made an open, fair and direct presidential election and the growth of civil society possible.

This early stage of the development of modern civil society in South Korea was marked by the "*simin-undong*" (civil movement) and the anti-corruption social movement. As a result of the June 1987 *Citizen Uprising*, Roh Tae-Woo, the ruling party's presidential candidate, was forced to announce the June 29 Declaration, which accommodated the citizens' call for direct presidential elections and political democratisation. A dramatic boom of newly established "*simin sahoe danchae*" (civil society organisation) immediately followed, and the prominent CSO, *Citizen's Coalition of Economic Justice* (CCEJ), was created in 1989, followed by many consumer, environmental, human rights and social justice CSOs which were created in the early 1990s.

Three consecutive 'democratic' governments after the end of the Roh Tae-Woo administration:

1989~1993) have helped spur both the growth of CSOs and their incorporation into the policy-making process. After about 30 years dictatorship by three military-turned Presidents, newly elected civilian Presidents, Kim Young-Sam (1993~1998), Kim Dae-Jung (1998~2003), and Roh Moo-Hyun (2003~) , were relatively more friendly to civil society leaders, working towards the consolidation of democracy. CSO leaders were occasionally recruited as ministers and heads of governmental institutions for anti-corruption, fair trade, consumer protection, human rights, sustainable development and decentralisation, and some were elected as national legislators and regional or local leaders. Major television stations and newspapers have competed in providing special CSO news sections. As a result, a wide spectrum of South Korean society reads news relating to civil society activities nearly every day.

The immediate post-democratisation period resulted in new players joining the political scene. Even though the "old social movement" groups, such as labour and agricultural movements and student organisations remained as powerful civil society actors, they must have competed with "new social movement" CSOs for social reform initiatives, which were guided by new rules of peaceful and non-violent demonstrations, in which middle-class citizens began to emerge as the participants and the foundation of the movement. The civil movement accomplished some electoral and political reforms, and broader issues, such as human rights, corruption and post-modern concerns about citizens' quality of life became more important. This new environment set the stage for the birth of a large variety of new CSOs. The CSOs strengthened South Korean civil society, and hence democracy, by improving citizen participation, interest articulation and representation. CSOs played an essential role in building a "culture of democracy" in which ordinary citizens learned to participate in the democratic process.

The "Civilian Government" (the Kim Young-Sam Administration: 1993~1998) launched a series of political and socioeconomic reforms in loose collaboration with CSOs, and initiated government funding for CSO projects in 1994. For the first time in South Korean history, many advocacy CSOs, which were critical of the government, received official funding through the 'open proposal competition'. These civic and social programs, funded by the state, resulted in the creation of new CSOs. Actually, the number of CSOs more than doubled between 1996 and 2002, to 22,000 (Joo et al. 2004).

A most dramatic phase took place during the Economic Crisis (1998-2001). Kim Dae-Jung (1998~2003) came into power to accelerate both of democratic reform and economic development simultaneously under the motto of "productive welfare" in order to overcome

the crisis. This was crucial in terms of CSOs' position in society, and also regarding their relationship to the government and business sectors, since CSOs, for the first time in South Korean history, were accepted by Kim Dae-Jung's Administration as members of the national governance system. It was also important that many advocacy-oriented CSOs began to appreciate the importance of both the valuable contribution of citizens, as donors and volunteers, and the direct service provision for the needy and empowering citizens to participate actively in the agenda setting and decision making processes of national and local affairs. New management skills and online technological devices were widely adopted and implemented by many CSOs.

Kim Dae-Jung's Administration further expanded the level of state funding with the newly enacted "Non-profit organisation (NPO) Supporting Law." The close relationship between the Administration and CSOs was apparent through the legal and institutional support, as well as the frequent communication between the government and CSO leaders, as often as the Administration was in trouble caused by the economic crisis, political stalemate and social turmoil. In fact, CSOs were falsely blamed by opposition parties for having a secret political connection with the Administration, as a result of CSOs identifying corruption within the opposition parties. For example, in the 2000 General Election the CSO National Alliance targeted corrupt and undemocratic candidates, the majority of which were opposition party candidates, to be removed from the ballots (Joo et al, 2004).

The Economic Crisis also had a profound effect on South Korean society. The 9% unemployment rate was the highest in modern South Korean history. Many CSOs voluntarily joined in the war on poverty and unemployment. Some examples of CSOs addressing the economic crisis include: CSOs developing and implementing job training programs for the unemployed, CSOs setting up food banks in major urban cities and CSOs joining the Civil "Social Safety Net" projects which assisted on the grassroots level. Also, many CSOs did not hesitate to utilise government-funded special job training programs, which in turn contributed to the expansion of their activities.

Under the current government of Roh Moo-Hyun (2003~), we are witnessing an explosion of citizen participation and a revival of right-wing political CSOs (Joo et al, 2004). The new government of Roh, declared as 'Participation Government' distinguished from the previous 'People's Government', not only has increased financial support to CSOs but also promoted citizens and CSOs' to participate in the policy making process. The explosion of citizen

participation was accelerated by the participation boom of volunteers and supporters for the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan. Since that time, volunteering and giving through CSOs, but also such direct action as “lighted candles” demonstration has increased. Some examples of the latter include "lighted candles" anti-war, anti-Japanese imperialism and anti-policies demonstrations. The key actors of the “lighted candle” demonstration, online ‘netizens’ continue to be involved further in formulating public opinion and setting national agendas, playing a significant role in South Korean civil society apart from other conventional NGOs. On the other hand, the revival of some right wing (anti-communist) CSOs has brought about some ideological confrontation and political conflicts within South Korean civil society, as some political parties and social forces on opposing sides join regarding the political and socioeconomic reform issues, such as regulation and redistribution.

2. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND CSO IN SOUTH KOREA

As described earlier, the June 1987 *Citizen Uprising*, which signalled the historical opening of modern South Korean civil society, and the consequent rise of *simin danchae* in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was accompanied by a wide discussion about civil society definition among scholars and civil society leaders.

There is no significant objection among South Korean civil society leaders and stakeholders to the CSI's definition of civil society as, "the arena, outside the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests." The importance of civil society's key role in providing a "public space where diverse societal values and interest interact" is widely accepted by many. However, it needs to be acknowledged that some researchers and civil society leaders still tend to define civil society as a set of social reform-oriented organisations. According to this perspective, civil society is composed of relatively formal organisations, thus excluding informal and ephemeral forms of collective citizen action; it includes only ‘civil’ associations in terms of pursuing public interests, thus excluding ‘uncivil’ associations which serve private interests or against public norms. It was not until the 21st century, and the era of "participation explosion", that many civil society stakeholders began to acknowledge the concept of civil society as a 'public space', rather than a set of certain organisations (Hong 2004). But ‘the public interests’ as a key criteria of civil society is still in debate.

Actually, in the first NAG meeting, some NAG members preferred a narrow definition of civil society, as a space for advocacy activities or *simin danchae*, thus excluding organisations such

as health care, sports and recreation, educational and religious organisations, as well as public media, taking the unique characteristics of the development of South Korean civil society into consideration. Some insisted that a much broader sense of civil society is of use, considering ambiguities in defining ‘public interests’ in contemporary South Korean civil society.

The disagreement on a definition of CSOs is rooted in the historical development of CSOs in South Korea. Under the authoritarian regime, many CSOs functioned either as ‘prolonged arms of the authoritarian regime’, or as the ‘source of clientelism’. There are still a few representative organisations that have a long history in their activities and many members throughout the country and have been supported on the basis of a special law enacted by the military government. These organisations are often rooted in traditional community-based associations at local level. These include many types of informal associations, such as alumni associations, indigenous kinship or local associations, which are characterised by undemocratic norms and pre-modern, hierarchical relationships. In a similar way, trade unions also had a symbiotic relationship with military governments. Apart from them, all other kinds of voluntary associations were strictly prohibited under the military dictatorship. After the democratisation in the late 1980s, those organisations were blamed for its undemocratic norms and activities in favour of and its financial dependence on government by the newly emerging civil society organisations which concern is primarily to improve government’s accountability and to consolidate a rule of democratic law. In this context, civil society leaders in South Korea used to exclude from the category of ‘civil society organisation (*simin sahoe danchae*) some types of associations which serve not public benefit, but aims at either pursuing private interests or reinforcing undemocratic norms, and which are not autonomous from the government and the business.

3 THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY USED IN THIS PROJECT

The definition of ‘civil society’ proposed by the CIVICUS CSI Project is characterised by a broad scope encompassing: ‘formal’ organisations and ‘informal’ forms of collective citizen action, ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movement organisations and ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ interest organisations. The NAG in South Korea, after a heated discussion, accepted this definition for international comparison, but unanimously decided to exclude political parties from the suggested list of 20 types of CSOs for the purpose of the operationalisation of the civil society concept. Without a doubt, both civil society leaders and politicians agreed that political parties are not members of civil society, since in South Korea, they are seen as part of the political system.

Following is a list of 19 types of CSOs representing civil society in South Korea, which were used in the implementation of the CSI in South Korea.

TABLE II.3.2: Types of CSOs in South Korea

1	Faith-based organisations
2	Trade unions
3	Advocacy CSOs (social justice, peace, human rights, consumers' groups)
4	Service CSOs (community development, literacy, health, social services)
5	CSOs active in education, training & research and think tanks
6	Nonprofit media
7	Women's associations
8	Student and youth associations
9	Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups
10	Professional and business organisations
11	Community-level groups/associations (self-help groups, parents' groups)
12	Economic interest CSOs (co-operatives, credit unions, mutual saving associations)
13	Ethnic/traditional/indigenous associations/organisations
14	Environmental CSOs
15	Culture & arts CSOs
16	Social and recreational CSOs & sport clubs
17	Grant-making foundations & fund-raising bodies
18	CSO networks/federations/support organisations
19	Social movements

III MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH KOREA

As part of the CSI, a brief mapping of social and civil society forces was conducted, whose objective was to identify and analyze relationships among civil society groups, as well as their relationship with external forces in society at large. In South Korea, the issue of ‘what is civil society?’ was hotly debated in the 1990s, which resulted in segregations and conflicts among CSOs. We therefore failed to conduct a thorough mapping among the NAG, whose is made up of representatives of different sectors. Instead, the NAG were informed about the definition-related suggestions by CIVICUS and discussed the key criteria of the category, ‘civil society organisation’ in South Korea. NAG members then determined which CSO types belong, or do not belong to civil society according to these criteria. The key criteria for CSOs, which resulted from the first meeting, was ‘public-benefit’, which means that it must exclude labour union (if not labour movement organisation), trade union, churches, business organisations, traditional/indigenous associations, recreational CSOs and sport clubs. The very narrow definition of CSOs is rooted in the common understanding of ‘*simin sachoe danchae*’ (translated literally in English ‘Civil Society Organisation’), which indicates some social reform-oriented active organisations. Therefore, another meeting (composed of some NAG members and a researcher from the NCO) was held to complete the mapping process on the basis of the results from the first NAG meeting, which members were expected to accept a more broader and neutral definition which includes most CSO types suggested by CIVICUS.

It followed a two-step mapping process 1) the identification and analysis of key actors and relations in society and 2) charting various actors in civil society and analyzing the relationship among them. Following figures show a part of social forces mapping.

Step one, identifying key social forces, was carried out by first, letting each NAG member draw up a list of key social actors, and second by confirming key social forces collectively in an open discussion with the guidance of the facilitator. Then, the social forces were arranged based on a scale of influence, weak, moderate or strong. These are visualised in the figures III.1.1 and III.1.2. Numbers used in the figures represent the groups within each CSO type.

Below is a list of CSO types analyzed for mapping civil society.


TABLE III.1.1: Types of CSOs analyzed in mapping

1	Faith-based organisations (except church, temple) ⁶
2	Trade unions
3	Women's associations
4	Student and youth associations
5	Development CSOs (literacy, health, social services)
6	Advocacy CSOs (social justice, peace, human rights, consumers' groups)
7	Education CSOs, think tanks, nonprofit media
8	Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups
9	Social service and health, charity organisations
10	Professional and business organisations
11	Community organisations (village associations, neighbourhood groups)
12	Community-level groups/associations (self-help groups, parents' groups)
13	Economic interest CSOs (co-operatives, credit unions, mutual saving associations)
14	Ethnic/traditional/indigenous associations/organisations
15	Environmental CSOs
16	Culture & arts CSOs
17	CSO networks/federations/support organisations
18	Social and recreational CSOs & sport clubs

Civil society actors are arranged, first in figure III.1.1, in terms of their influence on the state and the market, and second in figure III.1.2, in terms of the national level influence on both the state and the market, and the regional/local level influence on communities. The numbers in the figure refer to the number in the list of CSOs in the above. For example, 1-1 and 1-2 represents faith-based organisation number 1 and number 2.

⁶ According to the understanding among Koreans, religious organisations (e.g. church, temple) are the places where people come together for the purpose of religious worship. On the contrary, faith-based organisation is the association or organisation relatively autonomous from the church, in which the believers come together to serve the needy.

FIGURE III.1.1: Civil Society Map 1




In figure III.1.1, the impact exercised by civil society actors on the state and the market can be divided into four areas: Area I (strong-strong) in northeast, Area II (strong state –weak market influence) in northwest, Area III (weak-strong) in southeast, and Area IV (weak-weak) in southwest. The most powerful actors of South Korean civil society identified in the Area I include several different sub-sectors of civil society, such as two national trade unions (*Korean Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU)*, *Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)*), two advocacy CSOs (*PSPD*, *CCEJ*), two environmental CSOs (*Korea Federation of Environmental Movement (KFEM)*, *Green Korea (GK)*), three professional and business organisations: *Korea Employers Federation (KEF)*, *Chamber of Commerce (CC)*, *Federation of Korea Industries (FKI)* and a community organisation (*New Village Movement (NVM)*).

Other influential groups of South Korean CSOs, in relation to the state, are shown in Area II: religious organisation (3), trade union (1), women's CSO (2), social service and health CSO (4), professional and business organisation (2), CSO network (1), and social, sports organisation (3). Other groups of CSOs that exercise strong influences on the market (see Area III) are a trade union (1) and two socio-economically marginalised group (2).

In summary, two strong trade unions, KFTU and FKTU, and two major advocacy CSOs, PSPD and CCEJ are particularly influential on the state and the market. This is confirmed by an analysis of major newspaper articles and television broadcasts for 2001 to 2003, in terms of total number of major groups of business (KEF, KCC, FKI), labour (KFTU, FKTU), civil

society (PSPD, CCEJ, YMCA, KFEM) mentioned in the press. This shows that PSPD, FK TU and FKI are the top three opinion leaders frequently mentioned in the press (Joo et al., 2004).

FIGURE III.1.2: Civil Society Map 2



In figure III.1.2, the impact of civil society actors on the state and the market at the national level on the one hand and the local/regional communities on the other hand is shown. Again, the most powerful actors of South Korean civil society identified in the Area I belong a range of different types of CSOs, such as national trade unions (KFTU, FK TU, *National Teachers Union*), service CSOs (*Community Chest*, *Korea Federation of Social Welfare*, *The Red Cross of Korea*), environmental CSOs (KFEM, GK) professional and business organisations (*Korean Bar Association*, CC, FKI), community organisation (NVM), and social and sports organisations (Lions Club, Rotary Club, JCI Korea)


In summary, the most powerful groups of CSOs in South Korea shown in Area I of both figure III 1.1 and figure III.1.2 are identified as trade unions, business organisations, professional associations, advocacy CSOs, environmental CSOs.

