State of Civil Society in Mongolia

(2004-2005)

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Mongolia

Center for Citizens' Alliance (former CEDAW Watch)/

ICSFD Ulaanbaatar Secretariat

Follow-Up Project to the International Civil Society Forum-2003 and the Fifth International Conference of New and Restored Democracies

FOREWORD

In December 2002, a group of pro-democracy and human rights NGOs were requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia to organize the International Civil Society Forum-2003 (ICSF-2003), in parallel to the Fifth International Conference of New and Restored Democracies (ICNRD-5).[1] Given that the one-party dominated 2000-2004 Government began its term by cracking down on media freedom and tightening the criminal code, the independent groups were initially wary of the above request. The NGO representatives openly stated that they would undertake the task only on the condition that the Government try to control the forum agenda and process in any way. Upon receiving Ministry officials' assurances that the NGOs would be ensured an independent space for the organization of the forum, the NGOs formed a National Core Group (NCG), elected the Center for Citizens' Alliance (then CEDAW Watch), as the ICSF-2003 Secretariat, and set about preparing for the ICSF-2003.[2]

Aside from organizing a productive and successful international forum, the NCG sought to maximize the positive impact of the ICSF-2003 preparatory and follow-up process on the Mongolian civil society development and democratic reforms. In this vein, the NCG organized a national pubic education campaign on civil society, democracy, human rights and good governance; conducted a civic journalism training for media professionals; and organized an theoretical workshop and a Civil Society Review round table discussion in order to clarify the use of the term 'civil society' in Mongolia, evaluate the development and current state of Mongolia's civil society and identify key strategic directions for future action towards strengthening civil society and more effectively promoting democratic reforms in Mongolia.

Significantly, the participants of the Civil Society Review round table discussion stressed the importance of developing a national democracy watch process and developing nationally owned democracy indicators for this purpose. These ideas were reflected in the outcome documents of both the Fifth ICNRD, the ICSF-2003 and the ICSF-2003 agenda, included a special session on the Civil Society Index (CSI) by CIVICUS. The Center for Citizens' Alliance (CCA) followed up on the contact established with CIVICUS during the ICSF-2003 and joined the group of civil society organizations (CSOs) committed to conducting the CSI assessment in their countries. Thus, in 2004, the Center for Citizens' Alliance undertook the organization and coordination of the CSI exercise in Mongolia as a first step towards the broader, long-term goal of institutionalizing a national democracy watch process. In this sense, the CSI exercise, the results of which are presented in this report, essentially represents a pilot project of crucial importance for developing nationally-owned democracy and civil society indicators and a suitable research methodology for implementing the national democracy watch.

[1] Both events took place in September, 2003, in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
[2] See Appendix XVI for the General Policies of the ICSF NCG.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Civil Society Index exercise was initiated and coordinated by the Center for Citizens' Alliance (former CEDAW Watch) as part of the follow-up activities aimed at implementing the recommendations of the International Civil Society Forum-2003 (ICSF-2003) and the Fifth International Conference of New and Restored Democracies (ICNRD-5).

This project would not have been possible without the dedicated work of the CSI Mongolia Team based at the Center for Citizens' Alliance. I would like to use this opportunity to thank our staff members, B. Bekhbat, S. Davaasuren and L. Bayarmaa, assistant O. Bayartuya and our two advisors, Mr. J. Enkhsaikhan and Ms. T. Undarya, for their hard work. Special thanks are due to Ms. T. Undarya for developing this report. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions made by the media monitoring team members, B. Bulgamaa, B. Myagmarjav and O. Bayartuya.

As any significant undertaking, the CSI project could not have been successfully undertaken without sufficient financial support. Therefore, I would like to thank our primary funders UNDP and USAID, as well as The Asia Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and CIVICUS for providing timely and much needed support for the various components of the CSI exercise.

The CSI project was closely linked with the process of developing Democratic Governance Indicators (DGIs) implemented by the ICNRD-5 Follow-Up Project Team, based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made an important contribution towards the successful implementation of the CSI exercise by promoting a mutually-reinforcing and complementary relation between the DGI Team and the CSI Team.

On behalf of the CSI Team in Mongolia, I would also like to extend our gratitude to the CIVICUS staff, particularly Mr. Navin Vasudev, Mr. Volkhart Finn Heinrich and Ms. Andria Hayes-Birchler, for the consistent technical support to the CSI Mongolia Team on the CSI methodology, process and other related issues.

The CSI exercise was a broadly cooperative and consultative process wherein the National Advisory Group (NAG) played a particularly important role. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of our NAG members for their generous investment of time, intellectual power and optimistic energy to this project, especially Mr. P. Ochirbat, First President of Mongolia and Board Chair of the Ochirbat Foundation, Mr. D. Lamjav, Head of the "Tsekh" NGO, Mr. Ts. Ganbold, Chair of the Department of Political Science of the Mongolian State University, Mr. S. Tserendorj, Commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission, Ms. D. Enkhjargal, Director of the National Center against Violence, Ms. Kh. Naranjargal, Head of the "Globe International" NGO, Mr. J. Batbold, President of the Union of Mongolian Non-Governmental Organizations, Ms. R. Urtnasan, Chair of the Department of Theater Arts of the Insititute of Arts and Culture, Ms. Sh. Jargalsaihan, Executive Director of the Mongolian AOUs' High Council, Mr. S. Nurdan, Head of the Nalaikh

District's Trade Union, Ms. B. Oyunbileg, Civil Society Expert, Ms. Ts. Oyuntsetseg, Executive Director of the Credit Union, Ms. E. Tuul, Civil Society Organizations' Coordinator of the Baganuur District, Mr. N. Sodnomdorj, President of the Mongolian Federation of Trade Unions, Ms. G. Undral, Director of the Democracy Education Center, Ms. Ch. Naranzul, Program officer of the Zorig Foundation and Ms. L. Itgel, Program Officer of The Asia Foundation.

Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the invaluable contributions made by each and every participant of the regional and national consultations, especially our colleagues from rural areas who overlooked the inconvenience of local travel on bumpy roads and crowded planes to take part in the CSI discussions and represent their partners who stayed behind. Without their active participation, the CSI exercise would have been extremely limited in its scope and impact as well as less fun.

J. Zanaa, Director
Center for Citizens' Alliance

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AOU	apartment owners' union
CCA	Center for Citizens' Alliance
CCE	Center for Citizen Education
CEDAW Watch	National CEDAW Watch Network Center
CHRD	Center for Human Rights and Development
CMES	Citizens' Movement for Ethical Society
CSO	civil society organization
CSS	community sample survey
DEMO Center	Democracy Education Center
DGIs	Democratic Governance Indicators
EGSPRS	Economic Growth Support and Poverty Reduction Strategy
HDI	human development index
ICNRD-5	5th International Conference of New and Restored Democracies
ICSF-2003	International Civil Society Forum 2003
ICSFD	International Civil Society Forum for Democracy
MAOUHC	Mongolian Apartment Owners' Unions' High Council
MDP	Mongolian Democratic Party
MFOS	Mongolian Foundation for Open Society
MJHA	Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs
MJPL	Movement for the Just Privatization of Land
MONES	Mongolian Women's Fund
MOSI	Mongolian Open Society Institute
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MRCA	Mongolian Red Cross Association
MSSL	Ministry of Social Security and Labor
MTUF	Mongolian Trade Unions' Federation
MWF	Mongolian Women's Federation
NAG	National Advisory Group
NCAV	National Center against Violence
NCG	National Core Group
NCTI	National Chamber of Trade and Industry
NGO	non-governmental organization
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NIT	National Index Team
NPO	non-profit organization
NSO	National Statistical Office
OFS	Open Forum Society
PEA	Political Education Academy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RSC	regional stakeholder consultation
SCC	savings and credit cooperative
TAF	The Asia Foundation
UMENGO	Union of Mongolian Environmental NGOs
WSP	Women for Social Progress Movement

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From 2004-2005, the Center for Citizens' Alliance (formerly the National CEDAW Watch Network Center), a Mongolian NGO that functioned as the ICSFD Secretariat, undertook the assessment of the state of civil society in Mongolia using the Civil Society Index (CSI) methodology, developed by the international civil society network CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.[3] The CSI was conducted with guidance from CIVICUS and with the broad participation of national civil society stakeholders. It is part of a broader, long-term effort to institutionalize a democracy watch system in Mongolia, based on the development of an appropriate methodology and nationally-owned indicators. The need for such a system was stressed by Mongolian civil society leaders at the 2003 Civil Society Review Round Table Discussion[4] and reflected in the outcome documents of the International Civil Society Forum-2003 and the Fifth International Conference of New and Restored Democracies.[5]

The CSI was conducted in Mongolia between September 2004 and October 2005and produced the first comprehensive study of the state of civil society in the country. Unlike most existing assessments of Mongolian civil society, the CSI research was initiated and conducted by Mongolian civil society activists, involved a broad range of CSOs and civil society activists and used a variety of methods and data sources, with a specific focus on information and analyses produced by Mongolian citizens. The assessment relied heavily on methods of collective analysis, such as the community survey and the regional stakeholder survey and produced concrete strategic recommendations and an action plan for further strengthening Mongolia's civil society. It also significantly fostered CSOs' capacity for collective analysis and action. Furthermore, the assessment used a broad definition of civil society, including trade unions, apartment owners' unions, political parties, chambers of commerce and community groups, among others. In that sense, the current report is more inclusive than other civil society studies of Mongolia, even though NGOs did figure prominently in the study. Within the scope of this action-oriented research, the CSI Mongolia Team systematically collected a wealth of qualitative and quantitative data along 70 indicators. This data was then used by the National Advisory Group (NAG), consisting of diverse civil society stakeholders, to score the indicators and produce an overall

Figure 1: Civil Society Diamond - Mongolia



[3] At the second ICSF-2003 Steering Committee Meeting in New York, on 28-29 February 2004, the title of the international process was formally modified as the International Civil Society Forum for Democracy (ICSFD).
[4] The RTD was held on 14-15 August 2003, with financial support from The Asia Foundation's Mongolia Office and the National Human Rights Commission. It was attended by 78 civil society leaders representing diverse civil society sectors. See Appendix XII for the Narrative Report on the RTD.
[5] These parallel events took place in September 2003, in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. See Appendices XIV and XV for the outcome documents.

assessment of the state of civil society in Mongolia along the CSI's four key dimensions: structure, environment, values and impact. The result of this assessment is visually represented by the Civil Society Diamond for Mongolia. As the Civil Society Diamond shows, civil society in Mongolia is still in a nascent stage of development and operating in a largely disabling environment, but is driven by rather strong positive values.

The CSI assessment also revealed that the civil society arena in Mongolia is increasingly diverse and vibrant, with a growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots groups and social movements. However, it still bears strong traces of the socialist period, primarily manifested in the continued influence of inherited mass organizations, as well as the wide-spread state-cantered attitude among average citizens and a significant number of civil society actors.[6] These features and the heterogeneity of the Mongolian civil society have often been obscured, intentionally and unintentionally, by the indiscriminate use of the term 'non-governmental organization' (NGO) with regard to all organizations formally covered by the 1997 NGO Law, as well as, separate laws for the Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, the Red Cross Association and the Apartment Owners' Unions, regardless of the nature of their relationship to the state. When, later on, the term 'civil society' become more popular, its introduction did not add much conceptual clarity to the definition of civil society's boundaries, make-up and the nature of its relationship to the state, family and market. The term was used interchangeably with the existing term 'NGOs', denoting only a small subset of civil society actors as well as referring both to organizations that in fact act as the extension of the state's coercive power as well as citizens' groups that are de facto non-governmental, i.e. independent of the state. In this regard, the CSI assessment brought greater clarity to the heterogeneous nature of civil society and existing state-CSO relations in evaluating the overall state of civil society in Mongolia.[7]

The examination of civil society's STRUCTURE (score: 1.2) showed that, although the overall level of people's participation in civil society remains rather low, there are strong signs of increasing grassroots mobilization in both rural and urban areas, in response to the harmful social and environmental impact of mining and construction companies' operations. The greater opening of the political space following the 2004 parliamentary elections also spurred numerous public protests and demonstrations organized by mass movements demanding government accountability and social equity. Most civil society activities, however, are concentrated in the capital city where most well established and professional CSOs, especially NGOs, are located. Rural civil society remains sorely underdeveloped, due to the lack of crucial resources, especially financial support and information. Rural citizens, especially herders, poor people and ethnic and religious minorities are generally under-represented at CSO leadership levels while women are not only adequately represented in most types of CSOs but in fact dominate in the leadership of issue-oriented, well established NGOs. There are strong trends for increasing inter- and intra-sectoral cooperation among CSOs, but the issue of the effectiveness and legitimacy of umbrella organizations remains contentious, due to the continued

[6] A well developed network of mass organizations guided by the Party-State.
[7] Appendix III presents scores for each indicator, sub-dimension and dimension.

predominance of inherited hierarchical structures in this area. Moreover, while inherited mass organizations are largely financially sustainable as well as able to benefit significantly from state resources at national and local levels, the financial sustainability of independent human rights and pro-democracy NGOs, in both urban and rural areas, is still extremely fragile as they continue to be almost exclusively dependent on foreign funding.

The study indicated that the external ENVIRONMENT of Mongolia's civil society (score: 1.1) is largely disabling. The rather hostile political context marked by the domination and repression of society by the state, excessive centralization, widespread corruption in the government and the strong entrenchment of oligarchic power constitute the main obstacles to civil society's development. Frequent violations of human rights, widespread poverty and unemployment, absence of a strong middle class, considerable urban-rural development gap and significant social problems, such as alcoholism, crime and violence further obstruct the development of civil society. On the more positive side, the legal framework for the operation of most CSOs, including political parties, human rights NGOs and anti-corruption and pro-democracy mass movements has so far been rather liberal, backed by the democratic Constitution of 1992. However, the Ministry of Justice is advocating for a new law on non-profit organizations that has a high potential to undermine independent citizen action, especially on more political issues such as demanding government accountability, countering oligarchic economic interests and combating the use of torture by law-enforcement institutions. The nature of state-civil society relations clearly differs by the branch and level of government and by the type of the CSO concerned. Nevertheless, on the whole, both state-civil society and private sector-civil society relations were assessed as largely unproductive.

The assessment of civil society's VALUES was more positive (score: 1.7). It showed that overall CSOs, especially NGOs and social movements, display a significant degree of commitment to promoting democracy, government accountability, non-violence, gender equality, poverty alleviation and environmental protection. However, the research showed there is a general lack of consistent application of democratic and humanitarian values and principles in the internal practice of CSOs, especially in terms of ensuring internal democracy, financial transparency, gender equitable hiring and promotion policies and non-violence. Political parties, apartment owners' unions and inherited mass organizations, including trade unions, were generally regarded as less democratic and transparent and, in some cases, prone to corruption and intolerance based on political affiliations.

Overall, despite clear and important examples of success in legislative advocacy, direct service, public education and empowerment of various social groups, especially women, the CSI assessed the IMPACT of civil society as somewhat limited (score: 1.4). As a NAG member put it, CSOs are generally unable to effectively convert their efforts and values into direct impact, due to the unfavourable political and economic environment. The CSI demonstrated that CSOs were especially active and had impact in areas of empowerment of various groups, through non-formal education, information dissemination and awareness-

raising activities, particularly with regard to promoting women's rights and gender equality. They are also more successful in policy advocacy on human rights and gender equality but have not been very effective in holding the state and corporations accountable. It is also clear that CSOs provide crucial services to underprivileged and marginalized citizens such as free legal aid, psychological counselling, services for battered women and children and non-formal education for poor children. Unfortunately, most of these services are limited in scope and are often irregular.

The CSI exercise not only produced the first comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society in Mongolia, but also provided a major impetus to the development of civil society in Mongolia, by fostering a higher degree of integration and mutual trust among diverse sectors of Mongolia's civil society and by helping develop a common strategic vision for strengthening Mongolian civil society nationally, beyond the boundaries of a few urban centres. Civil society stakeholders that participated in the CSI assessment agreed to cooperate towards establishing an effective civil society 'justice system[8]' starting with the establishment of ethical self-regulatory mechanisms for CSOs, developing a national civil society network of information and communication with an emphasis on *aimag* to *aimag* sharing of experience and equitable distribution of information from Ulaanbaatar to aimag. They also came up with an idea of working out an innovative, non-hierarchical, partnership-based approach to community empowerment and democracy promotion entitled "Islands of Freedom" and emphasized the need to build CSOs' monitoring, research and analytical skills to increase their capacity to hold the State and corporations accountable and combat corruption. Furthermore, the stakeholders agreed to cooperation on promoting institutional, financial and technical capacity of CSOs with a special emphasis on rural CSOs and relations between local legislatures and local civil society; and mobilizing support for rural civil society stakeholders to create and/or strengthen aimag, regional and national civil society councils to improve cohesion, coordination and cooperation among CSOs.

Finally, the participants deemed it useful to undertake CSI exercises at local level in each of the aimags in order to examine more closely each of the contexts, regional differences, support better coordination and cooperation among local CSOs, increase their capacity for collective action and analysis and help develop strategies and action plans better suited to the local context. In addition, aimag CSIs shall enable national comparison of aimags by their level of civil society development, which can help spur competition among aimgs to score better on this indicator and hold local government more accountable on the issue of promoting democracy, human rights and civil society at the local level.

Thus, the CSI project provides Mongolian civil society with a collectively generated and owned roadmap for future actions directed at effectively fostering the development of a civil, democratic and humane society in Mongolia, which is the prime goal stated in the 1992 democratic Constitution of Mongolia.

[8] The term 'justice' is a direct translation from Mongolian. It is about fairness and justice and hence carries a more moral and spiritual connotation than the word 'accountability', which is usually used in this context.

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the findings of the Civil Society Index (CSI) project undertaken in 2004-2005 by the Center for Citizens' Alliance (National CEDAW Watch Network Center) within the framework of the follow-up activities to the International Civil Society Forum-2003 and the 5th International Conference of New and Restored Democracies and as part of an overall effort to develop nationally-owned democracy indicators and institutionalize a national democracy watch process.[9] The need for the latter was stressed at the August 2003 Civil Society Review round table discussion of Mongolia's leading civil society actors.[10]

The CSI methodology was developed by CIVICUS, based on the experiences and efforts in a large and diverse number of countries regarding the assessment and analysis of the state of civil society. It can be described as a participatory action-oriented research project, since it aims not only at developing a comprehensive assessment of the overall civil society development in the country but also at improving national and local CSOs' organizational and analytical capacity as well as developing concrete strategies and collective action plans for increasing civil society's capacity to contribute to the country's development and democratic governance.

In each country the CSI is implemented by a National Coordinating Organisation (NCO).[11] It is guided by a National Advisory Group (NAG) that consists of diverse civil society representatives and other stakeholders.[12] The NCO received technical support and guidance from the CSI project team at CIVICUS. The NCO – the Center for Citizens' Alliance in Mongolia - collected and synthesized data and information on civil society from a variety of primary and secondary sources. This information was employed by the NAG to score the 74 CSI indicators, which together provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society. The findings were then discussed at a national workshop, where civil society stakeholders identify specific strengths and weaknesses of civil society as well as develop recommendations on how to strengthen civil society. The international CSI project team at CIVICUS provides training, technical assistance and quality control to the NCO throughout the project implementation.

The CSI is an international comparative project currently involving more than 50 countries from around the world. The need for comparability between different countries and contexts is a source of a certain tension between country-specific knowledge and knowledge comparable cross-nationally on a global scale. CIVICUS sought to resolve this tension by making it possible to adapt the methodology and the set of more than 70 indicators to country-specific factors. While this is a very useful aspect of the CSI, the CCA and NAG found it difficult to modify the methodology and analytical framework to adapt to Mongolia's context without prior experience of undertaking CSI or a similar exercise. Such knowledge was developed during the implementation of the CSI. Therefore, the CCA generally followed closely the CSI toolkit instructions.

[9] See Appendices XIII-XV for more on this.
[10] See Appendix XII.
[11] See Appendix IV for the National Index Team Members' list.

The CSI exercise represents the first systematic attempt to produce a comprehensive analysis of the state of civil society in Mongolia and develop sorely needed programs to strengthen civil society nation-wide, going beyond the capital city. The exercise has achieved significant success on both accounts as this report shall demonstrate. Throughout the CSI exercise, CCA made a conscious and concerted effort to ensure broad and diverse participation from different civil society sectors, levels of government, private sector, media and funding community as contributors both to the collection and analysis of information.

Structure of the Publication

Section I, "The CSI Project: Background and Approach", provides a detailed history of the CSI, its conceptual framework and research methodology.[13]

Section II, "Civil Society in Mongolia," provides an historical overview of civil society's development in Mongolia, the ways in which the concept of civil society is understood and applied by Mongolians and key features of the country context. It also describes the definition employed by the CSI project in Mongolia, provides the mapping of civil society and social forces conducted by the NAG and sketches the make-up of the country's civil society

Section III, the main body of the report entitled "Analysis of Civil Society" is divided into four parts - Structure, Environment, Values and Impact – which correspond to the four main dimensions of the CSI. The section contains narrative descriptions of each indicator, sub-dimension and dimension and provides their assessment.

Section IV, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Mongolian Civil Society" presents ideas and opinions highlighted by the civil society stakeholders that participated in the diverse components of the CSI exercise.

Section V, "Recommendations and Next Steps" presents recommendations and the strategic action plan developed by the participants of the Regional and National Consultations of Civil Society Stakeholders towards the strengthening of civil society and democracy in the country.

The Conclusion summarizes key findings of the CSI research project and their implications for the future development of civil society in Mongolia.

Finally, appendices contain more detailed information on some of the components of the CSI exercise and other relevant materials.

[12] See Appendix V for the List of NAG members.
[13] See also Appendix II for the Scoring Matrix and Appendix I for the Chart of CSI Steps and Components.

I. CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT AND APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world.[14] To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index. In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept.[15] The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its latest current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners have implemented the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1.1).

Table I.1.1: Countries that participated in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005[16]

1. Argentina	19. Germany	38. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Ghana	39. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Greece	40. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Guatemala	41. Russia
5. Bulgaria	23. Honduras	42. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Hong Kong (VR China)	43. Serbia
7. Chile	25. Indonesia	44. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Italy	45. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Jamaica	46. South Korea
10. Croatia	28. Lebanon	47. Taiwan
11. Cyprus[17]	29. Macedonia	48. Togo
12. Czech Republic	30. Mauritius	49. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Mongolia	50. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Montenegro	51. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Nepal	52. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Netherlands	53. Vietnam
17. Gambia	35. Nigeria	54. Wales
18. Georgia	36. Northern Ireland	
	37. Orissa (India)	

In Mongolia, the project was implemented from October 2004 to October 2005 by the Center for Citizens' Alliance (then CEDAW Watch), which performed as the Secretariat for the International Civil Society Forum for Democracy (ICSFD). CCA was first introduced to the CSI methodology at the International Civil Society Forum-2003 during a special session, organized and led by Mr. Navin Vasudev from CIVICUS. The CCA staff resolved that the implementation of the CSI project in Mongolia would prove to be an important and useful step towards the development of nationally-owned democracy indicators for the institutionalization of a national democracy watch process. Hence, Ms. J. Zanaa, Director of the CCA, applied to join the 2003-2005 CSI

[14] CIVICUS, *The New Civic Atlas. Profiles of Civil Society in 60 Countries* (Washington, DC: CIVICUS, 1997).
[15] Helmut K. Anheier, *Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy* (2004).
[16] This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted as of June 2006.

implementation phase and CIVICUS accepted CCA's application. Consequently, Ms. J. Zanaa and Dr. J. Enkhsaikhan, ICSFD Advisor, took part in CIVICUS CSI training workshop in February 2004 in Johannesburg, South Africa and project activities began in earnest in October 2004 once sufficient funding was secured for the ICSF-2003 and ICNRD-5 follow-up activities.

2. Project Approach and Methodology

The CSI uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a broad range of research methods. At the core of the CSI lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of sub-dimensions, which again are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI data collection, which includes secondary sources, a population survey, regional stakeholder consultations, a media review and a series of case studies. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by a National Advisory Group (NAG). The research and assessment findings are discussed at a gathering of key stakeholders, whose task is to identify specific strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations on key priority actions to strengthen civil society. The CSI project approach, conceptual framework and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.

2.1 Conceptual Framework

Definition of Civil Society

CIVICUS defines civil society as "the arena outside of the family, the sate and the market where people associate to advance common interests."[18] The definition stresses the political nature of civil society as the CSI exercise is interested in the power dynamics between the state and civil society as well as within the civil society arena between different social groups. At the core of the definition lies the ability and freedom of citizens to bond with each other and undertake collective action vis-à-vis the state, market forces and other entities with a view to improving their living conditions and advancing common interests.

The CSI definition has two other interesting features. First, by conceptualizing civil society as an arena, rather than a set of organizations, it strives to go beyond the usual focus on formal and institutionalised CSOs, to take into account informal coalitions, groups and various types of informal collective action. Second, while civil society is sometimes perceived as a sphere in which positive activities and values reign, the CSI adopts a rather broad understanding of common interests without strictly imposing normative criteria. Thereby the definition allows for the inclusion of negative manifestations of civil society such as nationalist and anti-democratic groups in the assessment. Furthermore, on the account of values and norms, the CSI assesses not only the extent to

[17] The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

[18] CIVICUS, *CIVICUS Civil Society Index Toolkit* (distributed at the Global Workshop for National Coordinating Organizations, 14-20 February 2004, Johannesburg, South Africa).

which CSOs support democracy and tolerance at the societal level but also the extent to which they themselves are intolerant or even violent.

Analyzing the State of Civil Society

The CSI examines and assesses the state of civil society along four main dimensions:

- The ***structure*** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external ***environment*** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state as well as the private sector);
- The ***values*** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance, gender equality or protection of the environment) and
- The ***impact*** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. impact on public policy, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of sub-dimensions, which contain a total of 74 indicators.[19] These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report. A wealth of quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources is collected and compiled along each indicator. Then the indicators are scored by the National Advisory Group (NAG). Indicator scores are aggregated into sub-dimension scores and sub-dimension scores are then aggregated into dimension scores. Finally, based on the dimension scores, a Civil Society Diamond (see figure 2 for an example) is constructed for the country or region under study, accompanied by a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the state of civil society in the country or region.[20]

Figure I.2.1: Civil Society Diamond Tool



The Diamond visually presents the scores of the four main dimensions and summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society in the given context. It captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions and can serve as a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about how civil society looks like in a given country. As the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot and should not be used to rank countries according to their scores on the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore

[19] See Appendices II and III.
[20] The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier 2004).

lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time as well as compare the state of civil societies across countries.[21]

2.2 Project Methodology

The CSI project used the following methods to collect and aggregate the necessary data.

Data Collection

The CSI recognized that, in order to generate a valid and comprehensive assessment of civil society, a variety of perspectives and data should be included – insider, external stakeholder and outsider views, as well as objective data ranging from the local, regional to the national level. The CSI therefore relies on a combination of primary and secondary research and a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection. These include: a review of existing information, regional stakeholder consultations, sociological surveys, media monitoring, in-depth interviews with key informers and case studies.

It is believed that this mix of different methods is essential to generate accurate and useful data and information, but also to accommodate the variations of civil society, for example in rural vs. urban areas. Also, the CSI seeks to utilize all available sources of information to avoid 're-inventing research wheels' and wasting scarce resources. Lastly, the research methodology is explicitly designed to promote learning and, ultimately, action on the part of participants. Besides feeding into the final national-level consultation and final research report, the data collection processes also aim to contribute to participant learning. This is done, for example, through group-based approaches that challenge participants to engage in a collective analysis of civil society in a systematic fashion, see themselves as part of a "bigger picture," think beyond their own organisational or sectoral contexts, reflect strategically about relations within and between civil society and other parts of society, identify key strengths and weaknesses of civil society at local and national levels, assess collective needs and chart out possibilities and directions for future collective action.

It is important to note that while the CSI strives to be sensitive to regional, sectoral and other differences within the civil society arena, it is not designed to exhaustively describe the specifics of the various civil society actors active, but rather provides an aggregate assessment of the needs of civil society as a whole. At the same time, it attempts to examine power relations within civil society and between civil society and other sectors and identify key civil society actors when looking at specific indicators under the structure, values and impact dimensions.

Following the overall methodological guidelines of the CSI Toolkit, the Mongolian CSI team implemented the following research tools:

- ***Secondary research:*** The project team began with a review of information from the many existing studies and research projects on civil society and various related subjects and synthesised this in an overview report on the state of civil society in Mongolia. Further, more in-depth review of secondary

[21] Anheier, 2004.

sources was conducted contemporaneously with the development of the first draft report to fill in the gaps and/or complement the primary research findings.

- ***Primary research:***
  1. *Civil Society Mapping Exercise:* In October 2004, the NAG undertook a mapping of civil society based on the proximity of different CSOs or CSO groups to the centre of power (the State) and the extent of influence their wield in society.
  2. *Regional stakeholder survey:* During March and April, 2005, representatives from CSOs, government, business and other stakeholders were surveyed in six selected regions. A total of 123 questionnaires were sent out to select persons (see below) and 97 questionnaires were returned.
  3. *Regional stakeholder consultations:* During March and April 2005, the same people from the same six regions were invited to participate in Regional Stakeholder Consultations. The participants were carefully selected based on a list of specific criteria including the person's involvement in and commitment to civil society, gender, age, partisan affiliation, sector of civil society, type of organization and core employment. An explicit effort was made in order to invite a diverse and appropriate mix of people representing civil society, local government, media and private sector. Four of the consultations were conducted in rural areas while two were conducted in the central area including the capital city due to the high concentration of population in this area. Consultations lasted a day and a half and the discussions evolved based on the results of the above survey and along the CSI dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators. Each consultation included a dynamic session on future collective action and regional networking. A total of 123 persons participated in the regional consultations.[22]
  4. *Community sample surveys:* From February through April 2005, 497 adults were surveyed in 6 communities representing the following six community types: urban-central, urban-peripheral, rural-central, rural-peripheral, rural-farming and rural-herding. Questions were asked regarding their membership in CSOs, the level of charitable giving and volunteering and their opinions on the role of CSOs. Although the CSI Toolkit advised that a minimum of 1,000 people be interviewed for this survey, due to the sparsely population nature of the Mongolian population in rural areas and the rudimentary infrastructure, it was financially and humanly impossible to undertake a bigger study within the limits of the project. Therefore, in consultation with CIVICUS, the project team aimed at including 100 people in each of the central areas (capital city and aimag centres) and 50 people in each of the rural remote areas (soums).[23]
  5. *Media monitoring:* From 15 February to 15 April 2005, five media sources (2 TV channels, 2 newspapers and the National Radio) were monitored over a period of two months regarding their coverage of civil society actors, activities and related topics.[24]

[22] See Appendices VI and VII for more information.
[23] Appendix VIII presents the community types and samples.
[24] Appendix IX presents the media image of civil society that emerged from the media review.

6. *In-depth interviews and additional fact-finding:* Around 20 interviews in person and on the phone were conducted on specific issues which emerged through the various research activities. Often, the meetings and interviews were combined with the collection of additional print materials, which fed into the additional secondary source review during the drafting of the final report.
7. *Participant observation and eye witness accounts:* As the project team was comprised of activist organizations and individuals that are deeply embedded in Mongolia's civil society, the data collection and analysis was further enriched by the rich first-hand experience and eye-witness accounts of the project team members themselves. This method, though not explicitly mentioned in the CSI Toolkit, was deemed useful and appropriate in line with the latest developments in ethnographic studies, which situate the scholar/observer in the local context and value first-person accounts of events as valid ethnographic data.

Data Aggregation

The various data sources are collated and synthesized by the CSI project team in a draft country report, which is structured along the CSI indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions. This report presents the basis for the indicator scoring exercise carried out by the NAG. In this exercise, each score is rated on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 being the minimum score and 3 being the most positive assessment. The scoring of each indicator is based on a short description of the indicator and a mostly qualitatively defined scale of scores from 0 to 3.[25] This NAG scoring exercise is modelled along a "citizen jury" approach (Jefferson Centre 2002), in which citizens come together to deliberate and make decisions on public issues based on a set of presented facts. The NAG's role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the data (or evidence) presented by the National Index Team in form of the draft country report.

In Mongolia, the NCO organized a day and a half retreat for the NAG members. For each section, NAG members first voted on the dimension score, then on the sub-dimension score and then they scored each indicator individually. In cases NAG members' scores differed widely, in-depth discussions took place to clarify the indicator, its conceptualization, data and evaluation. Subsequently, the members recast their votes on the given indicator, often changing the score that was originally given. Then, an average of these scores was calculated for each indicator, from which the sub-dimension score was derived. This sub-dimension score was compared to the originally given sub-dimension score. If the two scores matched or did not differ widely, the score derived from the indicator scores was automatically adopted. In case, the two scores diverged widely, NAG members discussed the reasons for this diversion and in few cases resolved to review some of the indicator scores. The dimension score was then derived from the sub-dimension scores through averaging and, in a similar fashion, compared to the dimension score given by the NAG at the onset. If there were significant divergences, their reasons were explored through an open discussion but the scores derived

[25] See Scoring Matrix in Appendix II.

from sub-dimension scores were automatically adopted. The final scores of the four dimensions (structure, environment, values and impact) were plotted to generate the Civil Society Diamond for Mongolia.

The NAG scoring process was rather intense given the amount of work that needed to be done within the short period of time and the difficulties in scoring a number of the indicators due to the diverse experiences and viewpoints of the NAG members, novelty of the CSI exercise and, at times, insufficient or vague data. At the end of the scoring exercise, the NAG also spent some time discussing and interpreting the shape of the Civil Society Diamond as well as the probable causal relations among the scores for the four dimensions.

The results of the NAG scoring meeting were presented at the National Consultation and participants were provided with an opportunity to verify, approve or, if necessary, change specific indicator, sub-dimension and dimension scores. The participants raised a number of issues with regard to the validity of the scores. These issues mainly arose in cases when the conceptualization of the indicator was unclear and/or there was no sufficient consensus on a particular interpretation of the indicator as well as when regional differences, especially the rural-urban divide, figured prominently. Thus, for example, a number of participants maintained that Mongolia is in fact experiencing a state of social crisis, as evidenced by the high rate of violence, crime and alcoholism. However, it was unclear whether the current situation would be defined as social crisis from the point of view of the CSI analytical framework. Important regional differences spurred heated debates among participants regarding indicators on CSOs' foreign relations and corporate social responsibility. At the end, the National Consultation participants voted to change scores for indicators on corruption within civil society, internal democracy of CSOs and socio-economic crisis.[26]

The scores given by the NAG and the National Consultation participants were further compared with the scores given by CIVICUS and, in some cases, adjustments were made to ensure the validity and comparability of the scores.

2.3 Linking Research with Action

The CSI is not a strictly academic research project. It aims not only at developing a comprehensive assessment of the overall civil society development in the country or region but also at improving national and local CSOs' organizational and analytical capacity as well as developing concrete strategies and collective action plans for increasing civil society's capacity to contribute to the country's development and democratic governance. The CSI methodology seeks to achieve these goals through broadly consultative and participatory components built into the overall process.

The overall research process is guided by the NAG, which consists of diverse civil society stakeholders.[27] In Mongolia, NAG discussions, coordinated by the NCO, achieved not only a common conceptual

[26] See Appendix XI for an excerpt from the Report on the National Consultation.
[27] See Appendix V for the list of NAG members.

understanding of civil society and the purpose and process of the CSI exercise but also helped strengthen a shared identity based on a sense of a common, broadly-defined mission to promote the development of a humane and democratic society in Mongolia. The Mongolian NCO was able to rely on the NAG members as well as other connections in order to identify committed, responsible and diverse participants for the Regional Stakeholder Consultations. The members of the NAG also helped raise the profile of the CSI exercise in Mongolia by, for example, participating in TV programs on the CSI process and outcomes. Furthermore, NAG members, many of whom are experienced and recognized civil society leaders, served as important resource people during the National Consultation. Their presence and participation had an indirect but important impact of further inspiring and encouraging grassroots and rural civil society stakeholders. Committed participation of key NAG members in guiding the CSI exercise and conducting the National Consultation also increased the sense of a broader ownership by the Mongolian civil society of the research findings and strategic action plans produced as a result of the CSI exercise.

Regional Stakeholder Consultations (RSCs), thanks to their participatory nature and emphasis on teamwork, provide a major impetus to the strengthening of inter-sectoral and regional-level communication and cooperation among civil society stakeholders and help build their analytical capacity. In Mongolia, due to the conscious effort made to ensure the diversity of participants including by their partisan affiliations and a parallel effort on the part of the coordinators to build the participants' trust in the non-partisan nature of the CSI process, the RSCs proved to be exciting and dynamic processes that significantly promoted mutual trust and understanding among the stakeholders across various divisions, most importantly those informed by political ideologies[28]. The coordinators also took this opportunity to consciously mitigate the urban-rural cultural divide as well as the boundaries between organizers and participants. This was done during the formal sessions by the equal participation of team members in the different break-out sessions as well as through the informal dinner banquets organized at the end of the first day. Given the rather reserved nature of Mongolians, these informal events with singing, joke-telling, poetry-reading and dancing made an extremely important contribution to promoting a friendly and relaxed atmosphere among the RSC participants by allowing them to connect to each other on a simple human level.

Very significantly, the CSI researchers' presentations and discussions, carefully guided along the CSI analytical framework, complemented by hand-out materials, greatly improved participants' knowledge and understanding of different aspects of civil society and enhanced their ability to individually and collectively analyse the state of civil society and democracy in their local contexts, as well as at the national level. Each RSC included a dynamic and interactive session on developing concrete strategic plans for collective actions, at, regional and national levels, aimed at strengthening civil society and promoting democracy and protection of human rights. RSCs went a long way to helping rural stakeholders to develop a sense of common purpose and shared identity.

The National Consultation that brought together diverse civil society stakeholders from all over the country built on the momentum created by the NAG consultations and, most importantly, by the RSCs as many of the RSC participants were invited to take part in the National Consultation.[29] In order to encourage networking, inclusiveness, democratic decision-making and broad-based information-sharing among CSOs at aimag levels, in selecting participants for the National Consultation, the NCO contacted its partners in rural areas and requested that local civil society stakeholders consult among themselves to select one to two representatives from their aimag to send to the National Consultation. In aimags, where the civil society councils or networks were still weak, this process did not go smoothly. In such cases, the NCO exercised its right to select participants from the aimag. Overall, the method proved effective and had an added impact of enhancing a sense of accountability on the part of those who came to Ulaanbaatar representing not only themselves as individuals or their organizations but a broader network of civil society stakeholders. These measures further encouraged the stakeholders to see the bigger picture, going beyond their parochial interests and identities and think more strategically about promoting civil society, valuing partnerships and cooperation with other organizations and individuals.

The National Consultation helped further strengthen the analytical capacity of the stakeholders by engaging them in a critical discussion of and reflection on, the results of the CSI research. The National Consultation helped the participants arrive at a common understanding of civil society at conceptual and empirical levels and develop a shared view of the major challenges faced by civil society stakeholders. Based on this common understanding, the participants finalized a strategic plan of action for the promotion of civil society development and democracy in Mongolia. The significance of the plan of action is not only in charting concrete activities and programs but in providing a roadmap, i.e. general directions for strategic intervention by individual CSOs or coalitions of civil society stakeholders. This roadmap is already proving to be a useful basis for fostering independent actions by rural stakeholders.[30]

2.4 Project Outputs

The CSI exercise in Mongolia produced a number of important outputs including the following:

- A comprehensive report on the state of civil society in Mongolia in both English and Mongolian;
- A collectively produced and broadly shared Strategic Plan of Action for the strengthening of civil society, supporting democratic reforms and promoting the protection of human rights in Mongolia;
- A set of Recommendations for civil society stakeholders for the strengthening of civil society in Mongolia;
- A press conference on key findings of the CSI research;
- A 40-minute TV talk-show on the CSI exercise and its follow-up activities with the participation of rural activists and key NAG members including the First President of Mongolia;

[28] See Appendix VII for the list of RSC participants.
[29] See Appendix X for the list of participants.
[30] See Section V for more detailed information on the action plan.

