DE NIEUWE DIALOOG

CIVICUS
World Alliance for Citizen Participation

CIVICUS CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX REPORT
FOR THE NETHERLANDS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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AFS Anne Frank Stichting
AFA Anti Fascistische Active Nederland
CBF Central Bureau for Fundraising
CIDI Centrum voor Informatie en Documentatie Israël
CDA Christian Democrats (political party)
CSI Civil Society Index
CSI-SAT Civil Society Index - Shortened Assessment Tool
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index
DUMC Dutch Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia
LBL Expertisecentrum Leeftijd
PvdA Labour (political party)
LBR Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van Rassendiscriminatie
LV Landelijke Vereniging van ADB's en Meldpunten
VVD Liberal Conservatives (political party)
LBR National Bureau for fighting Racial discrimination'
NCO National Coordinating Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SCP Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands)
SAG Stakeholder Assessment Group
LPS Stichting Landelijk Platform Slavernijverleden
SMOM Subsidieregeling Maatschappelijke Organisaties en Milieu
VEB Vereniging van EffectenBezitters
WVS World Values Survey

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Civil Society Index - Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) is a comprehensive participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society actors at country level. This report presents the results of the CSI-SAT conducted in the Netherlands. *De Nieuwe Dialoog* implemented the project from January to June 2006. Using a relatively broad definition of civil society, the CSI-SAT examines civil society along four main dimensions: Structure, Environment, Values, and Impact. A Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG), comprising mainly activist-oriented Civil Society Organisation (CSO) representatives, scored the Civil Society Index (CSI) indicators, which were grouped in subdimensions, which in turn, were aggregated in four dimensions. In figure I below, the results of the four dimensions are visualised. The results for the Structure, Values and Environment dimensions are quite satisfactory, with scores above two on a zero to three point scale. However, the assessment of civil society's impact is rather disappointing at 1.7.

FIGURE I: Civil Society Diamond for the Netherlands

Although overall a quite positive picture of the state of civil society emerged from the assessment, some indicators that negatively affected the scores within the Impact dimension indicator are worth mentioning: 4.1.3 shows low impact (1) on the national budgeting process, responsiveness to priority social concerns (4.3.1) received a low score of 1, in particular regarding the issues of a multicultural society and integration. Civil society also scores low (1) on empowering marginalised people (4.4.3), supporting livelihoods for poor people (4.4.6) and meeting the needs of marginalised groups (4.5.3), but for the latter two it was noted that the Dutch state provides ample services. The scores didn't reveal any particular strong aspects (scores 3), hence a relatively low overall score resulted for the Impact dimension

In the other dimensions there are also remarkable scores. In the Structure dimension for example, collective community action (1.1.5) scored low (with a 0), as did charitable giving (1.2.1) and diversity in CSO leadership (1.3.2). However, there are also several very strong aspects on citizens participation, including breadth of citizens participation (other than collective community action) (1.1), time spent by volunteers (1.2.2) and distribution, international links and resources of CSOs (1.3.3, 1.4.5 and 1.6.3, resp.).

As for the, overall favourable, Environment dimension, political rights (2.1.1) scored a 2 instead of 3 for two reasons. First, new developments in anti-terrorism legislation may endanger civil liberties (in particular of minority groups), and second, non-Dutch citizens in the Netherlands lack some fundamental political rights, such as voting. Furthermore, state decentralisation (2.1.6) is found to be low (0). Despite the high scores of 3, there was a heavy debate on allowable advocacy activities (2.5.2) and autonomy (2.6.1). The issue here is that the state has been moving away from subsidising a broad range of CSOs to attaching stricter conditions on CSO funding, such as demanding that they not criticise government. Corporate

philanthropy (2.7.3) scored low with a 1, partly because their sponsoring is perceived as advertising. Despite these critical points, the environment is generally very positive, including a strong rule of law and freedom (2.1.3, 2.2 and 2.5), little corruption (2.1.4), socio-economic circumstances (2.3), trust (2.4.1) and state support for CSOs (2.6.3).

In the Values dimension the low scores of 1 for both diversity within civil society and action to promote tolerance at the society level (3.3.2) require attention. In the Values dimension the SAG inserted an indicator 3.8 "Diversity", with respect to ethnicity, culture and sexual preference, in addition to the CIVICUS standard set, which is analogous to its "Gender diversity" indicator. The strongest aspects of the Values dimension are transparency and non-violence in the CSO sector (3.2 and 3.4).

Next Steps

De Nieuwe Dialoog will publish the findings of this study and popularise this publication among CSOs and that part of the public which is less familiar with the topics discussed here, including the government, civil servants and politicians, both at the national and local level. This publication could also serve as a useful introduction for students of civil society and related themes. *De Nieuwe Dialoog* will also initiate meetings with those members of civil society who are interested in being involved in building on the findings of the CSI project. In its English version, this publication will also serve as the basis for international comparisons within the framework of the Civil Society Index project as a whole.

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the results of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index - Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) application in the Netherlands, carried out by the CSI implementing partner in the Netherlands, De Nieuwe Dialoog. The project was carried out from January 2006 through June 2006, as part of the international CSI project coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The CSI is a comprehensive participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society actors at country level, which is currently (being) implemented in more than 50 countries around the world.

In 2004, CIVICUS developed the CIVICUS Civil Society Index - Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT), which is based on the original CSI design, but is a shorter, less extensive and less resource-intensive process to assess the state of civil society. The CSI-SAT is particularly relevant in countries, where there is a substantive amount of secondary data available on civil society and it can also serve as a useful preparatory activity for a full CSI implementation at a later stage. The CSI-SAT aims to:

  1) Generate relevant knowledge on the state of civil society at a country level, and
  2) Provide an assessment of civil society's current state by civil society stakeholders.

In each country, the CSI-SAT is implemented by a National Coordinating Organisation (NCO), guided by a Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) and the CIVICUS CSI project team. The NCO collects and synthesises data and information on civil society from a variety of secondary sources. This information is employed by the SAG to score the 74 CSI indicators, which together provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society. The findings are then finalised and a final report is published to publicise the CSI-SAT at national level. The international CSI project team at CIVICUS provides training, technical assistance and quality control to the NCO throughout the project implementation.

Structure of the Publication

This report presents the results of the CSI-SAT project in the Netherlands, based on existing data and evaluations by representatives of CSOs. It seeks to provide a comprehensive assessment of the current state of Dutch civil society. It is structured as follows.

Section I provides a detailed history of the CSI-SAT, its conceptual framework and research methodology.

Section II provides a background on civil society in the Netherlands, and describes the use of the civil society concept in the Netherlands and the definition employed by the CSI-SAT project.

Section III, entitled Analysis of Dutch Civil Society, is the central part of this report. Dutch civil society is being mapped by examining four dimensions – Structure, Environment, Values and Impact. Results of the secondary analysis are presented, and evaluations and assessments of the SAG are taken into account. The presentation of the results, according to individual dimensions and subdimensions, is intended to act like a catalogue. Readers looking for an overall interpretation of the report should refer to the conclusion.

The conclusion in Section IV maps the Civil Society Diamond and offers an interpretation on the report's implications for the overall state of civil society in the Netherlands.[1]

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[1] The Civil Society Diamond is a visual tool developed by CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier, Director of the Center for Civil Society at the University of California, Los Angeles, which presents the overall findings of the CSI study in form of a diamond shaped graph.

I. CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX SHORTENED ASSESSMENT TOOL APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich and Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept (Anheier 2004). The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2006), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than 50 countries (see table I.1.1).

TABLE I.1.1: Participation in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2006[2]

1. Argentina	18. Germany	37. Palestine
2. Armenia	19. Ghana	38. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	20. Greece*	39. Romania
4. Bolivia	21. Guatemala	40. Russia*
5. Bulgaria	22. Honduras	41. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	23. Hong Kong (VR China)	42. Serbia
7. Chile*	24. Indonesia	43. Sierra Leone
8. China	25. Italy	44. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	26. Jamaica	45. South Korea
10. Croatia	27. Lebanon	46. Taiwan*
11. Cyprus[3]	28. Macedonia	47. Togo*
12. Czech Republic	29. Mauritius	48. Turkey
13. East Timor	30. Mongolia	49. Uganda
14. Ecuador	31. Montenegro*	50. Ukraine
15. Egypt	32. Nepal	51. Uruguay
16. Fiji	33. Netherlands*	52. Vietnam*
17. Georgia*	34. Nigeria	53. Wales*
	35. Northern Ireland	
	36. Orissa (India)	

* Represents the ten countries/territories implementing the CSI-SAT.

In the Netherlands, De Nieuwe Dialoog implemented the project from January to June 2006. De Nieuwe Dialoog applied to conduct the project due to the Civil Society Index' (CSI's) aim to combine a comprehensive assessment on the state of civil society with the identification of concrete recommendations and actions on the part of civil society stakeholders. Also, the comparison of civil society's features in the Netherlands with those of other countries in Europe was seen as potentially useful for Dutch Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) willing to cooperate with like-minded organisations in those countries.

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[2] This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted. This is the complete list of countries participating in the CSI as of March 2006.
[3] The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

2. PROJECT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The CSI uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a structured framework to collect comprehensive data on the state of civil society on the national level. At the core of the project approach lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of subdimensions, which again are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI data collection process. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by a Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG). The CSI project approach, conceptual framework, and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.[4]

2.1 Conceptual Framework

How to define civil society?

At the heart of the CSI's conceptual framework is obviously the concept of civil society. The CSI defines civil society as "the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market, where people associate to advance common interests" (Heinrich 2004: 13). In this respect and different from most other civil society concepts, the CSI has two interesting features. Firstly, it aims to go beyond the usual focus on formal and institutionalised CSOs, and to take account of informal coalitions and groups. Secondly, while civil society is sometimes perceived as a sphere in which positive activities and values reign, CIVICUS seeks to also include negative manifestations of civil society in the assessment. The concept therefore covers not only charitable associations or environmental organisations but also groups such as skinheads and aggressive sports fans. The CSI-SAT assesses not only the extent to which CSOs support democracy and tolerance, but also the extent to which they themselves are intolerant or even violent.

How to conceptualise the state of civil society?

To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:
- The *structure* of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external *environment* in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state as well as the private sector);
- The *values* practised and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The *impact* of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of subdimensions that contain a total of 77 indicators.[5] These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data

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[4] For a detailed description of the CSI approach, see Heinrich (2004).

[5] See Appendix 2. For the Dutch assessment three indicators are added to the regular 74, in order to assess 'Diversity Equity': 3.5.1A, 3.5.2A and 3.5.3A.

presented in this report. The framework of indicators, subdimensions, and dimensions underpinned the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report and the SAG's assessment of Dutch civil society. It is also used to structure the primary component of this publication.

To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI-SAT makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool (see Figure I for an example).[6] The Civil Society Diamond graph, with its four extremities, visually summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of civil society.

FIGURE I.2.1: Civil Society Diamond

The diagram is the result of the individual indicator scores aggregated into subdimension and then dimension scores. As it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about how civil society looks like in a given country. As the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot, and should not, be used to rank countries according to their scores on the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time as well as compare the state of civil societies across countries (Anheier 2004).

