

An Assessment of Russian Civil Society (2005)

CIVICUS CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX REPORT FOR
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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**St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies “Strategy”
in collaboration with the Departments of Public Policy of the Moscow State
University – Higher School of Economics**

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Short Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT)
An international action-research project coordinated by CIVICUS:
World Alliance for Citizen Participation

FOREWORD

The CSI-SAT in Russia was carried out by the National coordinating organisation in Russia - St. Petersburg “Strategy” Center in cooperation with the Moscow State University-Higher School of Economics.

St. Petersburg “Strategy” Center was created in 1993 with the mission to provide “Assistance in establishment of civil society and constitutional state in Russia through implementing projects and programs aimed at development of public participation, social partnership and responsibility of the authorities”. Nowadays, “Strategy” Center is itself developed into a full-fledged resource and support center for public policy centers in Russia and abroad. St. Petersburg “Strategy” Centre is a member of CIVICUS and other international civil society networks.

“Strategy” Centre is the only one in the North-West and one of few in Russia relatively steadily functioning public policy centre sustaining independence from authorities and corporate interests. “Strategy” Centre has been a politically non-partisan organisation since its date of establishment, independent of political forces, and does not engage in election campaign activities, for the same reason.

Current programs of “Strategy” Center include:

1. “Ombudsman and Human Rights” Program (Promotion of the Institute of Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman) in and Human Rights Awareness Rising)
2. “Corruption Prevention” Program (Development and Implementation of Systemic Measures on Corruption Prevention through Joint Work of NGOs, Authorities and Business)
3. “Transparent Budget” Program (Development of Public Participation in Budget Process)
4. Program “Development of Public Policy and Centers for Public Policy” (CPP)

The work has been carried out by Liliana Proskuryakova, Head of international unit of the “Strategy” Center and Alena Vandisheva, intern and then lawyer of the “Strategy” Center. Important contributions – results of field work from Russian towns were made by the Public Policy Department of the Moscow State University – Higher School of Economics (HSE). Department of Mathematics of HSE contributed with a model to evaluate and interpret the results of field work.

The current report is by all means not a comprehensive picture of the dynamic and colorful civil society mosaics, varying from region to region in more than 80 subjects of the Russian Federation. However, it is a good starting point for a discussion on strengthening, networking and cooperation processes within the broader civil society and among all stakeholders.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Civil Society Index (CSI) project using the CSI's Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) was carried out by St. Petersburg "Strategy" Center in cooperation with the Departments of Public Policy and Mathematics of the Moscow State University – Higher School of Economics. The project's approach and research methodology was developed by the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

At various stages most notable input into the report through the provision of information materials was made by the Carnegie Moscow Center, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Democracy Initiatives (Survey 2004), WCIOM: All Russia Centre of Public Opinion Research, Perm Civic Chamber, the NGO Development Center of Moscow, Transparency International – Russia, Coalition "We, Citizens!", Inter-regional civil society foundation Siberian Center for the Support of Civic Initiatives, Center for Democracy and Human Rights, Information for Democracy Foundation (INDEM), various institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Moscow Office and Moscow International Business Association and many others.

I would also like to thank the CSI team at CIVICUS, especially Kumi Naidoo and Volkhart Finn Heinrich, for their support and understanding throughout the project.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BP	British Petroleum
CE	Civic Engagement
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CIDCM's	Peace and Conflict Dataset
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVICUS	World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CPC	Corporate Philanthropy Club
CPP	Centers for Public Policy
CS	Civil Society
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSI-SAT	CSI's Shortened Assessment Tool
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FBK	Russian auditing and consulting company
FNPR	Federation of free labor unions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HSE	Higher School of Economics (Moscow)
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGRA	Institute of Civil Society Analysis
INDEM	Information for Democracy Foundation (Moscow)
INDRI	International Network of Democratic Research Institutes
INGOs	Internationally oriented NGOs in Russia
ISAR	Institute for Soviet and American Relations
IT	Information Technology
Kedr	Environmental party
KOK	Committee Public of Control
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NAG	National Advisory Group
NAK	National Anti-Corruption Committee
NAN	NO to Alcoholism and Drugs
NAN	NO to Alcoholism and Drugs Foundation
NCO	National Coordinating Organisation
NDRI	Network of Democratic Research Institutes
NGOs	Non-governmental non-commercial organisations
NIT	National Index Team
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PASOS	Policy Association for an Open Society
PPC	Public Policy Center
RF	Russian Federation
RUSAL	Russian Aluminium Company
SAG	Stakeholder Assessment Group
SU-HSE	Moscow State University – Higher School of Economics
TACIS	European Union's Technical Assistance program in CIS
TOS	Territorial self-governance bodies
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCIOM	Russian government-funded public opinion poll agency
WVS	World Values Survey

WWF
ZATO

World Wildlife Foundation
Closed administrative-territorial units


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document summarises the results of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) application in the Russian Federation, carried out by the CSI implementing partner in Russia, the St. Petersburg Center for Humanities and Political Studies “Strategy” (“Strategy” Center). The project was carried out from June 2003 through December 2005 as part of the international Civil Society Index (CSI) project coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The CSI is a comprehensive needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society actors at country level, which is currently being implemented in more than 50 countries around the world.

At the core of the project is the concept of civil society, which is defined as “an arena, situated for the most part outside family, state and market, in which people voluntarily interact for the promotion of their own and public interests and the common good”. This definition includes a large number of diverse organisations, including voluntary organisations, professional bodies, trade unions, local informal and formal community and sports organisations. In Russia, the CSI assessed the state of civil society based on secondary information, which was compiled in a comprehensive draft report. Based on this report, the project’s Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) scored 70 indicators, which are grouped under four dimensions: structure, environment, values and impact. The indicators are a mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators, and each one is scored on a scale from 0 to 3. The scores are then averaged to give an overall score between 0 and 3 for the four key dimensions of civil society: structure, environment, values and impact. Together these four scores are used to plot the visual representation of civil society, the Civil Society Diamond.

THE FINDINGS

The Civil Society Diamond for Russia, shown in figure I.1.1, depicts a somewhat small civil society, operating in a relatively disabling environment. While civil society’s values receive the most positive assessment, its impact on politics and society is relatively weak. The findings indicate that Russian civil society is in the midst of a transition from a low stage of development, which existed during Soviet times, to a well-developed stage under a democratic rule. It is important to note that the aggregated scores also present the average picture of the large country, in which civil society’s impact, environment, values and structure differ greatly from region to region, depending on the specific political climate, social-cultural differences and other variables.

FIGURE I.1.1: Civil society index diamond for Russia

Looking at civil society's structure, the following points stand out. A substantial proportion of the population shows some involvement in civil society activities. However, this involvement remains limited and sporadic. Various studies carried out in different regions of Russia, at different times and using different methods, provide extremely contradictory results on the magnitude of citizens' activism. There is also a critical gap, noted by many political

scientists, between civic attitudes and actual civic activism. For example, according to a population survey, while more than a quarter of Russians are willing to sign a petition, only 10% have actually done so.¹

Compared to individual forms of civic activism, the infrastructure of civil society is somewhat stronger. Communication and cooperation among Russian civil society organisations (CSOs), including cross-sectoral partnerships and international linkages, are sufficiently developed. There are plenty of cross-regional civil society networks and umbrella bodies in Russia, both formal long-term as well as temporary coalitions. According to the current report, all key social groups of the population are represented in CSOs' membership and leadership. CSOs are also rather evenly distributed throughout the country with certain gaps in rural and remote areas. However, crucial challenges for improving civil society's structure remain, such as the limited technical and financial resources available to the sector.

The social and economic context does not represent any major obstacles to civil society's development, with the exception of a poor culture of trust within society, which should become a clear priority area for CSOs. However, in general, the political context has ample room for improvement. Civil liberties and press freedom need to be further developed and safeguarded. Similarly, the legislative environment poses a number of serious challenges for CSOs. According to expert studies, corruption is a major problem in Russia, as is the limited enforcement of the law, with negative consequence for CSOs' operating environment.

Civil society efforts to promote the ideas of democracy, transparency and tolerance within society are clearly strengths of Russian CSOs. Russian civil society practices and promotes values of human rights, transparency and accountability within society. However, CSOs should take sufficient care to observe the same values of democracy and due diligence principles in their own work.

All of Russia's regions have legislative provisions for state-civil society dialogue and interaction, which is sufficiently developed. However, this dialogue does not result in a corresponding impact. Influencing policy process, including impact on the national (federal)

¹ Christopher 2005: 554.

budget process, human rights and social policy (at the federal level) remains rather limited. While influence of civil society at the regional and local levels is somewhat more effective, but it varies a lot from region to region.

In most regions CSOs can freely exercise their right to criticise the government, appealing to the media and international organisations. Advocacy work in the social services sphere has been especially advanced at the regional level, where civil society has an influence on the state. However, CSOs work very little in the area of private sector accountability.

Educating and raising awareness is an important contribution of Russian CSOs to society, so is building social capital. However, civil society's efforts to empower women and marginalised groups of the population are an area where improvement is needed. Furthermore, CSOs activities in supporting livelihoods and poverty eradication are very limited. An increasing focus on these grassroots level activities should increase CSO membership and civic activism, since joint community activities, volunteer work and CSO membership remain rather low.

However, civic activism is not likely to substantially grow in the near future, since abolished elections of regional governors and the limitation of the space for policy engagement by citizens does not contribute towards citizens' activism. Furthermore, civil society suffers from insufficient resources, first of all, but not exclusively, financial. Foreign foundations, which still remain a key donor group in Russia, are downsizing their presence in the country, while grant and charitable programs of Russian authorities and businesses are still to gain weight, scope and experience.

Structure of the Publication

This report seeks to provide a comprehensive assessment of the current state of Russian civil society, with a particular focus on its strengths and weaknesses. It is structured as follows:

Section I, "The CSI-SAT Project: Background & Methodology", provides a detailed history of the CSI-SAT, its conceptual framework and research methodology.²

Section II, "Civil Society in Russia", provides a background on civil society in Russia and describes the use of the civil society concept in Russia and the definition employed by the CSI-SAT project.

Section III, entitled "Analysis of Civil Society", is divided into four parts: Structure, Environment, Values and Impact, which correspond to the four main dimensions of the CSI. The presentation of the results, according to individual dimensions and subdimensions, is intended to act like a catalogue, and readers looking for an overall interpretation of the report should refer to the conclusion.

The conclusion in Section IV maps the Civil Society Diamond and offers an interpretation on the report's implications for the overall state of civil society in Russia.³

² See also Appendix 2 List of indicators and technical notes.

³ The Civil Society Diamond is a visual tool developed by CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier, Director of the Center for Civil Society at the University of California, Los Angeles, which presents the overall findings of the CSI study in form of a Diamond-shaped graph.

I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX SHORTENED ASSESSMENT TOOL APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich 2004; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the then director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept (Anheier 2004). The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase, which lasted from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than 50 countries (see Table I.1.1).

TABLE I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005 ⁴

1. Argentina	19. Ghana	37. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Greece*	38. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Guatemala	39. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Honduras	40. Russia*
5. Bulgaria	23. Hong Kong (VR China)	41. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Indonesia	42. Serbia
7. Chile*	25. Italy	43. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Jamaica	44. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Lebanon	45. South Korea
10. Croatia	28. Macedonia	46. Taiwan*
11. Cyprus ⁵	29. Mauritius	47. Togo*
12. Czech Republic	30. Mongolia	48. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Montenegro*	49. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Nepal	50. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Netherlands	51. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Nigeria	52. Vietnam*
17. Georgia*	35. Northern Ireland	53. Wales*
18. Germany	36. Orissa (India)	

* Represents the ten countries implementing the CSI-SAT.

In Russia, “Strategy” Center implemented the project from July 2003 to December 2005. St. Petersburg “Strategy” Center applied to conduct the project due to the CSI’s aim to combine a comprehensive assessment on the state of civil society with the identification of concrete recommendations and actions on the part of civil society stakeholders. Also, the comparison of civil society’s features in small cities and a selection of Russia’s regions with those of the whole territory of Russia, as well as other countries in the CEE/CIS region was seen as

⁴ This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted, as of February 2006.

⁵ The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

potentially useful for “Strategy” Center’s work with like-minded organisations in those countries.

Prior to implementing the CSI-SAT, the Russian NCO attempted to launch a full CSI project since July 2003. In the course of these efforts, the Russian NCO and the research team set up the National Advisory Group (NAG) composed of diverse group of stakeholders, which gathered in its full composition on 8 December 2004. NAG agreed on the definition of civil society used for the purpose of the pilot project and the current project. Resources, both time and financial, restricted the methodology used. The researchers listed above gathered three times to work out the project framework.

2. PROJECT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The CSI uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a structured framework to collect data on the state of civil society on the national level. At the core of the project approach is a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of subdimensions, which again are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI data collection process. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by a Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG). The CSI project approach, conceptual framework, and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.⁶

2.1 Conceptual Framework

How to define civil society? At the heart of the CSI’s conceptual framework is obviously the concept of civil society. CIVICUS defines civil society as the space between the family, state and the market, where people come together to pursue their interests (Heinrich 2004). In this respect, and different from most other civil society concepts, the CSI has two interesting features. First, it aims to go beyond the usual focus on formal and institutionalised CSOs, and takes account of informal coalitions and groups. Second, while civil society is sometimes perceived as a sphere in which positive activities and values reign, CIVICUS seeks to also include negative manifestations of civil society in the assessment. The concept therefore covers not only charitable associations or environmental organisations, but also groups such as skinheads and aggressive sports fans. The CSI-SAT assesses the extent to which CSOs support democracy and tolerance, and also the extent to which they themselves are intolerant or even violent.

The following definition was accepted by the Russian SAG:

“Civil Society is an arena, situated for the most part outside family, state and market, at which people voluntarily interact for promotion of own and public interests and the common good”.

⁶ For a detailed description of the CSI approach, see Heinrich 2004.

How to conceptualise the state of civil society? To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:


- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, the relationship between civil society and the State, as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of sub-dimensions that contain a total of 74 indicators.⁷ These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report. The indicator—subdimension—dimension framework underpins the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report and the SAG’s assessment of Russian civil society. It is also used to structure the primary component of this publication.

To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI-SAT makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool (see figure II.1.1 for an example).⁸ The Civil Society diamond graph, with its four extremities, visually summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society.

The diagram is the result of the individual **FIGURE I.1.1: Civil Society Diamond Tool**

indicator scores aggregated into subdimension and then dimension scores. As it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond provides a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about what civil society looks like in a given country. Since the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it



cannot, and should not, be used to rank countries according to their scores on the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multifaceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time, and compare the state of civil societies across countries (Anheier 2004).

What is unique about the CSI-SAT? As stated above, the CSI-SAT is a substantially shorter version of the full CSI, as it uses a less participatory and less comprehensive approach to collecting the information on the state of civil society in a particular country. Different from

⁷ See Appendix 2, List of indicators and technical notes.

⁸ The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier 2004).

the full CSI, the CSI-SAT relies on existing data only and does not include the consultative and action-planning stages of the full CSI. However, its conceptual framework and breadth of indicators is the same as in the full CSI.

2.2 Project Methodology

This section describes the methods used to collect and aggregate the various data used by the CSI-SAT project.

Data Collection: In recent years there has been a proliferation in the amount of literature published on civil society; however, there is a lack of an analytical framework to help organise and systematise this information into a comprehensive picture of the state of civil society at the country level. The CSI seeks to provide such a framework, as it identifies and reviews relevant data sources that cover the full range of civil society organisations included in the study. Here a variety of national and international data sources are utilised and drawn together in accordance with the indicators' definitions provided by CIVICUS.

For the CSI-SAT study in Russia includes:

- (1) A comprehensive study of secondary sources took place.
- (2) All relevant data produced by the all-Russia Social Opinion Poll Agency (WCIOM) for 2004 was incorporated in this Report. Data from other studies was also included in Russian CSI-SAT Report, namely the USAID NGO Sustainability Index, USAID Democracy Initiatives Survey 2004 in Russia, etc.
- (3) The Report also incorporated data of a community survey (with an adapted methodology) in 5 Russian towns: Rostov Velikij (Rostov Oblast), Khimki (Moscow Oblast), Skopin (Ryazan Oblast), Chernushka (Perm Oblast), Petrodvorets (St. Petersburg area). The work carried out in these towns included a simplified community sampling with a shorter questionnaire than the one proposed by CIVICUS, gathering and interpretation of official data on social-political environment and in-depth interviews (case studies on impact) with NGOs and officials. This work was carried out by researchers from HSE. A special mathematical model and program was developed to interpret the data.
- (4) The report includes case studies of civil society's impact both gathered in the towns mentioned above and in the course of in-depth interviews conducted with NGOs and officials from the Russian regions of Siberia. These interviews were carried out by researchers from St. Petersburg "Strategy" Center.
- (5) Corporate social responsibility study, including the review of annual reports of companies like SUAL, RUSAL, BP and the Report on Social Investments in Russia for 2004 "The Role of Business in Social Development" produced by UNDP and the Russian Association of Managers.

Data Scoring: The various data sources are collated and synthesized by the CSI project team in a first draft country report, which is structured along the CSI indicators, subdimension and dimensions. This report presents the basis for the indicator scoring exercise. In this exercise, each score is rated on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 being the lowest assessment possible and 3 the most positive. The scoring of each indicator is based on a short description of the indicator and a mostly qualitatively defined scale of scores from 0 to 3.⁹ The scoring exercise is modelled along a "citizen jury" approach (Jefferson Centre 2002), in which citizens come

⁹ See Appendix 2, List of indicators and technical notes.

together to deliberate, and make a decision on a public issue, based on presented facts. The SAG's role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence (or data) presented by the National Index Team (NIT) in form of the draft country report.

In Russia, the scoring process consisted of an initial score given by the CIVICUS CSI Team, which was then matched against the score given by the participants of the second SAG meeting held on 20 February 2006 in Moscow and scores of those NAG members who were unable to attend the meeting in person and e-mailed their scores to the NCO. The researchers themselves deliberately did not score the indicators to retain neutrality. The scores for all indicators of all SAG members were rounded off by the NCO. Certain disagreement between the CIVICUS scores and the average scores of the NAG members and among the NAG members occurred on a number of indicators, which is noted in the relevant sections of this report.

The subdimension scores are arrived at by a simple averaging of the component indicator scores. The final scores of the four dimensions (structure, environment, values and impact) were plotted to generate the Civil Society Diamond for Russia.

2.3 Linking Research with Action

The CSI is not a strictly academic research project, since its declared objective is to include civil society stakeholders in the research and assessment process. This was limited in the current project. However, it is intended that the country report be used in a number of civil society meetings in 2006, including the "Civil Society G8" initiative that is set up to provide civic engagement in the G8 Summit in 2006 in St. Petersburg, Russia. These meetings will explore the implications of the report for civil society, seek to include all the major stakeholders, and will possibly propose certain actions regarding specific recommendations on how to strengthen civil society in Russia.

2.4 Project Outputs

The CSI-SAT implementation in Russia has resulted in a comprehensive country report on the state of civil society. This will be disseminated to a range of stakeholders, as well as the media and policy makers. In addition, it will be directed to the newly created Russian (federal) Civic Chamber, as well as for the regional civic chambers that are being created throughout the country. The Report will also feed into the work of civil society consultative bodies, created by Russian authorities at various levels that allow for open participation of CSOs, including participation of the St. Petersburg "Strategy" Center, research team members and SAG members. Additionally, some CSOs in Russia's regions accepted the CSI tool with some modifications as means to locally and regionally assess civil society.

II CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

1. SPECIAL FEATURES OF RUSSIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

FIGURE II.1.1: Russia Country Information¹⁰

Country size: 17.07 mln. sq. km.
Population: 144.2 mln (2004)
Population density: 3.4 per sq. km
Population growth: 0.62% (2003)
Urban population: 73% (2002)
Life expectancy: 65.07 years (2003)
Gender distribution of the population:
 1147 women per 1000 men (2002)
Share of young people (up to 19): 25.2% (2002)
Population below national poverty line (2002): 17.8% (2004)
Cities with population over 50 000: 229 (2002)
Form of government: Federal democratic state, presidential republic
Languages: 98% speak Russian (2002)
Ethnicity: 80% Russian, 20% belong to 180 various ethnicities and nationalities
GDP per capita (current US\$): 3,975 (2004)
GDP (current US\$): 572,960 mln, 2004)
GDP Growth: 7.1% (2004)
Atlas GNI (Gross National Income) per capita \$3,400 (2004)
Unemployment rate: 7.8% (2005)
 (Sources: the World Bank, International Labor Organization)

Among the oldest traditional forms of civil society in Russia are community (*obschina*), Merchants' guilds, *zemstva* (elected bodies of local authorities in Russia 1864-1917), as well as lawyers's bar associations. These forms of associational life vanished with the installation of the Soviet regime. Yet, even during the worst times of Stalin's totalitarian regime certain civil society forms were preserved: professional organisations like the Union of Writers, the Union of Film Directors, sport and cultural societies. Clearly, all of these organisations were under strictest control of the state, but were able to advocate for their interests from within the state apparatus. Parallel to "official" civil society, sporadically created underground forms of civil society also existed, such as the informal circle "Communist party of youth". Participants of the circle were arrested and put into jail. Another form of civic activism, which was strongly suppressed, was the dissident movement.

Thus, any forms of formal independent civil society did not exist during the Soviet period of our history. During certain periods of Soviet

history, when political regime softened and certain political transformations occurred, civil society reached through, expanded and increased its influence. This happened, for example, in the second half of 1950-ies— beginning of 1960-ies, during the "warming", and even more after 1985 under the *perestroika* policy.

During and after *perestroika* civil society bodies that started to appear in the economic sphere are unions of cooperatives and business associations, like the "Round Table fo Russian Business". In the political sphere the first alternative political parties started to appear on the bases of *dissident* movement: first the Democratci platform of the Communist party of of the USSR, and then the Republican partly, Democratic Russia movement, etc. The third sphere of civil society development were the national movements and fronts which emered in the late 1980s/beginning of 1990s. These created the basis of still acting and strong political parties in the former Soviet Union Republics and in Russia itself.

The non-political civil society groups existed already before *perestroika* and part of them were fully controlled, part of them were partly controlled and the rest existed in the underground form — religious, cultural, intellectual movements and organisations. For

¹⁰ Sources: World Bank in Russia web-site www.worldbank.org.ru, fugures for 2005. Data from National Statistical Office and Staff estimates.

example, until 1985 in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities there existed circles (groups) of intellectuals that discussed not only scientific problems, but also political matters, global macro-economic issues, etc. These circles later gave birth to political leaders and strong CSOs like “Consumer society”.¹¹

The growth of political activity in the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s preconditioned the emergence of informal movements and development of various forms of citizens’ participation. A spontaneous process of setting up political parties began in 1988: formed at that time national fronts, social movements and political clubs later evolved into political parties and political movements. In the 1990s, when the USSR Law on ‘Public Associations’ was adopted, Russian multiparty system received its official recognition. In 1991 when Russia officially declared its independence and broke off from the Soviet Union, CSOs received the *de facto* freedom of association. *De jure*, however, civil society’s legislative and regulatory environment remained largely unregulated, and its institutional infrastructure rather weak.

The social and economic transformations that have been taking place for over a decade in Russia have consumed most of people’s attention and resources. Collectivism and obligatory membership in CSOs during the Soviet time was replaced by the capitalist values of consumerism and individualism. In 1990s many have seen the political parties and human rights groups as being in opposition to the authorities.

In Russia laws on non-profit organisations started forming only in the 1990s, though even back in Soviet time some legislative documents recognized special status of organisations acting for public good, contrary to government organisations or private businesses, and admitted their right to tax and other privileges.¹²

According to the latest available data from the Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation, there are at least 600,000 registered non-governmental non-commercial organisations operating in Russia. At least as many may be working in the country without official registration. The number of NGOs in Russia has grown rapidly since 1991, and now includes social service providers, educational organisations, policy think-tanks, gender-based groups, credit unions and many others. Rather than advocacy NGOs forming a separate group, advocacy forms a particular activity of many of these organisations, belonging to various other sectors (democracy development, human rights, etc.). In addition, organisations like those representing veterans and disabled people still remain from the Soviet years. Thus, NGOs in Russia fill a number of important civic functions, including advocating for the marginalised and providing social services where the state cannot or will not. President V. Putin has underlined the importance of these organisations, amongst other occasions at a 2005 meeting with his Advisory Council on Civil Society, he expressed his hope that “NGOs may become good and irreplaceable partners to the state in combating most acute problems.”¹³ However, Grigory Shvedov of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, considers recent strengthening the “vertical of power” and the governmental initiatives to tighten control over civil society one of the current tendencies in Russia.

¹¹ Satarov 2004: http://www.sakharov-center.ru/publications/Cennosti_i_lichnost/04.htm.

¹² Russian NCO legal status: a handbook 1996.

¹³ Proskuryakova 2005 <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6607>.

2. CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

Civil society is not a common term in Russia. Researchers differ with regard to the boundaries of civil society, usually excluding some of the following organisations: faith-based organisations, labour unions, business groups, political parties and/or criminal groups. Civil society's picture varies greatly in each of the 80 subjects of the Russian Federation (Russia's regions), as well as in urban vs. rural areas. It is within these different perspectives, with their contested definitions and validity, which are entrenched in many areas of Russia that this report seeks to describe and examine some kind of common ground.

The Concept of Civil Society Used in this Study

As mentioned in Section I.2.1, the civil society definition proposed by CIVICUS is characterised by a very broad scope encompassing 'positive' and 'negative' organisations and also informal forms of citizens' participation. Most of the research has focused on organisations, but some forms of informal groups were considered, for example environmental activists.

Additionally, decisions were made regarding a number of organisational types, whose membership in civil society are country-specific historical factors. CIVICUS drafted a list of 20 types of CSOs to operationalize the civil society definition. These were adapted to the Russian context by the SAG and research groups members in the following ways:

- Political parties were excluded from the definition.
- "Uncivilized" elements of civil society, such as criminal groups were excluded from the definition.

The reasons for excluding political parties are that in modern Russia political parties remain a sidelined group of CSOs. Moreover, many political parties recently turned into quasi-parties, i.e. parties created and managed by the state in the form of "political projects". Uncivilized elements of civil society, such as criminal groups, were excluded as this category would have been impossible to study, given the limitations of CSI-SAT in Russia, since no reliable research data exists on this category of organisations.

Furthermore, the following obligatory criteria (of belonging of an organisation to civil society) were defined:

1. Voluntary work/free will (of entering and exiting from organisation for members and staff, conscientious choice of citizens) or
2. Protection and promotion (advocacy) of common interests (own and those of a target social group)
 - Legality of interests (to a certain degree)
 - Public good
 - Non-violence

Additional criteria were first stated as criteria of exclusion of CSOs from the study; however this provision was later revised by researchers and CSOs that do not fulfill these criteria were included in the study. These were; Internal democracy (participation of staff/members of an organisation in decision-making); Self-sufficiency (to the degree possible given the limitation of the environment) and capacity for self-development

This gives the following list of included organisation types, which includes a number of legal forms (table II.2.1).