- Publication of several news items in newspapers and a civil society journal on the process and outcome of the CSI project in Mongolia;
- Development of a number of manuals in Mongolian on the different components of the CSI exercise in Mongolian (e.g. on Conducting Regional Stakeholder Consultations, Community Sample Surveys, Media Monitoring, CSI Analytical Framework, Conducting the National Consultation);
- Several in-depth reports on the different research and consultation components and stages of the CSI process and
- Six Regional Stakeholder Consultations involving a total of over 120 people and a National Consultation involving over 70 participants.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN MONGOLIA

1. KEY FEATURES OF THE MONGOLIAN CONTEXT

Mongolia is a landlocked Asian country sandwiched between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. With a population of approximately 2.5 million and a territory of 1.5 million square kilometres, Mongolia is one of the least densely populated countries in the world. This is especially true outside of the increasingly over-populated capital city of Ulaanbaatar, which supports more than 1/3 of the total population. That the urban human development index (HDI) is higher than the rural HDI by 14% is indicative of the significant development gap between urban and rural areas.[31] The literacy rate is high at 97.8%, among adults over the age of 15. Racially and ethnically, Mongolia is largely homogenous with 81.5% of the population being Khalkh while the Kazakh constitute the main ethnic minority at 4.3%.[32] There is no statistical data on religion, but it is assumed that the majority of the population are religious or cultural Buddhists while the Muslims, Christians and people of other faiths are very small minorities.[33] The official language is Mongolian.[34]

Figure II.1.1: Country Profile

Country size: 1,564,116 sq. km.
Population: 2,533.1 thousand
Urban population: 1,498.2 thousand
Average life expectancy: 64.6 years
Infant mortality rate: 22.3
Form of government: Parliamentary Democracy (majoritarian electoral system)
Freedom House Democracy rating: Free
Seats in parliament held by women: 6.7%
Official Language: Mongolian
Ethnicity: Khalkh 81.5%, Kazakh 4.3%, other 14.2%
Religion: majority considered Buddhist, Muslim and Christian minorities
HDI Score & Ranking: 0.679 (117th)
GDP per capita: 422 USD
Official poverty rate: 36.1%
Unemployment rate: 24.7%

In 1989-1990, Mongolia embarked on a dual transition to liberal democracy and market economy, after approximately 70 years of socialist dictatorship as a satellite of the USSR. The process of the institutionalization of a parliamentary democracy was impressively peaceful, as well as effective, resulting in

[31] By the 2002 data, the HDI is 0.723 in cities and 0.636 in rural areas. See: Government of Mongolia and UNDP, *Mongolia's Human Development Report 2003* (Ulaanbaatar), 24.
[32] National Statistical Office, *2000 Population and Housing Census: The Main Results* (Ulaanbaatar, July 2001), 50.
[33] The post-socialist period has seen the revitalization of the traditional religions as well as the shamanist practices. The dominant religion among the Kazakh minority is Islam but not all Mongolian Kazakhs consider themselves religious. Christianity was mainly introduced in the post-socialist period by foreign missionaries.
[34] Figure 3 gives the Country Profile in Brief based on official statistics. Most of the data were derived from: ICNRD-5 Follow-Up Project (based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia), *Country Information Note for Mongolia* (Ulaanbaatar, 2006). It should be noted that many civil society actors prefer not to rely on official statistics as they give extremely low estimates of poverty and poverty- related data. Thus, some research CSOs such as the Gender Center for Sustainable Development estimates the actual poverty rate at a minimum of 50% with 60-70% in most districts of Ulaanbaatar (interview with the Gender Center for Sustainable Development).A difficulty was encountered in searching for a realistic assessment of the unemployment rate. The official figure is 3.6%, which is based only on people who voluntarily register with the unemployment bureau. A 2004 report stated the unemployment rate is 6.6%. See: National Statistical Office, World Bank and UNDP, *Core Report on Household Income, Expenditure and Living Standards Sample Survey* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 59. The unemployment rate stated in Figure 3 is based on the 2000 census. See: Ministry of Finance and UNDP, *Gender Analysis of the Budget in the Employment Sector. Research Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 40.

the adoption of a democratic constitution guaranteeing human rights and freedoms,[35] a functioning government formed through regular and largely free and fair popular elections, emergence of a multi-party system, NGO sector, independent media and religious organizations.[36] Democratic consolidation, however, remains a challenge with low levels of civic engagement and education, weak and dependent judiciary and high levels of corruption, combined with a lack of government openness and transparency, increasingly solidified domination of the MPRP, vis-à-vis a weak and fragmented opposition, irresponsible party politics and unethical journalism, accompanied by growing partisan polarization and general disillusionment in national politics.[37] Regressive trends, compared to the previous democratic gains, were observed particularly strongly during the 2000-2004 parliamentary period dominated by MPRP.[38]

The political situation is set against expanding and deepening poverty despite substantial improvements in the domestic economy after the deep crisis of the 1990s. Following the withdrawal of massive economic support of the USSR, Mongolia's GDP growth rate dropped by 9.4% in 1990-1994 and the inflation rate soared to 325%.[39] The economy began to slowly recover in 1994-1996[40] as a result of restructuring including trade liberalization and privatization. In 2002, the GDP growth reached 4.0%[41] and GDP per capita was estimated at 422 USD.[42] The growth rate is not sufficient, however, to reduce wide-spread poverty, which is officially declared to be 36.1%.[43] The development gap between urban and rural development has intensified in the post-socialist period. Thus, in 2002, 61.6% of the GDP was produced in cities and only 38.4% in rural areas.[44] Transportation and information infrastructures are grossly underdeveloped in most rural areas, barely

[35] The democratic constitution was adopted by the parliament in 1992 based on extensive deliberations both inside and outside the government structure.
[36] This is significant as practice of religion was suppressed during socialism.
[37] In fact Mongolia is starting to look like a 'feckless pluralism' described by Thomas Carothers as countries that "tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings. Despite these positive features, however, democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. The alternation of power seems only to trade the country's problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respect. And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly conceived and executed and economic performance is frequently bad or even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous and successive governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the country…" See: Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* (January 13, 2002), 10.
[38] In 1992-1996 and 2000-2004 parliamentary periods, MPRP occupied 72 out of 76 seats of the Mongolian unicameral parliament, State Great Khural. During this period, the minority members were effectively denied their right to speak in the parliament.
[39] Government of Mongolia and UNDP, *Mongolia's Human Development Report 1997* (Ulaanbaatar), 11.
[40] The annual growth rate was 1.9% in 1994-1996 and the inflation rate dropped to 53% in 1996. See: *Mongolia's Human Development Report 1997*, 11.
[41] *Mongolia's Human Development Report 2003,* 1.
[42] World Bank, *Mongolia. Public Expenditure and Financial Management Review. Bridging the Public Expenditure Management Gap* (2004), 8.
[43] NSO, World Bank and UNDP, *Core Report on Household Income, Expenditure and Living Standards Sample Survey* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 2.
[44] *Mongolia's Human Development Report 2003,* 1.

linking the peripheries with aimag and soum administrative centres and the capital city. Migration to urban areas increased over the last decade with at least 21% of the population being migrants in 2000.[45]

Mongolia is a country of minor significance in the international hierarchy with two big powers, China and Russia, as its only neighbours, neither of which are sufficiently democratic and both exert considerable influence on Mongolia's economy. To avoid repeating its history of excessive dependence on one or the other big neighbour, the 1992 Constitution and the 1994 Concept of National Security of Mongolia stressed the vital importance of developing extensive and balanced foreign relations, close cooperation with the UN, respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and pursuit of a peaceful foreign policy. Accordingly, Mongolia has actively developed its international relations, especially with more consolidated democracies and powerful economies such as the USA, Western European states, Japan and South Korea. However, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the war on terror declared by the United States, there was a marked tilt of Mongolia's foreign policy towards the United States. Thus, the Government of Mongolia joined the coalition of the willing and dispatched a military regiment to Iraq and military instructors to Afghanistan. Furthermore, despite having ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Mongolian Government signed with the United States a bilateral agreement that exempted Americans from the Court's jurisdiction. This policy shift was endorsed by all major political forces.

Prominent reverse gender gaps in education set Mongolia apart from most other countries. At secondary school level, the girls' enrolment rate is higher than the boys' by 20% and women constitute 70% of university students.[46] This trend started in the socialist period, but was amplified after 1990. At the same time, women have been grossly under-represented at decision-making levels. Currently, only 6.6% of the 76 MPs are women, including an MP who is the only female cabinet member.[47] Women are also under-represented in managerial posts and among big business operators. Women are concentrated in white-collar jobs in financial, education, health and hotels sectors, while men are concentrated in blue-collar jobs in mining, transportation, defence, energy and construction sectors. Men and women are more or less balanced in processing, trade, real estate and agricultural sectors.[48] Thus, though on the whole women earn less than men, their social status is on average higher than men's.[49] The gender dynamics is further complicated by highly visible and effective female leadership of Mongolia's civil society alongside high rates of violence against women.[50]

[45] Ibid., 47.
[46] Ibid., 14.
[47] Ms. T. Gandi is a Minister of Health and Social Policy.
[48] See the gender distribution by sectors in the data from NSO Report of Population and Housing Census 2000 quoted in Asian Development Bank and World Bank, *Country Gender Assessment. Mongolia* (Manila, 2005), 19.
[49] For cultural dimensions of gender relations in Mongolia, see: Uradyn E. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Undarya Tumursukh, "Fighting over the Reinterpretation of the Mongolian Woman in Mongolia's Post-Socialist Identity Construction Discourse," *East Asia* 19, no. 3 (Fall 2001).
[50] Center for Human Rights and Development, National Center against Violence and National CEDAW Watch Network Center, *Violence against Women and Legal Framework in Mongolia* (Ulaanbaatar, 2002).

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT IN MONGOLIA

Mongolia has experienced a variety of citizens' organizations ranging historically from (1) mass resistance, led by feudal lords to overthrow the Manchu yoke in the pre-socialist period before 1921, to (2) quasi-governmental mass organizations intended to transform Mongolian people into 'homo socialisticus' during the socialist period from 1924 to 1989 and, finally, to (3) pro-democracy mass movements and small-size issue-oriented Western-style voluntary organizations, which emerged in the late 1980s and later and after 1990.[51] However, most contemporary analysts consider the transition to democracy in 1989 and 1990 as the beginning of the development of Mongolia's civil society.

In the pre-transition period, a plethora of mass organizations, ranging from women's and youth wings of the MPRP and trade unions, to the Mountaineers' Association and Mongolian Red Cross, existed. While not all were founded directly by the MPRP, none could form and operate without MPRP's permission. These organizations closely followed the official ideology and were intended to help the Party-State achieve the social, cultural, political and economic transformation of the society into a communist one. They had a top-down organizational structure and, backed by the power of the Party-State, commanded a significant degree of influence in society. They were financed by the Party-State and/or through membership dues, which were habitually automatically deducted from the citizens' salaries. Hence, these organizations were not independent of the state and participation in them, though extensive, was semi-coerced rather than voluntary.

However, these organizations did fulfil many civil society functions, such as developing citizens' capacity to organize and interact in the public sphere, collect and distribute information, albeit with an ideological tilt, and relate to the institutions of the modern state. Many of these skills, as well as some of the mass organizations that helped instil them, enabled the proliferation of citizen-initiated movements and organizations in the transition period.

The democratic transition that began in 1989 and 1990 was made possible by the changes in the external environment and active interventions of the independent pro-democracy movements, such as the Mongolian Social Democratic Movement, Democratic Movement and National Democratic Movement that were able to mobilize the masses to demand the stepping down of the MPRP PolitBureau, drawing up of a democratic constitution and formation of the government through popular elections. These movements opened up the political space for independent citizen action and free association and served as the basis for the birth of the first opposition parties.

[51] This periodization of the development of Mongolian civil society was proposed by the participants of the 2003 Round table discussion. Thus, a number of participants point out that citizens' participation in socialist mass organizations prior to 1989-1990 was not entirely coerced and, moreover, that there were citizens' movements in the pre-socialist period as well such as Ard Ayush's movement for national self-determination.

The adoption of the democratic constitution in 1992 and the holding of the first free and fair parliamentary elections in the same year provided further impetus for the emergence of a new type of citizen's organization: Western-style issue-oriented, office-based, more professionalized advocacy and oversight non-governmental organizations (NGOs) aimed at influencing public policy and holding the government accountable. Some of the most active NGOs were pro-democracy and pro-development organizations, which were formed and led by women affiliated with opposition parties. The development of NGOs in the 1990s was supported financially, technically and ideologically by a number of foreign and international organizations, such as The Asia Foundation (USA), Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany), USAID, UNDP, NED, AusAID and the Global Fund for Women. This support was essential for the adoption of the NGO Law in 1997, which further facilitated the formation of new NGOs. Towards the late 1990s, however, donor support became less focused on political aspects of democratization and more focused on the socio-economic support role of the emerging non-governmental sector, emphasizing service-delivery functions of NGOs over their advocacy and monitoring roles.[52]

At the same time, mass organizations, inherited from the socialist period, sought to restructure themselves and redefine their mission and relationship with the MPRP and the Mongolian State. To a large extent, however, these organizations with extensive national networks have maintained close ties with the State through their largely unbroken ties with the former communist party MPRP that was in power in 1992-1996 and 2000-2004, controlling 72 out of 76 parliamentary seats during both periods. These organizations range from women's, children's, youth and pensioners' associations to peace and friendship associations, chambers of commerce, the Mongolian Red Cross Association and traditional trade unions. Independent women's organizations were the most successful in breaking the monopoly of the Mongolian Women's Federation, in a large measure due to extensive donor support for women's rights programs, whereas in other sectors the inherited umbrella organizations are still hegemonic. The few independent trade unions remain weak vis-à-vis the Mongolian Federation of Trade Unions and until very recently the Mongolian Pensioners' Association had monopolized the right to represent the elderly. The Free Pensioners' Association was formed in 2005 and captured public attention through its bold and consistent struggle for an equitable pension system and, most recently, through the active role it played in anti-corruption and pro-democracy mass protests and demonstrations.

The newly established constitutional guarantees for the freedom of religion spurred a proliferation of religious, mainly Buddhist, organizations. Christian churches nevertheless rapidly expanded their activities, due to the active recruitment of converts by Western and Asian Christian missionaries. The revival of mosques has been highly localized, mainly taking place in the predominantly Kazakh Bayan-Ulgii aimag. The development of religious organizations has not been smooth, given the clear preference and privileges granted by the State to the major Buddhist temples and organizations. Despite the proclamation of freedom

[52]A more in depth treatment of the historical background can be found in: Center for Citizens' Alliance (former CEDAW Watch), *NGO-Government Policy Dialogue in Mongolia. Case Studies* (forthcoming). The research is a part of a comparative study of NGO-

of religion in the Constitution, wide-spread public discrimination against Christians and their organizations often triggered by the overly aggressive missionary activities of the Christian churches and continued marginalization of the Islam due to the ethnic minority status of the Kazakhs. Within Buddhist organizations, the Gandan-Tegchinlen Monastery, the only monastery that was allowed to remain in operation during socialism, has successfully maintained its dominance, in a large measure through developing close ties with top Government institutions and officials. Newer Buddhist temples, especially those in rural areas, are often marginalized. Overall, one of the main challenges faced by most Buddhist temples and monasteries is a serious lack of internal democracy, financial transparency and accountability to the public. Less strictly religious, spiritual associations, more loosely based on Buddhist or similar teachings, tend to be more open to the public and less dogmatic.

The economic privatization of the early 1990s and democratization led to the formation of various new as well as mutant forms of "proto"-CSOs such as the Apartment Owners' Unions, which mostly formed without the actual knowledge or participation of the apartment owners based on the former Apartment Management Bureaus that were run by the municipality. The AOUs are still mostly undemocratic, non-transparent and unaccountable though important inroads, albeit limited in scope, are being made by some of the unions. They are also often accused of serving partisan political interests during election campaigns, with a significant bias favouring the former communist party. The Association of Mongolian Advocates (Defence Attorneys) is another partially reconstituted inheritor organization that has yet to develop into a strong, democratic and accountable body. Its development is particularly important given its monopoly right to license practicing defence attorneys and provide poor citizens with free legal representation services.

Herders,' farmers' and manufacturers' cooperatives were in operation during socialism but due to the lack of state support they mostly failed to develop into self-sufficient strong networks. The transition opened new space for the revival of cooperatives but the task remains arduous due to the unfavourable and inefficient banking and credit systems (especially in rural areas), general lack of economic resources and rudimentary roads and transportation infrastructure. The savings and credit cooperatives began to emerge in large numbers in 1997 but most of them work as banking organizations and are seriously challenged by their lack of financial transparency and accountability to members.

Self-organized community groups barely existed during socialism, given that the Party-State and its subsidiary organizations held the monopoly of citizens' organization. However, in the post-socialist period such groups began to emerge, mobilizing particularly actively against the encroachment on their living environments by construction and mining companies. In addition, herders' groups began to emerge, with support from environmental protection projects funded by international organizations, bonding around alternative and/or supplementary income-generation projects and developing grassroots democracy in their baghs (sub-divisions of soums).

Social movements that played a vital role in bringing about the democratic changes in 1989-1990 receded into the background in the mid 1990s but re-emerged very strongly after 2000. Wide-spread social discontent over the lack of improvement of the majority's living conditions, continued high poverty rates, increasing crime and, most importantly, increasing corruption among public officials has been increasingly channelled into the formation of a number of mass movements, which have mounted intensive series of public protests and demonstrations demanding the restitution of justice, government accountability and drastic anti-corruption measures. The activities of the movements grew stronger following the 2004 parliamentary elections that ended the MPRP's near-monopoly of political power by more evenly distributing the seats between the MPRP and other parties, which helped significantly expand the political space for independent citizen action and more balanced and timely reporting on current events by the independent media.[53]

3. OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Literally, the Mongolian term for civil society is "citizens' society." As such, it is fundamentally political in that it asserts the primacy of the citizen's wellbeing, his/her rights and interests over the interests of the State and describes a society wherein this principle is a reality. It is in this sense that the term was used in the 1992 democratic Constitution of Mongolia, which states in the preamble that the supreme objective of the people of Mongolia is "building a humane, civil and democratic society in the country."[54]

This broad definition of "civil society" was reiterated and further elaborated at the 2003 Civil Society Review round table discussion, in contradistinction to the 'imported' meaning of the term "civil society," which has been used interchangeably with the term "NGOs" and "NGO Sector" since the late 1990s. Until then, the operational term for citizens' independent and voluntary organizations and activities was the term "NGO," which emphasized the independence from the State in the context of the overarching task of promoting democratization and increasing pluralism. This term came to be used in the early 1990s with the inflow of donor support for the development of non-governmental organizations as part of the democratization process, replacing the term "mass (or public[55]) organizations" that was used in the socialist period.

However, following the 1996 peaceful transition of power through the parliamentary election, international donors shifted their focus to Mongolia's economic development and socio-economic functions of NGOs. In the late 1990s, donor organizations began to actively use the term "civil society." The term was translated

[53] The report's subsequent sections contain more detailed information on the different components of Mongolian civil society mentioned in this part.
[54] Preamble, *Constitution of Mongolia (1992)*.
[55] The word public (olon niit) in Mongolian does not have the same meanings as in English. The meanings are identical in phrases such as 'public opinion' but 'public office' is translated as 'state office' in Mongolian. Thus, the idea that the core responsibility of the state is to serve people becomes lost in this term. Instead, a more authoritarian meaning emerges, which elevates the state over the people.

into Mongolian identically with the constitutional term of "civil society" but was not clearly defined. Nor was it clearly distinguished from the term "NGOs" and became widely used interchangeably, without bringing more clarity to the understanding of state-society relations. The conceptual confusion that followed helped obscure the distinction between the new breed of independent voluntary organizations and nominally non-governmental organizations that have functioned largely as an extension of the State machinery. This situation undermined the strengthening of more politically-oriented human rights, policy advocacy and government oversight NGOs, especially in the context of greater emphasis put on social service-delivery functions of NGOs by important international organizations such as the World Bank, ADB and UNDP and the Government in the 2000-2004 period.

The Civil Society Review RTD stressed the importance of understanding civil society in a broader, more systemic sense and paying careful attention to the nature of power relations between the state and citizens, their organizations and activities. In order to bring further conceptual clarity to the use of the term "civil society" in Mongolia, the RTD participants defined 3 levels at which "civil society" is to be understood.

First, in the broadest (constitutional) sense, "civil society" is to be understood as a society that is based on democratic principles, wherein 1) citizens are able to make their State institutions to serve them according to the will of the people, 2) citizens are able to check the State's arbitrary power and protect their own and other fellow citizens' human rights and freedoms, 3) citizens deeply understand and value human rights and freedoms and other democratic principles and 4) citizens have equal access to political power and are provided with equal opportunities to benefit from economic and socio-cultural development.

Second, "civil society" is to be understood as citizens' activities that are independent of the State, which contribute to developing horizontal networking schemes and help check the State's abuse of its monopoly of coercive force and create an environment in which citizens can solve their issues with each other without the intervention of the State. This definition would encompass all independent of the State civic action, whether or not it is conducted by a formally institutionalized NGO.

Third, "civil society" is to be understood as formal institutions, which may include NGOs, religious groups, media organizations and political parties. depending on the nature of their actions and agenda. These organizations are to be de facto independent of the State and are to be, in principle, supporting democratic values and principles. The development of these formal institutions bears strategic importance for promoting the establishment of "civil society" in its constitutional sense. Thus, along with focusing on, for instance, NGO sector development, activists and their supporters must constantly check if their programs are in fact resulting in the empowerment of citizens at all levels, particularly at the grassroots, vis-à-vis their governing institutions and other components of the society.

4. CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY USED IN THIS STUDY

The above points were reiterated during the National Advisory Group meeting on October 20, 2004, with a particular emphasis on the constitutional concept of "civil society." Discussion also revolved around the classification of political parties. Some NAG members favoured their inclusion in the state arena while others maintained they belonged to civil society. It was agreed that opposition parties, especially extra-parliamentary parties, as well as, in some cases, local branches of the ruling party removed from the power centres should be considered as part of civil society. There was a proposition to include local self-governing institutions, Citizens' Representatives' Khurals, as part of civil society.[56]

Nevertheless, it was resolved to follow the CIVICUS definition for the purposes of the CSI exercise with no changes.[57] Accordingly, civil society in Mongolia, under the CSI definition, comprises the following groups:

1. *Non-governmental organizations* registered with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MJHA) under the 1997 Law on Non-State Organizations (NGO Law). There are over 4,700 registered NGOs including Western-style professionalized advocacy and oversight groups, research and analysis institutions, inherited mass organizations, social movements, small-size voluntary groups with ad hoc operations (most rural NGOs are such), charitable organizations such as Rotary Clubs, the Mongolian Red Cross Association (MRCA),[58] few foundations, community-based organizations, professional associations (teachers, doctors, etc.) and aimag and soum diasporic groups called local councils.[59] It is widely believed that most of the NGOs exist mainly on paper. Possibly, only about 1/5 of them operate on a regular basis.[60] NGOs differ widely by their institutional capacity and influence on society and are concentrated in urban centres. The few NGO umbrella bodies are mostly ineffective. NGOs are not required by law to be non-partisan but it is widely agreed that they should be such. However, many NGOs run openly activities despite their formal non-partisan status.[61]

2. *Trade Unions* registered with the MJHA under the 1991 Law on Trade Unions, which include inherited structures and fewer new unions formed in the context of market economy. This is one of the best structured sectors of civil society with aimag and district Trade Unions' Councils in all areas and the

[56] Local legislatures.
[57] The First NAG Meeting Minutes (Ulaanbaatar, October 20, 2004).
[58] The Mongolian Red Cross Association is governed by the NGO Law, its own law entitled *Law on the Legal Status of the Mongolian Red Cross Association* adopted in 2000and the Law on Donors.
[59] Local councils are not simply diasporic, they are actually trans-internal-border groups involving both diaspora living in the capital city (and other urban areas) and local communities that have remained in their home aimags and soums.
[60] The 2003 Directory produced by the Mongolian Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation) lists approximately 2,700 NGOs but does not differentiate between NGOs that are operational and those that are not. See: Mongolian Open Society Institute, *Directory of Mongolian NGOs* (Ulaanbaatar: BCI, 2003).
[61] NGOs' partisan sympathies become more apparent during election campaign periods. Thus, the leaders of the Mongolian Women's Federation formally supported MPRP in the 2004 parliamentary and 2005 presidential elections. A Voter Education Center's employee reported that the Mongolian Red Cross Association supported MPRP informally but openly at local levels in 2004. There is no doubt a number of pro-democracy NGOs provided various kinds of informal support to the Mongolian Democratic Party. Such partisan tendencies were critiqued both during the first NAG meeting and CSI Regional Stakeholder Consultations (RSCs). The same critique was strongly raised during the *Mongolia's Democratic Development: Challenges and Opportunities* Conference organized by the ICNRD team involving broad participation of civil society activists on June30-July1, 2005 in Ulaanbaatar. In general, partisan activities of NGOs are a widely critiqued issue among opponents as well as proponents of civil society in Mongolia.

Mongolian Trade Unions' Federation at the national level.[62] Trade unions have organized public protests to protect workers' rights and the Federation has negotiated and signed tri-partite agreements with the Government and the Employers/Owners' Association. However, there is some evidence of excessive partisanship and lack of accountability among some of the Council and Federation leaders.[63]

3. *Chambers of Commerce* registered with the MJHA under the 1995 Law on Chambers of Trade and Industry, which stipulates that there may only be one National Chamber of Trade and Industry (NCTI) and one chamber per aimag or for two to three aimags. The existing NCTI, inherited from the socialist period, regularly convenes consultation meetings with business representatives and has close ties with the Government. It is broadly believed that its services to the business community have been limited and ineffective.

4. *Savings and credit cooperatives* (SCCs) registered with the Mongol Bank under the 1995 Law on Cooperatives that began to emerge only in 1997. There are about 570 SCCs but only about 250 of them operate regularly.[64] Collectively, SCCs have approximately 30,000 members, over 60% of which are women.[65] One of the best known SCCs is Moncord, a women's microfinance cooperative that serves over 600 members.[66] The Union of Mongolian SCCs was founded in 2005 and is still in the process of institutionalizing.[67] Main problems of SCCs are their lack of open, transparent and participatory procedures and poor risk management.[68]

5. *Political parties* registered with the Supreme Court under the 1990 Law on Political Parties.[69] In 2003, there were 18 political parties registered.[70] However, the main competition is between the MPRP and Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP), the only parties that have truly national memberships.[71] The Mongolian New Social Democratic Party, the Civil Courage-Republican Party and the Mongolian Republican Party currently hold few seats in the parliament. Despite the constitutional commitment to pluralism, MPRP dominates the political terrain at both national and local levels due to its better structure, substantial property and sizeable membership inherited from the socialist period.

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[62] Newer trade unions, however, often chose not to become members of these umbrella bodies.

[63] For example, the leadership of the Mongolian Trade Unions' Federation formally supported the MPRP in the 2004 parliamentary elections, reportedly without consulting its members and sent formal letters to its aimag branches requiring their support for the MPRP campaign. A majority of trade union leaders are MPRP members though regular members belong to different parties. Majority of NAG members stated that trade unions are close to MPRP and higher decision-making powers.

[64] Fact-finding interview with B. Oyuntsetseg, Executive Director, Credit Union SCC (August, 2005).

[65] S. Jargalsaikhan, Executive Director, Union of Mongolian SCCs, "Legal Framework of Mongolian SCCs and Issues to Consider in the Future," *Business Times* 27 (August 2005).

[66] Moncord was initially founded by the members of the Liberal Women's Brain Pool, one of the pioneering independent women's groups formed in 1992 by female members of one of the democratic opposition parties. See for more information on Moncord: Asian Development Bank and World Bank, 26.

[67] B. Oyuntsetseg.

[68] G. Tsolmon, "The Trust in SCCs has Declined," *Unuudur* 138 (June 13, 2005); B. Oyuntsetseg; S. Jargalsaikhan.

[69] The Law was amended in 2003 and 2005.

[70] Supreme Court data quoted in The Asia Foundation, *Legal Empowerment in Mongolia. Research Report* (Ulaanbaatar, January 2004), 7.

[71] The MDP is a result of the 2000 merger of 2 main opposition parties: the center-right Mongolian National Democratic Party and the centre-left Mongolian Social Democratic Party.

6. *Religious organizations* "founded in order to provide for the religious and spiritual needs of the believers and conduct religious rituals and teaching," registered with the MJHA under the 1993 Law on State and Monastery/Church Relations, after a review by aimag and capital city legislatures.[72] In 2000, there were 168 registered religious organizations, most of which are Buddhist temples that are more evenly distributed throughout the country.[73] Christian churches tend to operate in urban centres and are active in community development and poverty alleviation. The few mosques are mostly found in Bayan-Ulgii aimag.[74]

7. *Apartment Owners' Unions* (AOUs) registered with aimag, district and soum administrations under the 2003 Law on the Legal Status of Apartment Owners' Unions and Common Property of Apartment Buildings. The AOUs were formed following the 1997-2000 privatization of apartment blocks with a mission to manage the maintenance, repair and cleaning of common property inside and outside apartment buildings and mediate between apartment owners and local authorities and service providers (electricity, water, garbage collection, etc.). Out of over 430 AOUs, more than 300 are located in the capital city. The High Council of AOUs founded in 1999 has 400 members.[75] Participation and trust in AOUs is low[76] though they are financed by mandatory maintenance and repair fees from apartment owners.

8. *Association of Mongolian Advocates' (Defence Attorneys')* is registered with the Ministry of Justice and governed by the 2002 Law on Legal Defence (Advocacy). The Association was first formed in 1934 as the Mongolian Advocates' Committee, a part of the unitary Party-State structure. In 1990, it was renamed as the Mongolian Advocates' Association and was granted a monopoly right to represent all defence attorneys in the 9-member Specialization Committee that determines lawyers' eligibility to act as defence attorneys by the Law on Legal Defence.[77] The Association claims a membership of about 1000 defence attorneys and is by law declared to be a non-governmental professional organization with a main mission of defending defence lawyers' rights. The Association is, however, widely criticized for

[72] Section 3, Article 6, *Law on State and Monastery/Church Relations of Mongolia* (1993).
[73] The small directory included in the brochure of the "Nature, Ecology-Development" Northern Buddhists' Conference (Ulaanbaatar, June 20-23, 2005) listed 62 temples and monasteries, 44 of which are in rural areas and 18 are in Ulaanbaatar. There is no reliable data on the number of monks. By the data recorded in the above brochure for 43 temples and monasteries, they have altogether 733 monks, 639 of which are in rural areas and 94 in Ulaanbaatar.
[74] Bayan-Ulgii is the western-most aimag of Mongolia with the highest concentration of Kazakhs.
[75] Brochure of the Mongolian Apartment Owners' Unions' High Council (Ulaanbaatar, 2004); fact-finding interviews with a MAOUHC staff member (August, 2005).
[76] AOUs are popularly considered to be non-transparent, corrupt and non-participatory though there are occasional examples of critical actions by AOUs and local communities such as protesting against illegal construction work in their localities. See, for example: B. Khishig, "The Fight to Protect the Playground is Continuing," *Udriin Sonin* 24 (August 3, 2005), 3. NGOs are starting to focus on increasing citizens' participation in AOUs as a way of developing local democracy and empowering grassroots. The Globe International NGO is a pioneer in this field. See: Globe International, "Results of the Study on the Mongolian Legislation and Other Legal Acts Specifying the Legal Status of Apartment Dwellers" in Globe International NGO and High Council of AOUs, *Manual for Apartment Owners' Unions and Apartment Owners* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004).
[77] *Law on Legal Defense (Advocacy) of Mongolia* (2002).

its non-transparent and undemocratic internal practices, lack of accountability and poor services to its members and failure to effectively defend the rights of defence lawyers.[78]

9. *Non-profit media* are few in number due mainly to financial obstacles. Most publications are produced by public education NGOs such as the Political Education Academy (PEA), Oyuntulkhuur Foundation, National Center against Violence (NCAV), Women for Social Progress Movement (WSP), Democracy Education Center (DEMO Center)and Mongolian Women's Federation (MWF).[79] A number of FM radio stations were set up with the assistance of the Mongolian Open Society Institute (MOSI), UNDP and other donors in rural areas, significantly strengthening this sector of civil society. Furthermore, *Open Forum* live television debate program has run in the last year with support from Open Forum Society (OFS, former MOSI). An independent television studio Jargalan has been producing *Nature of Civilization* television program in cooperation with various CSOs.[80]

10. *Informal self-help health and leisure groups or community groups that spontaneously mobilize for collective struggle*. Aside from occasional media reports about the second type of groups, there is essentially no information on these groups as they are neither registered, nor institutionalized. Hence, it is difficult to assess their magnitude or impact beyond observing that their numbers seem to be growing.

Private sector philanthropy is also an aspect of civil society. However, information in this area is limited to occasional media report*s*, few annual reports of the businesses and ad hoc interviews with business representatives. Private sector entities, albeit in small numbers, do contribute to public-benefit causes despite the absence of tax benefits for such donations either through CSOs such as local councils[81] and national foundations or directly to the target groups.[82]

There are also some anomalous cases such as the Association of Local Governments registered with the MJHA as a NGO despite a clear provision in the NGO Law that only non-state actors, citizens and

[78] Although the Law on Legal Defense does not mention it, the Association has been charged with the duty of providing the obligatory free legal defence services to poor citizens who are unable to pay for legal representation. The Association has generally failed to fulfil its duties in this regard, possibly due to the leadership's poor relations with its members. Several of the members reported that the Association's leadership abuses its right to issue defence lawyers' ID cards by linking it to costly membership fees and the right to practice legal defence. Thus, the Association issues ID cards with limited terms, for example two years. When the term of the card expires, defence attorneys become unable to penetrate state institutions such as courts and pre-detention centres and therefore lose their ability to perform their duties as defence attorneys. They are forced to pay high membership fees in order to renew their licenses while not receiving any services from the Association. This scheme creates extra-legal constraints on the practice of defence lawyers as the law only mentions specific cases of serious violations or incompetence on the part of the lawyer for revoking his/her defence attorney's license. Source: direct reports by regular members of the Association of Mongolian Advocates.

[79] These publications – newspapers and journals –are printed in limited numbers and have limited distribution.

[80] Many CSOs produce radio and TV programs as part of their public education programs but this kind of programming tends to be of temporary nature.

[81] Such grants often go to support rural schools, hospitals or publication of genealogical or historical records.

[82] For example, the Spirt Bal Buram corporation conducted a "Good Affairs" Campaign within the framework of which they paid tuition fees of poor university students, distributed free computers to young families and supported children of poor single mothers. In a similar fashion, the APU paid tuition fees of university students. The Tavan Bogd corporation marked its 10th anniversary by, inter alia, providing the Children's Detention Center with 5 tons of rice and delivering presents to the orphaned or abandoned children of the non-governmental Lotus Center. Fact-finding interview with Ch. Batsaikhan, Manager, Tavan Bogd Corporation (August, 2005).

organizations that are distinct from executive, legislative and judicial institutions of the state, may form NGOs.[83]

The following classification of CSOs was used under the CSI definition for the purposes of the community sample and civil society stakeholders' surveys:

Table II.4.1: Types of CSOs included in the study

1	Herders' and farmers' groups, movements and cooperatives	14	Youth and student associations, groups
2	Business associations, employers' groups	15	Women's groups and organizations
3	Professional associations	16	Non-partisan political advocacy NGOs
4	Local councils, neighbours' groups, AOUs, aimag, soum and district citizens' councils	17	Traditional and ethnic groups, heritage associations
5	Religious and spiritual organizations, groups	18	Environmental groups
6	Political groups, movements and parties	19	Sports and leisure groups and associations
7	Arts and culture groups and associations	20	Charity organizations
8	Development NGOs	21	CSO federations, networks, coalitions
9	Credit and savings cooperatives	22	Non-profit media
10	Self-help groups	23	Associations of socio-economically marginalized groups
11	Health and social services groups, organizations	24	Aid foundations and funding organizations[84]
12	Trade unions	25	Other
13	Education, training and research organizations		

5. CIVIL SOCIETY MAP

At the first NAG meeting, participants undertook a social forces analysis, with the purpose of 1) identifying and discussing the relationship between civil society actors and other influential actors within society at large and 2) identifying and discussing relationships among influential civil society groups within civil society. As a first step, the participants identified different forces in the society and classified them by the level of their influenced and then mapped their relationship to each other. As the next step, the participants classified different CSO types by the level of their influence and then mapped their relationship to each other. Very influential forces are pink, quite influential ones are yellow, influential forces are green and not very influential players are blue. See the following table and figure for the analysis of social forces in the society:

Table II.5.1: Social forces in society by level of their influence

Very influential	Quite influential	Influential	Not very influential
Dominant political parties	Courts	Police	Public education, policy advocacy NGOs
Government	International financial institutions	Local government	Small businesses
Parliament	Big international businesses	Main Buddhist organizations	Environmental NGOs
President	Large foreign donors	Inheritor CSOs	Armed forces
Big businesses	Dominant media	Independent media	Service delivery NGOs
			Small parties

[83] The Association of Local Governments was not included in the CSI exercise as it was not considered as a CSO.
[84] This category only includes Mongolian foundations and donor organizations.

Figure II.5.1: Social forces map



The analysis of social forces within Mongolian society reflects the dominant position of the state structures within society, close connectedness of big business interests with the political elite, continued predominance of state-serving if not state-run media and a heavy influence of foreign donor organizations, international financial institutions and big foreign businesses on Mongolia's economy and public policy-making processes. The analysis also points to the privileged position of inheritor organizations, including trade unions, vis-à-vis more independent CSOs in terms of accessing state resources and influencing society in general. An interesting and somewhat unique feature of post-socialist Mongolian society is the proximity of top religious leaders and institutions to top government officials, which lends a political advantage to Buddhist organizations and often blurs the boundaries between the secular state and the religious domain.

Despite the active involvement of independent CSOs including smaller parties, their influence is generally limited due to the difficulties they encounter in accessing pubic decision-making structures as well as dominant media channels. A positive trait of society is the low profile of the armed forces and a so far firm civilian control over them. Lastly, though few in numbers, some independent media have recently gained significant momentum and are performing the crucial role of serving as a bridge between citizens and decision-makers and monitoring the performance of government officials and other influential social forces.

The following table and figure present the analysis of the influence wielded by different civil society groups and their inter-relations:

Table II.5.2: Main CSO types ranked by the level of their influence within civil society

Very influential	Quite influential	Influential	Not very influential
Dominant political parties	Advocacy and public education NGOs	Environmental groups	Sports and leisure clubs
Media	Business associations & Chambers of Commerce	Youth and student groups	Community groups
Main Buddhist organizations	Research, analysis and training institutions	Women's NGOs	Art and culture organizations
	Inheritor CSOs including Trade Unions	Local councils	Smaller parties
	Social movements	Cooperatives	Professional associations

Figure II.5.2: Civil society map



The above map reflects one of the most significant developments in the civil society arena in the recent years: the formation of increasingly strong social movements formed to demand state accountability, drastic actions to combat corruption and reduce poverty and the fulfilment of state obligations towards specific groups of citizens such as the youth and elderly. To name a few, these include the Citizens' Movements for Ethical Society, Movement for Radical Renovation, the Free Pensioners' Association, the Mongolian Students' Union and the environmental Coalition of Movements for the Protection of Home and Rivers.[85] The map also shows the unequal distribution of power within the civil society arena marked by the predominance of major political parties, significant influence of key Buddhist leaders and institutions and main media organizations. Politically-oriented public education and advocacy NGOs, research and training institutions and women's groups often overlap and/or work in relatively close cooperation a number of such well established and increasingly professionalized CSOs have gained significant space in the civil society. Inheritor CSOs occupy a rather large space, exert a significant level of influence and often overlap with the

[85] The actual name of the coalition is very hard to translate into English. This is a coalition of 8 rural environmental and human rights movements, mainly mobilized to counter the harmful effects of mining and other businesses that are destroying their livelihoods.

dominant political party's space. The map also suggests that the most influential elements of Mongolian civil society are highly politicized while less overtly political forms of citizens' associations such as sports, arts, culture and leisure groups, professional associations and community groups remain somewhat underdeveloped.

III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

In this section the bulk of the information and data collected during the course of the project is presented. The analysis is structured along the individual indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions. The section is divided along the four dimensions: **Structure, Environment, Values** and **Impact**, which make up the CSI Diamond. At the beginning of each part, a graph provides the scores for the sub-dimensions on a scale from 0 to 3. Findings for each sub-dimension are then examined in detail. A separate box also provides the scores for the individual indicators for each sub-dimension.

1. STRUCTURE

This section describes and analyses the overall size, strength and vibrancy of civil society in human, organizational and economic terms. The score for the Structure Dimension is 1.2, indicating a somewhat small-sized and weakly structured civil society. The graph below presents the scores for the six sub-dimensions within the Structure dimension: extent of citizen participation; depth of citizen participation; diversity of civil society participants; level of organization; inter-relations and civil society resources.

Figure III.1.1: Sub-dimension scores in Structure dimension



1.1. Breadth of people's participation

This sub-dimension looks at the extent of various forms of citizen participation in Mongolian civil society. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.1: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	1
1.1.2	Charitable giving	2
1.1.3	CSO membership	1
1.1.4	Volunteer work	2
1.1.5	Community action	1

1.1.1 Non-partisan political action. The CSS indicated a post-1990 increase in the number of people who sign petitions (from 6% to 12.9%) and participate in public demonstrations (from 3.8% to 10%) but a drop in the number of people who write to newspapers (from 7.2% to 5.4%).[86] Altogether, 10.7% of the respondents before 1990 and 17.9% after 1990 had undertaken at least one of the above three forms of participation.[87] The data point to very low levels of citizens' political participation despite extensive mobilization by various groups in the past 15 years, including the 1989-1990 mass protests for a regime change, the 1994 hunger strike of the opposition for the end to the State control of national television and radio, the 1997 student demonstrations for better education conditions[88] and massive strikes of teachers for higher salaries and better working conditions, the 2002 demonstrations by the Movement for the Just Privatization of Land, the 2005 anti-corruption demonstrations staged by the Citizens' Movement for Ethical Society (CMES) that reportedly drew 5,000 citizens,[89] counter-protests against CMES initiated by the Voters' Movement for Development,[90] the pensioners' protests for higher and equitable pension payments[91] and the march of about 30 former workers of Erdenet Concern demanding the payment of their disability benefits.[92]

1.1.2 Charitable giving. There is little study of philanthropy in Mongolia.[93] The CSS suggested that a significant proportion of people give to charity (61.6%). The percentages were understandably lower in the poorer areas (43% in Yaarmag and 42% in Saikhan soum) compared to wealthier areas (65% in Ulaanbaatar's 11th district).[94] It is unclear, however, what causes motivate people to donate. The Mongolian Women's Fund (MONES), one of few CSOs that consciously seek to develop private philanthropy for social change, raised funds from 352 individuals in 2004[95] but reported it is generally difficult to secure individual donations for the promotion of gender equality and women's rights in Mongolia. The NAG members

[86] See: CSS. This is not surprising given extremely low levels of public trust in newspapers in the post-socialist period demonstrated by the CSS and East Asia Barometer survey. See: Political Education Academy, *East Asia Barometer. Comparative Study of Democratic Development* (Ulaanbaatar: "Sogoo Nuur" Co. Ltd., 2005), 139.