As stated earlier, the CSI-SAT is a substantially shorter version of the full CSI, as it uses a less participatory and less comprehensive approach to collecting the information on the state of civil society in a particular country. Different from the full CSI, the CSI-SAT relies on existing data only and does not include the consultative and action-planning stages of the full CSI. However, its conceptual framework and breadth of indicators is the same as in the full CSI.

2.2 Project Methodology

This section describes the methods used to collect and aggregate the various data used by the CSI-SAT project.

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[6] The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier 2004).

2.2.1 Data Collection

In recent years there has been a proliferation in the amount of literature published on civil society. However, there is a lack of an analytical framework to help organise and systematise this information into a comprehensive picture on the state of civil society at country level. The CSI seeks to provide such a framework, by identifying and reviewing relevant data sources that cover the full range of civil society organisations included in the study. A variety of national and international data sources are utilised and drawn together in accordance with the indicator definitions provided by CIVICUS.

For the CSI-SAT study in the Netherlands, a comprehensive study of secondary sources took place. The project team began with a review of information from the many existing studies and research projects on civil society and various related subjects.

2.2.2 Data Scoring

The various data sources are collated and synthesised by the CSI project team in a first draft country report, which is structured along the CSI indicators, subdimensions and dimensions. This report presents the basis for the indicator scoring exercise. In this exercise, each score is rated on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 being the lowest assessment possible and 3 the most positive. The scoring of each indicator is based on a short description of the indicator and a mostly qualitatively defined scale of scores from 0 to 3.[7] The scoring exercise is modelled along a "citizen jury" approach, in which citizens come together to deliberate, and make decision on a public issue, based on presented facts.[8] The SAG's role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence (or data) presented by the National Index Team in form of the draft country report.

In the Netherlands, the scoring process consisted of an initial score given by the researchers, which was then commented on by the SAG. In the case of most indicators there was no disagreement, since the data were quite clear. Scores for approximately twenty indicators, however, were seen as somewhat ambiguous. These indicators were then scored in a SAG meeting. Scores were agreed upon by consensus rather than voting, with people being given the opportunity to register a 'minority report' if they felt the group had not taken their view seriously. Following this meeting, the comments of the stakeholders were incorporated into the draft report, which was then circulated electronically to all who attended and to a wider group of stakeholders. Any comments received from this group were incorporated in the draft report, and the final score for each indicator obtained from the modal scores registered. Where significant disagreement still occurred, it is noted in this report. The subdimension and dimension scores were arrived at by simple averaging of the component indicator scores. The final scores of the four dimensions (structure, environment, values and impact) were plotted to generate the Civil Society Diamond for the Netherlands.

2.3 Linking Research with Action

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[7] See Appendix 2: List of indicators and technical notes.
[8] See the comments by the Jefferson Center on the Citizen Jury Process: http://www.jefferson-center.org/ (accessed on 30 November 2006)

The CSI is not a strictly academic research project, as its declared objective is to include civil society stakeholders in the research and assessment process. This was limited in the project implementation in the Netherlands. However, it is intended that the country report be used in a future meeting of stakeholders. This meeting will explore the implications of the report for civil society, seek to include all major stakeholders and will propose a plan of action.

2.4 Project Outputs

The CSI-SAT implementation in the Netherlands resulted in a comprehensive country report on the state of civil society. This will be disseminated to a range of stakeholders, as well as the media and policy makers.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NETHERLANDS

1. SPECIFICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

FIGURE II.1.1: Country Information

The Netherlands
Capital: Amsterdam
Languages: Dutch (official), Frisian (official)
Government type: constitutional monarchy
Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: Free
Population: 16,300,000
GNI/Capita: $23,390
GDP - per capita (PPP): $30,600 (2005 est.)
HDI ranking: 12th
Life expectancy at birth: 78,4 years (2003)
Ethnic groups: Dutch 83%, other 17% (of which 9% are of non-Western origin: mainly Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans, Surinamese, and Indonesians) (1999 est.)
Religions: Roman Catholic 31%, Dutch Reformed 13%, Calvinist 7%, Muslim 5.5%, other 2.5%, none 41% (2002)

Sources: Freedom House, The World Factbook (CIA), Human Development Index (HDI)[9]

The roots of Dutch civil society date back to the Middle Ages, when people living in the low countries practised 'joint water management' to defend themselves against public enemy number one, the sea. However, this section provides a brief description of the modern history of Dutch civil society, focusing on its developments in the last few decades.

These developments should be seen against the background of *Verzuiling* ('pillarization'). Pillarization was a way of solving tensions in the 'land of minorities', which the Netherlands has been for some time. Dutch civil society from World War II, until approximately 1967, was described against this backdrop of pillarization. Andeweg and Irwin provide a good description of the Netherlands in those days:

> *"This was a society in which virtually all areas of civil and social life were organised along the principles of religion or political ideology. Three or four pillars dominated Dutch society, and the role of the citizen within this system was dualistic. The Catholic, Protestant, and Socialist pillars were all the outgrowth of emancipation movements specifically oriented towards organizing those identifying with the group into the organisations provided by the movement. Mobilizing the adherents to join such organisations, such as the associated political party, trade union, broadcasting organisation and so forth was a major goal of the movement. Thus, membership was highly stimulated. On the other hand, (.) the role of the citizen was generally a passive one. The members of the pillars gave their trust to the leaders of the pillars who could then negotiate the necessary compromises" (2002: 69-70)*

The period from 1967 to 1977 is known as a period of 'de-pillarization'. Catholics, Protestants and Socialists tore down the walls of their pillars and mixed with each other.

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[9] See respectively: http://www.freedomhouse.org//modules/mod_call_dsp_country-fiw.cfm?country=6800&year=2005&page=0&view=mof (15/4/2006), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nl.html (15/4/2006), and Human Development Report (2005): *International cooperation at a crossroads. Aid, trade and security in an unequal world* New York: United Nations Development Programme.

However, the contours of the times of *Verzuiling* are still visible in civil society today. Most political parties, trade unions and broadcasting organisations remain as they were, but have lost most of their ideological vigour. The tradition of consensus seeking and compromise also survived this historical period. Nevertheless, during the period of de-pillarization major changes occurred, such as an extensive process of secularization.

More recently, as Dekker et al. (2004) suggest sees civil society as the sphere where citizens use their democratic freedoms to the fullest and where civic organisations, in contact with each other and with the government, realise democratic relations. During the past 25 years, membership and active participation, in the shape of volunteer work, have been quite stable, with around 55% of all adults being a member of at least one CSO, around 20% being a member of two or more CSOs and just above 40% doing volunteer work (Dekker et al. 2004: 187).[10]

Despite this seemingly stable picture, important changes took place. For example, membership in political parties and trade unions has dropped, while membership of nonprofit and recreational organisations has risen. Young people became less involved organisations, while women become more involved. Another trend, which began halfway through the 1990s, is the growing number of 'passive' members, while it becomes more and more difficult to recruit volunteers. (Dekker et al. 2004: 188-189)

Dekker et al. pays direct attention to three kinds of organisations that traditionally are important players in Dutch civil society: political parties, trade unions and churches, all of which have seen a decrease in membership in the past few years (2004: 189-197). [11] As indicated above, membership of political parties has dropped quite dramatically, from 457,143 members in 1978 to 290,488 members in 2002. However, it then increased to 311,304 in 2004. This recent rise is clearly a result of the turmoil of the last few years, sadly marked by the murders of politician Pim Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Nevertheless, the loss of members is clear. In general, explanations for this drop are sought in the declining influence of ideologies and the corresponding changing character of political parties, which are becoming more professionalised and focused on the media. Trade unions show the same tendencies, with a drop in membership, a fading ideology and the rising importance of a more professional, service-oriented approach. The churches did not escape a decline in membership either, as a result of religion becoming individualised and democratised. As indicated above, de-pillarizations started a process of secularization, which manifests itself in different ways: such as the general drop in membership, a decrease in the number of people attending church and the difficulty in recruiting new clergymen.

The general picture is that traditional institutional structures are losing ground, but is something else replacing it? It appears that this is the case. For example, the churches may have lost influence, but that does not mean people lost their need for spirituality. However, the difference is that now people try to find it in a more individualistic way. In general, people are less inclined to commit themselves to certain groups than previously, when people were born into and bound to one specific 'pillar'. People prefer less demanding memberships and smaller commitments. This explains why so many nonprofit organisations have seen a steady rise in their membership figures, such as organisations dealing with international aid, nature and the environment and ethical issues. More traditional organisations transform into service-

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[10] Using a broader definition of CSOs the percentage is up to 10% higher. Unfortunately this broader definition is only used in research since 1995.

[11] All data in this paragraph and the next are taken from these pages.

oriented organisations. Furthermore, more informal and unconventional forms of participation are discernable, a development that some commentators analyse as a trend towards 'communities lite', characterised by 'loose connections' (e.g. Duyvendak and Hurenkamp 2004; Wuthnow 1998).

2. CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CSI PROJECT

2.1 The Concept of Civil Society Used in this Study

As mentioned in section I.2.1, the civil society definition proposed by CIVICUS is characterised by a very broad scope, encompassing 'positive' and 'negative' organisations, as well as informal forms of citizen participation. As existing research and available data are mostly based on visible units, such as CSOs, most of the research has focused on organisations. During the first SAG meeting the stakeholders decided to use a very broad definition of civil society, incorporating all possible types of CSOs, except political parties.[12] Hence, this assessment focuses on all kinds of CSOs, from sports associations to interest groups. However, because of the nature of the CSI-SAT method and in accordance with the composition of the SAG, the more political types of CSOs, which are actively engaged in promoting a common good, are the focus of this study. The SAG in the Netherlands had specific concerns, such as the position of ethnic minorities within civil society, while in other countries more stress might for example be placed on the position of disabled people.

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[12] Also, chambers of commerce are excluded from our definition. In the Netherlands, they are more closely tied to the market than to civil society.

III. ANALYSIS OF DUTCH CIVIL SOCIETY

In this section the bulk of the information and data collected during the course of the project is presented. The analysis is structured along the individual indicators, subdimensions and dimensions. This section is divided along the four dimensions: **Structure, Environment, Values** and **Impact**, which make up the CSI Diamond. At the beginning of each subsection, a graph provides the scores for the subdimensions on a scale from 0 to 3. Findings for each subdimension are then examined in detail. Separate boxes also provide the scores for the individual indicators for each subdimension.[13]

1. STRUCTURE

This section describes and analyses the overall size, strength and vibrancy of civil society in human, organisational, and economic terms. The score for the Structure Dimension is 2.1 indicating a relatively well structured and large civil society. Figure III.1.1 below, presents the scores for the six subdimensions within the structure dimension: breadth of citizen participation; depth of citizen participation; diversity of civil society participants; level of organisation; inter-relations and civil society resources. The depth of citizen participation and the density of inter-relations might be seen as two important areas of concern in an otherwise positive structure for civil society.