TABLE II.2.1: Types of CSOs included in the study

1. Religious (faith-based) organisations	12. Business-community associations
2. Labour unions	13. Councils and associations of local communities/ small territories (e.g. Council of a village, Council of a micro-region, society for the support of local communities, territorial public councils, etc.)
3. Human rights organisations (protection of human rights of a certain social groups/ all citizens and self-help groups)	14. Groups and associations servicing communities (e.g. self-help groups, associations of parents)
4. Social sector groups (e.g. CSOs working for the support of local communities, providing social services, working in the sphere of healthcare, etc.)	15. CSOs bound by common economic interests (e.g. cooperatives, credit unions, self-help groups, etc.)
5. Groups working in the sphere of education, re-qualification, additional education and research (e.g. academic and research groups, resource centres, non-commercial schools, people's education groups, etc.)	16. National-cultural unions
6. Non-governmental media	17. Environmental organisations
7. Gender-based groups	18. CSOs working in the sphere of culture and art
8. Age-based groups	19. Social and free time CSOs, sports clubs
9. Unions of marginalised social and economic groups (e.g. poor, homeless, immigrants, refugees, etc.)	20. Grant-making foundations
10. Groups providing social and medical assistance (e.g. charity organisations that raise funds for medical research/services, unions of disabled persons, etc.)	21. Political parties (outside the boundaries of this research)
11. Professional and sector-specific organisations (e.g. unions protecting interests of certain professions, such as real estate agents association, PR specialists association etc.)	22. Networks, federations, support organisations of CSOs
	23. Social and public movements (e.g. movement for peace, etc.)
	24. Quasi-CSOs
	25. Advocacy groups
	26. Unions of military and veterans


III ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

This section is divided along the four dimensions: **Structure, Environment, Values** and **Impact**, which make up the CSI Diamond. The diagram provided in the beginning of each sub-section shows the scale used to measure the sub-dimension variables (scores from 0 to 3). This is followed by detailed examination of the findings for each sub-dimension. Separate boxes also provide the scores for the individual indicators for each sub-dimension.¹⁴

1. STRUCTURE

This section describes and analyses the overall size, strength and vibrancy of civil society in human, organisational and economic terms. Figure IV.1.1 below presents the scores for the six subdimensions within the Structure dimension: extent of citizen participation; depth of citizen participation; diversity of civil society participants; level of organisation; inter-relations and civil society resources. The score for the Structure Dimension is 1.4, indicating a slightly weak structure for civil society in Russia with some limitations in the depth and breadth of civil society participation, as well as modest resources available to civil society. Civic engagement and active citizenship are clearly the areas where more efforts need to be exercised by civil society. Also, the resource constraints for CSOs need to be addressed since resources for civil society have become scarce and predominantly come from foreign sources.

FIGURE III.1.1: Subdimension scores in structure dimension



1.1 The Extent of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the extent of various forms of citizen's participation in Russian civil society. Table III.1.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

¹⁴ See Appendix 2, the CSI scoring matrix, for a more detailed description of the indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.1: Indicators assessing the extent of citizens' participation (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	1
1.1.2	Charitable giving	-- ¹⁵
1.1.3	CSO membership	1
1.1.4	Volunteer work	1
1.1.5	Community action	1

1.1.1 Non-partisan political action. Population surveys show that a very insignificant part of Russian citizens actively undertake political actions. For example, the USAID Democracy Initiatives Survey conducted in Russia in 2004 showed the following: 1% of the subjects answered positively to the question 'Are you a member of a political party?'; and the questions 'Are you a member of some other political organisation?' as well as 'Are you a member of a non- governmental, non-commercial organisation?' were also answered positively by 1% of respondents.

TABLE III 1.2: USAID Democracy Initiatives, Survey 2004

Have you ever attended any demonstrations or protests in the past year?

	Total	Moscow	St. Petersburg	Nizhny Novgorod	Saratov	Samara	Perm	Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk	Khabarovsk	Rostov-on-Don	Tomsk	Irkutsk
Base: all respondents	100%	42%	19%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	6%	2%	4%	2%	2%
Yes	2%	2%	2%	2%	4%	3%	1%	3%	0%	3%	3%	3%	3%
No	97%	97%	98%	96%	96%	96%	99%	97%	100%	96%	97%	96%	94%
Refused	0%	0%	0%	1%		1%		0%		0%			1%
Unsure	0%	1%		1%	1%			0%		1%		0%	2%

USAID Democracy Initiatives survey showed that in 2004 only 2% of Russians united and undertook actions to resolve problems that appear in their village/town. Out of the regions surveyed, the largest extent of citizen's activism was noted in Saratov, Novossibirsk and Khabarovsk.

¹⁵ Indicator was taken out due to lack of data

TABLE III.1.3: USAID Democracy Initiatives, Survey 2004

Have you ever attended any demonstrations or protests in the past year?

	Total	Moscow	St.Petersburg	Nizhny Novgorod	Saratov	Samara	Perm	Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk	Khabarovsk	Rostov-on-Don	Tomsk	Irkutsk
Base: all respondents	100%	42%	19%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	6%	2%	4%	2%	2%
Yes	2%	2%	2%	2%	4%	3%	1%	3%	0%	3%	3%	3%	3%
No	97%	97%	98%	96%	96%	96%	99%	97%	100%	96%	97%	96%	94%
Refused	0%	0%	0%	1%		1%		0%		0%			1%
Unsure	0%	1%		1%	1%			0%		1%		0%	2%

According to the USAID Democracy Initiatives, an insignificant number of Russians took part in demonstrations or protest actions in 2003-2004: overall in Russia only 2% of respondents with the highest numbers in Saratov (4 % answered positively to the question).

TABLE III 1.4: USAID Democracy Initiatives, Survey 2004

In the past year, have you ever worked or cooperated with others in this village/town to try to solve some of the problems of this village/town?

	Total	Moscow	St.Petersburg	Nizhny Novgorod	Saratov	Samara	Perm	Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk	Khabarovsk	Rostov-on-Don	Tomsk	Irkutsk
Base: all respondents	100%	42%	19%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	6%	2%	4%	2%	2%
Yes	2%	1%	2%	4%	5%	4%	1%	2%	5%	5%	3%	3%	4%
No	97%	98%	98%	94%	94%	96%	99%	97%	95%	93%	97%	96%	93%
Refused	0%		0%	1%	0%	0%		0%		1%		0%	1%
Unsure	1%	1%		1%	1%	0%		1%		1%		0%	2%

Noteworthy among the recent large-scale non-partisan political actions are the mass protests that broke out in 2004 over proposals to overhaul the social welfare system, replacing travel, housing and health care benefits with monthly cash payments.¹⁶

The results of the World Value Survey 2000 show that 29% of respondents in Russia have undertaken one of the following forms of nonpartisan political action: written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition or attended a demonstration. USAID Democracy Initiatives survey showed that in 2004 only 2% of Russians united and undertook actions to resolve problems that appear in their village/town.

¹⁶ Amnesty International 2004 Russia Country Report.

Based on the results of these various surveys, it is evident in Russia that though there is an interest in politics, it is not accompanied by significant political involvement. According to one population survey, whilst more than a quarter of all Russians are willing to sign a petition, only 10% have actually done so.¹⁷ The same survey revealed that a quarter of all Russians are willing to attend a lawful demonstration and 20% have actually participated in one. In contrast, fewer are prepared to join a boycott and only 2% of the surveyed respondents reported to have actually joined a boycott. As expected, the numbers are even lower for those who have taken part in an unofficial strike.¹⁸ The differences across studies with respect to the percentage of people participating in non-partisan political action are due to differences in research methodology, the cities/regions surveyed and the forms of political engagement considered.

1.1.3 CSO membership. There are few CSOs that have a significant membership in Russia. These are either CSOs, which already existed during the Soviet Union such as veterans' organisations and labor unions or the newly created civic-political movements and branches of international NGOs, i.e. GreenPeace. The 2000 World Values Survey indicates that 31.5 % of respondents are members of CSOs. Furthermore, the WVS provides the following data on CSO membership:

TABLE III.1.5: CSO membership by category

Membership in: category of CSO	Percentage
Social welfare services for elderly people	1.6
Church organisations	2.4
Cultural organisations	1.2
Labor Unions	23.1
Political parties (national)	0.7
Local political organisations	0.9
Human rights organisations	0.1
Environmental groups	0.7
Professional associations	0.9
Youth organisations	0.6
Sports organisations	3.5
Women's groups	0.5
Peace movement	0.1
Health organisations	0.7
Other groups	1.2

1.1.4 Volunteer work. Research on the extent of volunteering in Russia shows a very limited proportion of the population volunteering for CSOs. Even though the 2000 World Values Survey indicates that only 4.8 % of respondents are volunteering for CSOs, many Russian people at the local level do volunteer work, not usually considered as such. This includes, for example, helping at schools where their children study to paint walls, etc. We could also mention the example of "subbotniki" still taking place (days when people come out to streets to clean their neighborhoods).

Professors and students of SU-HSE studied volunteering in 5 Russia's towns. According to their findings, in Rostov-the-Great town 50% of the population volunteer for CSOs: 14%

¹⁷ Christopher 2005: 554.

¹⁸ Christopher 2005: 554.

regularly and 36% rarely. Those who take part in the events organised by non-government, non-profit organisations make only 36%. SU-HSE analysis in Skopin (Ryazan Oblast) showed that 70 % of the town population work as volunteers there (though, it should be noted that the majority of respondents used to do it even back in the Soviet time). This data, as well as some of the findings below, contrast significantly with the data of the World Values Survey. Again, the difference is due to different definitions of volunteering used by the respective studies.

According to an opinion poll carried out from August till October 2004 by the Institute of Public Development, 70 % of respondents claimed that the number of volunteers that take part in NGOs' activity, increased. In such cities as Rostov-on-Don and Nizhny Novgorod the research teams found out an increase in the number of persons that provide voluntary support to NGOs.

In the Survey conducted by the Institute for Social Development between August and September 2004, 70 % of respondents claimed that the number of volunteers engaged in NGO activities had increased. By contrast, the number of volunteers among of USAID Democracy Initiatives Survey subjects is only 2%.

TABLE III.1.6: Results of opinion poll, August - October 2004, the Institute of Public Development

In the past year, have you volunteered?

That is, have you spent time helping or participating in the activities of a non-governmental, non-commercial organisation?

	Total	Moscow	St.Petersburg	Nizhny Novgorod	Saratov	Samara	Perm	Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk	Khabarovsk	Rostov-on-Don	Tomsk	Irkutsk
Base: all respondents	100%	42%	19%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	6%	2%	4%	2%	2%
Yes	2%	1%	4%	2%	2%	3%	0%	1%	0%	2%	4%	3%	4%
No	97%	98%	96%	97%	97%	96%	100%	99%	100%	96%	95%	96%	94%
Refused	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%				2%	1%	1%	2%

Volunteering in Russia is well summed up in I.Kokarev's book, entitled "Neighboring Communities: a way to the Future of Russia". It elucidates how civil initiatives should be organised, volunteering in particular: "if correctly organised, thoughtful introduction of volunteering into project implementation process as a mandatory component thereof makes volunteering an important auxiliary resource for the efficient development of crisis (and not only crisis) territories".¹⁹

1.1.5 Community action. As mentioned under the previous indicator, Russian citizens rather prefer other types of community action to volunteering. Civic education and raising awareness is a prominent part of community action. At times, state libraries become the centers of civic education. For example, the Khasavyurt library (part of Dagestan region bordering Chechnya), which lost its capacities to accommodate readers after yet another

¹⁹ Kokarev 2001: 124.

terrorist act, plays an important social role in the city. It built the strategy to widen its collection taking into consideration human rights issues, provided access to information about possibilities of citizens' self-organisation, and organised discussions for people from a dozen of local communities.

Similarly, the children's library of Murmansk city helps young people to build their identity not only as Russian citizens, but also as citizens of the Barrens region; it has become the main space for citizens' initiatives in the city. The Rostov-on-Don city library takes part in over a dozen of projects of regional importance and clearly surpasses the limits of a traditional cultural institution. In fact, these libraries are not only information points, but also centers that make an impact on public opinion. However, not all large libraries play a social role in promoting active citizenship, nor all rural libraries that possess a good development potential, use it.²⁰

“Artels (workmen's cooperative associations), associations and mutual loan societies are historically recognized forms of production organisations and income distribution that allow for the realization of personal interests within a collective and with the help of the collective. Recognizing the organic nature of this form of economic and social life, we can speak of an emerging sector in a social economy - i.e. the community of non-profit organisations and non-government associations - as being the future of Russia”.²¹

As one observer noted, “It is reluctantly that Russia yields itself to local self-governance and new civil culture. As experts note, within the latest 10 years of democratic reforms, the municipal power has failed to get on its feet, and the readiness of citizens and grassroots social groups to undertake the solution of even very basic social problems has not shown any considerable growth. New self-governance institutes have not started working efficiently, even regardless of the fact that necessary legal prerequisites were created in the 90^{ies}”.²²

The SAG members present at the SAG scoring meeting agreed that community action is often underestimated in opinion polls, especially those of international organisations.

1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the depth of various forms of citizen participation in Russian civil society. Table III.1.7 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.7: Indicators assessing depth of citizens' participation (0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
1.2.1	Charitable giving	-- ²³
1.2.2	Volunteering	-- ²⁴
1.2.3	CSO membership	0

According to the data of the present report, the depth of citizen participation is very limited. During election campaigns political parties actively engage other types of CSOs to mobilize citizens and work towards deepening citizens' participation. The so-called liberal political

²⁰ Shvedov 2005.

²¹ Liborakina/Yakimets 1997: 152.

²² Basics of local self-governance 2001: 130.

²³ Indicator has been taken out due to lack of data

²⁴ Indicator has been taken out due to lack of data

parties and independent media are tactical allies of other CSOs (primarily NGOs), however, a more well-thought through cooperation is missing.²⁵

1.2.3 CSO membership. As mentioned under 1.1.3, there are few organisations with a large membership in Russia. The WVS indicates that out of those Russian citizens who are members of at least one CSO, 31.5 % of respondent are members of CSOs, while only 12% have multiple memberships.

1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants

This subdimension examines the diversity and representative nature of the civil society arena. It analyses whether all social groups participate equitably in civil society or whether there are any groups which are dominant or excluded. Table III.1.8 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.8: Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants (2.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	2
1.3.2	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	2
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	2

Russian civil society is extremely varied and differs by organisation type, region of activity, history of creation etc. As of 1 January, 2003 (the latest available data), according to the State Statistics Committee, Russia had 622,174 registered non-profit (non-commercial) non-government organisations of different kinds. These organisations make up 16.18% of the total number of registered legal entities.

Institutions are the major component of these CSOs (43.6%), followed by religious and community organisations (27.7%) and then cooperatives (11.4%). Four point two percent are foundations and various gardeners' (*sadovodcheskie*) associations. These are followed by non-profit partnerships, housing associations, groups of house owners (*condominiums*), autonomous non-commercial organisations, and associations and unions.²⁶

1.3.1 Representation of social groups among CSO members. The SAG members present at the second SAG meeting agreed that most of key social groups of Russian civil society are represented among CSOs members and staff in Russia's regions. Among the under-represented groups are the marginal social groups of the Russian society – very rich and very poor people.

In terms of age groups, older people (above 55) are underrepresented and mid-aged (35-55) people overrepresented. Not surprisingly, lower-income people are significantly underrepresented among CSO members and individuals with medium and high income are over-represented.

²⁵ Shvedov 2005.

²⁶ Data of the project "Assistance in improving and developing the legal basis for non-government non-profit organizations and the Third (non-commercial) sector", implemented by the State Duma Committee on public associations and religious organizations, and the United Nations Development Program in the Russian Federation.

Federation: <http://ngopravo.ru>

1.3.2. Representation of social groups among CSO leadership. SAG members in Russia present at the second SAG meeting agreed that representatives of most social groups are represented among CSO leadership.

Within the leadership of CSOs an outstanding a problem is the “personality factor”. Very often even experienced organisations, efficiently working for a number of years, have problems in cooperating with each other, because their leaders disagree on some issues. Over the years those disagreements evolve into conflicting opinions and open hostility. Such ‘warring’ organisations try hard to keep their ‘foes’ excluded from public bodies²⁷. The USAID NGO Sustainability Index of the past few years also noted that key characteristics and development potential of Russian CSOs are strongly dependent on the leader. “The majority of organisations are “one-man shows”, meaning that they are led by a single charismatic leader, who runs the organisation when the time and money permits”. The turnover of leadership is also very low.

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs around the country. CSOs are equally distributed through subjects of the Russian Federation (Russia’s regions), with a small exception: rural and remote areas are areas where CSOs are sometimes absent.

According to the data gathered by the joint UNDP – Russian State Duma project several years ago, NGOs are geographically distributed in the following way²⁸:

TABLE III.1.9: Distribution of Russian NGOs by federal regions (joint project of the Russian State Duma – UNDP in Russia)

Federal Okrug (administrative entity)	Number of registered NGOs (according to the RF legislation)
Central Federal Okrug	174886
North-West Federal Okrug	68059
South Federal Okrug	75325
Volga Federal Okrug	137649
Ural Federal Okrug	53542
Siberia Federal Okrug	83074
Far East Federal Okrug	29639

1.4 Level of Organisation

This subdimension looks at the extent of infrastructure and internal organisation within Russian civil society. Table III.1.10 summarises the respective indicator scores.

²⁷ Social Strategies: interaction between corporate civil initiatives and local administration. Russian North-West Experience 2002.

²⁸ Data of the project ‘Assistance in improving and developing the legal basis for non-government non-profit organizations and the Third (non-commercial) sector’, implemented by the State Duma Committee on public associations and religious organizations, and the Development Program of the UN Organization in the Russian federation: <http://ngopravo.ru>

TABLE III.1.10: Indicators assessing level of organisation (1.6)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
1.4.1	Existence of umbrella bodies	1
1.4.2	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	2
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	1
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	2
1.4.5	International linkages	2

1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies. SAG members of CSI-SAT in Russia present at the second NAG meeting agreed that umbrella organisations exist in all sectors of civil society. Most CSOs are members of a certain umbrella organisation (e.g. permanent associations, temporary goal-oriented coalitions, etc.), though, at times CSOs find it difficult to cooperate when it comes to sharing of ideas and resources.

Examples of major umbrella organisations in Russia are the following:

- People's Assembly, Moscow is a coalition of non-government, non-profit organisations started after the Civil Forum. Its main actors are umbrella organisations having their head office in Moscow, such as: the Association of Consumers, International Resources, the 'Memorial' Society, Socio-Ecological Union, etc. The website www.civitas.ru is intended to become a resource center and database for the NGOs throughout Russia.
- 'We are Citizens!' Coalition was founded by NGOs from several regions of Russia (they are listed on the Coalition's website www.citizens.ru.) The Coalition unites organisations from Russia and some CIS countries, dealing in mobilizing civil activity before elections, promoting citizen participation and informing the public on a wide range of important political issues. A large number of events in the regions of Russia were initiated as a follow-up of the Civil Forum of 2001.
- Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East (the Association has its representative office in Moscow). Member organisations actively cooperate with local community organisations in the North and Far East, actively using advocacy practices. See www.raipon.ru
- 'To the Civil Forum!' Coalition can be named as an example of regional coalitions created in the process of the preparation to the 2001 Civil Forum and the support thereof.²⁹

1.4.2. Effectiveness of umbrella bodies. SAG members present at the second SAG meeting agreed that CSO federations are somewhat effective in achieving their goals, depending on the category and scope of their activity. The factors here are political regime of a region, the level of unity and internal coherence of the particular umbrella body in question. For example, labor unions federations proved rather effective in achieving their goals when mobilizing large groups of citizens during the reform of social welfare provisions in Russia. At the same time, a CSO coalition against a Bill allowing processing of nuclear wastes in Russia which gathered signatures attempting to call for a referendum on the matter appeared to be unsuccessful due to the negative political context.

1.4.3 Self-regulation within civil society. Generally, throughout the country, CSO attempts for self-regulation remain few. To our knowledge, CSOs in Russia undertook very few initiatives to introduce self-regulation mechanisms, such as codes of conduct and standards

²⁹ Farewell to the Resource Center...Welcome to the Public Development Center! "Effect of Being" 2003. <http://www.cip.nsk.su/english/index.html>.

of excellence. Among such initiatives one could mention Standards of Excellence of NGO work, which were developed by the Center for the Support of Civic Initiatives “Uchastie” on the basis of international standards for volunteer sector³⁰ and with contributions from NGOs from Pskov, St. Petersburg, Moscow in accordance with their view on the criteria of quality work, efficiency of civil society work and underlying values.

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. Support infrastructure exists mostly for NGOs, labor unions and business associations. For other CSOs support infrastructure is not much developed. At the same time, NGO resource centers, with drying financial support, have now often turned into organisations providing commercial services for other NGOs.

According to the NGO Sustainability Index in Russia (USAID, 2002), “...NGO resource centers have served as catalysts for increased NGO activism in the regions. Russia spans eleven time zones and has over 35 cities with populations over 500,000. In a country of this size, NGO resource centers are vital providers of NGO training and expertise. In all, Russian NGOs are connected by 40 resource centers across the country”.

The most important existing resource centers are listed in Annex 5.

1.4.5 International linkages. In 2003, there were 84 secretariats (headquarters) of international NGOs (INGOs) and internationally oriented NGOs in Russia. In other words, the number of secretariats per million people was 0.6. This number reflects a 100% growth in the presence of international NGOs in Russia during the period 1993-2003 when the number of internationally oriented NGOs doubled from 42 to 84.³¹ Another indication of Russian civil society’s growing international linkages is the fact that 3284 INGOs had at least one member or member organisation in Russia. Similarly, according to the 2005/06 Global Civil Society Yearbook, 0.46% of INGOs in Russia are involved in a network of global CSOs. This score indicates different aspects of network centrality such as the share of Russia in the total number of organisations participating in the network, which indicates the inclusiveness of the network. With the United Kingdom and the United States of America respectively having 10.17% and 19.98% involved in the network of global CSOs, this comparative data reflects the concentration of the network in the developed world.

Russian organisations actively network with international organisations and campaigns.³² Examples include the following:

- the *Quilt* Campaign (people make special quilts to remember their near who died of AIDS; quilts made by Russian citizens were displayed in schools, in Palaces of Culture, at conferences, in the streets and squares of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Barnaul, Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, Rostov-on-the-Don, Volgograd, Tomsk);
- preparation of alternative reports on the issues of public interest for the meetings of such international organisations as special UN institutes etc. E.g. - the Report for the Special Representative of UN General Secretary on the Status of Human Rights Advocates and Non-Government Human Rights Organizations of Russia in 1999 – 2002 (April 2002); the Report on the State Policy in Facilitation Civil Initiatives. The Position of Non-Government Organization (May 2000); the Report on the Status of Non-for-Profit Sector

³⁰ Illustrative Standards for the Voluntary Sector in English and Russian 1994.

³¹ Anheier et al. 2005: 298.

³² E.g. International Confederation of Consumer Associations, World Alliance for Civil Assistance, NGO network of the Baltic Sea Region, NCO network of Europe and Central Asia on cooperation with the World Bank, etc.

in Russia and its Contribution into the country's social and economic development (March 2000).³³

1.5 Inter-Relations within Civil Society

This subdimension analyses the relations amongst civil society actors in Russia. Table III.1.11 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.11: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society (1.5)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	2
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	1

1.5.1 Communication between CSOs. Communication among civil society actors is rather well developed. Communication is carried out through networks and via the Internet; proof of its effectiveness is the high speed of gathering signatures for petitions and open letters to governments. In general, Russian CSOs actively communicate with each other, however these communications are often limited by the boundaries of the sector they belong to. Cross-sectoral communication within civil society is as a rule carried out by support organisations, foundations and policy centers, as well as the few most advanced organisations. For example, Moscow Helsinki Group regularly prepares human rights updates that are widely disseminated throughout the CSO community. So does NAN (NO to Alcoholism and Drugs) Foundation sending out its regular update specifically devoted to intersectoral interaction (both government-CSO and within civil society).

1.5.2 Cooperation between CSOs. Though some NGOs cooperate, by and large according to the 2003 NGO Sustainability Index, NGOs do not perceive their interests as being broadly shared by others. One of the reasons for this is that “NGO organisational development remains highly individualistic and dependent upon each organisation's leadership”. Another reason is the restrictive environment, for example, “many regions have included new mechanisms for NGO/government cooperation such as municipal grants procedures and competitive procurement, but these laws only amend federal legislation and do not eliminate the federally mandated controls”.³⁴

Russian environmental organisations show exemplary cooperation practices, especially in organising public campaigns, like the public campaign to ban utilisation of nuclear waste in Russia and NGO Coalition on “Sakhalin” project funded by an international consortium of corporations and financial institutions. Cross-sectoral cooperation mostly happens due to requirements of funders demanding CSO consortiums. For example, Moscow Helsinki Group joined forces with gender groups for a project to monitor gender discriminatory practices in Russia. However, as CSO of various types often compete over scarce resources of donors and attention of authorities, cooperation remains limited.

1.6 Civil Society Resources

This subdimension examines the resources available for civil society organisations in Russia. Table III.1.12 summarises the respective indicator scores.

³³ Democracy and Human Rights Development Center, www.demokratia.ru

³⁴ USAID Sustainability Index for Russia, 2002, www1.usaid.gov

TABLE III.1.12: Indicators assessing civil society resources (0.7)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	1
1.6.2	Human resources	1
1.6.3	Technical and infrastructure resources	0

1.6.1 Financial resources. The financial viability of Russian civil society received a score of 4.6 in the 2004 NGO Sustainability index rating with 7 indicating a very poor level of development and 1 indicating an advanced level of NGO sector development. According to the report, donors are scaling down their commitments or limiting their focuses to specific themes. NGOs are also negatively affected by the lack of tax incentives to promote corporate and individual philanthropy. Only a small number of corporations provide support to CSOs, but only after formal or informal approval of the state. Certain regional and municipal grants schemes exist in some 20 Russia's regions. In some parts of Russia (like Volga and Siberia), CSOs also have possibilities to take part in tender competitions for social services.

Amendments to the Law on Charitable Organizations severely restricted the ability of NGOs to generate revenues. In 2003, few regional NGOs were successful in winning municipal contracts. Likewise, Moscow business associations and think tanks are engaged in consultancy work for the federal government on service fee basis. Nonetheless, the majority of Russian NGOs are still effectively excluded from collecting revenues through service fees. For the majority, securing finances has become more difficult in the years since 1998 and it is speculated to worsen over the next few years.³⁵ The majority of NGOs have less than 2-3 months of operating capital, operate on a grant-to-grant basis and are dependent on foreign donors.³⁶

Grant making and charity foundations may have a negative impact on the civil society mainstream in the following way. In the situation when private foundations (mostly foreign) remain the key grantmakers in Russia, CSOs are likely to switch to implementation of the type programs that are set as priorities and are thus funded by these foundations. In case these programs that are brought to Russia, are not viable by definition, — financial support creates artificial demand.