VI ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY

1 STRUCTURE

This section describes and analyses the overall size, strength and vibrancy of civil society in human, organisational, and economic terms. The score for the Structure Dimension is 1.5. Figure IV.1.1 below presents the scores for the six subdimensions within the Structure dimension: extent of citizen participation; depth of citizen participation; diversity of civil society participants; level of organisation; inter-relations and civil society resources.

FIGURE IV.1.1: Subdimension scores in the structure dimension



1.1 The Extent of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the extent of various forms of citizen participation in South Korean civil society. Table IV.1.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.1.1: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	2.0
1.1.2	Charitable giving	1.0
1.1.3	CSO membership	3.0
1.1.4	Volunteering	2.0
1.1.5	Community action	1.0

1.1.1 Non-partisan political action. According to the Community Survey 2004, as much as 63.3% of respondents have participated in at least one type of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter a newspaper 14% signed a petition 62.1%, attended a demonstration 17.7). According to the data from the World Values Survey 2000, 52.5% (signing a petition 52.3%, joining in boycotts 10.1%, attending lawful demonstrations 22.7%, joining unofficial strikes 9.5%) have an experience of participating in non-partisan political action.

1.1.2 Charitable giving. The Community Survey 2004 shows that during the last year 70.4% of respondents made donations including religious offerings on a regular or irregular basis. A survey by VOLUNTEER 21 in 2002, which excluded religious offerings, shows that 52.4% of respondents gave charitable donations in the last 12 months. However, only 24.1% of donors made donations on a regular basis, e.g. once a month or once several months (Volunteer21, 2002). It means that 13% of the adult population give to charity on a regular basis. Unfortunately no statistical data is available, regarding donors who give to charity on a regular basis by means of either non-religious giving or religious offerings. Religious offerings were excluded from the category of ‘charitable giving’, as religious offerings are often not spent for the charitable purpose, but serves the enlargement of religious organisations.

1.1.3 CSO membership. The result of the World Value Survey 2000 shows that 51.7% of South Korean population belong to at least one civil society organisation (excluding the categories of religious organisations, political party). According to 2003 data from South Korea National Statistical Office, which included seven categories including: social community, religion, leisure, volunteering, academic group, trade union and political associations, 44.8% of South Korean adults were members of at least one CSO (male: 48.2%; female 41.6%). A survey by VOLUNTEER 21, in 2005, shows that 85% of the adult population are CSO members. Community survey 2004 shows a similar result, where 89% belong to at least one civil society organisation. It is noteworthy that the latter two surveys include some kinds of non-public associations such as mutual-benefit credit groups, alumni, and indigenous kinship or local associations in the category of CSOs. The score assigned by the NAG was based on this broad definition of civil society organisation.

1.1.4 Volunteering. A minority of people undertakes volunteer work. The Community Survey 2004 revealed that 19.8% of the adult population participated in voluntary activities through organisations, while 26% of respondents had experience of informal volunteering. Thirty-five and one half percent of the respondents volunteered either formally or informally. The Survey in 2002, by VOLUNTEER 21, showed that 16.3% of adults over the age of 20 had experience

in formal volunteering. According to the official census, which asks “are you volunteering now,” the population of volunteers was only 6.9% in 1993, a decade later, it had more than doubled to 14.6% (Korea National Statistical Office 1994, 2003). A steady increase in volunteering reflects the growth of South Korean civil society. Since 1994 the Korea Council of Volunteering has been established. The same year, a daily newspaper has launched campaigns for volunteering, a university has included volunteering class in its official curriculum, and a conglomerate has founded an organisation for corporate social contribution activities. After that, the government promoted volunteering, establishing a Volunteer Centre in every local district. But as volunteering is conducted mainly in service sectors, other sectors of civil society are often short of volunteers.

1.1.5 Community action. Citizen participation in community activities is limited. According to Community Survey 2004, 41.2% of respondents knew about discussion meetings in the community, and about half of them actually attended those discussion meetings at least once last year. Likewise, 32.4% of the respondents knew about community-organised activities, among them close to 2/3s attended those activities at least once. Consequently, 30.6% of respondents have actually participated in a collective community action within the last 12 months, i.e. attended a community meeting (21.2%); participated in a community-organised events or a collective effort to solve a community problem (20.2%).

1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the depth of various forms of citizen participation in South Korean civil society. Table IV.1.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.1.2: Indicators assessing depth of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Charitable Giving	0
1.2.2	Volunteering	1.0
1.2.3	CSO membership	3.0

1.2.1 Charitable giving. According to the VOLUNTEER 21 Survey in 2002, about 70% of South Koreans donated less than 50,000 Won. A similar amount was found by the Korean Giving Index 2002 (www.beautifulfund.org), which listed the average amount of annual giving as 57,859 Won, which is only 0.38% of the average net income (net income: 15,070,000 Won per capita GNI in 2003: Korea National Statistical Office). Some argue that the restrictive law on fund raising might be a reason for such a small scale of giving. According to the law, civil society organisations may not raise money without a permission of

the government (Hankyoreh, 2005. Nov. 14). Another possible reason for the small scale of giving is that the main driving force in the recent increase in givers is based on the small amount of giving by means of telephone, Internet and mobile phone.

1.2.2 Volunteering. While the breadth of volunteering is rapidly expanding with new volunteers participating from a wide spectrum of society, the depth of volunteering does not show any significant development. The survey of VOLUNTEER 21, in 2005, shows that a volunteer spent an average of 1.02 hours in a week (4.08 hrs per month), less than 1.9 hours and 2.1 hours per week respectively in 1999 and 2002.

1.2.3 CSO membership. According to a survey by VOLUNTEER 21, in 2005, 68% of CSO members belong to more than one CSO, while the result of World Value Survey 2000 indicates 48%. The Community Survey 2004 shows that about 80% of CSO members belong to more than one CSO. Although the result is rooted from a sample survey on the metropolitan area, National Advisory Group members agreed that multiple memberships are common in South Korean civil society.

1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants

This subdimension examines the equitable representation of different social groups within civil society. It analyses the participation of women, minorities and other social groups in CSO leadership and membership, and the distribution of CSOs around the country. Table IV.1.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.


TABLE IV.1.3: Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	1.5
1.3.2	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	1.2
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	1.6

1.3.1 Representation of social groups among CSO members. The assessment of the diversity of civil society participants looks at the representation of the following social groups within civil society: (1) women, (2) rural dwellers, (3) the poor, (4) disabled, (5) foreign workers and (6) the aged. The results of the Regional Stakeholder Consultation (RSC) 2004 show that most minority groups are regarded as severely underrepresented among CSO members, except women and the disabled, who are seen as somewhat underrepresented (see Figure IV.1.2). On the basis of this result, NAG assessed that some significant social groups are absent from CSOs, if not largely absent. While some groups such as the poor and foreign


workers are absent from CSO members, other groups such as women and the disabled are somewhat underrepresented in CSOs.

FIGURE IV.1.2: Diversity of CSO membership



Source: RSC 2004 (1=absent/excluded, 2=severely underrepresented, 3=somewhat underrepresented, 4=equitably represented)

1.3.2 Representation of social groups among CSO leadership. The NAG assessed the representation of minority groups in CSO leadership positions more negatively than in CSO membership. According to regional stakeholder survey, most minority groups are ‘absent’ or ‘severely underrepresented’, except women. (See figure IV.1.3 below.) CSO leadership roles have been taken mainly by intellectuals, who have had experienced of the struggle movement against oppression under the authoritarian regimes before 1987. They have lots of personal networks often from certain distinguished universities (Kwon, 2001). Furthermore, the rather hierarchical characteristics of organisation or networking in civil society might have let the most significant social minority groups excluded from CSO leadership. It is not until recent years that diverse small-scale voluntary organisations at local level have been recognised as a key actor in civil society.

FIGURE IV.1.3: Diversity of CSO leadership

Source: RSC 2004 (1=absent/excluded, 2=severely underrepresented, 3=somewhat underrepresented, 4=equitably represented)

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs around the country. This indicator examines how evenly CSOs are distributed throughout the country. While half of regional stakeholders responded that CSOs were concentrated in the major cities, 41% answered that CSOs are relatively evenly distributed among urban areas. According to the Directory of Korean NGOs 2003, about 50% of CSOs are located in the metropolitan areas (Seoul 33.9%, Gyeonggy Province 12.4%, City of Incheon 3.6%)(see the table IV.1.4). Compared to the previous situation in 1999, the number of CSOs in Seoul and Gwangju has decreased, while CSOs in other areas have increased. Some members of National Advisory Group state that the explicit uneven distribution of CSOs between metropolitan areas and others is not so serious if metropolitan-concentrated demographic composition is taken account: it is natural that CSOs are distributed in proportion to the population. As shown in the table IV.1.4, 46.2% of the whole population live in the metropolitan areas. Accordingly, more than half of the National Advisory Group members evaluated that CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country, even though the rest states that CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.

TABLE IV.1.4: Distribution of CSOs^a (%)

	Civil society	Local autonomy /the poor	Social service	Environment	Culture	Education /research	Religion	Labour	Economy	International	Total	Population ^b
Seoul	39.74	14.35	27.22	28.61	39.50	33.57	80.85	33.90	83.33	83.33	33.91	21.4
Busan	4.08	8.80	6.26	4.89	5.48	8.57	2.13	2.71	0.00	0.00	5.26	7.9
Daegu	3.78	5.09	6.34	5.87	4.11	6.43	0.00	4.75	0.00	2.38	5.00	5.4
Incheon	3.09	5.56	4.41	2.93	2.97	2.14	1.06	4.07	0.00	2.38	3.61	5.4
Daejun	3.19	5.56	4.80	1.22	4.79	7.14	4.26	3.73	0.00	7.14	4.06	3.0
Gwangju	2.59	4.17	3.63	2.93	2.05	5.00	0.00	3.05	16.67	2.38	3.07	2.9
Ulsan	2.49	1.85	2.78	1.96	1.37	2.14	0.00	2.03	0.00	2.38	2.26	2.2
Gye-onggi Province	13.94	16.20	13.15	16.63	6.16	11.43	2.13	9.83	0.00	0.00	12.37	19.4
Gangwon Province	3.29	6.48	3.56	6.85	6.16	0.71	1.06	4.07	0.00	0.00	4.11	3.2
ChungBuk Province	2.49	3.24	3.17	2.69	3.88	4.29	4.26	4.41	0.00	0.00	3.15	3.2
ChungNam Province	3.29	4.63	4.02	4.65	2.74	6.43	1.06	2.03	0.00	0.00	3.61	4.0
JeonBuk Province	4.98	7.41	5.88	3.67	6.85	5.71	1.06	4.07	0.00	0.00	5.28	4.1
JeonNam Province	3.78	5.09	4.41	5.87	3.65	2.14	0.00	8.81	0.00	0.00	4.45	4.3
GyeongBuk Province	3.59	4.63	3.25	5.13	2.51	0.71	1.06	5.76	0.00	0.00	3.53	5.9
GyeongNam Province	4.28	6.02	5.03	5.13	6.39	1.43	1.06	4.75	0.00	0.00	4.75	6.5
Jeju Province	1.39	0.93	2.09	0.98	1.37	2.14	0.00	2.03	0.00	0.00	1.57	1.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

a Source: <Directory of Korean NGOs 2003 >

b Source: Korea National Statistical Office 2000

1.4 Level of Organisation

This subdimension looks at the extent of infrastructure and internal organisation within South Korean civil society. Table IV.1.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.1.5: Indicators assessing level of organisation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of umbrella bodies	2.6
1.4.2	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	2.4
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	1.5
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	1.2
1.4.5	International linkages	1.2

1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies. The scores by National Advisory Group for the existence of umbrella bodies show quite positive results. Whereas there is no empirical data about how many CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body, in the regional stakeholder survey, most respondents assessed that many individual CSOs belong to an umbrella body, federation or network organisation ('a small majority' 44.1%, 'a large majority' 34.3%). As South Korean civil society has grown mainly through its opposition to the central government and big businesses, the strategies of CSOs have been focused on building solidarity networks, which are looser in structure than formal umbrella bodies. *Solidarity Network* was a good example. It came into being after the dissolution of *Citizens' Solidarity for General Election 2000*, which led the *Nakseon* Movement in the 2000 general election. As of 2005, 443 organisations are participating as members in the *Solidarity Network*. However they are so loosely networked that the central organisation of *Solidarity Network* is not representative of each of its members. Other major CSO federation or umbrella bodies include: *Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ)*, *Korea Women's Associations United (KWAU)*, *Korean Women link*, *YMCA*, *Korea Christian Action Organization*, *Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM)*, *Green Korea United (GKU)* and *Global Civic Sharing*. However, some members of National Advisory Group argued that in South Korea there are only a few umbrella bodies in the strict sense which have strong binding force among its members and is representative of the members to the outside.

1.4.2 Effectiveness of umbrella bodies. The NAG score shows that umbrella organisations are rather effective in their work. Most stakeholders regard them as 'somewhat effective' (64%) or 'effective' (29%) in achieving their goals. In the 1990s, the solidarity networks among social reform oriented NGOs used to be effective in achieving their goal of promoting social reform and democratic consolidation. The umbrella bodies are more usual among social welfare organisations which have increased since late 1990s. While the role of the umbrella

bodies for social welfare activities is still positive, the impact of solidarity networks among advocacy NGOs is slightly decreasing.

1.4.3 Self-regulation within civil society. According to the stakeholder survey, 72% of CSOs adhere to a code of ethics. Most regional stakeholders regard the existing self-regulation mechanism of CSOs as quite effective (66%) or effective (12%), however, a minority (21%) regards it as quite ineffective. In recent years, civil society leaders have recognised some ethical scandals (e.g., sexual harassment) as reflecting the weakness of self-regulation and democratisation within civil society. From this reason, about one half of NAG members responded that some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but the impact is limited. Most of the rest answered more negatively. They said that only preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate, even only a small minority of CSOs is involved.

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. The NAG score for this indicator reflects that there is a limited infrastructure for civil society. This is based on the result of the regional stakeholder survey, which shows that most stakeholders (91%) think the support infrastructure is limited. In fact, there are only a few institutions that support CSO activities. The Korean Ngo Times, *Cyber NGO Resource Centre* by Graduate School of NGO Studies of *Sungkonghoe* University, *Resource Centre for Asian NGOs*, *Korea Democracy Foundation*, and *Worldnet* are examples of civil society information centre. These organisations were recently established and their activities lean towards political advocacy and social movements.

On the other hand, the infrastructure for social welfare activities has been relatively well established due to governmental initiatives. Throughout the country, a wide variety of social service CSOs and volunteer centres are financially and administratively supported by the government. As a national umbrella institution, the *Korea Council of Social Welfare* runs a *Social Welfare Information Centre*, which provides periodical data and statistics on social service and volunteering activities.

1.4.5 International linkages. It is difficult to paint a complete picture of the international activities of South Korean CSOs because empirical data is not available. According to the stakeholder survey, 34% of respondents stated that their organisations do not have any international linkages at all, while 37% have some connections with international organisations. Of the 37% with international connections, 27% have experience participating in programs with foreign CSOs, 23% participated in international civil events and 38% participated in international meeting. Although the results of RSC showed a high percentage of CSOs having international linkages, the NAG felt that a limit number of (mainly national

level) CSOs have international linkages. This is because most of the organisations that RSC respondents (89 persons) are affiliated with are CSOs at the national level, of whom only about one-third has international linkages.