[87] CSS.

[88] According to the Mongolian Student Union, approximately 20,000 students participated in these demonstrations. Fact-finding interview with a MSU representative (August, 2005).

[89] The movement's 400 person march from the Freedom Square on February 24, 2005, declared as the "Day to Hold Power-Holders Accountable," reportedly grew 5,000-person strong by the time it reached the Sukhbaatar Square. An earlier march from the Freedom Square to the State Prosecutor's Office reportedly drew about 1000 people. Fact-finding interview with a CMES representative (August, 2005); G. Enkh, "The Demonstration of the Yellow-Scarved Passed Peacefully," *Unuudur* 45 (February 24, 2005); B. Enkhtsetseg, "The Protestors Have Called the Power-Holders to a Duel," *Unuudur* 24 (February 4, 2005). *Udriin Sonin* reported the number of CMES supporters as 100,000 but the figure appears seriously exaggerated. See: B. Bold, "The Citizens' Movement is To Become a Party," *Udriin Sonin* 195 (August 16, 2005).

[90] Both movements were accused and accused each other of being motivated by partisan goals, which complicates the analysis of non-partisan political activism. It is nevertheless clear that the CMES was supported by many citizens concerned with corruption and lack of transparency and accountability on the part of public officials, regardless of their partisan sympathies. Possibly, the same holds true of the Citizens' Movement for Development.

[91] This is a very serious issue as current pension amounts vary widely depending on the year the person retired. While a person who retired before 1995 is paid only 20-30 thousand TG, a later retiree is paid twice more. The pensioners' situation is worsening drastically due to the rapid increase of consumer prices. Therefore, the pensioners have spent days literally knocking on the Prime Minister's doors. They also established a Free Pensioners' Association in spite of and in distinction to the existing Pensioners' Associations.

[92] B. Indra, "Erdenet's Marchers Have Spent Four Days outside the Capital City," *Unuudur* 80 (April 5, 2005). These citizens walked on foot from Erdenet to Ulaanbaatar for 9 days and spent 4 more days outside Ulaanbaatar in a half-starving condition. Some of them had to return due to failing health conditions.

[93] The Mongolian Women's Fund (MONES) attempted to study the causes for which Mongolians donate but the survey results are inconclusive due to poor methodology and research design.

[94] It would be helpful to compare these data to another independent study.

[95] Mongolian Women's Fund, *MONES 4. Annual Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 17.

stressed that charitable giving to friends, neighbours and colleagues on such occasions as death, marriage, birth of a child and hospital treatment are traditionally strong among Mongolians.[96]

There are several prominent examples of large-scale fundraising campaigns. In 1997, Mongolians contributed widely to finance State Awarded Composer Mr. Jantsannorov's life-saving surgery in China. Similarly, significant sums were gathered to finance the sculpting of the 80 feet statue of Maitreya. During socialism, Mongolians had a long-standing tradition of making in-kind donations to help herders during the most difficult seasons. This tradition facilitated Mongolians' spontaneous donations to herders affected by the *dzud* of 1999-2001.[97] Most recently, Mongolians all over the country, regardless of their income levels, donated to help Tsunami victims. There are no estimates of the total number of donors. The Mongolian Red Cross Association (MRCA) reported the number of people and organizations that channelled their donations through MRCA as 1,500.[98]

1.1.3 CSO membership. The CSS indicated that slightly less than a half of the adult population (45.3%) are members of at least one CSO. Both party membership and non-party CSO membership levels were lowest in the herding community of Zuil soum (22% and 14%), which suggests a much lower level of organizing among and representation of semi-nomads. Non-party CSO membership in Ulgii was higher (56%), which may indicate a more closely knit social structure among Kazakhs. A relatively high percentage of non-party CSO membership (46%) in the poorest sample community (Saikhan soum) is mainly due to their membership in charity organizations as aid recipients.[99]

Figure III.1.2: CSO types with largest membership (%)



Figure 7 shows the first 6 types of CSOs with the largest membership (according to the CSS data), starting with political parties (41.2%) and ending with women's associations (4.4%). The most popular non-party CSOs are trade unions with 14.1% of the respondents being union members.[100]

All other types of CSOs showed very low levels of membership, especially environmental groups (0.2%), CSO networks and umbrella organizations (0%), education and research NGOs (0.4%), development NGOs

[96] NAG Scoring Meeting (Nukht, September 20-21, 2005).
[97] *Dzud* are translated approximately as blizzards. As fodder is used in winter only to supplement food that animals find for themselves by digging for grass under thin layers of snow, many animals die of starvation when grass gets sealed by thick layers of ice due to *dzud*. During socialism, the state had provided emergency assistance in such cases by sending large amounts of fodder to affected areas but this system was largely dismantled in the post-socialist period with the transition to market economy and privatization of livestock. Herders have been left on their own to bear the risks of pastoral nomadism.
[98] A. Saikhan, "Mongolians Have Donated 100,000 USD," *Unuudur* 131 (June 4, 2005). The MRCA also organized a charity concert with participation of famous performers, sportsmen, poets and other prominent people.
[99] In examining the issue of membership, one should keep in mind Mongolia's socialist history with high level of Party-State-induced mobilization due to which evidence of formal membership may not necessarily be a good indicator of the width of citizens' participation, especially if the membership is that of inheritor organizations.
[100] CSS.

(0.4%), non-profit media (0.4%), associations of socio-economically marginalized groups (0.4%), ethnic and traditional groups (0.4%), culture and arts CSOs (0.4%)and non-partisan political advocacy groups (0.8%).[101]

1.1.4 Volunteering. There is no pre-existing study of voluntarism in Mongolia. The CSS produced moderately high data for more traditional forms of volunteering outside family circles but within narrow networks of friends and neighbours (54.9%) such as assisting elderly neighbours, looking after neighbour's children, fetching products from stores and giving rides by cars or motorcycles. NAG members observed that although traditionally strong, this type of volunteering is declining with the weakening of community ties, increased stress, instability and deterioration of living conditions.[102] There is some evidence of the increasing trend for religious voluntarism associated with the revival of Buddhism and Islam and introduction of new religions as well as reports of spontaneous volunteering during natural disasters and other crisis situations.[103] According to the data from 17 of the 25 member organizations of the National Volunteer Network,[104] they jointly wield 105,894 volunteers.[105]

1.1.5 Collective community action. CSS results contradicted the popular perception of very low participation[106] in community actions with 51% of CSS respondents reporting they took part in one or more community meetings in the last year (72% reported such events took place) and 51% reporting they participated in voluntary actions to further common interests of the community. This is consistent with the 2003 Globe International survey of 51 households from 3 apartment buildings of Ulaanbaatar, which found that approximately half of the apartment owners participate in Apartment Owners' Union meetings to varying degrees while the other half remain completely uninformed about venues and dates of such meetings.[107]

In addition, the intensification of mining and construction work in the last years has given rise to numerous grassroots/community movements for the protection of their local environment and quality of life. Thus, the Ongi River Movement, Khuvsgul Dalainkhan Citizens' Movement, Sacred Subarga Movement in Tsenkher soum of Arkhangai aimag,[108] Zaamar citizens' movement and Sharyn Gol movement have arisen in rural areas to protect their rivers and pastures. In the cities, apartment block and school communities have

[101] Ibid.
[102] NAG Scoring Meeting (Nukht, September 20-21, 2005).
[103] CSI Overview Report.
[104] The network was set up in 2004 with support from the UN Volunteers program Volunteer Services Overseas offices.
[105] These numbers are formally numbers of the NGOs' members. Not all members may in fact be volunteers. There is also an interesting issue to explore further with regard to the nature and quality of NGO membership, especially in light of a report by a recent non-poor volunteer member of the MRCA who stated he joined the organization in order to benefit from MRCA's aid for the poor and that this is a common motivation for most MRCA members. Inherited organizations such as the MRCA are particularly interesting to examine as they claim largest memberships (88,000 for MRCA). Inquiry in this field is complicated by many numeric discrepancies. For example, 8,800 volunteers were attributed to LEOS (Liberal Women's Brain Pool) while the updated number of LEOS members is 6,000.
[106] This view is voiced in almost all civil society fora. Encouraging grassroots activism was posed as one of the main issues for Mongolia's civil society development at the Civil Society Review RTD (August, 2003). See also: G. Chuluunbaatar, "Civil society, citizens' participation and role of mass media," *Mongolia's Democratic Development: Challenges and Opportunities National Conference* (Ulaanbaatar, June 30-July 1), 1-8.
[107] Globe International, 73.
[108] Ts. Tseveenkherlen, "Civil War is About to Start in the Land of Tsenkher," *Unuudur* (July 27, 2005).

mobilized in substantial numbers to protect children's playgrounds, other spaces immediately outside apartment blocks and school yards from construction companies.[109]

1.2. Depth of people's participation

This sub-dimension looks at the depth of various forms of citizen participation in Mongolian civil society. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.2: Indicators assessing the depth of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Charitable Giving	0
1.2.2	Volunteering	1
1.2.3	CSO membership	2

1.2.1 Charitable giving. While CSS respondents had a general difficulty estimating their donation amounts, a significant percentage (41.1%) reported donating 500-10,000 TG last year while 12.9% indicated giving 10,000-150,000 TG and more. Understandably, poorer communities gave less and wealthier gave more (17% of 11th district respondents gave 10,000-150,000 TG and more). The majority of MONES donors in 2004 (56.8%) gave 101-1,000 TG while 19.3% gave 10-100 TG and 18.7% gave 1,001-10,000 TG.[110] In such manner, MONES collected 870 USD from Mongolian nationals in 2003.[111] Mr. Jantsannorov reported the total amount of donation for his surgery ranged from 10,000 to 15,000 USD[112] and the MRCA reported the total sum it collected for Tsunami victims was 100,000 USD.[113] CSS showed that an average citizen donates 0.003-0.1% of his/her monthly income to charity on an annual basis. The low amounts of donations are understandable given the high poverty rate in the country.

1.2.2 Volunteering. The depth of volunteering was difficult to estimate due to the absence of existing systematic data and inability of most CSS respondents to accurately estimate the amount of time they spent on volunteer assistance.[114] The CSS suggested generous donations of time by volunteers: 28.5% spending 1-10 hours, 12.6% giving 10-20 hours, 26.9% spending 20-40 hours and 2.2% spending 40-70 hours per month. The mean time devoted by respondents to volunteering is 2-5 hours a month.

1.2.3 CSO membership. The CSS suggested relatively high levels of multiple memberships in CSOs, especially among party members, with 51.1% of CSO members belonging to more than one CSO. The level of membership and of double or triple membership is higher in aimag centres, which is due not so much to the higher number of CSOs as the lower population size. Furthermore, as rural CSOs activities are more ad

[109] Fact-finding interview with a community representative from the Sukhbaatar District (August, 2005); B. Khishig; S. Sod, "The 31st School Community Demands the Resignation of Their Director," *Udriin Sonin* 143 (June 13, 2005).
[110] Mongolian Women's Fund (2004), 17.
[111] Mongolian Women's Fund, *MONES Annual Report 3* (Ulaanbaatar, 2003), 22.
[112] This is an impressive sum given the lower level of economic development at the time but it is impossible to tell how much of the funds were contributed by individuals and how much by companies. See: Natsagiin Jantsannorov, *Summon the Awakening Reason. Collection of Interviews* (Ulaanbaatar: Mon-Sudar Publishing House, 2002), 135.
[113] Interestingly, these included donations of sheep by herders. See: A. Saikhan.
[114] Time is not precisely measured by most Mongolians, especially in rural areas. There is a joke that Mongolians have only 2 hours: before noon and after noon. Hence, it is not surprising that 27.7% of CSS respondents could not estimate the time they donated and estimations given by other respondents should also be taken with a grain of salt.

hoc, rural activists can better accommodate membership in multiple CSOs. By comparison, CSO activities are more vibrant in Ulaanbaatar despite lower levels of single and multiple CSO membership.[115]

1.3 Diversity of civil society participants

This sub-dimension examines the diversity and representativeness of the civil society arena. It analyses the extent to which all social groups participate equitably in civil society and whether there are any groups which are dominant or excluded. Table 4 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.3: Indicators assessing the diversity of civil society arena

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	2
1.3.2	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	1
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	1

1.3.1 CSO membership. The majority of RSC respondents (52.8%) stated women are equitably represented in CSO membership but 40.4% maintained they are under-represented. Women are indeed under-represented in political parties, business and trade associations and local councils while they dominate in human rights, women's rights, public health, public education and poverty alleviation NGOs and most professional associations (teachers, doctors, journalists, etc.).[116]

Rural representation was judged to be low or very low by 66.7%. More than 1/3 of the respondents did not have enough knowledge about the ethnic and religious minorities' representation (36%-37.1%) and most of those who expressed an opinion predominantly stated these groups are under-represented. Small minorities (10%-13.4%) held these 3 groups were not represented at all. The picture is even grimmer for the poor: 32% of the respondents thought the poor were not represented at all and 27.8% stated their representation was very low.[117] In addition, the CSS strongly demonstrated under-representation of the herding community (18% CSO membership) even compared to the poorer farming community (56%) and certainly compared to the capital city (31.5%) and aimag centre communities (59.8%-67%).

1.3.2 CSO leadership. Only 4.1% of RSC respondents stated women were not represented in CSO leadership while 39.2% judged their representation equitable. Some observers even refer to Mongolian civil society as 'matriarchal.'[118] However, political parties, except for the female-headed CCRP, have been less welcoming for women: about 25% (38) of the MDP's 196-member National Coordinating Council are women while 1 out of 21 MPRP Governing Board Members and about 40 of the 250 Baga Khural members are women.[119]

[115] RSCs, participant observation.

[116] Participant observation (1992-2005); MOSI (2003); R. Narangerel, "The Role of Human Rights NGOs in Civil Society," Lawyers' Center for Legal Reform Support, *First National Human Rights NGO Forum Papers* (Ulaanbaatar, May 2-3, 2002), 12; CEDAW Watch, *Open Forum on Civil Rights and Liberties* (Ulaanbaatar, November 24, 2002); M. Steven Fish, "Mongolia: Democracy without Prerequisites," *Journal of Democracy* 9.3 (1998), 127-141; The Asia Foundation, "Mongolia's Political and Economic Transition: Challenges and Opportunities" Conference in Celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of The Asia Foundation's Mongolia Program (Ulaanbaatar, September 11-13, 2000) available on-line at http://www.asiafoundation.org.

[117] This suggests that the many CSOs that work on development and poverty alleviation do not ensure full participation of their target groups and are, hence, not as participatory in their operation as is desirable.

[118] Participant observation (1992-2005); R. Narangerel, 12; Fish, 127-141; TAF (2000), all of which stress the role of women in Mongolian civil society.

[119] Before 2004, 21 out of 126 MPRP Baga Khural members and 1 out of 15 Governing Board members were women. Low numbers of women in political party leadership possibly undermines the effectiveness of women's civil society leadership as well. Also, some

The perception of the representation of the poor was especially negative with 48.5% of RSC respondents stating they are not represented in CSO leadership while others judged them under-represented. Similarly, a majority of RSC respondents (62.9%) judged rural representation as low or very low. Again, 33%-38% of them stated they are not informed about ethnic and religious minorities while most remaining respondents (42.2%-47.4%) stated these groups' representation was low or very low.

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs. An overwhelming majority of RSC respondents (83.1%) observed that CSOs are concentrated in Ulaanbaatar (36.1%) or in Ulaanbaatar and aimag centres (47%). Civil society at aimag centres is smaller both in terms of CSO numbers and level of consistent operation. Soums, especially more remote ones, are essentially devoid of regular CSO activities due to poor infrastructure and lack of human, financial, political and other resources.

1.4. Level of organisation

This sub-dimension looks at the extent of infrastructure and internal organisation within Mongolian civil society. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.4: Indicators assessing the level of organization within civil society

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of umbrella bodies	1
1.4.2	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	1
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	1
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	1
1.4.5	International linkages	2

1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies. Umbrella organizations are a contentious issue due to Mongolia's legacy of hyper-centralization and post-socialist efforts to confront and counteract the socialist tendency towards massive hierarchical structures. The early and mid-1990s were characterized by centrifugal tendencies as post-1990 CSOs sought to establish their independent status vis-à-vis inheritor umbrella organizations. Towards the late 1990s, the more numerous and established new CSOs began gradually to form new types of more horizontal networks and coalitions to improve their coordination. Therefore, the existing umbrella organizations are a mix of inherited structures (e.g., Mongolian Trade Unions' Federation, Mongolian Women's Federation, MRCA, etc.) and new networks and coalitions organized either sectorally (e.g. Mongolian Women's NGO Network, UMENGO, Reproductive Health Network) or regionally (aimag NGO councils or networks).[120] Within the short time span of the CSI exercise, the number of new regional networks grew from 4 to 7. Overall, there exist few umbrella organizations. Not surprisingly, almost half of RSC respondents (47.4%) stated that only a minority of CSOs belong to umbrella organizations while 14.4% stated a very small minority of CSOs belong to umbrella organizations, 18.6% stated that a majority do and 4.1% that a large majority do (10.3% did not respond or stated they do not know).

female members of the MPD maintain that the increase of female representation in the MDP's governing body (compared to 7 before) did not translate into quality.

[120] Aimag NGO councils or networks began to emerge very recently in aimag centres based on local CSOs' attempts to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis local authorities and improve their coordination and cooperation.

1.4.2 Effectiveness of umbrella organizations. Only 8.2% of RSC respondents think umbrella organizations are generally effective, 17.5% judged them generally ineffective and the majority (59.8%) held their effectiveness varies. Women's networks tend to be more effective as was the Mongolian Women's NGO Coalition's advocacy for female candidates during the 2000 parliamentary election campaign. The effectiveness of umbrella bodies is sometimes undermined by different expectations of member organizations. For example, in the case of UMENGO,[121] some members saw its main value in pooling resources and unifying NGO voices for more effective advocacy campaigns and others saw its main value in serving member organizations.

1.4.3 Self-regulation. Journalists' associations directed considerable energy to the establishment of an ethical self-regulatory mechanism for journalists and media organizations. A code of ethics was drawn up and signed[122] but hasn't been implemented due to strong economic and political interests, lack of legal protection for journalists, absence of political will of owners and editors and weakness of journalists' associations. Thus, media professionals remain mostly uninterested in voluntarily abiding by the code of ethics.[123] The group of NGOs that jointly organized the ICSF-2003 drew up an explicit ethical code to govern their cooperation and coordination for the duration of the project.[124] No significant activities in this direction have taken place in other areas. What efforts have been made were considered as largely ineffective (31%) or as having limited effect (41%) by RSC respondents. The RSCs in fact gave birth to the idea to draw up a code of conduct for NGOs in order to minimize the problem of partisan engagement by formally non-partisan NGOs, prevent and combat corruption among NGOs and pre-empt government interference to 'bring order' to the NGO sector.[125]

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. Support infrastructure for civil society is extremely limited if one discounts international organizations' financial and technical assistance. Government support for CSOs is not systematic and is often politically motivated. In mid-1990s, TAF program gave birth to an idea to set up a NGO Support Center in order to assist the strengthening of new and reformation of the old NGOs. The Mongolian Open Society Institute (MOSI/Soros Foundation) picked up this idea 5-6 years later, mobilized the support of other donors and held a series of NGO consultations. However, the NGO Support Center did not materialize though the MOSI did temporarily maintain an Open Web Center that had minimal impact for NGO development.[126]

MONES is one very few local foundations that provides small grants to strengthen grassroots groups[127] and it has also begun to offer proposal-writing and project implementation training to its grantees. Oyuntulkhuur

[121] Discussion with the President of UMENGO (2004).
[122] The Code of Ethics was signed at the 2nd Congress of the Mongolian Journalists' Unified Union on March 11, 2005. The Union is a 2002 merger of the Mongolian Free and Democratic Journalists' Association and the Mongolian Journalists' Association.
[123] Journalists and heads of journalists' associations explicitly stated on the Open Forum TV program that they will not abide by the code of ethics because they need the money they can earn during election campaigns serving partisan interests (2005).
[124] ICSF-2003 National Core Group, *General Policies* (Ulaanbaatar, January 6, 2003).
[125] Draft National Strategic Plan for Civil Society Development; draft Code of Ethics for CSOs.
[126] Few NGOs have access to internet and even fewer use it regularly, to say nothing of the general citizenry: in 2002, 8,000 people had internet access (see: *Mongolia's Human Development Report 2003*, 16). Therefore, most NGO web pages put up with the assistance of the Open Web Center were soon abandoned, unused and outdated.
[127] In 2001-2004, MONES gave 78 grants to groups. In 2004, the total amount of grants was 20,961 USD. See: Mongolian Women's Fund (2004), 13, 30.

Foundation, aside from giving small grants, has financed the INFO newspaper to support information dissemination among and by civil society actors. The DEMO Center conducts training for various civil society stakeholders and maintains an e-mail network of approximately 500 organizations. The Open Forum Society (former MOSI) continues to make grants to CSOs and maintains a resource centre to support CSOs' and other stakeholders' policy research and analysis. These efforts are, however, insufficient to provide for the needs of CSOs, which is consistent with the negative assessment of CSO support infrastructure by RSC respondents: 40.2% judged it as weak and 24.7% as non-existent. A minority (16.5%) indicated there is an expanding infrastructure.[128]

1.4.5 International linkages. Mongolian CSOs' international relations are rather well developed but mainly among Ulaanbaatar-based organizations. Only 3.3% of RSC respondents stated that CSOs do not have foreign relations while 46.4% stated there is a fair number of CSOs with foreign relations. Women's NGOs in particular tend to have broad international linkages, especially within the Asia-Pacific region.[129] Rural CSOs have a harder time developing foreign relations due to poor infrastructure and information systems and lack of language capacity.[130] In fact, some of the rural participants of the National Consultation in fact felt the score for this dimension should be 0 based on their experience.[131]

1.5. Inter-relations

This sub-dimension analyses the relations amongst civil society actors in Mongolia. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.5: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	1
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	2

1.5.1 Communication. A very small minority of RSC participants (3.1%) judged the level of communication and information sharing among CSOs extensive and almost half (49.5%) judged it limited or very limited. The RSC participants further noted that the effectiveness of communication varies by civil society sectors and is higher within sectors than between different sectors. Communication between women's rights NGOs, trade unions and media organizations tends to be more extensive while communication between SCCs, local councils and religious organizations tends to be irregular. An important development is increasing cross-aimag information sharing between community-based rural movements with facilitation of the Ongi River Movement.[132] Communication between environmental NGOs has improved since the establishment of

[128] It should be noted, however, that Mongolians are not accustomed to thinking of an 'infrastructure' in relation to CSOs due to the lack of experience in developing civil society and regulating a democratic society. Therefore, the respondents had a difficulty understanding and responding to this question.

[129] These linkages have included APWLD (Asia-Pacific Forum for Women, Law and Development), IWRAW-Asia Pacific, APWIP (Asia Pacific Women in Politics), AWID (Association for Women's Rights in Development)and the International Network of Women's Funds. It is significant that LEOS hosted the 3rd East Asia Women's Forum in 1998 and that the CEDAW Watch has functioned as the Secretariat for the International Civil Society Forum for Democracy.

[130] It would have been interesting to include an indicator for the connectedness of rural CSOs to urban CSOs.

[131] National Consultation, Nukht, September 22-23, 2005.

[132] The community-based rural movements and their members are generally poor and stationary (mobility across or within the country and between countries requires money). In general, due to poor infrastructure, it is much harder for rural groups to meet each other even if they are from neighbouring aimags than it is for them to communicate with Ulaanbaatar-based CSOs. However, rural

UMENGO. Communication mostly takes a form of in-person meetings through round table discussions, conferences and workshops as well as correspondence by traditional letters and exchange of occasional publications. E-mail is still not widely used due to the lack of internet in rural areas and lack of technological capacity of CSOs. There are few CSO newspapers and newsletters.[133]

1.5.2 Cooperation. While the need to improve CSO coordination and cooperation is an important concern for Mongolian activists, intra-sectoral cooperation among CSOs is generally better than inter-sectoral cooperation but varies by sectors. Again, women's NGOs tend to cooperate more effectively and more often. Thus, coordinated actions by a number of women's NGOs led by the National Center against Violence and the Women Lawyers' Association achieved the adoption of the Law against Domestic Violence in 2004. In 2003, human rights NGOs led by the Lawyers' Center in Support of Legal Reform succeeded in releasing a man unjustly detained for 7 years. Environmental NGOs led by UMENGO effectively advocated against the building of a bridge across the territory of a national park in the East and the building of a power station in Gobi.

Inter-sectoral cooperation was judged to be extremely rare or non-existent by 39.2% of RSC respondents and only 15.5% of them cited 1 or 2 cases. Important examples of inter-sectoral cooperation include the rural civil society/local government/private sector tri-partite consultations initiated by the Uvurkhangai branch of the Women for Social Progress Movement (WSP) and replicated in 4 other aimags.[134] In 2002, several women's rights and human rights NGOs and media representatives came together to support the Movement for the Just Privatization of Land and organized a public forum on civil rights and liberties condemning Government's violent suppression of the MJPL's peaceful protests. In addition, successful cases of women's rights and environmental protection campaigns involved various stakeholders such as media, government agencies and research institutes. But the latter's participation was not so much based on their self-motivation as on the financial incentives offered by the leading NGOs.

Some of the main obstacles to the effective cooperation of CSOs seems to be lack of information exchange in view of weak development of civic journalism and lack of financial, technical and human resources of CSOs; low levels of trust between CSOs and CSO leaders, often influenced by partisan sentiments; and a general high pressure on the time of individuals engaged in civil society, given most activists must maintain income-earning activities (sometimes several) to keep their families afloat while contributing to civil society work. Nevertheless, there are growing trends of inter-sectoral cooperation as evidenced by the work of the Center for Human Rights and Development with rural environmental movements on the Law on Minerals, coordinated demonstrations by various movements to demand state accountability on corruption and

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activists would often benefit much more from exchange with each other given the socio-economic, political and cultural context of urban CSOs is drastically different from rural contexts. The recent exchanges between rural movements is also significant in that they bypass Ulaanbaatar whereas most inter-CSO communication is hierarchical centralized through a key CSO in the capital.

[133] These include newsletters by the National Center against Violence, Gender Center for Sustainable Development, DEMO Center, INFO newspaper produced by Oyuntulkhuur Foundation, Mongoljingoo newspaper produced by the Mongolian Women's Federation, political party newspapers, few religious and/or spiritual publications, etc. Often CSO-produced newspapers and newsletters are limited to the duration of the specific project that funded the publication. The distribution of these publications, with few exceptions, tends to be rather limited.

women's NGOs' call to cooperate with mass movements and citizens on educating voters, combating corruption, influencing public policy and promoting human rights.[135]

1.6. Resources

This sub-dimension examines the resources available for civil society organisations in Mongolia. Table 10 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.6: Indicators assessing civil society resources

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	0
1.6.2	Human resources	2
1.6.3	Technical and infrastructural resources	1

1.6.1 Financial resources. CSOs differ widely by the level of their capacity including the extent of financial resources they command. Inheritor CSOs such as the MTUF, MCTI and the Mongolian Youth Federation, generally enjoy greater financial security and institutional strength based on the ownership of their office spaces and other assets.[136] Few post-1990 CSOs such as the Mongolian Democratic Union, Press Institute of Mongolia and Zorig Foundation, enjoy a comparable degree of financial security. However, the majority of CSOs, especially rural ones, suffer from a perpetual lack of financial resources, which was cited as the main hurdle to effective functioning of CSOs by RSC participants. Thus, only 13% of RSC respondents judged CSOs' financial capacity sufficient, 25% judged it somewhat sufficient, 31% regarded it as insufficient and 4% as completely insufficient.

1.6.2 Human resources. On average, human resources are deemed sufficient for achieving CSOs' stated goals. The assistance of international donor organizations has enabled a fair number of advocacy, public education and service-delivery CSOs (mostly based in Ulaanbaatar) to achieve a significant level of organizational development. As a result, these organizations wield substantial social capital and human and technological resources.[137] Women-led CSOs are leaders among these organizations.[138] Given the high level of general education among Mongolians, human/professional capacity is not as problematic. Thus, 36.4% of

[134] Khuvsgul, Darkhan, Umnugovi and Dornod. See: Uvurkhangai Branch of WSP, "Let's Develop an Equitable System by Ourselves" Project Report for the one-year period of 2003-2004 submitted to the World Bank; WSP, TAF and MOSI, *Participation of Social Groups in Rural Development. Tri-Partite Community Dialogues* (Ulaanbaatar, 2002).

[135] The CSI research was concluded in October 2005. However, some of the trends in civil society became more clearly manifested in 2006 following the forced resignation of the coalition government in January, 2006. The spring of 2006 has been marked by increasingly coordinated and strategic cooperation of CSOs including mass movements, NGOs, policy think tanks and individual citizens (researchers, publicists, etc.). Thus, 7-8 movements that had in 2005 staged public protests relatively independently, each focusing on their issues of concern (pension payments, public transportation fees, corruption, land allocation, quality of education, etc.) formed a temporary united front in 2006 to confront the Parliament and the Government they saw as fundamentally corrupt. Similarly, a number of women's rights NGOs united under the Network of Mongolian Women's NGOs organized an open discussion on March 8, 2006, giving their assessment of the current political, economic, human rights and civil society situation in Mongolia and proposing a general strategy for broad-based coalition building to address critical issues faced by the Mongolian public.

[136] For example, the MTUF owns its office space, the Trade Unions' Cultural Center, the Institute of Labor, etc. Fact-finding interview with a MTUF staff member (August, 2005).

[137] International donors played a very important role in this development.

[138] This is common knowledge in Mongolia and was most clearly demonstrated during the 2002 First National Human Rights NGOs' Forum wherein 81.8% of the presenters were female and women activists dominated the discussion. Also see references for sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.

RSC respondents judged it sufficient and 30.6% judged it somewhat sufficient while 15.1% reported it insufficient or completely insufficient.[139]

1.6.3 Technological resources. This seems to also be a problem area as 35.8% of RSC respondents stated that CSOs' equipment and technology are insufficient or completely insufficient for reaching their stated goals. This is a drawback especially in rural areas and even more so for CSOs whose leaders do not hold important positions in local government.[140] But it is clear CSOs' technological capacity varies significantly as 21.3% and 20.6% of the RSC respondents respectively stated that it is sufficient and somewhat sufficient.

Conclusion

The examination of the structure dimension highlights some of the main weaknesses of Mongolian civil society, such as the highly unequal geographic distribution of CSOs with a high concentration of CSOs in the capital city, poor support infrastructure for CSOs and the lack of crucial financial and technological resources, especially in rural areas. These weaknesses are closely linked to other weaknesses in the structure of civil society such as the lack of effectiveness of umbrella organizations, self-regulatory mechanisms and somewhat weak inter-relations. The breadth of citizen participation in civil society is still relatively narrow, but somewhat higher than that of the depth of citizen participation. This is especially clear with regard to charitable donations: though large numbers of people do donate, however the amount of their donations is extremely low due to the high poverty rate.

The CSI research showed that while Mongolian civil society needs to improve with regard to its internal diversity, particularly in terms of adequate participation and representation of socio-economically, geographically and culturally marginalized groups, it shows strengths in terms of active participation of women at both membership and leadership levels. The high level of education of the Mongolian population also translates into a relative strength of Mongolian civil society in terms of adequate human resources for achieving CSOs' stated goals. The legacy of socialism is evident in the relatively high percentage of people who are members of one or more CSOs, though formal membership does not always mean active involvement in civil society. An important recent trend is the increasingly effective and strategic intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral cooperation among various CSOs. While leading CSOs have rather well developed international linkages, the picture is very different for rural CSOs, once again pointing to significant disparities between urban and rural CSOs in terms of access to crucial international resources (funds, information, training, etc.).

The analysis of the structure dimension also revealed some important issues faced by Mongolian civil society such as the difficulty of distinguishing between non-partisan political action and partisan political action. This is largely due to the deployment of the word 'political' to accuse citizen actions for being 'partisan.' The rhetorical and conceptual conflation of the term 'political' with the term 'partisan' becomes

[139] The remaining respondents either did not answer or stated they do not know.

particularly operational during highly politicised public protests and demonstrations. For the purposes of the CSI, the research team focused on the key demands of mass movements and other CSOs regardless of how their actions were framed by the power-holders and the media and tried to refrain from judging their actions as 'partisan' unless there was clear evidence. On the other hand, many formally non-partisan CSOs, especially inheritor organizations, overtly take partisan stances including by formally supporting specific parties and candidates in national and local elections. Here, the research team focused on such facts reported in the media, by eye-witnesses or representatives of these CSOs.[141] In any case, these difficulties stress the importance of strengthening Mongolian people's non-partisan political activism based on a clearer understanding of the boundaries between partisanship and non-partisanship.

Both the CSI analysis and the CSI participatory processes indicated there is room for a degree of optimism regarding the improvement of the structure of civil society in Mongolia. This is true particularly in relation to increasingly strategic and multi-partite CSO alliances, which cut across regional, sectoral, gender and class boundaries.

[140] Many rural CSO leaders hold government jobs and thus have access to local government assets (fax machine, printer, copier and computer).
[141] This is an important point that also deals with the CSOs' ethics.

2. ENVIRONMENT

This section describes and analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which civil society exists and functions. The score for the Environment dimension is 1.4, indicating a rather disabling environment for civil society. The figure below presents the scores for the seven sub-dimensions within the Environment dimension.

Figure III.2.1: Sub-dimension scores in Environment dimension



2.1. Political context

This sub-dimension examines the political situation in Mongolia and its impact on civil society. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.1: Indicators assessing political context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.1.1	Political Rights	2
2.1.2	Political competition	2
2.1.3	Rule of law	1
2.1.4	Corruption	0
2.1.5	State effectiveness	1
2.1.6	Decentralisation	1

2.1.1 Political rights. According to the Freedom House rating, Mongolia's score is 2 defining its political system as free.[142] All citizens over 18 with necessary citizenship documents have a right to participate in parliamentary, presidential and local government elections. Elections are meaningful and lead to the change in leadership, even if MPRP's advantageous position is consistently observed.[143] However, the principles of equality, universalism and fairness of elections are persistently compromised by the size differences of electoral districts, non-participation by undocumented (mostly migrant) citizens and citizens living abroad

[142] Freedom House Survey. Nations in Transition. Reports, Mongolia.www.freedomhouse.org cited in: D. Ganbat, "The Issue of the Quality of Mongolia's Democracy and Introduction to the Draft National Action Plan on Strengthening Democracy," *Mongolia's Democratic Development: Challenges and Opportunities Conference*, 2.

[143] The 1992 parliamentary elections led to an overwhelming victory of MPRP (72 out of 72 seats), the 1996 elections put the Democratic Union Coalition in majority (50 out of 76 seats), the 2000 elections brought MPRP back as a dominant force (72 out of 76 seats) and the 2004 elections resulted in a tie between MPRP and Motherland-Democracy Coalition. Presidential elections replaced the democratic president with one from MPRP in 1997, the latter's re-election in 2000 and election of another MPRP candidate in 2005.

and continued excessive partisan influence (especially of MPRP) on election management bodies at all levels including the General Election Commission.[144]

The 2004 parliamentary elections demonstrated an alarming trend of increasing corruption of election management and campaign practices at all levels including voter list manipulation, ballot sheet manipulation, use of public servants and state property (premises, vehicles, equipment)[145] and charitable aid items (e.g., through MRCA) for partisan campaigning, vote-buying, bussing voters from other districts, use of religious symbols and even intimidation by local authorities.[146] Some of these were repeated during the 2005 presidential election too.[147]

2.1.2 Political competition. Although 18 parties are currently registered with the Supreme Court, the main actors are the dominant MPRP and the MDP with few third parties forming a weak and fragmented opposition.[148] In 2004, a staggering 96.1% of indirect advertising (worth approximately 1,490.3 million TG) and 53.8% of paid advertising on the state-owned television channels were for MPRP campaign.[149] This is but one indicator of MPRP domination bolstered by its incumbent status. Many analysts stated that the situation deteriorated following the 2004 parliamentary and 2005 presidential elections[150] and the formation of the Grand Coalition Government of MPRP and Motherland-Democracy Coalition (MDP, Motherland Party, Civil Courage Republican Party). Some experts have maintained that Mongolia looks more like a country with a one party dominant system rather than a multi-party system and that the opposition as an institutional component of Mongolia's democracy has essentially dissolved.[151] In 2005, the parliament amended the 1990 Law on Political Parties so as to privilege the 2 main parties and weaken competition from newer parties.[152]

Both major parties, especially MPRP, claim substantial national memberships and both are heavily criticised for having become increasingly undemocratic, elitist, non-transparent and corrupt, particularly at top leadership levels, essentially expressing oligarchic rather than popular interests.[153] Parties do not effectively represent their support bases and significant social groups such as the poor or herders are left essentially unrepresented. This contributes to the lack of programmatic differentiation between parties despite their

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[144] D. Dorjsuren and D. Gankhuyag, "Political Parties, Political Competition, Electoral Process," *Mongolia's Democratic Development: Challenges and Opportunities Conference*; NHRC, "One. Implementation of the Right to Elect and Be Elected," *Report on Human Rights and Freedoms in Mongolia* (Ulaanbaatar, 2005), 5-32; B. Delgermaa, "Baseline Study 2001 – Report on the Human Rights Situation in Mongolia – An Independent Review," in Lawyers' Center for Legal Reform Support, *First National Human Rights Forum Papers. May 2-3, 2002* (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 15.

[145] Out of 1,788 public servants illegally mobilized for partisan election campaign, 1,766 were recruited for MPRP; 1,017 public vehicles served MPRP election campaign while 16 served MDP; and MPRP used public venues for free for 101 events while MDP used public premises for free for 25 events. Open Forum Society, Voter Education Center, Globe International, *2004 Parliamentary Election Campaign Finance Monitoring Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 35, 37.

[146] D. Dorjsuren and D. Gankhuyag; Mongolian Human Rights Commission (2005); *2004 Parliamentary Election Campaign Finance Monitoring Report*; fact-finding interviews with Voter Education Center staff, a Member of the General Election Commission and 2004 election observers (June, July and August, 2005).

[147] Fact-finding interview with a Member of the General Election Commission (July and August, 2005).

[148] The 2000 merger of the two main opposition parties – the centre-right Mongolian National Democratic Party and the centre-left Mongolian Social Democratic Party – into the MDP has weakened more than consolidated the opposition forces.

[149] *2004 Parliamentary Election Campaign Finance Monitoring Report*, 51.

[150] The parliamentary elections resulted in a relatively even distribution of seats between the MPRP and the Motherland-Democracy Coalition of 3 opposition parties. The presidential election resulted in the victory of Mr. N. Enkhbayar, former Chair of MPRP, 2000-2004 Prime Minister and 2004-2005 Speaker of Parliament.

[151] D. Dorjsuren and D. Gankhuyag, 3.

[152] Ibid., 4.

declarations of democratic, liberal or conservative ideologies. Their actual practice, especially in the socio-economic field, is in constant conflict with the stated ideologies and is governed more by raw competition for power and wealth[154] under a veneer of manipulative populist slogans. While the opposition tends to be more liberal and the MPRP more authoritarian, the democrats, despite their title, have not consistently and effectively supported democratic reforms.[155]

This observation is consistent with the Democratic Governance Indicator score – 2.6 on a scale from 1 to 5 – for the democratic role of political parties, indicating the predominance of undemocratic features in this sphere.[156] The DGI conclusion states that although the multi-party system is being established in Mongolia in institutional terms, political parties are actually weak in terms of promoting and consolidating democracy.[157] However, the MPRP-executed forced resignation of the coalition government headed by a MDP Prime-Minister on 11 January 2006, provided a strong impetus to the emergence and/or intensification of various reform movements within both MPRP and MDP[158] at the same time as forcing the MDP and Civil Courage Party to take a strong oppositional position vis-à-vis MPRP and its allies. Under the pressure of its members, the MDP held a National Congress whereby its members approved the democratic reform agenda of the party and re-elected the party leader. By contrast, the MPRP leadership has steadfastly resisted its reform movements' demands to hold a National Congress. Nevertheless, the emergence of relatively well organized groups advocating for greater accountability, transparency and internal democracy within a rather authoritarian-style party can be seen as an important positive development.