In his address to the Federal Assembly in 2004, President Putin blamed certain civil society organisations that their priorities are in “obtaining funding from influential foreign foundations”, “servicing doubtful groupings and commercial interests”, and, therefore, “when taking about violations of fundamental human rights and vilolations of real people's interests, the voice of these organisations are often not heard”, because they “cannot bite the hand”, which feeds them”. Although it remains unclear what the President meant exactly, the threat towards Western charitable foundations was clearly articulated.³⁷

At a certain level of funding, the foundations start playing a policy role. A special role here belongs to groupings of grant makers, such as Russian Donors' Forum.³⁸ In addition, the

³⁵ 2003 NGO Sustainability Index. See

www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf

³⁶ . See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf

³⁷ Overview Report of the Moscow Helsinki Group in the Observance of Human Rights in Russia, 2004

<http://www.mhg.ru>

³⁸ Shvedov 2005.

long-term financial viability of CSOs is under threat from announcements of foreign donor withdrawals.³⁹ Coupled with complex federal legislations on the earned income of CSOs, the ability of CSOs to establish a secure sustainable financial base remains weak.

1.6.2 Human resources. Qualified specialists are in deficit in civil society. Consequently, CSOs are restricted by limited access to professional services such as accountants, lawyers, fundraisers and public relations officials to interact with government authorities and donors. Affected by an inadequate financial resource base, CSOs' are often unable to pay for the required goods and training opportunities.⁴⁰

1.6.3 Technical and infrastructure resources. SAG members of CSI-SAT in Russia present at the second SAG meeting agreed that mostly CSOs from Moscow, St. Petersburg and regional centers possess good technical (computers, IT, equipment, telephones, etc.) and infrastructural resources. This constitutes a small percent of the total number of CSOs. Nearly all CSOs, from the countryside and provincial areas, lack technical and infrastructure resources.

Conclusion

A substantial proportion of the Russian population show a limited involvement in civil society activity. This involvement appears to be difficult to measure, specifically the types and frequency of civic activism. Grassroots activity, including community action, volunteer work and CSO membership remains rather low and should clearly become an area of concern and action for civil society. Various studies provide contradictory results on the scale and magnitude of citizens' activism. For example, the results of the World Value Survey 2000 show that 29% of respondents have undertaken one of the following forms of nonpartisan political action: written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition or attended a demonstration. At the same time, the USAID Democracy Initiatives survey showed that in 2004 only 2% of Russians united and undertook actions to resolve problems that appear in their village/town. With regards to the prospects for an increase in citizens' activism, it is likely that developments such as the abolished elections of regional governors and limitation of public policy space will further decrease citizens' activism in public life.

Despite the low levels of civic engagement, Russian civil society is rather diverse with all major social groups represented among CSO membership and leadership and CSOs are evenly distributed throughout the country's seven federal districts. Communication and cooperation among Russian CSOs takes places in a number of ways, Internet being the primary sources for cross-regional communication for cross-regional networks and umbrella organisations. One gap is the lack of cooperation between different CSO sectors. Of course cases of competition over resources and funding still play a role and even dominate the situation in some regions.

Despite 15 years of development aid and foreign assistance, Russian civil society, especially located outside major urban centres and regional capitals, clearly lacks financial and technical resources. Foreign assistance still remains the major source of support for CSOs in Russia and even this source has recently dried out with many foundations and international

³⁹ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_urasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf

⁴⁰ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_urasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf


development agencies moving on to developing countries. The initial consideration behind the exodus of foreign funders was that Russia has advanced well on its transition path and, judging by the per capita income, is no longer in need of massive foreign assistance. An additional consideration was a certain disappointment that some of the supported CSOs did not fulfil their mission and despite “social investments” Russia is turning back onto the authoritarian track. While foreign donors are pulling out, no new sustainable and effective mechanisms were created to substitute foreign with local funding.

Thus, the biggest weakness of civil society’s structure in Russia is its inability to mobilize large groups of society in support of causes, such as democracy advancement or empowering marginalised people. The biggest strength of Russian civil society’s structure is well-developed communication of civil society within the country, and its strong international linkages.

2. ENVIRONMENT

This section describes and analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which Russian civil society exists and functions. The score for the Environment Dimension is 1.1, indicating an environment that is more hindering than assisting the development of civil society. Figure III.2.1 presents the scores for the seven sub dimensions within the Environment Dimension. It shows that only the social and economic context appear to be conducive to civil society development, while other areas require substantial improvement.

FIGURE III 2.1: Sub dimension scores in environment dimension (1.1)



Thus, overall in Russia, and supported by specific case studies conducted in the 2004-2005 by the research team members from the State University-HSE in the towns of Skopin, Ryazan Oblast; Rostov-the-Great, Rostov Oblast; Vidnoye, Moscow Oblast; and Peterhof, St. Petersburg area, prove that civil society's environment can be characterized as rather or in some cases even fully disabling.

2.1 Political context

This subdimension examines the political situation in Russia and its impact on civil society. Table III.2.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.1: Indicators assessing political context (1.2)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
2.1.1	Political rights	1
2.1.2	Political competition	1
2.1.3	Rule of law	1
2.1.4	Corruption	1
2.1.5	State effectiveness	1
2.1.6	Decentralization	2

After the years of political struggle, economic conflicts and social shocks, the public agenda is now formed exclusively by political institutions, mostly executive federal authorities. The

President, the Duma factions, governors, political parties and groups, political leaders, etc. have very unequal political weight as actors in the political arena alongside a whole number of ‘service structures’ from analysts to the institutes that become part of news in press and on TV.⁴¹

The Russian social arena is fragmented due to the diversity of actors who also communicate only sporadically. Politics lacks the publicity that cultivates contacts between members of society, cultures, different territories and ethnic groups; i.e. between the powerful and the people. Without it, democracy doesn’t work.⁴²

Thus, it does not come as a surprise that numerous NGOs, especially human rights organisations, have been rather critical of the political transformations in the country within the last few years. Also, some political scientists are expressing serious criticism of the latest political and economic reforms held in Russia, among them: reform of social welfare entitlements, revocation of direct general elections of the heads of executive authorities of Russia’s regions, reform of local self-governance, change of procedures in forming the Council of Federation - upper Chamber of the Russian Parliament, administrative reform, change of the election system to the State Duma – lower Chamber of the Russian Parliament - from the mixed system to the elections by party lists.

On the above listed recent political changes, Lilia Shvetsova of Carnegie Moscow Center writes: “the steps made by Putin during his first presidency period – establishment of his own institute of governors and subordination of regional power structures to the Kremlin, suppression of oligarchs and regional barons, liquidation of independent TV – became the foundation of the new way to exercise power”⁴³.

2.1.1 Political rights. Russian citizens according to the constitution and the current legislation possess all rights attributed to a democratic regime. In reality, there are certain impediments for the practical implementation of these rights. The key criticism touches upon the recent set of political reforms, including the law imposing new restrictions on NGOs and to a certain degree in the constitutional right of association, the abolition of general elections of regional governors, etc.

In view of Russia’s state-controlled media, as well as the increasing restrictions on opposition parties (and their funders), the ability of Russians to elect political leaders is severely impeded. International observers consistently note that in its current shape the media industry has a hampering effect on free and fair elections.⁴⁴ In the 2004 Presidential election, observers deemed the election “well-administered”, Putin decisively won with 71.4% of the vote.⁴⁵

In 2002, a new law enabled the government to suspend political parties accused of extremism, however, the broad and ill-defined scope of ‘extremism’ allows for abuses and the general suppression of legitimate political parties. More recently, the strength of the presidency and executive authorities was further entrenched with a new law abolishing the election of regional governors in place of president appointed governors.

⁴¹ *Let’s Speak About Civil Society*, published by the Public Opinion Foundation Institute, 2001.

⁴² Yakovleva 2002 [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html].

⁴³ Shevtsova 2004.

⁴⁴ See, for example, country reports from Amnesty International, Freedom House and Human Rights Watch.

⁴⁵ Freedom House, *2005 Freedom in the World*, Russia Country Report.

2.1.2 Political competition. The institutionalization process of Russian political parties for the most part was completed after the new election law came effective shortly before the last parliamentary elections in 2004. The number of political parties in Russia has been gradually decreasing. At present, four parties are represented in the Russian State Duma – lower Chamber of the Parliament: pro-Kremlin “United Russia” (68% of seats), Communist Party (10.22%), nationalist leftist “Motherland” (in 2005 split into 2 factions: 7.11% & 2.67%) party and ultra conservative right-wing “Liberal Democrats” (7.78%). The MPs that are not a member of any of the above-mentioned factions constitute 3.56%. Political parties which did not manage to overcome the 7% barrier and be represented in the Duma claim and attempt to prove in courts that political competition during election campaigns and in between is seriously limited by the current power (including, but not limited to the use of the so-called “administrative resource”).

The recently increased threshold for parliamentary representation (7%) did not allow the prominent in the previous Duma (2000-2003) “Yabloko” party and Union of Right Forces receiving enough votes and be represented in Duma. They are now in the process of re-institutionalization.

All Russian federal-level elections are being observed by foreign observers (e.g. Council of Europe). For example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) found the latest presidential election results legitimate, but issued its reprimand for the lack of competition because of unequal attitude to the candidates on government controlled TV⁴⁶.

There are also radical attitudes and analysis expressed by a number of political scientists. For example, Veniamin Chirkin, Professor at the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, expressed his opinion, according to which Russian Constitution doesn’t stipulate any competition principle in the political system⁴⁷. Among these critics are international NGOs, like Freedom House. The Russia’s decline 5 to 6 in Freedom House’s rating, or in other words from a country considered ‘partly free’ in 2003 to ‘not free’ in 2004, is attributed to the near elimination of influential political opposition parties within Russia, as well as the concentration of executive power and Putin’s proposal to take control over the hiring and dismissal of judges. In December 2004 the Duma abolished elections for governors in place of Presidential appointments.⁴⁸

2.1.3 Rule of law. According to international studies, Russia is not doing well on implementing its legislation and regulation in practice and assuring the rule of law. For example, according to USAID’s NGO Sustainability Index, Russia scores 4.3 on the indicator of rule of law.⁴⁹ Similarly, the World Bank Governance score for Rule of Law in Russia is -0.7 on a scale from -2.5 (negative) to + 2.5(positive), which positions Russia in the lowest third of countries globally⁵⁰.

In the opinion of Judge Stephen Williams, who chairs the Court of Appeal in Washington D.C., the ‘Rule of Law’ institute is only at the stage of its early development in Russia and has not reached any comparable level with the “West”. The main element of this political institute in principle is to assure independence of judicial authority. Notably, the YUKOS

⁴⁶ http://leo-mosk.narod.ru/works/04_05_01_Kosachev.htm.

⁴⁷ <http://www.osada.sova-center.ru/archive/2F7B0F7/2FF9229/36CF354?print=on>.

⁴⁸ Amnesty International 2004 Russia Country Report. www.amnesty.org.

⁴⁹ http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf.

⁵⁰ <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/>.

(*IOKOC*) case has manifested that in Russia judicial authority has its hands and feet bound by the Government.⁵¹

In general, the weak rule of law and inefficient court system create a difficult environment for social organisations of all sorts. During 2004, there were significant high profile cases regarding politically-driven prosecutions on business community leaders and academics. In April 2004, researcher Igor Sutiagin with the Russian Academy of Sciences underwent an unfair trial and was strictly sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Sutiagin had been held in custody since 1999 on charges of treason for allegedly providing information to a foreign company, which Sutiagin maintained were public sources. The Council of Europe's Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has been investigating numerous arrests and prosecutions of allegedly politically-driven prosecutions by the state, and the ongoing pattern of arbitrary arrest of independent businessmen, scientists, journalists and environmentalists.⁵²

These examples vividly illustrate the selectiveness of the state in applying the rule of law, and highlight the control that executive authorities often exercise over the judiciary.

2.1.4 Corruption. In 2004 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index Russia scored a 2.8, thus recognizing Russia to be the 90-th most corrupt country in a survey of 146 countries (in 2003 the score was 2.7, placing Russia into the 86-th position out of 133 countries).⁵³

In both market and state sectors, corruption in Russia is rampant. The Moscow-based Information for Democracy (INDEM) Foundation conducted a report in 2002 revealing that an estimated \$37 billion is spent annually by Russians on bribes and kickbacks.⁵⁴ This corruption ranges from petty corruption to traffic enforcement officers to high profile corporate crime.

In response to the problem, President Putin has embarked on a number of anti-corruption measures. In 2002, the government heightened legislation to combat money laundering and in November 2003 President Putin signed the Decree on the Establishment of the Council for Corruption Enforcement. The Council, being an advisory body, includes the Prime Minister, Speakers of both Parliament Chambers, and chairpersons of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Arbitration. According to the Decree, the main goal of the Council is to reveal the causes of corruption and help the President in identifying political measures to fight it. Nonetheless, critics of Putin's anticorruption campaign maintain that cases such as the trial of Yukos chairman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, as well as new tax assessments reflect that the government's anticorruption efforts are biased and selectively applied to political adversaries.⁵⁵

⁵¹ <http://www.inosmi.ru/print/211055.html>.

⁵² Amnesty International 2004 Russia Country Report, www.amnesty.org.

⁵³ Corruption Perception Index is "the poll of polls", reflecting the perception of corruption in specific countries by business people and analysts, both native and foreign. The largest score of 10 means that the country is practically not corrupted; while the score of 0 means that the level of corruption is very high. The mean divergence reflects the difference in the evaluations given by different sources: the higher the deviation, the greater the difference in the perception of the country by different sources (in 2003 the standard divergence for Russia made 0.8). Minimum and maximum demonstrate the highest and the lowest evaluations of the country by different sources (on Russia, the minimum was 1.4, while the maximum was 4.9). For more information see <http://www.transparency.org.ru>.

⁵⁴ Freedom in the World 2005, Russia Report.

⁵⁵ Freedom in the World 2005, Russia Report.

2.1.5 State effectiveness. The World Bank Governance score for government effectiveness in Russia is -0.22 on a scale from -2.5 (negative) to + 2.5(positive), which positions it close to the average of countries globally.⁵⁶

Governing a modern state requires the coordination of a large array of central institutions with diverse interests and cultures. This basic function of the state is one that post-communist Russia has not yet mastered. That even the most prominent state institutions continue to work at cross-purposes was illustrated in spring 2002, when the President and Prime minister, supposedly members of the same leadership team, advanced very different policies on economic growth.⁵⁷

Critics of Russia's current state performance regard "each of Putin's political changes as increasing the power of the Kremlin and decreasing the power of other political actors and institutions. The restructuring has not produced a more effective state, but a weaker, more corrupt and less accountable regime"⁵⁸.

2.1.6 Decentralisation. SAG members present at the second SAG meeting agreed that at present there are several administrative reforms and reforms of the local self-governance underway. Decentralization takes place at the level of Russia's regions (subjects of the Federation). At the level of local-self-governance (municipalities) it is still to come.

In 2006 the federal budget expenditures constituted 4,270,114 mln RUB and revenues constituted 5,046,137 mln RUB. Thus, budgeted revenues exceeded the projected expenses by 776,022 mln RUB. The federal fund to support the subjects (regions) of the Russian Federation constituted 228,167 mln RUB. The federal foundation for co-funding of social welfare expenditures of the subjects of the RF constituted 26,180 mln RUB. The foundation for the reform of regional and local finances constituted 1,412 mln RUB, including subsidies to local budgets – 128.4 mln RUB. Subventions for the regional budgets for the balance of their budgets constituted 20,000 mln RUB. Subventions to the regional budgets to cover the financial assistance to the budgets of the closed administrative-territorial units constituted 8,621 mln RUB. Inter-budget transfers to the budgets of the subjects of the RF constituted 59,318 mnl RUB. The Federal Foundation for Regional Development constituted 2,679 mnl RUB.⁵⁹

2.2 Basic Rights and Freedoms

This subdimension examines to what extent basic freedoms are ensured by law and in practice in Russia. Table III.2.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.2: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms (1.3)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	1
2.2.2	Information rights	2
2.2.3	Press freedom	1

⁵⁶ World Bank data, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/>.

⁵⁷ Huskey 2003: 115-121.

⁵⁸ Stanford University, USA <http://cddrl.stanford.edu/news/324/>

⁵⁹ Ministry of Finance of the RF, www.minfin.ru

2.2.1 Civil liberties. According to the 2005 Freedom in the World Survey conducted by Freedom House, Russia scores 5 on the ‘civil liberties’ scale reflecting a not free rating, where 1 score is awarded to the countries with most freedom and 7 – to the countries with least freedom.

The Amnesty International report for 2004 remarked an increased outbreak of terrorism in Russia and, correspondingly, repressive government measures as well as severe human rights abuses. Legally, terrorism penalties have increased and Parliament has prolonged the custody term for persons suspected of being connected with terrorist activities up to 30 days without arraignment. Amnesty International also mentions continued violations of human rights in Chechnya, even though the Government assures that the situation has normalized, and more frequent attacks of extremist groups (including the so-called skinheads) on ethnical and national minorities’ representatives and foreign citizens. The organisation also notices that Russian citizens more and more often win justice through the European Human Rights Court.⁶⁰ In general, disappearance, rape, killing, torture and ill-treatment of civilians remain a consequence of the Chechen conflict and in the majority of cases Russian authorities do not investigate the allegations of human rights abuses.⁶¹

According to the survey conducted by the All-Russia Opinion Poll Research Center (WCIOM) in May 2004, 48.9% of all the respondents find the right to work to be the most important of all the rights and liberties granted by the Constitution. Noteworthy is workers’ attitude to the violations of their rights. The majority (55%) regard such violations as a hard but inevitable burden. Only 14% of workers expressed their discontent and declared the intention to struggle for their rights. Another 14% perceive violations as something given. Forty percent of workers whose rights had been violated made no attempts to defend their interests. Among those who tried to defend their rights: one third (32%) tried to do it in the process of personal negotiations with their bosses at work. Every tenth had to quit, the problem remaining unsolved, and 8% decided to follow the “eye for eye” principle: they simply began to work less. Every tenth preferred informal methods of problem solving: from threats to gifts. Only 12% of employees resorted to “civilized” ways are such as turning to court or trade unions; participating in group protests, is not regarded by workers in Russia as an effective means of struggling for their rights.⁶²

The Government proclaims its support of the freedom of assembly and unions. However, in July 2001 a new legislation restricted the number of political parties in Russia by introducing the mandatory minimum number of members for the party to be officially registered⁶³. Moreover, increasing restrictions on freedom of the assembly and association include the June 2004 law that banned demonstrations in various public places including close to presidential residences, court buildings and prisons and placed heavy limitations on the organisation of other demonstrations and public meetings.⁶⁴ Reportedly, there have been violent responses to demonstrations by law enforcement officers.

Other basic civil rights abuses include the law enforcement agencies’ routine use of torture and ill-treatment to extract confessions. For example, in 2004, 15-year old Victor Knaus was allegedly beaten and forced to confess to the murder of two children. In other instances, riot

⁶⁰ <http://www.amnesty.org>

⁶¹ Amnesty International, 2004 country report Russia.

⁶² According to Russian Opinion Poll Research Center (*ВЦИОМ*) data.

⁶³ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/russia.htm>

⁶⁴ Amnesty International 2004 Russia Country Report. www.amnesty.org

police were reportedly responsible for beatings and torture of prisoners and throughout the country prison conditions remained abhorrent and inhuman.⁶⁵

Human rights defenders also continue to face severe harassment from state authorities. Allegations in some instances include torture and death. Currently there are several human rights defenders appealing to the European Court of Human Rights to redress the climate of impunity under which the state authorities operate.

2.2.2 Information rights. When studying freedom of information in 2003 and 2004, Privacy International classified Russia as a country that has not yet passed any law on information access. Recently, the model law on the access to information was adopted by Kaliningrad Oblast in 2002. Its implementation was monitored by Transparency International-Russia and on the basis of this work S. Sheverdyayev wrote a report on the model of openness of authorities. It should be noted that a Law setting out provision for openness of information was adopted at the federal level over 10 years ago: a federal Law on information, information advancement and information protection was adopted by the State Duma on 25 January 1995 (Law N 24-Φ3).

However, already on February 12, 2003 the Government Decree on the Guaranteeing of Access to Information on the Actions of the Government of the Russian Federation and Federal Bodies of Executive Power was issued and came in May 2003. The Decree obliges all executive authorities of the Russian Federation to timely provide updated information on own activity through the Internet and other information resources (the Decree states 53 items of open information). From 1 January 2004 a new federal Law amending the law “On the state registration of legal entities”, adopted on 23 June 2003 came into effect. In accordance to this Law, state registries that contain information on legal entities and individual entrepreneurs will be open, however with certain exceptions. In accordance with this law, any person may send a request to the Ministry of Taxes and within 5 days for a given fee, set by the Government, can obtain copies of founding documents of any legal entities and individual entrepreneurs. Passport data and other personal data of physical persons may also be provided to state authorities. All requests to obtain information on the founders and individual entrepreneurs will be recorded. It should be noted that any legal and physical person, whose information is requested, may be informed about who requested such information and when it was requested. According to TI-Russia, adoption of these documents testifies to the fact that Russian legislators slowly advance Russia to the world standards of legislative basis on access to information that guarantees free access to open information to everybody⁶⁶.

The Internet portal Strana.Ru closely follows the issue of (information) openness of federal and regional authorities throughout all Russia. Strana.Ru together with the official Rossiyskaya Gazeta” (Russian Newspaper) and the union of journalists “Media-Union” prepared the rating of 434 bodies of authorities in Moscow and in Russia’s regions rating them by the degree of their readiness to provide information.

Over 1000 journalists from the “Media-Union” attributed indicators on the 23 high-scale to government bodies taking into consideration their public relations, Internet editions, rules of accreditation and responses to information requests. The Index of (information) openness was published in the “Russian Newspaper” in the beginning of April 2002 (see Table III.2.3).

⁶⁵ Amnesty International 2004 Russia Country Report. www.amnesty.org.

⁶⁶ “International movement for freedom of information in 2003”, analytical report of the expert of the Center TI-R, M.Savintseva, describing the situation as of August 2003, www.transparency.org.ru.

TABLE III.2.3: Indicators assessing openness

Open.		Maxi 23
↑	Ministry of economic development and trade of the RF	16.76
	Representative of the President of the RF in the Privolzhsk federal district	16.74
	Ministry of civil defense, emergencies and liquidation of the consequences of disasters of the RF	16.50
↓	The Governor of Moscow Oblast	0.03
	Arbitrary Court of the Republic of Tatarstan	0.03
	Arbitrary Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan	0.03
	Close	0.03

The results of the indicators above show that Russian courts remain the least open public institutions and provide fertile ground for corruption. Moreover, given that judicial power is tasked to counterbalance the executive and legislative powers, this limited openness that compromises its independence is of crucial importance. The two ministries that got the highest score – Ministry of Economics Development and Ministry of Emergencies – are also most trusted by the people.

Joining the Council of Europe, Russia took an obligation to implement the European standards of openness of information by public officials and institutions. Nevertheless, practically nothing has been done yet. Regardless of President Putin's numerous statements about his intentions to ensure information openness of Government institutions, there still remain hindrances to getting socially significant information. Even journalists having special rights to get information often face the practice when they get unmotivated refusal when seeking information.⁶⁷

2.2.3 Press freedom. Though the Russian Constitution proclaims freedom of speech, in practice the Government continues putting pressure on the mass media. For example, in June 2003 the last independent TV channel TVC (*TBI*) was “seized” by the Government. This action was a continuation of the takeover government campaign: before it had taken control over two other independent TV channels: NTV (*HTB*) in April 2001 and TV-6 (*TB-6*) in January 2002. The Government also tried to “shut down” the “Echo of Moscow” (*Эхо Москвы*) independent radio station after it broadcasted the live telephone interview with a hostage.

The above facts are also reflected in international studies. In a 2005 Freedom House study, Russia scored 14 for its legislation on mass media; for political environment – 31; for economic environment – 23; the total being 68 out of a score of 100, where 100 indicates a not free press. Freedom House believes that in 2004 the freedom of press remained limited, and the Government continued controlling mass media and hindering the work of independent journalists. All the Federal TV channels – 1, RTR (*PTP*) and NTV (*HTB*) – as well as the majority of radio stations, remain largely controlled by the Federal executive agencies.⁶⁸

Some of Russia's regional authorities go even further in controlling the media. The article by Nicholai Simonov and Valentina Ostroushko, entitled “They've plucked out mass media's

⁶⁷ Dzyaloshinsky 1999: 248.

⁶⁸ <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

best feathers” tells readers about the Provision of Accreditation Act adopted in Bryansk Region. In fact, it legalized censorship: “From now on, if even a single deputy is dissatisfied by the coverage of a City Council session provided by some journalist, the access to the Council Assembly Room for this journalist will be banned.”⁶⁹

Self-regulation takes place within the media sector itself. For example, in February 2001 a Media Committee started surveys of TV audiences. The Agreement on establishment of such a Committee establishment was signed by the representatives of the National Broadcasting Association, the Association of Advertisers, Russian Association of Advertising Agencies and the RF Ministry of Press, Broadcasting and Mass Media. The main goal of the Media Committee is forming an open and independent system for measuring TV audiences”⁷⁰.

Chechnya remains a closely monitored thematic area by authorities in terms of media coverage. In particular, journalists and reporters on the Chechnyan crisis face harassment, physical threat and other ill-treatment. Freedom House reports that the government has also limited journalist access to Chechnya and issues privilege to journalists loyal to the state. Anna Politkovskaya is one reporter on Chechnya who has been threatened several times and escaped attempted injury from government officials and state authorities.⁷¹

To sum up, there remains very little freedom for the nation-wide and even regional TV channels. Newspapers still retain certain limited degree of freedom, especially those with small circulation and those who are published locally. There are also certain issues, such as the conflict in Chechnya, which remain totally closed for independent press coverage.

2.3 Socio-Economic Context

This subdimension analyses the socio-economic situation in Russia. Table III.2.4 shows the respective indicator score.

TABLE III.2.4: Indicator assessing socio-economic context (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
2.3	Socio-economic context	1

According to the World Bank, in 2003 Russia displayed the following growth indicators:⁷²

TABLE III.2.5: World Bank 2003 growth indicators for Russia

Population growth	0.4 %
Average life expectancy	65.7 years
GDP growth	7.3 %
Export of goods and services (% of GDP)	31.7 %
Import of goods and services (% of GDP)	20.8 %
Export of hi-tech goods	18.9 % of total exports
Foreign investments	8 billion USD
Per capita growth	8.7 USD

⁶⁹ Simonov/Ostroushko 2005: 7.

⁷⁰ Fedotova 2002: 238.

⁷¹ See Amnesty International 2004 Russia Country Report. www.amnesty.org

⁷² <http://www.worldbank.org/data/dataquery.htm>

The Report on Human Resources Capacity Development for 2004, entitled “On the Way to the Knowledge Based Society”, analyses the approaches to measuring the economy of knowledge, provides the main indexes and indicators, and draws international comparisons. The analysis of main indicators shows that the country’s economy has good prerequisites to adapt to new conditions. These are: high educational qualifications, good opportunities and developed logistics for innovations. The main hindrance for Russia’s advancement towards the economy of knowledge is an underdeveloped institutional environment (low efficiency of state management and economy regulation; uncultivated venture entrepreneurship, high administrative barriers, etc.)⁷³.