1.5 Inter-Relations within Civil Society

This subdimension analyses the relations amongst civil society actors in South Korea. Table IV.1.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.1.6: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	1.7
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	2.1

1.5.1 Communication between CSOs. Communication among CSO actors is seen as somewhat limited. Only about 55% of regional stakeholders evaluated the level of communication and exchange of information between civil society actors as moderate or significant. One critical problem is that communication by means of conferences or seminars typically takes place within individual sectors, not between sectors. In particular, communication between social service CSOs and advocacy oriented CSOs is very rare. Communication between NGOs, trade unions, professional organisations and social movement CSOs is relatively significant, as they sometimes jointly organise coalitions for social causes or international issues.

1.5.2 Cooperation between CSOs. Civil society actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. On the question of CSO alliances regarding certain issues or a common concern, half of regional stakeholders choose ‘very frequently’ (50%) and only 8% answered ‘very seldom or never.’ Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances can be identified, such as the *Nakseon* Movement in 2000, in which more than 900 CSOs participated.

Also the analysis of newspaper articles shows a variety of coalition activities among CSOs. Major CSO advocacy actions have successfully been accomplished through effective coalition strategies (Joo et al., 2003). The following are examples of recent CSO coalition activities:

- Nakseon Movement for Political Reform
- South-North Unification Coalition
- CSO Coalition for Education Reform
- CSO Coalition for Anti-Corruption Legislation
- People’s Action for Newspaper Reform

- Coalition for Local Autonomy Reform
- Civil Coalition for Disability Discrimination Act
- Coalition for abolition of Family Headship System

The NAG score indicates that civil society actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern, and some examples of cross-sectoral CSO coalition can be detected.

1.6 Civil Society Resources

This subdimension examines the resources available for civil society organisations in South Korea. Table IV.1.7 summarises the respective indicator scores.


TABLE IV.1.7: Indicators assessing civil society resources

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	0.8
1.6.2	Human resources	1.3

1.6.1 Financial resources. The NAG assessed that among the three different types of resources, financial resources are the most insufficient impacting CSOs abilities to achieve their goals. According to the stakeholder survey, a majority (54.6%) of respondents consider the financial resource base of their organisation as unstable.

According to respondents, membership fees account for the largest share of the total revenue of CSOs (41.2%) followed by fees and other income (15.5%). Government support accounts for 15%, and the proportion of donation from individuals (11%) and businesses (4%) are relatively small. According to a global survey of 36 nations by Salamon and his associates (2004), the revenue source of South Korean CSOs is composed mainly of membership and fees (71.4%), followed by government support (24.3%) and philanthropy (4.4%). The high proportion of membership fee in CSO revenue means that the financial resource for CSOs is not only small in amount, but also unstable, because there are only a few members who pay their dues on the regular basis. And amount of irregular fees depend on the capacity of individual CSOs to draw the attention of citizens through advertising its brand-name, so that it varies widely according to reputation of individual CSOs. On the contrary, the proportion of government support in revenue of CSOs is small. As many stakeholders pointed out, it is the main reason for the poor and unstable base of financial resource. Because government support is not only small in amount, but also distributed by funding a certain kind of projects or events, it could not strengthen the infrastructure for autonomous activities of CSOs in general.

Figure IV.1.4: Uneven distribution of budget unit: hundred million (□) Won



Source: Directory of Korean NGOs 2003

According to the *Directory of Korean NGOs 2003*, the estimated annual budget of a civil society organisation was approximately 600,000,000 Won on average (about 600,000 USD). However, as shown in figure IV.1.4 above, financial resources are unevenly distributed among different parts of civil society. While the sectors of culture and international aid activities have ample funding, c sectors such as education and research, local autonomy, poverty relief, and environment are short of financial resources. On average, most civil society sectors except a few sectors suffer from a serious financial problem.

1.6.2 Human resources. According to the *Directory of Korean NGOs 2003*, CSOs have an average of 8.5 employees and 20.4% of CSOs have more than 10 employees. It is noteworthy that human resources in civil society are quite unevenly distributed. While social service (14.6 employees on average), religion (6.8 employees) and labour (6.7 employees) sectors have more paid fulltime employees, the other sectors are suffering from a shortage of human resources: culture (3.4 employees), education/academic (3.8 employees), local autonomy/poor people (3.9 employees). Besides, even in the well-staffed CSOs, employees have been suffering from low wages due to poor and unstable financial resources, although most of them are well educated with college diploma and have professional knowledge and expertise. This is the main reason of frequent change of occupation among CSO employees.


Conclusion

As the score 1.5 indicates, the structure of South Korean civil society is of limited strength. The subdimension with the lowest score is the resource (1.0), followed by the depth of citizen participation (1.3). The stakeholders assessed that the Korean civil society suffers from a serious financial, human resource problem. And the amount of the charitable giving and the volunteering time also are not sufficient to strengthen the civil society. The third lowest score is the subdimension of diversity within civil society. There is lack of the leader diversity in particular. On the contrary, the interrelations among civil society actors, the level of organisations, and the breadth of citizen participation are quite strong. Within the subdimension of interrelations, the cooperation among civil society actors is vibrant so that civil society, despite of its low resources, can influence politics and society. Even though the cooperations between service CSOs and advocacy CSOs are rather rare, the cross-sectoral CSO alliances within each are often and effective. Correspondingly, both the existence and effectiveness of umbrella organisation or solidarity networks among CSOs are at high degree. Within the subdimension of the breadth of citizen participation, the non-partisan political action, the CSO membership and the breadth of volunteering show quite high scores. CSO membership indicates the high score, but it was hardly considered by the civil society leaders as an evidence of the vibrant citizen participation in civil society. Because CSO membership concentrates in indigenous and recreational associations, which is not likely to serve strengthening the public sphere where people come together to discuss on social issues. The liveliness of citizen participation in South Korea is rather due to the non-partisan political action and volunteering, which seems to reflect the segregation of advocacy-oriented and service-oriented civil society activities in South Korea.

2. ENVIRONMENT

This section describes and analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which South Korean civil society exists and functions. The score for the Environment Dimension is 1.6, indicating a somewhat neutral environment for civil society. Figure IV.2.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Environment dimension.

FIGURE IV.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension



2.1 Political context

This sub-section describes and analyses the basic features of the political system in South Korea and its impact on civil society. Table IV.2.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.2.1: Indicators assessing political context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.1.1	Political rights	2.0
2.1.2	Political competition	2.0
2.1.3	Rule of law	1.5
2.1.4	Corruption	0.9
2.1.5	State effectiveness	2.0
2.1.6	Decentralisation	0.9

2.1.1 Political rights. Since the democratic liberalisation in 1987, political rights have improved and expanded continuously. A direct election system for presidential elections was introduced in 1987 and regulations, restricting the participation of labour unions and civil organisations in elections were partially abolished in 1998 and 2002, respectively. Reflecting

this reality, the score for South Korea by the Freedom House Index of Political Right has continuously been improving. (See Table IV.2.2 below.)

TABLE IV.2.2: Freedom House Political Rights Index

Years	1985-87	1988-2003	2005
Index	4	2	1

Source: Freedom House (2004; 2005)

Nonetheless, there are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens. For example, the National Security Law prohibits from organizing any communist party and partially restricts political expression and freedom of ideology and conscience. One hundred eighty days before election day, election law prohibit citizens or CSOs from expressing their support or opposition to a candidate or political parties even on a personal homepage.

2.1.2 Political competition. Since the collapse of authoritarian regime in 1987, which had limited the establishment and activities of political parties, political competition has continuously improved. On average, four to six political parties, running in the four general elections have successfully elected members of Parliament. There was even a transition of government when the opposition party, in 1997 took over.

In spite of these developments, factors still exist that severely limit the political advancement of minority parties. The ideological spectrum of political parties was limited to the right, due to a constituency-based electoral system that limits the political advancement of minority parties. Given these circumstances, it would be correct to suggest that the introduction of proportional representation system (party list system) in 2004, and the consequent advancement of political parties with leftist inclinations to the Parliament, marked a significant development in political competition in South Korea. However, this should not be overestimated. The seats of the Democratic Labour Party, the first left-wing party in the National Assembly, account for still no more than 3%. The other non-party members of the National Assembly are conservatives. The South Korean party system, formally a multiple party system, is a two-party system in substance and is skewed toward a rightist political ideology. It is a structural consequence of the past authoritarian regimes which systematically excluded the leftists and labour from the political arena and civil society (Choi 2002).

TABLE IV.2.3: South Korean party system

	UP	GNP	MDP	DLP	The rest
ideological spectrum	Right	Right	Right	Left	Right
% of total representatives	50.8	40.5	3.0	3.3	2.4

Source: National Election Commission (<http://www.nec.go.kr>)

2.1.3 Rule of law. South Korea is governed by *Statutory and Constitutional Law*, and the judicial system is composed of a three trial-level system. Seemingly, these laws and institutions are an embodiment and keep the rule of law. However, while their existence is one thing, their effectiveness is another. First, illegal activities and arbitrary enforcement of laws by the government have been frequently debated (Park 2002). The National Intelligence Services, which repressed citizens, claiming that they were maintaining national security under the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s to 1980s, has continued its illegal activities including: illegal bugging operations against politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats and civic activists (Sisa Journal 2003.4.24). There is evidence that the police selectively enforce the laws against advocacy CSOs and trade unions (The Korean Ngo Times 2003.11.24). Also in politics, 18.9% of national congressmen were found guilty of violating the election law, during the last general election in 2004 (The Hankyoreh 2004.12.10).

Table IV.2.4 shows that while South Korean Society has made great progress on the rule of law, there is significant room for improvement. According to the World Bank, South Korea ranks lowest of the OECD countries.

TABLE IV.2.4: Rule of law compared with OECD countries

	Estimate (-2.5 to +2.5)	Percentile rank (0-100)
OECD(average)	+1.51	90.3
Korea, South	+0.67	68.6

Source: World Bank (2004)

2.1.4 Corruption. South Korea has largely grown through government-led industrialisation and as a result of government bureaucrats holding substantial discretionary power. Issue of corruption in South Korean society, due to the economic involvement of bureaucrats with discretionary powers, has been a topic of wide debate. According to *Transparency International*, the Corruption Perception Index (2004) for South Korea is 4.5 ranking South Korea 47th among a total of 145 countries, while the Bribe Payers Index (2002) is 3.9 ranking South Korea 18th among 21 countries.

A drastic measure to resolve corruption was made recently. With cooperation among civil society leaders, government and congressional leaders and business leaders, the *Social Compact on Anti-corruption and Transparency* (SACT) was launched in March 2005. This Compact is arguably the first systematic attempt in South Korea to curb corruption throughout the government, business, and civil society.

2.1.5 State effectiveness. The number of civil servants in South Korea was 915,945, as of December 2003. This accounts for 1.9% of the total population of South Korea (National Statistical Office 2005), and it is substantially lower in comparison to those of USA and England at 6.9% and 6.5%, respectively. However, the government of South Korea has been a good reputation in terms of its effectiveness (Wade 1990). In particular, the government has executed the role of a tugboat that led government-led economic development through its active involvement in the market. The World Bank's data, as illustrated in Figure IV.2.5, show that the effectiveness gap between OECD countries and South Korea is not very wide.

TABLE IV.2.5: Government effectiveness compared with OECD countries

	Estimate (-2.5 to +2.5)	Percentile rank (0-100)
OECD(average)	+1.56	89.7
Korea, South	+0.95	80.3

Source: World Bank (2004)

However, the government is receiving criticism about its vulnerability on its reform policies on *chaebol* or conglomerate business groups.⁷ Furthermore, the South Korean government performs poorly on social policy. The welfare expenditure accounts for only 10.1% of government expenditure, which is the lowest among the OECD countries, such as Sweden (51.1%), Germany (45.3%), Japan (36.8%) and the United States (28.8%) (Cho, 2002).

2.1.6 Decentralisation South Korea is a politically, economically and geographically centralised nation. Functions and authorities of the central government are highly centralised, to the point of overpowering regional and local governments. As such, South Korean political resources are also highly centralised. Financially, the local government accounted for 26.8% of the total national expenditure in 2004 (NSO <http://kosis.nso.go.kr>).

Recently, the present government, in its effort to address this issue, began pursuing decentralisation as a top national priority, and is planning to transfer the capital from Seoul, which has more than 500 years of tradition and where the central government is located, to a provincial location in the South. However this has led to widespread political resistance among factions of the opposition party and powers with vested interests.

⁷ Chaebol refers to the several dozen large, family-owned Korean corporate groups of Korea such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai. Although they have played a major role in Korean economic development since 1960s, they are criticised for lacking managerial transparency and for monopolizing the nation's wealth.

2.2 Basic Rights and Freedoms

This sub-section describes and analyses to what extent basic freedoms and rights are ensured by law and in practice in South Korea. Table IV.2.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.2.6: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	2.0
2.2.2	Information rights	2.0
2.2.3	Press Freedom	1.9

2.2.1 Civil liberties. Civil liberties have also continuously improved since the Democratization Movement in the 1980s. Reflecting this reality, the score for South Korea on the Freedom House Civil Rights Index has continuously improved. (See Table IV.2.7 below.)

TABLE IV.2.7 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index

Years	1987	1988-92	1993-2005
Index	4	3	2

Source: Freedom House (2004; 2005)

Nonetheless, there is room for improvement. The most important law that restricts civil liberty is the National Security Law (Amnesty International 2004; Freedom House 2004). This Law, constituted in 1948, limits freedom of expression and association, and has always been disputed, due to its ambiguous regulations and arbitrary applicability. For this reason, the UN Human Rights Committee and Amnesty International have ceaselessly recommended its abolition. However, conservative politicians and several national newspapers, including the *Chosun Ilbo*, which has the majority of readers, have resisted its abolition, insisting that North Korea's ambition to invade the South is still significant (Media Review)

In addition, freedom of association and collective action is partially or totally restricted for civil servants, white-collar and immigrant workers.⁸ Due to the South Korean governments restrictions on acquiring citizenship, approximately 20,000 people with Chinese lineage, who were born and are living in South Korea, are still excluded from becoming South Korean

⁸ Civil Servant Law deprives civil servants and teachers of their rights to collective action. And Korean Government has refused to recognise any migrant workers' trade union and publicly announced that the *Migrant Workers Union*, established in 2005, could not have the three basic labour rights- the right to organise, the right to strike, the right to collective bargain.([http\\www.molab.go.kr](http://www.molab.go.kr))

nationals and every year 600 conscientious objectors are being detained for refusing to perform compulsory military service.(Korea Solidarity for Conscientious Objectors. (<http://corights.net>).

2.2.2 Information rights. The Constitutional Law of South Korea stipulates the right to information. The “Law on Freedom of Information on Public Organization” was enacted in 1996. This was the first law of its type in Asia. Although there has been acute conflict between civil society and the government on the issue of the scope of freedom of information, the Freedom of Information Law was amended in 2004 to reflect the perspectives of civil society. Over the last few years, citizen rights to access public information have continuously been expanded and this trend is being greatly enhanced by the expedient introduction of e-Government.⁹ In practice, however, it is still difficult for citizens to obtain information. Regulations that prohibit revealing government information are seen as excessive. Furthermore, the law leaves the decisions on revealing information to the discretion of bureaucrats.

2.2.3 Press freedoms. Freedom of the press in South Korea is guaranteed. According to *Freedom House* (2004), South Korea, although restricted by the National Security Law, belongs to the “Free” country group, in which freedom of the press and expression, in general, are respected.