FIGURE III.1.1: Subdimension scores in structure dimension

1.1 Breadth of Citizen Participation

This subdimension looks at the extent of various forms of citizen participation in Dutch civil society. Table III.1.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

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[13] See Appendix 2, the CSI scoring matrix, for a more detailed description of the indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.1: Indicators for breadth of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	3
1.1.2	Charitable giving	3
1.1.3	CSO membership	3
1.1.4	Volunteer work	2
1.1.5	Community action	0

1.1.1 Non-partisan political action. In 1998, 66% of the Dutch population claimed to have undertaken some form of non-partisan political action; like writing a letter to a newspaper, signing a petition and attending a demonstration (Van den Brink 2002: 178). Hence, the Netherlands just scores a 3 ('more than 65%').

1.1.2 Charitable giving. In 2003, 84% of the Dutch population donated to charity (Schuyt 2005: 16).

1.1.3 CSO membership. In 2003, 54% of the Dutch population aged 18 and over belonged to at least one CSO (De Hart and Devilee 2005: 190).[14] The major part, 34% is a member of 'just' one CSO, while 20% belongs to two or more. On average, members belong to 1.5 CSOs. Trade unions, environmental organisations and particularly sports associations are finding particular favour among the adult population. It is worth mentioning, that at least from the early 1990s onward, there has been a slight drop in membership of social organisations.

1.1.4 Volunteer work. In 2004, 43% of the Dutch population undertook volunteer work on a regular basis, meaning at least once a year (De Hart and Devilee 2005: 192). As in membership, people are particularly active in sports associations (14%). Trade unions (3%) and environmental associations, on the other hand, are highly professionalised and neither demand nor attract much volunteer work. Instead, people put time in religious, spiritual and philosophical groups (8%), or in activities at their childrens' schools (8%).

1.1.5 Community action. In 2002, 34% of the Dutch population indicated having undertaken action with others at least once in the past two years for an issue of national importance, for issues related to world problems, such as the war and poverty, and for issues that are important for their municipality, or for their neighbourhood (Dekker, De Hart and Van den Berg 2004: 183). On annual average, this means an average of less than 30%, hence the 0 score.

1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation

This subdimension looks at the depth of various forms of citizen participation in Dutch civil society. Table III.1.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.2: Indicators for depth of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Charitable Giving	1
1.2.2	Volunteering	3
1.2.3	CSO membership	2

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[14] For a two years older, but otherwise comparable version of this report in the **English** language, see Roes, Theo (2004) *The Sociale State of the Netherlands (Summary)* The Hague: SCP.

1.2.1 Charitable giving. In 2003, people who give to charity on a regular basis donated, on average, 1.2% of their personal income (Schuyt 2005: 10).

1.2.2 Volunteering. On average, in 2004, volunteers devoted 17.2 hours a month to volunteer work (Schuyt 2005: 84).

1.2.3 CSO membership. As indicated under indicator 1.1.3, CSO membership, in 2003, a fifth of the Dutch population aged 18 and over belonged to more than one CSO. Since 54% of the Dutch belonged to at least one CSO, we can calculate that 37% of all CSO members has two or more memberships (De Hart and Devilee 2005: 190). If a broader range of CSO were included, than is used here in the quoted research the percentage is higher. For example, the World Values Survey (WVS) data shows higher percentages.

1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants

This subdimension examines the diversity and representative nature of the civil society arena. It analyses whether all social groups participate equitably in civil society or whether there are any groups which are dominant or excluded. Table III.1.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE **III.1.3: Indicators for diversity of civil society participants**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	2
1.3.2	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	1
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	3

1.3.1 Representation of social groups among CSO members. Some social groups are under-represented. Data from 2003 indicates that the low-educated, immigrants, singles, the unemployed, the elderly, housewives and city dwellers are under-represented. In light of the political discourse on non-western immigrants (especially Muslims) during the last few years, it is worth mentioning that CSO membership among Muslims is less widespread than in the total population (-24%). However, the difference is almost the same for western immigrants (-22%). It should be noted that this difference is stable for non-western immigrants, while the gap for western immigrants seems to be a recent development, since in 1991 the difference was only -11%.

1.3.2. Representation of social groups among CSO leadership. This indicator looks at the extent to which CSOs' leadership is representative of various social groups. The *Emancipatiemonitor,* of the Social and Cultural Planning Office in the Netherlands, offers insight in the position of women. In 2003, for example, women occupied 41% of all *voluntary* leadership positions. This indicates that in general women are underrepresented in leadership positions, noticeable exceptions being those related to school (57% women) or care (72%). The share of women in *paid* leadership positions in larger associations (Non-Governmental Organisations with more than 50.000 members) is considerably lower than that in *voluntary* leadership positions: 26%. (Merens et al. 2004: 194-196). In general, the SAG felt that significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles, hence the score of 1.

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs around the country. Since the Netherlands is densely populated, highly urbanised and quite organised, CSOs exist throughout the country. People living

outside urban areas are more likely to be a member of a CSO than their urban counterparts (De Hart and Devilee 2005: 192).

1.4 Level of Organisation

This subdimension looks at the extent of infrastructure and internal organisation within Dutch civil society. Table III.1.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.4: Indicators assessing level of organisation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of umbrella bodies	2
1.4.2	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	2
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	2
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	2
1.4.5	International linkages	3

1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies. This indicator asks about the percentage of CSOs that belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations. Unfortunately, hard data could not be found to answer this question. However, it is possible to take an educated guess. De Hart and Devilee (2005: 201-203) researched the extent to which CSOs received support for recruiting volunteers. Almost half of all CSOs indicated they have received support. Of them, 67% mentioned their federation or umbrella body as a supporter or one of their supporters. If we take the CSOs included in this research as representative, it can be expected that the percentage will be around 67%. One might even speculate a higher percentage, since organisations can belong to a federation or umbrella body without receiving, or even needing support for recruiting volunteers.

1.4.2 Effectiveness of umbrella bodies. Using the same data as for 1.4.1, it can be seen that CSOs, when looking for new volunteers, would rather ask federations or umbrella bodies for support than other institutions (De Hart and Devilee 2005: 203). This indicates that involved CSOs consider them to be effective in achieving their specific goals. In general, it might be expected that the key reason for establishing federations or umbrella bodies is actually increased effectiveness.

1.4.3 Self-regulation within civil society. The Stakeholder Assessment Group assigned the efforts among CSOs to self-regulate a score of 2, which means that some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place, but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement.

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. Devilee gives an overview of the support infrastructure for voluntary organisations in the Netherlands (2005: 95-97). It shows there is a well-developed support infrastructure, based on government assistance, support from specialised CSOs and mutual support by different voluntary organisations, such as umbrella bodies. As indicated above, CSOs prefer to attract support from umbrella bodies and the like, and at least 67% of them do so. Around 36% received support from organisations at the provincial level, 18% from a local organisation, 15% from volunteer recruitment centres and only 6% from organisations at the national level (De Hart and Devilee 2005: 202-203). However, the SAG assessed that the existing infrastructure is not quite able to meet all of the support needs for civil society.

1.4.5 International linkages. Being a small country, a trading nation and the front door to Europe, the Netherlands could not escape internationalisation. CSOs are no exception. Although most CSOs have narrow goals, and are primarily focused on local, provincial or national topics, quite a few are members of international networks. On some topics, such as developmental aid and the environment, CSOs are even quite frequently seen at different international stages.

1.5 Inter-Relations

This subdimension analyses the relations amongst civil society actors in the Netherlands. Table III.1.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.5: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	2
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	2

1.5.1 Communication between CSOs. There are many networks within the voluntary sector. The frequency of contacts between civil society actors differs from sector to sector. For example, 'only' 10% of all contacts that consumer interest organisations have, are frequent, 20% are occasional, and 70% are very rare. On the other hand, educational organisations have over 30% of frequent contacts, plus a 35% of occasional contacts. Trade unions, employer organisations, international aid organisations and environmental organisations are also important examples of relatively frequently communicating organisations (De Hart 2005: 39).

1.5.2 Cooperation between CSOs. Organisations in the Netherlands do not seem to have much trouble finding each other when they need to. Some recent examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances or coalitions are Keer het Tij! ('Change the Tide', a movement against the currently dominating 'right wing' political discourse, consisting of over 500 organisations), De Nieuwe Dialoog ('The New Dialogue', initiator of this report and consisting of 13 organisations), the Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties ('Cooperating Aid Organisations', consisting of 8) and the Sociale Alliantie (a 'Social Alliance' fighting poverty and inequality, consisting of 54 organisations).

1.6 Resources

This subdimension examines the resources available for civil society organisations in the Netherlands. Table III.1.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.1.6: Indicators assessing civil society resources

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	2
1.6.2	Human resources	2
1.6.3	Technical and infrastructure resources	3

1.6.1 Financial resources. The indicator examines the availability of the financial resources to achieve the goals of the organisation. Therefore the perception is different for different types of organisations. In general, however, organisations feel that financial resources are not fully adequate for what they want to do.

1.6.2 Human resources. In the years 2003 and 2004, 38% of all CSOs had a volunteer shortage, especially in the care giving, religion and social-cultural work sectors. The culture and education sectors have less problems finding volunteers (Devilee, 2005: 15).

1.6.3 Technical and infrastructure resources. Society in general has a relatively high level of Internet access and computer usage, which has its impact on civil society. Most volunteer-based CSOs have a reasonable level of IT infrastructure. Most CSOs, even the smaller ones, nowadays have a website. Internet is often used to collect (digital) signatures for petitions.

Conclusion

A substantial proportion of the population shows some degree of involvement in civil society activity. Lots of people are prepared to give some time to volunteering, to make charitable donations or to engage in some form of political or civic expression. Based on a wide definition of CSO, including sports and social clubs, more than half of the population could claim formal membership of at least one CSO. There have been improvements in the level of representation and involvement of some key groups, such as women, people with disabilities and ethnic minorities, but there is still a general view that certain groups are less well represented and involved. On the CSI scale both collective community action and charitable giving are relatively low (score 1).

In the Netherlands, CSOs are present in most regions and sectors, and there is a range of coordinating bodies and civil society networks that encourage communication, and from time to time even cooperation. Basic support structures and financial, human and technical resources are adequate and self-regulation mechanisms are present.

2. ENVIRONMENT

This section describes and analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which Dutch civil society exists and functions. The score for the Environment dimension is 2.5, indicating a conducive environment for civil society. Figure III.2.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Environment dimension. It shows that only with regard to relationships between civil society and the corporate sector, there is room for improvement.

FIGURE III.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension

2.1 Political context

This subdimension examines the political situation in the Netherlands and its impact on civil society. Table III.2.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.1: Indicators assessing Political Context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.1.1	Political rights	2
2.1.2	Political competition	3
2.1.3	Rule of law	3
2.1.4	Corruption	3
2.1.5	State effectiveness	2
2.1.6	Decentralisation	1

2.1.1 Political rights. Citizens of the Netherlands can freely elect their representatives, organise themselves into political parties and have full freedom of assembly, association and petition. The international organisation Freedom House (2005) assigns the Netherlands to the

most positive category ('1') on political rights.[15] This all points to a score of 3, however, the SAG decided to score this indicator lower because of the lack of some political (voting) rights for non-Dutch citizens as well as increasing activity by the secret service in the "war against terrorism", such as vis-à-vis certain organisations from Muslim communities. In addition reference was made to the recent, forced 'integration'[16] of immigrants living in the Netherlands for many years, under government threat to withdraw people's residence permit or even their Dutch passport.