1. *Poverty*. The World Bank development indicators report that in the year 2000, 6% of the population were living on less than \$1 per day, while 24% were living on less than \$2 per day.⁷⁴

The Russian auditing and consulting company FBK (*ФБК*) studies poverty regularly. Its report for 2005⁷⁵ presents the economic analysis of poverty level and population differentiation by income. The analysis is based on both on an Russian approach in measuring poverty and western methods of poverty assessment. It emphasises that the poverty level measured with the help of a subjective approach significantly differs from official indicators. In order to identify the ways to overcome poverty that Russian citizens perceive as the most efficient, FBK commissioned a special sociological survey.⁷⁶

2. *Civil war /armed conflicts*. Giving Russia a score of 1, the Uppsala Conflict Dataset acknowledges that over the last five years the Russian Federation has experienced armed conflict. This reference is primarily made to the armed conflict (anti-terrorist operation) in the Republic of Chechnya, a subject of the Russian Federation. According to the official information from the Russian executive authorities, at present the anti-terrorist operation has been completed.

3. *Severe ethnic or religious conflicts*. According to the CIDCM’s Peace and Conflict Dataset 2003, the Russian Federation received a score of 2 for the self-determination indicator and 1 for human security on a scale from 1 to 3 (1 = general high level of problems, 2 = problems of lower magnitude, limited time; 3 = little/no problems during previous period).⁷⁷

One example of ethnic conflicts in the Russian Federation is a scandal rooted in confessional and religious issues that broke out in the Adygei Republic in the summer of 2005. “Adygei ethnic organisations strongly and rudely opposed the initiative to put up a Christian monument of St. Nicolas in Maikop (a republican center) and gained their way – the construction project was suspended. The events associated with this monument revealed interconfessional and ethnic contradictions and gave some reasons (though not sufficient) to reflect on those contradictions. It has been for the first time in the history of post Soviet Adygeia that a group of Muslims openly conflicted with the local Orthodox Eparchy, which can deepen interconfessional and ethnic contradictions between Russians and Adygeians.”⁷⁸

⁷³ <http://www.undp.ru/index.phtml?iso=RU&lid=1&cmd=publications>

⁷⁴ 2004 World Bank Development Indicators

⁷⁵ www.fbk.ru/upload/contents/321/%E4%EE%EA%EB%E0%E4_%C1%E5%E4%ED%EE%F1%F2%FC.pdf

⁷⁶ <http://www.fbk.ru>

⁷⁷ <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC03print.pdf>

⁷⁸ Tsvetkov 2005 // <http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/media/73280.htm>

4. *Economic crisis.* Data from the 2005 World Bank Global Development Finance study shows that Russia's share of total external debt/GNP is at 42% in 2003. Ever since Russia de-facto defaulted on its external debt in 1998, no such threat has been envisaged again. To prevent such situations in the future, amongst other measures, Russian Government formed the so-called Stability Fund, which is filled by the revenues from high oil prices.

However, Alexander Khandruiev, Head of the BFI Consulting Group (*БФИ*) and the First Vice President of the Regional Bank Association, during live broadcasting of the RBK (*РБК*) TV channel on 30 April 2004 said that there is a possibility of an economic crisis in Russia. According to him, there are no prerequisites for a new default, but so-called 'financial bubbles' are possible. This phenomenon is met in the countries with high growth rates, Russia being among them. Prices on certain assets, first of all prices on real estate and securities (shares and bonds) can increase dramatically quickly. 'Financial bubbles' can emerge, if the price growth for some asset reaches 20% a year. Khandruiev also noted that at present the possibilities for the financial bubble emergence are only an abstraction, but there are some market segments where their likelihood is now rather high. It is the real estate market, the participants of which can soon face the situation when they are unable to meet their liabilities. The situation is aggravated by the fact that in Russia this market is artificially monopolized. Speaking about the likelihood of the banking system crisis in Russia, the expert claimed that it is possible in case of the liquidity crisis. But, as is known, currently the Russian market is characterized by surplus liquidity. Even considering that the Central Bank of Russia has decreased its official currency reserve within the last few weeks and pulled back rubles from the market, the amounts on correspondent accounts are large⁷⁹.

5. *Social crisis.* With regard to a social crisis, the international disaster database reflecting the percentage of Russian citizens affected by natural disasters in 2003 and 2004 (as a share of the population) is 0.7. Social crisis situation formed in Ryazan because of the probability of the Chemical Fiber Factory closure. In the end of May the Factory administration suddenly announced that they had failed to solve the existing problems, and that the Factory was to be closed as of June 1 (for 3 months). Some of the employees were to be fired and this caused protests. It was reported that a group of workers tried to occupy the warehouses with finished products in order to have control over their shipment. They declared that they didn't believe the Administration's claims that there was no demand on the Factory products. CFF protest was supported by the chemical industry union. The workers' meeting sent appeals to the leader of Federation of Independent Labor Unions, Mr. Shmakov, President and Governor demanding that they investigated the situation and stopped the Factory closure. Till now the situation remains unclear. It's noteworthy that the official opposition (CPRF and Rodina) remain passive towards this conflict⁸⁰.

3. *Socio-economic inequities.* Social and economic inequalities are a negative factor in Russia's development. The 2004 World Development indicators in the survey year 2000 indicate the Gini index in Russia was a high 0.45.

Participants of the round table discussion "Socio-economic inequities in the making of the information society", held on September 22 2005 in the Center for the Information Society

⁷⁹ IA 'Aliance Media' based on RBK materials // www.vologda.allbusiness.ru/NewsAM/NewsAMShow.asp?ID=12579

⁸⁰ Avdonin 2005 // <http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/media/72969.htm>

Development (*PIIO* Center), concluded that inequality ceased to be an economic incentive and turned into a drag on the development of Russian economy and society at large. Economists and sociologists are convinced that “Inequity of income under the conditions of an unregulated market is aggravating and results in the degradation of the economy, since the share of poorly educated population, unable of producing or consuming hi-tech products, grows”.⁸¹

7. *Illiteracy*. The UNDP 2004 Human Development Report indicates that adult illiteracy is not a pervasive problem in the Russian Federation with an adult illiteracy rate of 0 % for ages 15 and above. Certain problems are related to the issues of computer and legal illiteracy of the population.⁸²

8. *IT infrastructure*. In 2003, there were 42 IT hosts per 10,000 inhabitants (ITU).

2.4 Socio-Cultural Context

This subdimension examines to what extent socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.6: Indicators assessing socio-cultural context (1.3)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
2.4.1	Trust	1
2.4.2	Tolerance	1
2.4.3	Public spiritedness	1

Within the years of the ‘cultural revolution’ (Gorbachev’s epoch) and the ‘political revolution’ (Yeltsin’s epoch), socio-cultural relations were adapted to serving the political regime, producing the descriptions of a certain vision of the world and, hence, was not ready to function under the conditions of a normal social life.⁸³ Today, the state works to create new ideas and a new ideology for Russia communicating them in official speeches and the media. However, there are other actors, apart from the state, that work to shape the socio-cultural context at the local level. Schools, libraries and museums are among them.

For instance, an important socio-cultural role is played by state museums of contemporary history: Perm-36 that is close to Chusovoy town (Perm region), island of Solovki, villages Yagodnoe (Magadan region) or Abez (Komi Republic), Ekaterinburg. They create a system of values for the region, based on uncensored historical facts, destined so the local people and for tourists. These are the tourist centers that generate myths about the “Great Russia”. Such historical centers of contemporary history should become increasingly professional in order to promote cultural tourism and civic education. Sizable travel distances in Russia by all means limit the capacities of regional museums to make an impact on the society as a whole, but their influence on citizens should not be underestimated. The particular feature of cultural institutions (museums, libraries, schools) is that they accept all people that have access to them, working with all gender and age groups of population..⁸⁴

⁸¹ Serveev // www.politcom.ru/2005/zloba6061.php

⁸² See: www.news.riccom.ru/news-text_news_angarsk_6779.htm; www.asmedia.ru/news/id4045.html; www.zelezo.ru/article-708818.html; http://www.hro.org/editions/chronic/109/109_10.php.

⁸³ *Let’s Speak About Civil Society*, published by the Public Opinion Foundation Institute, 2001

⁸⁴ Shvedov 2005.

2.4.1 Trust. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, scholars have consistently identified low levels of interpersonal trust among citizens in Russia. In a recent survey in 2005, a poll revealed that less than a quarter of all Russians agreed that most people can be trusted.⁸⁵ Similarly, the World Values Survey of 1999 found that 76% of respondents believe that they “must be very careful in dealing with people”, and only 24% believe that “most people can be trusted”.⁸⁶

According to the survey of five Russian towns, carried out by the researchers of SU-HSE, 53% of respondents are ready to render unconditional help to anybody who asks them for help in the street, and 44% will render help on some conditions. The trust in people and the trust in authorities seem to differ a lot for Russians: since 2004, trust in government has increased in Russia, continuing its upward trend since 2001 while trust in people remains low.⁸⁷

In a regional context, it is useful to note that according to analysts, levels of trust (in people) among Russian citizens are extremely similar to the levels of trust among citizens within other countries of the former Soviet Union, which tend to be higher than in Central and Eastern Europe.⁸⁸

2.4.2 Tolerance. In the 1999 World Values Survey, Russia scored 1.4 on the Tolerance Index (0 reflects the most tolerant attitude and 5 the most intolerant attitude). According to this survey, attitudes within Russian society can be considered to be at a moderate level of tolerance. In this survey, 8% of respondents indicated that they would not like to have people of a different race as neighbours, 13.7% stated they would not like to have Muslim neighbours, 11.2% would not like immigrant neighbours, 11.5% would not like to live with Jews as neighbours, 53% would not like to have neighbours affected with AIDS or 58.2% prefer not to have homosexuals as neighbours.

According to the analytical report of Moscow Human Rights Office, by June 2004 xenophobia became rather widespread in Russia. Sociological surveys, held by the *Expertiza* Foundation, show that more than 42% of Russian citizens believe that “Jewish influence in the government, politics, business, jurisdiction, education and show business must be limited”; 23% were unsure; 28% agreed that it would be right to restore the Jewish people or that “their residence on the territory of Russia must be restricted”.

At the same time, the survey revealed that more than 60% of residents think that similar restrictions must be introduced, first of all, for the people from the Caucasus. Also, half of Russian residents are ready to vote for limiting the number of Chinese, Vietnamese and people from the former Central Asian republics of the USSR. The same number are sure that “national minorities are given too much power in this country”; and one fourth of respondents declared that there must be restrictions (pales) for representatives of all the nations except the Russian”. The number of those who strongly object to mixed marriages increased (up to 10%).

Almost half of respondents (47%) consider that national discrimination is a frequent

⁸⁵ Marsh 2005: 453.

⁸⁶ <http://www.icef.ru/study/year3/Politology/2004%20Stuff/Bashkir.doc>.

⁸⁷ Press-release, Global Survey of World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, 15 December 2005 - Geneva, Switzerland.

⁸⁸ Marsh 2005: 453.

phenomenon in Russia. However, only 17% of the young people see national discrimination in the open existence of organisations promoting nationalistic ideas. Significant parts of young Russians (approximately 20%) are intolerant to those who are different. They are contaminated with a variety of phobias. One also must mention the rather wide appeal and spread of the skinhead movement.⁸⁹

To sum up, the Russian society may generally be referred to as intolerant and such phenomena as xenophobia and national discrimination are frequent.

2.4.3 Civic consciousness and spiritedness. The Public Spiritedness Index of the 1999 World Values Survey in Russia has a score of 2.9 on a scale from 0 (low public spiritedness) to 10 (high public spiritedness). The index is constructed out of 3 questions to survey respondents: How justifiable is (1) claiming government benefits, which one is not entitled to, (2) avoiding a fare on public transport and (3) cheating on taxes. The score is closely linked if not a direct consequence of the low level of trust among people and also the reason for SAG to score 1 for this indicator. However, one should note that the situation is gradually and persistently changing and public spiritedness is likely to have improved since 1999.

2.5 Legal Environment

This subdimension examines the legal environment for civil society and assesses to what extent it is enabling or disabling to civil society. Table III.2.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.7: Indicators assessing legal environment (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	1
2.5.2	Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	1
2.5.3	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	1
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	1

2.5.1 CSO registration. Under Russian law citizens are guaranteed the right to form associations, and non-governmental organisations are allowed to function freely. The law provides for different types of legal and institutional non-governmental organisations, including public associations that do not require registration as legal entities. These provisions are to be found in the 1993 Constitution, the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (RF), the Federal Law “On Public Associations,” and a number of other laws. The government registers a public association, depending on the territory and scope of its operation, either through the RF Ministry of Justice, or through regional and local departments and agencies. The law specifies the legal documents to be submitted for registration purposes.

The 1995 Federal Law “On Public Associations” requires that all public associations which had been registered under laws of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic, i.e. before 1995, should renew their registration with the state, i.e. file their legal papers for obligatory re-registration. The 1995 law set June 30, 1999, as the deadline for re-registration. In early 1999

⁸⁹ Analytical Report of Moscow Human Rights Office: <http://antiracism.ru/>

tens of thousands non-governmental organisations in Russia were expected to go through the re-registration procedures. An organisation failing to re-register faces liquidation by a court decision.

Based on information provided by many NGPs, justice departments, independent experts and mass media, a large number of NGOs had not passed the re-registration procedures within the time limit set by the law. As of late January 2000, the exact number of organisations across the country, which had not submitted documents for re-registration, or had submitted and been rejected and/or had filed suits against justice departments for the illegal denial of registration, is not known. A rough estimate puts the number at tens of thousands cases.

While most of these organisations, apparently, had ceased to exist by 1999, and for this reason did not apply for re-registration, a significant number of public associations were denied re-registration, either on illegal grounds, or on the basis of far-fetched and formal pretexts. Many organisations were pressured by justice departments to change the name of their organisation or its statutory goals. Organisations were forced to comply, for fear of losing their legal status and endangering the well-being of the people they serve. There are good reasons to believe that regional and local authorities used the requirement for NGOs to re-register as an opportunity to get rid of “undesirable” organisations which criticise the authorities’ actions in certain areas or suggest alternative remedies. Among the most vulnerable were human rights and environmental organisations.

In November 1999, in response to many complaints by citizens and organisations of unbiased refusals to re-register organisations, the State Duma considered and adopted an amendment to the Federal Law “On Public Associations.” According to this amendment, the deadline for re-registration was to be extended to June 30, 2000. However, two weeks later, the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament, the Council of the Federation, voted against this amendment.

The authors of the “Report on the Violations Committed in the Course of Registration and Re-Registration of Public Associations in the Russian Federation in 1999” compiled by the International Centre of Not-for-Profit Law, representatives of non-governmental associations, experts, and members of the State Duma recommend that the and the State Duma adopts the said amendment, and that the President signs it. The Government and the Ministry of Justice should, following the decisions of the judicial authorities, if the deadline for re-registration is extended, make it possible for NGOs to receive consultations and explanations concerning the legal requirements in order to avoid errors when submitting their papers.⁹⁰

On November 8, 2005 a draft law “On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” on CSOs was introduced to the Russian Parliament. The Law, adopted in the third reading in December 2005 and signed by the President in January 2006, was one of many recent Russian laws through which the government is seeking to exert greater control over CSOs by restricting registration through various provisions, such as a ban on foreign organisations, and requirements for existing Russian CSOs to apply for government permission to continue operations.⁹¹ Accordingly, critics speculated that the impact of these restrictions would mean the closure of many Russian CSOs, the departure of

⁹⁰ Report on the Violations Committed in the Course of Registration and Re-Registration of Public Associations in the Russian Federation in 1999, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, <http://www.icnl.org/>

⁹¹ New Draft Law Restricts Activities on NGOs in Russia *The International Center for Not-For-Profit Law* ICNL News Update November 11, 2005, see www.icnl.org

foreign CSOs and the termination of foreign funding to certain CSO activities. However, in mid-December 2005, President Putin opted to temper the controversial bill, and consequently, proposed amendments to the bill's content and overall the proposed degree of government oversight of NGOs. Passed by the lower house of the Duma, the amendment package softened the restrictions on foreign NGOs, but left intact provisions for increased government control and regulation over Russian NGOs.

NGOs have reported difficulties in registering and complying with government legislation on CSO registration. The new law "On introducing changes in some legislative acts of the Russian Federation" took legal effect in April 2006 which made the CSO registration process even more complicated: if in the previous iteration the main principle was that of information, in the new version it is the principle of permission.⁹² Fears expressed by CSOs amongst other occasions at the regional stakeholder consultation held in July 2005 in Novosibirsk by Liliana Proskuryakova (St. Petersburg Center *Strategy*), there are administrative barriers for registering regional and local organisations: they can spend endless months on the approval procedures, because institutions of justice are corrupted.

Yet, the application of the law in practice still remains unclear. Certain NGOs, like the Moscow-based Center for Democracy and Human Rights, intend to evaluate the application of the law in early 2007. At the Civil G8 international conference in Moscow, held on 3-4 July 2006, President Putin promised to take into consideration CSOs' amendments to the law if they prove that CSOs are being pressured as a result of the application of this legislation.

2.5.2 Permitted advocacy actions. According to USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2005, "overall, the current ability of NGOs to participate in shaping policy is still limited, and the impact is minimal and dependent on the good will of the government. Developing constituencies that are highly visible will give NGOs credibility and add weight to their claims and legislative demands" No notable limitations to advocacy actions take place, and NGOs "are gaining greater access to policy makers at the regional and municipal government levels".

Though Russia has been relatively tolerant of NGO activism including NGO criticisms of government policies, the Parliament's December 2005 legislations, backed by President Putin, aimed to control and curtail NGO activity and the ability of NGOs to criticise the government. It is believed that the bill was inspired by government fears regarding the recent flood of pro-democratic revolutions or 'colour' revolutions in several post-Soviet countries (e.g. Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia) and the role of foreign NGOs advocating for such pro-democratic changes. The government's restrictive treatment and limited dialogue with foreign NGOs reflects the Russian government's firm political belief that foreign NGOs should not act as funders of political activity in Russia.⁹³

In general, government policies and legislative initiatives of 2004 and 2005 do not encourage, but also do not openly restrict public advocacy initiatives. However, some researchers and CSOs are of the opinion that legislation has increasingly restricted NGO advocacy activities,

⁹² <http://www.sovetpamfilova.ru/made/press/2059/?parent=432>

⁹³ For further discussion, see Bacon 2006: 24.

and in particular, in the area of human and civil rights NGOs have been significantly restricted from participating in defining social policy priorities and decision-making.⁹⁴

2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs. The application of the current tax system to CSOs in Russia cannot be considered favourable. Organisations have reported harassment from tax authorities, such as prolonged tax audits, taxation of grants and unnecessary questioning of their organisation's activities by government authorities. The ability to actually generate tax free revenue is severely limited in Russia.⁹⁵

CSOs are not granted any tax remissions. The tax system is not favorable to CSOs and this means that all their activities may be dealt with by various state authorities (Tax Inspection and others) to be undertaken against CSOs status, or on commercial basis. Similarly, CSOs are not granted any tax preferences. According to USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2005, "unfavorable tax regulations include the lack of tax-deductible corporate contributions, the severe limitations placed on NGOs' ability to generate tax-free revenues and a legal environment that does not permit endowments or trusts".

A narrow range of CSOs, usually those that have close relations with authorities (government-created CSOs and other), enjoy insignificant tax exemptions. According to the USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2005, "since 1999 organisations receiving technical and humanitarian assistance from foreign donors have had to register their projects with a state inter-ministerial commission to get an exemption from certain taxes. Recently, poorly structured legislation procedures have led to delays in obtaining tax exemptions and adversely affecting the reputation of these organisations".

Draft amendments to the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, considered by the State Duma in the fall of 2004, contained provisions that could seriously hinder the work of CSOs in Russia and aggravate the conditions for their development, charity and philanthropy,⁹⁶ namely additional regulations for grant giving. The Government approved a special official list of grant-givers, and organisations/individuals not included in this list have no right to give grants to NGOs.⁹⁷

To sum up, taxation remains an intricate issue. Russian tax legislation is based only on the needs and conditions of the business community. CSOs do not have any special tax status in rendering services to local communities. The main reason is that the Government does not trust philanthropists or NGOs and suspects that, if given any tax benefits, CSOs will abuse them.

2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy. In 2003, Russian philanthropy was setback when leading businessman and philanthropist M. Khodarkovsky was jailed and his foundation's assets seized. This occurrence, along with harassment from authorities and threats of tax inspections of grant recipients, diminished philanthropy and endangered the financial viability of many CSOs. Furthermore, the 2001 Tax Code cancelled tax benefits for corporate donors, thus

⁹⁴ 2003 NGO sustainability index.

⁹⁵ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_urasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf

⁹⁶ Center for Democracy and Human Rights, www.demokratia.ru

⁹⁷ REGNUM Information Agency, 24.09.2004

dissuading businesses to pay for NGO services officially⁹⁸. Corporate donations continue to not be tax deductible and NGO initiatives to make them favourable have been met with an aversion from governments. The effect of these policies is that the tax environment does not encourage endowments or trusts.⁹⁹ Only philanthropists that fund projects identified by the state can receive tax benefits. Existing taxation is designed in such a way that philanthropic entrepreneurs have to interact with NGOs in a “grey zone”.

2.6 State-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the Russian Assembly Government, assembly sponsored public bodies (ASPBs) and local government. Table III.2.7 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.8: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations (1.3)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
2.6.1	Autonomy of CSOs	1
2.6.2	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	2
2.6.3	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	1

2.6.1 Autonomy of CSOs. Currently, there are two models of interaction between the government and NGOs. The first model involves NGOs turning to the government when seeking the solution of some problem. The second model has already been discussed for several years, at least within the scholarly community. It is the model of a ‘corporate state’ that has a special structure for tackling specific problems – an organisation having special relationship with the government. Such an organisation gets money from the government to work at a clearly defined task –so, being formally an NGO, the organisation is accountable to a specially identified Ministry of the Government and/or in other words, the NGO is co-opted by the state.

Thus, in Russia two tendencies are currently clashing. On the one hand, we are calling for democracy and civil society with the President referring to them in his annual address to the Parliament and public. On the other hand, at least part of the Government obviously strives for control over a certain number of NGOs and their activities.¹⁰⁰

The new Law on NGOs adopted in December 2005 (and came effective in January 2006) will have a number of adverse effects on Russian civil society and will help officials tighten control over civil society. First, it will limit Russian citizens’ constitutional right to create unregistered but formalized civil society groups, those with statutes and governing bodies. There will be unclear and widespread possibilities for refusing registration of CSOs. The government is able to exercise more control over NGOs’ work and expenditure, and will be able to ask any organisation to provide any documentation at any time. In addition, each of the hundreds of thousand of existing NGOs will have to re-register with the authorities. Given the high level of corruption in Russia, this proposition will leave ample space for abuse. The situation bares an imminent threat to paralyze the work of thousands of charity,

⁹⁸ *NGO Sustainability Index in Russia*. USAID, 2002.

http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2002/russia.pdf

⁹⁹ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf

¹⁰⁰ Mangarov 2001: <http://www.cip.nsk.su/english/index.html>

cultural, youth, social, human rights, environmental and other organisations.¹⁰¹ In this context, it is useful to highlight the historically antagonistic relations between the state and environmentalists. In the last ten years, it is well-documented that environmental organisations, and especially, foreign-funded ones, were subject to random checks through various measures such as audits by the tax police and investigations by the intelligence services.

President Putin also initiated the establishment of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation designed to submit recommendations to MPs on socially important legislation, which some human rights organisations have claimed is another attempt by the Russian government to take control over NGOs.¹⁰² However, Russian authorities have been stepping up their efforts to increase grant-making programming for NGOs. In late November 2005, the Duma agreed to allocate 18 million dollars of the state budget to the promotion of civil society.

Nonetheless, the actual outcome of the new NGO Law and the resulting degree of CSO autonomy remains to be seen. It has been argued by some critics that the proposed NGO Law reflects the government's concern with domestic security issues and crime. With respect to crime, considerable aspects of the draft NGO legislation concerns preventing money laundering through NGOs.¹⁰³ Whether state security rhetoric is genuine or otherwise, given the recent wave of legislation it seems clear that the state is currently curtailing the autonomy of Russian CSOs.

2.6.2 Dialogue between CSOs and the state. Until the middle 1990s the Government did not recognize civil society as a serious or influential force capable of facilitating or supporting reforms in the Russian Federation. In April 1994, President Yeltsin signed the so-called Public Concord Agreement, its main idea being “non-usage of violence in achieving political goals”.¹⁰⁴ These signified the passage to constructive dialogue between various social and political forces, rather than harsh criticism.

In the XXI century the dialogue between CSOs and the state at the federal and regional levels took place in the form of Civil Forums and CSO consultative structures, initiated and created by the state. In the end of 2001 the Civil Forum (held annually through 2004) significantly changed the Russian NGO sector due to a new quality of dialogue with the state. These quality changes included, primarily, the direct access of CSO activists to top federal decision-makers, which opened good opportunities for advocacy work. Moreover, the forums were a sign made by the top federal executive officials across the country and down the “vertical of executive power” that dialogue with CSOs is possible and desirable. Shortly after the first Forum, President Putin signed the Decree nominating the staff of the Russian Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Russian Federation. The Commission is chaired by Ella Pamfilova, who is also head of the Russian movement “For Civil Dignity”.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Proskuryakova L. Russian Civil Society Will Find It Harder to Breathe. 2005.

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Bacon 2006: 24.

¹⁰⁴ Public Concord Agreement 1994: 24.

¹⁰⁵ “Pravda” online, Authorities and Civil Society in Russia: cooperation steps up, 17:35 2002-10-29, <http://english.pravda.ru/politics/2002/10/29/38846.html>

The experience of “Interlegal” Foundation and “We, Citizens” Coalition gives us two examples of independent CSO consultative bodies at the regional level: Public Chambers in Omsk and Kemerovo. Registered as independent legal entities, they were created to facilitate dialogue and exchange of experiences. Proposed candidates for Chamber members are carefully selected and have to prove their competence and status. Authorities propose issues for consideration to their consultative bodies that form their agenda.¹⁰⁶ The experience of Consultative bodies varies greatly and should be assessed on case-by-case basis. Some of them have a real opportunity to influence public decision-making (i.e. Civic Council by the Chair of the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia) whereas other regional consultative bodies were created purely for PR purposes.

Public advisory bodies currently functioning in Russia fall into following models:

- Councils under governors/mayors;
- Councils at special departments of city administrations;
- Councils at legislative bodies.¹⁰⁷

At least one of the three types of councils exists in most of Russia’s regions. At present these are being to a large extent substituted or aided by the regional level Civic Chambers that follow the example of the Russian federal Civic Chamber in late 2005. The creation of the Civic Chamber under the head of the government is receiving a rather ambiguous evaluation. The key function of the Chamber will be civic expertise of the socially important draft legislation with subsequent recommendations to MPs. At the first stage the appointees of the President took their places in the Chamber and the rest of its delegates were selected by the presidential appointees by the end of 2005. The Civic Chambers are permanent consultative bodies, an institutionalized form of state-civil society dialogue, unlike the Civic Forum, which was organised as an *ad hoc* event.