The NAG decided to give only a moderately positive score on this indicator. Studies tend to mirror the NAG view regarding this indicator. There is no political control over the content of the news media in South Korea, however, the economic environment surrounding the press has threatened freedom of the press. First, three major dailies, whose tones are extremely conservative, account for 75.2% of the newspaper market share (Newspaper and Broadcasting 2004.5), which has seriously limited the diversity of the press in South Korea. These newspapers have been entirely under the control of private owners, who have been arrested on charges of evading taxes, embezzling company funds or transferring wealth to their heirs illegally (The Hankyoreh 21, 2001.8.14).

2.3 Socio-Economic Context

This subdimension analyses aspects of the social and economic situation and their impact on civil society in South Korea. Table IV.2.8 shows the respective indicator score.

⁹ According to the recent report by the UN, Korea, in its level of preparation towards Electronic Government, ranks 5th among countries under investigation (UN Global E-government Readiness Report 2004).

TABLE IV.2.8: Indicator assessing socio-economic context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.3.	Socio-Economic Context	3


To operationalise the concept of ‘socio-economic context’, eight indicators were selected as follows: 1) poverty, 2) civil war, 3) severe ethnic or religious conflict, 4) severe economic crisis, 5) severe social crisis, 6) serious socio-economic inequities, 7) illiteracy, 8) lack of IT infrastructure. For each of these indicators, CSI methodology defined a specific benchmark that indicated that the respective indicator presents a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society.

1. *Widespread Poverty-do more than 40% of South Korean people live on less than \$ 2 per day?* No. The poor, living on less than 350 US dollar a month, account for 15% of the total population. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of widespread poverty in South Korea.

2. *Civil war-did the country experience any armed conflict during the last five years.* No. No armed conflict took place since the South Korean War, 1951-1953.

3. *Severe ethnic or religious conflict.* No. There was no severe ethnic or religious conflict during the last decade.

4. *Severe economic crisis- is the external debt more than the GDP.* No. At the end of 1997, South Korea was confronted with serious financial crisis that had never been experienced by OECD countries (OECE 1998). As a result, the South Korean foreign reserve was almost depleted and South Korea entered into an IMF Relief Loan Agreement for \$57 Billion. In 1998, South Korea experienced the worst economic situation in its history with -6.9% growths. However, in 1999, with a 9.5% economic growth, South Korea was able to quickly escape the crisis. (See figure IV.2.2 below.)

FIGURE IV.2.2: Severe Economic Crisis in 1997

Source: National Statistical Office (<http://kosis.nso.go.kr>)

Due to this economic crisis, the transition of opposition party into government materialised for the first time in South Korean history. With the emergence of a government that was favourable to civil society, the relationship between the government and civil society entered into a new era.

5. *Severe social crisis.* In the last decade, South Korea has not experienced any serious social crisis.

6. *Severe socio-economic inequities- is the Gini index more than 40.0?* No. Income inequality in South Korean society, in spite of rapid economic growth, is not significant. According to the UNDP (2004), the South Korean Gini Index of 31.6 ranks it 27th among 127 countries. This value, although higher than those of Japan (24.9), Sweden (25.0) and Germany (28.3), is lower than those of England (36.0), the USA (40.8) or other newly industrializing nations including Hong Kong (43.4) and Singapore (42.5).

7. *Pervasive adult illiteracy- are more than 40% of the adult population illiterate?* No. South Korean society uses its unique language called “HANGUL” that is very easy to learn, and education until 16 years of age is compulsory by Law. As such, the illiteracy in adults in South Korea is at a very low level of 3.1% (UNDP 2004).

8. *IT infrastructure- are there less than 5 hosts per 10,000 inhabitant?* No. IT infrastructure in both the government and private sector of South Korea is highly developed. Of the total population of South Korea 76.5% subscribes to a mobile communication network and 79% are connected to ultra-high speed Internet services (Ministry of Information and Communication 2005). Internet in South Korea has established itself as a space for internal communication within civil society.

2.4 Socio-cultural context

This subdimension describes and analyses to what extent socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society in South Korea. Table IV.2.9 shows the respective indicator score.


TABLE IV.2.9: Indicator assessing socio-cultural context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.4.1	Trust	1.1
2.4.2	Tolerance	0.0
2.4.3	Public spiritedness	2.0

2.4.1 Trust. According to the Community Survey 2004, only one fourth of South Koreans thinks that most people can be trusted. It means that mistrust is widespread in South Korea. It is similar to the result of WVS 2000 (27.3%).


2.4.2 Tolerance. South Korea is composed of a single race and as such there are no serious racial conflicts or racially discriminating organisations. Therefore, it would appear that that value of tolerance might not be viewed as important. However, a culture of intolerance is not common in South Korea. Figure IV.2.3 illustrates the ratio of reluctance in accepting a member of a minority group as one's neighbour. The ratio of people rejecting people of a different race is relatively low, however, more than 80% of respondent expressed their rejection towards AIDS infected individuals and homosexuals. The tolerance indicator generated from these data is 3.1¹⁰, characterizing South Korean society as highly intolerant. As the reasons for these high levels of intolerance, some scholars take notice to various historical and political experiences that have suppressed the diversities of ideologies and culture, such as the long-embedded Confucianism, colonialism under Japan (1910-1945) and authoritarian rule(1948-1988) etc.(Ha 2003).

¹⁰ This indicator derived by averaging the means for the three variables; 1) people of a different race, 2) People of a different religion(Muslims), 3) immigrants/foreign workers, 4) people who have AIDS, 5) Homosexuals.

FIGURE IV.2.3: People intolerant of certain groups as neighbours

Source: World Values Survey (2000-2001)

2.4.3 Public spiritedness. This indicator is operationalised via survey questions about the extent to which citizens have a tendency to violate certain public norms, e.g. cheating on taxes, claiming state subsidies without entitlement etc. According to the Community Survey 2004, the majority of South Koreans look upon behaviours that go against public norm as very negative (Figure IV.2.4).

FIGURE IV.2.4: Degree of Citizen's Endorsement of Antisocial Practices

Source: Community Survey (2004)

The result is similar to that of the World Values Survey. The public spiritedness indicator

generated from the WVS2000 is 1.9¹¹, which shows a moderate level of public spiritedness.

2.5 Legal environment

This sub-section describes and analyses to what extent the existing legal environment is enabling or disabling to civil society. Table IV.2.10 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.2.10: Indicators assessing legal environment

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	1.1
2.5.2	Allowable advocacy activities	1.3
2.5.3	Tax exemption	0.6
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	1.1

2.5.1 CSO registration. The law requiring registration or reporting of CSOs was abolished in 1997. However, the registration process is still difficult and complicated. According to the Law on Supporting NPOs, CSOs have to meet several requirements in order to register with the authorities, including: having at least one hundred members; having produced achievements in public benefit activities during the past one year and not playing political roles. To register as a legal person is even more difficult.¹² It requires the submission of lists of property owned by CSO, personal detail information about the board and the starting members, the articles of association, and the minutes of general meeting for establishment etc. Thus most civic and advocacy organisations are unincorporated and informally organised (Salamon et al. 2004).

2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities. Respondents to the stakeholder survey assess that legal advocacy activities for rights are somewhat restricted (41.1%) and 27.8% believe the restriction is excessive. Laws limiting CSO advocacy activities include: the “Law on gatherings and demonstration”, which restricts demonstrations¹³ the “Election Law”, which restricts election activities the “Law on control of collection of contribution fund”, which

¹¹ The score is derived from a combined index of three variables; 1) avoiding a fare on public transport, 2) cheating on tax, 3) accepting a bribe.

¹² One fifth of regional stakeholders in Korea are still making unsatisfactory evaluation on the process and cost of registration. (RSC 2004). Considering that a lot of them belong to an organisation that has qualifications for registration, “one fifth” is by no means small number.

¹³ The law prohibits not only from staging rallies in the peripheral zones of foreign embassies, schools, main roads etc., but also from holding vigils after sunset

makes financial procurement difficult¹⁴ and the “National Security Law”, which restricts the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly. The National Security Law was adopted 50 years ago in the context of a divided Korea. South Korean officials have argued that the country needs the National Security Law to counter the military threat from North Korea. But the National Security Law has been widely misused to detain people who posed no threat to security. South Korean governments have consistently used the law to remove people who pose a threat to established political view, to prevent people from taking part in discussion surrounding relations with North Korea and as a form of control at times of social unrest. (<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250031999?open&of=ENG-KOR>)

2.5.3 Tax exemption. A majority of CSOs in South Korea does not pay taxes because of their small size. However, it is not the case that CSOs in general are exempted from taxes because of any favourable taxation law. On the contrary, CSOs that have acquired prescribed condition and legal status must pay prescribed taxes on income of any kind (Cha 2002). Therefore, the NAG’s score on this indicator was very low (average of 0.6).¹⁵

2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy. There are some provisions in the tax law that offer tax benefits for philanthropy. If a contribution is made to a particular CSO in accordance with the “Law on support for non-profit organisation”, then the contributor can receive a partial tax deduction. If the contributor is a corporation, then a contribution of up to 5% of its income can be deducted, and if the contributor is an individual, then up to 10% of income can be claimed as a tax deduction. However, the issue is that such deductions are applicable only when a contribution is made to a specific organisation, which has satisfied the complicated conditions of registering, such as the legal registration and recommendation of the proper authorities, the authorisation from the Minister of Economy and Finance, rather than all CSOs. Therefore, such preferential taxation clauses do not encourage or assist either contributors or CSOs in need of contributions (Cha 2002).

¹⁴ The law requires prior authorization from authorities before CSOs can raise contributions and prohibits from paying the advertisement expenses for subscription which exceed 2% of the total contribution fund.

¹⁵ This negative evaluation compares with a positive one of the Johns Hopkins Legal environment (Salomon et al. 2004). It seems that the difference between them is caused by different conceptualizations of “civil society”. Unlike our concept, that of the Johns Hopkins includes the education organisations (41% of total CSO workforce), such as pre-schools, elementary schools, high schools, universities, which are much favoured with tax exemption in Korea.

2.6 State-civil society relations

This sub-section describes and analyses the nature and quality of relations between the state and civil society in South Korea. Table IV.2.11 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.2.11: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.6.1	Autonomy of CSOs	1.6
2.6.2	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	1.0
2.6.3	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	1.3


2.6.1 Autonomy. CSOs in South Korea, including labour unions, had long been under the control of the authoritarian regime. Since the Citizen Uprising in 1987, a large number of new and autonomous CSOs have formed, and the majority of existing organisations have escaped from the control of the government. Overall, the autonomy of South Korean civil society has improved greatly. However, the status of the incorporated CSOs remains much the same. They are still subject to frequent unwarranted interference from the related authorities in their operation.¹⁶ This is why most advocacy civic groups do not want to be incorporated despite of its economic and legal advantages (The Hankyoreh 2004. 5.20). Reflecting these situations, opinions of regional stakeholders on this issue are divided fairly evenly between those who see a lack of autonomy and those who regard civil society has been able to operate rather independently.

2.6.2 Dialogue. There are institutional channels of communication between the government and civil society, such as, the Government Advisory Committee, the Public-Government Cooperative Project and the Government Supported Public Foundation. These channels were activated following the inauguration of Kim Dae-Jung in 1997. However, the capacity and role of these channels are still quite limited. As of 2004, the ratio of CSO activists participating in the 249 committees, reached an average of 19.6%, bureaucrats occupy the chairmanship of the committees and activists' roles are limited to those of advisors without the right to vote (Committee on Development of Civil Society 2004). Thus, the clear majority of regional stakeholders (67.3%) evaluated communication with the government as limited.

¹⁶ For example, the veterans' organisations, whose members amount to 700 million, are supervised by the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs in the process of their establishment, election, dissolution etc (Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs 2004). And the same is true for some business organisations and service CSOs supported by the state. A survey reported 34% of professional and business organisations are interfered with by the related authorities (Civil Service Commission 2003).

2.6.3 Cooperation/support. The government supports CSOs directly and indirectly. Indirectly, the government provides tax exemptions or deductions and administrative support through various laws, although in practice these laws have little significance (see section 2.5.3). Directly, the government is providing financial support through the Law on support for nonprofit organisations. However, the overall level of support is quite limited.¹⁷ To make matters worse, at the local level, the major beneficiaries of financial support were often the CSOs which formerly were controlled by the authoritarian government, such as the *Korea Freedom League* and the *National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement* (RSC 2004; The Hankyoreh 2004. 10.27).

FIGURE IV.2.5: Sources of CSO revenue in South Korea



Source: Salamon et al. (2004)

As a result, the share of governmental financial contribution to the revenue the nonprofit sector as illustrated in Figure IV.2.5, accounts for only 24%. The majority of CSOs have to rely on their own means of generating revenues including user fees.

2.7 Private sector-civil society relations

This sub-section describes and analyses the nature and quality of relations between the private sector and civil society in South Korea. Table IV.2.12 summarises the respective indicator scores.

¹⁷ The total sum of funds provided to non-profit organisations was \$15,000,000 annually for the 1999-2003 period, which was cut to \$10,000,000 in 2004 because the main opposition Grand National Party and major newspapers stubbornly opposed financial support for the advocacy CSOs (NGO Times 2004.9.12).

TABLE IV.2.12: Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.7.1	Private sector attitude to Civil Society	0.8
2.7.2	Corporate social responsibility	1.1
2.7.3	Corporate philanthropy	1.6

2.7.1 Private sector attitude. The relationship between business and civil society in South Korea is more confrontational than cooperative. Prominent CSOs (PSPD, CCEJ etc.) in South Korea continuously check and monitor the activities of conglomerates.

Conglomerates, including *chaebol*, show two conflicting attitudes towards CSOs. First, they deploy direct countermeasures against certain CSOs. The Federation of South Korean Industries, a major *chaebol* lobbying group, and the Centre for Free Enterprise, a pro-*chaebol* think tank, have openly denounced advocacy CSOs as anti-market leftists through statements, newspaper advertisements, publications and lectures to citizens, since they perceive CSOs' monitoring activities as challenging the capitalistic market and ownership order. Other businesses attempt to establish cooperative partnerships with civil society. In order to achieve this, some of *chaebol* and conglomerates continuously expanded their support and contribution activities (FKI 2004). However, in so far as regional stakeholders are concerned, businesses are mainly seen as ignorant (66.0%) or even hostile (21.3%), rather than favourable to civil society (12.8%) (RSC 2004).


2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility. South Korean businesses have recently begun to work on their social responsibility, but are facing severe criticisms from the general public and advocacy CSOs for their lack of accountability and transparency (Joo 2003). Civil society leaders feel businesses tend to only pay lip service to the notion of corporate social responsibility. The results of stakeholder survey also reflect this trend with half respondents stating that there is limited work of companies on corporate social responsibility and another third stating that the work is insignificant.

Recently, during the Presidential election in 2002, it was revealed that major *chaebols* as global corporations had provided illegal election contributions to politicians. Their moral hazard is being recognised as one of the factors that caused economic crisis in 1997(OECD 1999). In addition, although not frequently, some major businesses have been criticised for their anti-social environmental crimes. For example, one of oldest corporations in South Korea discharged Phenolchemie, an environmental pollutant, into a river in 1992 and was legally and socially punished. As a result, major businesses receive low levels of trust (35%), while NGOs enjoy the highest (77%) among major social institutions (Gallup International

2003; Joo 2004a).

2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy. Social contributions by South Korean businesses, in aggregation, are quite substantial. Approximately 1.865 Billion \$USD, from 202 major businesses was contributed to various organisations, foundations or the governments etc.(FKI 2004). However, in its composition, this is severely lopsided and contributions to support the activities of CSOs are very meagre at 3.1% of the total (FigureIV.2.6). The rest of the contributions by businesses goes to governments or their own foundations which are being suspected to be a means of illegally inheriting owners' wealth to their heirs or evading taxation (PSPD 1998).