2.1.3 Rule of law. Over 500 laws have been newly passed since 1990,[159] most of which are not properly based on research and public discussion.[160] Judicial independence, competence, transparency and accountability are serious and persistent concerns.[161] In the public opinion, courts routinely favour wealthy people (89%), high public officials (91%)and friends and relatives (86%)[162] and the 2001 conference

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[153] Ibid., 2-3.
[154] Ibid., 2.
[155] Most notably, the failure to end state control of National Television and Radio during the 1996-2000 term of the Democratic Coalition.
[156] ICNRD-5 Follow-Up Project, *Country Information Note*, 11.
[157] ICNRD-5 Follow-Up Project, *Democratic Governance Indicators: State of Governance in Mongolia. Assessment Summary* (Ulaanbaatar, 2006), 16.
[158] B. Bold, "Party Members Announced a Protest," *Udriin Sonin* 295 (December 9, 2005); "The Party Leadership is Not Politically Sensitive," *Udriin Sonin* 011 (January 14, 2006); Ch.Tamir, "The Rupture of the Political System," *Udriin Sonin* (March 24, 2006); Ch. Bayartogtokh, "Parties' Internal Conflicts are Intensifying," *MONTSAME News* (March 10, 2006); B. Bilguun, "Demand for a Special National Congress," *Udriin Sonin* 293 (December 7, 2005), Center for Citizens' Alliance, "What Lies Behind and Follows After the Forced Resignation of Ts. Elbegdorj's Government" Position Paper (February 4, 2006).
[159] World Bank, *"Mongolia: Demand for Legal Reform" Research Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2000) quoted in TAF, *Legal Empowerment in Mongolia (Research Report)* funded by ADB (Ulaanbaatar, January 2004), 10.
[160] Kh. Temuujin, "Rule of Law and Human Rights in Mongolia," *Mongolia's Democratic Development: Challenges and Opportunities Conference*, 5.
[161] *Legal Empowerment in Mongolia;* Kh. Temuujin; *Mongolia's Human Development Report 2003*, 18-19; G. Dalaijamts, "State of Civic and Political Rights and Freedoms," in *Human Rights Commission in 3 Years. 2001-2003* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 34. However, the 2003 survey by the Sant Maral Foundation commissioned by the Judicial Reform Project indicated a slight positive trend in public attitude towards courts. See: *Legal Empowerment in Mongolia,* 13.
[162] *Judicial Reform Project and Sant Maral Foundation Survey* (2001) in Kh. Temuujin, 8.

participants concluded that "attempts to issue court decisions serving individual interests and profit the interests of their acquaintances, political party, organization, firms and friends have become wide-spread."[163]

The Supreme Court lacks capacity and political will to issue interpretations to laws based on the principles of democracy and human rights.[164] The main body of legal professionals remains unreformed and unfit for a democratic legal system.[165] Citizens' legal education is low compounded by the lack of accountability of legal institutions, non-transparent legislative processes and the general lack of access to public information.[166] Thus, laws are not consistently implemented and are routinely violated by citizens and government.[167]

2.1.4 Corruption. A 2002 research concluded that corruption has reached an alarming level in Mongolia[168] and the 2004 corruption monitoring project indicated that 88.9% of citizens think that corruption is widespread or very widespread.[169] According to the Transparency International rating of 146 countries, Mongolia is a corrupt country with a score of 3.0.[170] The most corrupt institutions are considered to be the courts (79%), customs (78.5-79.6%), the prosecutor's office (76.9%)and the police (71.2-70.6%).[171] Perceived corruption levels of the taxation office (67.6%), local government (63.6%) and parliament (56.4%) are also high.[172] Sources also note an alarming trend of normalization of corruption as an everyday phenomenon and public acceptance of it[173] and stress that anti-corruption measures are either not implemented or are ineffectual.

2.1.5 State effectiveness. According to the World Bank Governance data set, Mongolia's score is -0.46 indicating a slightly below average level of state effectiveness.[174] Domestically, state institutions are seen to be predominantly ineffective, embedded in a political culture of non-transparency. The parliament lacks capacity for analysing policy issues[175] and producing quality legislation. The judicial system still requires massive reforms.[176] The effectiveness of the executive is hindered by extensive red-tape and corruption, lack of clarity and accountability, mismatches between decision-making authority and responsibility for service delivery, poor management skills and low understanding of democratic, human rights and gender equality

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[163] D. Ganbat, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, "New Century and Courts," *"Judicial Power in New Century" International Conference of Theory and Practice* (Ulaanbaatar, June 26-27, 2001), 39. Moreover, the East Asia Barometer and CSS showed very low levels of public trust in courts.
[164] Interview with B. Dangaasuren, Supreme Court's Disciplinary Committee's Inspector, "The Mongolian Supreme Court Has Transformed into Ganbat's Private Company," Udriin Sonin 176 (July 25, 2005), 3, 7 (Ganbat is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court); Kh. Temuujin.
[165] Kh. Temuujin, 5.
[166] Ibid., 5; *Legal Empowerment in Mongolia,* 11.
[167] *Legal Empowerment in Mongolia,* 10; Kh. Temuujin, 5.
[168] "Corruption in Political Circles" Research Report (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), quoted in D. Ganbat, 3.
[169] S. Oyun and Sociological Academy, *Public Perception on Anti-Corruption Measures and the Implementation of the National Program on Combating Corruption. Monitoring Research Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 34.
[170] Transparency International. Corruption Index. www.transprency.org, quoted in D. Ganbat, 3.
[171] S. Oyun and Sociological Academy, 36.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid., 61; M. Ganzorig, "Governance Reforms and Combating Corruption," *Mongolia's Democratic Development: Challenges and Opportunities Conference*, 6.
[174] On a scale from -2,5 to +2.5.
[175] TAF, *Strengthening Legislative Research and Analysis Capacity of Mongolia's State Great Hural* (Ulaanbaatar, 2005).
[176] Discussed in part c) of the sub-section. See also: L. Ider, "Study of How Primary Court Are Resolving Complaints and Disputes Related to Human Rights and Freedoms," *Human Rights* 4 (2004), 49-52; Kh. Temuujin, 11-12.

principles.[177] Local governments are similarly plagued by lack of openness and effectiveness.[178] The problem is further exacerbated by the excessive partisanship of state employees (majority being MPRP members) and massive dismissals of public servants after each parliamentary election.[179] As a result, discontent with the performance of the state is widespread and public trust in government is low.[180]

The Democratic Governance Indicator score, for 'government accountability and effectiveness', is 2.8 indicating a significant presence of undemocratic practices.[181] It is thus clear that there are numerous problems with regard to the quality, efficiency and equitable delivery of state services. Nevertheless, the Mongolian state is still largely functional in terms of tax collection and the provision of public education, healthcare, welfare, postal and other services. It should also be taken into account that the level of corruption and effectiveness varies significantly by the government sector and agency.[182]

2.1.6 Decentralisation. Decentralization has been an important concern in the post-socialist period. However, all sources agree that political and financial power is still excessively centralized and local self-governance remains on paper.[183] Local revenue autonomy is extremely limited with a share of total expenditure from own sources being less than 15% in more than 1/3 of the aimags; only Orkhon and Ulaanbaatar were able to support 80% of its expenditures in 2001 while the rest relied on state transfers for over 70%.[184] As a result, local legislatures are limited to nominally discussing and approving budgets allocated from above[185] and political, economic and cultural power is concentrated in the hands of the local governor. RSC participants uniformly stated excessive centralization as a major hurdle to local democratization and development and reported the situation was exacerbated by the 2002 Law on Public Sector Finance Management.

The Democratic Governance Indicator for decentralization is 2.8, which emphasizes the weak institutionalization of local legislatures, which were intended by the Constitution to serve as the main vehicle

[177] See part d) of this sub-section and: NHRC, *State of Human Rights and Freedoms in Mongolia* (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 55; CHRD, NCAV and CEDAW Watch; ADB and World Bank; World Bank (2004); CHRD, *State of Human Rights in Detention Centers* (Ulaanbaatar, 2003).

[178] WSP, *"Openness of Citizens' Representatives' Khurals – Citizens' Participation" Research Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2001); WSP, TAF and MOSI; World Bank (2004), ix-x.

[179] Although the Law on State Service holds that civil service must be politically neutral, this principal has been routinely violated, in part due to the hangover from the socialist period when the MPRP made state service appointments through its party nomenclature system. In 1996, when the democrats first gained state power, they dismissed significant numbers of public servants affiliated with the MPRP. In 2000, MPRP too dismissed thousands of public servants at both national and local levels. Such frequent changes of public servants has hindered the professionalization and continuity of state services, seriously affecting their quality and effectiveness. Nevertheless, MPRP has consistently opposed initiatives to ensure political neutrality of state servants. Thus, in 2002, the MPRP-dominated parliament struck down a resolution on ending the dismissal of public servants based on political affiliation and, in 2005, MPRP parliamentarians unanimously voted down the bill requiring that all public servants except for political appointees shed their party affiliations and swear an oath of non-partisanship. See: Asian Development Bank, *Country Governance Assessment. Mongolia* (Manila: October 2004), 49-51; Liberty Center (fact-finding interview).

[180] Political Education Academy; CSS.

[181] ICNRD-5 Follow-Up Project, *Country Information Note*, 11.

[182] See information for Indicator 2.1.4. Also, the qualitative study of NGO-Government policy dialogue suggests that 'hard' sectors that deal with concrete economic issues such as the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Infrastructure are more closed, corrupt and, therefore, less effective and responsive whilst 'soft' sectors that deal with health and welfare (Ministry of Social Security and Labour) are less corrupt, more open and somewhat more effective and responsive. See: CCA (forthcoming).

[183] Open Forum Society, *Local Budget Process. Guide for Citizens* (Ulaanbaatar, 2005); *Poverty Matters* (Newsletter of the Poverty Research group) 2 (May and June 2005), 3; WSP, TAF, MOSI; World Bank (2004), xi; RSCs.

[184] World Bank (2004), xi.

[185] *Poverty Matters* 2, 3.

for the local self-governing mechanisms.[186] Citizens' Representatives' Khurals local legislatures) seriously lack sufficient financial resources to conduct regular activities and meet only twice a year, which dramatically limits their ability to oversee the executive (Local Governor's Office). Moreover, in most aimags, local legislatures are in fact dominated by employees of the local executive, further reinforcing the dominant position of the Local Governor over the local legislature. The strong hold of the MPRP on a significant percentage of local governments through MPRP governors as well as MPRP-dominated local legislatures is another contributing factor to the (re)centralization of political, economic and cultural power in Mongolia.[187]

2.2. Basic freedoms and rights

This sub-dimension examines to what extent basic freedoms are ensured by law and in practice in Mongolia. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.2: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	1
2.2.2	Information rights	1
2.2.3	Press freedom	1

2.2.1 Civil liberties. That Mongolia has and is experiencing an impressive number of citizens' movements and vigorous formation of CSOs[188] testifies to the extensive ability of citizens to exercise their rights of assembly, association and expression. Nevertheless, civil rights and freedoms are not fully guaranteed and are frequently violated. The CHRD estimated that over 500,000 people working in the informal sector are unable to join or form trade unions as they do not have labour contracts. Many workers of private and foreign-owned factories are discouraged by the management from joining trade unions and holding union meetings.[189] The NHRC noted that MJHA's restrictive regulations and discrepancies between the NGO Law and other laws impede CSO registration process.[190] It is alarming that rural CSO actors reported numerous cases of politically-motivated harassment and interrogation of local activists and even surveillance of civil society meetings by local power brokers (employers, party leaders and local authorities).[191] Resultant fear was said to be a major hurdle to civil society engagement in rural areas.[192]

Citizens' rights to hold public protests and demonstrations are restricted by the 1994 Law on Holding Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations, which privileges public order over civil liberties.[193] The law affords

[186] ICNRD-5 Follow-Up Project, *Country Information Note*, 12; ICNRD-5 Follow-Up Project, *Democratic Governance Indicators*, 21-22.
[187] RSCs; National Consultation discussions; WSP (2001).
[188] Civil Society Review RTD; MJHA and Supreme Court data on registered CSOs; G. Chuluunbaatar; Lawyers' Center for Legal Reform Support; TAF (2004); etc. See also sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.5.
[189] CHRD, *State of Human Rights in Mongolia 2001. Notes* (Ulaanbaatar, 2001), 7-8.
[190] G. Dalaijamts, 33. See sub-section 5 for more on CSO registration.
[191] This issue came up very strongly and unexpectedly during the Civil Society Consultation on the National Program of Action for Strengthening Democracy in Mongolia organized by the ICSFD Ulaanbaatar Secretariat/CEDAW Watch on May 10-11, 2005 (meeting minutes are available).
[192] This contradicts somewhat the Freedom House score of 2, which holds Mongolia to be free. However, Freedom House data are largely based on urban middle class intellectuals' opinions and do not, therefore, sufficiently take into account the rural context and the lived reality of lower income Mongolians.
[193] G. Dalaijamts, 33; CEDAW Watch/Human Rights NGO Action for Civil Rights and Liberties, *Open Forum on Civil Rights and Liberties. Presentations* (Ulaanbaatar, November 24, 2002); D. Orosoo, "The Right to Hold Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations

excessive power to local authorities to decide whether or not and when public protests and demonstrations can be held and, until this year, public meetings of political nature could not be held on Sukhbaatar square although pubic gatherings of cultural, sports and economic nature had been allowed.[194] Moreover, a permit to hold public protests and demonstrations can only be issued to an officially registered CSO.[195] In 2002, the restrictive provisions of this law were deployed by the Government in conjunction with the Traffic Law to suppress peaceful demonstrations by the MJPL.[196] In 2001, a more creative form of restriction was used by the city mayor's office by building a temporary children's playground on the Freedom square to pre-empt opposition protests on the square. The State does not refrain from dispatching police and army forces to suppress and/or contain public protests and demonstrations.

The CSI assessment given by Mongolian civil society stakeholders thus contradicts the Freedom House rating of Mongolia as free with a score of 2. The contradiction is due to the fact that the CSI research focused on the actual experience of activists and average citizens while the Freedom House assessment tends to rely on more formal and thus often superficial indicators.

2.2.2 Information rights. Citizens' information rights are very limited. All branches of government at all levels lack transparency, openness and accountability and are not subject to a law on public information.[197] The state list of secret information is too long (73 items) and too broadly defined[198] and the Law on Privacy of Organizations allows heads and officials of organizations to determine what information is to be kept from public disclosure according to his/her subjective opinion or interest.[199] The Criminal Code penalizes seeking and disseminating secret information but does not mention sanctions for the person who leaks the information.[200] Income and property statements of public officials are protected by the 1995 Law on Individual Privacy.[201] Only one MP has made her financial accounts public.[202] An open government website has been maintained with assistance from USAID and TAF to inform citizens on public affairs. However, the initiative remains rather limited in both content and outreach.[203] The Globe International has initiated the

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and the Need to Reform Its Legal Basis," *Human Rights* 3 (2004), 10-21. The latter 2 sources critique not only concrete provisions but also the conceptual basis of the Law on Holding Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations and argue for a fundamental revision of the law.

[194] The government acceded to the amendment under pressure from the Citizens' Movement for Ethical Society.

[195] This provision was used against the MJPL in conjunction with the MJHA's unjustified refusal to register the MJPL.

[196] During the same time, the government encircled the main opposition party's building by police force and put a few of its leaders under house arrest. See: CEDAW Watch/Human Rights NGO Action for Civil Rights and Liberties. In 2005, as a result of a massive and sustained protest by the Citizens' Movement for Ethical Society, some of the restrictive provisions of the Law on Public Protests and Demonstrations were amended.

[197] Nearly all sources quoted in this report maintain this view.

[198] Globe International stated that the List of Secret Information is itself secret. It includes such items as the list of university students studying abroad on government grants.

[199] H. Naranjargal, "Right to Know: Freedom of Information," in Lawyers' Center for Legal Reform Support, 44; National Human Rights Commission, *State of Human Rights in Mongolia* (Ulaanbaatar, 2001), 33. The law in fact encourages the creation on non-transparent organizational culture and fear of information disclosure among employees. See also: G. Chuluunbaatar, 8.

[200] H. Naranjargal, 46.

[201] Ibid.

[202] Ms. S. Oyun has urged other MPs to do the same but no one has followed her suit to date.

[203] The website operators try to put all draft laws and sufficiently in time for holding effective public discussions. However, often the government agencies in charge have been slow or reluctant to provide information for the website, which has posed major issues in terms of timing and limited scope of information posted. Furthermore, a very small percentage of the population, mainly consisting of students and young professionals, has internet access (see section 2.3.8). Thus, the general population has not been able to benefit from the website. An important advantage of this initiative, however, is that many overseas Mongolians have been able to participate in policy discussions through the internet chat room. See: Government of Mongolia, www.opengovernment.mn.

drafting and advocated for the passage of the Law on the Right to Information but the parliament has lacked the political will to adopt the law. State information became particularly restricted after 2000.[204]

2.2.3 *Press freedoms.* The transition to democracy ended the strict Party-State control of all media institutions and spurred an explosive growth of private media, especially newspapers. The 1998 Law on Media Freedom bans state censorship and state ownership of mass media. In 2004, there were 161 newspapers, 69 journals and magazines, 43 radio channels, 37 air and 15 cable television channels.[205] Despite the 1998 Law on Media Freedom, which bans state-ownership of mass media, 11% of the journals, 47% of the newspapers, 30.2% of the radio stations and 51.4% of the television stations (excluding cable channels) are state-owned.[206] The most far-reaching Mongolian National Television and Radio are still state-owned and it is planned to transfer these to public supervision within this year.[207] Restrictions on media freedoms intensified after 2000 with the MJHA launching an inspection campaign of a large number of print media, adoption of undemocratic amendments to the Criminal Code, widespread censorship of program content at state-owned broadcast media and continued lawsuits against journalists by public office-holders on allegations of slander.[208] On the other hand, low levels of ethics and professionalism among journalists pose a major obstacle to effective protection of media freedoms.[209]

The state of independent media is critical in rural areas as RSC participants uniformly stressed.[210] Very few aimags have significant alternative sources of information[211] whereas in most other areas, citizens' choice is limited to a government-controlled television station, radio channel (often FM)and a newspaper. RSC participants reported that independent media are unable to compete with dominant party-affiliated media, which are subsidized by local government budget.[212] It is also telling that 1/5 of daily newspapers are distributed to aimags and soums (often reaching in 2 weeks) while local newspapers account for only 2% of the total newspaper sales.[213] Rural residents watch on average 1.8 hours of television programming while Ulaanbaatar residents watch on average 9 hours of programming.[214] This situation is consistent with the Freedom of Press rating of Mongolia as 'partially free' at 35.[215]

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[204] Ts. Oyungerel, "Opinion-Based Discrimination in Mongolia," in Lawyers' Center for Legal Reform Support, 39.
[205] Press Institute of Mongolia, *Mongolian Media Monitoring* (Ulaanbaatar, 2005), 4-5.
[206] Ibid., pp. 24, 34, 38, 41.
[207] A governing board consisting of members of the public are to supervise the MNTV&R. Elections have been held among civil society sectors to put forward their candidates for the governing board. This transfer process is highly politicized and is currently stalled.
[208] Ts. Oyungerel, 38-39; Liberty Center Urgent Alerts (www.liberty_center.org); personal accounts of CSO actors.
[209] G. Chuluunbaatar, 8; Mongolian Union of Free Newspapers, "Journalists' Ethics" Project, *Human Rights* 4 (2004), 31-32; G. Dalaijamts, 32; H. Naranjargal, "Free Media and Ethics," in Globe International NGO, *"Journalist and Law" Series 5. Reputation and Slander* (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 35-39. A study revealed that 30.1% of plaintiffs on slander cases are public servants including 14% who are high-ranking office holders including the President, MPs and Governors. In addition, 2.2% of the organizations who filed complaints on slander were government institutions. See: MOSI, "Report on the Study of Court Resolutions of Slander through Media," in *"Journalist and Law" Series 5. Reputation and Slander* (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 64.
[210] The situation is particularly critical in the poorer aimags such as Selenge (70% poverty rate) and Dornogovi.
[211] Khuvsgul, Darkhan-Uul, Uvurkhangai and Sukhbaatar participants indicated their aimags are relatively better off in terms of media situation.
[212] For example, Khentii and Khovd.
[213] G. Chuluunbaatar, 8; H. Naranjargal, "Free Media and Ethics," 35; CHRD (2001), 7.
[214] Ibid.
[215] The Freedom House's Freedom of Press survey assesses the degree of print, broadcast and Internet freedom in every country in the world by examining the legal environment in which media operate, political influences on reporting and access to information and economic pressures on content and the dissemination of news. It assigns each country a numerical score from 0 to 100 that determine a category rating of Free, Partly Free or Not Free. See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/media/pressrel/042705.htm.

2.3. Socio-economic context

This sub-dimension analyses the socio-economic situation in Mongolia. It is measured by one aggregate indicator – socio-economic context. The table below shows the indicator score.

Table III.2.3: Indicator assessing the socio-economic context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	1

Within the sub-dimension/aggregate indicator 'socio-economic context,' the CSI exercise looked at the following eight indicators, which together can inform the nature of the socio-economic context in Mongolia and represent different ways in which the socio-economic context can potentially impact on civil society: 1) poverty, 2) civil war, 3) severe ethnic or religious conflict, 4) severe economic crisis, 5) severe social crisis, 6) serious socio-economic inequities, 7) illiteracy and 8) lack of IT infrastructure. Further, specific benchmarks were provided for each of the indicators to assess the extent to which it serves as a barrier to civil society. The benchmarks and data for these eight indicators for Mongolia are presented in the table below:

Table III.2.4: Socio-economic context indicators, benchmarks and data

1	***Poverty.*** *Is there widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on less than $2 per day)?*	
	Yes	The poverty rate is officially declared to be 36.1%[216] but the figure is broadly contested,[217] especially given the official minimum standards of living are set too low at 20,200-26,500 TG per month (only 56-74 US cents per day).[218] No independent study of the scope and depth of poverty has been conducted but some estimate it at 50% or higher. Poverty is higher in rural areas, especially in the eastern region,[219] and there is indication of continued expanding and deepening trends. According to the 2004 World Development Indicators, 50% of Mongolia's population live on less than 2 USD per day.[220]
2	***Civil war.*** *Did the country experience any armed conflict in the last 5 years?*	
	No	
3	***Severe ethnic or religious conflict.***	
	No	
4	***Severe economic crisis. Is the external debt more than the GDP?***	
	Yes	Though it is commonly considered that Mongolia has not had a severe economic crisis after the early 1990s, levels of external debt are rather high: net present value of debt is 59.4% of GDP, total debt stock is 88.8% of GDP and total debt service is 2.9% of GDP.[221] The total external debt as a percentage of GNI is 118% according to the Global Development Finance 2005 data produced by the World Bank.[222]
5	***Severe social crisis.*** [223]	
	Yes	Alcoholism, domestic violence and crime rates are worrisomely high to the extent of indicating severe social crisis. Estimates show that 51% of the adult population abuses alcohol[224] and an average of

[216] National Statistical Office, World Bank and UNDP, Main *Report of the Sample Survey on Household Income, Expenditure and Living Standards* (Ulaanbaatar, 2004), 2.
[217] The research findings were released during an election period and members of the public, e.g. participants of the 2004 Open Forum television program on poverty, argued the figure was much lower than the real poverty rate. By comparison, an independent study of oil-rich Kazakhstan estimated Kazakhstani poverty rate to be 40% (quoted during the Open Forum).
[218] Poverty Research Group of the Ministry of Finance and UNDP, *Impact of Utility Charges on Poor Households. Survey Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2005), 17.
[219] National Statistical Office, World Bank and UNDP, 2.
[220] By 1995 survey data. See: World Bank, *World Development Report 2005. A Better Investment Climate for Everyone* (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 259.
[221] By 2002 data. See: World Bank (2004), p. 236.
[222] Based on 2003 survey data. See: International Secondary Data Sources prepared and provided by CIVICUS.
[223] This indicator was intensively discussed by the participants of the National Consultation. According to the general vote taken on the issue, Mongolia is currently in a state of deep social crisis.
[224] A 1985-1997 study quoted in Association against Alcoholism and Narcotics, *Manual for Trainers* (Ulaanbaatar, 2005), 74. The same study is attributed to UNDP in ADB and World Bank, 44.
[225] Association against Alcoholism and Narcotics, 76.

		130,000-140,000 people per year pass through the sobering centres.[225] By the NCAV data, 1 in 3 women is subject to some form of violence and 1 in 10 women is subject to regular physical violence.[226] In 2002, there were 22,555 registered crimes (28.9% were violent crimes), which is 2.5 times higher than in 1990.[227] Moreover, the 1999, 2000and 2001 *dzuds* (blizzards) had tragic repercussions for many herding families: in 2000-2001, 840 families in Khuvsgul and 186 families in Govi-Altai lost all their livestock and by the end of 2000, 46 families in Govisumber had lost all their animals.[228]
6	***Severe socio-economic inequities.*** *Are there severe socio-economic inequities in the country (e.g. Gini index higher than 0.40)?*	
	No[229]	The Gini index is 0.33 and the gap between the wealthy and the poor is broader in rural areas. Consumption of the wealthiest quintile is 5.5 times higher than that of the lowest quintile.[230]
7	***Illiteracy.***	
	No	Literacy rate in Mongolia is among the highest in the world at 97.8 (98% for men and 97.5% for women)[231] but there is an observed downward trend due to poverty.
8	***Lack of IT infrastructure.*** *Does the country lack basic access to internet communication? (e.g. less than 5 hosts by 10 000 inhabitants)*	
	Yes	In 2002, there were 8,000 Internet users in Mongolia.[232] According to the International Telecommunication Union database, there were 0.16 hosts per 10,000 people in 2003.[233]

The analysis of civil society's socio-economic environment showed that 4 out of the 8 indicators form barriers to the development and functioning of Mongolian civil society. Thus, Mongolian civil society is operating in a somewhat disabling socio-economic context.

2.4. Socio-cultural context

This sub-dimension examines to what extent socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.5: Indicators assessing the socio-cultural context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.4.1	Trust	1
2.4.2	Tolerance	2
2.4.3	Public spiritedness	1

2.4.1 Trust. The CSS indicated relatively low levels of inter-personal trust with 69.8% stating that only few people can be trusted, 19.9% stating most people can be trusted and 7.6% stating most people cannot be trusted. No other studies are available on this issue.

2.4.2 Tolerance.[234] On the average, 34.6% of the CSS respondents indicated some form of intolerance. Tolerance for ethnic and religious differences seems to be slightly higher with 23.9%-26.6% of the

[226] *Violence against Women and Legal Framework in Mongolia*, 2.
[227] NSO data quoted in *Mongolia's Human Development Report 2003*, 18.
[228] NHRC, *State of Human Rights in Mongolia* (Ulaanbaatar, 2001), 110.
[229] The answer is not only based on the official data. However, it is common knowledge in Mongolia that poverty-related official data are not accurate. Therefore, if objective data were available, this indicator may well be present in the Mongolian context as an inhibiting factor to civil society.
[230] NSO, World Bank and UNDP, 2.
[231] NSO (2001), 74.
[232] NSO data quoted in *Mongolia's Human Development Report 2003*, 16.
[233] International Secondary Data Sources prepared and provided by CIVICUS.
[234] This concept presented one of the main difficulties in undertaking the CSI research as the concept is not well developed in Mongolia and the term is difficult to translate into Mongolian. Moreover the Mongolian term *(busdad) khuleetstei khandakh* used by the CSI team was often confused with a popular notion *khultsengui*, which means to be passive, patient and somewhat obedient especially vis-à-vis authorities due to the meaning of the word *khuleetstei* that commonly denotes (wise) patience in the face of conflicts or irritating circumstances. Occasionally the concept is translated as *busdyg tevchih uzel* (approximately meaning tolerating others) but it was decided this translation excessively flattens the concept of tolerance and obscures the humane notion encompassed by the term. Further thought should be paid to the expression of the concept in Mongolian. Also, participants in consultative components of the CSI exercise emphasized that the major problem of intolerance and discrimination in Mongolia is the one based on party affiliation and political convictions. Hence, this item was added to the list of examples on tolerance.

respondents picking people of other ethnic and religious groups as undesirable neighbours. They seemed less tolerant towards foreign migrant workers (30.4%)[235] and much less tolerant of people with AIDS (45.1%) and homosexuals (47.1%). There is also evidence of increasing discrimination against rural migrants in the urban areas.[236] The biggest problem of non-tolerance cited by RSC participants is that of discrimination by political views, especially strong and harmful in rural areas. In general, the concept of tolerance is not well developed in Mongolia as a democratic value, which is evident from the fact that 80.2% of the East Asia Barometer survey though that a political leader should refuse to make a compromise no matter how many people disagree with him/her if he/she is confident he/she is right.[237]

2.4.3 Public spiritedness. The CSS indicated very high level of public spiritedness with 86.1%-92.2% of the respondents stating that claiming benefits one is not entitled to, avoiding payment for using pubic transportation, avoiding tax and avoiding payment for water and electricity services cannot be justified under any circumstances. However, it is common knowledge in Mongolia that the above actions are both wide spread and widely condoned.[238] This suggests very low levels of public spiritedness, which is also evident from the frequent damage of public property for entertainment or financial gain. Another example is the irresponsible use of public spaces, especially roads.[239] However, NAG members emphasized that this social phenomenon results from the general distrust in the government rather than being a steadfast refusal by citizens to respect common goods.

2.5. Legal environment

This sub-dimension examines the legal environment for civil society and assesses to what extent it is enabling or disabling to civil society. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.6: Indicators assessing the legal environment

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	1
2.5.2	Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	2
2.5.3	Tax exemptions for CSOs[240]	2
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	0

[235] Most recently, the Mongolian Traditional United Party organized a press conference advocating for stricter procedures for issuing work permits and hiring foreign workers. Reported on the television news in September, 2005.
[236] *Poverty Matters* Special Edition (May, 2005), 4.
[237] Political Education Academy, 116.
[238] See, for example, data on non-payment of utility charges: Poverty Research Group of the Ministry of Finance and UNDP, 51, 62.
[239] Mongolian drivers are notorious for disrespecting traffic regulations, each other and pedestrians while participating in the traffic.
[240] The CSI toolkit refers to this indicator in terms of tax laws being favourable or not to CSOs. In Mongolia, the term 'tax laws' or 'tax systems' automatically includes tax incentives for business support for CSOs. Therefore, for the sake of greater clarity, we have made the title of the indicator more specific to refer to tax exemptions for CSOs.

2.5.1 CSO registration. RSC respondents' opinions were divided on the ease and efficiency of the process.

Table III.2.7: RSC participants' assessment of the CSO registration system

Question: Is the CSO registration process…	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't know/ didn't answer (%)
Efficient?	37.1	25.8	37.1
Simple?	29.9	39.2	31
Inexpensive?	45.4	12.4	42.2
Implemented according to the law?	61.9	11.3	26.8
Implemented consistently?	40.2	13.4	45.4

A small minority (12.4%) stated the 10,000 TG fee is too high but 45.4% thought it was reasonable. Interestingly, the majority (61.9%) judged the NGO registration system consistent with the laws,[241] which contradicts observations by the NHRC and CSO leaders that, despite consciously liberal provisions of the 1997 NGO law, the actual process was made cumbersome by the MJHA 's restrictive regulations.[242] NGO registration has been delayed or refused on various extra-legal grounds such as the review of NGO requests for registration by a ministry's council, requirement to give a 'proper' name to the NGO and shorten the bylaws, requirement to clarify the mission statement in distinction to existing NGOs.[243] These requirements, none of which is currently written down, interfere with the autonomy of NGOs. In several cases, the MJHA refused to register NGOs without giving legal reasons for doing so.[244]

Rural CSOs are particularly affected by inefficiencies of the registration process. The NGO Law provisions particularly favourable to rural NGOs[245] were never implemented in practice and were invalidated by the adoption of the 2003 Law on Registration of Legal Entities. The Law on Registration of Legal entities additionally requires that applicants submit proof that the CSO name does not overlap with that of an already registered entity, potentially causing more obstacles to CSO registration.[246] Furthermore, applications of religious organizations must be reviewed by local authorities before the registration application can be submitted to the MJHA, which potentially causes obstacles to the freedom of religion and right to association of minority religious groups. Lastly, journalists and civil rights activists have argued that media

[241] This is likely due to several factors: 1) many rural NGO actors do not personally go through the registration process as it is unnecessary in the case of rural branches of Ulaanbaatar-based NGOs, 2) NGOs that registered before 2000 encountered less bureaucratic hurdles and 3) according to a 2001 study, NGO activists' knowledge of the NGO Law tends to be rather low. See: B. Oyunbileg, *Status of the NGO Law Implementation* (unpublished, commissioned by TAF, 2001).

[242] G. Dalaijamts, 33; B. Oyunbileg.

[243] Beyond ascertaining that the new NGOs' name does not overlap with that of an already registered NGO, the MJHA is not charged with ascertaining the distinctiveness of new NGOs' missions from those of existing ones. But most recently, the MJHA returned the registration application of the National Volunteer Network requiring that the Network clarify how it is distinct from currently registered NGO networks (which are not volunteer networks).

[244] Or simply by non-decision. In 2002, the MJHA refused to register the MJPL and gave no formal justification. The MJPL was belatedly registered in part due to the Human Rights NGO Action for Civil Liberties. In 2003, over a dozen of community-based organizations supported by the World Vision were denied registration. Though the MJHA did not give formal justification, the refusal seems to have been based on the suspicion of Christian influence on these organizations. However, unless these organizations were planning to function as churches (in which case they should register as religious organizations), the MJHA was obliged to register them without delay as NGOs. The MJHA thus broke 2 constitutional principles: the freedom of association and non-discrimination by religious affiliation.

[245] Anticipating hurdles for rural NGOs, the Article 10 of Chapter 3 of the NGO Law stated that NGOs should be considered to have been registered if they do not hear from the MJHA within 30 days and mandated that the MJHA enter them into the state registry and issue a certificate of registration.

[246] The proof must be issued by a state institution.

organizations should not be required to register with the MJHA but should register with tax authorities to better ensure freedom of media.[247]

2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities. There are no excessive legal constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities. Many CSOs have used this political space to openly criticize the government, monitor its performance and engage in policy advocacy as discussed earlier in this report. Only 1% of the RSC respondents stated that existing laws restrict CSOs' advocacy activities without sufficient ground while 14.4% held that the existing laws do not restrict CSO advocacy activities at all. Half (50.5%) of the respondents stated that the laws and regulations do sometimes restrict CSO actions while 18.6% held that restrictions are minimal. Though infrequently, the government has made attempts to suppress or discredit various CSOs' advocacy activities as in the case of the MJPL and human rights NGOs in 2002[248] via extralegal means as well as use of legal loopholes, contradictions between various laws and literal and conservative interpretation of laws.

2.5.3 Tax exemption. The 1997 Law distinguishes between public benefit NGOs and member-benefit NGOs. According to the 1998 Package of Tax Laws, all types of NGOs are tax-exempt on income from membership fees and contributions. Public benefit NGOs are tax-exempt for all types of income including mission-related or unrelated income-generating activities, while member-benefit NGOs must pay income tax for all other income. In practice, the latter provision is not consistently enforced due to the difficulties in distinguishing between public benefit and member service NGOs (one NGO may be both at the same time) and the lack of capacity of the tax office to ensure the above legal provision.

2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy. Although the 1997 NGO Law provided for tax deductions to companies for their donations to NGOs, the 1998 Package of Tax Laws abolished that incentive. Individual donors may claim tax deductions if they file tax returns but this is not implemented in life.[249] The current draft Law on Non-Profit Organizations initiated by the MJHA and developed by the ministry staff with the assistance of the Open Forum Society includes provisions on tax incentives for private philanthropy but these provisions are unlikely to be approved by the parliament.[250]

2.6. State-civil society relations

This sub-dimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the Mongolian state. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.8: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.6.1	Autonomy of CSOs	1
2.6.2	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	1
2.6.3	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	1

[247] Ts. Oyungerel, 39.
[248] See section 2.6.1.
[249] Individuals do not file tax returns. Instead, tax is withheld by employees and paid out to the Government. There is no system put in place whereby individuals could effectively file tax returns and claim deductions for their charitable contributions. The main issue in Mongolia regarding tax benefits for philanthropy concerns benefits for businesses, not individuals.
[250] According to the officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice as well as some parliamentarians working on the Package of Tax Laws.

2.6.1 Autonomy. As discussed in part b) of sub-section 6, CSOs enjoy substantial degree of autonomy from the state and are thus able to engage in various monitoring and advocacy activities. Nevertheless, despite accepting the existence of independent CSOs, the state has not fully ceased its attempts to control CSO activities as 85.6% of RSC respondents indicated. It does so through the registration process, control of information dissemination through state-owned mass media, restrictions on public protests and demonstrations as well as intimidation, interrogation and surveillance at local level. RSC participants noted that state encroachments on CSO autonomy grow stronger in election years and were more intense in the period from 2000 to 2004. They also vary in form and intensity. Thus, government efforts to suppress the MJPL were most intensive involving police brutality and extensive media propaganda[251] while its attempts to discipline critical women's and human rights NGOs were more subtle.[252]

Furthermore, while urban middle-class based CSOs are generally able to function free from government intervention, rural CSOs seem more vulnerable vis-à-vis both local and national authorities.[253] Thus, the autonomy of rural CSOs is more problematic as most CSO leaders hold government jobs and mostly exist in the context of high level of concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the local governor combined with acute partisan polarization and competition with an attendant atmosphere of partisan suspicions and attempts at control.[254]

Many government officials as well as conservative NGO representatives express concern over the 'excessive' number of NGOs and stress the need to "bring order" to the NGO field by restricting their numbers, imposing hierarchical umbrella structures and heightening state supervision. In part, it is this concern that motivated the MJHA to undertake the drafting of the Law on Non-Profit Organizations. Moreover, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, in advocating for this initiative, stated there is a dire need to "remove NGOs from politics."[255] Blatant use of force on a larger scale and/or in the capital city is

[251] CEDAW Watch/Human Rights NGO Action for Civil Liberties.

[252] In 2002, in response to the Open Forum on Civil Liberties organized by a group of women's and women-led human rights NGOs, government officials spoke on both radio and television criticizing women's NGOs' excessive politicization and lack of attention paid by them to the reduction of crime and poverty. In 2001, one of the women's NGOs presented the Shadow Report on the Implementation of CEDAW in Mongolia to the CEDAW Committee in New York. In response, the Minister of Social Security and Labor sent a package of documents to the NGO containing comments on the Shadow Report by the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, which stated that the authors of the report "demonstrated their intellectual inferiority" by their analysis of some of the provisions in the Labor Code.

[253] RSCs.

[254] Given poor development of private businesses in rural areas and concomitant concentration of economic and political power in the local governor's office, rural partisan competition is much more of a zero-sum game than it is in the capital city and other wealthier urban areas. Therefore, government attempts at controlling CSOs are much stronger as well based on partisan suspicions and desire to maintain power monopoly.

[255] Witness accounts (Fall, 2003). In consistence with this aim, the draft law, which contains significant tax benefits for public-service NPOs, does not include in the list of public-benefit activities such crucial NGO functions as policy advocacy and government oversight. Moreover, the decision-making bodies with the power to determine the status of a NPO and thus the organization's eligibility for the numerous benefits, would include government representatives. While such arrangements may be feasible in more decentralized, liberal societies, in the Mongolian context, especially in rural Mongolia, these councils would in practice ensure government control over NGO activities. The political effects of the NPO Law would be detrimental to the effective functioning of CSOs that work on human rights, democratic reforms, anti-corruption, civil liberties and other political issues. In addition, the commonly used term 'to politicize' has a distinctly negative connotation in Mongolian, invariably meaning partisan political motivation or manipulation. The analytical distinction between partisan and non-partisan politics is under-developed just as the understanding that human rights, women's rights, anti-corruption and pro-democracy advocacy, public education and oversight activities are fundamentally political. This lack of analytical understanding often helps de-legitimate CSOs' political functions.

rare but it did occur in 2002 vis-à-vis the MJPL.[256] The state exercises a degree of control through a selective legitimation of CSOs by hand-picking 'friendly' CSOs to support or cooperate with. When these select CSOs are put in charge of coordinating broader CSO input into policy discussions, the state is able to exert greater influence over such processes.[257] CSOs with some access to the state and/or cooperative relations with its institutions often exercise self-censorship so as not to jeopardize their standing vis-à-vis the state.[258] Thus, in 2002, 2 NGO leaders expressed desire to withdraw from the Human Rights NGO Action for Civil Liberties from fear of undermining their NGO projects with various state agencies.[259] It was also reported that the NGOs that undertook the 2004 election campaign finance monitoring had to edit out many MPRP-related critical comments from the final report upon demand from the Open Forum Society.[260]

2.6.2 Dialogue. A big majority of RSC respondents (79.4%) stated that state-CSO relations are limited or very limited while some (7.2%) even maintained these relations do not exist. Indeed, there is no institutionalized structure to ensure regular and meaningful state-CSO dialogues. State institutions and public servants lack desire and understanding of the need to ensure broader participation of citizens and their organizations in policy development and decision-making. Such exchange occurs on an ad hoc basis and varies by civil society sector.[261] CSOs that work on children's, the elderly's and handicapped people's issues have had traditionally stronger ties with the Government without major fluctuations depending on the party in power. The MTUF also has a more institutionalized relationship with the government through the signing of tri-partite agreements with the Government and Employers' Association. Women's NGOs have been more active and successful in establishing formal channels of communication with the Government, mainly through the Ministry of Social Security and Labour.[262] However, few of these relations could be described as a two-way street as in most cases, the government maintains a dominant position, particularly when the mediator of state-CSO communication is hand-picked by the government as was the case with NGO-

[256] The local authorities of the Northern farming regions threatened the MJPL members that they shall loose all their sources of livelihood should they participate in the demonstrations in the city and that their wives shall lose their jobs (e.g. as teachers in the local schools). The farm workers' tractors were held up at the entry point to the capital city on the pretext of not fulfilling technical requirements under the Traffic Law. During the demonstrations, some of the members were detained by the police and beaten up, policemen dressed in civilian clothes mingled among the protesters with video cameras and the state-owned media regularly broadcast biased news seeking to discredit the demonstrators. The violence reached its peak when the Government dispatched a police force of over 1000 against the peaceful demonstrators and executed a mass arrest during the night using brutal force and even rounding up several reports along with the MJPL members.