The very fact of creation and composition of the Civic Chamber caused the split within Russian civil society organisations into three groups: (1) those who support the creation of the body, like most initiatives of the federal authorities (i.e. old-type Soviet NGOs); (2) those who decided to join the Chamber from the start in order to influence and correct the process form within (some think-tanks and moderate citizen’s groups) and (3) human rights organisations, which refused to work in the Chamber and have persistently opposed the idea as Kremlin’s attempt to grasp control over civil society and create what they perceive to be “the Chamber of tame NGOs”. The Russian mass media coverage of the process made the impression that the staff of the Civic Chamber under the President of Russia had been selected very thoughtfully, with consideration of the interests of practically all the layers of the society.¹⁰⁸ According to Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Head of President’s Administration, one of the main functions of the new public agency should be “control over all kinds of democracy”. Like the State Duma Deputies, its members are able to get information from government agencies, including confidential information, and demand explanations from officials. The Chamber is funded from the federal budget to the amount of over 120 mln rubles. On the other hand, a great number of politicians, public figures and human rights advocates doubt the need for this agency. Some advocacy organisations, e.g. Moscow

¹⁰⁶ Social Strategies: interaction between corporate civil initiatives and local administration. Russian North West Experience. 2002.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

¹⁰⁸ Central Press and Internet Publication Review No 10 for 1-10 October 2005 made by the Center for Public Information.

Helsinki Group, refused to take part in this Kremlin Project, calling this idea “the Ministry of Moscow Civil Society” - people, appointed by the government mustn’t control democracy.¹⁰⁹

According to the 2003 NGO Sustainability Index, other types of dialogue also take place: economic think tanks were invited by the state to provide input on important national issues and regional NGOs pressed for dialogue with local governments on social problems.

In the study carried out by Mosco-based International Research and Exchange Council (IREX) the legislation and practice of civil society-state dialogue were studied in all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation.¹¹⁰ The main conclusion is that the legislation of all Russia’s regions, including the Chechen Republic and Chukotskiy Autonomous Region contains provisions that treat CSOs as a party in the dialogue. As of 1 April 2006, overall 1339 documents regulate state-civil society dialogue at the regional level. This legislation can be divided in seven types: regulating the work of civic chambers, regulating social state order, regulating state funding for civil society (grants, tax benefits, etc.), on citizens’ addresses, on interaction (civic engagement, civil society consultations, etc.), on charitable activity, on public hearings and on other forms of interaction.

The specific feature of the Far Eastern federal district is that there exists legislation on state support, on citizens’ addresses and on state-civil society interaction

- There is no law on social state order
- In Yakutiya and Magadan Oblast there exist laws on public morale

The specific feature of the Sirebian federal district is the legislation on state-civil society interaction

- There is one law (in Altai Republic) on social state order
- There is one region (Altai Republic) which has a civic chamber
- There is one region (Irkutskaya Oblast) which has a law on charity

The specific feature of Ural federal district is the law on state support and state-civil society interaction

- There is no law on social state order
- There is no legislation on charity
- In one region (Yamalo-Nenetsky Autonomous district) there is a decree on raising the qualifications of leaders of civil society reception desks for citizens.

The specific feature of Privolzhsk federal district is the legislation on state support, state-civil society interaction and public hearings

- There are 4 regions which have a law on social state order (Saratovskaya Oblast, Permskaya Oblast, Nizhegorodskaya Oblast and Orenburgskaya Oblast)
- There are no laws on charity in republics, while they exist in oblasts

The specific feature of Central federal district is legislation on state-civil society interaction and public hearings

- There is no law on social state order
- In one region (Voronezhskaya Oblast) there is a law on charity

¹⁰⁹ Public Chamber proved to be closed // Gazeta’, Issue No 186 of 10/03/2005).

¹¹⁰ The results of the research below were presented by D. Milovidova from IREX at the Civic G8 Forum in Moscow, 3-4 July 2006 and also could be found at www.irex-dialog.ru/karta.

- Civic chambers exist in 13 out of 18 regions there

The specific feature of the North-west federal district is legislation on citizens' addresses, state-civil society interaction and public hearings

- There is no law on social state order and no legislation on charity
- Civic chambers exist in 4 out of 10 regions

At the same time, despite leadership's and President Putin's statements articulating the need to strengthen civil society and increase dialogue, no consultations or public discussions took place with stakeholders regarding the December 2005 draft NGO bill. Furthermore, there seems to be a certain disjuncture between the state's rhetoric in favour of strengthening Russian civil society and the reality of recently restrictive state legislation curtailing civil society activities and heightened government oversight.

It is obvious that civil society cannot create such framework for cooperation itself, but that the government should develop *its own* understanding of the necessity to advance partnership relations with civil society, and should be the one to make the first step towards civil society. On the other hand, if civil society is to make the first step and support such an initiative, it will show a level of maturity and readiness for unleashing its own capacities and active involvement.”¹¹¹

2.6.3 Support for CSOs on the part of the state. SAG members present at the second NAG meeting agreed that some of Russia's federal executive authorities, regions and municipalities have launched grant and state (municipal) funding programs, for which CSO are eligible. However, this state funding constitutes only a minor part of the total resources for Russian CSOs. As mentioned in 1.6.1, certain regional and municipal grants schemes exist in some 20 Russia's regions. In some parts of Russia (like Volga and Siberia), CSOs also have possibilities to take part in tender competitions for social state order. However in many instances, the grant funds are insufficient to provide for the needs of a wide range of CSOs and in some stances these schemes suffer from the lack of due diligence principles.

2.7 Private Sector-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector. Table III.2.8 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.9: Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
2.7.1	Private sector attitude to civil society	1
2.7.2	Corporate social responsibility	1
2.7.3	Corporate philanthropy	1

2.7.1 Private sector attitude to civil society. Generally speaking, the private sector is little informed about the achievements of CSOs and has no incentives from the state to support CSOs.

¹¹¹ Let's Speak About Civil Society, published by the Public Opinion Foundation Institute, 2001.

According to the opinion poll “Corporate social responsibility: myths and reality” carried out by WCIOM and ordered by CAF (Moscow, 2002), 20% of respondents (businessmen) think that development of charity work depends upon the active position of CSOs. At the same time, there is a clear mistrust towards NGOs from the part of commercial companies. This is reflected in the barriers on the way of increasing charity work, named by businessmen, which include absence of guarantees of purpose use of resources allocated (by CSOs) and general mistrust of the companies’ management towards mediators between the company and the end beneficiary. Furthermore, 92% of companies top managers believe that primary need in charity assistance is with marginalised groups of population (88% of respondents help these people). Environmental problems are of concern for 30% of managers (10% of respondents support environmental projects). While companies’ directors believe that religious organisations do not require support at all, 35% of respondents support them.¹¹²

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility. The 2004 Annual Report “Social Investments in Russia: the Role of Businesses in Social Development”, gives an estimation of Russian businesses’ social investments and is based on corporate social responsibility research conducted by the Managers’ Association. The Report is based on numerous Russian and foreign sources, and additional data provided by Russian companies.¹¹³ According to the Report, “the amount of social investments per one employee (IL) makes up 28 330 rubles per year, the social investment per gross sales ratio (IS) makes up 1.96 %, and the social investment per balance sheet profit (IP) – 11,25 %.”¹¹⁴ These figures make up rather substantial volumes of social investments given the virtual absence of tax incentives.

There are a lot of practical examples of social investments made by Russian businesses. They can be categorised according to the following five main directions: personnel development investments; health care programs; resource saving programs; conscientious business practice and local community development. However, only the big businesses (Russian corporations and transnational companies) and familiar with the notion of CSR may afford to have CSR in place and only a handful of companies are able to work in the the sphere of local community development.

In 2001 -2004 Managers’ Association held more than 20 large scale corporate responsibility events, conducted 6 research projects, made more that 10 publications, established more than 50 partnerships, rendered regular support to the Resource Center for Corporate Responsibility and attracted more than 120 leading mass media to information partnership.¹¹⁵

Despite the unfavourable legislative environment and difficult provision of the Tax Code hundreds of thousands of commercial companies find “holes” in the legislation in order to carry out charity activity. Of the interviewed heads of enterprises, 64.2% provide charity assistance in the same amount as before the new Tax Code was adopted irrespectable of tax exemptions. Charity is perceived as a personal course, which cannot be used to obtain profits.

However, the mindset of the heads of companies in relation to charity is increasingly becoming more pragmatic In the year 2002 67% of top manager interviewed considered charity a pure altruism, and only 7% thought it will allow the company to advance its work with the target markets, in the 2003 research showed that top managers evaluate the

¹¹² <http://www.cafcf.ru/publications/donorsforum/obshestvo-research.pdf>

¹¹³ Annual Report on Social Investments in Russia: the Role of Businesses in Civil Development 2004.

¹¹⁴ Op.cit: 10.

¹¹⁵ <http://www.amr.ru/doc1347.html>

effectiveness of their charity costs against a better marketing strategy (the indicator was named by 7.8% managers interviewed) and a higher return on the capital invested (2.3%). Before 2003 there was no consideration of economic indicators when taking about charity. The overall environment for charity in Russia is considered as unsatisfactory by 76 % of companies' top managers.¹¹⁶

The expert opinion poll among businessmen, carried out in 2004 by the Institute of Comprehensive Social Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, showed that the Russian business community prioritises the following types of CSR: following social obligations (paying taxes, salaries, social packages for employees) by 25% of respondents; "internal" charity in combination with social assistance to low-income and marginalised groups (50%); implementation of social projects (25%).¹¹⁷

The negative side of the otherwise rather positive picture of CSR above is that substantial social investments are made by large companies in the small towns and areas of their operations. Where social investments are made on a wider scale (and also locally), the areas of concern are strongly pointed out to the companies by the authorities. In other words, companies find themselves obliged by authorities to fund certain projects and invest in certain social infrastructure. This pattern cannot be called a genuine CSR. For specific examples of corporate social responsibility see Annex 3 to the present Report.

2.7.3 Corporate Philanthropy. As discussed in context of indicator 2.5.4 on tax benefits for philanthropy, the range of CSO support from the corporate sector has been under pressure from the legal environment and application of tax legislation. Philanthropists and businesses are generally more willing to contribute funds to CSO that are not controversial and more reticent to make donations to human rights and environmental CSOs.¹¹⁸

In Russia there is an umbrella body for private sector philanthropy work - Corporate Philanthropy Club (CPC) that includes such corporations and agencies as SUAL Holding, GlaxoSmithKline, International Moscow Bank, BIN Bank, Uniastrum Bank, the World Bank, Rosbank, M.Video, British American Tobacco, Chevron Texaco, RAO *Norilsk Nickel* etc. At the CPC meeting on 9 December 2003 it was mentioned that, according to some estimation, companies spend on charity up to 17% of their profits. In 2003 only YUKOS invested \$150 mln into social sphere. Still, for the lack of information, the public is unaware of this side of corporate activity, and, probably, this is one of the reasons for strong anti-oligarchy attitude. Besides, the Government is not creating conditions or setting priorities in this sphere.¹¹⁹

A special survey of company head managers showed that corporate charity is more spread in the regions than in Moscow. Thus, when asked if they make charity contributions, positive answers were given by 42% of respondents in Moscow, 46% in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and 55% in Perm Oblast. Still, the majority of head managers do not consider corporate charity as strategically beneficial for their businesses.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Report "The Attitude of Society and Its Key Groups towards Charity Activity in Russia", prepared by the Agency for Social Information, November 2003, Moscow.

<http://www.caacf.ru/publications/donorsforum/obshestvo-research.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ Gorshkov, Lebedev, 2004: 40.

¹¹⁸ 2003 NGO Sustainability Index, Russia.

¹¹⁹ CPC press release in "Cross Sector Cooperation" No 56, NAN Foundation, December 2003.

¹²⁰ http://www.naco.ru/mir_op/publik/bauman.shtml.

According to CSOs' perception of corporate philanthropy in Russia the picture is very similar. In August – October 2004 the Civic Development Institute (Moscow) surveyed the needs and problems of CSO managers. Only 3% of respondents agreed that “businesses render great support to NGOs, including financial; 33% partly agreed with this statement; 64% disagreed. See also Annex 3 – Corporate Social Responsibility study.

Conclusion

Russian civil society operates in an environment that is somewhat restrictive to its activities. Civil liberties and press freedom need to be further developed and the political context has ample room for improvement. The fight against terrorism, spread widely across the world including Russia, has led to certain curtailments of civil liberties. Political competition is limited due to imperfect regulations of political party funding, the new system of appointment of regional governors and the use of administrative leverages in order to create unequal conditions during elections for participants of election campaigns (the so-called “administrative resource”). According to expert studies, corruption is a major problem in Russia, so is the enforcement of the rule of law.

Different from the political context, social and economic factors do not create any major obstacles to civil society's development. However, socio-cultural factors are problematic. The general level of public spiritedness is low, as is interpersonal trust. Developing a greater trust is a clear priority area for civil society, as low public trust results in low public support and low citizens' activism and, therefore, CSOs find it difficult to mobilize people in support of their course and to attract greater membership.

The tax legislation and regulations for CSOs on most occasions treat CSOs as commercial companies, presuming they act as for-profit organisations. The list of foundations that are allowed to allocate revenue tax exempt grants does not include many grantmakers working with Russian CSOs and the list of allowed income tax-exempt activities clearly does not cover all CSOs activities. Registration of CSOs has only recently become an issue with registration chambers being returned for many times without any good official reason. In general, the legislation and regulations, particularly in their application in practice are not favourable to CSOs. On the contrary, the latest legislative initiatives are intended to further curtail CSOs' freedoms. Foreign foundations, the major grantmakers in Russia, are treated suspiciously by authorities and corporate philanthropists have no tax incentives to donate to civil society. Foundations supporting civil society, created and funded by the state, are few and only give out small grants. State and municipal grant programs, as well as legislation on social state order, exist only in some regions and also have rather limited budgets. Corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy exist only as rare exceptions, practiced by large Russian and multinational businesses.


Consequently, civil society, often lacking resources, finds it difficult to effectively hold government and private sector to account. On a positive note, CSOs successfully dialogue with the state both within formal consultative bodies, as well as at various other forums (i.e. the Civic Forums). Frequent forms of government-CSO interaction include civil society councils by governors/mayors, special departments of executive authorities and legislative bodies. The effectiveness and the level of autonomy of these consultative bodies vary greatly from case to case and should be looked at on individual bases. In cases when CSOs are directly funded from the federal or regional budgets or state foundations (with few exceptions like some state order contracts or the Russian State Science Foundation, *РГНФ*), their autonomy is significantly compromised. Even though, NGOs are allowed to participate in policy making process through

various dialogue mechanisms, legislative provision for which exist in all Russia's regions, the impact of CSOs allowed by authorities, especially at the national level, in most cases is limited.

3. VALUES

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practiced by Russian civil society. The score for the Values Dimension is 1.5, reflecting an overall positive value basis of Russian civil society. Figure VI.3.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Values dimension. All subdimensions, but particularly those relating to poverty eradication and transparency receive relatively moderate scores, which is likely to be linked to the restrictive environment for CSOs described above.

FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension



To give a taste of local differences on this dimension, according to the data obtained through the SU – HSE research (2004-2005) of civil society in 5 Russia's towns, the extent to which positive social values are promoted by civil society can be characterized as:

- in between 'Limited' and 'Moderate' in Skopin (Ryazan Oblast);
- close to 'Significant' in Rostov-the-Great;
- 'Moderate' in Vidnoie (Moscow Oblast);
- 'Limited' in Peterhof (St. Petersburg area).

This difference among the various towns can be mainly attributed to the differences in political regimes of the regions where these towns are located.¹²¹

3.1 Democracy

This subdimension examines the extent to which Russian civil society actors practice and promote democracy. Table III.3.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy (1.5)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	1

¹²¹ For the full study see: Aleskerov, Belyaeva, Bychkova, Zakamskaya, Uzbashev "Development Level of Civil Society (an attempt of in-country comparison)" in Journal "Political Marketing #3, 2005 http://bci-marketing.aha.ru/polm05_03.htm; Abramova, Ginsberg, Novikov, 2006

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs. Overall democratic practices within CSOs remain rather poor, a fact which is also reflected in USAID Sustainability Index for the past few years. For example, as stated in the Index for 2004, “the majority of organisations are still “one-man shows,” meaning that they are led by a single charismatic leader who runs the organisation when the time and money permits. These organisations also have little turnover of leadership and are generally not transparent in their operations”.¹²²

Stakeholder consultations held in Novosibirsk by L.Proskuryakova, the “Strategy” Center expert, yielded the following results: internal (peer) discussions and collegial decision making are typical for environmental non-profit organisations, while in veterans’ associations such a practice of tackling problems is not accepted, decisions being made strictly hierarchically. Appointing leaders by real election is a common mechanism in environmental CSOs, while in organisations with the military members election is formal (without competition).

Some analysts argue that Soviet era attitudes still affect the organisational structures of some CSOs whereby leadership reflects the personality of the leader and many organisations are “one-man shows”. The existence of boards of directors is often a donor requirement and there is low awareness on the applicability of organisational norms among CSO leadership.¹²³

3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy. Civil society is active in commenting and opposing the attempts by the state to curb democracy. Examples include campaigns for alternative civil service, campaigns against new amendments to NGO legislation (April 2006), monitoring the human rights situation in Chechnya, monitoring outbursts of fascists and radical nationalists – including inaction from the state, etc.

Also, organisations that do not have a civic status in the public opinion or formal legal registration exercise important civic action. For example, an active role was played by the Society for Animals’ Rights Protection, whose members organised mass protest actions demanding to prosecute a veterinarian who disregarded the prohibition to use ketamin in curing pets. These actions made such an impact that Prosecutor General brought public excuses in the program of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”. Thus, an independent union of citizens that does not even have political goals, but effectively promotes democratic values in the public space may start playing an active civic role. Among CSOs there are “NGO-veterans” — human rights organisations that constantly perform civic expertise. These are not only Moscow network organisations, but also regional organisations from Voronezh, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Perm, Ryazan, Syktyvkar, Nizhny Novgorod, Khabarovsk, and other cities.¹²⁴

The “Liberal Mission” Foundation¹²⁵ actively promotes democratic values. The Foundation organises regular discussions of the challenges in the democratic development of Russia and lectures of its experts. The approach of Moscow School of Political Studies¹²⁶ is based on the idea that for the contemporary Russia the only possible way to evolve is to develop and

¹²² See www.usaid.gov NGO Sustainability Index for Russia, 2004

¹²³ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf NGO Sustainability Index for Russia, 2003

¹²⁴ Shvedov 2005.

¹²⁵ <http://liberal.ru/>

¹²⁶ <http://www.msps.ru/>

enforce democratic institutes. The mission of the School is to create the conditions conducive to growing civic consciousness throughout Russia. For that the School organises and conducts training seminars in Russia and abroad; publishes books by the School experts; issues periodicals, journals and booklets with the materials of the School's seminars. Similar set of educational activities, however at a more general level, covering virtually all Russia's regions and the three sectors of the society was organised by the "Open Russia" Foundation in its School of Civil Society and School of Public Policy.

Thus, Russian CSOs are an active actor in promoting democracy and all matters that are usually included in its notion. CSOs also actively perform the function of watchdogs preventing and opposing the government's attempt to curb democracy.

3.2 Transparency

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Russian civil society actors practice and promote transparency. Table III.3.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within civil society	1
3.2.2	Financial transparency of CSOs	0
3.2.3	Civil society actions to promote transparency	2

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society. Fighting corruption has become a core problem in Russia in all sectors of society. Though corruption is found everywhere, transition economies such as Russia, it represents a major obstacle. In Russia, corruption combined with bureaucrats lacking professionalism or understanding of human values, causes wars, crises and extreme poverty. Thus, one of the most important tasks of today is to develop an efficient mechanism to counteract this phenomenon.¹²⁷ Civil society is responsible for exercising public oversight over government actions. "The absence of an efficient system for public control over government actions is one of the factors allowing corruption growth. It is in this direction that responsible forces of the Russian society can and must act in order to prevent corruption development".¹²⁸

Neither NGOs nor the Government like the word 'corruption', which is symbolized by a comment made during stakeholders' consultations in Novossibirsk: for Siberia corruption processes are not characteristic: everyone knows everybody, it's like "a big village". According to the knowledge of the Inter-regional Public Foundation Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center (SCISC), that has held grant tenders since 1994 and strictly checks the accounting reports of grant recipients, examples of corruption such as misuse of grants are not frequent. However, as it turns out, corruption within civil society exists, but is not perceived as such. There are a number of pre-requisites to this. On the other hand, it's very difficult for donors to verify CSO reports, because it's easy to buy any accounting document, and to authenticate documents is difficult, since "grant managers are not Federal Security Service officers". If any project is not implemented by a CSO, the donor can apply sanctions,

¹²⁷ Corruption and how to abate it: the role of CS. 2000.

¹²⁸ Civil Initiatives and corruption prevention. 2000.

e.g. take away the project equipment. Another corruption model used within civil society is when a grant application is submitted by one organisation, but the real executive is a different organisation (e.g. a CSO applies for a grant, and a state building company implements it), even though they work for the same target audience. Such behavior testifies to the lack of CSO professionalism.¹²⁹

Certain provisions of the newly adopted amendments to the NGO legislation that came effective as of 18 April 2006 preview a number of mechanisms to increase NGO accountability and reduce certain corrupt practices within civil society, like obligation to compile an annual activity report. However the effects of the application of the law still remain to be seen.

Thus, corruption in Russian civil society exists and certain corrupt practices are acknowledged by CSOs when specifically pointed out. However, the phenomenon of corruption within civil society as such is rarely understood as a problem and therefore remains largely untackled. In the future, CSOs may be forced to work out certain self-regulatory mechanisms to reduce corruption and increase transparency as a response to the newly introduced legislative changes.

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs. According to the 2003 USAID NGO sustainability index, NGOs have not substantially increased their transparency or ability to hold themselves accountable.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, many NGOs are aware of the importance of transparency have attempted to improve it by systematizing education and interaction with the public and attempting organisational transparency. According to the Index, organisations that have improved their capacity for internal governance are generally affiliated with western organisations, benefiting from training programs under foreign grants, and yet this group comprises only 5-10% of operational NGOs.

One of the very few initiatives to promote CSO transparency was introduced as a response to the new Law on CSOs, mentioned in indicator 2.6, by the Agency for Social Information (*ACH*) in December 2005-January 2006. IREX awarded a grant for a CSO group to evaluate the level of transparency of Russian CSOs and to draft recommendations on the standards of transparency. The project finished in April 2006 and covered over 18 regions. In the course of the project 20 civil society discussions and a public hearing were organised. The conclusion is that CSOs should be accountable to the controlling agencies, donors, beneficiaries, volunteers and own staff. As CSOs promote greater transparency of other sectors, clearly more could be done to increase own CSOs transparency and accountability.

Publication of annual reports is one of the important visible signs of CSOs transparency. The NGO Development Center in St. Petersburg regularly initiates a competition of annual reports for NGOs functioning on the territory of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. Its results were summarised within the framework of the “Social St. Petersburg: The New Solutions. The 2005 Forum that was held in on 24-25 November 2005. According to the organisers, participation in this competition enabled NGOs to meet state-of-the-art standards of social work¹³¹. A good annual report functions largely as a presentation material, but, compared to an informational booklet, it gives a fuller picture, describing the current state of

¹²⁹ Data from the Report on Stakeholder Consultations held in Novosibirsk by L.N.Proskuriakova, 07/15/2005.

¹³⁰ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf NGO Sustainability Index for Russia, 2003.

¹³¹ <http://asi.org.ru/ASI3/main.nsf/0/4FDD3D9FBD097CAFC32570B400346760>

affairs, NGO results and its financial position. These data are especially important for potential partners and donors.

During stakeholder consultations held in Novosibirsk by L.Proskuriakova, the ‘Strategy’ Center expert, some participants shared their opinion that “open financial accounting is a western approach and nobody among Russian CSOs is particularly interested in this accounting”. On the other hand, some “sector leaders”, e.g. Siberian Center for the Support of Civic Initiatives always publicize their accounts.

Financial transparency is not a typical practice for the CSOs that are accountable only to the Administration of Justice. If an organisation doesn’t submit reports for 2 years, according to the law, it must be closed, but very often the Administration of Justice has no money for check ups and closure.¹³² Very few NGOs actually publish and disclose (let alone publish) their accounts, budgets, etc. Most NGOs would never name their sponsors and/or amounts of project budgets (grants obtained). Many NGOs pay salaries “in black” schemes (without social security and income tax).

To sum up, a very small share of CSOs follow the best practice of internal transparency, even in cases when this openness does not pose a threat to their existence from the part of authorities. Some initiatives, like those by St. Petersburg NGO Development Center or IREX, described above should however be specially noted and are aimed to make a difference in this area.

3.2.3 CSOs actions to promote transparency. Centre for Anti-Corruption Research “Transparency International – R”, the leading Russian NGO to promote transparency, is implementing a number of programs to promote government and corporate transparency, including: advancement of access to information, preventing and fighting corruption in its multiple forms. For example comprehensive research supported by dissemination of its results in the form of publications and press conferences was done on the use of “administrative resource” of authorities during elections (project “Monitoring of Administrative Resource”, corruption perception (Corruption Perception Index), advancement of transparency at the local level (project “Municipal Transparency”), etc. The tools used by TI-Russia include public opinion and expert opinion surveys, development and introduction of business ethics codes, monitoring of election campaigns and procurements, etc.¹³³

INDEM Foundation works on monitoring the work of the Federal Assembly of the RF by means of joining forces of various CSOs and their networks. This work is aimed at easing access to information, development of information technologies, and Internet tools, development of systems of interactive management, improving public understanding of democratic principle and procedures. Other projects of INDEM Foundation includes monitoring and prevention of corruption by means of civil society and business, diagnostics of the situation in the sphere of corruption and governance and anti—corruption policy-making. Furthermore, INDEM gathers and places on its web-site corruption-related statistics, analyses legislation on the rights of national minorities, supports the database and online weekly newsletter.¹³⁴

¹³² Data from the Report on Stakeholder Consultations held in Novosibirsk by L.N.Proskuriakova, 07/15/2005.

¹³³ www.transparency.org.ru/

¹³⁴ www.indem.ru/

The work to promote transparency in the budget sphere is carried out by Russian organisations – members of the International Budget Project. For example, in 2005 the St. Petersburg Center for Humanitarian and Political Studies ‘Strategy’, the Karelia Civic Self-Governance Foundation ‘Initiative’ and Murmansk Association of Female Journalists initiated the partnership project “Applied Budget Analysis Implementation in the Reform of Housing and Communal Services in the North West of Russia”. The project, supported by the Civil Society Foundation of the Canadian International Development Agency, was implemented in Petrozavodsk, Murmansk and St. Petersburg and was aimed at exploring the possibilities of community participation in the budget process as a form of promoting transparency in the budget sphere.¹³⁵

Think-tanks and research institutions, like “Rus-Expert Transit” from Nizhny Novgorod do studies and publications on transparency and non-transparency of oil sector. A number of CSOs and civic activists that work on anti-corruption matters joined forces to form the most important in the area umbrella bodies - National Anti-Corruption Committee (NAK) and the Committee Public of Control (KOK).