2.1.2 Political competition. The situation of political competition seems to fit a score 3. There is a robust, multi-party competition with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties. At the time of writing (April 2006) the three most important parties in the Netherlands are the Christian Democrats (CDA) and Liberal Conservatives (VVD), which is in power, and Labour (PvdA) in the opposition. The other parties in parliament are the Green Left, List Pim Fortuyn, Socialist Party, Democrats '66 and two small Christian parties.

2.1.3 Rule of law. Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.

2.1.4 Corruption. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2005, the Netherlands is the 11th least corrupt country in their survey of 159 countries, with a score of 8.6 on a 10-point scale, indicating a very low level of corruption.[17] Although this CPI is not specifically about corruption within the public sector, it is taken as the best indicator available.

2.1.5 State effectiveness. For a few decades now, there has been a debate about the growing gap between 'politics' and 'the citizen', which indicates the state bureaucracy is not entirely responsive. Although the state is largely functional, there has been growing criticism of its efficacy and efficiency, e.g. with respect to the problems with immigration and the quality of education.

2.1.6 Decentralisation. In the 'Miljoenennota 2005', in which the government reveals its financial plans for the following year (i.e. 2006), total government expenditure was computed at 146.7 billion, of which 14.2 billion was sent to the local and provincial authorities ('Gemeente- en Provinciefonds').[18] When local government income is taken into account, over 20% of government expenditure goes to subnational authorities.

2.2 Basic Freedoms and Rights

This subdimension examines to what extent basic freedoms are ensured by law and in practise in the Netherlands. Table III.2.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

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[15] On a scale of one to seven, where one is the best. See Freedom House, map of freedom: the Netherlands http://www.freedomhouse.org//modules/mod_call_dsp_country-fiw.cfm?country=6800&year=2005&page=0&view=mof (15/4/2006).
[16] including examination of language and socio-cultural knowledge of the Netherlands
[17] See: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (15/4/2006).
[18] For a summary of the 'Miljoenennota' see: http://prinsjesdag.minfin.nl (10/3/2006).

TABLE III.2.2: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	3
2.2.2	Information rights	3
2.2.3	Press Freedom	3

2.2.1 Civil liberties. Civil liberties are fully ensured by law. In practise, a few incidents have occurred, like the prohibition of banners against the minister for Integration and Immigration. The SAG stresses the need for civil society and individuals to be watchful, to prevent more of the negative incidents happening. In general, however, the situation in the Netherlands still seems quite healthy, as Freedom House shows in their index for civil liberties, the Netherlands ranking high in level of freedom, with a maximum score of '1'.[19]

2.2.2 Information rights. Government documents are easily accessible by the Internet, however (and naturally) often only in Dutch. All legislation and official documents can be found at http://www.overheid.nl. Parliamentary publications in particular can be found at http://parlando.sdu.nl.

2.2.3 Press freedom. Freedom House (2005) awarded the freedom of the press in the Netherlands a total score of 11 (Legal Environment: 1, Political Influences: 6, Economic Pressures: 4), which indicates a free media.[20] The following information is largely taken from the Freedom House website (see footnote 14 below):

Freedom of speech and of the press is constitutionally guaranteed. Restrictions against insulting the monarch and royal family exist, but are rarely enforced. At times, journalists protested against authorities' actions, which they claimed hindered press freedom, such as police restricting access when they arrested a local television camera crew for allegedly filming where they were not allowed. In July 2004, a crime reporter's phone was tapped by the prosecution's office.

The murder of Theo Van Gogh, an outspoken filmmaker and newspaper columnist, sparked concerns about the status of free speech and the press in the country. Van Gogh was well known for his strongly critical views toward Muslims and Islam and had recently made a film depicting violence against women in Islamic societies. The killer was brought to trial and has been sentenced to a lifelong imprisonment. Following the murder of Van Gogh, authorities criticised the media for inciting racial intolerance, and Dutch leaders contemplated invoking a seldom-used law banning blasphemy.

The country's media are free and independent. Despite a high concentration of newspaper ownership, a wide variety of opinion is expressed in the print media. In a remnant of the traditional pillar system, the state allocates public radio and television programming to political, religious, and social groups according to their membership size. The television

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[19] On a scale of one to seven, where one is the best. See Freedom House, map of freedom: the Netherlands: http://www.freedomhouse.org//modules/mod_call_dsp_country-fiw.cfm?country=6800&year=2005&page=0&view=mof (15/4/2006).

[20] Scale: 0-30 means a free media, 31-60 means a partially free media, and 61-100 means the absence of free media. See Freedom House, map of press freedom: the Netherlands http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16&year=2005&country=6800 (15/4/2006).

market is competitive, and viewers have access to diverse domestic and foreign broadcasts. Internet access is not restricted.

2.3 Socio-Economic Context

This subdimension analyses the socio-economic situation in the Netherlands. Table III.2.3 shows the respective indicator score.

TABLE III.2.3: Indicator assessing socio-economic context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	3

2.3.1. Socio-economic context. To measure the concept of 'socio-economic environment', eight indicators were selected, which represent the different means through which the socio-economic context can potentially impact on civil society: 1) poverty 2) civil war 3) severe ethnic or religious conflict 4) severe economic crisis 5) severe social crisis 6) serious socioeconomic inequities 7) illiteracy and 8) lack of IT infrastructure. For each of these indicators a specific benchmark was defined which indicated that the respective indicator presents a socio-economic barrier to civil society. The benchmarks and data for these eight indicators for the Netherlands are presented below:

1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on $2 per day). Not present. In 2003, 9.8% of all households had a 'low income', which in the Dutch case means a disposable year income of €10,200. This income means a buying power equal to the buying power of a single person under the age of 65 drawing social benefits in 1979 (Vrooman et al. 2005: 16-20).

2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years). Not present.

3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict. Not present.

4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP). Not present.

5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years). Not present.

6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4). Not present. In 2005 the Gini coefficient for the Netherlands was 30.9% (2005).[21]

7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%). Not present. In the Netherlands 1.5 million people are 'functionally illiterate', which means that people cannot read, write or count well enough to handle everyday information independently. One million of the 'functionally illiterate' are native, half a million are immigrants. Of the native 'functionally illiterate' 250,000 are truly illiterate. Among young people between 16 and 25 years old, 7% are 'functionally illiterate' (Vogels 2005: 65).

8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10,000 inhabitants). Not present. In 2001, the Netherlands sheltered 118.81 Internet hosts per 1000 inhabitants.[22]

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[21] See CIA, The World Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nl.html (15/4/2006).
[22] See the following Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/7/2766808.xls (15/4/2006).

The analysis of civil society's socio-economic environment showed that none of these socio-economic barriers is present in the Netherlands. Thus, Dutch civil society is operating in a very conducive socio-economic context.

2.4 Socio-Cultural Context

This subdimension examines to what extent socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.4 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.4: Indicators assessing socio-cultural context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.4.1	Trust	3
2.4.2	Tolerance	2
2.4.3	Public spiritedness	2

2.4.1 Trust. World Values Survey (WVS) data for 1999 show that 60.1% of Dutch citizens trust other citizens. This indicator is based on the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" and the possible answers "Most people can be trusted" and "Need to be very careful".[23]

2.4.2 Tolerance. According to the World Values Survey (WVS) the Netherlands is characterised by a high level of tolerance. However, recent years have shown a rise of intolerant incidents involving different minorities, both as victims and offenders, which prompted the SAG to score a 2.

2.4.3 Public spiritedness. The World Values Survey (1999) shows a high degree of public spiritedness, with a mean index of 2.3. In the WVS people are asked to judge a number of statements, for example "Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled". They can give answers ranging from 'it can always be justified' to 'it can never be justified'. Of course, rejecting such 'immoral statements' is supposed to be an indicator for a good public spiritedness.

2.5 Legal Environment

This subdimension examines the legal environment for civil society and assesses to what extent it is enabling or disabling to civil society. Table III.2.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.5: Indicators assessing legal environment

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	3
2.5.2	Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	3
2.5.3	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	2
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	3

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[23] The WVS database is available on the Internet: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (15/4/2006).

2.5.1 CSO registration. How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process: (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied? Associations and foundations are obliged to register at the Kamer van Koophandel, the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. They have to fill in a form consisting of three easily understandable pages. The Chamber of Commerce claims to process the forms 'as soon as possible'. Administration costs are € 21.26 a year. Treatment seems to be fair and consistent. Exceptions are not widespread.[24]

2.5.2 Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government. There are no formal barriers to CSOs criticising the government and public administration. Nevertheless, CSO dependence on subsidies does influence the extent to which they feel free to engage in advocacy and/or to criticise government. The SAG stressed the presence of informal constraints such as the aforementioned state subsidies.

2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs. The tax system has some benefits for CSOs. For example, charity organisations are exempt from capital transfer tax and inheritance tax.

2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy. Certain tax benefits are available for philanthropy. Giving by households and individuals is promoted by allowing for tax deductions. However, the government decides which charity organisations count for the tax deduction. Indirectly, the state funded € 232 million in philanthropy. This amount is expected to rise to € 274 million in 2008. This is both an absolute rise, from 223 million in 2002 to € 274 million in 2008, and a relative rise, from 2.5% to 3.45% of all tax expenditure. In total, households and individuals donated € 1868 million (plus €329 million in natura). In 2003, 19% of them did use the tax deductions, but 53% couldn't use the tax deductions. Clearly, this tax benefit does not stimulate giving as much as it could if more people would benefit (Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005: 31, 44, 47).

Certain tax benefits stimulate corporate philanthropy, however, not for gifts, only for sponsoring. Companies that sponsor certain organisations get some tax deductions. In 2003 companies spent € 1716 million on sponsoring and € 555 million on gifts. Of the total € 2271 million spent on 'philanthropy', 37% goes to sports and recreation, 23% to culture, and a poor 2% to international aid and environment and nature (Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005: 62-68).

2.6 State-Civil-Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the Dutch Government. Table III.2.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.6: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.6.1	Autonomy of CSOs	2
2.6.2	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	2
2.6.3	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	3

2.6.1 Autonomy of CSOs. Usually the state does not interfere with CSO activity. The Netherlands have a tradition of government subsidising an extensive range of Non-

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[24] See the website of the Chamber of Commerce: http://www.kamervankoophandel.nl (10/3/2006).

Governmental Organisations (NGOs), including those being critical towards government policies. However, in recent years, in various sectors, such subsidies have been cut down, thereby diminishing civil society's opportunities to raise critical voices. Several CSOs received a rebuke by the minister of Integration and Immigration and the minister of Development Cooperation for supporting activists protesting against government policy. Incidents like these made the SAG score this indicator with a 2, which implies that some CSOs are subject to 'occasional unwarranted government interference'.