[257] Groups of CSOs thus favoured vary depending on the party in power. For example, during MPRP rule, inheritor CSOs tend to enjoy more advantages whereas during the opposition rule, post-1990 liberal CSOs tend to have greater access to the state. An example of this is the PRSP process. See: CEDAW Watch (forthcoming).

[258] Access to the state, support from and cooperation with the state, no matter how limited, is seen as an important asset by many CSOs. On one hand, this is a natural reflection of the actual power the state institutions hold. On other, this is indicative of the socialist mentality, which privileges the state.

[259] In addition, one of the activists stated she was afraid for her personal safety. The atmosphere of fear was created by the Government through its systematic heavy- and under-handed suppression of the MJPL.

[260] Fact-finding interview (August, 2005).

[261] RSCs; G. Chuluunbaatar, 5; Center for Citizens' Alliance (forthcoming).

[262] The MSSL has been traditionally in charge of women's, children's, youth, elderly people's and family issues. There exists a Gender Equality Council under the aegis of the Prime Minister (formerly, under the Minister of Social Security and Labour), which includes women's NGO representatives. International organizations have played an important role in influencing the government to create this council. Moreover, in 2004, the Standing Committee on Social Policy revived the voluntary NGO Council on Social Policy, which is coordinated by the LEOS and includes many women activists. The Council existed during the 1996-2000 parliament dominated by the Democratic Coalition and was revived by Mr. Lambaa who was re-elected as a MP in 2004 and reappointed as the Head of the Standing Committee on Social Policy.

Government dialogues on PRSP. Still, there some positive trends of government agencies developing greater capacity for engaging in dialogue with CSOs.[263]

2.6.3 Cooperation/support. State support for CSOs is limited in general[264] and tends to favour a limited range of social service delivery CSOs and is often influenced by partisan considerations. The extent of local government support varies from aimag to aimag. State support takes different forms such as contracting a CSO for a specific service (micro-credit distribution and management, research, analysis, coordination of NGO-Government dialogue, etc.), allowing free or discounted use of office space in a government building, access to government information and officials and occasional grants. Thus, CSOs such as MWF, Oyuntulkhuur Foundation, a group of researchers/academics led by the Political Education Academy[265] and CHRD have functioned as subcontractors to the government on a variety of projects. Orkhon government has given free office space and small grants to the MWF and Alcoholics Anonymous.[266] The NCAV has succeeded in securing regular government subsidies for its shelter house services (the first such grant was in the amount of 3,000,000 TG). The Ulaanbaatar legislature has begun to allocate 50,000,000 TG per year for subcontracting NGOs.[267] Zavkhan legislature has also allocated 1,000,000 TG to support women's NGOs' activities.[268] UMENGO has successfully cooperated with the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Environmental Protection in their environmental protection advocacy campaigns.[269] In sum, there are some positive trends of greater support from national and local governments to CSOs but they remain narrow in scope. Overall, CSOs are not satisfied with the current level of State support for civil society and National Consultation participants stated that many state institutions and aimag governments are "blind and deaf towards CSOs."

2.7. Private sector-civil society relations

This sub-dimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.9: Indicators assessing private sector-civil society relations

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.7.1	Private sector attitude to Civil Society	1
2.7.2	Corporate social responsibility	1
2.7.3	Corporate philanthropy	1

2.7.1 Private sector attitude. CSO actors were quite divided on the issue of the private sector's attitude towards civil society as human rights, women's rights and pro-democracy NGOs maintained that private sector does not support civil society at all, a significant portion of RSC respondents (42.3%) felt private sector's attitude toward civil society was positive while 29.9% of them thought it was indifferent. This is

[263] See the following section.
[264] RSCs; G. Chuluunbaatar, 11.
[265] These activities, however, were conducted not as part of the Ministry's routine operations but within a framework of the project on International Conference of New and Restored Democracies. Therefore, it is doubtful that these positive trends shall be institutionalized within the Ministry.
[266] RSCs.
[267] Ibid.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Fact-finding interview with UMENGO representative (April, 2005); Center for Citizens' Alliance (forthcoming).

indeed likely to be true in the case of CSOs that work in arts and culture, sports and recreation, religious arena, charity and local development. Some aimag participants also reported that private sector attitude towards CSOs is much more positive than the government's but because local businesses themselves are under government pressure, they are unable to effectively support CSOs.

It is also known that political parties, especially the MPRP and, to a lesser extent, Democratic Party are very effective in raising funds from private companies. However, this form of fundraising, especially with regard to parties in power often border on or in fact becomes a form of extortion and corruption. More politically oriented non-partisan CSOs have, as a rule, been unable to rely on private sector support.

It must be stated that the stakeholders' assessments of private sector attitudes seemed to be rather hypothetical in the absence of a sufficient number of concrete examples of cooperation with and support from the business community for specific CSO activities. In fact, the rather positive assessment was strongly contested by the NAG members during the scoring meeting and by the participants of the National Consultation. These discussions revealed that while in a few aimags and in the capital city, a limited number of CSOs have been able to establish positive relations with the private sector, in most aimags and poor urban communities, local residents feel they are 'under siege' by mining and alcohol-producing companies that completely disregard social and environmental impacts of their operations. Thus, while large alcohol-producers such as APU and SAPU have run large-scale public relations campaigns emphasizing their philanthropic roles, their campaigns generally targeted capital city residents while their products are marketed nationally. This is another clear evidence of a marked difference in urban and rural contexts for CSO functioning and development. Overall, the agreement was reached that large companies only pay lip service to business ethics but do not assume responsibility for extensive harmful social and environmental effects of their work.[270]

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility is a new concept for Mongolians and is not a wide-spread practice. Only 2.1% of RSC respondents judged corporate social responsibility as high, the rest judged it very low (45.4%) or limited and somewhat limited (41.2%). This is indicative of predominantly irresponsible business atmosphere spurred by the transition to market economy that was not informed by popular awareness of business ethics. Business sectors incurring highest social and environmental costs are mining and construction. Some rural participants of the National Consultation expressed a strong opinion that the score for this indicator should be 0,[271] which possibly points to the difference of corporate discourse in the city and rural areas and harsher attitudes of business actors towards the rural population. The participants emphasized disregard for the social consequences of their actions by alcohol producers and mining companies.

2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy. The limited private sector support has favoured non-political CSOs that operate in the arts and culture, sports and recreation, charity and local development and religious arena. Politically-oriented groups such as human rights, women's rights, environmental protection and anti-

[270] See also Appendix XI for an Excerpt from the Narrative Report on the National Consultation.
[271] National Consultation, Nukht, September 22-23, 2005.

corruption CSOs have depended almost exclusively on foreign donors. Some aimags reported that private sector attitude towards CSOs is much more positive than the government's but because local businesses themselves are under government pressure, they are unable to effectively support CSOs. Philanthropy campaigns by large corporations such as Spirt Bal Buram, Tavan Bogd and APU have tended to give their donations directly to the target groups while smaller companies have often given to community groups, especially local councils.

Conclusion

The examination of civil society's external environment yields a somewhat disappointing picture. It is clear that a number of political and structural socio-economic factors combine to create a rather disabling context for the development and effective functioning of civil society. While the main democratic political institutions such as the parliament, popular elections, multi-party system and media freedom have been put in place and important liberal provisions are proclaimed by the Constitution and other laws, the de facto functioning of these institutions is seriously marred by the continued domination of the former communist party and irresponsible performance of the opposition forces, continued excessive domination of the State in economy and society combined with high level of corruption among state officials, vulnerability of the judiciary to political and economic influences and frequent violations of civil and political rights of citizens. Although some important advances have been made in state-civil society relations, CSI participants unanimously maintained that state-civil society and private sector-civil society relations need significant improvement. Tax benefits for philanthropy are absent further preventing the development of productive relations between CSOs and businesses. Moreover, although laws on CSOs are mostly favourable, there are frequent violations by state institutions of those laws with an effect of restricting the right to free association.

Widespread poverty and the increasing gap between haves and have-nots form a formidable obstacle to the development of a healthy civil society. Whilst officially, the Mongolian Government does not recognize the country is in a state of deep economic and social crisis, the CSI exercise maintains the opposite. For example, the amount of foreign debt has exceeded GDP indicating deep distortions in the national economy. In addition, National Consultation participants and other stakeholders involved in the CSI process held a particularly strong opinion on the presence of a deep social crisis given the high level of alcoholism, domestic violence and crime. Furthermore, in terms of socio-cultural factors, inter-personal trust was shown to be rather low while tolerance levels were deemed to be slightly higher. Although Mongolia still retains its strengths gained during socialism in terms of universal education and high literacy rates, due to weak IT infrastructure, civil society is unable to take full advantage of the relatively high education levels. The analysis shows that the external environment will continue to pose serious hurdles to the development of a strong and vibrant civil society in Mongolia for decades to come.

3. VALUES

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practiced by Mongolian civil society. The score for the Values dimension is 1.7, reflecting overall positive trends in the value basis of the Mongolian civil society. Figure 8 below presents the scores for the seven sub-dimensions within the Values dimension. The lowest score (1) is accorded to the Tolerance sub-dimension, which mainly reflects the high level of intolerance based on political affiliations.

Figure 9: Sub-dimension scores in Values dimension



3.1. Democracy

This sub-dimension examines the extent to which Mongolian civil society actors practice and promote democracy. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	1
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	2

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs. Democratic practices in terms of institutional culture and structure differ across different types of CSOs. Religious organizations, major political parties, AOUs and SCCs are notorious for their lack of internal democracy while newer and smaller NGOs tend to be less hierarchical and more team-based. Inheritor mass organizations tend to be more vertically structured, encumbered by sizeable memberships and cumbersome organizational make-up. Although 38.5% of RSC respondents stated their leaders are elected by members, the quality of the CSO elections is still dubious.[272] On the whole, as RSC participants observed, NGOs fair better than other types of CSOs and any other institutions in the society in terms of internal democracy. The majority of RSC respondents stated that members and staff have substantial (27%) or moderate (25.8%) influence on decision-making while 19% thought members and staff have little to now influence. Patronage and nepotism do occur among CSOs but their scope is unknown.[273]

[272] Reports from insiders of membership-based organizations. For the protection of the informers, the NIT chooses to keep their identity anonymous.

[273] It should also be noted that not every case of hiring a family member, relative or a friend is dictated by self-interest. As Mongolia has a small population, employers suffer from a severe shortage of capable and dedicated

3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy. About 41% of RSC respondents indicated they know of examples of such activities while 23.7% stated there are no such examples and 45% were unable to respond either way. Frequently cited examples were the Citizens' Movement for Ethical Society, the International Civil Society Forum hosted by Mongolian CSOs in 2003and the MJPL. Furthermore, 33% of the RSC respondents stated CSO role in promoting democracy at societal level is limited or very limited, 35% stated it was moderate while 29% deemed it significant (3% stated they do not know or did not answer). This is surprising given democracy education and advocacy for government accountability and transparency in the last 15 years have been conducted solely by NGOs. On the other hand, all 3 of the above-mentioned events were widely covered by the national press whereas regular activities of CSOs on civic education, human rights and government accountability do not receive such attention from the media. This lack of information on civil society activities, especially in rural areas, seems to be the main reason for the rather negative evaluation by the RSC respondents.

Examples of numerous CSO activities in this field include long standing programs of the WSP/Voter Education Center on non-partisan voter education and improvement of election campaign management, LEOS programs on promoting women candidates and educating women voters, Political Education Academy's nation-wide democracy training for government officials and various professionals, civic education programs of the Citizens' Education Center, Globe International's advocacy for the Law on the Right to Information, public education on democracy by the DEMO Center, monitoring of detention centres by the CHRD, training and consultation on civil society and civic journalism by the ICSF-2003 Secretariat and human rights watch by the Liberty Center. It is likely, however, that many of these programs do not reach into rural areas and are not large-scale enough to be considered as popular campaigns. On the other hand, many of these programs have been sustained for years and have a well established institutional basis.

3.2. Transparency

This sub-dimension analyses the extent to which Mongolian civil society actors practice and promote transparency. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within civil society	2
3.2.2	Financial transparency of CSOs	1
3.2.3	Civil Society actions to promote transparency	2

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society. According to RSC participants, corruption is rare but not non-existent among CSOs.[274] Most participants stated that CSOs cannot be corrupt because they do not have sufficient resources to use for ulterior motives. This does not refer to political parties as the leaderships of the major parties wield significant resources and have been frequently accused of corruption (both in their capacity of

employees. Often, one cannot avoid hiring a close relative or a friend. On the other hand, CSO actors are often driven to help their family members or friends by hiring them in the absence of other structures of support in the society and other means to help their relatives or friends. Even in this case, many CSO actors will be mindful of the needs of the organization and the ability of their protégé to meet those needs.

party leaders and public office holders). It is commonly believed that the so-called 'creative accounting' is popular among NGOs and it is often cited by foreign consultants as an evidence of corruption. However, NGOs report that they are forced to engage in 'creative accounting' to 'save' money in order to spend it on operational costs, which most donors are reluctant to cover. Therefore, it is difficult to consider these as corruption cases. Only one NGO corruption case has been publicly disclosed and referred for criminal investigation: fraud and embezzlement by a Board Member of the Mongolian Women's NGO Coalition from the 20,000 USD grant by the Japanese Embassy.[275]

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs. Transparency is low among CSOs due to the absence of an effective system whereby CSOs could make their financial accounts and programmatic activities open to the public: 41% of RSC respondents stated their CSOs do not make their financial accounts public while 24% stated they do not know. Publishing costs and absence of free alternatives are often cited by CSOs as main hurdles for publicly accounting for their financial operations. Under the NGO Law, NGOs are required to submit financial and narrative annual reports to the MJHA and financial reports to the Taxation Office. Most NGOs do the latter but not the former, which is often taken as evidence of NGOs' reluctance to be transparent. However, this conclusion should not be hastily made because the MJHA itself is not a transparent institution. Hence, NGO reports kept by the MJHA would still not be publicly accessible. Moreover, some NGOs do not agree in principle that they should report on their activities to a Government institution.[276] Also, some NGOs publish annual reports for public distribution but may not always send it to the MJHA.

3.2.3 CS actions to promote transparency. Promoting government transparency and accountability is an important concern for Mongolian CSOs but until recently their actions have tended to lack effective coordination and strategy. The WSP is one of the first NGOs to have put the issue squarely in 1994-1995 by succeeding to gain access to the Parliamentary Archives, previously inaccessible by regular citizens. The WSP has since advocated for the public disclosure of election campaign finance records; sought to increase citizen participation in local budget processes; and conducted a participatory action-oriented research on the openness of local legislatures.[277] The Globe International has led the drafting of and lobbying for the Law on the Right to Information to improve citizens' access to government information. The Zorig Foundation and MOSI have organized essay and poster contests on combating corruption. The MCTI has convened a broader CSO consultation to form a national network against corruption[278] and most recently, the CMES has held mass protests demanding justice for allegedly corrupt government officials.[279]

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[274] Although 20.8% of them stated that corruption is wide-spread or very wide-spread, when asked to clarify about the corruption cases, it became clear that many of the participants primarily meant government corruption.

[275] The case was repeatedly dismissed by the prosecutor's office due to political interference. This incident also demonstrated the difficulties of disclosing corruption among CSOs in the context of poorly developed atmosphere of support for CSOs due to the danger of generalizing such lack of ethics to all CSOs and thus undermining the legitimacy of all CSOs.

[276] Which is in part justified given some restrictive tendencies towards NGOs on the part of the MJHA.

[277] WSP, *Openness of Citizens' Representatives' Khurals – Citizens' Participation. Research Report* (Ulaanbaatar, 2001).

[278] The MCTI has conducted a corruption perception survey among business people but it has not delivered on its promise to coordinate a strong anti-corruption advocacy campaign. There is reason to believe that MCTI's initiative was mainly motivated by the availability of donor funds for anti-corruption activities.

[279] That the CMES exclusively focused on MPRP officials, especially Mr. Enkhbayar who served as a Prime-Minister in 2000-2004, as a Speaker of Parliament in 2004-2005 and was elected as the President in 2005, was broadly cited as evidence of CMES's partisanship. While this allegation may have some merit, it should be taken into account that it is in the nature of movements (as large-scale mobilizations for relatively short periods of time) to focus on pressing current issues and since in 2000-2004, it was

Not all of these undertakings were well planned or backed by consistent commitment and have lacked impact on a larger scale. This is possibly one of the reasons for the inability of 41% of RSC respondents to answer the question on examples of CSOs' anti-corruption campaigns while 25% stated that there were no such examples and 26% being able to give only 1-2 examples. Furthermore, 40.6% of RSC respondents evaluated CSO role in promoting government transparency as limited or very limited, 36% as moderate and 16.5% as significant. However, the above assessments by RSC participants did not take into account intensive struggles of various urban community-based groups to hold municipal and district offices accountable for their non-transparent dealings on land privatization and construction permits as well as emergent rural movements' efforts to engage local and national authorities in the protection of their environments and livelihoods from mining companies. Furthermore, anti-corruption mobilization of mass movements gradually gained significant momentum, starting with the mass demonstrations organized by the Citizens' Movement for Ethical Society (CMES) and reaching a high point in the spring of 2006, following the forced resignation of the coalition government that had been vocal on combating corruption. In addition to the CMES, particularly strong positions were held by the Movement for Radical Renovation, the Free Pensioners' Association and the Democratic Union.[280]

Holding private corporations accountable is a relatively new issue for Mongolian CSOs but is increasingly a crucial one with the emergence of urban community groups and rural movements combating harmful mining and construction operations. Until recently, these actions have been highly localized, which likely explains why the majority of RSC respondents judged them limited or very limited (55.6%) while 24.7% of them thought such efforts were moderate. It is also telling that 55.6% of RSC respondents evaluated CSO role in promoting corporate transparency as limited or very limited, 24.7% as moderate and only 1% as significant.[281] Nevertheless, rural-based movements' efforts to check the onslaught of corporations on their environments and traditional livelihoods have been significant and are increasingly expanding, becoming better organized and more strategic.[282] This trend became particularly visible in the spring of 2006 with the mobilization of CSOs on a national scale to re-examine laws and government policies on mining licenses, investment, environmental and social responsibility of mining companies and the balance between national interests and profit-making interests of international mining corporations.

MPRP that had dominated the government and stifled the opposition, it was logical for the CMES to focus on MPRP officials rather than both MPRP and opposition, when they mobilized in 2004 and early 2005. In any case, it seems to be true that the CMES embarked on its bold campaign without a well formulated strategy and action plan.

[280] "Protesting against Dynastic Leaders," *Udriin Sonin* 011 (January 14, 2006); Ch.Tamir, "The Rupture of the Political System," *Udriin Sonin* (March 24, 2006); "Citizens' Movements Shall Spread throughout the Country," *Udriin Sonin* 027 (January 28, 2006).

[281] Throughout the course of the CSI research, one of the general problems caused to collective assessment and analysis was lack of systematic information on CSO activities, especially in rural areas. As the majority of the RSC survey respondents come from rural areas, it is not surprising that their assessments of different types of CSO activities are in fact much lower than a more careful overview of the civil society arena would suggest. Thus, whilst urban and rural communities' struggles to hold local and national government and private companies accountable have been significant, these activities have not been systematically reported by the media.

[282] Public awareness of these actions is also on the rise owing to the increasingly active reporting by independent media on civic activities and to the movements' own improved public relations.

3.3. Tolerance

This sub-dimension examines the extent to which Mongolian civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	1
3.3.2	Civil society activities to promote tolerance	1

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena. The question on whether or not there were forces within civil society that were openly discriminatory was one of the most difficult questions to answer for RSC respondents.[283] It became clear during RSC discussions that participants uniformly understood the problem of intolerance in terms of discrimination based on political views and affiliations and identified this form of intolerance as a major hurdle to the development and effective functioning of civil society in Mongolia. The problem is particularly damaging in rural areas due to stronger partisan polarization and become intensified during election periods. Such intolerance is fanned by irresponsible negative campaigning of political parties.[284] Thus, in 2004, some MDP supporters called MPRP members and supporters 'communists' while a female MPRP candidate called female MDP supporters 'democracy's whores.' The statements were picked up as sensational news by the media but no civil society actors publicly denounced them. However, the main problem of intolerance seems to mostly originate not with CSO stakeholders per se but with local government officials, political party leaders and some private employers.

Xenophobic ethnocentric groups were quite visible and vocal in the 1990s[285] but began to lose their strength in the late 1990s. However, there is an increasing trend of the re-intensification of nationalist, especially anti-Chinese sentiments spurred by the continued high unemployment and poverty rates and an importation of Chinese blue collar workers for construction work as well as Chinese-run farms and mining sites.[286] While there are occasional evidences of dormant racism towards dark skin people (African, South Asian) and strong discriminatory attitudes against homosexuals and people with AIDS, there have been no reports of serious incidents informed by homophobia or racism in the civil society arena.[287] On the whole, if one discounts for political parties and some strongly partisan NGOs, CSOs do not interfere much in each other's work. In addition, there are emergent epistemic and activist communities mostly consisting of progressive

[283] 46.4% of the respondents stated they do not know or did not respond this question while 38% stated 'no', 11.3% stated there are 1-2 examples and 4.3% stated there are several examples. However, all examples dealt with discrimination based on political views and mainly dealt with political parties, government and employers.
[284] RSCs; CHRD (2001), 6.
[285] See Bulag; Undarya Tumursukh (Fall 2001).
[286] After the conclusion of the CSI research process in September, 2005, young male members of the nationalist movement Dayaar Mongol (All Mongol or Global Mongol) attacked a Chinese-run hotel and a convenience store vandalizing the property and beating Chinese men who were at the sites at the time of the attack. Furthermore, a mass protest led by Mr. Gundalai, MP who was elected as a Democratic Party member but left the DP to form his own People's Party, used strong anti-Chinese slogans in protesting against the building of the Shangri La hotel in the Ulaanbaatar city center. Participants of the protest vandalized the tents of the Chinese construction workers and even stole some of their food. These events were broadly covered by TV stations and newspapers. Sadly, a number of prominent civil society figures as well as many average citizens condoned Dayaar Mongol youth's violent actions as having been informed by sincere patriotism. See: B. Hajidmaa, "Even a Wrong Action is Right When Dictated by True Patriotism," *Udriin Sonin* 289 (December 1, 2005); "The Movement for Ethical Society Expresses Support for Patriotic Young Men," *Udriin Sonin* 289 (December 1, 2005).
[287] CSI media review.

pro-democracy, human rights and gender equality activists, journalists and academics that are characterized by highly tolerant, broad-minded and inclusive attitudes to different lifestyles and identities.

3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance. The National AIDS Foundation's activities to prevent AIDS and support gay and lesbian health groups could be considered as activities aimed at promoting tolerance for people with AIDS and homosexuals. No other pro-tolerance actions including those addressing intolerance based on political differences can be detected and 85.6% of the RSC respondents either did not answer this question at all or stated they do not know of such actions.[288] Furthermore, 45.4% of RSC respondents evaluated CSO role in promoting tolerance at societal level as limited or very limited, 18.6% as moderate, 15.5% as significant and 19.6% stated they do not know or did not answer the question. However, it could be argued that NGOs' actions aimed at instilling respect for individual freedoms, rights and choice within the broader pro-democracy and human rights programs contribute to the promotion of tolerance in broader terms.

3.4. Non-violence

This sub-dimension describes and assesses the extent to which Mongolian civil society actors and organisations practice and promote non-violence.[289] The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the CS arena	2
3.4.2	CS actions to promote non-violence	2

3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena. Although civil society actions in Mongolia have generally been peaceful, there is a worrying trend of escalation of violence as disempowered and frustrated citizens begin to use violence as a means of last resort. In Tsenkher soum of Arkhangai aimag, members of the Ariun Subarga movement were reported to have attacked the "Mongol Gazar" mining company's camp and break windows of their bulldozer by throwing stones. In response, the company's security forces fired guns in the air and deployed suffocating gas. Community members also reported being beaten and pushed, regardless of gender, by the company's security forces.[290] In Sukhbaatar district, a community activist reported that elderly women threw themselves into excavators' front units to prevent their work on the children's playground.

[288] The NIT made conscious and significant efforts to ensure the diversity of RSC participants by party affiliations, partisan and non-partisan status, gender, age, civil society sector and occupation in order to encourage trust and dialogue between these groups. In this sense, the RSCs can be said to have been the first conscious attempt to start 'healing' the partisan animosity ripping the fabric of society into two intolerant camps.

[289] This item also presented difficulty in CSI research as the concept of violence and non-violence are not well developed in Mongolia. While political, ethnic and religious violence is essentially non-existent, the Mongolian society is characterized by a high level of inter-personal violence. Institutional violence is also extremely at schools and hospitals and possibly in other institutions such as orphanages and elderly's homes established during the socialist period based on dehumanizing modernist notions of institutional organization and effective service. Ms. Kh. Khulan, National Advisor to the ICNRD team, advised during the National Consultation that the CSI team pay attention to modifying the indicator so as to capture these and other specifics of the nature of violence in the Mongolian society. Furthermore, while many other countries have greater historical, spiritual, intellectual or cultural links with the tradition of non-violent movements and civil disobedience led by Gandhi or Martin Luther King, these historical precedents are absent from the popular imagination of Mongolians. Buddhist traditions that provide deeper and broader analysis of non-violence were suppressed during socialism and the main forces within civil society come from more modernist backgrounds and have extremely thin links with the Buddhist traditions. Therefore, understanding of non-violence in the civil society sphere tends to be more mechanical and superficial.

[290] Ts. Tseveenkherlen.

There were also reports of violent conflicts between community groups and construction companies that resulted light injuries of the activists, most of whom are pensioners.[291] Finally, the leader of the Zul Association of Family Members of Murder Victims reported that significant numbers of people, frustrated with the inefficiency of the justice system, are ready to administer private justice on alleged murderers of their loved ones.

Other kinds of violent incidents are rare. Consistently, 5.2% of RSC respondents stated that there are no civil society groups that express their interests through violent means while 36.1% stated that violence was very rare among CSOs and 44.3% stated they do not know about this issue.[292] Examples include the fist fight that erupted at the MDP's November 2004 conference due to an ineffective rivalry for the party's leadership and the fact that the CMES leadership resorted to throwing eggs and tomatoes at the government building, deeming it an innovative method of protest.[293] None of the cases was considered as serious and few civil society representatives openly denounced them. Interestingly, 59.8% of RSC respondents stated they do not know or did not answer the question on whether or not the civil society at large denounces acts of violence by CSOs while 16.5% stated civil society at large denounces such acts rarely or never but 23.7% did state that it does so most or all of the time. It should be stated that in general, the concept of non-violence in the sense used by Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King is not developed in Mongolia and is not broadly discussed. In other words, violence is mainly understood in terms of physical violence such as fist fights, use of weaponry or damage to property. Non-physical forms of violence such as psychological, verbal, symbolic, rhetorical, emotional and spiritual are generally not readily recognized and analyzed.

3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence. The CSI Mongolia team and RSC survey respondents had initial difficulties in assessing CSOs' actions to promote non-violence due to the CSI analytical framework's strong suggestion of a conception of non-violence in relation to wars, armed conflict and ethnic or religious violence. These issues are entirely or largely absent from the Mongolian public sphere. Hence, it is not surprising that 39% of RSC respondents stated they cannot think of examples of activities to promote non-violence at a societal level while 14.4% stated there are 1-2 such examples, 1% that there are several examples[294] and 45% did not answer or stated they do not know.

However, once this indicator is approached based on a broader understanding of non-violence, the main detectable activities in this area are the highly visible and fairly effective activities by women's NGOs to reduce and gender-based violence, especially domestic violence and sexual harassment in the workplace. Activities in this area ranged from training legal professionals, police and local government representatives; conducting surveys on the scope and types of domestic violence; analyses of existing legal and policy framework; raising public awareness; providing shelter and transition house services for victims of domestic violence; providing free legal and psychological counselling; pilot projects on behaviour-changing therapy

[291] A community leader reported that construction company's bulldozers arrive at night and that security forces beat and handcuff community activists. See: B. Khishig.
[292] 11.3% stated such groups are isolated and marginalized.
[293] In a television interview, Mr. Batzandan, leader of the CMES, stated that such methods of protest were used by European movements and that they constitute interesting way.
[294] Examples given mainly dealt with women's NGOs,' NCAV's in particular, work against gender-based violence.

for violent men; and advocating for the Law against Domestic Violence.[295] CSOs have also worked on violence against children and elderly people. CSOs have been particularly vocal in opposing winter horse races that often result in injuries sustained by child jockeys due to the cold weather and accidents.[296] In addition, a growing number of religious and non-sectarian spiritual associations propagate compassion and non-violent lifestyles. While some Buddhist and Christian teachings are broadcast on TV, these activities generally tend to be more localized and limited to the membership of their organizations.

3.5. Gender equity

This sub-dimension analyses the extent to which Mongolian civil society actors practice and promote gender equity. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equality

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the CS arena	2
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	1
3.5.3	CS actions to promote gender equity	2

3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena. As stated earlier in this report, women are active and visible as both members and leaders of CSOs. Open discrimination against women is very rare among CSOs: 53.6% of RSC respondents stated there are no forces within civil society that openly discriminate against women, 14.4% stated there are 1-2 examples[297] and 32% stated they do not know or did not answer. The gender composition of CSOs varies significantly by the CSO type and civil society sector. Women dominate among public education, advocacy and oversight NGOs that work on development, democratization, human rights, women's rights and children's rights and SCCs. Women are a minority in traditional religious organizations (Buddhist, Muslim and shamanist), kinship-based local councils and political parties. In these spheres, discrimination against women is widespread. Political parties have often been criticised by women's NGOs for their lack of gender-sensitivity but few open criticisms have been levelled against religious organizations and local councils. Furthermore, 15.5% of RSC respondents stated that civil society at large does not openly criticize gender discrimination by CSOs while 16.5% indicated they do so sometimes,

[295] These activities were spearheaded by the NCAV but many other NGOs have been active in this area including MONES, Foundation in Support of Rural Women, Women Lawyers' Association, CEDAW Watch, LEOS, CHRD, etc. See: Undarya Tumursukh, *Analytic Report on Domestic Violence in Mongolia* (commissioned by the Soros Foundation) (May 2, 2002); CHRD, NCAV and CEDAW Watch; National Center against Violence, *5-Year Report of the National Center against Violence* (Ulaanbaatar, 2001); NCAV, *Compilation of Seminar, Forum and Meeting Presentations for 1996-2000* (Ulaanbaatar); CEDAW Watch (forthcoming).

[296] In Mongolian traditional horse racing, jockeys are young children. During socialism, horse racing generally took place in summer time during the National Naadam Festival. However, in the post-socialist period, winter horse-racing was reintroduced as part of the revival of pre-socialist tradition and both summer and winter horse racing has fast developed into a commercial practice with high gambling stakes. Children are generally not insured and their voluntary consent is dubious. Although no thorough study has been made, CSOs and medical professionals have reported regular incidences of light and serious injuries sustained by the child jockeys. Particularly dangerous is winter racing as children run a high risk of freezing their limbs and faces in addition to risks of falling of their horses. The children's rights CSOs, the Center for Human Rights and Development, the Animal Rights Protection Association and media organizations have protested against these violent practices. See for recent examples: "The Animal Rights Protection Association has Issued a Protest," *Udriin Sonin* 030 (January 4, 2006), 3; B. Bold, "On the 3rd of the New Year Children Froze and Ministers Rejoiced," *Udriin Sonin* 029 (January 3, 2006), 1, 3.

[297] However, several of the examples dealt with discrimination in the market place based on gender, age and political affiliation as well as lack of women's participation at decision-making levels. Others pointed to the lack of women's representation in political parties.

17.5% that they do so most of the time and 5.2% that they do so all the time. However, a significant percentage (45.3%) stated they do not know or did not answer the question.

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs. Non-discrimination by gender was set in principle during socialism in part in order to effectively mobilize both men and women for the rigorous industrialization programs. Therefore, equal employment opportunities for men and women is not a new issue and is often understood even if not explicitly written. Thus, though 39.3% of RSC respondents stated their organizations had gender equitable hiring and promotion policies, none of these are written policies. This does not automatically mean that CSOs do not discriminate by gender but does mean that few CSOs consciously seek to maintain gender equity in their hiring and promotion policies. Interestingly, there is a nascent trend and/or interest for women's and women-led CSOs to hire men to maintain greater gender-balance in their staff.[298]

3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity. In general, promotion of gender equality and women's rights is one of the most visible and oldest programs of the Mongolian civil society but its scope and intensity may differ from aimag to aimag.[299] The Mongolian Women's Federation formed during the socialist period had worked enthusiastically on promoting women's education, employment and quasi-voluntary participation in socio-cultural life of the county in accordance with the socialist ideology. In the post-socialist period, independent women's NGOs began to form, initially affiliated with pro-democracy popular movements and opposition political parties. In addition to advocating for democracy and social progress, these NGOs began to actively promote liberal conceptions of women's rights, including women's political rights and gender equality. With consistent support of a variety of international donor organizations, these new NGOs have expanded numerically as well as programmatically, addressing a broad range of women's rights issues such as women's economic and political empowerment, violence against women, sexual harassment, gender stereotyping, reproductive rights and gender-sensitive budgeting.[300] Similarly, the women's NGOs have engaged in a broad range of activities including policy analysis and advocacy, legislative lobbying, monitoring of government performance, public education, gender-sensitivity training for various professionals and public servants, income-generation projects, media campaigns, various skills training and capacity-building for specific groups of women and research.[301]

Women's NGOs are considered to be rather influential and, indeed, their advocacy campaigns have succeeded in the adoption of a number of important laws, amendments to existing laws and programs including the Law against Domestic Violence, National Program on Ensuring Gender Equality and the Family Code. It is also telling that 3 out of 7 successful examples of NGO activities listed in the Asian

[298] For example, NCAV, CEDAW Watch.
[299] Though women's groups tend to be active all over the country, some RSC participants (from Sukhbaatar and Dornogovi) stated that their aimags rate low on women's rights and gender equality programs.
[300] See sources cited for sub-dimension 1.3 regarding women's representation and participation in civil society.
[301] It was rather surprising that RSC survey respondents' assessment of women's NGOs activities was rather low. Thus, the majority of RSC respondents stated they cannot think of or do know of broad-based campaigns for gender-equality promotion that took place in the last year (76%) while 22.7% stated there are 1-2 examples and only 1% indicated there are many such examples. Furthermore, 27% of RSC respondents stated that civil society has played a significant role in promoting gender equality while another 27% evaluated this role as moderate and 32% as limited or very limited (14.%% stated they do not know or did not answer the question). This discrepancy most likely originates from the rudimentary information infrastructure, especially when it concerns civil society actions and gender issues. This makes it difficult to rely on RSC data as the main basis for assessing the indicators including the current one.

Development Bank's assessment of Mongolia's governance system are women's rights initiatives.[302] It should also be noted that in view of the reverse gender gap in education and concomitant problems of male socio-cultural disempowerment (sometimes economic and political as well depending on the group in question), gender equality programs have been excessively biased towards women. This triggered broad-based criticisms from both male policy makers and average citizens including women.[303] In this context, the first men's NGO was formed in 2003 to protect men's rights and has started to cooperate with women's NGOs to achieve their goals.[304]

3.6. Poverty eradication

This sub-dimension examines to what extent Mongolian civil society actors promote poverty eradication. The table below presents the indicator score.

Table III.3.6: Indicator assessing poverty eradication

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	CS actions to eradicate poverty	2

3.6.1 CS actions to promote poverty eradication. Poverty alleviation is an important concern for Mongolian CSOs. A fair number of CSOs have worked in this area with varying degrees of success and a substantial percentage (42.2%) of RSC respondents gave examples of such activities. The Mongolian Women's Federation and LEOS have run micro-credit schemes for women nation-wide. Several women's NGOs including the MWF and MONES have offered skills training to women to help them find employment or become self-employed. MONES and the Foundation in Support for Rural Women have financed small groups' income-generation projects. Community-based organizations supported by the World Vision have also been active in this area at grassroots levels. The MRCA and other charity organizations such as the Rotary Club, Soroptimist International's Mongolia Chapter and Christian charities have offered immediate assistance to the most needy. The Center for Social Development organized CSO consultations on PRSP involving both urban and rural CSOs. Many other small CSOs including those of handicapped citizens have run small-scale projects such as sewing bags, making shoes, growing vegetables and flowers and making souvenirs for tourists. SCCs contribute to poverty alleviation as well. Unfortunately, many of the NGO projects suffer from lack of participation by the target groups in program-development.[305]

Regional stakeholder consultation respondents' evaluation of CSO work in this area is rather mixed: 19.6% stated they cannot think of examples of civil society campaigns in this area for the last year while 30.9% remarked there are 1-2 examples, 11% that there are several or many examples[306] and 38% stated they do not know or did not answer the question. Furthermore, 34% of RSC respondents evaluated CSO role in

[302] ADB (2004), 70-71.
[303] These criticisms were informed by the general sense of greater male socio-economic and cultural disempowerment signified by low images of Mongolian men, male alcoholism, frustration, unemployment, morbidity and shorter life span compared to higher education rates among women and greater availability of white collar jobs for women. Also see Bulag for more on male disempowerment in Mongolia.
[304] Unfortunately, due to the absence of well informed discussions on the causes and types of male disempowerment in Mongolia, the Mongolian Men's Association often attempts to strengthen patriarchal structures in their effort to (re)empower men. Interestingly, the Executive Director and 7 out of 18 members of the governing board are women.
[305] Participant observation (1995-2005).

alleviating poverty as very limited or limited while 33% evaluated it as moderate and 23.7%v as significant (9% indicated they do not know or did not answer).

3.7. Environmental protection

This sub-dimension analyses the extent to which Mongolian civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability. The table below presents the indicator score.

Table III.3.6: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	CS actions to sustain the environment	2

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment. As mentioned in section A, both urban and rural citizens have actively mobilized to protect their environment. However, all of these community movements mobilized due to clear and imminent danger to the quality of their livelihoods caused by mining and construction. Protection of environment as a public good such as combating air, noise, water and soil pollution in urban areas or protecting wildlife in rural areas is less popular. UMENGO and other environmental NGOs have filled in this space to some extent and have effectively advocated for the protection of national park areas in Dornod and Gobi. One of these campaigns (against Numrug Bridge) was widely covered by the press in 2003.[307] Nevertheless, only 34% of RSC respondents stated they know of examples of such activities by CSOs, which may be due to the variation of environmental activism by aimags and districts.[308] Furthermore, 43% of RSC respondents evaluated civil society's role in protecting environment as limited or very limited, 30% as moderate and 15.5% as significant (11% indicated they do not know or did not answer the question).

Conclusion

The analysis of the Values dimension showed that, overall, CSOs, especially NGOs and social movements, display a high degree of commitment to promoting democracy, government accountability, non-violence, gender equality, poverty alleviation and environmental protection. Indeed, in Mongolia so far these issues have been addressed almost solely by NGOs and social movements. However, despite fairly active work of CSOs in these fields, the CSI research showed that CSOs, especially political parties, credit and savings cooperatives and some inheritor organizations, often fail to consistently apply the principles of democracy, accountability and financial transparency in their internal practices. A heated debate ensued at the National Consultation regarding the level of corruption among CSOs. Many participants, predominantly coming from NGOs, opposed to the suggestion that corruption is widespread among CSOs, which was mostly due to the difficulty they had in keeping in mind a much broader definition of civil society including political parties, cooperatives, business associations and religious organizations. When reminded of the broader definition, participants reviewed their opinions and it was agreed that corruption in civil society exists but its level varies by CSO type.

[306] Again, examples given were not all of CSO activities but included government programs on poverty alleviation as well as some environmental protection cases.
[307] Due to the effective media strategy of UMENGO. See: CEDAW Watch (forthcoming).

It is interesting that while women's NGOs have been very active in promoting gender equality and women are well represented in most civil society sectors, a significant portion of CSOs do not have clearly stated policies on gender equitable practices within their organizations. Thus while women may still be present in large numbers as members or employees in such organizations such as political parties, trade unions and chambers of commerce, they are absent or their participation in minimal at the level of leadership of these CSOs. Furthermore, religious, especially Buddhist and Muslim organizations are notoriously male-dominated and patriarchal.

The analysis showed that Mongolian civil society is a somewhat intolerant arena. The main problem of intolerance identified by Regional and National Consultations had to do with a high level of partisan polarization, which forms a major obstacle to constructive communication and cooperation of citizens and CSOs, especially in rural areas. Although tolerance for ethnic, racial, cultural, religious and other differences is not a well-developed concept in Mongolia, the CSI research pointed to somewhat disturbing signs of Khalkh-centrist nationalism, xenophobia, latent discrimination of dark-skin people, poorly examined and articulated discrimination against ethnic and national minorities such as Kazakhs, Durvuds and Buryats, as well as the traditionally strong anti-Chinese sentiment further exacerbated by the free market policies of the Mongolian government.