To sum up, CSOs actively work to promote transparency in various spheres. However, joining efforts of various organisations would substantially increase the impact of CSOs on authorities and the private sector.

3.3 Tolerance

This subdimension examines the extent to which Russian civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance. Table III.3.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance (1.5)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	1
3.3.2	Civil society activities to promote tolerance	2

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena. The key intolerant groups within civil society in Russia include nationalist extremist groups, that promote religious and racial intolerance (so-called “skin-head” groups, anti-semits, etc.), as well as chauvinist organisations. Also, some human rights organisations, while promoting certain human rights, at the same time, neglect or even reject other human rights. For example, some human rights organisations working on political rights, would reject the rights of sexual minorities or women’s rights.

3.3.2 Civil society activities to promote tolerance. Some Russian NGOs work on the issue of tolerance. This is proved by the growing number of conferences dedicated to the issues of tolerance and respect to people, and the growing number of publications on this theme. The collection of articles, entitled “We are Co-Citizens. (Mass Media and Society)” fully elucidates the problem of educating tolerance through mass media.

¹³⁵ The results are published in: Applied Budget Analysis Implementation in the Reform of Housing and Communal Services in the North West of Russia. 2005.

As examples of CSOs that are active in promoting tolerance, we refer to the following: the ‘Civil Society’ Institute (one of its programs is “Tolerance”)¹³⁶, Advocacy Youth Group – Rostov, the Rostov Regional Branch of the Cross Regional Charity Youth Organization (it’s educational program is entitled “Tolerance: My Step!”¹³⁷); and the “Liberal Mission” Foundation (tolerance between three structures is investigated within the framework of the project “Business, Power and Civil Society”). Support from within civil society to tolerance matters is provided by the Institute of Tolerance that functions with the support of Open Society Institute provides grants to CSO on tolerance-related matters.¹³⁸

CSO work to promote tolerance is prominent both in the streets and in the virtual space. A festival of internet-projects “For tolerance against extremism” is held annually in order to develop Russian Internet space and support to youth initiatives, aimed at resolution of social matters, strengthening of international links, decrease of extremist outbursts

CSOs actively work in the sphere of ethnic and religious tolerance. International organisation “Union of committees for protection of Jews in the former USSR” in its 2002 report on anti-semitism, xenophobia and religious discrimination describes the situation in Russia’s regions. This organisation has branches in 30 Russia’s regions and monitors on a daily basis violation of human rights in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. According to the Head of organisation, Josef Brod, “the situation worsens every year. This is linked to social segmentation of the Russian society, low quality of life, especially at the provincial level, absence of culture”.

CSOs hold dialogue with authorities on tolerance matters, as well as work as sub-contractors to develop legislation and regulations in this sphere. In December 2001 the dialogue between CSOs and authorities entitled “Tolerance, counteraction to discrimination, peacekeeping, bringing up in the spirit of tolerance” brought to the following agreements between CSOs and:

- 1) The Ministry of Education – on creation of the Civic Council on tolerance by the Ministry with presentation of a package of suggestions from NGOs by the end of 2001. Discussion of the joint action plans in the sphere of monitoring of intolerance in the media, expertise of educational textbooks, development and introduction of special educational programs.
- 2) The Ministry for Foreign Affairs on regular basis arranges consultations on the matters of mutual concern, participation of the representatives of the Ministry in joint work with NGOs and the Ministry of Education, etc.

However, it is now up to the government to ensure law enforcement of these legislative acts and regulations. For example, the Law “On counteraction to extremist activity” of 2002, as well as article 282 of the Criminal Code on sparking inter-ethnic conflicts constitute the legislative basis to advance tolerance in the society. However, the multitude of violations of these legislative acts rarely ends up with corresponding sentences and jail. For example, editors of chauvinist periodicals rarely ended up in courts or were not convicted. From the viewpoint of A. Aypetyan, Director of the Center for Inter-ethnic Cooperation states that Russia does not live to provisions of the Framework convention on protection of national minorities of the Council of Europe. Examples of violations of this Convention include the

¹³⁶ <http://osi.albertina.ru>

¹³⁷ <http://edu.seu.ru/db/>

¹³⁸ <http://www.tolerinst.ru/>

¹³⁹ Civic mechanisms of counteraction to terrorism and xenophobia, <http://tolerance.ngo.ru/>

impossibility to open a national school for children of Armenians, Meskhitin-turks, and other ethnic minorities. The public is not informed about the convention.

3.4 Non-violence

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Russian civil society actors and organisations practice and promote non-violence. Table III.3.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence (1.5)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the civil society arena	2
3.4.2	Civil society actions to promote non-violence	1

3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena. Within the civil society arena only radical groups (such as nationalists or fascists, which do not fall under the definition of civil society according to Russia’s SAG) are violent to other CSOs or member of society at large.

The “uncivilized” actors of civil society, radical and extremist groups are relatively small, but may be quite active in some of Russia’s regions. The murders of foreign students, especially those of Asian and African descent, by the “SkinHead” extremist group, caused marches and demonstrations of protest of the foreign students in St. Petersburg, Voronezh and other cities. These acts are condemned by the authorities, but continue to happen on regular basis. Political parties sometimes use discriminatory claims to win the votes of constituency. The political party “Rodina” that used inter-ethnic discriminatory elements in its pre-election advertising was taken down from elections to the Moscow city legislature. Other civil society groups rarely use violent means to express their interests.

3.4.2 Civil society actions to promote non-violence. There are frequent civil society actions and campaign on non-violence. Most prominent here are environmental groups and human rights groups.

For example, the Youth Human Rights Movement and Non-violence and World’s Culture network started their campaign for the abolishment of tortures in 2004 on the International Day of Peace announced by the UN General Assembly as a global day for ceasefire and non-violence. The human rights group addresses the President of the RF and the Federal Assembly of the RF demanding the ratification of the protocol #6 of the European Convention on human rights and freedoms. This address was turned into a campaign.¹⁴⁰

On 20 December 2005 in St. Petersburg Art Center at Pushkinskaya 10, the exhibition “Life of Chechnya” was held. At the exhibition they also showed a documentary of the end of 1990s, based of Chechen children’s stories. With this exhibition the Youth Human Rights Movement of St. Petersburg and human rights group “House of Peace and Non-violence” started the campaign “Interaction with Chechnya”¹⁴¹. During the campaign it was planned to hold similar exhibitions, photo and movie-shows, round tables on the problems of Chechen People, organise meetings with people, living and working in Chechnya. Furthermore, the

¹⁴⁰ Press-release, 22.09.2004, Liberal and Libertarian Movement “Russian Radicals”, <http://radikaly.ru/>

¹⁴¹ Institute of Collective Actions, <http://ikd.ru/>

organisers gathered textbooks for students of higher educational establishments and schools in Chechnya, books for libraries of Grozny city, artistic materials for schools of Arts. The organisers considered that the most important part of this campaign was the establishment of personal contacts between students and school-children, professors and human rights activists of various Chechen cities and St. Petersburg.

Other examples of CSOs that are active in promoting non-violence are: the Russian Public Association “World without Violence”¹⁴² that organises peace marches and publishes a series of books “Non-Violence Library”; “Golubka” Training Center¹⁴³; and Penza Regional Branch of the Russian Peace Fund. Within the framework of the project “From Reconciliation to Cooperation”, supported by the Dutch CORDAID organisation, a group of organisations (International Non-Violence, Moscow; Alternative to Violence, Khasavjurt; and Creation, Gudermes) published the booklet by V.V.Sukhov “Civic Peace Initiatives”¹⁴⁴ This work summarises the results of the “From Reconciliation to Cooperation” Project aimed to facilitate the development of the cooperation between ethnic, professional, social and territorial communities living in the regions neighboring with the administrative border between the Chechnya Republic and the Republic of Dagestan, Northern Osetya-Alanya and Stavropol Kraj.

To sum up, a number of CSOs across Russia are active in promoting non-violence in many different aspects: from exhibitions and direct meetings with people to publications and analytical reports. However, CSOs generally lack resources and/or support of public officials to scale up their work, spread it nation-wide or assure sustainability. As a result phenomena such as xenophobia and ethnic discrimination are notable within wider society. Some of Russia’s regions in the Caucasus also suffer from terrorism and ethnic clashes.

3.5 Gender Equity

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Russian civil society actors practice and promote gender equity. Table III.3.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equality (2.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the civil society arena	2
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	-- ¹⁴⁵
3.5.3	Civil society actions to promote gender equity	2

3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena. SAG members present at the second SAG meeting agreed that within the civil society arena no gender discrimination can be noted.

3.5.3 Civil society actions to promote gender equity. Women’s NGOs are very active in promoting gender equity in Russian society.

“Due to the changes in the country in the beginning of the 1990s, there appeared a possibility to expand the area of civic activity for women’s organisations. The process of their

¹⁴² <http://www.mbn.tulanews.ru/>

¹⁴³ <http://www.a-z.ru/assoc/golubka/chto.htm>

¹⁴⁴ Sukhov 2005.

¹⁴⁵ Indicator was taken out due to lack of data.

emergence started very intensively, and the range of their interests proved to be rather wide. This process of creating new organisations was the most intensive in major megapoles – Moscow and St. Petersburg. That falls within the traditional country pattern: in supply of information and resources there is a huge lag between the two capitals and the rest of Russia (a ‘country within the country effect’).¹⁴⁶

The Internet portal www.owl.ru acts as the key resource center for women’s and gender groups. One of the largest umbrella bodies working towards gender equity is the Consortium of women’s NGOs that was registered in April 1996 and grouped most prominent women-leaders of CSOs and government bodies throughout Russia. The goals of the consortium were to implement the constitutional principle of equal rights, freedoms and opportunities for women and men, raise the potential of women’s organisations in civil society development and insist on promoting highly professional women-specialists at the decision-making level. The consortium works as a coalition of 98 women’s groups from 37 Russia’s regions. The Consortium is a member of international network of Women’s Consortium of CIS-USA, working since 1993. The international network groups over 200 women’s organisations: 30 from USA, over 100 from Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, 98 from Russia.¹⁴⁷

Relevant policy work is also undertaken by a network of NGOs, The League of Women-Voters, which originally was founded in St. Petersburg and now has 19 branches throughout Russia. Gorbachev Foundation has a special program devoted to women-leaders, including a series of round tables and trainings.

Gender organisations also organise large-scale media events. Initiated in 2001, the international program “Gender Montage” grouped a series of film directors, journalists, and experts in the sphere of gender studies from 12 countries including Russia. Its task is the creation and advancement of a series of documentaries to show the mechanisms of gender-based discrimination. The project is being developed as an artistic laboratory, the participants of which create documentaries, exchange experiences, learn things at seminars and training-sessions. The project was implemented by the Institute of Social and Gender Studies in partnership with Network Women’s Program of Open Society Institute –New York and international network of programs for women in CIS countries, the Baltic States and Mongolia.¹⁴⁸ Another example of a public and media events was women’s inter-regional club “Baikal Amazon Women” hold annual car rides through the whole of Russia and to neighbouring countries, trying to attract attention, pressing issues in the social sphere.¹⁴⁹

3.6 Poverty Eradication

This subdimension examines to what extent Russian civil society actors promote poverty eradication. Table III.3.6 presents the indicator score.

TABLE III.3.6: Indicator assessing poverty eradication (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
3.6	Civil society actions to eradicate poverty	1

¹⁴⁶ Women’s Non-Government Organizations of Russia and CIS. 1998.

¹⁴⁷ <http://wcons.org.ru/>

¹⁴⁸ Institute of Social and Gender Policy <http://www.genderpolicy.ru/>

¹⁴⁹ <http://baikal-amazons.irk.ru/>

3.6.1 *Civil society actions to eradicate poverty.* There are very few CSOs in Russia that work on poverty issues as such. CSOs usually target marginalised groups or some of the poverty causes and consequences, like social exclusion and civic education. A number of think-tanks and NGO groups work to research the problem and suggest changes in the policy course, among them: Independent Institute of Social Policy (comprehensive research on poverty), People’s Assembly (linking poverty with administrative barriers), etc.

“The number of neglected children, including the so-called social orphans, is growing, regardless of all the measures undertaken by the Government and CSOs. The main reasons of this growth, besides the antisocial parents’ behaviour, include: inflation, unemployment, economic instability, growth of crime, poverty. No measures can change this situation, unless it is not brought to the public’s attention and widest strata of the society are involved complementing the efforts of special public agencies struggling and searching for solutions, as well as implementing them”¹⁵⁰.

According to the data obtained in the course of the consultations with Siberian NGOs held in Novosibirsk by L. Proskuriakova, the ‘Strategy’ Center expert, there are very few CSOs working at poverty eradication. Even social security agencies sometimes believe that, in the case of retired military servants, for example, this work is reduced to providing direct social assistance and does not include a comprehensive set of measures like professional retraining.

The reason that so little CSOs fight poverty is two-fold. First of all, poverty is not officially acknowledged as a problem in modern Russia, which is a proud member of the G8 and writes off the debt to Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Therefore, there is no state funding available to CSOs to tackle the problem. Secondly, foreign foundations’ exodus from Russia is for the most part due to high GDP per capita due to oil and gas revenues, so foreign foundations too, do not see poverty as a matter of concern for civil society.

3.7 Environmental Sustainability

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Russian civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability. Table III.3.7 presents the indicator score.

TABLE III.3.7: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability (2.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
3.7.1	Civil society actions to sustain environment	2

3.7.1 *Civil Society actions to sustain the environment.* The most prominent of all-Russia environmental groups include: Russian Regional Resource Center (working as a special TACIS project), GreenPeace-Russia (working in Russia since 1992), World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) in Russia, ISAR: Resources for Environmental Activists was founded in 1983, as the Institute for Soviet and American Relations, Social-Ecologic Union. There is a multitude of well-organised regional groups, like Coalition “Clean Baltic” and “Children of the Baltic Sea”, etc. A number of environmental movements tried chances at parliamentary elections, e.g. environmental party “Kedr” (created in 1993, turned into political party in 1994).

¹⁵⁰ Social Orphanage is in the Agenda: “Street Children” on the pages of regional newspapers. 2002.

Environmental NGOs are active campaigners. For example, GreenPeace-Russia organised a number of public campaigns: anti-nuclear (including themes of energy-saving and alternative energy sources), on preservation of forests, on sea bioresources, against chemical contamination, campaign to save Lake Baikal, etc. Other methods of civil society's work to sustain the environment include advocacy, practical actions to clean environment, resolutions and open letters, etc.

The Russian environmental movement appears to be well entrenched with environmental organisations actively addressing issues from nuclear safety protection of local parks with environmental organisations working in each of Russia's eighty-nine constituent regions.¹⁵¹ During Perestroika, the Russian environmental movement was able to mobilize thousands of citizens to sign petitions and demonstrate against further development of the country's nuclear power industry. For example, the movement successfully prevented the construction of more than 50 nuclear reactors, as well as hydroelectric power stations and gas pipelines.¹⁵² In fact, throughout the 1980s and 1990s environmentalists are attributed by scholars to having played a momentous role in mobilizing grievances against the state, eroding the legitimacy of the Soviet administration and precipitating the collapse of the Soviet regime.

The example of population's and environmental NGOs involvement in the decision making process on waste disposal is of importance here. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast gives, perhaps, the most successful examples of ecoNGO activities, regional environmental policy and interaction between NGOs, government agencies and businesses. The main umbrella ecoNGO organisation is the "Dront" Ecological Center. It provides for the efficient work of the environmental movement."¹⁵³

An anti-nuclear campaign was launched in 1995 by the 'ECOPROTECTION!' International Group and the International Socio-Ecological Union. 'ECOPROTECTION!' is the alliance of environmental activists acting on the territory of the former USSR, founded in 1989-1990 in Kaliningrad. Now, it has its branches in Moscow, Voronezh and some other cities of Russia and Eastern Europe. The International Socio-Ecological Union was founded in 1988 and has in its ranks about 300 member organisations on the territory of the former USSR.

Conclusion

Russian civil society works well to project and promote values within society. Its efforts to promote such values as democracy, transparency and tolerance within society and authorities are substantial. Examples range from an annual festival of internet-projects "For tolerance against extremism" and "TI-Russia" promotion of transparency through its "Corruption Perception Index" and monitoring of "administrative resource" to Center "Strategy's work on advancing budget transparency at all levels, etc.

Promoting environment sustainability is a key value, which Russian civil society is promoting very actively. CSOs working in the area range from such large NGOs as Russian branches WWF and Greenpeace to smaller local organisations. Russian CSOs here often act in partnership with foreign CSOs, academia and even appeal to intergovernmental organisations.

¹⁵¹ Henry 2002: 184.

¹⁵² See, for example: Dawson 1996; Yanitskii 1996; Glenys 1997.

¹⁵³ Almanach 'Concern. Social ecology of the regions of Russia' , issue No 8. 2002.

It should be noted that civil society efforts to promote values in the society have a limited impact on the population and, like other indicators, vary from region to region and from city to city. According to the data obtained through the SU – HSE research (2004-2005) of civil society in 5 Russia's towns, the extent to which positive social values are promoted by civil society can be characterized as:

- in between 'Limited ' and 'Moderate' in Skopin (Ryazan Oblast);
- nearly 'Significant' in Rostov-the-Great;
- 'Moderate ' in Vidnoie (Moscow Oblast);
- 'Limited' in Peterhof (St. Petersburg area).


However, these CSOs efforts to promote values in society are being counterbalanced by the inability of CSOs to practice these values internally, particularly their failures to assure their own financial transparency, their own democracy and to reduce their own internal corruption practices. Often CSOs do not properly understand or even identify the problem and here is the role for support and umbrella organisations.

One area, which is still a striking social problem for Russia, but little tackled by civil society is poverty. The limited role of civil society on poverty eradication and some other values is partly due to the restrictive environment under which CSOs operate. For example, if CSOs providing services to the poor and needy would not be taxed as commercial companies and had a chance to fairly compete for state orders in this sphere, civil society could make a greater contribution in the area.

4. IMPACT

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions within Russian society. The score for the Impact Dimension is 1.2, reflecting the SAG's assessment that civil society in Russia has a rather limited impact on society and decision-makers. Figure III.4.1 presents the scores for the five subdimensions within the Impact dimension.

FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension



The local studies, according to the SU-HSE survey of 5 Russia's towns held in 2004-2005, yield similar scores as the All-Russia assessment: civil society impact is characterized in Skopin (Ryazan Oblast) as 'insignificant'; and in Rostov-the-Great, Vidnoie (Moscow Oblast) and Peterhof (St. Petersburg area) as 'Limited'.

4.1 Influencing Public Policy

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Russian civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy, in the fields of social policy and human rights policy as well as its impact on the national budgeting process. Table III.4.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing public policy (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
4.1.1	Human rights impact	1
4.1.2	Social policy impact	1
4.1.3	Impact in national budgeting process	1

Until the end of the 1990s CSOs understood their influence only as criticism of government agencies/ official regime and opposition. Later CSOs began to understand that efficient and sustainable social changes require a dialogue and compromise with official decision makers, which, in its turn, demands competence and professionalism.

The advocacy score for Russian NGOs is 4.2 (scale 1 -7) in the 2004 USAID NGO Sustainability Index. The report states: "NGOs are gaining greater access to policy makers at

the regional and municipal government levels; however, in general they continue to have difficulty influencing policy, particularly at the federal level. NGOs generally have the most success when advocating for specific issues. Independent think-tanks have informed public debate and shaped key public decisions on housing and budgetary reforms and environmental policy. Although NGOs generally do not launch advocacy campaigns at the federal level, both regional and Moscow-based groups have organised to prevent passage of a new tax code that would have required the registration of all grants. Overall, the current ability of NGOs to participate in shaping policy is still limited, and the impact is minimal and dependent on the good will of the government”.¹⁵⁴ Also, according to opinion polls, Russian residents estimate the CSO influence on the life of the country as extremely insignificant (72%)¹⁵⁵.

Today only few advocacy organisations and organisations attempting to influence specific issues of public policy possess a set of tools. One of the examples here is an All-Russia Invalids’ Association (a powerful organisation with a well adjusted structure) effectively influences the government decision making – e.g. by lobbying laws.¹⁵⁶

The set of tools used by Russian CSO include:

- Appeals and petitions to the Deputies and executive agencies of all levels on behalf of coalitions and associations (e.g. campaigns against taxing NGOs in the same way as for-profits) or on behalf of the people (e.g. the campaign against the importation of nuclear wastes for their recycling in Russia);
- Direct meetings with opinion makers;
- Public and Deputy Hearings;
- Street manifestations;
- Submitting alternative draft laws and by-laws - sometimes jointly with the deputies;
- Organising public boards of experts and advisory boards at various government agencies (e.g. Public Councils at the Committee of Order Protection, Territorial Affairs and NGOs of the Saratov Oblast Duma; Public Council on Civil Education at the Committee on Education of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, etc);

Experts note that NGOs have become more inventive in their advocacy efforts. Though their activities still remain hard to implement, NGOs are beginning to give up ineffective models of public campaigns and cooperate with professional advocacy groups and other influential political clusters – such as party and business lobbies.

4.1.1 Human Rights. CSO are the most active promoters of human rights in Russia. Overall these organisations are the most successful to make their voice and position heard by the decision-makers and those in power.

Importantly, human rights organisations produce alternative reports to those presented by Russian authorities in international institutions, provide their expert opinion on draft legislation and regulatory acts, carry out civic education programs on Russian and international human rights problems and documents, etc. The portal on human rights in Russia HRO.ORG is the key Internet resource center, containing a database of Russian human rights organisations. Human rights CSO are the major driving force behind the

¹⁵⁴ See www.usaid.gov/ USAID NGO Sustainability Index for Russia, 2004.

¹⁵⁵ How to wake up Civil Society? Russian Opinion Poll Research Center Press issue No 120 of 09/29/2004), see <http://www.wciom.ru>

¹⁵⁶Data from the Report on Stakeholder Consultations held in Novosibirsk by L.N.Proskuriakova, 07/15/2005.

creation and promotion of the Institute of Ombudsman (Human Rights Commissioner) joining forces with the Council of Europe, UNDP and the International Ombudsman Institute.¹⁵⁷

An important role is played by environmental groups, which in the course of two dozens years of existence developed to be able to exercise citizen's control. These groups may well be called "movements". Various sector-specific NGOs, advocating in favor of human and civic rights can be divided into those that provide goods for their target groups (such as marginalised groups as victims of political repressions, refugees, victims of Chernobyl catastrophe, etc.) and those that fight for concrete individual rights (for example the right for conscription to alternative /to military/ civic service).¹⁵⁸

The Human Rights Network regularly collects signatures for campaigns against human and civil rights violations. In November 2005 it placed on its website <http://hro.org/> the declaration of Russian NGOs expressing concern about the draft law on introducing changes into some laws of the Russian Federation, aimed at toughening control over civil society institutes. All interested and supportive individuals and organisations are invited to sign it.¹⁵⁹

According to Moscow Helsinki Group, there are many examples of human rights organisations that experienced pressure from regional authorities and departments of federal authorities. Certain problems in this regard were experienced by human rights organisations in Chechnya, St. Petersburg, Republic of Tatarstan, Krasnodar Krai, and Orlovskaya Oblast.¹⁶⁰

The overall impact of CSOs in the sphere of human rights can be characterized by moderately significant despite the many challenges human rights groups face in modern Russia.

4.1.2 Social Policy Case Study. CSO in Russia are very active in influencing social policies. As stated in 4.1, "NGOs generally have the most success when advocating for specific issues". Organisations like the Independent Institute of Social Policy¹⁶¹ produces quality analytical reports on pressing social matters, the Russian officials and the World Bank being among their clients. Federal and regional authorities (federal Ministry on Social Care and Healthcare and regional committees) actively engage the multitude of CSO working on social matters through consultative councils, regional and municipal grants and state order schemes.

An interesting example is offered by the war and reserve veteran organisations in Novosibirsk united their forces in the Coordination Council to provide interaction between the Novosibirsk Oblast Administration and organisations of veterans, officers of reserve and retired military officers. This Council is based on the parity principle: it includes 19 NGO leaders and 19 officials from the Administration. Initially the government did not take any part in the Council creation. It was set up on the money of 2 grants provided by the Inter-regional Public Foundation Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center through a grant competition. Till now, it remains difficult to obtain information on the work of the Council, it is resisting even basic openness. Nevertheless, together with the Administration, the Council

¹⁵⁷ See the web-site of St. Petersburg "Strategy" Center www.ombu.ru

¹⁵⁸ Shvedov 2005.

¹⁵⁹ Web-site of Russian human rights NGOs <http://www.hro.org/ngo/about/2005/11/10-2.php>

¹⁶⁰ Overview Report of the Moscow Helsinki Group on Observance of Human Rights in Russia in 2004 <http://www.mhg.ru>

¹⁶¹ Social Policy Institute <http://www.socpol.ru/>

manages to push through serious projects serving the needs of its target groups: e.g. the program for the social adaptation of the military that operates without any government funding. Also together with the Administration it created a whole infrastructure for providing housing to this target group (more than 600 apartments purchased since 1998). Jointly with the Mayor's Office of Novosibirsk, the Council has constructed 2 houses on a share holding principle. They designed Novosibirsk Regional Non-Government Program for providing homes for the military, entitled "Affordable Housing for the Military". The goal of the program is to increase the opportunities for the military who participate in government programs. Each year 300-600 target group members are retrained free of charge at the 'Sphere' educational center. The Council proved to be an efficient mechanism for influencing the government through using the so-called 'administrative resource'.¹⁶²

The Russian Academy of Sciences, and specifically, the Institute of Systemic Analysis conducted a sociological survey studying NGO influence on social policy and their findings concluded that NGOs were largely excluded from social policy decisions, such as budgeting for the social sector and from defining social policies.¹⁶³

On a concluding note, it should be underscored that CSOs have a limited impact on social policies at the federal level, unless large public support is mobilized. At the regional level, success stories like the one described above are frequent. The problem is that authorities often treat CSOs' efforts to influence policies as attempts to influence politics, the tendency being reinforced by the same Russian word used for "policy" and "politics".

4.1.3 Impact on national budgeting process. The budget process in Russia is a closed and complicated one, hard to influence for CSOs. One of the few ways to influence the process is through public hearings. However, it has become a common practice that the budget information is disclosed by the federal Ministry of Finance and regional Administrations. Some CSOs are tasked by authorities themselves to monitor budget spendings, e.g. the newly created federal Civic Chamber is tasked to monitor budget spendings for the National Target Programs.

Russian CSOs have created a widespread network of centers and specialists capable of implementing applied budget analysis. For example only the network of International Budget Project list the following Russian members: St. Petersburg "Strategy" Center (www.transparentbudget.ru), Pskov Regional Civil Initiative Support Centre, Institute for Urban Economics, Murmansk Association of Journalists, Women from closed cities (ZATO).¹⁶⁴ Other prominent civil society groups working on the national and sub-national budgeting process include: "East-West" Institute (Open Finances Program, www.iew.org/EWI/Economics.nsf/pages/ftir), Non-commercial foundation for restructuring of enterprises and development of financial institutions (www.fer.ru), Russian Union of taxpayers (www.taxpayers.ru), Yaroslav CSO "Center for Social Partnership" (<http://csp.yaroslavl.ru>), Regional CSOs "Ravenstvo" from Samara (www.hippo.ru), Union "Don Women" from Novocheerkassk (<http://home.novoch.ru/~donwomen/>), Youth Parliament of Volgograd Oblast (<http://www.mpvo.narod.ru>).