2.6.2 Dialogue between CSOs and the state. Extensive dialogue occurs between different levels of government and civil society. The Netherlands have a long tradition in this perspective - the well known 'poldermodel'. However, this tradition is becoming less and less important. Certain consultation councils have disappeared. Consultation of civil society happens more and more on an *ad hoc* base. This development can be summarised with words like *informalisation* and *expertisation*.

2.6.3 Support for CSOs by the state. It seems that the state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs. A telling example is the so called SMOM, which stands for 'Subsidieregeling Maatschappelijke Organisaties en Milieu' (funding programme for environmental CSOs). In 2006, SMOM has a € 7.09 million budget. The programme granted applications for projects by 69 different organisations.[25]

2.7 Private Sector-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector. Table III.2.7 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.2.7: **Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.7.1	Private sector attitude to Civil Society	2
2.7.2	Corporate social responsibility	2
2.7.3	Corporate philanthropy	1

2.7.1 Private sector attitude to civil society. Between most CSOs and the private sector there are no tensions. Many small and large businesses support certain CSOs, especially sports associations, such as soccer teams. However, CSOs that seek to campaign against business interests usually do not receive such sponsorships.

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility. The concept of 'socially responsible entrepreneurship' is becoming more and more fashionable in the private sector. To a certain extent, this is lip service to the outside world, but it is finding its way into company policies which change slowly in a positive way. Therefore the SAG scored a 2, noting, however, that scores 1 and 2 don't fully exclude each other and both are true to some extent.

2.7.3 Corporate Philanthropy. As mentioned above, 37% of corporate philanthropy goes to sports and recreation, 23% to culture and a minimal 2% to international aid, environment and nature. Church and religion receive 3%, health care 7%, education and research 11% and social goals 11% (Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005: 66). So, money goes to quite a large range of CSOs, although gifts are not evenly distributed among different sectors of CSOs).

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[25] See 'Dossier SMOM' at: http://www.vrom.nl/smom (16/4/2006).

However, this indicator was also difficult to score, as it includes both amount and breath of charity. The SAG decided on the score of 1, since the amount of charity is considered very low. Also, often it is not pure charity, since advertising opportunities are requested in turn.

Conclusion

Dutch civil society enjoys in many respects a conducive environment for its activities. The Netherlands are a liberal democracy, in which basic freedoms are protected and guaranteed, and there is freedom to participate in the political process at all levels. There are high levels of trust in the basic institutions of government and media, though not always in politicians. Some legal and financial regulations provide encouragement for civil society bodies. On the other hand, the number of structural partnerships between government and civil society organisations is declining. State funding varies between different civil society sectors, but there is considerable direct and indirect support for CSOs. However, the SAG expressed concern about certain developments, such as reducing subsidies for critical NGOs and increasing controls form the "war on terror", which reduce space for civil society. Also, there is concern over discrimination of minorities in Dutch society. A mixed picture exists of the contribution of the private sector to civil society. There are developments on corporate social responsibility but these are slow and not very deep. Also corporate philanthropy is limited.

3. VALUES

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practised by Dutch civil society. The score for the Values dimension is 2.0, reflecting an overall rather positive value basis of Dutch civil society. Figure III.3.1 presents the scores for the eight subdimensions within the Values dimension, including one on diversity that the SAG added to the CIVICUS standard set. Only the subdimensions relating to civil society's tolerance and diversity receive low scores.

FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension

3.1 Democracy

This subdimension examines the extent to which Dutch civil society actors practise and promote democracy. Table III.3.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	2
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	2

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs. Data for 2003 indicate that 76% of all CSOs are associations, 16% are foundations and 8% have some other legal form. Associations need to have members. Those members nominate a management committee. The committee needs to issue an annual financial report and account for the course of action taken. Foundations only have committees, not members. In practice, not all associations practise internal democracy. For example, members often do not show up at the annual General Member Assemblies. In any case, actual member influence on the CSO policy, on a scale from insignificant (1) to very influential (10), CSOs in the Netherlands score 6.4 (De Hart 2005: 45, 72).

3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy. It was difficult to score this indicator, since democracy in the Netherlands is well established and arguably does not need much promotion. However, some activities in this area can be detected. For example, during the latest municipal elections (March 2006) some CSOs made an effort to get immigrants to vote, such as initiatives connected to Forum and the Landelijk Overleg Minderheden, the 'National Deliberation platform for Minorities').[26]

3.2 Transparency

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Dutch civil society actors practise and promote transparency. Table III.3.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within civil society	3
3.2.2	Financial transparency of CSOs	3
3.2.3	Civil society actions to promote transparency	2

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society. As indicated before, at 2.1.4, according to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2005, the Netherlands is the 11th least corrupt country in their survey of 159 countries with a score of 8.6 on a 10-point scale, indicating a very low level of corruption.[27] Although this Index is not focused specifically on corruption within civil society, it is taken to be the best indicator available.

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs. In associations, management committees are obliged to be accountable to all members, hence financial accounts should be 'publicly' available to members. For other CSOs, such as charity organisations, it is in their own interest to be transparent. For example, the Centraal Bureau Fondsenwerving ('Central Bureau for Fundraising', CBF) tries to regulate the world of charity organisations by demanding certain mechanisms to be in place and rewarding their members with a hallmark. Members have to put financial information online, and the CBF website offers online financial information on 734 fundraising organisations.[28]

3.2.3 CSOs actions to promote transparency. News media actively promote government and sometimes corporate transparency. CSOs deliver information to both media and parliament for holding executive powers accountable, thereby indirectly promoting government transparency. Corporate transparency is being promoted by pressure of shareholders and stockholders, which are sometimes organised in a CSO, such as the Vereniging van EffectenBezitters (VEB), the association of stockholders.

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[26] See respectively: http://www.forum.nl/ and http://www.minderheden.org/ (30/11/2006). For statistics of actual immigrant votes see data from the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (University of Amsterdam): http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/imes/verkiezingen.htm.
[27] See: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (15/4/2006).
[28] For the CBF in general see: http://www.cbf.nl/. For online financial information of allied associations see: http://www.cbfcijfers.nl/ (17/3/2006).

3.3 Tolerance

This subdimension examines the extent to which Dutch civil society actors and organisations practise and promote tolerance. Table III.3.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	2
3.3.2	Civil society activities to promote tolerance	1

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena. Civil society actors generally support the right to express an opinion, while denouncing discriminatory behaviour or speeches. However, there are groups, especially extremists of all kinds (e.g. ultra right-wing and Islamic fundamentalists), who are not exactly tolerant. In general, those organisations do not have a large fan base.

3.3.2 CS activities to promote tolerance. Some see an important role for CSOs in this field. The closing statement of the Breed Initiatief Maatschappelijke Binding ('Broad Initiative for Social Cohesion'), a meeting of several CSOs, states: "It is such CSOs and connections that are close to citizens and that, together with them, organise activities in neighbourhoods to fight deterioration, prevent nuisance, bring back cohesion, and promote tolerance."[29]

It is hard to find civil society actions explicitly concerned with promoting tolerance. However, there are a number of organisations involved in battling racism and other forms of discrimination. The Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van Rassendiscriminatie ('National Bureau for fighting Racial discrimination', LBR) names the following NGOs: Anne Frank Stichting (AFS), Anti Fascistische Actie Nederland (AFA), Centrum voor Informatie en Documentatie Israël (CIDI), Dutch Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (DUMC), ENAR Nederland, E-Quality (Experts in gender and etniciteit), Kafka, Kenniscentrum Lesbisch en homo-emancipatiebeleid, Expertisecentrum Leeftijd (LBL), Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van Rassendiscriminatie (LBR), Landelijke Vereniging van ADB's en Meldpunten (LV), Magenta, Netwerk CS, Stichting Landelijk Platform Slavernijverleden (LPS) and Tiye International.[30]

These NGOs are probably visible for the discriminated minorities involved, but broad based support and public visibility are lacking.

3.4 Non-Violence

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Dutch civil society actors and organisations practise and promote non-violence. Table III.3.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the CS arena	3
3.4.2	CS actions to promote non-violence	2

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[29] Our translation. For the original text, see Slotverklaring Breed Initiatief Maatschappelijke Binding at: http://www.lbr.nl/?node=2605 (15/4/2006).
[30] See: http://www.lbr.nl/?node=457 (15/4/2006).

3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena. There are a few groups with violent tendencies within civil society. Collectively, CSOs denounce these few organisations in public. Examples of excesses include incidents in the weeks following the murder on filmmaker Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004. Researchers counted 174 violent incidents in November 2004. For the Netherlands this is an extremely large number of incidents. In only 20 % of these cases, native Dutch were targets, while Muslims were targets in more than 60%. Religious buildings were attacked: 47 mosques and 13 churches. Beside extreme right, racist violence targeting Muslims, negative examples include radical left activism, hooliganism and sporadic violence against minorities, such as Jews or homosexuals. Most of the mentioned acts of violence seem to have been carried out by individuals and unorganised groups, rather than by CSOs. However, despite being still very marginal, intolerant forces might be on the rise, indicating caution is needed.[31]

3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence. Many CSOs have been set up as a reaction to some form of violence in society, for example women's aid groups acting against domestic violence, the Kinderbescherming (protecting children) and the Dierenbescherming (protecting animals), victim support groups. Other groups promote peace and human rights (Amnesty International and other actors). About a hundred institutionalised CSOs are actively involved in issues of non-violence. In the 1990s several people were killed during violent incidents in nightlife. This 'senseless violence' ('zinloos geweld') evoked a short lived trend of silent marches ('stille marsen') to protest against a society perceived to become more violent.[32]

3.5 Gender Equity

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Dutch civil society actors practise and promote gender equity. Table III.3.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equality

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the CS arena	2
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	2
3.5.3	CS actions to promote gender equity	2

3.5.1 Gender equity within the CS arena. In 2003, 51% of all CSO members were women and 41% of all voluntary leadership positions were taken by women. In larger NGOs only one in four leadership positions were taken by women. In smaller NGOs, more women are present in leadership positions. (Merens 2004: 195-196, Marchand 2003: 7).

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs. The Stakeholder Assessment Group estimates that a small majority of CSOs actively practise gender equity.

3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity. There is a long history of CSOs campaigning and working towards gender equity. Nowadays, discourse centres on topics such as providing enough day nurseries in order to enable women to work. However, women groups have lost visibility in comparison to the 1960s, partly because of their own success.

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[31] See Monitor Racisme & Extremisme: http://www.monitorracisme.nl/ (24/3/2006).
[32] See the websites of stichting www.mishandeling.nl and of stichting voor actieve geweldloosheid: respectively http://www.partnermishandeling.nl/ and http://www.geweldloosactief.nl/ (24/3/2006).

3.6 Poverty Eradication

This subdimension examines to what extent Dutch civil society actors promote poverty eradication. Table III.3.6 presents the indicator score.