Similarly, the concept of non-violence has so far not been well examined in relation to the development of civil society in Mongolia. However, the CSI exercise showed that this issue is increasingly important for the Mongolian society given 1) the escalation of conflict between rural communities desperately trying to protect their livelihoods and large mining companies destroying their environments and 2) high level of mobilization of mass movements in Ulaanbaatar seeking to hold the government accountable for corruption and other issues. A deeper understanding of violence and use of creative forms of non-violent struggle are extremely important issues for the Mongolian civil society at this stage of its development.

While the CSI research was not able to clearly determine if the values of civil society actors were significantly different in the sense of being progressive, democratic and humane compared to the rest of society, participant observations, stakeholder consultations and the participatory processes of the CSI exercise nevertheless indicate that important segments of Mongolian civil society are indeed fully aware of the main principles of democracy and human rights and are dedicated to their promotion in society. This is an important source of optimism for the future strengthening of Mongolia's civil society and its contributions to the development of a humane and democratic society in Mongolia.

[308] Thus, while RSC participants from Arkhangai noted their aimag rates high on environmental activism, Dornogovi participants stated environmental activism is low in their aimag.

4. IMPACT

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions within Mongolian society. The score for the Impact dimension is 1.4, reflecting a somewhat low level of impact for Mongolian civil society, especially when compared to the efforts exerted by Mongolian CSOs. Figure 10 below presents the scores for the five sub-dimensions within the Impact dimension.

Figure III.4.1: Sub-dimension scores in Impact dimension



4.1. Influencing public policy[309]

This sub-dimension describes and assesses the extent to which Mongolian civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.1: Indicators assessing influence on public policy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Impact on human rights (women's rights)	2
4.1.2	impact on social policy (poverty reduction)	1
4.1.3	Impact on national budgeting process	1

4.1.1 Human rights case study (women's rights). CSOs have had greater success in influencing government policies on women's rights and gender equality.[310] Women's NGOs actively participated in the development of the 1995 National Program on the Advancement of Women's Status and its redevelopment into the National Program on Gender Equality in 2002. Women activists successfully advocated for the establishment of the Women's Rights Council under the Minister of Social Security and Labor (later reconstituted as the Gender Equality Council under the Prime Minister). Furthermore, women's NGOs have provided input into the Family, Labor, Civil and Criminal Codes with relative success and achieved the adoption of the Law against Domestic Violence in 2004 after almost a decade of advocacy, public education and training programs. RSC respondents' assessment is consistent with this picture with a significant majority (68%) stating that CSOs' efforts in this field have been very or relatively strong, 29% evaluating their impact as

[309] The NAG chose the following issues for the case studies: corruption, poverty and gender equality.
[310] See sections on advocacy and values. Also see: ADB and World Bank, 62-63; TAF (2004), 18-20; TAF (2005), 16.

significant and 41% as moderate.[311] However, CSOs' advocacy for increasing women's political representation and combating sexual harassment in the work place has been less successful as CSO activities themselves have been less consistent.[312]

4.1.2 Social policy case study (on poverty alleviation). While numerous CSOs are engaged in various income-generation and employment creation projects throughout the country,[313] they have not generally been proactive at policy level. The only broad CSO participation in policy development was initiated by the government (under pressure from donor organizations) during the development of the EGSPRS in 2001-2003.[314] Reportedly over 200 NGOs participated in the PRSP consultations and a group of 12 Ulaanbaatar-based NGOs contributed to the process more formally representing their civil society sectors. However, a number of CSO representatives are of the opinion that their participation in the PRSP process was ensured mainly in form rather than in substance.[315] The MJPL action for the just privatization of land was of crucial significance for ensuring more sustainable livelihoods for farm workers and gher district dwellers. But only a handful of established CSOs supported this initiative and none of the international organizations that focus on poverty reduction supported the MJPL and its allies. As a result, the MJPL had very limited impact on land privatization policies.[316] CSOs' influence on economic and fiscal policies is substantially limited by their lack of analytical capacity in this area. Nevertheless, RSC respondents' evaluation of CSO efforts in this field is not as negative though less favourable than that of CSOs' gender-equality promotion efforts: 61% stated CSOs' efforts to influence public policy on poverty are strong or relatively strong while 28% judged their impact as significant, 31% as moderate and 27% as limited.

4.1.3 National budget case study (WSP project on monitoring local budget). So far the only initiative dealing with citizen participation in the budgetary process was undertaken in 2001 by the WSP in cooperation with its Uvurkhangai, Bulgan, Umnugovi, Darkhan-Uul, Selenge and Khuvsgul branches.[317] Within the framework of this effort, activist researchers were selected from each of the participating aimags and trained in budget research and analysis methodology after which a thorough analysis of local budgetary processes was undertaken in the 6 aimags. This project for the first time raised the issue of citizen participation in budgetary processes in relation to its transparency and efficiency. The studies clearly demonstrated serious

[311] An additional 16.5% thought the efforts have had little impact and 4.1% thought they have had no impact.

[312] The former is mainly due to the lack of political will on the part of male political leaders while the latter is also due to the lack of coordinated and consistent action on the part of women's NGOs.

[313] According to the *Directory of Mongolian NGOs* produced by MOSI, almost half of the registered NGOs address poverty alleviation in one way or another. See: MOSI (2003).

[314] At first, IPRSP (Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) was developed by the government with practically no CSO involvement and sent for approval by the World Bank Board in 2001. After the World Bank Board approval, the government proceeded to develop the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and conceded to involving CSOs in the process but did so via the Center for Social Development, a NGO set up especially to coordinate CSO input into the PRSP. Regional PRSP consultations held throughout the country involved national and local CSOs due to the significant efforts of the World Bank participation consultants. At the end of the process, the EGSPRS (Economic Growth Support and Poverty Reduction Strategy) was approved by the World Bank Board of Directors after passing by the Mongolian Government in 2003. Its status as a policy document is dubious as it has not been approved by the parliament.

[315] Center for Citizens' Alliance, *NGO-Government Communication and Cooperation on Policy Issues* (forthcoming research report of a comparative study funded by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation comprising Mongolia, Kazakhstan, China and Vietnam).

[316] RSCs.

[317] This project based on the 2000 initiative of the Uvurkhangai branch of WSP to examine and increase the efficiency of the local budgetary processes in 2 of the soums. See: Voter Education Center of WSP, Appendix on WSP Activities in Rural Areas, *Citizens' Participation Manual* (Ulaanbaatar, 2002).

flaws in the local budgetary processes caused by excessive centralization the state budget, lack of ability on the part of local legislatures to participate in and monitor local government activities concerning budget allocations, lack of transparency of the local government, poor knowledge of budgetary processes among local citizens and absence of institutionalized channels for citizen participation in and monitoring of budget decisions.[318] The results of the research were presented to local government representatives, Citizens' Representatives' Khurals,[319] national MPs as well as the general public and helped raise public awareness on the need to and possibility of ensuring citizen participation in local budgetary processes. However, the project has not materially changed the way local budget is composed and allocated, nor did it aim to do so directly.[320]

4.2. Holding state and private corporations accountable

This sub-dimension analyses the extent to which Mongolian civil society is active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.2: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state accountable	1
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	1

4.2.1 Holding state accountable. As discussed in section C, CSO actions to combat corruption and increase government transparency and accountability have lacked coordination and focus despite this issue being an important concern for civil society stakeholders as well as the general public.[321] However, the main factor limiting the impact of CSO input into anti-corruption policy making and implementation has been the lack of political will on the part of the government to take decisive measures to combat and prevent corruption. This is despite the organization of various seminars and discussions on the topic by both CSOs and government with support and pressure from various donor organizations such as UNDP and MOSI. A clear example of a failure to effectively address this issue is the fact that despite CSO advocacy efforts for unhindered public access to government information and public disclosure of campaign finance records, these laws still have not been legislated.[322] Thus, it is not surprising that while 45% of RSC respondents stated that CSOs have been actively seeking to influence state policy on corruption, more than half thought these efforts have had very little to zero impact. The same conclusion was drawn by the 2004 study on corruption.[323]

Nevertheless, despite the lack of significant direct impact on transparency and accountability practices of state institutions, CSO activities in this area have fulfilled a crucial function of raising public awareness on

[318] Ibid.
[319] WSP in fact organized aimag level discussions on the research results involving local government and legislature representatives. The latter accepted the conclusions drawn from the WSP studies as valid, which served as the basis for further consultations on ways to improve local budgetary processes. The WSP sent information packages including recommendations to national MPs to help address not only the issue of non-transparency of the local budgetary processes but also the problem of over-centralization of the state budget, which drastically undermines the development of local self-governing institutions. See: Voter Education Center of WSP (2002).
[320] Fact-finding interview with WSP representatives (September, 2005).
[321] See previous sections for more detail on activities in this area.
[322] Despite the fact that both drafts of the set of provisions on campaign finance disclosure and the Law on the Right to Information have already been drafted by CSOs (WSP/Voter Education Center and Globe International respectively) based on extensive comparative research.
[323] S. Oyun and Sociological Academy.

these issues and educating the citizenry on the principles of government accountability and the importance of citizen oversight in holding the state accountable.[324] CSOs' are increasingly undertaking important monitoring activities such as the WSP/Voter Education Center's monitoring of MPs' performance[325] and the openness of local legislatures; campaign finance monitoring by WSP/Voter Education Center, Globe International and Open Forum Society; CHRD's detention centre monitoring; Liberty Center's human rights watch activities; monitoring of the implementation of CEDAW by the CEDAW Watch; parallel report on the implementation of the UN Convention on Children's Rights by a group of children's rights NGOs; trade unions' monitoring of workers' rights; monitoring of the corruption perception and implementation of the National Program on Combating Corruption by various research institutions, MCTI and Zorig Foundation; and media watch projects by the Press Institute of Mongolia, Globe International and journalistic associations.

Other examples include UMENGO-led actions to stop local and national government plans to build a bridge in the Numrug national park area and a power station in the Gobi national park area; MJPL demonstrations to demand additional scrutiny of and amendments to the land laws and public oversight of the land privatization procedures; CMES protests to hold corrupt public officials accountable and pensioners' demands for the rectification of pension system inequities.[326] These initiatives have resulted in increased capacity of CSOs to undertake watchdog and advocacy activities and public dissemination of previously unavailable government information. However, due to the absence of a legal framework and mechanism for ensuring government accountability to the public, the bulk of state information remains off limits to regular citizens, CSOs and media alike, which forms a major obstacle to the effectiveness of CSO efforts to hold the state accountable. On the other hand, CSOs themselves need to better strategize and coordinate their actions. To this end, a chapter of the Transparency International was opened in 2003 upon the initiative of a number of Mongolian CSOs with encouragement of donor organizations but this network has so far existed primarily on paper. Thus, while the majority of RSC respondents stated CSOs are quite active (35%) or somewhat active (39%) in this field, more than half (52%) thought they have had little to no success.

4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable. As previously mentioned, holding private corporations accountable is a new but increasingly important concept for Mongolian CSOs. The mobilization of rural environmental movements and urban community groups to protect their livelihoods from destructive effects of mining and construction operations of private companies has intensified significantly in the recent years. However, very few of such struggles have so far managed to stop destructive corporate activities and even fewer have been able to prevent damage to their communities due to a confluence of factors such as poor performance of local and national government institutions,[327] absence of civil society support structure, poor

[324] See previous sections for more detail on activities in this area. See also: TAF (2005), 16; TAF (2004), 18-20; R. Narangerel, 12-13.
[325] The program was at its peak in the late 1990s.
[326] See Section III of this report for more on these activities.
[327] A representative of the last urban community of Sukhbaatar district to win their case in court against the construction work on their children's playground reported that theirs was only the third successful case though numerous communities have mobilized in a similar fashion. Fact-finding interview (August, 2005). Ongi River Movement is perhaps the only case of rather moderate success of CSO initiation of tri-partite negotiations between local government, mining companies and local communities in search of better solutions for their common problems.

organizational capacity and legal education of the community groups and the general weakness of the rule of law in the country. In addition, trade unions and women's and human rights' NGOs have monitored the protection (or lack thereof) of labour rights in private, especially foreign-owned, factories and called for management actions and government intervention to rectify violations of human rights in this sphere.[328] These initiatives have been crucial in raising public awareness on corporate social responsibility and the role of citizens and the government on checking harmful corporate activities. However, they seem to have had limited direct impact on the affected groups.

The lack of direct impact, the novelty of the concept of holding private corporations accountable[329] and the localized nature of CSO activities in this area are possibly the reason for the 65% of RSC respondents stating that CSO activities in this area are limited or non-existent and 21% could not answer the question. Furthermore, RSC respondents overwhelmingly stated that CSO activities in this area have limited or no success (70%) while 18% could not answer the question.

4.3. Responding to social interests

This sub-dimension analyses the extent to which Mongolian civil society actors are responsive to social interests. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.3: Indicators assessing responsiveness to social interests

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	2
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	1

4.3.1 Responsiveness. CSOs have played a vital role in directing public attention to a series of crucial problems facing post-socialist Mongolia such as prevalence of domestic violence, lack of democracy education, legal illiteracy, alcoholism, poverty, corruption, need for revival and development of religious practice, violations of labour rights, environmental degradation, need for grassroots empowerment, gender inequality, street children and poor information distribution.[330] On the whole, CSOs have been more attuned to the needs of the society and more efficient in raising public awareness on critical issues, putting them on the policy agenda, developing policy suggestions and even laying the groundwork for their implementation.[331] AOUs and local councils have emerged CSOs to tackle new pressing issues such as management of common property of apartment dwellers and coordinating diasporic communities' input into rural development. Other examples include Zorig Foundation's project on empowering poor migrant women, Mongolian Women's Fund's grants for women's skills development and income-generation, National AIDS Foundation's public awareness raising programmes and Rotary Club and similar charity groups' donations to hospitals and other institutions.

[328] Gender Center for Sustainable Development research on women workers' rights in foreign-owned sewing factories, LEOS research on the conditions of salespeople (mainly women) at the Narantuul open market, etc.
[329] It may be that many civil society stakeholders do not conceive of anti-construction and anti-mining community actions as attempts to hold private corporations accountable.
[330] R. Narangerel, 12-13; TAF (2004), 18-20; TAF (2005), 16.
[331] NCAV's activities in this regard have been the most systematic of all.

However, while the extent of CSO responsiveness to social concerns varies significantly by the CSO type and sector, many CSOs, especially the more professionalized NGOs as well as inheritor organizations, suffer from a general lack of strong bottom-up connectivity to their constituents. Therefore, while CSOs may address crucial large-scale issues, their actions may not always be well fine-tuned to the needs of the affected groups. The CSI exercise did not identify any examples of priority social concerns that CSOs have not attempted to address, even though some were addressed only in a limited fashion.

4.3.2 Public trust. According to the CSS results, on the whole, CSOs do not enjoy much public trust with the majority (61%) stating they do not trust them while those who trust CSOs constituted 26%. CSS respondents indicated lower level of trust in political parties (23%), slightly higher in trade unions (31%) and higher still in the Red Cross Association (47%). The trust in religious organizations was polarized with 54% not trusting and 45%. Public trust in CSOs (26%) is higher than trust in the judiciary (24%), political parties (23%)and newspapers (18%) and lower than trust in the president (56%) the prime minister (46%), television (44%), armed forces (43%), parliament (34%), big companies (32%) and the police (28%).[332] The low level of trust in CSOs is likely due to the general lack of substantive information on CSO activities, lack of outreach by CSOs (especially in rural areas) and connectivity to grassroots, lack of citizens' awareness on the role of CSOs and socialist legacy of privileging the state.

4.4. Empowering citizens

This sub-dimension describes and assesses the extent to which Mongolian civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalized groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.4: Indicators assessing empowering citizens

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	2
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems	1
4.4.3	Empowering marginalized people	1
4.4.4	Empowering women	2
4.4.5	Building social capital	2
4.4.6	Supporting/creating livelihoods	2

4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens. Informing and educating citizens is the key area of CSO activity.[333] It is primarily, if not solely, CSOs (NGOs in particular) that have carried out public education programs on democracy, human rights, gender equality, reproductive health, gender-based violence, civic and voter education, children's rights, citizen oversight of government, citizen participation in budget processes, legal reform, international treaties and many other subjects. CSOs make a wide use of seminars and training

[332] Conversely, the public distrust in CSOs (61%) is lower than CSS respondents' distrust in newspapers (80% not trusting much or at all), police (69%), judiciary (67%) and political parties (67%). The distrust in CSOs is higher than distrust in the parliament (60%), television (54%), (53%), armed forces (49%), prime minister (48%) and the president (38%). These data are somewhat consistent with the East Asia Barometer results, which indicate that the lowest levels of trust are enjoyed by political parties (39% trust them a little and much), newspapers (42%), judiciary (45%) and police (47%). The higher levels of trust are enjoyed by television (79%), armed forces (65%)and parliament (57%). The East Asia Barometer does not, however, present data on public trust in CSOs.

[333] The MOSI directory lists 74 public information and 262 education CSOs. See: MOSI (2003).

programs and, increasingly, publications in their public education programs.[334] Not all CSOs have effectively used media but a number of women's NGOs, some environmental groups, human rights organizations, public health CSOs and voter and civic education groups have over the years developed better ties with journalists and developed effective media strategies. The NCAV, National AIDS Foundation, UMENGO, CEDAW Watch/ICSFD Secretariat, Mongolian Youth Development Foundation (MYDF) and Open Forum Society have conducted some of the most effective media campaigns.

Surprisingly, however, RSC respondents' assessment was not as favourable: 49.5% stated CSOs have not worked actively to improve public education while 26.3% stated their efforts were moderate. Moreover, 9.5% thought CSOs have not been active at all in this sphere while 11.6% stated CSOs have worked very actively to inform citizens. Nevertheless, 42.3% stated CSOs' public education activities have had significant success while 35.1% thought they have had limited success. Furthermore, 21% of CSS respondents stated that CSOs provided them with important information on pressing issues. It is possible that the more negative assessments were based on the 'amount' of public education that is still needed rather than the level that has already been achieved due to CSO efforts.[335] It was also evident that civil society stakeholders, especially those in rural areas, are often under-informed about CSOs' contributions to public education, which once again points to the poor information infrastructure of rural Mongolia.

4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action. So far, few established CSOs have provided support to emergent CSOs and community groups. The brightest example of work in this area is that of the Uvurkhangai branch of WSP, which organized tri-partite consultations with NGOs, local businesses and local government in order to help improve the legal environmental for the development of local businesses. These initiatives as well as WSP's work on improving citizen participation in local budget processes have had empowering effects on rural communities and spurred the establishment of new local CSOs. The Ongi River Movement has begun to share from its own experience with other emergent environmental movements. The Civic Education Center has helped build a community centre in a Selenge aimag soum and has facilitated grassroots mobilization for the solution of common issues. While there are a number of other similar examples, overall such activities of CSOs are still very limited.

Most of the RSC respondents thought CSO efforts in this field are limited (44.1%) or moderate (34.4%) while 40.9% thought these efforts have had limited success and 37.6% that they have had significant success. Furthermore, 18% of CSS respondents stated that CSOs ran programs in their communities to help local citizens achieve collective decision-making on a pressing issue.

4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people. A fair number of CSOs operate, nationally and locally, on behalf of or for the benefit of marginalized people. One of the ways of assisting them is through information,

[334] Practically all operating CSOs, especially NGOs, conduct various seminars and training workshops. Their publications vary in their regularity and quality but are continuously improving in terms of both. Globe International, Open Forum Society, WSP, DEMO Center, Oyuntulkhuur Foundation and a number of other NGOs produce publications on a more regular basis. Many of these publications are distributed free of charge.

[335] In other words, given the transition of the society from one system to another, the need for re-education of citizens is massive. Therefore, while CSOs have made significant contributions already, their work to date can only provide for a small fraction of the overall need. Often, Mongolians compare the work that has been done to the 'ideal' situation, which causes them to underestimate their own achievements to date.

education and empowerment, as can be observed from media reports. Much work is being carried out through national and local campaigns and programs to reduce poverty. However special study needs to be undertaken to seriously evaluate impact of CSO activities on the marginalized people. As mentioned earlier in the report, poverty alleviation is an important concern for Mongolian CSOs and 29% of RSC respondents stated CSO services they know of focus on the poor (including 11.6% which focus on the poor and women).[336] In terms of impact, 50.6% evaluated CSO services as successful (46% rather successful and 4.6% very successful) and 24.1% as having limited success.[337] Furthermore, 26% of CSS respondents stated that they received important information and other services from CSOs for the improvement of their livelihoods including assistance aimed at bettering living conditions of the community's poor (13.9%) and local women (10.5%).[338]

Examples of important CSO services to marginalized groups include Zorig Foundation's project for empowering young unemployed migrant women, MYDF project for prevention of prostitution involving poor teenage girls, faith-based organizations' shelters for homeless children, the National AIDS Foundation's support for gay and lesbian groups and people with AIDS and the "Bayantsagaan" Herders' Association's efforts to support herders' livelihoods.[339] On the whole, however, CSO activities directly targeting marginalized groups remain limited compared to other types of activities such as general public education, policy advocacy and member services.

4.4.4 Empowering women. CSOs have had considerable success in improving the legal framework for the protection of women's rights and equipping women with the knowledge of women's rights and human rights.[340] RSC respondents' evaluation of CSOs' campaigns to combat violence against women were rather favourable: 62% stated CSO activities in this area were successful (45% rather successful and 16.5% very successful) while 25% regarded them as unsuccessful. Indeed, women's micro-credit, legal literacy training, democracy and human rights programs, health education, skills training and numerous other projects have comprised large numbers of women and have succeeded in empowering women to raise their family income, better their employment chances, protect their rights in the court of law and effectively express their interests. However, women's CSOs due to their limited capacity as well as, in some cases, poor links with their constituents, are unable to comprise all women that need their assistance. Women's NGOs' work in the area of women's political empowerment and combating sexual harassment in the workplace have had little impact: the number of women in decision-making positions remains low and there have been no reports of employers instituting anti-sexual harassment policies.

[336] While 17.4% of RSC respondents stated that CSO services they know of have focused on the poor, 18.6% stated they focused on women, 11.6% they focused on both women and the poor and 24.4% stated they focused on the whole population.
[337] These figures refer to all kinds of CSO services, including those to the poor. N. Baasankhuu, Dundgovi Aimag Representative of Gobi Region Economic Development Program, "Ways to Strengthen Herders' NGOs," in *Pluralist Center. Information Journal* 2 (Fall, 2003), 85-88.
[338] It should not be assumed, however, that all CSS respondents are marginalized or that local women are necessarily a marginalized group.
[339] The association was established with USAID's financial support.
[340] Civil Society Review RTD (August, 2003), TAF (2000), Lawyers Center for Legal Reform Support (2002), CEDAW Watch (forthcoming), TAF (2004).

4.4.5 Building social capital. There is evidence of growing social capital among CSOs, especially among NGOs in the same locality. Ulaanbaatar-based NGOs meet often at various seminars and conferences and have been gradually extending their networks. Increasingly, NGOs work together on joint projects and there have even been a few cases of effective inter-sectoral cooperation. Human rights and pro-democracy groups possibly have the best networking with each other and umbrella organizations such as UMENGO, the High Council of AOUs, the MTUF and Mongolian Women's Federation also play an important role in increasing coordination, cooperation and trust among CSO actors. There is also evidence that CSO actors are more tolerant due to their heightened awareness of human rights and democracy.

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods. Christian faith-based organizations, CSCs, development NGOs and handicapped citizens' groups are the main actors in this field. The Mongolian Women's Federation, the Liberal Women's Brain Pool and a number of other CSOs as well as credit and savings cooperatives have run micro-credit schemes to help women and the poor start up small businesses. The Mongolian Women's Fund has also been providing small grants for income-generation projects. Some CSOs cooperate with the government on income generation and employment creation jobs. Examples given by RSC respondents stressed training programs offered by various CSOs including training and workshops on business management, vocational skills, forming cooperatives, handcrafts, growing vegetables, etc. Moreover, 19% of CSS respondents indicated CSOs resolved a specific problem for their community and 13% stated CSOs ran programs in their community to help citizens increase their household incomes.

4.5. Meeting societal needs

This sub-dimension examines the extent to which Mongolian civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalized groups. The table below summarizes the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.5: Indicators assessing how civil society is meeting societal needs

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	1
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	2
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalized groups	1

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision. Only about 1/5 of RSC respondents indicated they know of examples of CSO campaigns demanding specific services conducted in the last year.[341] Examples given included pensioners' demands for equitable pension payments, CSO lobby for the adoption of the Law against Domestic Violence, advocacy for open access to public information and CSO demands for greater protection of human rights. In addition, student organizations had also mobilized to demand state benefits. In terms of impact, 30% of RSC respondents stated these advocacy activities were successful (27% rather successful and 3% very successful) while 21% evaluated them as not very successful and 2% as not successful at all (47% stated they do not know or did not answer the question). The Open Forum live television debate program has effectively drawn public and policymakers' attention to a number of critical

[341] 47% stated they cannot think of such examples while 31% stated they do not know or did not answer.

social issues such as the social protection of the 'ninja' (poor illegal gold prospectors),[342] publication of sufficient number of quality textbooks for secondary schools, etc.

4.5.2 Meeting needs directly. The majority (64%) of RSC participants stated they know of CSO services to people while 41% stated these services have been rather successful and 22% that they have had little success. One of the most important sets of services rendered by a CSO is that offered by the NCAV to domestic violence victims including shelter and transition house services, legal and psychological counselling, support groups and even counselling for violent men. The MYDF, Scouts Association and Mongolian Youth Federation have run important educational projects and fairs as well as summer camps for youth and children. The Zorig Foundation, in cooperation with UNESCO, has offered training programs for young unemployed migrant women. The Lotus Center and a few other faith-based groups have run orphanages and shelter houses for street children. The MRCA has delivered emergency assistance to *dzud* victims and other poor groups. A fair number of human rights NGOs have provided crucial legal literacy and human rights training for average citizens. In addition, various charity organizations such as Rotary Clubs and So optimist International have provided direct assistance to hospitals, patients, poor herders and other groups. Considering CSOs' limited resources, the evaluation of their efforts by RSC respondents was rather favourable with 27% stating CSOs have played a rather important role in directly meeting societal needs while 40% thought their role has been moderate.

4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalised groups. Overall, the CSI findings indicated that the State is still more effective than CSOs in reaching larger numbers of marginalized citizens as 45.3% of the CSS respondents stated that the state provides effective assistance to the poor, marginalized herders and other people in need while 22.5% reported that CSOs provide more effective assistance. Almost a quarter of the participants responded that both the state and CSOs provide effective assistance while 8.0% replied that they did not know. Furthermore, 26% of the CSS respondents stated they received important information and other services from CSOs for the improvement of their livelihoods including assistance aimed at bettering living conditions of the community's poor (13%) and local women (11%).[343] It is also worth noting that CSS respondents indicated they have received more help from government (28%) than from CSOs (7%) though 48% stated they received no assistance from either. Regional and National Consultation participants as well as NAG members, however, stressed that while the State may have a wider reach due to its more extensive structure, its services are not necessarily of good quality or well suited to the needs of the people. By comparison, CSO services, even if more limited in scope due to more limited organizational and financial capacity, tend to be better designed, well targeted and of better quality.[344]

[342] The 'ninja' are a new phenomenon that has reached a massive scale with the deepening of poverty as thousands of poor citizens migrated to mining sites to illegally prospect for gold on lots already mined by companies. The ninja work under extremely dangerous and hard conditions and their living conditions are equally inhuman. Their activities also contribute to the environmental degradation.

[343] It should not be assumed, however, that all CSS respondents are marginalized or that local women are necessarily a marginalized group.

[344] Moreover, the State and CSO services are not of the same nature, which further complicated the comparison between the effectiveness of State services and that of CSO services. The NAG resolved to give a score of 1 indicating that while State services may be wider, CSO services are of better quality. Moreover, there is some evidence that CSOs reach groups of people that are almost

Conclusion

The analysis of the Impact dimension showed that despite clear and important examples of CSOs' success in legislative advocacy, direct service provision, public education and empowerment of various social groups, the impact of their activities on society has been on the whole rather low. CSOs have achieved the most impact in the areas of informing and educating citizens, empowering women and promoting human rights and gender equality at policy level. CSOs rate moderately in terms of their responsiveness to social needs while it is clear they provide important direct services to various under-privileged groups of people such as the elderly, battered women and children, the handicapped, etc. Although there are important initiatives aimed at holding the state and private sector accountable, they have until recently been rather narrow in scope and inconsistent and have not had significant impact. Similarly, impact of activities aimed at reducing poverty, empowering marginalized groups and monitoring national budget processes has been rather limited.

On the one hand, as a NAG member put it, the relatively low impact of CSOs is due to the unfavourable political and economic environments, particularly the obstacles formed by the authoritarian, monopolistic attitudes of the state. This suggests that although CSOs, especially NGOs, develop important models of non-formal education, community development, income-generation and service-delivery, they are mostly unable to expand the scope of their activities due to their limited organizational capacity and structure and inability to effectively cooperate with the State to take advantage of the latter's extensive administrative structures. Furthermore, the State actively undermines CSOs' efforts to combat corruption and promote government transparency, e.g. by harassing investigative journalists and mounting deliberate mis-information media campaigns to discredit CSOs and social movements.

On the other hand, the assessment of the Impact dimension suggests that the Mongolian civil society would do well to re-evaluate and improve its programmatic strategies, design and consistency in order to achieve better results. Linking the evidence of low impact of CSO activities with the findings on the structure of civil society, it is also clear that CSOs stand a chance of improving the effectiveness of their programs by improving their inter-relations, communication and cooperation.

completely outside of the State welfare system such as orphans, street children, homeless people as well as other marginalized groups such as gay and lesbians.

IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF MONGOLIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

Extensive discussions, regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the Mongolian civil society, took place during the Regional Stakeholder Consultations, the National Consultation and the National Advisory Group meetings. This section presents, in no particular order of importance, the strengths and weaknesses identified at the above-mentioned fora. A significant portion of identified strengths and weaknesses were related to the external environment, which was discussed in detail in the previous chapter. Therefore, instead of reiterating here environment-related points, we chose to focus this section on issues that are more internal to the civil society arena.

1. STRENGTHS

- **Diversity**: many different types of CSOs have emerged and are working on a variety of issues, including anti-violence, environmental protection and poverty alleviation. Newer CSOs have, to a large extent, succeeded in breaking the monopolistic hold of socialist-style mass organizations.
- **Information and media**: while significant limitations in this area exist, some regions have an important advantage of being able to benefit from multiple sources of information and alternative media channels such as independent TV and FM radio stations and newspapers.
- **International linkages**: albeit unevenly, Mongolian CSOs have benefited from the greater integration of Mongolia into the international system by developing their relations with important foreign, regional and international organizations and networks. This connectivity enables Mongolian CSOs to draw on international resources including funds, expertise and information and strengthen their ability to use international conventions Mongolia is signatory to as a leverage in their advocacy activities.
- **Democratic culture**: although overall socio-cultural indicators for Mongolian society remain low, CSOs are making an important contribution to the development and gradual expansion of spaces where people learn to take collective decisions, based on consensus and open deliberation, respect each other's opinions, listen to each other, achieve mutual compromise and develop greater tolerance for diverse views and lifestyles. In particular, NGOs are rather open, democratic and participatory in their work.
- **Women's leadership**: although women are mostly excluded from political decision-making levels, civil society provides an important avenue for their active involvement and leadership in society. Women's leadership and participation contributes greatly to the democratic and humane development of Mongolian civil society.
- **New skills and methods**: CSOs are developing new methods of organizational management and operations that are based on team work, consultations and equitable participation thereby strengthening more non-hierarchical, horizontal relations within CSOs with some spill over effects onto society at large.

- **Human resources**: Mongolian CSO leaders and members are generally well educated. This advantage is further reinforced by the strong commitment of the leaders, staff and members to the CSOs' stated goals and a higher level of awareness among civil society stakeholders of the common good, human rights, gender equality, social justice and principles of democracy.
- **Institutional development**: a number of important CSOs have emerged and have been able to strengthen themselves institutionally, improve their management and decentralized organizational structure, effectively recruit volunteers, constructively participate in and sustain CSO coalitions and networks, contribute to the improvement of information exchange and coordination among CSOs. These CSOs also place a greater emphasis on adherence to ethical principles, maintaining financial transparency and independence.
- **Connectivity to society**: many CSOs are attuned to the needs of society and responsive to the needs of disadvantaged groups. As CSOs have lighter and more flexible organizational structures, they tend to respond to social needs more quickly as well as more appropriately than the government. Their programs, even if limited in scope, also tend to be more cost-effective compared to state programs and large donor-driven projects.
- **Cooperation with the State**: in some areas, CSOs have made important progress in developing more open and constructive relations with different government agencies, local government and local legislatures. Though unevenly, government officials, committed to the common good are beginning to understand the importance of coordination and cooperation with CSOs.

2. WEAKNESSES

- **Rural civil society is much weaker** than civil society in the capital city: In the rural areas they are fewer in numbers, with very low financial capacity, more vulnerable to interference by local government, poorly institutionalized, with less consistent operations, more limited access to information, fewer and less diverse media and weak local self-governing institutions.
- **Uneven participation**: certain segments of the population, especially the poor and uneducated and those living in more remote areas, are not represented in civil society and display extremely low levels of participation. This also indicates most CSOs; somewhat weak links with grassroots organizations.
- **Financial capacity**: the majority of CSOs are not financially sustainable and tend to operate on a project basis, which means that CSOs on the whole do not command the financial resources necessary for conducting emergency actions.
- **Quality of programs**: CSO actions and programs are often not strategic enough and tend to be more ad hoc. Often, they are not well planned, not comprehensive or well integrated.
- **Critical skills and capacity**: overall, CSOs are lacking in research, analytical and monitoring skills and in their ability to conduct quality and impact assessments and strategic planning. Sometimes, CSOs themselves lack adequate legal knowledge.

- **Organizational weaknesses**: CSOs' financial transparency, internal democracy and accountability to their constituents are still insufficient. The low turn-over of CSO leaders often leads to stagnation of the organization. Members' participation in decision-making processes is often inadequate. Also, inter-CSO communication, coordination and cooperation remain in need of significant improvement, especially between different civil society sectors and with the private sector.
- **Leadership flaws**: some CSO leaders use their organizations to advance their own social status, personal ambitions and living standards.
- **Mentality**: although many CSOs are indeed more independent and proactive, many CSOs are still held back by the socialist mentality of relying on the state, waiting for guidelines and orders from above and therefore lack independent initiative. There are also problems of low levels of trust and a tendency of many CSOs to limit themselves to narrow organizational interests.
- **Multi-party system**: political parties are in serious need of reform and strengthening in terms of their ideological distinction and programs, internal democracy, transparency and accountability and ethics.
- **Partisanship**: a major hindrance to a healthy development of civil society is excessive partisan polarization, which enhances the zero-sum game attitude to politics and promotes feelings of distrust, insecurity and animosity. Particularly harmful are partisan activities of formally non-partisan CSOs, particularly when decisions are taken by the CSO leaders on behalf of all members without consulting with the latter. This kind of unethical behaviour is particularly common among inheritor organizations, some of which go as far as to use influence to recruit members for the dominant party.
- **Public support**: CSOs are still unable to enjoy broad-based public support due to the low level of public understanding of the importance of civil society and CSOs' contributions to the country's development, poor development of civil journalism and CSOs' own poor public relations.
- **Support infrastructure**: a major weakness of Mongolian civil society is the essential absence of a support infrastructure for its development. The tax system is largely unfavourable, the registration process has become increasingly hindering and State support for CSO activities remains highly inadequate.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

This section presents the recommendations for strengthening Mongolian civil society and a Strategic Plan of Action, which emerged as a result of the Regional Stakeholder Consultations and the National Consultations. The recommendations focused on further expanding and building on the existing strengths and addressing existing weaknesses of Mongolian civil society. The Strategic Action Plan, presented here as Next Steps, lists concrete actions that the participants of the Regional and National Consultations agreed to undertake in cooperation with each other.

1. RECOMMENDATIONS

With regard to citizens:

- Scale up CSOs' information dissemination, public education, legal literacy and training programs for the population at large.
- Expand the scope of CSO activities to involve more citizens and use more participatory methods more effectively and broadly.
- Promote decentralization, reduction of urban-rural disparity and strengthen local self-governing institutions and rural development to enhance local democracy structures, particularly in rural areas.
- Upgrade programs directed to children by supporting children's own organizations and training school social workers.
- Identify social entrepreneurs and support them, especially at grassroots levels.
- Improve research and organize open contests for citizens on public affairs and civil society to better understand and respond to social needs and ensure citizen participation in civil society's activities.

With regard to the state:

- Conduct training for public servants to improve their understanding of civil society, human rights, democracy, gender equality and other pertinent issues.
- Promote government accountability and effectiveness through monitoring its performance, such as . undertaking monitoring the government's poverty reduction programs and assess their impact.
- Improve CSO communication, coordination and cooperation with local self-governing institutions to strengthen local legislatures' links with citizens and their capacity to watch over local administrations.
- Advocate for an effective law on combating corruption and improve the quality and regularity of state information dissemination to people in order to promote government transparency.
- Organize election monitoring (e.g. through developing a CSO methodology) to prevent electoral fraud and ensure that elections are free and fair.
- Advocate for the allocation of funds in national and local budgets for supporting civil society initiatives and a delegation of some state services to CSOs.

With regard to private sector:

- Encourage private sector to dedicate a certain percentage of their profit to philanthropy.
- Promote multi-stakeholder, multi-partite consultation schemes and cooperation, especially in rural areas (e.g. business, local government, CSOs).

With regard to media:

- Improve CSO cooperation with media.
- Promote greater accountability and adherence to ethical standards among media.

With regard to CSOs:

- Improve management, legal education, public relations, advocacy, research and monitoring skills and capacity of CSOs, train CSO personnel.
- Build CSOs' capacity to develop more strategic, well-designed and well-planned programs and conduct impact assessments of their work.
- Promote financial sustainability of CSOs, especially in rural areas, by improving their fundraising skills, engaging state support and advocating for a more favourable tax system that provides tax benefits for private sector philanthropy.
- Enhance CSO accountability, financial transparency, internal democracy and ethical behaviour by improving CSO bylaws, including transparency provisions, clearly spelling out gender equitable hiring and promotion policies and drawing up an ethical code for CSOs and using internet, e-mail and open letters, as less costly forms of reporting openly to the public.
- Help rural CSOs establish independent and direct relations with international, regional and foreign organizations and donors.
- Develop a unified information network, connecting all aimags, using different forms of communication including latest information technology wherever possible.
- Form CSO councils or networks at aimag and regional levels and, if possible, also at soum and national levels to improve cooperation, pull together resources, share experience and foster inter-aimag partnerships.
- Conduct aimag civil society consultations and national civil society fora every year.
- Organize open-door days or civil society bazaars, institute a national civil society day and run monthly campaigns on promoting civil society to inform and involve citizens more actively in civil society.
- Develop a CSO directory (a yellow book of civil society), produce civil society journals on a subscription basis (thus secure the necessary funds) and manuals on civil society.
- Get an hour on public radio and television dedicated to informing the public of civil society's activities.

- Pay attention to the training of trainers and develop a pool of trainers for community development (especially important for rural areas).
- Refrain from partisan approaches to common issues, issue a call for formally non-partisan CSOs to maintain high ethical standards and remain non-partisan, especially during election campaign periods.

2. NEXT STEPS

The CSI exercise led to the development of the following Strategic Plan of Action for the Strengthening of Mongolia's Civil Society:

- Develop a national civil society network of information and communication (with an emphasis on aimag to aimag sharing of experience and equitable distribution of information from Ulaanbaatar to aimags).
- Develop a civil society 'justice system[345]' starting with the establishment of a self-regulatory mechanism for CSOs (to put in place common ethical standards for civil society actors, promote public trust in CSOs and protect civil society arena from government interference).
- Develop a new methodology entitled "Islands of Freedom" for democracy promotion, based on community development and fostering of more horizontal relationships between community members and civil society activists (non-hierarchical, partnership-based approach to community empowerment and democracy promotion).
- Improve monitoring, research and analytical skills of CSOs to increase their capacity to hold government accountable, combat corruption in government and abuse of public office.
- Improve institutional, financial and technical capacity of CSOs with a special emphasis on rural CSOs and relations between local legislatures and local civil society.
- Undertake CSI exercises at local level in each of the aimags, in order to more closely examine each of the contexts, regional differences, support better coordination and cooperation among local CSOs, increase their capacity for collective action and analysis, and help develop strategies and action plans better suited to the local context. In addition, aimag CSIs shall enable national comparison of aimags by their level of civil society development, which can help spur competition among aimgs to score better on respective indicators and hold local government more accountable on the issue of promoting democracy, human rights and civil society at local level.
- Mobilize support for rural civil society stakeholders to create and/or strengthen aimag, regional and national civil society councils to improve cohesion, coordination and cooperation among CSOs. This process should be linked to regular (every 2-3 years) aimag, regional and national civil society fora aimed at encouraging nation-wide discussions of challenges faced by the Mongolian civil society, crucial social needs that demand civil society and government action and fostering collective action to address these issues.

[345] The term 'justice' is a direct translation from Mongolian. It is about fairness and justice and hence carries a more moral and spiritual connotation than the word 'accountability', which is usually used in this context.