In 2004 a People's Assembly, which organised itself in Krasnoyarsk Krai and several CSOs,

¹⁶² Op. cit.

¹⁶³ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf

¹⁶⁴ International Budget Project, <http://www.internationalbudget.org/groups/russia.htm>

successfully lobbied for the Law on Krai Social Grants No 10-1974 that was passed by the Legislative Council of Krasnoyarsk Krai on May 25, 2004 and signed by the Governor on June 13, 2004.¹⁶⁵ The Law allows for allocation of a special budget for the implementation of social projects on a wide range of issues. For full policy case studies- See Annex 2.

On a concluding note, the impact on the national budget process is very similar to that of overall CSOs' impact: limited (attempted or simulated) at the federal level and quite successful in some regions, where authorities are open to dialogue and influence.

4.2 Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Russian civil society is active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable. Table III.4.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.2: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable (1.0)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state accountable	1
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	1

4.2.1 Holding the state accountable. Holding state accountable is impossible without government agencies being transparent, their work being clear to the public and open for public participation. Therefore, NGOs must make their contribution in the struggle against corruption.

Russian CSOs use the following methods and approaches to fight corruption: (1) cultivating state openness, (2) developing public participation, (3) conducting 'public examination of legislative documents, laws and draft laws, (4) removing administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, (5) providing problems' coverage by mass media and (6) assisting the reform of state administration.¹⁶⁶ Thus, CSOs are active in holding the state accountable, undertaking a wide range of efforts from implementing such social strategies as 'transparent budget' (St. Petersburg Center 'Strategy', Murmansk Association of Women Journalists, etc.) or 'turnkey public participation'(St. Petersburg center 'Strategy') to nationwide initiatives like National Anti Corruption Committee or Cross-Regional Trust Dialogue.¹⁶⁷

The ability of CSOs to monitor the state has been reportedly more successful at the local and even regional than federal level. For instance, NGOs in Tomsk monitored Duma members and officials to evaluate if election promises were met in 2003 and six NGOs in Samara cooperated with government in a coalition to solve pressing social problems.¹⁶⁸

To sum up, greater concerted efforts of civil society are required to influence the authorities at the federal level, while at the local and even regional level there exist cases of CSOs successfully holding the state accountable. The ability to hold the state accountable varies from region to region and depends of a number of variables including political regime, level of CSO development, amount of resources available for civil society in the region, etc.

¹⁶⁵ The 'Vedomosti' newspaper . Issue No16 (21) of 06/29/2004.

¹⁶⁶ Civil initiatives and corruption prevention 2000.

¹⁶⁷ Corruption Prevention: what is society capable of. 2003.

¹⁶⁸ See www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/russia.pdf

4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable. Russian CSOs are not very active in holding private corporations accountable. Given the current low level of corporate social responsibility and environment in which CSOs operate this task seems next to impossible. As an alternative path to influence corporations, CSOs approach their international creditors, like the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. However, some prominent cases of direct efforts exist and below are examples of these.

The Shell-led Sakhalin Energy company is seeking up to USD 300 million from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for the highly controversial Sakhalin II project in the Russian Far East, the largest oil and gas project in the world. In the case of Sakhalin project, funded by EBRD and private companies, Environmental Watch of Sakhalin¹⁶⁹, a coalition of Russian CSOs, joined forces with CEE Bankwatch Network to demand development of an oil spill response plan, a set of measures to protect the endangered Western Gray Whale and other actions.¹⁷⁰

A similar international campaign was organised in connection with the The TogliattiAzot Ammonia Terminal, which is being constructed by the TogliattiAzot company on the Black Sea coast of the Taman Peninsula in the Russian Federation. The total project cost is estimated at USD 210 million. Both European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation have given the project the highest category 'A' in environmental rating. There are plans for further development and expansion of the port so that in addition to ammonia it can also handle various oil products, liquefied natural gas and other chemicals. It is planned that by 2015 up to 31.5 million tons of hydrocarbons and chemical cargoes will pass through the port. The local population as well as many NGOs in Russia are concerned about this project and oppose its implementation. Due to earlier public protests, the construction of the terminal was delayed for years and the company started building work only in 2002. Significant concerns that have been raised are related to the safety of the terminal, the economic justification of the project and possible negative impacts on Taman's socio-economic situation, including environment and archaeological monuments.¹⁷¹

4.3 Responding to Social Interests

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Russian civil society actors are responsive to social interests. Table III.4.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.3: Indicators assessing response to social interests (1.5)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	2
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	1

4.3.1 Responsiveness. Apart from the issue of poverty, CSOs usually respond rather well to pressing social needs, working on matters of social concern. This is unfortunately done not always in communication with the population itself. However, poverty as a general matter, being a major social concern, finds little place in Russian CSOs' activities. Three years ago, the share of people living below the poverty line was 25%. It has now gone down to 15%

¹⁶⁹ Environmental Watch of Sakhalin, <http://sakhalin.environment.ru/oil/srp/sakh2.php>

¹⁷⁰ CEE Bankwatch, www.bankwatch.org/

¹⁷¹ CEE Bankwatch, www.bankwatch.org/

with half of these being working poor.¹⁷²

A survey carried out by the USAID Democracy Initiatives showed that the majority of Russian CSOs play an important role in the resolution of societal problems, in particular social matters, which was asserted by 56 % of respondents (see Table III.4.4).

TABLE III 4.4: USAID Democracy Initiatives survey, 2004

How much time does your organisation devote to volunteering or community service?												
	Total	Moscow	St.Petersburg	Nizhny Novgorod	Saratov	Samara	Perm	Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk	Khabarovsk	Rostov-on-Don	Tomsk
Base: who mentioned the 1st problem in question q7.1	100%	41%	24%	3%	3%	4%	3%	3%	5%	4%	4%	3%
A great deal	56%	60%	49%	56%	82%	59%	43%	51%	59%	54%	59%	50%
A fair amount	28%	25%	27%	37%	14%	26%	40%	44%	35%	35%	31%	31%
Not very much	11%	13%	10%	7%	3%	12%	7%	4%	5%	11%	7%	15%
Not at all	5%	2%	14%		1%	2%	9%	1%	2%		3%	3%
Refused	0%											1%
Unsure	0%					1%	1%					

4.3.2 Public trust in CSOs. Data from the World Value Survey shows that, on average, 57.3% of citizens trust CSOs (here: labour unions & churches). This compares as follows to other institutions: 67.8 trust the army, 36.1% the press, 29.9% the police, 20% the parliament and 19.8% major companies. According to the 2003 NGO sustainability index, the Russian public remains largely suspicious of NGOs and does not believe that they contribute to society's overall welfare.

According to the “Public Opinion” Foundation survey, the majority of the citizens of Russia still consider public associations as nominal, but not well-functioning social institutes: 70% of respondents either ‘know nothing’ or ‘heard something’ about CSOs, and 73% of respondents answered negatively to the question whether they would like to take part in CSO activities. Even those who are informed about such organisations are often very skeptical about their effectiveness. “The weakness of our public organisations, - says the expert of the “Public Opinion” Foundation in Vologda, - is their inability to protect human rights. On the whole, we have no real alternative to the state power.”¹⁷³

¹⁷² Russian Vice-Prime Minister, Alexander Zhukov, Public announcement on ORT “Vremena” TV program, 22 January 2006

¹⁷³ Field of opinions. Dominants. 2001. 19 July. № 26. P. O-1, O-6-7.

4.4. Empowering Citizens

This subdimension examines the extent to which Russian civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups. Table III.4.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.5: Indicators assessing empowering citizens (1.3)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	2
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action	2
4.4.3	Empowering poor people	1
4.4.4	Empowering women	1
4.4.5	Building social capital	2
4.4.6	Supporting livelihoods	0

4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens. Leaders of educational organisations and scholars are now looking for ways to bring about a better understanding of Civil Society through channels of formal education, because educating a ‘new citizen’ and creating a ‘new society’ are, mainly, responsibilities of universities and education establishments, most of them remain state-owned. Without greater knowledge and understanding of rights and responsibilities in a democratic society the government can’t expect its citizens to meet civilized social norms. Higher education establishments are absolutely instrumental in delivering this knowledge.¹⁷⁴ The Board of Experts on Civic Education at the Committee on Education of the State Duma of the Russian Federation started playing another important role in promoting civil education in Russia. This Board, chaired by the President of St. Petersburg Center ‘Strategy’, regularly assembles to work through a previously agreed agenda.¹⁷⁵

Publication of information and analytical materials is an important work done by CSOs to educate/inform citizens. The “We are Citizens” Coalition, publishing series of books on the violations in election process and various laws followed by comments, is also seminal to the process.¹⁷⁶ There are some publications that explain the order of human rights implementation: “Compass”¹⁷⁷, “It’s your right not to go to war”¹⁷⁸, “You start working – learn about your rights!”¹⁷⁹, “If you learn and work you must know your rights!”¹⁸⁰

For citizens, however, the mass media remain the main source of information. However, quite a number of mass media are not only backed by some political, financial and, sometimes, criminal structures, but are also fully dependent on them. Some mass media, including the respectful ones, participate in propaganda campaigns aimed at manipulating people. This is especially evident during election campaigns.¹⁸¹

Table III.4.6. below shows that an absolute majority of CSOs, which consider civic education an an important area, spend substantial time on civic education initiatives. The issue is clearly

¹⁷⁴ Shirobokov, Sergei, Civil Society Development: Reforming Higher Education in Russia, http://www.prof.msu.ru/PC/omsk/3_08.htm

¹⁷⁵ <http://www.strategy-spb.ru>

¹⁷⁶ Violations in the election process: examples, indications, counteractions 2003.

¹⁷⁷ COMPASS: Guide on human rights education for young people 2004.

¹⁷⁸ Gnezdilova 2004.

¹⁷⁹ You start working – learn about your rights! 2004.

¹⁸⁰ If you study and work, you must know your rights! 2004.

¹⁸¹ Dzyaloshinskiy 1999.

prioritized in the two larger cities (with clear leadership of Moscow and St. Petersburg). The importance attributed to the issues is almost insignificant even in large “million”¹⁸² cities and regional capitals like Rostov-on-Don, Samara and Perm.

Table III 4.6: USAID Democracy Initiatives, Survey, 2004

How much time does your organization devote to educational programs for citizens about this problem?													
	Total	Moscow	St.Petersburg	Nizhny Novgorod	Saratov	Samara	Perm	Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk	Khabarovsk	Rostov-on-Don	Tomsk	Irkutsk
Base: who mentioned 1 st prob. in question q7.1	100%	41%	24%	3%	3%	4%	3%	3%	5%	4%	4%	3%	3%
A great deal	21%	20%	26%	11%	31%	26%	16%	8%	12%	33%	9%	23%	28%
A fair amount	34%	37%	29%	35%	37%	37%	37%	33%	31%	32%	23%	33%	32%
Not very much	22%	24%	18%	31%	21%	20%	19%	25%	21%	15%	34%	19%	19%
Not at all	22%	18%	27%	24%	11%	16%	28%	32%	36%	19%	35%	25%	20%
Refused	0%											1%	
Unsure	1%	1%				1%		2%		1%			1%

The role of civic education in society has traditionally been played by cultural and educational institutions. For example civic activity of the school of Tyrnauz town, where children are taught practical skills of tolerance, is likely to have more relevance than the work of many NGOs in Kabardino-Balkariya region. In the school of Monchegorsk city (Kolsky peninsular) one teacher of history has for years brought up winners of the all-Russia school competition on the History of Mankind in the 20th century; in the school of Belostok village (Tomsk region) the Director does his best for children to have knowledge about the Soviet period and repressions in their village. These three schools, as well as many others, organise discussions, engage schoolchildren in research programs, and cooperate with NGOs’ projects. They play a social role of their own, and do it more effectively, than certain city public centers.¹⁸³

On a concluding note it should be underscored that awareness raising and civic education are clearly some of the strengths of Russian civil society and their important contribution to the application of the democratic principle of informed public participation.

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective actions and resolving joint problems. According to the Results of 2004 USAID Survey of Democracy Initiatives, two thirds of NGOs’ respondents

¹⁸² Cities with population of 1 million persons and above

¹⁸³ Shvedov 2005.

noted they do not pay any attention to protest actions and demonstrations, while only 1% acknowledged paying a lot of attention to this matter. 20% of the respondents noted that NGOs pay great attention to educational programs that help citizens find solutions to their pressing problems.

Table III 4.7: USAID Democracy Initiatives, Survey 2004

How much time does your organisation devote to protesting or demonstrating? (%)													
	Total	Moscow	St.Petersburg	Nizhny Novgorod	Saratov	Samara	Perm	Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk	Khabarovsk	Rostov-on-Don	Tomsk	Irkutsk
Base: who mentioned the 1st problem in question q7.1	100	41	24	3	3	4	3	3	5	4	4	3	3
A great deal	1		1	4	1	2	1	1		4	1	1	
A fair amount	8	7	8	17	10	12	19	4	4	9	2	8	6
Not very much	21	19	28	28	18	18	19	19	7	15	22	27	15
Not at all	70	73	63	50	70	67	61	74	89	71	74	63	76
Refused	0							1				1	
Unsure	1	2		2	1	1		1		1	1		3

After the initial wave of face-to-face free-of-charge capacity building events sponsored by western donors in 1990s, a virtual NGO school of NGOs' managers was opened by the NGO Development Center (Moscow). Currently, the Virtual Resource Center in Kaluga city not only contains resource information for NGOs, but also provides trainings to NGOs (<http://www.trainet.org/>), as do all regional resource centers listed in Annex 5, nowadays partly on commercial basis. The training center "Golubka" was one of the first CSO groups to start providing training and capacity building for NGOs on professional basis.¹⁸⁴

The competition of local publications dedicated to citizens' participation in solving social problems of Moscow and the making and development of social partnerships, entitled "PEOPLE FOR PEOPLE - 2004" was held for the 4th time. The competition, which contributes towards building collective actions, was initiated by the 'Social Partnership' center for the interaction between public and state structures as an incentive for regional, municipal and district mass media to contribute into the civic development of the Russian capital.¹⁸⁵

4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people. There are a number of marginalised groups in Russia. Key groups among them, which may overlap, are: poor (those living below the poverty line), pensioners; working poor (those paid from the state/regional budget, for ex. school teachers, medical doctors of state hospitals, etc.); single parents; people with special

¹⁸⁴ Training Center "Golubka" <http://www.golubka.org/>

¹⁸⁵ <http://www.spcenter.ru/files/prensa.htm>

needs; homeless people; people with limited freedom (prisoners, etc.). General tendencies should also be taken into account, like “feminization” of poverty.¹⁸⁶ Poor and marginalised people are the target groups for a handful of CSOs. Whereas CSOs do not address poverty in general, they are efficient in addressing the concerns and problems of concrete groups of marginalised people.

One of the few CSOs working with marginalised people is CSO “Nochlezhka” in St. Petersburg, which maintains a shelter and offers food and work (selling the newspaper that the CSO publishes) for homeless people. Given that there are almost no state shelters, this is an important type of assistance to homeless people. For 4 years the Inter-regional Public Foundation ‘Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center’ has been delivering the ‘Accessible Education’ program for the poor families of Novosibirsk Oblast. This program is currently funded by the Committee on Youth Policy in Novosibirsk Oblast. It reached the agreement with a number of universities on providing scholarships and dormitories for the Program participants. Annually, having successfully finished the Program, 30-35 students enter universities.

The conclusion is that CSOs have little understanding of the roots and causes of social exclusion, the importance to empower marginalised people and work little in this area.

4.4.4 Empowering women. CSOs are active and successful in empowering certain narrow groups of women, which are their target groups (i.e. unemployed women of a town, women-political candidates, etc.). However, when it comes to empowering all women (i.e. advocating in favour of new anti-discriminatory legislative measures) CSOs are relatively unsuccessful.

Some of the successful approaches to empowering women are listed below.

Women’s groups and CSOs that have women as a target group and work to help them raise their professional qualifications and quality of life. “Women from ZATO” for example work to provide additional education to women from closed towns. Within 10 years of its active work, the Regional Public Organization ‘East-West: Women’s Innovation Projects’ has accumulated a rich experience in using information technologies for improving the status of women, forming the information space to reflect real position of women in society and visualize the activities of women’s organisations. Through its real and virtual conferences, and its 2 language portal ‘Woman and Society’, the Organisation provides educational materials to broad circles of society, actively interacts with journalists, academic community, power structures, other civil society sectors, and international community.¹⁸⁷

The Consortium of women’s non-government associations published the book “Learning to Live in Civil Society. Gender Analysis of School Textbooks”. This publication provides an assessment of sets of textbooks and workbooks in all the main elementary and secondary school subjects. The influence produced by schools in forming gender attitudes in students is very strong, as it is at school that children and teenagers spend most of their time. The Consortium’s study revealed that in textbooks of all levels and on all subjects authors separate ‘male’ and ‘female’ spheres of activities. Gender education of school teachers must be aimed at forming their attitudes based on gender equity and acquainting them with principles and methods of gender pedagogy¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸⁶ Suvorov 2000.

¹⁸⁷ <http://www.owl.ru/>

¹⁸⁸ <http://hro.org/editions/wom/2005/07/05.php>

On a general note, civil society efforts to promote gender equity are focused at decision-makers and those in power. Gender advocates do not adequately communicate their message neither to the population nor to other CSOs.

4.4.5 Building social capital. In the analysis of civil society's contribution to building social capital, the researchers examined if there is any correlation between membership of CSOs and higher levels of interpersonal trust in Russia, which can be checked by cross-tabulating the results of the two variables. The analysis of Chi-Square tells us whether the correlation is significant. In the case showed below, there is a significant correlation. Therefore, CSO members show consistently higher levels of interpersonal trust than non-CSO members in Russia (28.3% vs. 22%). This gives us reason to believe that CSOs contribute towards building social capital.

Table III 4.8: Data of the World Values Survey (1999), Chi-Square

CSO membership * MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED Crosstabulation

			MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED		Total
			MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED	NEED TO BE VERY CAREFUL	
CSO membership	non member	Count % within CSO membership	363 22.0%	1288 78.0%	1651 100.0%
	member	Count % within CSO membership	216 28.3%	548 71.7%	764 100.0%
Total		Count % within CSO membership	579 24.0%	1836 76.0%	2415 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.321 ^b	1	.001		
Continuity Correction ^a	10.979	1	.001		
Likelihood Ratio	11.105	1	.001		
Fisher's Exact Test				.001	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.317	1	.001		
N of Valid Cases	2415				

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 183.17.

Percentage of CSO Trusters

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	trust in CSO	1195	47.8	57.3	57.3
	do not trust in CSOs	890	35.6	42.7	100.0
	Total	2085	83.4	100.0	
Missing	System	415	16.6		
Total		2500	100.0		

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods. SAG members present at the second SAG meeting agreed that CSOs (with the only exception of disabled people's groups and some other small groups) do not work towards creating workplaces and employment for their target groups.\

4.5 Meeting Societal Needs

This subdimension examines the extent to which Russian civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups. Table III.4.9 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.9: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs (1.3)

Ref. no.	Indicator	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	2
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	1
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalised groups	1

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provisions. CSOs are active in lobbying the government and regional authorities to meet pressing societal needs. For example, sectoral labor unions and associations of labor unions (i.e. the largest Federation of Independent Labor Unions, FNPR) held mass protest actions throught the country trying to make the Government alter the notorious Law on Entitlements, which was intended to substitute entitelements for in-kind social care services with modest cash payments. These protest actions proved rather successful, as the Bill was substantially re-worked and modified by the executive branch of authorities and the Parliament. In addition, public debates were launched at the nation-wide TV channels.

A specific example of government lobbying is the reform of Perm regional system for helping children who need state protection. Interaction between a number of Perm community organisations within the framework of this program aims at restructuring the conditions under which social services are rendered to children; clearly formulating children's needs (forming a clear-cut 'social order') for the government and municipal agencies serving children (including the most vulnerable group – orphans).¹⁸⁹

Based on the above typical cases, lobbying the state for social service provision at the country level was considered rather successful by the SAG members, who scored 2 for this indicator.

¹⁸⁹NCO activities in protecting interests of children in social sphere. 2004.

4.5.2 Meeting societal needs directly. The score for service provision on USAID NGO Sustainability Index 2004 for Russia is a medium 3.0. According to the report, “the Russian Government has traditionally been the sole provider of services and is hesitant to relinquish that responsibility to any significant degree. Laws governing service provision exist in just a few regions and are applied unevenly or lack implementation mechanisms. Providing services is not a self-sustainable activity for supporting the NGO sector with the exception of the few more progressive regions, where public administrations are supportive, NGO service provision is growing rapidly. However, in general, ambiguous legislation and suspicious tax police prevent NGOs from meeting societal needs directly. The requirement for NGOs to pay taxes on the value of their services, even if they provide them free of charge, serves as a deterrent to providing services at all”. (USAID 2004)

Local CSOs, territorial self-governance bodies (TOS) and CSOs that existed since the Soviet times have inherited the vast network of branches throughout Russia (for ex. veteran organisations, unions of disabled persons, etc.) and are active and efficient in directly meeting the pressing societal needs. They know well their constituency and are in direct communication with them. Credit unions and their associations are active in promoting self-help schemes. Micro-credit programs are, on the contrary, very little developed.

Various types of CSOs provide direct social services to their beneficiaries. Such a role is sometimes played by Russian protestant communities. An active role is carried out in hospitals and jails for minors. In one of the jails in Marij El region the children-inmates have a sports center and a satellite TV. This, however, does not prevent the management of the jail to use children’s labor for manufacturing furniture. The work of such church groups can well be classified as missionary. The Orthodox Church, on the contrary, often limits itself to servicing its parishioners and does not perform social functions¹⁹⁰.

The research of the leading anti-corruption think-tanks, like “People’s Assembly” and INDEM show that administrative barriers contribute a great deal to impoverishment of the population. The methods, practised by Russian CSOs to liquidate administrative barriers include: independent expert examination; change of normatives; enforcement of instructions; change of conditions for rendering services (not regulated by the law); giving explanations to the employees of service organisations; informing consumers; distance services.¹⁹¹

Thus, various types of CSOs from religious communities to territorial self-governance bodies actively work to provide direct social services to the population. However, this service work has a limited overall impact due to existing legislation, which treats provision of all types of services to people as commercial activity.

4.5.3 Meeting the needs of marginalised groups. The following groups of the population of Russia can be categorised as marginalised: the needy, single parents, the illiterate or those who can’t speak Russian, people with special needs, people with limited freedom (prisoners and the disabled) etc.

As mentioned under 4.5.2, local CSOs, territorial self-governance bodies (TOS) and CSOs that existed since the Soviet times have inherited the vast network of branches throughout Russia (for example, veteran organisations, unions of disabled persons, etc.) are more

¹⁹⁰ Shvedov 2005.

¹⁹¹ Galitsky 2004.

effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups. This is especially true for smaller marginalised groups or servicing marginalised groups in a given territory. Rural areas and marginalised groups that spread throughout the country are, on the contrary better serviced by the state and regional authorities.

For example, St. Petersburg regional charity organisation ‘Nochlezhka’ (‘Doss-House’) renders serious help to the homeless people, whose number reaches 8 000 people. This organisation created a special registration service for the homeless, which helps to raise their status before the government structures. Any homeless person who turns to ‘Nochlezhka’ can get social consultations and welfare. The social worker will assist in getting medical aid, restoring documents (rehabilitation), finding the job. The organisation established a special service for collecting donations that are used, e.g., for the “Night Bus” program implementation (hot meals and urgent social help to the homeless)¹⁹².

The overall conclusion is that only a few CSOs address the needs of marginalised groups.

Conclusion

The impact of Russian civil society on the political system and society remains rather modest. Civil society’s track record in holding state and private corporations accountable is less impressive at the federal level, while at the regional and municipal levels its impact becomes more visible.

A major reason for the limited impact is the drying sources of CSOs funding limiting their overall capacities. Many foreign donors, private and public, whose funding constitute the bulk of civil society resources have opted for an exodus strategy considering Russia a country wealthy enough to develop its civil society by itself. However, in rare cases when CSOs are funded by the government, their autonomy is seriously compromised. The private sector, for the most part, has little knowledge of civil society and the overall funding provided by businesses remains small and highly concentrated in just a few cities/regions.

Despite the fact there are many forms of government-CSO interaction, which authorities eagerly support, they rarely allow for this interaction to result in some sort of influence. Thus, the intense government-CSO interaction does not result in the corresponding level of impact of civil society on policies and civil society’s role in influencing policy process at the federal level, including impact on the national (federal) budget process, impact on human rights and social policy (at the federal level) remains rather limited.

On the other hand, informing and educating citizens, building social capital and pressing the state to provide for social needs are clearly areas that are well developed in Russian CSOs’ work.

However, with the exception of the above-mentioned areas, civil society’s impact on the population seems to be much less compared to the impact by the state and private corporations. The civil society’s efforts to empower women and poor people are a good example of modest civil society influence on the population, despite a lot of work involved on and around these issues, including direct social service delivery

¹⁹² <http://www.homeless.ru>.

The services and values that civil society work hard to promote have little impact on the population at the country level due to limited resources, disabling environment and low level of citizens' activism. In addition, the level of public spiritedness in Russia is low, so is public trust in CSOs, while the level of interpersonal mistrust is comparatively high.

IV. CONCLUSION

The conclusion seeks to draw together the main findings and recommendations of the CSI project in Russia. It offers an interpretation of the state of Russian civil society as depicted in the Civil Society Diamond and then engages with some of the key findings resulting from the CSI-SAT project.

1. THE GENERAL PICTURE


The Civil Society Diamond for Russia is shown below (Figure IV 1.1) and testifies that Russian civil society has still a long way to go to strengthen its structure, improve its external environment, increase its impact and practice and promote important values. Out of the four civil society dimensions, the values dimension is most developed.

First and foremost it should be noted that the structure, environment, values and impact of Russian civil society vary greatly from region to region and therefore should primarily be evaluated at the regional level. However, some overall assessment can be made.

Here, strong points include the well-developed communication and cooperation within the sector, including the existence of coalitions, networks and international linkages. Also, civil society is operating in a positive social and economic environment, where, despite low levels, social capital is being developed and civic education efforts are expanding.

At the same time, the political and legal environment leave ample room for improvement. Additionally, civil society's presence and work at the grassroots level, its mobilization of citizens and motivation of people to volunteer remain poorly developed areas. Also, poverty eradication and empowering marginalised groups of population are not focus areas for civil society.

FIGURE IV.1.1: Civil society index diamond for Russia



There also are a number of puzzling results that surfaced in the course of the study.

Firstly, a substantial proportion of the population shows some involvement in civil society activities. The percentage of the population having some involvement with civil society varies from 4% to 70% depending on the methodology of research and types of activity considered to fall under the categories of volunteering and civic activism. In any case, the general conclusion is that the frequency of the population's involvement in

civil society remains rather limited. Furthermore, abolished elections of regional governors and

the shrinking of public space do not contribute towards greater citizens' activism, including such parameters as turnout at elections.