FIGURE IV.2.6: Social contribution rates by institutions donated



Source: FKI(2004)

As a consequence 3/4s of stakeholders mentioned that in their experience during the last financial year no CSO received any funding from indigenous businesses (RSC 2004). One reassuring fact, however, is that corporate support for certain public foundations including foundations established with its own capitalisation is decreasing, and that contribution to civil organisation is continuously, albeit slightly, increasing (FKI 2004).

Conclusion

Overall, the average score of 1.6 given to the environment dimension suggests that the environment is neither particularly favourable nor unfavourable to civil society in South Korea. Nonetheless, the analysis indicates that the various political, social, cultural, economic and legal factors affecting the external environment in South Korea have varying impacts,

from enabling to disabling on civil society's activities.


The socio-economic context received the highest score of 3.0 and is the most significant strength in the dimension. Some indicators, such as IT infrastructure and illiteracy, are particularly conducive to the development of South Korean civil society. This strength is a result of long lasting positive socio-economic developments in South Korea, beginning in the 1960s. Albeit assessed as somewhat less positive, basic freedoms and political context are also conducive for South Korean civil society. Basic freedoms, such as civil liberties, rights to information and freedom of the press, have constantly been enhanced and political contexts, such as political rights or political competition, have been improving since the democratic liberalisation in 1987. Despite these developments, many regional stakeholders and NAG pointed out some laws, such as the National Security Law, the Election Law or the Law on Freedom of Information, as the obstacles for citizens to participate in political process.

The socio-cultural context and legal environment are the main weaknesses of this dimension. Mistrust and intolerance are widespread among South Korean citizens. The level of intolerance towards minority social groups is among the highest in the world. The existing legal environment surrounding CSOs' activities is also disabling. The law on gatherings and demonstration and the National Security Law interfere with free advocacy activities, and the tax law and the Law on control of collection of contribution fund are not favourable to the CSOs' finances and fundraising. Most of these weaknesses originated in the cultural and legal legacy of the past, including Confucianism, colonialism and authoritarianism. In addition, civil society relations with the private sector and state were assessed as problematic. Since the major CSOs concentrated their efforts on improving the accountability of the state and the business, the conflicts has been more usual than collaboration between them. Generally speaking, the environment in which South Korean civil society exists is rather detrimental to the activities of civil society.

3 VALUES

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practiced by South Korean civil society. The score for the Values Dimension is 2.3, indicating a positive value basis of South Korean civil society. Figure IV.3.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Values dimension.

FIGURE IV.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension



3.1 Democracy

This sub-section describes and analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society practices and promotes democracy. Table IV.3.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	1.8
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	2.6

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs. This indicator looks at the extent to which CSOs practice democracy within their organisations. Under the authoritarian regime, major South Korean CSOs, including trade unions, professional and business organisations, teachers' organisation and major service organisations, were established and controlled by a corporatist system (Kim 1997; Choi 1998).¹⁸ The government strongly intervened in the process of their

¹⁸ Corporatist system can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, licensed by the state (Schmitter et al.

election and decision-making. Therefore, their members' preferences were minor considerations for the leaders and democratic practices could not exist within major CSOs. This remained the case until the late 1980s.

However, with the breakdown of the authoritarian regime and the transition to democracy, the situation has changed dramatically. Advocacy CSOs and trade unions, as the vanguards of democratisation and key players in ending authoritarianism in South Korea, have introduced democratic practices in their operations. KFEM, the largest environmental organisation in Asia, is a just one example. In 2003, it took important measure to expand democracy within its organisation. The nearly eighty thousands members of KFEM directly elected the Secretary General for the first time in the history of South Korean CSOs (The Hankyoreh 21 2003. 1.29)

Nonetheless, there is room for improvement for democracy within CSOs, because some CSOs still adhere to their old non-democratic practices. *Seoul YMCA*, with 100 years of history, still excludes women in their decision-making process. It illustrates that democracy within South Korean CSOs is characterised by highly uneven development. Overall, there is significant room for improvement for democracy within CSOs. According to stakeholder survey, only 62.8% of organisations elect their leaders democratically involving its members. Overall, there is significant room for improving democracy within CSOs.

3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy. Historically, civil society has played an extremely significant role in promoting democracy and its role in the democratisation process was particularly critical. The historical turning point that initiated the Citizen Uprising of 1987 was marked by the resistance of civil society, which continued to impart the expansion of democracy. *Citizens' Solidarity for General Election 2000* is a symbolic example of political democracy in South Korea. This campaign, with the goal of ousting anti-democratic politicians through the election, was joined by some 900 CSOs, and resulted in successfully ousting 59 of the 86 targeted candidates (Moon 2000).

Enormous efforts are also put in the democratisation at the social level. For example, the *Union of Teachers and Education Workers of Korea*, an umbrella organisation of teachers working to improve the environment and circumstances of education, has played a substantial role in political democratisation, as well as in promoting democracy within schools. The activities of the *Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media*, which seeks democracy within the

1979).

mass media, and CCEJ and PSPD, are pressing for the democratisation of corporate governance (Park 2002).

3.2 Transparency

This sub-section describes and analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society practices and promotes transparent procedures and behaviour. Table IV.3.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within Civil Society	1.8
3.2.2	Financial Transparency of CSOs	3.0
3.2.3	Civil Society actions to promote transparency	2.6

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society. Although issues of corruption in the government and the market are quite common, reports of corruption within civil society are rare. The majority of regional stakeholders saw corruption within civil society is ‘very rare’ (51.1%) and ‘occasional’ (43.6%).

In the case of religious organisations, however, the situation is quite different. Some religious groups are categorised as some of the most corrupt organisations in South Korean civil society (The Hankyoreh 2004.12.5; Sisa Journal 2005.). Some large churches, which have tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of members, were often accused of appropriating funds, evading taxes or transmitting orders from fathers to sons (Christian Alliance for Church Reform: <http://www.protest2002.org>). The same situation is true of some Buddhist denominations (The Hankyoreh 2005.1.5). These groups are characterised by, and well known for, their lack of an external checking or control mechanism.

Overall, NAG assessed that CSOs also are not free from corruption, since the internal or external monitoring and accounting system are in many cases not yet established.

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs. Recently, CSOs in South Korea began to make their financial statements public (The Korean Ngo Times 2003.11.24). Several major CSOs, such as PSPD, *Citizens’ Action Network* and *The Beautiful Foundation*, made their financial statements public on the Internet. *The Beautiful foundation* is a leading organisation pursuing financial transparency, to the point of making public, in minute detail on the Internet, how contributions from citizens and groups are made and how they are used.

It is interesting to note that financial transparency is closely associated with the capacity and level of financial independence of CSOs. According to stakeholder survey, an overwhelming majority of organisations (85.4%) open their financial statements to the public. While financially stable and independent organisations can do so, a majority of financially unstable organisations have difficulties making their financial statements public. It is not because these relatively small organisations lack financial transparency, but because they suffer from low levels of financial independence and a lack of knowledge or expertise in accounting (RSC 2004)

3.2.3 Civil society actions to promote transparency. Advocacy CSOs are determined and focused on activities aimed at encouraging the practice of transparency within the government and market. These include monitoring the budget of central and regional governments, activities promoting the freedom of information, campaigns for passing a law on the prevention of corruption and a law on the protection of private information. Examples of activities aimed at increasing transparency in the market include: monitoring corporate accounting and campaigns for minority shareholders. A *Social Compact on Anti-corruption and Transparent Society* (2005) is an intensive expression of such efforts. This Compact has been collaborated upon by the government, politicians and enterprises, and organised by civil society, in order to eradicate corruption from all sectors of society. It is anticipated that this will substantially contribute to reducing corruption in South Korea (Transparency International 2005)

3.3 Tolerance

This sub-section describes and analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society practices and promotes tolerance. Table IV.3.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	1.9
3.3.2	Civil society activities to promote tolerance	1.9

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena. There are some cases of intolerant forces within South Korean civil society, including a recently founded rightist organisation, *Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Kim*, in which some evangelical churches, veteran organisations and conservative extremists frequently participate. An analysis of major newspapers reveals that among these groups, especially evangelicals have frequently taken a hostile attitude toward homosexuals,

people infected with HIV/AIDS, religious minorities (Muslim, etc.) or conscientious objectors. However, such intolerant groups tend to be criticised within Korean civil society (RSC 2004).

3.3.2 Civil society actions to promote tolerance. CSO activities to promote tolerance in society were not an important issue, because most of them concentrated their efforts on more fundamental political and socio-economic democratisation and reforms.

South Korean CSOs have long emphasised common attitudes and actions, rather than admitted the existence of diversity within society, because of their long-lasting struggle against the authoritarian regime. It is not until recent years that CSOs express and accept diverse views and ideologies (Korea NGO Report 2004). As a result, a variety of conflicts have been growing, e.g. between progressive and conservative CSOs, between advocacy and service CSOs (Media Review). However, on the other hand, some influential CSOs for minorities (immigrant workers, homosexuals, conscientious objectors, mentally ill people etc.) have exercised their influence, thus contributing to the promotion of tolerance in society at large (Korea NGO Report 2002-2003). In particular, the advocacy activities for the disabled and women who had been discriminated for a long time, succeeded in improving tolerance toward them. Reflecting this reality, 34.6% of regional stakeholders knew several or many examples of CSOs' activities dedicated to promoting tolerance (RSC 2004). However the activities of improving tolerance in society at large have not been the main concern in South Korean civil society, thus limited to a minority of CSOs.

3.4 Non-violence

This sub-section describes and analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society practices and promotes non-violence. Table IV.3.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the CS arena	2.0
3.4.2	CS actions to promote non-violence	2.0

3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena. In its struggle against the authoritarian government in the 1980s, South Korean civil society had sometimes resorted to violence. Students formed barricades and threw rocks and petrol bombs at the police, and labourers occupied factories and roads. These practices have gradually decreased during the process of democratisation, and recently non-violent and peaceful rallies have become more common. The Anti-American rallies, and Anti-War and Peace rallies in 2002 and 2003, and the Anti-

Impeachment rallies in 2004 symbolically illustrated the culture of peaceful demonstrations in South Korea. During this period, several demonstrations or gathering had tens of thousands of participants. These all progressed as peaceful demonstrations, with participants expressing their opinions through “lighted candles”, without the presence of violent confrontation.

Violent demonstration, however, has not yet disappeared altogether. In 2003, physical confrontation between the regional residents, including CSOs, and government sustained for several months over the issue of the construction of nuclear waste treatment plant in the *Buan* district. Such an expression of opinion through violent means still occurs occasionally in South Korea. However, in most cases, such violent behaviour is no longer justified. Of the regional stakeholders, 84% agreed that violent behaviour is criticised by civil society at large.

3.4.2 Civil Society actions to promote non-violence. Activities of civil society to promote non-violence in South Korea can be largely divided into three categories. The first category is the direct protection of minorities who are subjected to violence. The rights of minorities in South Korea have been restricted and they have been consistently exposed to violence. Violence against women, children and foreign labourers has frequently been a social issue. Campaigns for a non-violent society, centred around female organisations, children’s organisations, legal organisations and organisations for the rights of immigrant workers, have been continuously pursued.

The second category is the direct arbitration for the peaceful resolution of conflicts between groups within civil society, or between civil society and the government. Major CSOs have attempted to arbitrate conflict through peaceful means in cases such as a dispute between a pharmacist and oriental herbal medical doctors in 1994, the dispute between medical doctors and pharmacists in 2000 and confrontation between the residents of *Buan* and the government in 2003 and 2004.

The third category consists of programs that indirectly assist peaceful conflict resolution efforts, in contrast to the cases described above. *Women Making Peace* is an example of a conflict resolution program. Teenagers and ordinary civilians are being educated and trained to resolve conflicts through conversation and tolerance rather than violence, through this program.

These activities have been performed mainly by advocacy CSOs and major civic groups that have human and organisational resources to intervene in a violent dispute or an act of violence. Compared to these organisation, service CSOs and relatively small regional CSOs have

played a passive role in promoting a non-violent society. Hence, regional stakeholders, who are affiliated with the relatively small regional CSOs, provided a more negative assessment than NAG members regarding civil society's role in promoting non-violence. Only 11.8% of regional stakeholders replied that there were numerous programs for peaceful resolution of conflict, while an absolute majority responded that they know one or two (33.8%) or several (47.1%) cases.

3.5 Gender equity

This sub-section describes and analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society promotes and practices gender equity. Table IV.3.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equality

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the CS arena	<u>2.0</u>
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	<u>2.4</u>
3.5.3	CS actions to promote gender equity	<u>2.7</u>

3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena. The extent of gender discrimination within the civil society sector is evaluated by NAG members as limited. This assessment is grounded on the fact that in major CSOs (PSPD, *Environmental Campaign Coalition*, *Green Coalition*, etc) female employees and members account for almost 50% (The Korean Ngo Times 2002. 2. 9). Unlike the case of members, however, women are somewhat underrepresented in civil society leadership positions. It was pointed out in a survey conducted by a feminist organisation that important decision-making has been mainly the role of male in major civil society organisations (Korean Women's Environmental Network 2005). On this issue the response by regional stakeholders was mixed. While 57% stated that civil society usually or always denounces such practices, around 25% expressed that this is rarely so (RSC 2004). From these results it can be inferred that there remains some gender inequity in South Korean civil society arena.

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs. Recently, South Korean society experienced significant progress in gender equity (see section 3.5.3) and CSOs have been the driving force behind this progress. Nevertheless, it seems to be different when it comes to practice within CSOs. According to the regional stakeholder survey, more than half (52.9%) of CSOs do not have a documented policy on gender equality in employment. This does not mean that they do not care about gender equity in their organisations. They just do not have a written or unwritten document on gender equity. Although most CSOs have unwritten policies or norms

on internal gender equity, they do not feel they need a written form because of the small number of their employees (RSC 2004).

3.5.3 Civil society actions to promote gender equity. A range of activities to promote gender equality in society are being carried out by CSOs. A good example is the campaign to abolish “the system of head of household” which places emphasis on the male and causes the female to on a subordinate role in the family. This has been forming the foundation of paternalistic social system of South Korea. This system, which has maintained itself, came to confront a powerful challenge in 2000 with the formation of the *Coalition of Citizens for Abolition of System of Head of Family* in which 113 CSOs participated under the leadership of *South Korea Women's Associations United (KWAU)*, and a representative women’s organisation in South Korea.

As a result of the prolonged campaign, the system of head of household was finally abolished in 2005. The majority of CSOs anticipate that it will play a pivotal role in progressing from the current male-centred society towards a society of gender equality. In addition, the Special Law on Sexual Violence (1993) and Law on Prevention of Family Violence (1997) made substantial contributions towards reducing sexual and physical violence against women. The role of CSOs centred on women’s organisations was critical in drafting these laws. Another example of CSOs’ efforts in this area is the Law on prevention of prostitution (2004) aimed to eradicate prostitution, by defining it as social violence against women.

The second trend is the attempt by CSOs to strengthen the political position of women. Although women account for 50.9% of the voters, their political representation is limited. In 2003, 321 women’s organisations set up *Coalition of Women for General Election* to improve the situation. The Coalition commenced activities to improve the election system and election itself, in order to establish the political power of women. This contributed to achieving 13%, in terms of political representation of women in parliament, the highest share in the history of South Korea. This is more than a two-fold increase in representation of women in the political arena from the previous election, which was 5.9% (NEC 2005).