Of these activities, priority shall be given to the development of the National Civil Society Network of Communication and Cooperation, the development of a self-regulating mechanism for ensuring high ethical standards among CSOs, and aimag-level CSI exercises beginning with 4-5 aimags in 2006, for the first round.

VI. CONCLUSION

The CSI exercise in Mongolia produced the first comprehensive study of the state of civil society in the country. Not only did it result in a current assessment of Mongolian civil society, but it also enhanced analytical capacity, improved networking and a stronger sense of shared identity and common goals among Mongolian civil society stakeholders. The CSI research process was widely participatory and consultative in nature. It drew on multiple sources of information and both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. A broad, representative group of civil society stakeholders participated in both data collection and data analysis components of the CSI process. Therefore, the resulting analysis can be understood as a self-assessment by Mongolian civil society, rather than a product of a few researchers. It should also be stated that, due to the embeddedness of the National Coordinating Organization in Mongolian civil society as an activist organization, the CSI process in Mongolia has been particularly strong in terms of its capacity-building and action-oriented aspects.

The CSI study demonstrated that while important advances have been made in Mongolia towards democracy, the country is still facing serious challenges in terms of developing a strong, diverse and vibrant civil society. The Civil Society Diamond of Mongolia (see figure 11), the visual representation of the current state of Mongolian civil society, is rather small with three of the four dimension scores ranging from 1 to 1.4. This indicates a somewhat weak development of civil society that is embedded in a largely disabling external environment (dimension score 1.1).

Figure VI.1: Civil Society Diamond Mongolia



The crucial conclusion drawn by the CSI participants was that the disabling political and economic environment, especially the domination and repression of society by the state, forms the main obstacle to the effective development of civil society in Mongolia. The excessive centralization of political, economic and cultural resources in the capital city and consequent rural underdevelopment and marginalization further aggravate the prospects of strengthening civil society in rural areas. Widespread poverty, growing disparity between the rich and the poor, deep economic and social crises marked by a high level of foreign debt and high rates of alcoholism and violence on one hand and wide-spread corruption, non-transparency and an ineffective government on the other hand, make the development of a democratic and humane society extremely problematic. Thus, it is no surprise that the CSI research showed that the level of interpersonal trust and public spiritedness in the Mongolian society is rather low.

The unfavourable environment is most likely the main reason for the weak structure and low impact of the Mongolian civil society. In terms of structure (dimension score 1.2), one of the main characteristics of

Mongolian civil society appears to be its highly unequal geographic distribution, with the significant majority of civil society activities and organizations being concentrated in the capital city and, to a much lesser extent, at aimag centres. Meanwhile, rural areas, especially the soums and baghs that are further from the aimag centres and the capital city, are essentially devoid of regular civil society operations. This disparity between urban and rural civil society is not simply numeric, it is also qualitative, in that while there is a critical mass of capital city-based CSOs that have developed significant institutional capacity and are able to maintain a substantial degree of independence from the state authorities, the same cannot be said about rural CSOs. Lack of capacity, especially a serious shortage of financial resources, is a major issue faced by rural CSOs, which is closely linked to the under-development of rural businesses and the excessive centralization of political and economic resources in the hands of the local governor. For the same reason, rural CSOs are frequently subject to unwarranted interference, pressure and intimidation by local authorities.

Another key feature of Mongolian civil society is the significant space occupied by the inheritor mass organizations, most of which have continued to maintain close ties with the former communist party and, through it, with the State. In part building on the extensive institutional structures and material basis gained during socialism and in part capitalizing on their proximity to the dominant party and state authorities during the post-socialist period, these organizations have largely succeeded to strengthen themselves institutionally and financially and are able to exert significant political influence. Although formally declared to be non-partisan, inheritor mass organizations, sometimes openly and sometimes more discreetly, serve partisan interests. This situation, along with the partisan attitudes of public officials and intensification of political competition during election campaigns, contributes to the excessive partisan polarization, animosity and distrust among civil society actors. Thus, partisanship seems to be a key reasons for the relatively low level of coordination and cooperation among CSOs, especially given the majority of the umbrella organizations are in fact inheritor organizations.

Nevertheless, the examination of the structure dimension as well as the values dimension (dimension score 1.7) also showed that, despite serious challenges, there has been much progress in the development of civil society in Mongolia. New issue-oriented independent NGOs, environmental, anti-corruption and pro-democracy social movements and opposition political parties have made an important contribution to the liberalization, diversification and decentralization of the public sphere. A number of these new organizations have become well established and recognized in society and actively work to promote democratic and humane values in society, through their public education, policy advocacy and oversight activities. However, when a broader view of civil society is taken, there is evidence of a frequent gap between the values promoted by CSOs at the societal level and CSOs' own internal practices. This is to say that CSOs need to pay attention to the improvement of their internal democracy, representativeness (diversity), financial transparency, accountability and abidance by gender equity and equality principles.

Though overall, the evaluation of civil society's values was more positive compared to other dimensions, it pointed to two disturbing trends related to a possible escalation of violence and increasing xenophobia. Both issues relate back to the unfavourable external environment, as large groups of impoverished citizens are driven to desperation by the unresponsiveness, non-accountability and corruption of government authorities. This dynamic is clearly visible in the confrontation between mining companies and poor rural communities, whose struggle for environmental protection is essentially a struggle for their right to life and human dignity. Second, there is some evidence of the intensification of the traditionally strong anti-Chinese sentiments and a growing influence of xenophobic nationalist movements and organizations, in response to some of the oppressive (for the poor and unemployed segments of the population) effects of globalization and poorly designed free trade policies. It is clear that these issues need to be explored in more depth in order to ensure that the principles of justice, non-discrimination and non-violence are strengthened in Mongolian society so that the Mongolian public can effectively address the core causes of societal problems instead of scape-goating specific groups of people.

The Impact dimension presented the most difficulty in the research process as impact assessment, research and analysis are not well developed in Mongolia. Though CSOs conduct many important activities which lead to important effects, most CSOs do not have a habit of monitoring the impact of their programs. Impact assessment is further complicated by the fact that often CSO programs' effects are delayed, diffused as well as contradictory. Keeping these issues in mind, the CSI team, to a certain extent, took a broader look at civil society's impact trying to assess, where appropriate, a cumulative effect of multiple-year programs of multiple CSOs. The main conclusion drawn with regard to this dimension is that CSOs have generally exerted much effort to address critical issues and needs of the society. However, their impact has been limited mainly due to the lack of state support, outright resistance of state authorities to respond to or cooperate with CSOs and lack of effective cooperation and coordination among CSOs. Thus, some of the fields wherein CSO activities have had most limited impact are rather predictable – holding state and private corporations accountable and influencing national budget processes. CSOs have been, however, most effective in influencing public policy with regard to women's rights and gender equality, empowering citizens through public education and information programs and empowering women. CSOs have also provided critical services to the most needy and are often the only sources of assistance for specific marginalized groups and communities. Still, CSOs' impact on the society remains rather low (dimension score 1.4), especially when compared to the amount of CSO effort.

Thus, while making it clear that important advances have been made by Mongolians towards developing a diverse and vibrant civil society, the overall assessment of the state of civil society also raises a number of concerns about serious obstacles faced by Mongolians in promoting democratic reforms, protecting human rights and strengthening civil society. However, the fact that the highest score was attributed to the Values dimension suggests a significant amount of commitment and energy among civil society actors to continue fighting for a humane and democratic Mongolia despite existing constraints. This score thus allows room for

an optimistic projection of the future strengthening of Mongolia's civil society, especially when faced by a rather pessimistic picture produced by the assessment of the Environment dimension.

Furthermore, true to its action-oriented goals, the CSI process in Mongolia provided a major impetus to the development of civil society in Mongolia. It fostered a higher degree of integration and mutual trust among diverse sectors of Mongolia's civil society, developed a broadly shared common understanding of what civil society is in Mongolia and where it should go, enhanced country-wide networking and sharing of experience among CSOs and helped build civil society actors' analytical capacity. More concretely, the participants of the CSI process produced a collective action plan for promoting democracy, strengthening civil society and protecting human rights based on a common strategic vision for the future of the Mongolian society.

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Appendix 1: CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX IMPLEMENTATION STEPS



Appendix 2: THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

1 – STRUCTURE

1.1 - Breadth of citizen participation

Description: How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engage in civil society activities?

1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

Description: What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

A very small minority (less than 10%).	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.2 - Charitable giving

Description: What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.4 - Volunteering

Description: What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A small minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A minority (31% to 50%)	Score 2
A majority (more than 50%)	Score 3

1.1.5 - Collective community action

Description: What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% -50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.2 - Depth of citizen participation

Description: **How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?**

1. 2.1 - Charitable giving

Description: How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

Less than 1%	Score 0
1% to 2%	Score 1
2.1% to 3%	Score 2
More than 3%	Score 3

1.2.2 - Volunteering

Description: How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

Less than 2 hours	Score 0
2 to 5 hours	Score 1
5.1 to 8 hours	Score 2
More than 8 hours.	Score 3

1.2.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

Description: **How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?**

1.3.1 - CSO membership

Description: To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	Score 2
CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.2 - CSO leadership

Description: To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.	Score 2
CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

Description: How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	Score 0
CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	Score 1
CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	Score 2
CSOs are present in all areas of the country.	Score 3

1.4. - Level of organisation

Description: **How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?**

1.4.1 - Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 70%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 70%)	Score 3

1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

Completely ineffective (or non-existent)	Score 0
Largely ineffective	Score 1
Somewhat effective	Score 2
Effective	Score 3

1.4.3 - Self-regulation

Description: Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Score 0
Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Score 1
Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Score 2
Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.	Score 3

1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

Description: What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 0
There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	Score 1
Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	Score 2
There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 3

1.4.5 - International linkages

Description: What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

Only a handful of "elite" CSOs have international linkages.	Score 0
A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 1
A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 2
A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.	Score 3

1.5 - Inter-relations

***Description:* How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?**

1.5.1 - Communication

Description: What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

Very little	Score 0
Limited	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Significant	Score 3

1.5.2 – Cooperation

Description: How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 0
It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 1
CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 2
CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 3

1.6 – Resources

***Description:* To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?**

1.6.1 - Financial resources

Description: How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.	Score 3

1.6.2 - Human resources

Description: How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.	Score 3

1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

Description: How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.	Score 3

2 - ENVIRONMENT[346]

2.1 - Political context

***Description:* What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

2.1.1 - Political rights

Description: How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	Score 0
There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Score 1
Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	Score 2
People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.	Score 3

2.1.2 - Political competition

Description: What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

Single party system.	Score 0
Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Score 1
Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction.	Score 2
Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.	Score 3

2.1.3 - Rule of law

Description: To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	Score 0
There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	Score 1
There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Score 2
Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.	Score 3

2.1.4 – Corruption

Description: What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

High	Score 0
Substantial	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Low	Score 3

2.1.5 – State effectiveness

Description: To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).	Score 0
The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	Score 1
State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	Score 2
State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.	Score 3

[346] For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

2.1.6 – Decentralisation

Description: To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Score 0
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Score 1
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.	Score 2
Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.	Score 3

2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

***Description:* To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?**

2.2.1 - Civil liberties

Description: To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

Civil liberties are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	Score 1
There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Score 2
Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.2.2 - Information rights

Description: To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Score 0
Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Score 1
Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Score 2
Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.	Score 3

2.2.3 - Press freedoms

Description: To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

Press freedoms are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	Score 1
There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Score 2
Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.3 - Socio-economic context[347]

***Description:* What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

Description: How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on $2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)	Score 0
Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 1
Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 2
Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.	Score 3

[347] This sub-dimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The sub-dimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

2.4 - Socio-cultural context

Description: **To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?**

2.4.1 - Trust

Description: How much do members of society trust one another?

Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	Score 0
There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 1
There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 2
There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 3

2.4.2 - Tolerance

Description: How tolerant are members of society?

Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Score 0
Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Score 1
Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Score 2
Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).	Score 3

2.4.3 - Public spiritedness[348]

Description: How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5).	Score 0
Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5).	Score 1
Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5).	Score 2
High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5).	Score 3

2.5 - Legal environment

Description: **To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?**

2.5.1 - CSO registration[349]

Description: How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	Score 0
The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent.	Score 1
The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	Score 2
The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.	Score 3

2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

Description: To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticize government?

CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	Score 0
There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Score 1
Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	Score 2
CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.	Score 3

2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

Description: How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	Score 0

[348] The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

[349] This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for sub-dimension 3. The indicator scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations).	Score 1
The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	Score 2
The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.	Score 3

2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy
Description: How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Score 0
Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 1
Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 2
Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 3

2.6 - State-civil society relations

Description: **What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?**

2.6.1 – Autonomy
Description: To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

The state controls civil society.	Score 0
CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	Score 1
The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	Score 2
CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.	Score 3

2.6.2 - Dialogue
Description: To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	Score 0
The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	Score 1
The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Score 2
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.6.3 - Cooperation / support
Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 2
The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

Description: **What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?**

2.7.1 - Private sector attitude
Description: What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

Generally hostile	Score 0
Generally indifferent	Score 1
Generally positive	Score 2
Generally supportive	Score 3

2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility
Description: How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Score 0
Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 1
Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Score 2
Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 3

2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy[350]
Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 2
The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

3 - VALUES

3.1 – Democracy

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs
Description: To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 0
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 1
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 3

3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy
Description: How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.2 – Transparency

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?**

3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society
Description: How widespread is corruption within CS?

Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.	Score 0
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	Score 1
There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Score 2
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.	Score 3

[350] The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs
Description: How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?

A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 0
A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 1
A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 3

3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency
Description: How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.3 – Tolerance

Description: **To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?**

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena
Description: To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Score 0
Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	Score 2
Civil society is an open arena where the expression of *all* viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	Score 3

3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance
Description: How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.4 - Non-violence

Description: **To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?**

3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena
Description: How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Score 0
Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	Score 2
There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.	Score 3

3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace
Description: How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility	Score 3

3.5 - Gender equity

Description: **To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?**

3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena
Description: To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Score 0
Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Score 1
Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Score 2
Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.	Score 3

3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs
Description: How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

A small minority (less than 20%)	Score 0
A minority (20%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

3.5.3 – Civil society actions to promote gender equity
Description: How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.6 - Poverty eradication

Description: **To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?**

3.6.1 – Civil society actions to eradicate poverty
Description: To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.7 - Environmental sustainability

Description: **To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?**

3.7.1 – Civil society actions to sustain the environment
Description: How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

4 - IMPACT

4.1 - Influencing public policy

Description: **How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?**

4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies
Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.1.3 - Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study
Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components.[351]	Score 1
Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

Description: **How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable**?

4.2.1 - Holding state accountable
Description: How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2.2 - Holding private corporations accountable
Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.3 - Responding to social interests

Description: **How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?**

[351] The term "specific budget component" refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the *overall* budget.

4.3.1 - Responsiveness

Description: How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 0
There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 1
There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 2
Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 3

4.3.2 - Public Trust

Description: What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

A small minority (< 25%)	Score 0
A large minority (25%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-75%)	Score 2
A large majority (> 75%)	Score 3

4.4 - Empowering citizens

Description: **How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?**

4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

Description: How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.3 - Empowering marginalized people

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.4 - Empowering women

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.5 - Building social capital[352]

Description: To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Score 0
Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Score 1
Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Score 2
Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.	Score 3

4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

[352] To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see sub-dimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

Description: How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5 - Meeting societal needs

Description: **How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

Description: How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Description: How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Description: To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

CSOs are less effective than the state.	Score 0
CSOs are as effective as the state.	Score 1
CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	Score 2
CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.	Score 3

Appendix 3: CSI Scores

1.2	**1. Structure:** breadth, depth and diversity of participants on the CS arena, inter-relations, capacity and level of organization:	
1.4	***1.1.*** **Breadth of citizen participation**	
	1	1.1.1. Non-partisan political action
	2	1.1.2. Charitable giving
	1	1.1.3. CSO membership
	2	1.1.4. Volunteering
	1	1.1.5. Collective community action
1.0	***1.2.*** **Depth of citizen participation**	
	0	1.2.1. Charitable giving
	1	1.2.2. Volunteering
	2	1.2.3. CSO membership
1.3	***1.3.*** **Diversity of civil society participants**	
	2	1.3.1. CSO membership
	1	1.3.2. CSO leadership
	1	1.3.3. Distribution of CSOs
1.2	***1.4.*** **Level of organisation**	
	1	1.4.1. Existence of CSO umbrella bodies
	1	1.4.2. Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies
	1	1.4.3. Self-regulation
	1	1.4.4. Support infrastructure
	2	1.4.5. International linkages
1.5	***1.5.*** **Inter-relations**	
	1	1.5.1. Communication
	2	1.5.2. Cooperation
1.0	***1.6.*** **Resources**	
	0	1.6.1. Financial capacity
	2	1.6.2. Human resource
	1	1.6.3. Technical capacity

1.1	**2. Environment:** political, social, economic, cultural and legal factors affecting CS and state-CS and private sector-CS relations:	
1.2	***2.1.*** **Political context**	
	2	2.1.1. Political rights
	2	2.1.2. Political competition
	1	2.1.3. Rule of law
	0	2.1.4. Corruption
	1	2.1.5. State effectiveness
	1	2.1.6. Decentralisation
1.0	***2.2.*** **Basic freedoms & rights**	
	1	2.2.1. Civil liberties
	1	2.2.2. Information rights
	1	2.2.3. Press freedoms
1.0	***2.3.*** **Socio-economic context**	
	+	2.3.1. Widespread poverty
	+	2.3.2. Severe economic crisis
	+	2.3.3. Severe social crisis
	-	2.3.4. Severe socio-economic inequities
	-	2.3.5. Pervasive adult illiteracy
	+	2.3.6. Lack of IT infrastructure
1.3	***2.4.*** **Socio-cultural context**	
	1	2.4.1. Trust
	2	2.4.2. Tolerance
	1	2.4.3. Public spiritedness
1.3	***2.5.*** **Legal environment**	
	1	2.5.1. CSO registration

	2	2.5.2. Allowable advocacy activities
	2	2.5.3. Tax laws favourable to CSOs
	0	2.5.4. Tax benefits for philanthropy
1.0	***2.6.*** **State-civil society relations**	
	1	2.6.1. Autonomy
	1	2.6.2. Dialogue
	1	2.6.3. Cooperation/support
1.0	***2.7.*** **Private sector-civil society relations**	
	1	2.7.1. Private sector attitude
	1	2.7.2. Corporate social responsibility
	1	2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy

1.7	**3. Values:** the extent to which CS actors practice internally and promote societally these values:	
1.5	***3.1.*** **Democracy**	
	1	3.1.1. Democratic practices within CSOs
	2	3.1.2. CS actions to promote democracy
1.7	***3.2.*** **Transparency**	
	2	3.2.1. Corruption within civil society
	1	3.2.2. Financial transparency of CSOs
	2	3.2.3. CS actions to promote transparency
1.0	***3.3.*** **Tolerance**	
	1	3.3.1. Tolerance within the CS arena
	1	3.3.2. CS actions to promote tolerance
2	***3.4.*** **Non-violence**	
	2	3.4.1. Non-violence within the CS arena
	2	3.4.2. CS actions to promote non-violence and peace
1.7	***3.5.*** **Gender equity**	
	2	3.5.1. Gender equity within the CS arena
	1	3.5.2. Gender equitable practices within CSOs
	2	3.5.3. CS actions to promote gender equity

2	***3.6.*** **Poverty eradication**	
	2	3.6.1. CS actions to eradicate poverty
2	***3.7.*** **Environmental sustainability**	
	2	3.7.1. CS actions to sustain the environment

1.4	**4. Impact:** the extent to which CS is active and successful in impacting the following:	
1.3	***4.1.*** **Influencing public policy*:***	
	2	4.1.1. Human rights of women
	1	4.1.2. Social policy: poverty eradication
	1	4.1.3. National budget
1.0	***4.2.*** **Holding state & private corporations accountable**	
	1	4.2.1. Holding state accountable
	1	4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable
1.5	***4.3.*** **Responding to social interests**	
	2	4.3.1. Responsiveness
	1	4.3.2. Public trust
1.7	***4.4.*** **Empowering citizens**	
	2	4.4.1. Informing/educating citizens
	1	4.4.2. Building capacity for collective action
	1	4.4.3. Empowering marginalized people
	2	4.4.4. Empowering women
	2	4.4.5. Building social capital
	2	4.4.6. Supporting livelihoods
1.3	***4.5.*** **Meeting societal needs**	
	1	4.5.1. Lobbying for state service provision
	2	4.5.2. Meeting pressing societal needs directly
	1	4.5.3. Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Appendix 4: National Index Team Members

1. **National Coordinating Organization:**

   ICSFD Secretariat/National CEDAW Watch Center

   - J. Zanaa, National Coordinator
   - B. Bekhbat, Program Officer
   - S. Davaasuren, Administrative/Program Officer
   - L. Bayarmaa, Research Assistant
   - O. Bayartuya, Part-Time Assistant

2. **Civil Society Expert:**

   J. Enkhsaikhan, Ph.D, ICSFD Advisor

3. **Senior Researcher:**

   T. Undarya, Ph.D Candidate (Political Science), ICSFD Advisor

Appendix 5: National Advisory Group Members

1. J. Batbold, President, Union of Mongolian Non-Governmental Organizations (UMENGO)
2. D. Ganbat, Executive Director, Political Education Academy
3. Ts. Ganbold, Chair, Department of Political Science, Mongolian State University
4. L. Itgel, Program Officer, The Asia Foundation
5. D. Lamjav, Head, "Tsekh" NGO
6. Sh. Jargalsaihan, Executive Director, Mongolian AOUs' High Council
7. R. Narangerel, Director, Citizen Education Center
8. Kh. Naranjargal, Head, "Globe International" NGO
9. Ch. Naranzul, Program officer, Zorig Foundation
10. S. Nurdan, Head, Nalaikh District's Trade Union
11. P. Ochirbat, Board Chair, ochirbat Foundation
12. B. Oyunbileg, Civil Society Expert
13. Ts. Oyuntsetseg, Executive Director, Credit Union SCC
14. Kh. Temuujin, Lecturer, School of Law, Mongolian State University
15. M. Togtokhnyam, Chair, National Committee for Children
16. E. Tuul, CSO Coordinator, Baganuur District
17. G. Undral, Director, Democracy Education Center
18. R. Urtnasan, Chair, Department of Theater Arts, Insititute of Arts and Culture
19. N. Sodnomdorj, President, Mongolian Federation of Trade Unions
20. S. Tserendorj, Commissioner, National Human Rights Commission
21. D. Enkhjargal, Director, National Center against Violence
22. Kh. Enkhjargal, Executive Director, National AIDS Foundation

Appendix 6: CSI Regional Stakeholder Consultations Table

Region	**Ulaanbaatar**	**West**	**East**	**South-West**	**North**	**Central**
Base	Ulaanbaatar	Darkhan	Khentii	Uvurkhangai	Khovd	Ulaanbaatar
Date	January 1	March 18-19	**March 25-26**	**April 8-9**	March 16-17	April 22-23
Representation	Ulaanbaatar *(emphasis on policy advocacy organizations)*	Darkhan-Uul Selenge Bulgan Orkhon Khuvsgul	Khentii Dornod Sukhbaatar Bayan-khongor	Uvurkhangai Arkhangai Umnugovi Dundgovi Dornogovi	Khovd Uvs Zavkhan Bayan-Ulgii Govi-Altai	Tuv aimag Ulaanbaatar *(emphasis on (grassroots organizations)*
Numbers	A total of 20	4 from each aimag, 20 in total	5 from each aimag, 20 in total	4 from each aimag, 20 in total	4 from each aimag, 20 in total	A total of 20
From CSI team	J. Zanaa J. Enkhsaikhan T. Undarya B. Bekhbat S. Davaasuren L. Bayarmaa O. Bayartuya	J. Zanaa J. nkhsaikhan T. Undarya B. Bekhbat S. Davaasuren L. Bayarmaa	J. Enkhsaikhan T. Undarya B. Bekhbat O. Bayartuya	J. Zanaa J. Enkhsaikhan T. Undarya B. Bekhbat S. Davaasuren L. Bayarmaa	J. Zanaa J. Enkhsaikhan T. Undarya B. Bekhbat S. Davaasuren L. Bayarmaa	J. Zanaa J. Enkhsaikhan T. Undarya B. Bekhbat S. Davaasuren L. Bayarmaa O. Bayartuya

Appendix 7: List of Participants of Regional Stakeholder Consultations

Ulaanbaatar Regional Consultation (January 5, 2005)

1. N. Batnasan, Mongolian Tourism Federation
2. Ts. Batbayar, Union of Parachuters in Support of Environmental Protection
3. Bekhbat, Ulaanbaatar City's Trade Union
4. B. Buyan-Ulzii, Mongolian National Federation of Handicapped Citizens
5. O.Gantuya, Federation of Mongolian Agriculture, Food and Environment Workers' Trade Unions
6. B. Gankhuyag, Mongolian Student Federation
7. Gantsetseg, Mongolian Student Federation
8. Davaasuren, Zorig Foundation
9. S. Judag, Association for the Protection of Voters' Rights
10. G. Jamyan, *Mongolyn Medee* Newspaper
11. N. Janlav, Sukhbaatar District's Elderly's Committee
12. B. Oyunbileg, Consultant, World Bank
13. G. Oyuntuya, Capital City Consumer Protection Association
14. À. Myadagmaa, "Mongolian Marvel" Center
15. M. Narantuya, National AIDS Foundation
16. Kh. Khulan, Advisor, ICNRD
17. D. Kherlentsetseg, Mongolian National Center for Children's Rights
18. Ms. Enkhtsetseg, Mongolian Center for Handicapped Children

Northern Regional Consultation in Darkhan City (March 8-9, 2005)

Darkhan-Uul aimag

1. R. Ganbold, Director, PEA Chapter
2. R. Tungalag-Erdene, Gal Golomt Movement; Local Governor's Office
3. Ch. Oyuntsetseg, Chair, Uils Tegsh NGO
4. L. Anar-Erdene, Instructor, PEA Chapter

Bulgan aimag

5. R. Oyunbileg, Chair, Center for Children
6. D. Naranbayar, Director, "Elgen Nutag" radio; Chair, Aimag Youth Association
7. A. Ganbold, Chair, Mongolian Youth Federation Branch
8. D. Chimgee, LEOS; Director, "Unu Bil" Company

Khuvsgul aimag

9. Ch. Byambadorj, Director, PEA Chapter
10. G. Tsetsen, Volunteer, Liberty Center; Chair, "Khuvsgul Daliakhan" Movement
11. A. Ganzorig, Organizer, Trade Union
12. B. Narantuya, Journalist-Operator, DES Television Channel

Selenge aimag

13. D. Munkhsaikhan, Dentist, Outpatient Department of the Unified Hospital; former Director, NCAV.
14. Kh. Altangerel, Aimag Chair, MDP
15. Mr. Batgerel, Private Entrepreneur
16. S. Baigalmaa, Social Insurance Inspector

Orkhon aimag

17. J. Ganchimeg, Coordinator, CEDAW Watch; Doctor, Aimag Health Center
18. G. Baasankhuu, Officer in Charge of Health Issues, Local Governor's office
19. I. Baasanjav, Director, "Nomin" Television Channel

Eastern Regional Consultation in Undurkhaan, Khentii (March 25-26, 2005)

Khentii aimag

1. B. Erdenenamjilmaa, Mongolian Democratic Women's Association; Head, Department on Social Issues, Local Governor's Office
2. E. Khongorzul, Officer in Charge of Relations with NGOs, Department on Social Issues, Local Governor's Office
3. D. Chuluunbaatar, Head Lama, "Shadavdarjaalan" Temple
4. D. Oyunchimeg, Chair, Aimag Chapter of the Association of Parents of Handicapped Children
5. J. Sukhbaatar, Head, Teachers' Association in Support of Rural Schools
6. B. Narmandakh, Secretary, Khan Khentii-Common Force Program (World Vision)

Dornod aimag

7. D. Gantsogt, Director, PEA Chapter
8. D. Enkhjargal, Director, "New Century" School
9. B. Tsengelmaa, Eastern Regional Unified Student and Youth Council
10. S. Gantuya, Member, NCAV
11. G. Batchuluun, Public Information Center

Dornogovi aimag

12. D. Tumurtogoo, Union of Employers-Owners
13. S. Azjargal, Chair, Aimag Federation of Trade Unions
14. D. Batgerel, Head, Savings and Credit Cooperative
15. E. Tsend-Ayush, Presidium Member, Aimag Youth Association; Labour Policy Expert, Local Governor's Office

Sukhbaatar aimag

16. S. Adya, Coordinator, LEOS
17. A. Ankhbayar, Chair, Aimag Chapter of the Association against Alcohol and Drug Abuse
18. Ch. Ganbaatar, Chair, Aimag Elderly's Committee
19. M. Yanjinlam, "Gal Golomt-Women" Movement
20. G. Sukhee, Presidium Member, Journalists' and Writers' Chapter

South-Western Regional Consultation in Arvaikheer, Uvurkhangai (April 8-9)

Uvurkhangai aimag

1. T. Ariunjin, PEA
2. B. Enkhtsogt, Uvurkhnagai Chapter Head, Association against Alcohol and Drug Abuse
3. G. Tserendorj, Private Entrepreneur
4. S. Undrakh, Information Service Officer, Aimag Citizens' Representatives' Khural
5. L. Tumurtogoo, WSP
6. Ms. Zolzaya, Aimag Chapter Chair, Chamber of Trade and Industry
7. Ms. Dolgorsuren, Branch Coordinator, Businesswomen's Association
8. D. Myagmarsuren, Chair, Aimag Scouts Union
9. S. Munkhdalai, Journalist

Arkhangai aimag

10. G. Erdenejargal, Manager, Savings and Credit Cooperative
11. S. Munkhgerel, Chair, "Gurvantamir" School's Student Union
12. V. Lkhagvasuren, Coordinator, Entrepreneurs' Union

Umnugovi aimag

13. S. Erkhembaatar, Head, Trade Union

14. D. Naranchimeg, "Goviin Dolgion" NGO
15. Ts. Enebish, Aimag Chapter of the Mongolian Radio
16. Ts. Sarantuya, State Administration and Legal Affairs Department, Local Governor's Office

Bayankhongor aimag

17. V. Gursed, Head, Trade Union
18. J. Ariunaa, Human Rights Expert, NHRC
19. G. Tsetsgee, Chair, Aimag Association for Consumer Rights Protection; National Professional Inspection Officer
20. P. Sanaadagva, Head, Aimag Association for the Protection of Mens' Rights

Dundgovi aimag

21. M. Enkhbat, PEA
22. N. Batjargal, Director, FM – 107.5 Radio
23. L. Danzannorov, Advisor, Professional Inspection Office; Lawyer
24. B. Ulziisaikhan, Secretary, Civil Courage Republican Party
25. T. Enkhbayar, Aimag Employment, Welfare and Service Department

Western Regional Consultation in Khovd, Khovd (April 16-17, 2005)

Khovd aimag

1. B. Ayush, UNDP Resident Representative to Khovd
2. D. Ankhbayar, Head, Motherland-Family Union
3. N. Baasanjav, Coordinator, Khovd Branch of CEDAW Watch
4. N. Damba, Secretary, Citizens' Representatives' Khural
5. B. Zoya, Translator, UNDP's Khovd Office
6. Ts. Narantuya, WSP
7. D. Tseveenravdan, Director, Political Education Academy Chapter
8. V. Erdenechimeg, Head, Union of Handicapped Women
9. P. Enkhbayar, Aimag Scouts Council

Uvs aimag

10. R. Altantsetseg, Head, Association for the Wellness of the Family
11. A. Nanzad, Correspondent, MONTSAME News Agency
12. A. Lantuubayar, Water Engineer, Food and Agriculture Department
13. D. Enkhtuya, Head, Aimag Women's Council of the MWF

Zavkhan aimag

14. Ch. Dariimaa, Social Worker, Aldarkhaan Soum
15. D. Shirendev, Head, Aimag Elderly's Committee
16. R. Erdenetuya, Social Policy Department, Local Governor's Office
17. A. Erdenetuya, Instruction Office, Mongolian National University's Zavkhan School of Finance and Economy

Bayan-Ulgii aimag

18. M. Barmagul, Aimag Coordinator, MONES
19. A. Jaidarkhan, Private Entrepreneur
20. T. Nurlan, Head, Aimag Democratic Union

Govi-Altai aimag

21. D. Gantulga, Head, Aimag Youth Association
22. S. Tsetsgee, Chair, Urban Planning Department, Yusun Bulag Soum
23. Sh. Tumurbat, Union of Employers-Owners
24. Ch. Sarangerel, Social Activist; Private Entrepreneur

Central Regional Consultation in Ulaanbaatar (April 22-23, 2005)

Tuv aimag

1. D. Narantuya, Coordinator, IC Information and Education Center
2. P. Tselmeg, Head, Businesswomen's Union
3. S.Enkhjargal, Coordinator, NCAV Chapter
4. Ch. Jadambaa, Expert, Aimag Education Center

Ulaanbaatar

5. O. Amartuvshin, Director, Fundraising Department, Mongolian Children's and Youth Development Foundation
6. M. Baasandorj, Head, Baganuur District's Consumer Protection Association
7. Sh. Gansuren, Group Facilitator, Zorig Foundation-UNESCO Project on Empowering Immigrant Women
8. S. Mariya, Secretary, Tolgoit NGO
9. S. Nurdan, Head, Nalaikh District' Trade Union
10. B. Oyungerel, Coordinator, V-Club of the DEMO Center
11. E. Tuul, Baganuur District Coordinator for LEOS and CEDAW Watch
12. N. Nyamaa, Member, Chingeltei District's Elderly's Health Group
13. O. Tumentsetseg, Nalaikh District Coordinator, World Vision
14. Y. Tuvshinbayar, Chair, 11th Microdistrict AOU
15. Ts. Sharkhuu, Social Worker, 1st Khoroo of the Bayangol District
16. M. Erdenechimeg, Project Coordinator, Zorig Foundation-UNESCO Project on Empowering Immigrant Women

Appendix 8: Community Sample Survey Table

Type	Urban: apartment district dwellers	Urban: gher district dwellers	Rural: herders	Rural: farmers	Aimag center: remote area	Aimag center: ethnic minority
Location	Ulaanbaatar 11th micro-district	Ulaanbaatar Yaarmag	Uvurkhangai Zuil soum	Selenge Saikhan soum	Khentii Undurkhaan	Bayan-Ulgii Ulgii
Dates	February 21-27	February 21-27	April 7-9	March 1-6	March 24-26	April 6-15
Profile	• Capital city center • Urban citizens • Largely middle class • Infrastructure well developed	• Outskirts of capital city • Mixed residents: city dwellers and recent migrants • Low income families • Poor infrastructure	• Somewhat removed from the capital • Rural population: soum residents • Semi-nomads • Herders • Largely low income families • Poor infrastructure	• Closer to the capital • Rural population: soum residents • Farm workers and farmers • Low income families • Medium infrastructure	• Removed from the capital • Aimag center • Mainly office workers • Mixed income levels (on the lower end though) • Medium infrastructure	• Removed from the capital • Aimag center • Mainly Kazakh/ Muslim population • Mainly office workers • Mixed income levels • Medium infrastructure
Population size	no data	no data	3,696 people, 861 households	2,584 people, 480 households	27,853 people	28,060 people, 5,288 households

Appendix 9: Civil Society's Media Image

With the exception of political parties and politicized movements, civil society does not receive much attention from most media sources.[353] Political parties or movements figure prominently on first or second pages of newspapers and are reported in the same fashion on television and radio while most other civil society news do not figure so prominently. Only about 3% of the news items covered by the CSI media monitoring carried material concerning CSOs other than political parties and movements. Of the total news items carried by the Mongolian National Television in the period under review, 26.9% was devoted to political issues (especially concerning past or forthcoming elections) and political parties or movements. The share of political news on Channel 25, a more independent television channel, was 36.7%. *Unuudur* daily newspaper in its 52 issues carried 165 news items on civil society, which amounted to about 3 news items per day. But less than 1/3 of those items focused on CSOs other than political parties and movements. In the 6 issues of *Seruuleg*, a broadly read biweekly tabloid newspaper, only 15 news items dealt with civil society issues.

Mongolian National Radio was the only media source that reported more systematically and regularly on CSOs other than political parties and movements. Of the 131 news items on civil society, 11 were about women's NGOs, 11 dealt with the protection of children's rights and education, 9 were about human rights NGOs, 9 concerned NGO activities connected with civic movements and 59 informed about other CSOs. This indicates greater access of CSOs to the National Radio as opposed to television and newspapers and, conversely, greater openness of the Mongolian National Radio to civil society. Some of the reasons include greater capacity of the national radio to prepare more quality programs due to less pressure of time and relatively sufficient staffing and lower rates of airtime for the radio (television airtime rates are prohibitively high).[354] In addition, the national radio has a long and well established tradition of programming on broader social and cultural issues, not limited to political news.[355]

There are two main sets of media reports on civil society. The first set focuses on a civil society organization or activity as an object of reporting. In this case, media tends to focus on more or less sensational news such as highly politicized and rather dramatic protests, movements and party politics. With very few exceptions, media reports on such events tend to be of clearly partisan nature and do not seek to present balanced, objective information to the citizens. CSI media monitoring established that *Unuudur* newspaper is one of the most balanced media sources in this regard. Mongolian National Television and Radio have tended to lean towards one of the main political forces depending on the party in power. This trend was particularly visible during MPRP rule and particularly strong in the case of the National Television. Channel 25 tended to present more positive views on opponents of MPRP and *Seruuleg* newspaper was rather systematic in publishing openly biased and poorly backed information.

The second set of media reports on CSOs and their activities are in fact pieces that are commissioned by CSOs and/or result from collaboration between CSOs and journalists. Such media pieces give more in-depth information on civil society activities and issues tackled by them. They tend to be less biased and more multifaceted. The Mongolian National Radio is more widely used thus by CSOs for public education purposes. However, not all CSOs have equal access to such opportunities due to their varied social status, institutional and financial capacity, social capital, networking and public relations skills. Inherited mass organizations have maintained traditionally strong ties with the older media including national radio and television and main newspapers. At the same time, a number of well established post-1990 new and independent, issue-oriented NGOs have also been able to develop functional relationships with various media organizations and individual journalists over the years. Thus, the NCAV, UMENGO, Zorig Foundation, Globe International, ICSF-2003 National Core Group, CEDAW Watch and several other CSOs have effectively used media in such a manner. However, these reports tend to be time-bound as they are realized within specific project or campaign frameworks.

[353] Unless otherwise remarked, this section is based on the data from the CSI Media Monitoring, at times supplemented by participant observation.
[354] B. Myagmarjav, Journalist, Mongolian National Radio.
[355] Ibid.

Overall, the CSI media monitoring showed that most news reports on CSO events (other than those related to political parties and movements) tend to be cursory and neutral. Media tend to give extremely limited information dealing with specific project activities of CSOs and rarely expand on the actual importance of the activity or its outcome for the society on the whole or a specific target group. However neutral, such cursory reports in fact serve to reinforce the wide-spread perception that CSOs, especially NGOs, are superficial, that they jump from projects to projects and are mainly interested in gaining foreign funding to sustain their own livelihoods. The situation is further aggravated by occasional highly biased, superficial and unfair media reports on NGOs. For example, a woman journalist once reported that the NCAV staff is a bunch of self-interested women driving around in jeeps and making money from foreign donors on the back of poor battered women. The report was based solely on the personal perception of the journalist and contained no information on the nature of the issue of domestic violence and the work undertaken by the NCAV to address the issue in the last decade.[356]

Thus, overall, media image of civil society is not very positive. It is intimately linked to the overall level of development of media in Mongolia and the effects of partisan polarization and political control on media organizations, which stifle the development of civil and investigative journalism in Mongolia.[357] The field is dominated by media that serve specific political and economic interests and mercantile considerations, which deeply affect the quality of reports, shrink the space for civil society in the media and encourage focus on the sensational.

[356] NCAV staff member.

[357] These observations are made widely by journalists and civil society activists alike. The issue was raised during the March, 2003 Workshop on Civic Journalism organized by the ICSF-2003 Secretariat, the follow-up Mongolian Journalists' Forum that was held on May 20, 2003. See in particular: D. Tserenjav, *The Status of Journalism in Society: Duties and Responsibilities* (paper presented at the Mongolian Journalists' Forum). The point was also made by B. Bulgamaa, Editor, *Ulaanbaatar Post* Newspaper in her report on CSI Media Monitoring.