Secondly, the sufficiently high level of a critical mindset among the population and the relatively low level of satisfaction with the quality of life, as shown, for example in the WVS, does not result in protest actions, be it readiness to sign a petition to street protests.

Thirdly, civil society organisations work hard to promote a set of important values in society at large, but their impact on the population remains limited.

Fourthly, various state-civil society dialogue and interaction mechanisms that are reflected in the regional legislation do not result in the corresponding level of influence at the federal level. Correspondingly, civil society's policy impact at the local and regional levels is clearly better developed than the one at the national level.

2. AREAS OF STRENGTH

The following summarises the key areas of civil society's strength. Firstly, the social and economic context does not create any major obstacles to the development of civil society. Civil society efforts to promote democracy, transparency and tolerance within society, as mentioned above, are further strengths of Russian CSOs. Social and political events of the last years showed that certain moves by the state that had a questionable democratic basis, always met consistent and organised opposition by civil society.

Another area of expertise advanced within civil society is its work around informing and educating citizens through seminars, training and additional (vocational) education programs. Building social capital and pressing the state to provide for social needs is clearly a well developed area in Russian CSOs and its advocacy work around social issues has been especially advanced at the regional level.

Communication and cooperation among Russian CSOs is developed through multiple networks, associations, coalitions and umbrella bodies. Examples of advanced levels of cooperation within one sector are environmental and human rights organisations that always join forces in defending their course. Examples of cross-sectoral cooperation include human rights organisations increasingly joining forces with gender groups to monitor gender-related forms of discrimination and otherwise improving gender equality.

State-civil society dialogue and interaction is well established and supported by legislation. Examples include formal consultative bodies (civil society and councils, civic chambers, etc.), competitions for state contracts for social services, grant programs, civil society consultations, civil society (independent) expertise and other. However, it should be noted that such dialogue is supported by the state at times for the sake of observing formalities or even just to 'simulate' dialogue. It is therefore important to assure that the dialogue results in concrete policy changes or at least, better mutual understanding between civil society and the state.

2. AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Russian civil society operates in a political and legislative environment that is somewhat restrictive to its activities. In general, the political context has ample room for improvement. More specifically, civil liberties and press freedom need to be further developed and safeguarded, since the fight against terrorism, spread widely across the world, including Russia, is curtailing civil liberties. Political competition is limited due to imperfect regulations of political party funding, the new system of appointment of regional governors and the use of “administrative resources” during elections. Other major problems in the area of political environment are extensive corruption and limited law enforcement.

The tax legislation and regulations for CSOs on most occasions treat CSOs as commercial companies, presuming they act as for-profit organisations. The list of foundations that are allowed to allocate income tax exempt grants does not include many grantmakers working with Russian CSOs and the list of income tax-exempt activities clearly does not cover all CSOs activities. A negative connotation attributed to “political” (in most cases meaning “policy”) role of civil society and foreign funding for civil society in the new legislation that came effective in April 2006 further limits civil society advocacy activities.

CSOs’ impact on the population is clearly insufficient and results from CSO’s low priority, limited efforts and resources concentrated around community actions, supporting livelihood and empowering marginalised groups of the population. Consequently, public trust in the sector as such, despite examples of concrete CSOs’ awareness-raising work on thematic issues is comparatively low. Increasing civil society’s presence and work at the grassroots level would likely trigger a number of important effects, such as increase of CSOs’ membership and civic activism, both currently being limited.

Another area for improvement is the financial stability of the sector that has become endangered with many foreign foundations downsizing or closing down in Russia. Foundations created by the state are few and grants they give out on an open competitive basis are small. State and municipal grant programs exist only in a handful of regions. Corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy exist on a low scale due to the absence of charity laws in most regions, as well as the negative image of “political activity” of CSOs depicted by the state.

Civil society’s impact on policy processes, including impact at the national (federal) level on the budget process, human rights and social policy remains rather limited, despite the existing multiple forms of state–civil society cooperation. This can be partly explained by the strengthened vertical power structure (i.e. public authorities), and partly by drying sources of CSOs funding. However, CSOs in most of the regions can freely exercise their right to criticise the government, appealing to electronic and other media, as well as to intergovernmental organisations.

CSOs’ inability to ensure their own financial transparency, internal democracy and reduce internal corrupt practices is a key problem. One reason for the absence of financial transparency is the restrictive legislative and regulatory environment that does not differentiate between charitable activity and commercial/political action. However, existing internal corruption practices and often limited internal democratic principles of CSOs (such as the absence of regular elections of political leadership or internal discussions) cannot be fully

justified by the restrictive environment and are clearly areas for improvement. Often this problem is not even properly understood or even identified by CSOs and here is the role for support and umbrella organisations.

3. MAIN CONCLUSIONS

As a result of some 15 years of development and foreign aid, Russian civil society of the XXI century is somewhat developed, yet still concentrated in major urban centers and regional capitals while all key social groups represented in CSO leadership and membership.

The situation of Russian civil society's structure, values, external environment and impact varies greatly from region to region. However, Russian civil society faces some challenges that are country-wide, including repressive legislation, heavy dependence on donor organisations and financial instability, and a strengthening of the "vertical layers of political power".

There are some areas for improvement of civil society, including low support from the population and low citizens' activism, low impact on the population and federal decision-makers, little efforts to improve the accountability of the private sector as well as civil society's own accountability.

Strong sides of the Russian civil society are its role in advancing important values in society, raising awareness and conducting civic education efforts as well as the rather well-developed cooperation and communication within the sector and dialogue with the state.

4. NEXT STEPS

One crucial step that should be made by Russian civil society is to strengthen the linkage with their target groups, direct and indirect beneficiaries in society or even the population of certain regions as a whole. Grassroots work, such as supporting livelihoods and ensuring citizen's input and feedback with regard to the work of executive and legislative decision-makers should become another priority for CSOs. This important first step will in turn contribute to increase CSO's membership and greater civic activism. Closer work with the population and greater civic activism also makes it possible to take a second step, which is to organise community action and build up volunteer work.

Self-regulation mechanisms of civil society, such as standards of excellence could become the solution for the challenge on how to reduce corruption within civil society and foster internal democratic principles. Advancement of self-regulation should also allow the sector to put in place own mechanisms of accountability and thus make further state regulation unnecessary.

A response to scarce funding for civil society could be the already tested practice of setting up community funds, as well as exerting more influence on the state to set up efficient grant programs at the federal, regional and municipal levels, as well as national foundations for civil society. Foreign foundations, those that operate in Russia and have recently started downsizing or closing civil society programs should think of leaving endowments behind, like it was done in the Visegrad countries.

St. Petersburg “Strategy” Center will make every attempt to publicise the findings of this study as widely as possible, to popularise this publication both amongst CSOs and amongst that part of the public which is less familiar with the topics discussed here – the government, civil servants and politicians both at the national and local levels, donors and international organisations. This publication should also serve as a useful introduction for students of civil society and related themes at the State University Higher School of Economics and other higher educational establishments. St. Petersburg “Strategy” Center will also initiate meetings with those members of civil society who are interested in being involved in building on the findings of the CSI project.

In its English version, this publication will also serve as the basis for international comparisons within the framework of the CI project as a whole and will feed in the Global CSI Report, Volumes 1 and 2 due in 2007. CIVICUS also plans to evaluate and refine the methodology employed on the basis of current experience and findings and plans to repeat the project in the future.

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ANNEX 1 - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS OF RESEARCH TEAM MEETINGS

1. Belyaeva Nina, Chair Public Policy Department of the State university – Higher School of Economics, Chair of Board NGO coalition “We, Citizens!” (Moscow)
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4. Jakimets Vladimir, Institute of Systemic Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow)
5. Kazakov Oleg, Director of the non-commercial research laboratory LINKS (Moscow)
6. Khaliy Irina, scientific secretary of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow)
7. Kovalevskaya Elena, Civil Society Institute (IGRA), previously – OSI-Russia (Moscow)
8. Panfilova Elena, Executive Director, “Transparency International – R”, (Moscow)
9. Proskuryakova Liliana, head of international unit, St. Petersburg “Strategy” Center (St. Petersburg)
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11. Tsibulski Vladimir, Director of the Institute of the Northern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Chair of Department of the Tumen State University (Tumen)
12. Zudin Alexey, Chair of Department of political programming of the Centre for Political Technologies (Moscow)

ANNEX 2 CASES OF CIVIL SOCIETY'S IMPACT

1. Solving problems of the Krasnoyarsk Krai citizens, who live in hostels; prevention of unlawful eviction.

The Agency for Public Initiatives, a Krasnoyarsk regional NGO, initiated the creation of the coalition to unite non-profit organisations, government agents, law enforcement agencies, and owners of hostels.

The goal of this coalition is to protect the rights and interests of those who live in the hostels of Krasnoyarsk city and Krai. The methods include: interdepartmental settlement of disputes related to hostels; working with the Deputies to create laws and regulations stipulating rights and responsibilities of hostels' owners, renters and dwellers.

Owing to the active work of this coalition, on February 1, 2005 there was a special session of the City Council on the violations of the rights of citizens living in hostels, chaired by the Deputy S.A. Litovchik. The session decided to set up a commission to check the tariffs and examine the living conditions in the hostels of Krasnoyarsk. The Commission included representatives of Krasnoyarsk Krai and city administrations, the City Council, hostels' owners and a group of activists.¹⁹³

On March 1, 2005 the Head of the city, P.I. Pimashkov, and the First Deputy of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor, L.V. Kuznetsov, signed the Action Plan for settling the problems related to the hostels located on the territory of the city of Krasnoyarsk. They also approved the schedule and appointed responsible representatives of the committees and departments of executive power agencies from the city and krai.

Within one year of its work the Agency for Public Initiatives wrote 186 appeals to various agencies. The Coalition conducted 8 round table discussions and 16 meetings, one of them chaired by the First Deputy of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor.

Owing to the cooperation with the Krai mass media, the activities of the Coalition received broad coverage. Printed media published 48 articles, and the Siberian news agency issues regular press releases. The 'Afontovo' TV channel made a two hour program within its cycle entitled 'Optimal Alternative', presenting some analytical materials and holding an interactive voting.

The Coalition has achieved the following:

- 1) responsible officials from committees and departments of executive power agencies are assigned
- 2) 11 hostels were transformed from organisations' or private property into the municipal property
- 3) ownership documents for the hostel on 44, Telmann Street were restored
- 4) the commandant of the hostel on 1, Norilskaya Street was changed, the hostel given to the municipal ownership, and court examinations on eviction of families terminated
- 5) there were conferences in 50 hostels of Krasnoyarsk, attended by deputies of districts' heads and administrators of organisations serving respective hostels. These

¹⁹³ The information about the staff of the Commission and the beginning of its work was published in the 'Gorodskie novosti' ('City news') newspaper of 05/27/2005.

conferences helped the dwellers get information from the first persons, identify their problems and start solving them.¹⁹⁴

2. Lobbying the Law on Krai Social Grants.

For NGOs fundraising is a pending problem.

In 2004 a People's Assembly was organised in Krasnoyarsk Krai to unite the Youth Chamber, Women's Chamber and the Chamber for Civil Development. The latter actively participated in the lobbying of the law on the interaction between government agencies and NGOs.¹⁹⁵

The Law on Krai Social Grants No 10-1974 was passed by the Legislative Council of Krasnoyarsk Krai on May 25, 2004 and signed by the Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor on June 13, 2004.¹⁹⁶ This law regulates the grant allocations from the Krai Budget for the implementation of social projects in the field of civic education, minor offence prevention, family support, children protection, health care, physical training and sports, youth leisure, social assistance for the needy, environment, culture and regionalism. The Law indicates who qualifies to be a Krai social grant recipient; stipulates the allocation principles, the order of competition and accountability requirements.

3. Round-table discussions of relevant issues.

Social activists of Novosibirsk Oblast regularly conduct round-table discussions, the agenda for which is formed by the representatives of CSOs (the Region has 3000 registered organisations). E.g., the Coordination Council of the Military discussed the creation of a non-governmental program for providing housing for the military; the Siberian Mediacenter initiated the Office of Public Prosecutor's check up of the City Administration grant program.

CSOs organise events every week; they pass resolutions, etc. The most efficient form of CSO's influence on government agencies is a dialogue (Siberian Fair, hearings, round-table discussions). In the majority of cases the Administration goes to meet CSOs.¹⁹⁷

4. Influencing legislation to support disabled persons.

Invalid associations of Novosibirsk Oblast set up their Coalition, due to the activities of which a number of by-laws were passed, including a special social security and support program for the invalids of Novosibirsk Oblast (designed jointly by the specialists representing all the stakeholders – invalids of all the groups). This program provided for the creation of a broad network of rehabilitation centers in the city and oblast.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴Based on the materials signed by the 'Agency for Public Initiatives' (Krasnoyarsk Region).

¹⁹⁵ Interview with A.A.Sidorenko, Deputy Director on Information and Training Programs, Krasnoyarsk Branch of the Siberian Network of NGOs

¹⁹⁶ The 'Vedomosti' newspaper. Issue No16 (21) of 06/29/2004.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Irina Kim (PR Board at the Novosibirsk Oblast Administration).

¹⁹⁸ Interview with V.I. Krivenkov, Board Chairman, Zaets local branch of Russian Invalids' Association.

ANNEX 3 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY SURVEY

2004 Annual Report on Social Investments in Russia: the Role of Businesses in Civil Development, dedicated to the estimation of Russian businesses' social investments, is based on corporate social responsibility research conducted by Managers' Associations, numerous Russian and foreign sources, and special data provided by Russian companies.¹⁹⁹

The said Report concludes that at present, Russia is going through a transition period: the burden of social expenditures is divided inequitably, largely falling on the 'heavy' industries; and companies' social investments are mainly allocated for 'internal' programs – companies' own personnel development.²⁰⁰

“The amount of social investments per employee (IL) makes 28 330 rubles a year, the social investment per gross sales ratio (IS) makes 1.96 %, and the social investment per balance sheet profit (IP) – 11.25 %.”²⁰¹

There are a lot of practical examples of social investments made by Russian businesses. They can be categorised according to the following 5 main directions:

- personnel development investments (e.g. Procter&Gamble's retraining program for the fired personnel; retirement programs of the 'Norilsk Nickel' company, etc.²⁰²);
- health care (e.g., the system for corporate health care at the 'RUSAL' company and the 'Severstal' medical care program²⁰³);
- resource saving (e.g., the "Sakhalin Energy" company's environment and social development assessment²⁰⁴);
- conscientious business practice (e.g., the Social Code of the 'Lukoil' corporation; the Chart of Corporate and Business Ethics of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs²⁰⁵);
- local community development (personal stipend program of the 'System' company; national art support program of the 'Alpha Bank'; and the competition in support of social infrastructure development projects held by the 'Ukos' oil corporation²⁰⁶).

The 'RUSAL' company jointly with the Russian branch of the British charity foundation 'NGO School' and regional NGOs of Novosibirsk are implementing a unique project to support social initiatives of school students – the grant competition '100 Class Projects'.²⁰⁷

Numerous examples of corporate social responsibility are supplied by BP and its branches in Russia. They include: long term business strategies; safe and clean work environment; Behavior Code; a broad variety of educational projects (e.g., support of research and seminars

¹⁹⁹ 2004 Annual Report on Social Investments in Russia: the Role of Businesses in Civil Development. Ed. By S.Litovchenko. Moscow, 2004.

²⁰⁰ Op.cit. , p. 10, 11.

²⁰¹ Op.cit. , p. 10.

²⁰² Op. cit., p. 58, 59.

²⁰³ Op. cit., p. 60-62.

²⁰⁴ Op. cit., p. 63-64.

²⁰⁵ Op. cit., p. 64-66.

²⁰⁶ Op. cit., p. 66-74.

²⁰⁷ School of allocating financial resources through competition. 2005: 11-14.

on international relations at the Moscow Institute of International Relations).²⁰⁸

On 18 and 19 March 2004 Moscow hosted the international conference entitled “Corporate Social Responsibility. Efficient Strategies of Social Investment Management”. Its materials were published in 2005 by the Social Information Agency.²⁰⁹ The conference participants represented 174 organisations. They shared their positive experiences of corporate social responsibility in Russia (e.g. the ‘Word Day of Children’ charity action²¹⁰, the ‘Severstal’ Group social standard²¹¹, etc.)

²⁰⁸ Corporate social responsibility is a prerequisite for corporate stability: says Tony Hayward, Chief executive - Exploration and Production Segment of the BP Group in his speech in the Russian Mendeleev Technical University on 29 June 2005.

²⁰⁹ Corporate Social Responsibility 2005.

²¹⁰ Op. cit., p. 62-64.

²¹¹ Op. cit., p. 51-54.

ANNEX 4 THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

1 – STRUCTURE

1.1 - Breadth of citizen's participation

Description: How widespread is citizen's involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engaged in civil society activities?

1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

Description: What percentage of people has ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

A very small minority (less than 10%).	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.2 - Charitable giving

Description: What percentage of people donates to charity on a regular basis?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of people belongs to at least one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.4 - Volunteering

Description: What percentage of people undertakes volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A small minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A minority (31% to 50%)	Score 2
A majority (more than 50%)	Score 3

1.1.5 - Collective community action

Description: What percentage of people has participated in a collective community's action within the last year (e.g. attended a community's meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community's problem)?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% -50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.2 - Depth of citizen's participation

Description: How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?

1.2.1 - Charitable giving

Description: How much (i.e. what percentage of personal's income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

Less than 1%	Score 0
1% to 2%	Score 1
2.1% to 3%	Score 2
More than 3%	Score 3

1.2.2 - Volunteering

Description: How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

Less than 2 hours	Score 0
2 to 5 hours	Score 1
5.1 to 8 hours	Score 2
More than 8 hours.	Score 3

1.2.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

***Description:* How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?**

1.3.1 - CSO membership

Description: To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	Score 2
CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.2 - CSO leadership

Description: To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.	Score 2
CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

Description: How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	Score 0
CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	Score 1
CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	Score 2
CSOs are present in all areas of the country.	Score 3

1.4. - Level of organisation

***Description:* How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?**

1.4.1 - Existence of CSO's umbrella bodies

Description: What percentage of CSOs belongs to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 70%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 70%)	Score 3

1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

Completely ineffective (or non-existent)	Score 0
Largely ineffective	Score 1
Somewhat effective	Score 2
Effective	Score 3

1.4.3 - Self-regulation

Description: Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abides by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Score 0
Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Score 1
Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Score 2
<u>Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO's behaviour can be detected.</u>	Score 3

1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

Description: What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 0
There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	Score 1
Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	Score 2
<u>There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.</u>	Score 3

1.4.5 - International linkages

Description: What proportion of CSOs has international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

Only a handful of "elite" CSOs have international linkages.	Score 0
A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 1
A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 2
<u>A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.</u>	Score 3

1.5 - Inter-relations

Description: How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?

1.5.1 - Communication

Description: What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

Very little	Score 0
Limited	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
<u>Significant</u>	Score 3

1.5.2 – Cooperation

Description: How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSOs' alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 0
It is very rare that CSs' actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO's alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 1
CSs' actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSOs' alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 2
<u>CSs' actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSOs' alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.</u>	Score 3

1.6 – Resources

Description: To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?

1.6.1 - Financial resources

Description: How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.	Score 3

1.6.2 - Human resources

Description: How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
<u>On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.</u>	Score 3

1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

Description: How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.	Score 3

2 - ENVIRONMENT²¹²

2.1 - Political context

Description: What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

2.1.1 - Political rights

Description: How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	Score 0
There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Score 1
Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	Score 2
<u>People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.</u>	Score 3

²¹² For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

2.1.2 - Political competition

Description: What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

Single party system.	Score 0
Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Score 1
Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction.	Score 2
Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.	Score 3

2.1.3 - Rule of law

Description: To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	Score 0
There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	Score 1
There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Score 2
Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.	Score 3

2.1.4 – Corruption

Description: What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

High	Score 0
Substantial	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Low	Score 3

2.1.5 – State effectiveness

Description: To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).	Score 0
The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	Score 1
State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	Score 2
State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.	Score 3

2.1.6 – Decentralisation

Description: To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Score 0
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Score 1
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.	Score 2
Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.	Score 3

2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

Description: To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

2.2.1 - Civil liberties

Description: To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

Civil liberties are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	Score 1
There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Score 2
Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.2.2 - Information rights

Description: To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Score 0
Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Score 1
Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Score 2
Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.	Score 3

2.2.3 - Press freedoms

Description: To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

Press freedoms are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	Score 1
There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Score 2
Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.3 - Socio-economic context²¹³

Description: What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

Description: How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)	Score 0
Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 1
Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 2
Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.	Score 3

2.4 - Socio-cultural context

Description: To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?

2.4.1 - Trust

Description: How much do members of society trust one another?

Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	Score 0
There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 1
There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 2
There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 3

2.4.2 - Tolerance

Description: How tolerant are members of society?

Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Score 0
Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Score 1
Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Score 2
Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).	Score 3

²¹³ This sub-dimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The sub-dimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

2.4.3 - Public spiritedness²¹⁴

Description: How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5).	Score 0
Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5).	Score 1
Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5).	Score 2
High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5).	Score 3

2.5 - Legal environment

***Description:* To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?**

2.5.1 - CSO registration²¹⁵

Description: How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	Score 0
The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent.	Score 1
The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	Score 2
The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.	Score 3

2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

Description: To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticise government?

CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	Score 0
There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Score 1
Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	Score 2
CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.	Score 3

2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

Description: How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	Score 0
The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations).	Score 1
The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	Score 2
The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.	Score 3

2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy

Description: How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Score 0
Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 1
Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 2
Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 3

²¹⁴ The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

²¹⁵ This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for sub-dimension 3. The indicator's scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

2.6 - State-civil society relations

Description: What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?

2.6.1 – Autonomy

Description: To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

The state controls civil society.	Score 0
CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	Score 1
The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	Score 2
CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.	Score 3

2.6.2 - Dialogue

Description: To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	Score 0
The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	Score 1
The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Score 2
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.6.3 - Cooperation / support

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 2
The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

Description: What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?

2.7.1 - Private sector attitude

Description: What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

Generally hostile	Score 0
Generally indifferent	Score 1
Generally positive	Score 2
Generally supportive	Score 3

2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility

Description: How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Score 0
Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 1
Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Score 2
Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 3

2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy²¹⁶

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 2
The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

3 - VALUES

3.1 – Democracy

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs

Description: To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 0
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 1
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 3

3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy

Description: How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.2 – Transparency

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?**

3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society

Description: How widespread is corruption within CS?

Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.	Score 0
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	Score 1
There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Score 2
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.	Score 3

3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs

Description: How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs makes their financial accounts publicly available?

A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 0
A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 1
A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 3

²¹⁶ The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency

Description: How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.3 – Tolerance

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?**

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Score 0
Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	Score 2
Civil society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	Score 3

3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance

Description: How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.4 - Non-violence

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?**

3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena

Description: How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Score 0
Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	Score 2
There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.	Score 3

3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace

Description: How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility	Score 3

3.5 - Gender equity

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?

3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Score 0
Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Score 1
Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Score 2
Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.	Score 3

3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs

Description: How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

A small minority (less than 20%)	Score 0
A minority (20%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

3.5.3 – Civil society actions to promote gender equity

Description: How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.6 - Poverty eradication

Description: To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?

3.6.1 – Civil society actions to eradicate poverty

Description: To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.7 - Environmental sustainability

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?

3.7.1 – Civil society actions to sustain the environment

Description: How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

4 - IMPACT

4.1 - Influencing public policy

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.1.3 - Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components. ²¹⁷	Score 1
Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?

4.2.1 - Holding state accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2.2 - Holding private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.3 - Responding to social interests

Description: How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?

4.3.1 - Responsiveness

Description: How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 0
There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 1
There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 2
Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 3

²¹⁷ The term “specific budget component” refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the *overall* budget.

4.3.2 - Public Trust

Description: What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

A small minority (< 25%)	Score 0
A large minority (25%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-75%)	Score 2
A large majority (> 75%)	Score 3

4.4 - Empowering citizens

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?**

4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

Description: How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organize themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.3 - Empowering marginalised people

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalised people?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.4 - Empowering women

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.5 - Building social capital²¹⁸

Description: To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Score 0
Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Score 1
Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Score 2
Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.	Score 3

²¹⁸ To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see sub-dimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

Description: How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5 - Meeting societal needs

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

Description: How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Description: How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Description: To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

CSOs are less effective than the state.	Score 0
CSOs are as effective as the state.	Score 1
CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	Score 2
CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.	Score 3

ANNEX 5 LIST OF MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE CENTERS IN RUSSIA:

NGO Resource centers:

- NGO Resource Center (Moscow), www.ngo.org.ru
- Non-Profit Organizations Development Center (St. Petersburg), www.ndc.org.ru
- Southern Regional Resource Center (Krasnodar) and the network of its resource centers in the South of Russia, www.ssrc.ru
- Siberian Center for the Support of Civil Initiatives (Novosibirsk) and the network of its resource centers in the Siberia, www.cip.nsk.su
- The *Golubka* Training Center, www.a-z.ru/assoc/golubka/
- Center for the support of non-profit organizations in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (the *Sluzhenie* Association), info.sandy.ru/socio/public/sluzhenie
- The *Ineca* Ecological Information Agency, <http://www.nvkz.kuzbass.net/ineca/index.html>
- NGO Resource Center (Tatarstan), <http://www.mi.ru/~epicentr/>
- The Interregional Community Fund - the Siberian Center for Civil Initiatives, <http://www.cip.nsk.su/>

Technical aid programs:

- TACIS Program of the European Union, <http://www.tacis.ru>
- Ford Foundation – <http://cci.glasnet.ru/fordf/>
- Macarthur Foundation – <http://cci.glasnet.ru/mcarth/>
- CAF (Charities Aid Foundation), <http://www.a-z.ru/caf/>
- *Eurasia* Foundation, <http://eurasia.msk.ru/>

Electronic (Virtual) Service Centers:

- Virtual Resource Center, <http://www.trainet.org/>
- *RosNGOInfo* Project – information for NGO, <http://www.a-z.ru/nkoinfo/index.htm>
- Russian Journal. Advertisements, <http://www.russ.ru/info/obyavl.htm>
- Russian Remedial Network, <http://www.hro.org/>
- Rights and Children in the Internet (remedial website for children and teenagers), <http://school-sector.relarn.ru/prava/>

Database systems and catalogues:

- Reference Library (servers, websites, NGO websites etc), <http://www.ngo.ryazan.ru/links/ngo.htm>
- NGOs and useful information for them on the Internews server, <http://www.internews.ru/nav/ngo.html>
- NGO Website Ring, http://www.a-z.ru/rosnko/nko_k.htm
- Non-profit organizations of the North-West of Russia, <http://www.spb.org.ru>
- NGOs of the Altai Territory, <http://arw.dcn-asu.ru/nko/index.ru.html>
- NGOs of Novokuznetzk, <http://www.nvkz.kuzbass.net/highway/nko/>
- Electronic Library – the project of the Canadian International Development Agency for providing informational support to NGO, <http://openlibrary.acdi-cida.ru/>

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