The third area consists of direct support activities for women. *Women’s Telephone*, established in 1983, provides consultation and protective custody for females subjected to physical and sexual violence. *Consultation Centre for Victims of Sexual Violence in Korea*, established in 1991, is a specialised consultation centre for victims of sexual violence and provides consultation for female victims, protective custody for 24 hours and legal assistance for acts of self-defence of the female victims.

Last, the fourth trend is the support for women’s organisations. *Korea Foundation for Women* was established with the aim of providing financial assistance to foster female professionals, and to women’s organisations. This foundation was initiated when the overseas financial assistance for women’s organisation ceased along with South Korea’s joining the OECD. This resulted in majority of women’s organisations experiencing difficulty in their operation. Prominent female personnel from all sectors of society and women’s organisations led the establishment of this foundation.

In conclusion, nearly all NAG members scored “3”, reflecting the assessment that civil society has been very successful in promoting gender equity.

3.6 Poverty Eradication

This sub-section should describe and analyzes the extent to which South Korean civil society promotes poverty eradication. Table IV.3.6 presents the indicator score.

TABLE IV.3.6: Indicator assessing poverty eradication

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	CS actions to promote poverty eradication	2.3

3.6.1 Civil society actions to promote poverty eradication. During the dramatic economic growth in South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, poverty was not a serious issue. As pointed out above under indicator 2.3.1., the reason was that the poverty level had continuously decreased through continuous and rapid government-led economic growth and full employment. However, poverty has gradually increased since the financial crisis of 1997. Representative CSOs of South Korea such as PSPD, CCEJ and The Korea Women’s Association, have come together to push for the expansion of social rights, including poverty eradication. Furthermore, numerous welfare organisations, such as *Korea Welfare Foundation* and *Korea Research and Consulting on Poverty* are active in advocating and assisting poor minorities. The majority of regional stakeholders evaluate such activities as being “moderate” (52.0%) or “significant” (37.3%). On the basis of this result, some NAG members scored “3”, taking the advocacy activities for the poor into consideration, while the rest answered “2” because of the CSOs’ poor contribution to direct support for livelihood of the poor.

3.7 Environmental Protection

This sub-section describes and analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society practices and promotes environmental sustainability. Table IV.3.7 presents the indicator score.

TABLE IV.3.7: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	CS actions to sustain the environment	2.6

3.7.1 Civil society actions to sustain the environment. The environmental movement in Korea had its origins in the launching of the *Korean Research Institute of Environmental Problems* in response to widespread pollution caused by the nation's rapid industrialisation. Environmental movements, with the emergence of national coalition organisations, such as the KFEM (1993) and GKU (1994), which are representative environmental CSOs in Asia, have become one of the most active areas of CSO activities. They have participated in many advocacy activities, such as the opposition of government development plans that destroy nature, a public campaign on the problems with nuclear power plants and nuclear waste disposal and environmental protection. Especially, the movements to save the *Dong River* (2000) and to cancel the plan to reclaim *Saemankeum* (2003) grew beyond environmental CSOs, to encompass religious CSOs and academic and social CSOs. Consequently, an overwhelming majority of regional stakeholders evaluate the effects of these environmental protection activities as “significant” (82.4%).

Conclusion

Overall, the NAG’s evaluation of the values dimension was quite positive. The average score of 2.3 signifies that the positive values that South Korean civil society is promoting and practicing are significant. In particular, the promotion of values, such as environmental sustainability, transparency and gender equality are recognised as accomplishments of Korean civil society.


This result is consistent with many studies that consider civil society a key element of South Korea’s democracy, which has been maturing since the 1990s. In this period, South Korean CSOs have made efforts not only to make the political process more democratic and transparent, but also to introduce democratic procedures and norms, such as elections of leaders or the publication of accounts, within their own organisational processes.

Although the value dimension received the highest score among the four dimensions, some subdimensions point to room for improvement in civil society’s promotion of certain values, such as intolerance and non-violence. The CSOs seem to fail to spread the culture of tolerating ‘the other’, the person or group with a different value from each other.

4. IMPACT

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions within South Korean society. The score for the Impact Dimension is 1.9, reflecting the high level. Figure IV.4.1 presents the scores for the five subdimensions within the Impact dimension.

FIGURE IV.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension



4.1 Influencing Public Policy


This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which South Korean civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy. Table IV.4.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing public policy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Political reform	2.5
4.1.2	protection of environment	2.7
4.1.3	anti-corruption	2.6
4.1.4	gender equality	2.7
4.1.5	Social welfare	2.0
4.1.6	protection of human rights	2.5

South Korean civil society is very active in influencing public policies, and its impact is evaluated as quite successful (see the Figure IV.4.2). Regional stakeholders responded that civil society is ‘quite active’ or ‘very active’ on all of the five issues in the following.

FIGURE IV.4.2: Effort and success in influencing public policy



Source: Regional stakeholder consultation 2004

1. effort: 1=not active at all, 2=active to a limited extent, 3=quite active, 4=very active

2. success: 1=no impact at all, 2=limited impact, 3=moderate impact, 4=significant impact

4.1.1 Political reform. One of most important public policy issues that South Korean civil society has been trying to influence in last two decades, is political reform. The result of the regional stakeholder survey show that for political reform policies there is the largest gap between the level of activities and the extent of impact: Civil society actors were most active in this issue, but the impact is relatively less significant compared to other policy issues including three issues of new social movement (environmental protection, gender equality, human rights). Three leaders of the democratisation movement have become president in the last decade, and their 'democratic' governments have had close partnerships with advocacy CSOs, pushing for social and political reforms. Many reform bills and laws, including Clean and Fair Election, Disclosure of High Officials' Assets and Real Estates, Anti-Corruption Prevention and Campaign Financing, were introduced or revised. The so-called 'Three Political Reforms', reform of the political party law, the political funds law and the election law are positive examples of CSOs' activities for political reform.

The *Pan-citizen Conference for Political Reform*, led by various leaders, including politicians, scholars, lawyers and CSO activists, petitioned for a legislation of 27 tasks, including reform ideas for party funding, election, the party system and national assembly. The activities of the alliance had a significant impact on the legislative reform related to the political system: The party-related proportional representative system, with two ballots for each voter, and a scheme for women allotment (50%) in the proportional representation, were successfully introduced. Common public speech, party public speech and the regional party system, which were mainly criticised for high-cost politics, were abolished. The donation of legal persons and organisations was banned. The legislation reform contributed to the enhancement of transparency in election and political system. Besides, for the first time in South Korean history, minority parties could have seats in the national Parliament.

However, generally speaking, the result of RSC shows, that civil society's impact is moderate.

4.1.2 Environmental protection. During the last two decades, environmental protection activities in South Korean civil society have dramatically increased. As the result of regional stakeholder survey shows, CSOs have been very active in influencing public policy regarding environmental protection and the activities have been very successful.

There are many examples of successful environmental movements including the cancellation of the Tong River dam construction project in 2000, and the cancellation of the construction of Buan nuclear facilities in 2004. The following is the summary of the former case.

The cancellation of the dam construction project on the Tong River is the most significant triumph of the South Korean environmental movement. The project was planned early in the 1990s and since then was the hottest issue for environmental CSOs. The government planned to construct a dam to prevent a flood in the Kang Won Do province and to preserve drinking water for metropolitan areas. The government announced the dam site in 1997 and finished the environmental evaluation in 1998. And then a national coalition of anti-dam movement, joined by more than two hundred CSOs was organised and its activities of campaigning, fundraising and demonstrations persisted until the President declared the cancellation of the project on 5 June 2000, the world environment day. As the President promised, the following year the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development was formally established as an advisory commission.

4.1.3 Anti-corruption. According to the regional stakeholder survey, civil society organisations were very active to influence public policies regarding anti-corruption (score

3.6), while its success is rather not significant (score 2.7). An important example is the launch of the Social Compact on Anti-Corruption.

In October 2004, *Transparency International Korea* proposed a South Korean version of Compact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency. In January 2005, the ‘Manifesto of 100 persons to Demand a Pact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency’ was declared, and a few days later, *The Council for Korean Compact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency* was established, with the cooperation of public and nonprofit organisations: *Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption*, *Transparency Forum*, *Yoonkyeong Forum*, *Parliamentarians’ Forum Against Corruption*, PSPD, CCEJ, *Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)*, and KCTU. On 20 March 2005, a united coalition of the president, parliament, business associations, labour organisations and CSOs officially announced the launch of the SACT in South Korea. It is the first time in history that three sectors of government, business and civil society have come together and made a decision for a nationwide anti-corruption movement.

4.1.4. Gender equality. Feminist organisations are some of the most influential CSOs in exercising significant impact on public policies in South Korea, as the score (2.7) by regional stakeholders shows. Interestingly, the result of regional stakeholder survey shows the smallest gap between effort and impact regarding the issue of gender equality. Actually, feminist CSOs have so far been very active in influencing public policies during the last decade, and their impacts have been very successful. Many public policies have been revised or introduced in favour of gender equality.

A good example of general equality activities is the reform of family law. Feminists in South Korea have long ceaselessly criticised the patriarchal phrases of the 1958 Family Law, and devoted significant energy for its amendment. A series of amendments were made in 1962, 1972 and 1990, yet, the law has inherited a critical problem of gender inequality in its family headship system until last year. Since the late 1990s, when feminist CSOs gained a momentum of, they have concentrated efforts on the abolition of the family headship system. There have been various activities, such as information on the legitimacy of abolition, submission of opinions on the amendment after eventual abolition and political lobbying for the amendment. Finally in 2005, Family Law was amended with the abolition of the family headship system.

4.1.5. Social Welfare. Social Welfare issues have received less attention from CSOs in South Korea. Although there are many social welfare CSOs, only a few CSOs have been involved in

the process of formulating policy in the field. The economic crisis in 1997 brought about opportunities for CSOs of getting involved in the welfare policy process. Even some advocacy-oriented CSOs, such as PSPD and CCEJ participated in the social welfare policy process. At the same time, new CSOs for social welfare advocacy, such as the Social Welfare Coalition, began to emerge during the last decade. Generally speaking, however, the result of RSC survey shows that social welfare is the field where CSOs are least active and the least successful among the six public policy issues examined here.

4.1.6 Protection of human rights. South Korean CSOs protecting human rights have been quite active and their accomplishments are seen as successful by stakeholders. During the authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, human rights, not only of underprivileged people but also ordinary citizens were violated. Since democratisation in the 1990s, social movements for human rights have continued as advocacy activities of South Korean CSOs have focused their actions on the protection of human rights of social minorities.

As a result, the Human Rights Act was introduced and a public institution, *National Human Rights Commission of Korea* was established. In 1993, the coalition of NGOs preparing for the participation in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, called for the establishment of national human rights institution. During the presidential election campaign, presidential candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, pledged to enact the human rights act and establish a national human rights institution. Later in 1998, when he was elected as the President, the Non-governmental Joint Council was set up to push for the passage of the Human Rights Act and the establishment of a national human rights institution. The Non-governmental Joint Council was joined by more than 90 advocacy CSOs. Due to the persistent efforts by the Joint Council and Kim Dae-Jung Administration, the National Human Rights Commission Act was enacted in August 2001. The NHRC has so far successfully accomplished its mission by investigating, and reporting a variety of human rights violation cases, including suspicious death in the army and detention centre, and discrimination against the disabled and immigrant workers (<http://www.humanrights.go.kr>).

4.2 Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable

This subdimension analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society is active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable. Table IV.4.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.4.2: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state accountable	2.4
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	1.6

4.2.1 Holding the state accountable. Civil society's activities in holding the state accountable were assessed by stakeholders as extensive. Most regional stakeholders responded that in improving the accountability of government to South Korean civil society is 'very active' (41%) or 'quite active' (54%). Sixty-one percent saw CSO activities as successful. A representative case for holding the state accountable is the Social Compact for Anti-corruption as described earlier in 4.1.3 and 3.2.3.

Another illuminating case is the Budget Watch Movement, which is widely recognised among South Korean citizens. The Budget Watch Movement, a taxpayers' rights movement in South Korea, focuses its activities on monitoring the effectiveness and transparency of central and local governments in the budgetary planning and administration. The Movement has been active, both at the central and at the local governments, and many of grassroots CSOs recently joined the Movement. First, the Information Disclosure Act of 1997 contributed to the activities and accomplishment of the Movement. Almost all of the local governments have recently faced demands by CSOs of the disclosure of information concerning the revenues and expenditures. Some local governments, such as the North District Government of *Gwangju* City voluntarily made their budgetary process open and transparent, by letting citizen representatives participate in the budget making process. As the result of budget information disclosure movement, almost all local governments are now disclosing administrative information. Organised in 1999, the Budget Watch Network is now expanding its activities to 30 local areas for five policy areas (local, public, environment, transportation, culture). Recently, it made taxpayer lawsuits and a petition for special legislation for taxpayer lawsuit (<http://www.0098.or.kr/>).

4.2.2 Holding the private corporations accountable. CSO activities for holding the businesses accountable are limited to a few CSOs, and their impact is evaluated as low. However, a two-thirds majority of regional stakeholders saw CSOs as active in holding the businesses accountable. But they are quite sceptical about the impact of CSO activities on the accountability of businesses. An absolute majority, 67.3% think it is not (or not very) successful. A good example of the limited impact in this field is the Fair Trade Law. CSOs insisted that the Fair Trade Law should be amended to solve the problem of so-called *Chaebol*, which has distorted the market economy through its opaque accounting and unfair transactions. With the persistent pressure of CSOs, the reform Bill of Fair Trade Law, which

key idea was the restriction of total investment amount inside *Chaebol* conglomerate, was introduced. But finally, an amended Bill permitting some exceptions for the restriction was passed in 2004.

4.3 Responding to Social Interests


This subdimension analyses the extent to which South Korean civil society actors are responsive to social interests. Table IV.4.3 shows the indicator score.

TABLE IV.4.3: Indicators assessing responding to social interests

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness to social interests	2.0
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	2.0

4.3.1 Responsiveness. The NAG score indicates that there are only some isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors. Although the significance of service-oriented activities of CSOs has gradually increased in recent years, and the existing civil society actors are not directly responding to the social concern of poverty reduction, as the result of regional stakeholder consultations shows (see the figure below). Also with regards to social issues such as promoting tolerance and peaceful resolution, CSO activities have been rather limited.

FIGURE IV.4.3: Role of civil society for priority social concerns



Source: Regional Stakeholder Consultation 2004

1. Q: "How would you describe civil society's role in promoting XXX (issues)?"
2. 1=very limited, 2=limited, 3=moderate, 4=significant

4.3.2 Public trust in CSOs. The World Value Survey 2000 shows that an absolute majority of South Koreans (86%) trusted CSOs (labour union, social service NGOs, environmental movement, women’s movement). Compared with other major social institutions, NGOs were the most trusted institutions in South Korea. According to the community survey 2004, 58% of the respondents answered that they trusted CSOs (including labour union, national civil society organisations, and local civil society organisations). The level of the trust in CSOs has been slightly decreasing in recent years, as the non-organised (or less-organised) citizen groups by means of Internet or at the grassroots level have been emerging.