TABLE III.3.6: Indicator assessing poverty eradication

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	CS actions to eradicate poverty	2

3.6.1. CS actions to eradicate poverty. In the Netherlands CSOs have initiated a number of activities aimed at eradicating poverty and social exclusion. An important initiative is the Sociale Alliantie ('social alliance') between 54 CSOs working in the field of poverty eradication. Traditionally, the Sociale Alliantie met once a year with local, provincial and national governments. However, since 2004, the Dutch government has refused to meet. There are other examples of fighting poverty, such as the Lions clubs, the foundation Beleggers vóór Belasting ('Investors *for* Tax', lobbying for taxes on profits from investing – in turn to be used in eradicating poverty) and the Voedselbanken ('Food Banks', supplying basic necessities to the poorest people).[33] There are also more informal, private initiatives.[34] In the past year, poverty eradication began to be a hot topic, especially due to the rising number of 'food banks'.

3.7 Environmental Sustainability

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Dutch civil society actors practise and promote environmental sustainability. Table III.3.7 presents the indicator score.

TABLE III.3.7: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	CS actions to sustain the environment	2

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment. Sustainable development has been one of the urgent needs of today's society. Therefore a substantial amount of civil society activities in this area can be detected. In the Netherlands, there is broad-based support for these activities. Environmental organisations have 3.7 million members. This amounts to a fourth of all Dutch adults, twice the number of union members or ten times the number of political party members. There are 85 CSOs with more than 400 members. The three largest organisations raise over € 100 million each year. Van der Heijden comes to the statement that "When looking at institutionalisation, the Dutch environmental movement is unique in the world" (2000: 84, our translation). We might call the environmental part of Dutch civil society a 'driving force' in protecting the environment in the sense that they are involved in many relevant negotiations and have a noticeable influence on Dutch public opinion. For example, there is a constantly high consciousness that the environment should be high on the public agenda (Van der Heijden 2000: 84-85). In general, however, the SAG felt that civil society activity is too low to receive the highest possible score, hence the score of 2.

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33 See respectively: http://www.socialealliantie.nl/, http://www.lions.nl,
http://www.beleggersvoorbelasting.antenna.nl/, and http://www.voedselbank.nl/ (16/4/2006).
[34] See for example: http://www.dederdekamer.org/3.12_activiteit.php?activiteit_id=2 (24/3/2006).

3.8 Diversity

The Stakeholder Assessment Group considered it necessary to add this subdimension to the CIVICUS' standard set, which analyses the extent to which Dutch civil society actors practise and promote equity on diversity, analogous to gender equity (subdimension 3.5). This is understood to include diversity in respect of ethnicity, culture and sexual preference. Table III.3.8 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.3.8: Indicators assessing diversity equality

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.8.1	Diversity equity within the CS arena	1
3.8.2	Diversity equitable practices within CSOs	1
3.8.3	CS actions to promote diversity equity	1

3.8.1 Diversity equity within the CS arena. Diversity may refer to a lot of different minority groups, such as ethnical, cultural or sexual groups, from homosexuals to Muslims. Therefore, it is difficult to score these indicators. The SAG estimates that people from certain minorities are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.

3.8.2 Diversity equitable practices within CSOs. The Stakeholder Assessment Group estimates that only a minority of CSOs have some kind of diversity policy.

3.8.3 CS actions to promote diversity equity. The Stakeholder Assessment Group detected only a few activities promoting diversity equity at the societal level, e.g. by the homosexuals rights group COC.

Conclusion

Dutch civil society is active in practising and promoting a set of key values. Most CSOs observe principles of democracy and accountability in their formal internal structures, and many take an active part during national government elections, by issuing statements on particular issues. Some CSOs also make it their business to monitor government and corporate conduct and increase accountability to the public. CSOs almost exclusively operate within the limits of peaceful action and lawful behaviour. The SAG's scores reflect that civil society does not promote some important values like tolerance and diversity equity to a great extent.

4. IMPACT

One of the most serious problems in the study of influence arises from the fact that, no matter how precisely one defines influence and no matter how elegant the measures and methods one proposes, the data within reach even of the most assiduous researcher require the use of operational measures that are at best somewhat unsatisfactory.
Robert A. Dahl (1961: 330)

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions within Dutch society. There are relatively isolated examples of research of impact by civil society. Arts, for example, researches the political influence of global NGOs in two UN conventions (Arts, 1998). However, in general, and certainly for the case of the Netherlands, it is hard to find specific data on impact. In this dimension, at best we can make educated guesses. The score for the Impact dimension is 1.7, reflecting a relatively low impact. Figure III.4.1 presents the scores for the five subdimensions within the Impact dimension.

FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimension scores in Impact dimension

4.1 Influencing public policy

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Dutch civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy in the fields of social policy and human rights policy as well as its impact on the national budgeting process. Table III.4.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing public policy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Human rights impact	2
4.1.2	Social policy impact	2
4.1.3	Impact on national budgeting process	1

4.1.1 Human rights impact. As the Freedom House diagnosis (Political Rights: 1; Civil Liberties: 1; Status: Free) indicates, civil society in the Netherlands does not need to press hard on the human rights topic. Since impact on this issue is hardly necessary, impact is relatively low.

However, sometimes action is needed and civil society is active in this area. Civil society actors have led many human rights campaigns, in both the international and domestic policy areas. Recent examples of efforts by civil society to influence public policy in the field of human rights are the protests against the treatment of, and tough approach towards, refugee seekers. One of the key organisations in these protests is '26000 Gezichten' (26000 Faces).[35] However, it is doubtful if these protests have had much of an impact. Aside from incidental activities, more structural and mostly lobbying activities take place. Every day members of the Dutch Parliament receive a large number of messages from CSOs, and CSOs often visit the Parliament to lobby on behalf of their interests. Some NGOs monitor the implementation of UN human rights treaties. According to Boerefijn et al. involved NGOs have contributed to a deeper and more meaningful implementation of different monitoring mechanisms (Boerefijn et al., 2003: 121-133).

4.1.2 Social policy impact. As on human rights, civil society organisations send members of the Dutch Parliament large numbers of messages on social policy, and often visit the Parliament to lobby for their interests. There are institutionalised talks between government, employers and trade unions, such as the well-known spring and autumn meetings. The Stichting van de Arbeid ('Labour Foundation') facilitates these and other meetings.[36] Further, the before mentioned Sociale Alliantie ('Social Alliance') is an example of civil society trying to influence social policy. Recently, on 14 February 2006 attempts to influence the policy making process concerning the Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning ('law for facilitating society') proved relatively successful. A list with suggestions for possible improvements to the law were presented to and discussed with parliamentarians from all parties. The Sociale Alliantie claims that many of these suggestions have been taken up in the final draft of the law.[37] However, according to the SAG impact in this area is limited.

4.1.3 Impact on national budgeting process. Overall, according to the SAG, civil society activity and impact in this area is very limited. In the Netherlands a substantial amount of subsidies are available for civil society actors, so it is natural that CSOs lobby for their share. Impact depends on the effect of the lobbying and on the political climate. However, recent substantial cuts in financial support for a broad range of CSOs by the department of Health and Care (2003), which were motivated by the wish to focus the instrument of subsidising to 'clear goals', have not been reversed as of now.[38]

4.2 Holding State and Private Corporations Accountable

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Dutch civil society is active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable. Table III.4.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

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[35] See: http://www.26000gezichten.nl/ (16/4/2006).
[36] See: http://www.regering.nl/actueel/dossieroverzicht/42_11844.jsp and http://www.stvda.nl/ (16/4/2006).
[37] See: http://www.socialealliantie.nl/WMO/index.htm (16/4/2006).
[38] See: http://www.minvws.nl/dossiers/subsidies/het-subsidiebeleid-van-vws/ (1/6/2006).

TABLE III.4.2: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state accountable	2
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	2

4.2.1 Holding the state accountable. There are several issue-based NGOs critically following state activities. For instance, Stichting Rekenschap ('Account Foundation') is organised around this theme. The organisation focuses on transparency of both public services and politics, and has been quite visible in the last few years. However, recently it had to quit its activities. According to their own account this was due to a lack of (government) funding (sic).[39]

At a far greater distance from the state itself, squatter-based organisations, such as Indymedia and Eurodusnie, operate. They are very active to protest perceived threats of civil liberties by the state.[40] In between there are several issue-based NGOs critically following state activities.

Overall, the impact, and coverage by media, of these activities is limited. It is worth mentioning that relations between civil society and political parties are quite weak and that trust in government and public services has suffered severe blows in recent years, tumbling from a 64% of the people trusting institutions in 1999 to 56% in late 2004. This is mainly due to negative perceptions of the recent policy agenda (Becker and Dekker, 2005: 354-359).

4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable. Civil society organisations are often more critical towards private corporations than government, at least they approach these corporations from different perspectives, and they play an important role in bringing excesses to the fore. It is difficult to quantify their exact amount of work in this field, since only successful interventions receive serious attention. Corporations that are not scrutinised and failed attempts to hold a corporation accountable seldom make the front page or the database of a researcher. Greenpeace's intervention, concerning the Brent Spar, and interventions by Milieudefensie and Amnesty International, concerning Shell's responsibilities for the situation in Ogoniland, Nigeria, spurred an ongoing debate inside Dutch civil society about how (not) to ask for accountability by corporations.[41] On average, the impact is considered to be limited only.

4.3 Responding to Social Interests

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Dutch civil society actors are responsive to social interests. Table III.4.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.3: Indicators assessing responding to social interests

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	1
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	2

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[39] See: http://www.rekenschap.nl/rekenschapnl/media/ezinevandedag.htm (1/6/2006).

[40] See: http://www.indymedia.nl/ and http://eurodusnie.nl/ respectively (30/11/2006).

[41] See for instance Keetie E. Sluyterman's inaugural 2004 speech, "Gedeelde zorg. Maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid van ondernemingen in historisch perspectief": http://www.bintproject.nl/textfiles/oratie_keetie.pdf (27/5/2006).

4.3.1 Responsiveness. Community associations often respond quickly to changes in local circumstances, and advocacy groups are able to identify the problems with a change in government policy more quickly than planned evaluations. A well-known current example is De Voedselbank, which distributes food to those for whom welfare is not sufficient, because of cuts in the budget. The SAG argued that civil society has not been responsive to slumbering dissatisfaction in society at large, concerning problems in poor neighbourhoods and the alleged lack of integration of immigrants, topics around which the late Pim Fortuyn, who was shot by an environmental activist in 2002, mobilised his support.

4.3.2 Public trust in CSOs. According to the 2005 Eurobarometer, in the Netherlands 77% of the people trust charity funds and other voluntary associations, 62% trust trade unions and 46% trust church institutions. Trust in the press is also high (radio 72%, television 68%, and written press 64%). Overall, a score 2 seemed to fit the Dutch situation well (TNS NIPO 2005: 5).

4.4 Empowering Citizens

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Dutch civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives. Table III.4.4 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.4: Indicators assessing empowering citizens

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	2
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems	2
4.4.3	Empowering marginalised people	1
4.4.4	Empowering women	2
4.4.5	Building social capital	2
4.4.6	Supporting/creating livelihoods	1

4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens. CSOs are an important additional source of information for Dutch people, especially in their field of concern. Not only are there a high number of websites available that contain all kinds of advice on different levels, there are also support points for volunteers in all cities. Classes, lessons and information programmes are organised all year in the larger cities by organisations such as IPP and Civiq, which target the entire population, from inactive citizens to highly experienced ones. According to the SAG Group, the impact in terms of people reached is limited, which is partially due to limited media attention.

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems. Despite this being an important role for CSOs, citizens often perceive government as the actor to talk to. To a certain extent, this is understandable. Civil servants have recently figured out several smart ways to enhance the role of civil society in empowering citizens, such as interactive policy development, enhancing transparency and information availability, (electronic) citizens panels and reduction of rules.[42] Government makes possible and promotes thinking about renewal of ways and modes of collective action. This is partly motivated by a strong desire to move traditional public responsibilities either to civil society or to citizens themselves.

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[42] See: http://www.xpin.nl/expertise/xpin_empower.php (1/6/2006), www.participatiewijzer.nl (5/9/2006).

4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people. CSOs do some work in this area, but outreach to and impact on marginalised groups, such as urban dwellers and ethical minorities is very limited.

4.4.4 Empowering women. The feminist movement in The Netherlands has brought about great changes since the 1960s, but much still needs to be done in terms of ensuring that the legal frameworks are implemented, and that women from ethnic backgrounds are enabled to make their own choices as well. Quite a few organisations are active in this area, however impact has declined in the past decade.

4.4.5 Building social capital. Civil society can be regarded as a rich source of social capital, which was assessed by comparing the level of general trust of CSO members with that of individuals who are not members of any CSO. The WVS shows that 61.3% of CSO members in the Netherlands think that most people can be trusted, compared to only 41.4% of those who do not belong to a CSO. [43] According to the SAG, this suggests that civil society contributes to building social capital in society, however modestly.

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods. This indicator deals with civil society activity in creating and supporting employment or income-generating opportunities, especially for poor people and women. This kind of activity is present but quite limited, examples vary from magazines sold by homeless people (such as *Straatkrant*), to employment agencies for former drug addicts. However, it is difficult to provide a general assessment of their effectiveness.

4.5 Meeting Societal Needs

This subdimension examines the extent to which Dutch civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups. Table III.4.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

TABLE III.4.5: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	2
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	2
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalised groups	1

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provisions. The Dutch welfare state is organised around the principle of civil society putting social questions on the agenda and government taking responsibility for the solution. In that sense, civil society is rather successful in lobbying for state service provision. However, recent years show a declining tendency to co-opt problems put forward by civil society.

4.5.2 Meeting societal needs directly. As CSOs professionalise and depend less on volunteers, service delivery to members becomes more important. However, it is doubtful if service delivery is adequately meeting societal needs. Organisations, such as the Salvation Army, prove rather successful in helping in a direct way, more successful than government agencies. It should be mentioned, however, that the Salvation Army operates with a large government budget.

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[43] The WVS database is available on the Internet: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (16/4/2006).

4.5.3 Meeting the needs of marginalised groups. This indicator compares CSOs and the state. The score is quite low for civil society in view of the large state effort in the Netherlands such as through social welfare.

Conclusion

CSOs have their influence in setting the agenda and achieving a number of outcomes by influencing policies and debates on social, political and economic matters, as well as exerting pressure on government and decision-makers. However, the SAG judges the overall current impact of civil society on government policy as limited. This mirrors the outcome of a brief social forces analysis conducted by the SAG, which labelled large companies, along with national government and the EU, in the most influential group, and large CSOs as only "influential". CSOs engage in educational and informational activities, and the spread of the Internet has increased the scale of information publicly available. At the same time, large sections of the population may remain untouched by these activities, and do not have access to sources of information and support. The SAG stresses the need for more CSOs aiming to empower different groups, by developing their capacities and through greater access to decision-making. Also, the need for more cooperation between different civil society actors is stressed. Finally, and remarkably, the SAG points at a certain lack of adequate response by civil society to the pressing societal issues of tolerance towards and integration of minorities.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This conclusion seeks to draw together the main findings and recommendation of the CSI-SAT project in the Netherlands. It offers an explanation of the state of Dutch civil society as depicted in the Civil Society Diamond, by picking out some important findings resulting from the CSI-SAT project. The diamond-shaped diagram (figure IV below) visualising the state of Dutch civil society is rather large, pointing to a well-developed civil society. However, it is not completely balanced: the Environment dimension stands out, while results for the Impact dimension are less satisfactory. The four dimension scores are between 1.7 and 2.5, indicating a well-developed civil society, existing in a positive environment. However, for civil society in the Netherlands its impact, which received the weakest score, is a concern.

Figure IV: Civil society diamond for the Netherlands

Although overall a quite positive picture of the state of civil society emerged from the assessment, some indicators that negatively affected the scores are worth mentioning. For example, within the Impact dimension indicator 4.1.3 shows low impact (1) on the national budgeting process. There were heavy debates on the impact of civil society in holding both the state (4.2.1) and private corporations (4.2.2) accountable, which in the end both received a score of 2. Furthermore, responsiveness to priority social concerns (4.3.1) received a low score of 1, in particular regarding the issues of a multicultural society and integration. Civil society also scores low (1) on empowering marginalised people (4.4.3), supporting livelihoods for poor people (4.4.6) and meeting the needs of marginalised groups (4.5.3), but for the latter two it was noted that the Dutch state provides ample services. The scores didn't reveal any particular strong aspects (scores 3), hence a relatively low overall score resulted for the Impact dimension.

In the other dimensions there are also remarkable scores. In the Structure dimension for example, collective community action (1.1.5) scored low (with a 0), as did charitable giving (1.2.1) and diversity in CSO leadership (1.3.2). However, there are also several very strong aspects on citizens' participation: breadth of citizens' participation (other than collective community action) (1.1), time spent by volunteers (1.2.2) and distribution, international links and resources of CSOs (1.3.3, 1.4.5 and 1.6.3).

Although civil society's 'environment is favourable overall, political rights (2.1.1) scored a 2 instead of 3 for two reasons. First, new developments in anti-terrorism legislation may endanger civil liberties (in particular of minority groups), and second, non-Dutch citizens in the Netherlands lack some fundamental political rights, such as voting. Furthermore, state decentralisation (2.1.6) is found to be low (0). Despite the high scores of 3, there was a heavy debate on allowable advocacy activities (2.5.2) and autonomy (2.6.1). The issue here is that

the state has been moving away from subsidising a broad range of CSOs and attaching strict and stricter conditions on CSO funding, such as demanding that they not criticise government. Corporate philanthropy (2.7.3) scored low with a 1, partly because their sponsoring is perceived as advertising. Despite these critical points, the environment is generally very positive, including a strong rule of law and freedom (2.1.3, 2.2 and 2.5), little corruption (2.1.4), socioeconomic circumstances (2.3), trust (2.4.1) and state support for CSOs (2.6.3).

In the Values dimension the low scores of 1 for both diversity within civil society and action to promote tolerance at the society level (3.3.2) require attention. In the Values dimension the SAG inserted an indicator 3.8 "Diversity", with respect to ethnicity, culture and sexual preference, in addition to the CIVICUS standard set, which is analogous to its "Gender diversity" indicator. The strongest aspects of the Values dimension are transparency and non-violence in the CSO sector (3.2 and 3.4).

It should be noted that the SAG itself, although broadly defining civil society, consisted of mainly activist-oriented CSOs, or a particular part of civil society.

Next Steps

De Nieuwe Dialoog will publicise the findings of this study and popularise this publication among CSOs and that part of the public which is less familiar with the topics discussed here, including the government, civil servants and politicians, both at the national and local level. This publication could also serve as a useful introduction for students of civil society and related themes. *De Nieuwe Dialoog* will also initiate meetings with those members of civil society who are interested in being involved in building on the findings of the CSI project. In its English version, this publication will also serve as the basis for international comparisons within the framework of the Civil Society Index project as a whole.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF SAG MEMBERS

Name	Organisation
	Civil Society
Miriyam Aouragh	Samen tegen racisme (Together Against Racism)
Ineke Bakker	Raad van Kerken (Council of Churches)
Bert van Boggelen	CNV (Trade Union)
Sylvia Borren	Oxfam Novib
Tineke Ceelen	Stichting Vluchteling (Foundation for Refugees)
Haci Karacaer	Milli Görüş
Frank Köhler	Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth Netherlands)
Jonathan Mijs	Landelijke StudentenVakbond (Students Union)
Judith Swenne	Nederlandse Bond van Plattelandsvrouwen
Frank van der Valk (Project Coordinator)	Oxfam Novib
Lodewijk de Waal (Chair)	De Nieuwe Dialoog
	Advisors
Paul Dekker	SCP Social and Cultural Planning Office
Menno Hurenkamp	University of Amsterdam
Mirjam Sijmons	Content Uitzendbureau

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INDICATORS[44]

Structure: breadth of citizen participation

1.1.1.Non-partisan political action		What percentage of people has ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition; attended a demonstration)? List of non-partisan political actions included: contacted politician or government official, worked in political party or action group, worked in another organisation or association, worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker, signed petition, taken part in lawful public demonstration, boycotted certain products, bought product for political/ethical/environment reason, donated money to political organisation or group, Participated illegal protest activities last 12 months
Score	☑	
0	☐	A very small minority (less than 10%).
1	☐	A minority (10% to 30%).
2	☐	A significant proportion (31% to 65%).
3	☐	A large majority (more than 65%).
1.1.2 Charitable giving		What percentage of people donates to charity on a regular basis?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A very small minority (less than 10%).
1	☐	A minority (10% to 30%).
2	☐	A significant proportion (31% to 65%).
3	☐	A large majority (more than 65%).
1.1.3 CSO membership		What percentage of people belongs to at least one CSO?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A very small minority (less than 10%).
1	☐	A minority (10% to 30%).
2	☐	A significant proportion (31% to 65%).
3	☐	A large majority (more than 65%).
1.1.4 Volunteering		What percentage of people undertakes volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A very small minority (less than 10%).
1	☐	A small minority (10% to 30%).
2	☐	A minority (31% to 50%).
3	☐	A majority (more than 50%).
1.1.5 Collective community action		What percentage of people has participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A small minority (less than 30%).
1	☐	A minority (30% -50%)
2	☐	A majority (51% to 65%).
3	☐	A large majority (more than 65%)

Structure: depth of citizen participation

1.2.1 Charitable giving		How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average per year?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Less than 1%
1	☐	1% to 2%

2	☐	2.1% to 3%
3	☐	More than 3%
1.2.2 Volunteering		How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work? This includes (Home Office 2003): giving advice, looking after children, property or pets, transporting or escorting someone, keeping intouch with someone who is housebound, doing shoppingh or payiong bills for someone, writing letters or filling in forms, household or garden jobs, home or car maintenance, representing someone, sitting with someone, raising money or taking part in sponsored events, organising or helping to run an event or meeting, leading a group or being a committee member, visiting people, secretarial or administrative work, befriending or mentoring people, campaigning and other practical help.
Score	☑	
0	☐	Less than 2 hours
1	☐	2 to 5 hours
2	☐	5.1 to 8 hours
3	☐	More than 8 hours.
1.2.3 CSO membership		What percentage of CSO members belongs to more than one CSO?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A small minority (less than 30%)
1	☐	A minority (30% to 50%)
2	☐	A majority (51% to 65%)
3	☐	A large majority (more than 65%)

Structure: diversity of civil society participants

1.3.1 CSO membership		To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.
1	☐	Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs
2	☐	Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.
3	☐	CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.
1.3.2 CSO leadership		To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.
1	☐	Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles
2	☐	Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.
3	☐	CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.
1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs		How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?
Score	☑	
0	☐	CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.
1	☐	CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.
2	☐	CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.
3	☐	CSOs are present in all areas of the country.