4.4. Empowering Citizens

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which South Korean civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives. Table IV.4.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE IV.4.4: Indicators assessing Empowering citizens

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	1.5
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems	1.8
4.4.3.	Empowering marginalised people	1.6
4.4.4	Empowering women	2.2
4.4.5	Building social capital	1.0

4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens. Civil society’s activities and impact in informing and educating citizens is seen as rather limited. As the community survey reveal, the best-known activities of CSOs, to local residents, is “helping poor people in the community” (29.8%), followed by “helping the old” (21.9%). Local residents are less aware of the activities of CSOs, such as “giving information to local residents” (16.7%) and “supporting citizen activity” (16.6%). While most regional stakeholders responded that civil society is very active (20.6%) or active (52.9%) in educating citizens, a majority, 57% of them answered that those activities have not been successful. Some regional stakeholders and NAG members pointed out the fact that participation of citizens in civic education programs run by CSOs has been slowing down in number, even though the importance of informing citizen was acknowledged by most civil society leaders.

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems. The NAG assessed that civil society is quite active in this area, but the impact is limited. While an absolute majority, 71% of regional stakeholders, agree that CSOs are active in building capacity for

collective action and resolving joint problems, only a small majority of them (56%) consider these activities to be successful.

Strengthening the capacity of local communities was a major issue in the 1990s, especially for environmental and women's CSOs. In recent years, South Korean CSOs have begun to show interest in the local community building activities by means of empowering local residents. There are a few discernible cases of community building activities: the protest against love-hotels construction in *Goyang* city or civil society's support to the resident referendum to reject the construction of nuclear waste facility in *Buan* district.

4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people. Empowering marginalised group such as the poor, the disabled, and foreign workers have been one of the important issues in South Korean civil society. However, the national advisory group assessed that the activities of empowering marginalised groups are rather unsuccessful, even though there are a few discernable examples, such as:

- A free consultation service by lawyers and social advisors, medical service for foreign workers (Migrant Worker's House)
- Campaign, education and political activities to realise the rights of the disabled for safe and free mobility (A Solidarity of the Disabled to Obtain the Mobility Right)

Nowadays, activities of empowering the marginalised people are limited to a few local CSOs. There are many organisations for marginalised people in the social service sector, but they focus on the provision of goods and services, being financially supported by the government, rather than empower marginalised groups.

4.4.4 Empowering women. In comparison with other minority groups, women are the main beneficiaries of civil society activities. Some national advisory group members assessed that civil society played a very important role in empowering women, while others state that its impact is still limited, because activities for women have been conducted exclusively by women's organisations. Furthermore, women rarely take leadership role in CSOs except women's organisations.

A discernable example of empowering women in South Korea can be described by the experience of KWAU. Since the establishment in 1987, it has been a centripetal point of progressive feminist movement in South Korea. It has six regional headquarters and 28 member organisations throughout the country. It has been working for empowering women in various fields: the improvement of laws that are discriminating against women, reform of patriarchal consciousness and custom, promotion of women's human rights, coexistence of

family and job, advocacy of policies for hiring more women and equal employment, enhancement of women's representation in politics, public offices and policy making process, promotion of women's role in peace and reunification of South Korean peninsula, domestic and international solidarity, and extension of feminist movement. It was not until in 2000 when the Ministry of Gender Equality was established that the government began to acknowledge and integrate gender issues in cooperation with feminist CSOs including KWAU. Actually, the leader of KWAU and two other CSO leaders became ministers of the Ministry of Gender Equality. For a campaign to upgrade the representation of women in the parliament, the feminist CSOs organised *Women's Political Network* in 1998 and *Women's Linkage for General Election* in 2003, and suggested a quota system of 20% seats for women as an affirmative action.

During the economic crisis of the late 1990s, feminist CSOs, entrusted by the government, joined to operate *House for Working Women*, child-care centres, local service centres and counselling centres for women. After the economic crisis, *Special Committee for Women's Employment* was established to address poverty issues among women. These service providing activities of feminist CSOs gradually contributed to the transformation of advocacy oriented feminist movement towards social service provision in many areas, including: education, counselling and job training for women. Recently, community based feminist CSOs in new suburban areas are expanding their activities to provide local housewives with various kinds of information regarding consumer rights, gender equality, and child care.

4.4.5 Building social capital. The NAG assessed that civil society contributes little to building social capital in society. In order to assess the impact of civil society on building social capital, the CSI methodology suggested comparing the level of public spiritedness, tolerance and trust among CSO members with non-members. The analysis of community survey shows that there is no significant mean difference between members and non-members of CSOs regarding public spiritedness index and tolerance index. Regarding inter-personal general trust, the comparison between CSO member and non-members could not be conducted, since a large majority of respondents belonged to the category of CSO members.

4.5 Meeting Societal Needs

This subdimension examines the extent to which South Korean civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised

groups. Table IV.4.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.¹⁹

TABLE IV.4.5: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Meeting societal needs directly	1.5
4.5.2	Meeting the needs of marginalised groups	2.0

4.5.1 Meeting needs directly. According to the regional stakeholder survey, 55% of respondents regarded civil society activities in ‘meeting societal needs directly’ as successful, while only 6.9% saw it as unsuccessful. However, it is noticeable that 38% didn’t answer the question. Many stakeholders seemed to feel incompetent to assess the status regarding service delivery by civil society organisations. The score by national advisory group (1.5) reflects this lack of knowledge.

After the economic crisis in the late 1990s, many CSOs became involved in launching programs to cope with unemployment problems. Their activities focused on meeting the basic needs of the needy. A variety of initiatives on free food provision for the elderly and homeless person (‘dining table community’) were arranged and supported by CSOs, and the Civic Safety Net Program was launched from the cooperation between government and civil society organisations. In the process, some problems emerged: the competition among CSOs for limited resources, and the autonomy of CSOs as they are depending more on governmental funding. Most CSO programs gradually disappeared after the crisis was over, were replaced by the formal provision by government on the base of National Livelihood Protection Law which came into action in 2000.

Today, local social welfare institutions and social service CSOs are taking charge of social service provision with financial and administrative support from the government. More government programs have attracted more service activities of CSOs and the increase of new service CSOs. As many CSOs are involved in social service programs funded by the government, the issue of the autonomy of the civil society from the state is hotly debated.

¹⁹ The indicator of ‘lobby the state’ is taken out in this report. In the pre-test phase in reviewing the questionnaire before the regional stakeholder survey, we confirmed that the concept of ‘lobby’ was often considered as something harmful, which should be eradicated immediately. In Korea, the concept has been understood as informal effort to influence the person in power *illegally*. It was true also in the national advisory group survey. Because of the different understanding on the concept itself from CIVICUS, the authors came to the conclusion that the indicator of ‘lobbying the state’ could not be assessed with accuracy, but also hardly be compared with other countries.

Many CSO leaders and stakeholders insist that CSOs should keep their independence from the government.

A good example for meeting societal needs by voluntary organisations autonomous from the state is the ‘dining table community’, which was arranged by a pastor in 1998. In the beginning, its main activity was the free food provision and ‘food bank’ for the homeless in a province. Now it includes also the ‘briquette bank’ for the poor who are not supported by government, ‘social bank’ (to promote self-reliant economic activity of poor women and the homeless) and a self-help community of the homeless. Even though there are a few discernable examples in this area, it is hard to say that civil society has been very active in meeting societal needs directly.

4.5.2 Meeting needs of marginalised groups. Since the 1970s and through the democratisation movement, social movements for marginalised groups were focused to fight against the strong drives of industrialisation and urbanisation led by the joint efforts of the government and industries. In recent years, CSOs are increasingly active in meeting their needs directly either by means of providing social services or by means of self-help promotion. However it is not easy to assess to what extent CSOs are more or less effective than the state in service delivery. A few CSOs such as the ‘dining table community’ described above are more effective than the state, particularly in discovering what the poor really want and satisfying it, and even mobilising the resource in some cases. However, generally in providing services the state is more effective than CSOs, because the state provision is conducted systematically and under consideration of equity, even though it needs further administration costs. According to the community survey, 53.8% of respondents assessed the voluntary sector to be more effective in service provision for marginalised groups than state agencies, while 38.7% regarded the state to be more effective.

The score by national advisory group (1.5) reflects the consideration of these complex factors. NAG members were of the opinion that the state provision is not enough to help the needy who have been growing in numbers in recent years, and therefore should be expanded. The result of community survey is regarded as an evidence of dissatisfaction of citizen with the current status of state provision, and not the effectiveness of service by CSOs

Conclusion

The impact dimension shows a rather healthy state of South Korean civil society. The sector’s role in influencing public policies is remarkably well developed, while its roles in empowering citizens and meeting societal needs reflect somewhat inactive and unsuccessful efforts. Holding accountability and Responding to social interests in terms of responsiveness

and public trust on NGOs are seen as moderate.

Showing the highest score, the impact of the civil society on public policy is evenly distributed among five fields (political reform, environmental protection, anti-corruption, gender equity, human rights protection), apart from social welfare. On the contrary, South Korean civil society has been not active in meeting societal needs. Furthermore, the sector has been not influential also in building social capital, and educating/informing citizens. This means that South Korean CSOs are quite weak in building strong ties with citizen or marginalised people, as it has been rather pursuing the institutional reforms. Regarding the accountability, civil society is influential in holding the state accountable, but its efforts in holding the business accountable get only a moderately positive result. This difference seems to reflect the political democratisation not accompanied by the economic democratisation.

V STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS

1. STRENGTHS

According to discussions at the National Seminar, major strengths of South Korean civil society can be found in values and impact dimensions while weaknesses were identified in structure and environment dimensions. The distinction between strength and weakness is empirically confirmed by scores of four dimensions: values (2.3) and impact (1.9) versus structure (1.5) and environment (1.6).

First, the driving force of CSOs' collective actions to confront governmental decisions is its 'solidarity strategy' of mobilising hundreds of CSOs and setting effective public agendas, which receive a high level of trust among ordinary citizens. Most of political and socio-economic reform agendas were set by the strong umbrella body of CSOs and some of them were successfully transformed into policy alternatives or legal enactments.

Second, advocacy activities of CSOs are evaluated as the most outstanding strength. In the values and impact dimensions, scores concerning advocacy activities (e.g., action to promote transparency) are distinctively higher than those for service activities. (e.g., poverty reduction).

Third, the positive socio-economic context of IT infrastructure and literacy accounts for another strength. With perfect scores of 3.0, the indicators of IT infrastructure and literacy indicate strongly favourable conditions for civil society activities, which are mainly the consequence of the successful socio-economic development during the last three decades. On the other part, civil liberties, rights to information and press freedom, and the political context of political rights and political competition, have been steadily improved to the upper level of "free, democratic society."

Fourth, values of democracy, transparency, human rights, gender equality and environmental protection are identified as major strengths of civil society in South Korea. These values are perceived by many people as a historical heritage that civil society has so far steadily accomplished.

The last, but not the least, strength of South Korean civil society is widespread public trust of civil society or CSOs. Public polls, domestic and international, continue to indicate that CSOs are most trustworthy entity among social and political institutions including legislative,

governmental, judicial institutions, press, corporations and others.

2. WEAKNESSES

Major weaknesses of South Korean civil society are found in its structure and environment dimensions. First, in the environment dimension, the most critical weakness is the socio-cultural context of civil society. In particular, significantly low levels of tolerance among citizens is regarded as a critical hindrance to the activities of CSOs and the development of civil society.

Second, the low level of resources available for CSOs is another weakness. Among a variety of resources, financial resources for CSOs are identified as most critical. Lack of CSOs' financial autonomy is regarded as hurting their independence from the government and business.

Third, the low level of the depth of citizen participation is evaluated as critical in that the currently ongoing process of citizen participation explosion does not effectively bring about the 'real' contribution of citizens to the development of civil society in the form of giving, volunteering, or becoming members of CSOs.

Fourth, the legal context is identified as significantly unfavourable to CSOs. In particular, the National Security Law, Election Law, and the Freedom of Information Law are identified as unfavourable to civil society. These legal regulations are obstacles both for CSOs to take collective actions and for citizens to participate fully in the political process. They were the legacy of the authoritarian regime that had long prohibited citizens from organizing voluntary associations autonomous from the government's control, but produced a culture of uncompromising militancy throughout the society.


Lastly, service activities of CSOs are evaluated as poor and this accounts for a weakness of civil society. While the high level of organisational development among CSOs is quite positive, it also has a negative side: it is heavily represented and led by some leaders from major CSOs on the frontline, thus significantly limiting the space for ordinary citizens' participation. The high level of organisation and cooperation among CSOs makes them powerful enough to stand strong against the government and business, to hold them accountable, and to exert successful impacts on public policies. Nonetheless, those powerful advocacy activities are accomplished by the sacrifice of service and empowerment activities

towards the population. Many advocacy CSOs are relatively weak in empowering citizens and meeting societal needs directly. On the contrary, service CSOs, representing an absolute majority of South Korean civil society, have long been impotent either to advocate the underprivileged or to empower citizens. Recently, community based CSOs have expanded their activities of empowering residents to participate in the decision making process of community affairs such as volunteering, school council, and nuclear plant siting.

VI. CONCLUSION

The conclusion is drawn both from the major findings of the CSI in South Korea, and from the discussion of the National Seminar by NCO and NAG members held in November 2005.

FIGURE VI.1.1: Korean Civil Society Diamond



(Structure 1.5/ Environment 1.6 / Values 2.3/ Impact. 1.9)

Civil society's strengths are a consequence of the fact that, over the past two decades, Korean civil society organisations (CSOs) have focused their time and energy on advocacy activities, such as holding the state and business sector accountable and transparency. Korean CSOs have tended to utilise 'nationwide solidarity' strategies of agenda setting and political mobilisation, which have been extremely effective and efficient so that advocacy CSOs were for some time the most trusted institutions among all major public and social institutions in South Korea. Their activities were also widely covered in major newspapers and TV stations. 'Nationwide solidarity' movements depended heavily on direct actions, such as campaigning, petitions, boycotting and demonstrations. These were successful since they united hundreds of CSOs to advocate on social and political issues.

For last two decades, South Korean civil society has been undergoing a comprehensive process of dynamic development. Particularly the last decade saw an explosion of civil society organisations (CSOs) and their growing political impact (Han and Song, 2004; Ha, 2001). Assisted by the spread of the Internet, the influence of not only organised CSOs but

also ordinary unorganised citizens on public opinion and political processes has increased dramatically. However, as the CSI study shows, it seems that the explosion of citizen participation during the last decade has contributed neither to improving the environment of civil society, nor to the structural development of CSOs and their impacts on socio-cultural transformation. In particular, the socio-cultural environment (e.g. tolerance, trust), legal environment, and relationship between civil society and private sector are still not conducive to activities of CSOs. Even though citizens are increasingly active in non-partisan political action, volunteering and giving, the resources of the CSOs remain limited.

The **structure** dimension examines the make-up of civil society, in terms of the main characteristics of individual and associational participation and the relationships among civil society participants. The findings reveal that the structure of South Korean civil society is of limited strength and scope. The most critical weaknesses constitute the lack of adequate financial and human resources, followed by the limited depth of citizen participation and limited leader diversity within CSOs. However, civil society's overall level of organisation and interrelations as well as the breadth of citizen participation are quite strong. For example, both the reach and effectiveness of umbrella organisation or solidarity networks among CSOs were assessed as quite positive. Regarding the extent of citizen participation, the following forms show rather high percentage of citizen involvement: non-partisan political action, CSO membership and volunteering. However, a closer look at CSO membership reveals that it is concentrated on recreational associations, which are not likely to contribute to strengthening the public sphere where people come together to discuss social issues. The vibrancy of citizen participation in South Korea is therefore not so much driven by organisational membership, but rather by common political actions and widespread volunteering, which seems to reflect the segregation of advocacy-oriented and service-oriented activities in South Korean civil society.