Structure: level of organisation

1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies		What percentage of CSOs belongs to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A small minority (less than 30%)
1	☐	A minority (30% to 50%)

2	☐	A majority (51% to 70%)
3	☐	A large majority (more than 70%)
1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies		How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Completely ineffective (or non-existent).
1	☐	Largely ineffective.
2	☐	Somewhat effective.
3	☐	Effective.
1.4.3 Self-regulation		Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abides by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.
1	☐	Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.
2	☐	Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.
3	☐	Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.
1.4.4 Support infrastructure		What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?
Score	☑	
0	☐	There is no support infrastructure for civil society.
1	☐	There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.
2	☐	Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.
3	☐	There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.
1.4.5 International linkages		What proportion of CSOs has international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Only a handful of "elite" CSOs has international linkages.
1	☐	A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.
2	☐	A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.
3	☐	A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.

Structure: inter-relations

1.5.1 Communication		What is the extent of communication between CS actors?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Very little
1	☐	Limited
2	☐	Moderate
3	☐	Significant
1.5.2 Cooperation		How much do CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?
Score	☑	
0	☐	CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.
1	☐	It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.
2	☐	CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.

3	☐	CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.

Structure: resources

1.6.1 Financial resources		How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?
Score	☑	
0	☐	On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.
1	☐	On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.
2	☐	On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.
3	☐	On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.
1.6.2 Human resources		How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?
Score	☑	
0	☐	On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.
1	☐	On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goals.
2	☐	On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.
3	☐	On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.
1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources		How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?
Score	☑	
0	☐	On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.
1	☐	On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.
2	☐	On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.
3	☐	On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.

Environment: political context

2.1.1. Political rights		How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.
1	☐	There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.
2	☐	Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.
3	☐	People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.
2.1.2 Political competition		What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Single party system.

1	☐	Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.
2	☐	Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction
3	☐	Robust, multi-party competition with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.
2.1.3. Rule of law		To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?
Score	☑	
0	☐	There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.
1	☐	There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.
2	☐	There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.
3	☐	Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.
2.1.4. Corruption		What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?
Score	☑	
0	☐	High
1	☐	Substantial
2	☐	Moderate
3	☐	Low
2.1.5. State effectiveness		To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?
Score	☑	
0	☐	The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).
1	☐	The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.
2	☐	State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.
3	☐	State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.
2.1.6. Decentralisation		To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.
1	☐	Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.
2	☐	Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.
3	☐	Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.

Environment: basic freedoms & rights

2.2.1. Civil liberties		To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Civil liberties are systematically violated.
1	☐	There are frequent violations of civil liberties.
2	☐	There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.
3	☐	Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.
2.2.2. Information rights		To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.
1	☐	Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.
2	☐	Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.
3	☐	Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.
2.2.3. Press freedoms		To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Press freedoms are systematically violated.
1	☐	There are frequent violations of press freedoms.
2	☐	There are isolated violations of press freedoms.
3	☐	Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.

Environment: socio-economic context

2.3.1. Socio-economic context	How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?
Score ☑	
0 ☐	Social & economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on $2 per day) Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)
1 ☐	Social & economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.
2 ☐	Social & economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.
3 ☐	Social & economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.

Environment: socio-cultural context

2.4.1. Trust	How much do members of society trust one another?
Score ☑	
0 ☐	Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).
1 ☐	There is widespread mistrust among members of society. (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).
2 ☐	There is a moderate level of trust among members of society. (eg 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).
3 ☐	There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).
2.4.2. Tolerance	How tolerant are members of society?
Score ☑	
0 ☐	Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS-derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).
1 ☐	Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).
2 ☐	Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).
3 ☐	Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).
2.4.3. Public spiritedness[45]	How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?
Score ☑	
0 ☐	Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS-derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5)
1 ☐	Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5)
2 ☐	Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5)
3 ☐	High level of public spiritedness. (e.g. indicator less than 1.5)

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[45] The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport, 3. cheating on taxes).

Environment: legal environment

2.5.1. CSO registration		How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) Following legal provisions (5) consistently applied?
Score	☑	
0	☐	The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.
1	☐	The CSO registration is not very supportive Two or three quality characteristics are absent
2	☐	The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.
3	☐	The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.
2.5.2. Allowable advocacy activities		To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticize government?
Score	☑	
0	☐	CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.
1	☐	There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.
2	☐	Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.
3	☐	CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.
2.5.3. Tax laws favourable to CSOs		How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?
Score	☑	
0	☐	The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.
1	☐	The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g., grants or donations).
2	☐	The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions or preferences and/or exemptions or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.
3	☐	The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.
2.5.4. Tax benefits for philanthropy		How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.
1	☐	Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.
2	☐	Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.
3	☐	Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.

Environment: state-civil society relations

2.6.1. Autonomy		To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?
Score	☑	
0	☐	The state controls civil society.
1	☐	CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.
2	☐	The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.

3	☐	CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.
2.6.2. Dialogue		To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalised are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?
Score	☑	
0	☐	There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.
1	☐	The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.
2	☐	The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.
3	☐	Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.
2.6.3 Cooperation / support		How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receives state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.
1	☐	Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.
2	☐	A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.
3	☐	The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.

Environment: private sector-civil society relations

2.7.1. Private sector attitude		W4hat is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Generally hostile
1	☐	Generally indifferent
2	☐	Generally positive
3	☐	Generally supportive
2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility		How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.
1	☐	Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.
2	☐	Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.
3	☐	Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.
2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy		How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receives support from the private sector?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.
1	☐	Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.
2	☐	A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.
3	☐	The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.

Values: democracy

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs		To what extent do CSOs practise internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practise internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).
1	☐	A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practise internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).
2	☐	A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practise internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).
3	☐	A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practise internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).
3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy		How much does CS actively promote democracy at a societal level?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.
2	☐	A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.
3	☐	CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

Values: transparency

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society		How widespread is corruption within CS?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.
1	☐	Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.
2	☐	There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.
3	☐	Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.
3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs		How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs makes their financial accounts publicly available?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.
1	☐	A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.
2	☐	A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.
3	☐	A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.
3.2.3 CS actions to promote transparency		How much does CS actively promote government and corporate transparency?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.

| 2 | ☐ | A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking. |
| 3 | ☐ | CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility. |

Values: Tolerance

3.3.1 Tolerance within the CS arena		To what extent is CS a tolerant arena?
Score	☑	
0	☐	CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.
1	☐	Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.
2	☐	There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.
3	☐	Civil society is an open arena where the expression of all viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour are strongly denounced by civil society at large.
3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance		How much does CS actively promote tolerance at a societal level?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.
2	☐	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.
3	☐	CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

Values: non-violence

3.4.1 Non-violence within the CS arena		How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among CS actors to express their interests in the public sphere?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.
1	☐	Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.
2	☐	Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.
3	☐	There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.
3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence and peace		How much does CS actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.
2	☐	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.
3	☐	CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility

Values: Gender equity

3.5.1 Gender equity within the CS arena		To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.
1	☐	Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.
2	☐	Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.
3	☐	Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS..
3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs		How much do CSOs practise gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A small minority (less than 20%).
1	☐	A minority (20%-50%)
2	☐	A small majority (51% - 65%)
3	☐	A large majority (more than 65%)
3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity		How much does CS actively promote gender equity at the societal level?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practises.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.
2	☐	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.
3	☐	CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

Values: poverty eradication

3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty		To what extent does CS actively seek to eradicate poverty?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.
2	☐	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.
3	☐	CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

Values: environmental sustainability

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment		How much does CS actively seek to sustain the environment?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.
2	☐	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.
3	☐	CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

Values: diversity[46]

3.5.1 Diversity within the CS arena		To what extent is civil society a diversity equitable arena?
Score	☑	
0	☐	"Divers" persons are excluded from civil society leadership roles.
1	☐	"Divers" persons are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.
2	☐	"Divers" persons are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.
3	☐	"Divers" persons are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS..
3.5.2 Diversity equitable practices within CSOs		How much do CSOs practise diversity equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure diversity equity?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A small minority (less than 20%).
1	☐	A minority (20%-50%)
2	☐	A small majority (51% - 65%)
3	☐	A large majority (more than 65%)
3.5.3 CS actions to promote diversity equity		How much does CS actively promote diversity equity at the societal level?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practises.
1	☐	Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.
2	☐	A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.
3	☐	CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

Impact: influencing public policy

4.1.1 Civil society's impact on Human Rights Issues		How active and successful is civil society in influencing human rights policy & practice at national level? Can CSO actions/campaigns to influence human rights policy & practice be detected? How significant were these actions/campaigns? Have the defined goals of identified CSO actions/campaign been achieved? Did they result in discernible impact? How significant was this impact?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.1.2. Civil society's impact on social policy		How active and successful is civil society in influencing social policy at national level? Can CSO actions/campaigns to influence social policy be detected? How significant were these actions/campaigns? Have the defined goals of identified CSO actions/campaign been achieved? Did they result in discernible impact? How significant was this impact?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components[47].
2	☐	Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.

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[46] This is understood to include diversity in respect of ethnicity, culture and sexual preference.

[47] The term "specific budget component" refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the overall budget.

3	☐	Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.1.3. Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study		How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components[48].
2	☐	Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

Impact: Holding state & private corporations accountable

4.2.1. Holding state accountable		How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable		How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

Impact: responding to social interests

4.3.1 Responsiveness		How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?
Score	☑	
0	☐	Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.
1	☐	There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.
2	☐	There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.
3	☐	Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.
4.3.2 Public Trust		What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?
Score	☑	
0	☐	A small minority (< 25%)
1	☐	A large minority (25% - 50%)
2	☐	A small majority (51% – 75%)
3	☐	A large majority (> 75%)

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[48] The term "specific budget component" refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the overall budget.

Impact: empowering citizens

4.4.1 Informing/ educating citizens	How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?	
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action	How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?	
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people	How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?	
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.4.4. Empowering women	How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?	
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.4.5. Building social capital	To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of CS compare to those of non-members?	
Score	☑	
0	☐	Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.
1	☐	Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.
2	☐	Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.
3	☐	Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.
4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods	How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?	
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.

Impact: meeting societal needs

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision		How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly		How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?
Score	☑	
0	☐	No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.
1	☐	CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.
2	☐	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.
3	☐	Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalized groups		To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalized groups?
Score	☑	
0	☐	CSOs are less effective than the state.
1	☐	CSOs are as effective as the state.
2	☐	CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.
3	☐	CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.

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