The **environment** dimension considers how enabling the external environment is for civil society and examines political, social, cultural, economic and legal factors as well as the attitudes and behaviour of state and business actors towards civil society. Among the seven subdimensions, the legal and socio-cultural contexts in South Korea are the most unfavourable for civil society. The legal context is a rather disabling, as election and national security laws restrict advocacy activities and tax laws limit the benefits of tax exemption and fundraising activities. Low levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness (socio-cultural norms) also pose a hindrance to the development of South Korean civil society.

The **values** dimension received the highest score among the four dimensions and reflects that South Korean civil society practices and promotes positive values to a significant extent. In particular, the promotion of values, such as environmental sustainability, transparency and gender equality are recognised as accomplishments of South Korean civil society. However, the role of civil society in promoting the values of tolerance and non-violence is rather limited.

The **impact** dimension shows a rather healthy state of South Korean civil society. The sector's role in influencing public policies is remarkably well developed. Showing the highest score among the subdimensions of impact, civil society's public policy impact covers five policy fields (i.e. political reform, environmental protection, anti-corruption, gender equity, human rights protection), while only the field of social welfare received a lower rating. However, South Korean civil society has been not active in meeting societal needs directly, building social capital, and educating/informing citizens. While civil society is strong in holding the state accountable, its efforts towards the private sector receive only a moderately positive result. This difference seems to reflect the fact that the political democratisation has so far not been accompanied by a similar process in the economy.

Thus, the CSI shows that the improvements of the state of civil society should focus on strategies to strengthen the structure of civil society and the environment in which it exists. Civil society leaders and external stakeholders unanimously suggested the government play a more active role in these efforts. Above all, the government should amend certain regulatory laws, including: the "Contribution Collection Law" and the "NPO Supporting Law", so that CSOs can become financially stable and sustainable with increased support from the government as well as citizens.

Another suggestion concerned the role of citizens in supporting efforts to strengthen CSOs. A major problem is that the current growth of citizen participation does not appear to contribute to the structural development of CSOs, but focuses on once-off individual activities. Also, the depth of citizen contributions through charitable giving, volunteering and membership activities for public-benefit organisations remains still marginal.

As citizens begin to emerge as the heart of democracy in South Korea, the long-term development of South Korean civil society needs to keep pace with the rising contributions of ordinary citizens, which will help CSOs to achieve financial and political independence from government and business. A variety of forms of citizen participation, including a recent series of "candlelight" demonstrations and online advocacy activities, rapidly became 'conventional' in South Korea. Online *netizens* are becoming important agents of formulating public opinion

and setting public agendas and a wide variety of their networks begin to play significant roles in South Korean civil society. Active citizens with Internet connections are becoming the building blocks of a new civil society of “Dynamic Korea,” a symbol of the national brand power of South Korea. One of the main challenges for South Korean civil society is connecting these explosive, but highly fluctuating forms of citizen participation with continuous, stable citizen organisations.

APPENDIX 1: The CSI Scoring Matrix

1 – STRUCTURE

1.1 - Breadth of citizen participation

Description: How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engage in civil society activities?

1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

Description: What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

A very small minority (less than 10%).	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.2 - Charitable giving

Description: What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.4 - Volunteering

Description: What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A small minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A minority (31% to 50%)	Score 2
A majority (more than 50%)	Score 3

1.1.5 - Collective community action

Description: What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% -50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.2 - Depth of citizen participation

Description: How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?

1.2.1 - Charitable giving

Description: How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

Less than 1%	Score 0
1% to 2%	Score 1
2.1% to 3%	Score 2
More than 3%	Score 3

1.2.2 - Volunteering

Description: How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

Less than 2 hours	Score 0
2 to 5 hours	Score 1
5.1 to 8 hours	Score 2
More than 8 hours.	Score 3

1.2.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

Description: How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?

1.3.1 - CSO membership

Description: To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	Score 2
CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.2 - CSO leadership

Description: To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.	Score 2
CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

Description: How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	Score 0
CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	Score 1
CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	Score 2
CSOs are present in all areas of the country.	Score 3

1.4. - Level of organisation

Description: How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?

1.4.1 - Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 70%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 70%)	Score 3

1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

Completely ineffective (or non-existent)	Score 0
Largely ineffective	Score 1
Somewhat effective	Score 2
Effective	Score 3

1.4.3 - Self-regulation

Description: Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Score 0
Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Score 1
Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Score 2
Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.	Score 3

1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

Description: What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 0
There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	Score 1
Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	Score 2
There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 3

1.4.5 - International linkages

Description: What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

Only a handful of “elite” CSOs have international linkages.	Score 0
A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 1
A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 2
A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.	Score 3

1.5 - Inter-relations

Description: How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?

1.5.1 - Communication

Description: What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

Very little	Score 0
Limited	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Significant	Score 3

1.5.2 – Cooperation

Description: How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 0
It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 1
CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 2
CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 3

1.6 – Resources

Description: To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?

1.6.1 - Financial resources

Description: How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.	Score 3

1.6.2 - Human resources

Description: How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.	Score 3

1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

Description: How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.	Score 3

2 - ENVIRONMENT²⁰

2.1 - Political context

***Description:* What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

2.1.1 - Political rights

Description: How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	Score 0
There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Score 1
Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	Score 2
People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.	Score 3

2.1.2 - Political competition

Description: What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

Single party system.	Score 0
Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Score 1
Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction.	Score 2
Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.	Score 3

²⁰ For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

2.1.3 - Rule of law

Description: To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	Score 0
There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	Score 1
There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Score 2
Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.	Score 3

2.1.4 – Corruption

Description: What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

High	Score 0
Substantial	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Low	Score 3

2.1.5 – State effectiveness

Description: To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).	Score 0
The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	Score 1
State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	Score 2
State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.	Score 3

2.1.6 – Decentralisation

Description: To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Score 0
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Score 1
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.	Score 2
Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.	Score 3

2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

Description: To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

2.2.1 - Civil liberties

Description: To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

Civil liberties are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	Score 1
There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Score 2
Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.2.2 - Information rights

Description: To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Score 0
Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Score 1
Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Score 2
Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.	Score 3

2.2.3 - Press freedoms

Description: To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

Press freedoms are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	Score 1
There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Score 2
Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.3 - Socio-economic context²¹

Description: What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

Description: How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)	Score 0
Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 1
Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 2
Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.	Score 3

2.4 - Socio-cultural context

Description: To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?

2.4.1 - Trust

Description: How much do members of society trust one another?

Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	Score 0
There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 1
There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 2
There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 3

²¹ This sub-dimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The sub-dimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

2.4.2 - Tolerance

Description: How tolerant are members of society?

Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Score 0
Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Score 1
Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Score 2
Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).	Score 3

2.4.3 - Public spiritedness²²

Description: How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5).	Score 0
Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5).	Score 1
Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5).	Score 2
High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5).	Score 3

2.5 - Legal environment

Description: To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?

2.5.1 - CSO registration²³

Description: How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	Score 0
The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent.	Score 1
The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	Score 2
The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.	Score 3

2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

Description: To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticise government?

CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	Score 0
There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Score 1
Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	Score 2
CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.	Score 3

²² The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

²³ This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for sub-dimension 3. The indicator scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

Description: How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	Score 0
The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations).	Score 1
The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	Score 2
The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.	Score 3

2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy

Description: How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Score 0
Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 1
Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 2
Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 3

2.6 - State-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?**

2.6.1 – Autonomy

Description: To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

The state controls civil society.	Score 0
CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	Score 1
The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	Score 2
CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.	Score 3

2.6.2 - Dialogue

Description: To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	Score 0
The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	Score 1
The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Score 2
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.6.3 - Cooperation / support

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 2
The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?**

2.7.1 - Private sector attitude

Description: What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

Generally hostile	Score 0
Generally indifferent	Score 1
Generally positive	Score 2
Generally supportive	Score 3

2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility

Description: How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Score 0
Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 1
Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Score 2
Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 3

2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy²⁴

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 2
The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

3 - VALUES

3.1 – Democracy

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

²⁴ The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs

Description: To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 0
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 1
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 3

3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy

Description: How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.2 – Transparency

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?

3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society

Description: How widespread is corruption within CS?

Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.	Score 0
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	Score 1
There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Score 2
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.	Score 3

3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs

Description: How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?

A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 0
A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 1
A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 3

3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency

Description: How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.3 – Tolerance

Description: To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Score 0
Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	Score 2
Civil society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	Score 3

3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance

Description: How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.4 - Non-violence

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?**

3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena

Description: How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Score 0
Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	Score 2
There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.	Score 3

3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace

Description: How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility	Score 3

3.5 - Gender equity

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?**

3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Score 0
Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Score 1
Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Score 2
Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.	Score 3

3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs

Description: How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

A small minority (less than 20%)	Score 0
A minority (20%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

3.5.3 – Civil society actions to promote gender equity

Description: How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.6 - Poverty eradication

Description: To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?

3.6.1 – Civil society actions to eradicate poverty

Description: To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.7 - Environmental sustainability

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?

3.7.1 – Civil society actions to sustain the environment

Description: How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

4 - IMPACT

4.1 - Influencing public policy

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.1.3 - Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components. ²⁵	Score 1
Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?

4.2.1 - Holding state accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

²⁵ The term “specific budget component” refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the *overall* budget.

4.2.2 - Holding private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.3 - Responding to social interests

Description: How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?

4.3.1 - Responsiveness

Description: How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 0
There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 1
There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 2
Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 3

4.3.2 - Public Trust

Description: What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

A small minority (< 25%)	Score 0
A large minority (25%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-75%)	Score 2
A large majority (> 75%)	Score 3

4.4 - Empowering citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?

4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

Description: How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.3 - Empowering marginalized people

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.4 - Empowering women

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.5 - Building social capital²⁶

Description: To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Score 0
Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Score 1
Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Score 2
Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.	Score 3

4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

Description: How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5 - Meeting societal needs

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

Description: How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

²⁶ To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see sub-dimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Description: How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Description: To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

CSOs are less effective than the state.	Score 0
CSOs are as effective as the state.	Score 1
CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	Score 2
CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.	Score 3

APPENDIX 2: List of NAG Members

Name	Organisations
Myong-Jae Cha *	Ph.D., Professor, Asian NGO Information Centre, Songkonghoe University
Seung-Chang Ha	Secretary General, Citizen's Action Network
Gyu-Ho Jeong	Ph.D. Research Advisor, Korea Dialogue Academy; former Christian Academy
Sungsoo Joo	Director, Third Sector Institute; Professor, Graduate School of Public Administration, Hanyang Univ
Youn-Koung Jung *	Director, GK
Hyeong-Woog Kim *	Senior Fellow, Presidential Committee on Ageing and Future Society
Jong-Seung Kim	Director, Korea Council on Social Welfare
Jung-Bae Kim *	Ph.D. Director, Korea Youth Development Institute
Chang-Ho Lee	Vice Director, Centre for Civil Society, Joongang Daily Newspaper
In-Kyung Lee	General Manager, Solidarity Network Korea
Jung-Su Lee	Secretary General, Green Future
Kang-Hyun Lee	Ph.D., Secretary General, Volunteer21 Korea
Young-Seon Park	Secretary General, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
Hong-Soon Park	Director, Community Partnership Centre
Yong-Hee Yang	CEO, Non-profit Network System & Communication; Professor, Department of Social Welfare, Hoseo Universit

* Did not participate in scoring.

APPENDIX 3: Overview of the CSI Research Method

In Korea, the CSI research team used the following research methods to collect data: regional stakeholder consultation and survey, community sample survey and media review. Each of the data collecting methods is summarised in the following:

Regional Stakeholder Consultation and Survey

The regional stakeholder consultation and survey was carried out from December 2003 to February 2004. The aim was to contact a diverse group of approximately 15-30 participants in each region, who would represent the full range of CSOs, the governments (national and local), and both genders. The CSI team divided the entire country into six regions. In each region the respondents were selected according to 18 types of organisations and gender.²⁷ The project team was assisted by a CSO manager from each of the six regions, and he/she provided the list of representative organisations in each region, and played the role of facilitator for organizing the consultation. The selected participants received the questionnaire by post, and they were then invited to the consultation meeting. Six consultation meetings took place. The composition of respondents is as follows.

TABLE A. Regional stakeholder survey response rate

Region	Questionnaires distributed	Questionnaires Completed (response rates)
Seoul	30	29 (96 %)
Busan	20	17 (85 %)
Incheon	19	16(84%)
Daegu	15	12(80%)
Gwangju	15	14(93 %)
Daejeon	15	14 (93 %)
CSOs	99	87(77%)
Governments	8	8(100%)
Others ²⁸	7	7(100%)
Male	74	65(88%)
Female	40	37(93%)
Total	114	102 (90%)

Community Survey

A community survey was conducted to investigate CSO membership and voluntary activities in CSOs, the value dispositions of citizens and attitudes towards and engagement with community-level activities. The community survey was carried out in the Seoul Metropolitan and Gyunggi Province, in which about 40% of the Korean population lives. First, seven sample communities in these areas were

s of illegally inherit

ing one's wealth or evade taxation(PSPD 1998)

selected: three self-governing Gu in the Seoul Metropolitan and four self-governing cities in the Gyunggi Province. Three are large communities, two are middle sized, and the remaining two communities are small. Both of the small size sample communities are characterised by the coexistence of urban and rural. The number of respondents was 700. They were selected on the basis of quotas, mainly based on age and sex. The survey method was the E-mail supported Web Survey, which was recently introduced in Korea as the broadband Internet became popular. The concrete process is as follows: an e-mail request for response to the online web survey was sent to a sample of potential respondents, they connected to the survey questionnaire on the Web, and answered the questions. Mbizon conducted the survey, from 9 to 28 December 2003.

The e-mail supported Web Survey method caused an unexpected problem in the survey result: the response rate of the highly educated and the male were higher. Therefore, the research team added a new variable, "WEIGHT" to correct the sampling problem by the help of SPSS statistics. The findings suggested in the report are outputs produced after the cases were weighted by the variable, 'WEIGHT'.

Regarding community survey, the model questionnaire was used with some modifications. It should be noted that civil society organisations were divided into two categories in the question on CSO membership and participation: civil movement organisations (advocacy-oriented NGOs) and a variety of grassroots/voluntary associations. Due to the fact that question about whether or not the latter are CSOs is still controversial in Korea. For participants of civil movement organisations, five possible answers were offered for survey questions on CSO membership and activities, they were: membership, participated as volunteer, donation and participated in events held by each CSO type, but for participants of grassroots/voluntary associations there were two possible answers: if member, yes, and if nonmember, no.

Media Review

The media review aims to figure out how CSOs are represented in the media. It took place over the course of seven months in 2002, from .Two major newspapers, *Chosun Ilbo* and *Hankyoreh*, were selected among more than 10 major national newspapers in Korea. While the *Chosun Ilbo* is a paper representative of the conservative press and has the largest circulation, the *Hankyoreh* is representative of the liberal press and has a relatively small circulation. All of the reviewed news articles, which contain the key word of "civil society," were selected from KINDS, a public database provided by the Korea Press Foundation. A sample of 157 news articles was collected: 32 articles from the *Chosun Ilbo* and 125 articles from the *Hankyoreh*. Among the forms of the news articles selected, more than half of them (52.9%) were 'News Story' (52.9%), followed by 'Opinion Piece (15.9%),' 'Feature/News Analysis (12.8%),' and 'Editorial (8.9%)'

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The Hankyoreh

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Sisa Journal

The Hankyoreh 21

The Korean Ngo Times

Internet Resources

[http:// www.humanrights.go.kr](http://www.humanrights.go.kr)

<http://www.0098.or.kr>

<http://www.beautifulfund.org>

<http://www.ccej.or.kr>

<http://www.chest.or.kr>

<http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br>

<http://www.greenkorea.org>

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