Appendix 10: List of Participants of the National Consultation (22-23 September 2005)

National Advisory Group

1. Ts. Ganbold, Chair, Department of Political Studies, Mongolian National University
2. D. Lamjav, Chairperson, "Tsekh" NGO
3. Kh. Naranjargal, Director, Globe International NGO
4. Ts. Oyuntsetseg, Executive Director, Credit Union SCC
5. Yo. Tuul, CSO Coodinator, Baganuur District

Rural Participants

6. G. Erdenejargal, Manager, SCC, Arkhangai
7. R. Lkhagvasuren, CSO Coordinator, Arkhangai
8. J. Ariunaa, Coordinator, NCAV, Bayankhongor
9. T. Nurlan, CSO Coordinator, Bayan-Ulgii
10. Kh. Erjan, Chair, Citizens' Representatives' Khural, Bayan-Ulgii
11. A. Ganbold, Expert, Employment and Welfare Office, Bulgan
12. S. Tsetsgee, Officer, Urban Planning Office, Govi-Altai
13. D. Gantulga, Head, Aimag Youth Association, Govi-Altai
14. L. Danzannorov, Head, "Free Youth" NGO, Dundgovi
15. N. Batjargal, Director, Mandalgovi Radio, Dundgovi
16. B. Ulziisaikhan, Secretary, Civil Courage Republican Party; Head, "Marvelous Culture" NGO, Dundgovi
17. Khulan, Instructor, PEA Chapter, Dundgovi
18. Ts. Dolgorsuren, Head, Women's Council of the MWF, Dornogovi
19. D. Enkhjargal, Executive Director, Open Education Foundation, Dornod
20. B. Bujin, Coordinator, NGO Network, Dornod
21. R. Erdenetuya, Social Policy Department, Local Governor's Office, Zavkhan
22. D. Shirendev, Head, Aimag Elderly's Committee, Zavkhan
23. G. Baasankhuu, Expert, Local Governor's Office, Orkhon
24. I. Baasanjav, Director, "Nomin" Television, Orkhon
25. J. Ganchimeg, Coordinator, CEDAW Watch, Orkhon
26. Ts. Sarantuya, Officer, State Adminsitration and Legal Affairs Department, Umnugovi
27. D. Naranchimeg, Director, "Goviin Dolgion" NGO, Umnugovi
28. T. Ariunjin, Director, PEA Chapter, Uvurkhangai
29. B. Enkhtsogt, Chair, Chapter of the Association against Alcohol and Drug Abuse
30. S. Munkhdalai, Director, "Noyon Uul" Radio, Uvurkhangai
31. D. Myagmarsuren, Board Member, Uvurkhangai Initiative NGO
32. M. Yanjinlkham, "Gal Golomt-Women" Movement, Sukhbaatar
33. Ch. Ganbaatar, Head, Aimag Elderly's Committee, Sukhbaatar
34. A. Ankhbayar, Head, Chapter of the Association against Alcohol and Drug Abuse
35. S. Enkhjargal, Coordinator, NCAV Chapter, Tuv aimag
36. Ch. Jadambaa, Expert, Tuv Aimag Education Center
37. D. Narantuya, Coordinator, IC Center, Tuv Aimag
38. D. Enkhtuya, Head, Women's Council of the MWF
39. A. Nanzad, Journalist, MONTSAME News Agency; Head, Culture and Education Trade Union
40. R. Tseveenravdan, Director, PEA Chapter, Khovd
41. N. Baasanjav, Teacher, 10-year School No.3, Khovd
42. N. Damba, Chair, Citizens' Representatives' Khural, Khovd

43. E. Khongorzul, Expert, Social Policy Coordination Department, Local Governor's office, Khentii
44. Ts. Valyasuren, Head, Women'c Council of the MWF
45. G. Tsetsen, Instructor, PEA Chapter, Khuvsgul
46. Puntsagbaljir, CSO Coordinator, Khuvsgul

Ulaanbaatar-based CSO Representatives

47. B. Buyan-Ulzii, Mongolian National Union of Handicapped Citizens
48. Sh. Gansuren, Group Facilitator, Zorg Foundation-UNESCO Project on Empowering Immigrant Women
49. G. Oyuntuya, Capital City Consumer Protection Association
50. Ya. Tuvshinbayar, 11th Microdistrict AOU
51. Sukhbaatar, Governor, 3rd Khoroo, Sukhbaatar District
52. Ts. Oyunbaatar, Mongolian National Union of Handicapped Citizens
53. J. Bayartsetseg, Open Society Forum
54. Tamir, Lecturer, Mongolian National University

Media Representatives

55. Naranbileg, *Zuuny Medee* Newspaper
56. D. Togtokhbayar, Free Lance Journalist

International Organizations

57. G. Munkh-Aldar, UNDP
58. Badamdash, TAF

ICNRD-5 Team Members

59. Kh. Khulan, Advisor
60. B. Ulziibayar, Project Manager
61. Bayasgalan, Administrative Officer
62. G. Chuluunbaatar, Researcher

Appendix 11: Excerpt from the Final Report on the National Consultation

Nukht Conference and Resort Center, September 22-23, 2005

…the **National Civil Society Consultation** is a culmination of a series of important undertakings, all geared towards producing a valid and comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society in Mongolia through a broad consultative process; building capacity among civil society actors for collective analysis and action; improving networking and coordination among diverse stakeholders; and developing a common vision for civil society and a common strategy for its strengthening.

Programmatically, the National Consultation aimed at the following:

1. Receive extensive feedback from a large and diverse group of civil society stakeholders on the draft CSI report and NAG scores for each indicator, sub-dimension and dimension to test the validity of the research, its conclusions and the scores.
2. Incorporate changes to the scores if necessary and desired/decided by the majority of the participants.
3. Discuss strengths and weaknesses of Mongolia's civil society based on the draft CSI report in order to identify main challenges and opportunities.
4. Develop a common vision and understanding of civil society and, based on that, draw up effective strategies and plans for collective action to more effectively promote the development of civil society, build on its strengths and eliminate its weaknesses.

Experientially, the National Consultation aimed at the following:

1. Further strengthen and broaden civil society networks and connections carefully initiated and cultivated during and after the regional stakeholder consultations.
2. Promote an atmosphere of mutual trust and equality, paying special attention to mitigating the urban-rural cultural gap and power inequalities as well as neutralizing partisan affiliations to contribute to the process of 'healing' the deep cleavage along party lines caused by the negative tactics and strategies of competition of the 2 main political parties (MPRP and MDP), abuse of public office and discrimination by political affiliation along party lines and corruption of electoral politics.
3. Promote inter-aimag connections and networks, especially within regions.
4. Receive information on follow-up activities at aimag level since the holding of regional consultations as well as, in some cases, aimag civil society consultations organized after the regional consultations.
5. Learn more, through both formal and informal discussions, about specific contexts in different aimags and districts, types of CSOs and civil society sectors.
6. Broaden the established understanding of civil society as limited to a group of NGOs to include many other types of CSOs such as apartment owners' unions (AOUs), savings and credit cooperatives (SCCs), political parties, trade unions, community groups, religious groups, etc. and learn more about their specifics.
7. Encourage representatives of SCCs, AOUs, political parties and religious organizations to view themselves as part of civil society and, accordingly, maintain certain standards of internal democracy, transparency and human rights in their internal or external operations.

On all of these accounts, the National Consultation reached impressive results, especially given it brought together approximately 70 civil society stakeholders from all aimags, Ulaanbaatar and its remote districts who represented different age groups, CSOs, political parties, regions, government agencies, local administration, media, etc. The majority of the participants came from rural areas, which is an important factor given most civil society events are dominated by Ulaanbaatar-based NGOs. Nevertheless, rather weak

participation of Ulaanbaatar-based stakeholders was an important downside of the National Consultation.[358] The situation is mitigated by the fact that the NAG includes more Ulaanbaatar-based stakeholders. Hence urban voices have been reflected in the draft CSI report. Furthermore, the CSI team/ICSFD Secretariat plans to hold more small-group meetings with key CSOs in Ulaanbaatar to introduce the results of the CSI exercise and strategic plan of action drawn up at the National Consultation.

It should be noted, in general, that throughout the CSI exercise, the CSI team made a conscious and concerted effort to ensure broad and diverse participation from different civil society sectors, levels of government, private sector, media and funding community as contributors both to the collection and analysis of information.

Discussion and Verification of the CSI Report and Scores

The first day of the National Consultation was dedicated to the discussion of the CSI report and NAG scores given to each indicator, sub-dimension and dimension. Participants were divided into 4 groups according to the 4 dimensions: Structure of Civil Society, External Environment, Values of Civil Society and Impact of Civil Society. CSI team members were present in each of the groups. All groups were able to benefit from the participation of NAG members as well. All discussions were lively but congenial, except for one group, where one of the Ulaanbaatar-based NGO activists tended to dominate the discussion, sometimes making rural participants feel their opinions were not appreciated.

Furthermore, important urban-rural differences were brought up, complicating the assessment of a given indicator. Thus, for example, at the group discussion on Environment, a heated argument arose around the issue of whether the score for indicator 2.7.2 on corporate social responsibility should be 0 (major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations) instead of 1 as given by the NAG (major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts). The advocate for this change came from Uvurkhangai aimag, where the reality is that mining companies and alcohol producers give no regard whatsoever to social and environmental outcomes of their operations. The CSI researcher explained that although there are important regional differences and specifics, the CSI report makes a general assessment for the whole country and does not limit the analysis to only 2 types of companies (mining and alcohol producing). In this broader context, there is an observable trend for major companies to engage in philanthropy and at least pay lip service to corporate social responsibility. A vote was taken, based on the discussion and the majority resolved to leave the score at 1.

At the group discussion on Structure, a debate evolved around the score for indicator 1.4.5 on international/foreign relations of CSOs. NAG, based on research data, gave a score of 2 (a moderate number of mainly national-level CSOs have international linkages). This score was rigorously contested by a participant from Khovd who stated that the score is unrealistic for his experience of rural civil society and that the score should be changed to 0 (only a handful of "elite" CSOs have international linkages) or at least to 1 (a limited number of mainly national-level CSOs have international linkages). The advocate for this change did not receive majority support in the discussion group but was ale to bring the issue to the floor in the plenary. Nevertheless, the majority of the participants did not support his proposition and the score was not changed.

These debates reflect crucial differences between Ulaanbaatar and the rest of the country as well as important differences between aimags. Thus Uvurkhangai CSOs have better developed international relations whereas the case is not such in many of the other aimags. Similarly, in some areas CSOs have been able to establish favourable relations with local companies whereas in many other aimags, this is not so. What seems common to most aimags is the experience of being 'under siege' by mining companies that receive their licences from the central government, i.e. from Ulaanbaatar and are thus not accountable to local communities. Furthermore, important issues regarding social impact of alcohol producing corporations were made by

[358] On one hand, this lack of participation is due to the overall 'workshop-fatigue' of Ulaanbaatar-based stakeholders. On the other hand, it is indeed the case that the general demand on the time of UB dwellers, especially of its more active segment, is much higher than that of rural civil society actors. Lastly, part of the problem was caused by the lack of professionalism of the courier service provider that failed to deliver in time some of the invitations due to their internal problems.

representatives of Alcoholics Anonymous. While major corporations such as APU and SAPU that produce alcohol have engaged in philanthropy, their activities seem to have concentrated in Ulaanbaatar while their product is marketed nationally.

Three concrete propositions to change indicator scores given by the NAG were brought to the plenary session at the close of the first day:

1. To consider that Mongolia is in a state of deep social crisis (alcoholism, violence, crime, etc.), which would change the dimension score for Socio-Economic Context from 2 to 1.
2. To change the score for indicator 3.1.1 on CSOs' Internal Democracy from 2 to 1 taking into account that the CSI framework comprises many different types of CSOs including hierarchical inherited mass organizations, non-transparent AOUs, political parties, etc.
3. To change the score for indicator 3.2.1 on Corruption within Civil Society from 3 to 2 considering again the broad range of CSOs comprised in the research project and the other section of the research, which indicates a very high level of corruption in government and society in general, which could not but influence civil society as well.

Mr. Lamjav, NAG member, proposed to discuss these proposals in a truly democratic fashion and volunteered to moderate the discussion and voting. He suggested that CSI team members be removed from discussion and voting as well as from leading the process though it was agreed to allow Senior Researcher Ms. Undarya to provide necessary clarifications and explanations. Upon Mr. Lamjav's advice, participants formed a committee for counting votes from amongst themselves, again with no involvement of CSI team members. Each proposition was clearly formulated and announced by Mr. Lamjav and he invited to speak those who support the proposition. When arguments for the change were exhausted, Mr. Lamjav invited arguments against the proposition. Votes were taken, asking first those who support to raise their hands and then those who oppose.

Much debate emerged on the issue of corruption among civil society. It was clear that many civil society stakeholders were strongly opposed to admitting or supposing that there was corruption among them. They claimed it is impossible because they do not have power or wealth to be corrupt about unlike public officials who abuse their office. It became clear that firstly, most participants continued to view civil society as limited to a group of NGOs, and, secondly, that they viewed corruption as only a matter of taking and receiving bribes. Mr. Lamjav, Ms. Undarya and some of the participants reminded several times to think of CSOs in broader terms and to understand corruption as an abuse of one's position and office including use of CSO resources for private purposes. Eventually, the majority voted for changing the score from 3 to 2.

Another interesting moment arose when a clear majority seemed to support one of the propositions. Slightly deviating from the previously used order of discussion and voting, Mr. Lamjav proposed, in the interest of time, that the participants first see how many people oppose the proposition, hear out their arguments, i.e. arguments of the minority group and then vote on supporting the proposition. Indeed, a minority raised hands in opposition and they were given floor to present their arguments for leaving the score as it is. After that Mr. Lamjav called for another vote but was met with much resistance from the participants who did not think it was necessary to vote again as 'they had already voted and their opinions have remained the same.' Mr. Lamjav stated that respect for minority rights is at the core of democratic practice and that we should not follow the negative model set by our national parliament, which only pays lip service to 'hearing minority opinion.' Finally, another vote was taken and this time, though the majority did win the proposal for the change, it was clear that some of the participants had indeed changed their views upon hearing minority arguments.

This incident showed how unused to democratic practice civil society stakeholders are, especially when it comes to making decisions as a large group. Most CSO actors are used to working in small groups and even the CSI team members could not have effectively led this democratic decision-making process due to lack of such experience. It was most fortunate that Mr. Lamjav was there to share from his experience of democratic practice of the early 1990s (the interim parliament, pro-democracy mass movements, etc). The incident also demonstrated that even CSO actors are not fully familiar with the essential components of a democratic system such as real respect for minority rights.

At the end of the day, though not all participants fully agreed with the decisions made, all of them were satisfied with the way decisions where made and accepted the results of the democratic procedure. In addition, their overall assessment of the CSI report was favourable and no participant contested research data presented in the report. It was stated that the CSI exercise is a very important innovative one for Mongolia and attention should be paid to using it for the evaluation of specific civil society sectors as well as such sectors as hospitals and schools.

Appendix 12: August 2003 RTD Report

Narrative Report
Civil Society Review Round Table Discussion
August 14-15, 2003, Ulaanbaatar

Prelude

As specified in the project proposal to The Asia Foundation on the Civil Society Review Round Table Discussion, the RTD was organized in order to:

- review the current status of Mongolia's civil society development including:
    - an assessment the important contributions Mongolian NGOs and movements have made so far to Mongolia's democratization
    - an analysis of the challenges to further strengthening the Mongolian civil society
- advocate for the creation of qualitative, nationally-owned criteria for measuring the growth of civil society, progress of democratization and protection of human rights from the point of view of the national civil society.

The RTD involved 77 participants (out of the 100 invited) who represented a broad spectrum of the NGO and research community as well as political parties, cultural organizations and private sector. Dr. Ochirbat, the First President of Mongolia, Dr. Chimid, Lawyer, Mr. Lamjav, Lawyer and other leading figures of the Mongolian civil society provided valuable insights into the discussions.

Process

The CS Review RTD was the second in the series of public fora organized within the framework of the ICSF preparations to stimulate discussion and analysis on the concept of civil society in general and the development of civil society in Mongolia. Thus, in March, 2003, the ICSF Secretariat organized a 2-day Workshop on Civil Society involving approximately 40 participants from NGOs and research institutions. With the assistance of Dr. Cas Mudde from the Antwerp University, Belgium, the participants were exposed to a theoretical discussion of what the term civil society connotes and what important interfaces it entails.

The Workshop was the first time that Mongolian activists and academics engaged in theoretical discussion on civil society. When asked how many of the Workshop participants had participated in conceptual discussions on civil society, only a handful of hands were raised and mainly by the members of the National Core Group in charge of organizing the ICSF-2003.

Although the Workshop participants clearly appreciated the opportunity to talk about civil society at a theoretical level, it was evident that they were not entirely satisfied and even felt slightly at a loss as to how exactly they should define civil society and how they should talk about. Ever more importantly, the participants did not get a sense of how this Workshop made a difference for their present and future work. In other words, no clear implications for practice arose from the Workshop.

One of the main achievements of the CS Review RTD was that it gave precisely what the March Workshop was unable to deliver: definite directions and areas for collective action and analysis and a more structured definition of civil society for the purposes of the Mongolian public.[359]

[359] Of course, the purpose of the March Workshop was different: to introduce Mongolian activists and academics to the latest theoretical developments on civil society and its conceptualization. In this relation, the Workshop was successful as it provided the analytical framework that the CS Review RTD was able to build upon. Unlike the CS Review RTD, the March Workshop did not intend to deliver an assessment of the Mongolian civil society or produce future strategies for its strengthening.

It did so by first giving an assessment of the past contributions of the Mongolian civil society to the country's democratization, starting from the impact and role of the Democratic Union in dismantling the socialist regime and paving the road for the transition to democracy and market economy and ending with the important role NGOs have played in the last decade in pushing for government accountability and transparency, improving public awareness-raising on democracy and human rights, developing human resource (NGO management, computer, language, communication, lobbying, training and other skills)and strengthening the economic development.

Several important observations were made during this session:

- Democratic Union was one of 3 popular movements that emerged in the late 1980s with such drastic effects on the socialist regime. It is necessary to capture the contributions and roles of all three mass movements to the democratic transition in Mongolia.
- One should approach carefully the issue of origins of the civil society and carefully distinguish between the various notions of civil society in this relation. Thus, Ard Ayush's movement could be considered as civil society action as well given it was independent of the State. This is also to say that Mongolian people's struggle for their freedom and independence did not start in the late 1980s but was manifest throughout the history in various ways.
- Mongolia's civil society has lost its strength and intensity in the last years compared to the transition period when it was able to pull down an authoritarian regime and demand laws protecting human rights and freedoms. Now, civil society organizations lack the ability to exert serious influence on State power and check its abuses. Hence, it is necessary to revitalize the Mongolian civil society.

Secondly, the CS Review RTD participants were provided with an analytical framework for evaluating and analyzing the challenges to strengthening civil society in Mongolia for the purposes of promoting Mongolia's democracy and protecting Mongolian citizens' human rights and freedoms. Thus, the participants were encouraged to view civil society not simply as a collection of NGOs but as a society that is based on democratic principles, in which:

- citizens are able to make their State institutions to serve them according to the will of the people,
- citizens are able to check the State's arbitrary power and protect their own and other fellow citizens' human rights and freedoms,
- citizens deeply understand and value human rights and freedoms and other democratic principles,
- citizens have equal access to political power and are provided with equal opportunities to benefit from economic and socio-cultural development.

One of the major achievements of the RTD was such conceptual clarification of the concept of civil society for Mongolia. Thus, on one hand, according to the above definition, civil society is to be understood as the ideal of the society we are hoping to live in and develop which the Democratic Constitution of Mongolia declared as the primary goal of the Mongolian people: establishing and developing a humane, democratic and civil society.

On the other hand, civil society is to be understood as citizens' activities that are independent of the State, which contribute to developing horizontal networking schemes and help check the State's abuse of its monopoly of coercive force and create an environment in which citizens can solve their issues with each other without the necessary intervention of the State. Such understanding of civil society would involve all independent of the State civic action, whether or not it is conducted by a formally institutionalized NGO.

In yet another sense, civil society is understood as formal institutions, which may include NGOs, religious groups, media organizations, political parties, etc. depending on the nature of their actions and agenda. Thus, these organizations are to be de facto independent of the state and are to be, in principle, supporting democratic values and principles. Nominally non-governmental organizations serving as extensions of State power would not be considered as civil society organizations in this understanding. Civil society institutions are not to be understood as the ultimate goal but as strategic goals, which are to lead us to the establishment of the civil society in Mongolia in the sense stated in the Constitution. In other words, the purpose is not to

establish and strengthen NGOs per se, as an end in and of itself, but as a step towards empowering citizens at all levels, particularly at the grassroots, vis-à-vis their governing institutions and other components of the society.

The organizers of the RTD stated in their presentation that in order to strengthen civil society in Mongolia, we need to look at not only the capacity development of NGOs and improvement of their relations with the State but focus on developing horizontal schemes of dialogue and cooperation between various components of the society and address multiple interfaces of civil society: with the State, with political parties, media, private sector, religious and cultural community, etc. It is particularly important to upgrade the role of political parties (competing for state power) and businesses (competing for economic resources) in the strengthening of civil society.

Media and civil society relations and inter-connections received substantial attention during the RTD. The ICSF organizers stated that their cooperation with the media has significantly improved since the start of their media campaign signified by the 5-day Civic Journalism Workshop conducted in March. Since then, media representatives have been working more closely and actively with the ICSF Secretariat and NCG. Media shall also be presenting their paper during the ICSF.

During the third session of the RTD, participants' attention was directed to the idea of developing a national mechanism for developing and applying national indicators for assessing the development of civil society, progress of democratization and protection of human rights. While the participants felt that this is indeed a very important and necessary endeavour, it was clear that they were not ready to formulate a specific plan of action or even form the advocacy group. Further discussion was needed to develop this idea further.

As a result of the above discussions, major areas for concerted action were outlined:

- empowerment of average citizens, particularly in rural areas (grassroots)
- development of sound research and analysis including criteria/indicators for measuring democratic development in Mongolia

Finally, the Mongolian presenter for the ICSF on the Status of Mongolian Civil Society was elected (Ms. Undarya Tumursukh, National Advisor, ICSF-2003) and charged with the responsibility to present a realistic assessment of the Mongolian democracy and civil society based on the discussions and presentations of the RTD.

Follow-Up

As agreed during the RTD, the ICSF organizers convened another meeting to further discuss the creation of the advocacy group (provisionally named Democracy Support Group) and the national evaluation, monitoring and advocacy mechanism for Mongolia's democracy. The meeting involved about 40 people who were able to gather at the Political Education Academy at a very short notice.

The meeting did not result in its stated goal of forming the Democracy Support Group but did reiterate and elaborate on two points:

- it is of vital strategic importance to support grassroots initiatives and empower average citizens to stand up for their own rights
- it is of vital strategic importance to develop national research capacity to assess and analyze Mongolia's democratic reforms, growth of civil society and protection of human rights

Regarding the structure of the national mechanism, the idea to create a National Committee (Mongolia Democracy Watch) involving state and non-state actors did not win popular support. However, a sound alternative was proposed to run the Democracy Support Group (loose coalition of civil society organizations representing all, to the extent that is possible, segments of the Mongolian society) as an annual forum where civil society groups gather and give their assessment of the developments in the country, present their research and analyses, voice their concerns, argue their points and issue recommendations and/or demands for State actors towards ensuring human rights and promoting democracy in Mongolia.

The idea of developing research capacity is not necessarily linked to a particular institution but it was agreed that research has to be done at a professional level. However, research should involve grassroots voices and opinions and also be used widely by activists for monitoring and advocacy, rather than be a set of documents used only by professional organizations but which do not have wider resonance or use.

An important point raised by a number of participants was that many networks and coalitions have been formed in Mongolia but hardly any of them work with any real impact. It was stated that this was due to their not having clearly discussed their mission and strategy. Hence, those involved in the formation of the DSG are to carefully discuss their vision, mission and strategy prior to the actual formation of the DSG so as not to create another inefficient amalgamation of civil society groups.

In concluding the meeting, it was decided that the participants shall submit their proposals to the ICSF Secretariat, which will develop a concept paper based on the present discussion and their written suggestions. After that, the activists and academics are to meet again and decide where to go from there.

The meeting was significant not only in its outcome (reiterating points raised during the RTD and giving clear directions for actions for individual organizations) but also in that the ICSF organizers self-consciously chose a different tack in approaching the formation of the DSG: openly discussing all the pros and cons and allowing the invitees to question the fundamental assumptions made by the proponents of the DSG idea. Thus, the organizers had brought to the table their suggestions but did not present them as ready-made solutions but actively solicited invitees' criticisms and suggestions.

Despite more than a decade of NGO actions, this is a fairly new approach to public fora and some of the more experienced political activists critiqued the approach as naive and wasteful of time. Despite the fact that one of the central tenets of democracy is open discussion, it was evident that in the last years many of the activists have become accustomed to running pre-mediated and pre-planned meetings focused on channelling participants' voices to the desired outcome rather than allowing for a more natural flow of the discussion ensuring full discussions of the issues. Clearly, one of the skills that Mongolian pro-democracy political and social activists need to develop is conducting truly participatory and democratic discussions.

Post Scriptum

The CS Review RTD is not the last in the series of public fora on democracy and civil society. The ICSF organizers intend to develop the idea of the DSG and the development of nationally-owned democracy, civil society and human rights criteria. They are hoping to suggest the creation of national mechanisms for evaluation, monitoring and advocacy in other countries during the ICSF and possibly include this idea into the Plan of Action that is expected to be produced by the ICSF.

In any case, regardless of the DSG idea (in whatever shape or form) being included in or excluded from the Plan of Action, the ICSF organizers shall follow through this project at the national level and intend to proceed in the most open and democratic fashion in doing so, so as to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the DSG in the future.

Appendix 13: ICNRD-ICSFD and DGI-CSI Relationship Chart



Appendix 14: ICSF-2003 Outcome Document

"Civil Society Partnerships for Democracy"
International Civil Society Forum
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, September 8-9, 2003
Declaration, Recommendations and Plan of Action

I. Introduction

The International Civil Society Forum (ICSF) on "Civil Society Partnerships for Democracy" took place in Ulaanbaatar prior to the International Conference of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) on "Democracy, Good Governance and Civil Society." This was the fifth ICNRD event since1988, but the first to include a major international parallel forum for civil society.

The ICSF brought together over 200 participants from Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe, Latin America and North America in order to promote partnerships and strengthen commitments to democratic governance locally, nationally and internationally. As we leave Ulaanbaatar, we have unanimously agreed on the need to adhere to and implement the principles, recommendations and plan of action outlined below.

II. Principles

Democracy is a universal good. For citizens the world over it is widely understood as the only legitimate form of governance.
All citizens have the right to participate in political decisions affecting their lives and their communities. In the 21st century, the democratic ideal is a necessary objective at all levels of governance: local, national, regional and international.
Democratic governance requires all of the following elements:

- Conditions of peace and security;
- Guarantees and mechanisms for ensuring rights and freedoms;
- Independent judicial institutions and the rule of law;
- Inclusion and equal opportunities for participation, including the participation of young people;
- Transparency, accountability and access to information;
- Free and fair elections as well as a functioning multi-party system;
- Gender equality;
- Free functioning of the press and other media; and
- Protection of minorities and vulnerable groups.

The struggle for democratic governance is ongoing in all communities. Democracy is an ever-evolving process that requires the commitment, engagement and empowerment of citizens, as well as of government officials and other stakeholders. Civil society participation is essential to ensuring the greater realization of all of these fundamental prerequisites for successful democratic governance.

III. Recommendations

Our deliberations in Ulaanbaatar have yielded the following recommendations for action by governments, civil society and international organizations/donor community.

A. Recommendations for Governments

1) Civil Society is autonomous and separate from government and needs to be respected in its various functions. While civil society organizations take many forms, governments need to let those forms emerge democratically.

2) Governments should create, in consultation with civil society, an enabling legal framework for both civil society organizations and political parties, while removing restricting legislation. They should also establish legislative frameworks and supporting mechanisms for participation of civil society in oversight mechanisms of security sector governance.

3) Governments should provide mechanisms to engage citizens, whether through formal or informal methods, for example through parliamentary hearings or e-government initiatives

4) It is essential to raise awareness regarding the importance of corporate social responsibility and to improve the regulatory framework for the private sector in order to reconcile ethics with private initiative.

5) Real democratic development must be complemented by development of a viable economic foundation.

6) Decentralization of government decision-making processes, local self-governance and respect for the rule of law are essential to improved governance.

7) Youth should be more involved in decision-making.

8) Improve the education system and curriculum to promote human rights education and active, participatory citizenship.

9) Implement the Millennium Development Goals with the participation of civil society.

10) Reconcile the imbalance between the mandate of the World Trade Organization and the requirements of social and economic rights treaties in order to promote a more just social and economic order.

11) G7 and Russia (G8) should recommit themselves to the Kananaskis aid plan and come up with the U.S. $64 billion needed annually to assist African development.

12) Provide unhindered access to means of communication, especially information communications technologies.

13) Enact effective laws maximizing freedom of information.

14) Enact effective measures to combat corruption.

15) Ensure meaningful engagement - not tokenism – by women's organizations. National gender policies and affirmative action are required and must be effectively implemented and monitored (including monitoring by women's groups).

16) Implement gender-just policies based on principles of equality and non-discrimination as defined in the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

17) Human rights must be seen as universal, indivisible and inter-related. Governments must ratify international human rights treaties as well as fulfil their obligations under these treaties following the evolving jurisprudence emanating from treaty bodies. Governments should ratify and implement the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court.

18) Governments need to strengthen national and regional human rights instruments and mechanisms. (e.g. more effective human rights commissions).

19) Governments should not use the terrorist threat to justify repressive practices.

20) Governments should strengthen mechanisms (e.g. "democracy clauses" of intergovernmental organizations) affecting how the international community responds to threats to democracy.

21) Respect cultural knowledge, diversity and language in all inter-relationships with groups, civil society and peoples.

22) Government policies and development should take on a rights-based approach. Governments should utilize a rights-based approach to policy assessments, implementation and evaluations. Justifiability of rights needs to be strengthened.

23) Governments should promote multilateral cooperation to promote and foster democracy as well as democratic governance monitoring mechanisms.

24) Governments should adopt "human security" as a framework for policy development.

25) Governments should undertake measures to strengthen legislatures in their countries.

26) Existing state-owned broadcasting should be converted into public service broadcasting, in order to promote citizens' right to know.

B. Recommendations for Civil Society

1) As civil wars have disrupted social organizations and civic leadership, civil society has a crucial role in avoiding armed conflict, developing peace accords and post-conflict peace-building.

2) In highly polarized and politicized societies the role of civil society is that of building bridges to promote dialogue. Government and civil society need to continue dialogue even when at loggerheads.

3) Institutional capacity building is a priority for civil society.

4) Civil society organizations need to continue to develop horizontal linkages among themselves and to preserve their autonomy from government and private enterprise.

5) Civil society should make itself accountable to the public and grassroots constituencies.

6) Civil society organizations need to be responsive to women's perspectives and utilize gendered analyses of social and political problems. Civil society should transform communities to create supportive environments for women in decision-making.

7) Civil society should create spaces within their own structures to enable participation of women in decision-making.

8) Civil society should ensure the participation of young people and other disadvantaged groups in the development and implementation of policies and programs.

9) Civil society organizations should monitor the effectiveness of existing youth policies and institutions (e.g. youth ministries) and lobby for reforms.

10) Civil society support of the UN treaty system is essential. Ensuring implementation of international agreements is an important strategy for the realization of civil society goals. Civil society can also advocate mechanisms to make present international obligations more binding.

11) Civil society should support parliamentary participation at all levels and their role within international institutions.

12) Civil society activities should not duplicate or replace the legitimate function of democratic representative institutions (e.g. legislatures).

13) Civil society should generate policy options for government.

14) Increase opportunities and political space by linking up regionally and internationally and lobbying intergovernmental organizations.

15) Civil society should participate in election monitoring as well as public policy and legislative strengthening.

16) Civil society organizations should mobilize broad-based support (including media) on the need to implement the Millennium Development Goals.

17) Civil society has an important role to play in monitoring and re-assessing multilateral aid programs.

18) NGO and government "needs assessments" should genuinely reflect the local context and culture.

19) Government and civil society groups should recognize that language and terminology can confuse; they should take measures that better reflect the realities of those they seek to assist.

20) Civil society and governments should engage further in inter-cultural dialogue.

C. Recommendations for Intergovernmental Organizations and the Donor Community (i.e. aid organizations, state, foundations, corporations)

1) Governments, business communities and civil society should work more closely together in the development and implementation of improved democratization aid policies and programs.

2) Donors should grant civil society actors more access to information in order to enable them to perform a real monitoring function concerning the implementation of aid programs.

3) Donor programs on democratization, rule of law and human rights should be based on a more strategic approach, be of a longer duration, be designed and implemented in a more transparent way.

4) Intergovernmental organizations should be sensitive to local practices and incorporate local perspectives in their decision-making.

5) Donors should provide opportunities for transparent and productive exchange between civil society and public authorities, including political parties.

6) Parliamentary participation at the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations should be strengthened.

7) Ensure that NGOs are afforded their participatory rights in intergovernmental processes, for example as codified in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. NGOs should have the right to fair hearings when participation rights are challenged.

8) Civil society has been both challenged and re-energized by events surrounding the war in Iraq. We agree with the Secretary-General's statement of March 10, 2003 that this war, if waged without Security Council authorization, "would not be in conformity with the Charter." Pre-emptive war is immoral and illegal under international law and should be widely condemned. Following the illegal intervention in Iraq, the UN General Assembly should adopt a "Uniting for Peace" resolution calling for an end to the U.S. – U.K. occupation. The UN General Assembly should also ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legality of "pre-emptive war."

9) Global financial market conditions often hinder democratic development. These problems should be addressed, for example by the following financial market reforms: implementation of a democratic debt arbitration mechanism, Currency Transaction Tax.

10) Project development assessments should incorporate a human rights impact assessment as well as peace and conflict impact assessment.

11) WTO, IMF and World Bank should be brought under more effective coordination within the United Nations system.

12) There should be greater transparency and consultation with civil society and parliaments in international financial decision-making.

13) The United Nations should develop and bring into force a human rights based Code of Conduct for trans-national corporations.

As delegates to the ICSF, we recognize that implementing these principles and recommendations will require the commitment and action of civil society partners around the world. We are each committed to disseminating the results of this meeting and taking action in our respective communities, organizations and networks, as well as with our respective governments.

IV. Plan of Action

At this International Civil Society Forum we have agreed on the need for a dedicated process and mechanism to follow up the outcomes from this Forum. We have therefore endorsed the creation of an *"ICSF Follow-up Mechanism"* that will take action in accordance with the following guidelines:

1) Governance. The decision-making structures that were responsible for organizing this forum shall be re-constituted to serve until the 6th ICNRD. These include the ICSF National Core Group (NCG) and International Core Group (ICG).

2) Coordination. The secretariat in Ulaanbaatar will continue as the interim secretariat for the ICSF Follow-up Mechanism, pending decisions on subsequent secretariat/coordination centre(s) in the period prior to the next ICNRD.

3) Mechanisms. The ICSF Follow-up Mechanism will include as part of its program:
   - *Encouraging and facilitating national and regional "Democracy Watch" networks;*[360]
   - Links with international organizations and stakeholders, in particular strengthening trilateral partnerships (governments, civil society, UN agencies) for advancing the ICSF-ICNRD process;

[360] Emphasis by the NIT.

- Information sharing, communications, joint analysis; the ICSF web site will be maintained and updated as necessary.

4) Program. National and trans-national civil society networks will monitor follow-up to ICSF recommendations and promote progress on:
   - Access to justice and the rule of law;
   - Conflict prevention, peace-building and transitions from conflict;
   - Mechanisms for monitoring compliance with human rights norms and democratic practices;
   - Promoting inclusiveness and greater participation in democracy.

5) Reporting and Accountability. The ICG/NCG and the Secretariat will elaborate the institutional memory of the ICSF and share it with future NCG/ICGs. The ICG/NCG and the Secretariat will report annually to delegates to this ICSF.[361]

Civil Society delegates will review progress on these goals at the next ICSF, to be held in 2006 at the time of the 6th ICNRD.

September 9, 2003.
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia

[361] At the second ICSF-2003 Consultation in New York n February 28-29, 2004, the ICG and NCG were reformed into a single Steering Committee with a diverse regional representation and the ICSF was renamed as the International Civil Society Forum for Democracy (ICSFD).

Appendix 15: ICNRD-5 Outcome Document

ICNRD-5 Ulaanbaatar Plan of Action
Democracy, Good Governance and Civil Society
12 September 2003

1. We, the governments and representatives of nations around the world gathered at the 5th International Conference of New or Restored Democracies in Ulaanbaatar on 10-12 September 2003, affirm the need to further work towards consolidation of democracy in our countries by building societies that are just and responsible, inclusive and participatory, open and transparent, that respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all and ensure accountability and the rule of law.

2. The Plan of Action of the Fifth ICNRD, which is to be presented to the United Nations General Assembly, will guide the work of the President and the Bureau in the years leading to the sixth ICNRD.

3. National Action

3.1 For democratic changes to be meaningful and of benefit to all people, these need to be reflected at the national level. Countries may therefore:

3.1 a Draw up, with the collaboration of citizens and civil society, a national plan for strengthening democracy which is consistent with the spirit of the Declaration agreed at Ulaanbaatar.

3.1 b Prior to the sixth ICNRD, prepare 'country information notes'. The country information notes will outline the prospects of advancing and deepening democracy in the country and the steps that have or still need to be taken to address the principles and recommendations of the ICNRD declaration.

3.1 c Develop their own national democratic indicators' databases to be better able to monitor their progress in democratic and social development over time. It is recommended that the development of own national democratic indicators benefit from the current work done in other multilateral fora. The creation of such a database should be an inclusive and dynamic process with the participation of policy-makers, academics and civil society. The exercise will raise public awareness on issues of democratic governance and provide a broad overview of progress in this area. This process could also be central to national consensus building with the engagement of all stakeholders leading to further national consolidation of democracy.[362]

3.1 d Give special attention to the following areas:

3.2 Participation and representation

3.2 a Ensure that the electoral process guarantees principles of holding free, fair and periodic elections, based on secret balloting and universal suffrage monitored by independent national election bodies;

3.2 b Emphasize voter education particularly in an effort to improve voter turnout and reduce invalid votes. Ensure that voters have access to independent and sufficient information;

3.2 c Ensure independence of electoral bodies and ensure their constitutional guarantees;

3.2 d Ensure transparent electoral campaign financing;

3.2 e Ensure the freedom of association including the right to form independent political parties to create a pluralistic society;

3.2 f Support the participation of citizens living abroad or overseas and ensure that the election and decision-making process benefits from the largest possible rate of participation within society.

3.2 g Decentralize decision making to the local level, where feasible;

3.2 h Improve democratic institutions at the local level;

3.2 i As appropriate, take immediate steps in publishing all legislation (even financial ones) as white papers and consider inviting comments from citizens and interested parties before these are enacted;

3.2 j Improve the work of parliamentary committees; and

[362] Emphasis by the NIT.

3.2 k The executive and legislature should hold regular consultations with citizens to ensure they are well aware of their needs and thus are able to address them accordingly at the highest levels.

3.3 Sustainable Development and Eradication of Poverty

3.3 a Develop safety nets, including social welfare systems, for the poor and marginalized in our societies;

3.3 b Ensure provision of essential services are affordable for the poorest;

3.3 c Address the urban/rural divide by developing plans that address the needs of rural communities;

3.3 d Promote Human Resource Development for achievement of national economic development goals, especially with a view to the unemployed pursuing a productive life in our communities;

3.3 e Promote public participation in environmental decision making;

3.3 f Prioritize the protection of the environment as this has a direct link to the alleviation of poverty;

3.3 g Aggressively pursue the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals.

3.4 Protection of Human Rights

3.4 a Establish or strengthen independent and impartial human rights commissions in conformity with the Paris Principles, ombudsman offices or similar bodies able to investigate human rights abuses and abuse of power;

3.4 b Harmonize national legislation with international instruments on the promotion and protection of human rights;

3.4 c Consider acceding to all the international human rights instruments, regularly prepare reports on their implementation and submit them for consideration by the appropriate treaty mechanisms and actively cooperate with the United Nations Commission of Human Rights;

3.4 d Support human rights monitoring capacities of NGOs and the media;

3.4 e Develop human rights education programmes for the military, the police, the civil service, as well as the general population. Countries should consider including civic/ democracy/ human rights education in their school curricula, or encourage the appropriate authorities to do so and if necessary, seek the help of the United Nations System and civil society;

3.4 f Promote and protect equality of all people before the law and their equal protection under the law;

3.4 g Ensure right of equal access to justice and to be protected from arbitrary arrest;

3.4 h Investigate alternative dispute settlement mechanisms;

3.4 i Set up, where absent, independent bar/law associations;

3.4 j Strengthen the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the judiciary;

3.4 k Ensure due process of law and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law;

3.4 l Ensure guaranteed right to a fair and impartial trial;

3.4 m Ensure that violations of human rights and abuse of power are well investigated and perpetrators brought to justice;

3.4 n Ensure remedies are provided to victims of human rights violations; and

3.4 o Protect those who work towards ensuring that rights and freedoms are fully respected.

3.5 Open and Transparent Government

3.5 a Facilitate citizens' access to information;

3.5 b Make internal and trans-national activities and transactions, that are most susceptible to corrupt practices, more transparent and easily accessible for investigation;

3.5 c Provide media education to national officials and civil servants to increase appreciation of the media's role in a democratic society;

3.5 d Facilitate access to government records and other information, within our national legal frameworks, while protecting individuals, organizations and institutions from abuse;

3.5 e Reform any legal instruments that inhibit the media from pursuing their work; and

3.5 f Support programs aimed at improving the professionalism and ethics of journalists in the country and encourage the formation of professional associations of media practitioners.

3.6 Rule of Law and Accountability

3.6 a Ensure that the military remains accountable to the democratically elected civilian government;

3.6 b Strengthen, where necessary, the separation of powers;

3.6 c Strengthen the legal basis of the fight against corruption, including, where possible, speedy negotiation and adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption;

3.6 d Become parties to the appropriate UN conventions and protocols to fight international terrorism and promote speediest conclusion to the negotiations on the draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism;

3.6 e Cooperate fully with the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the United Nations Security Council to fight terrorism and other international mechanisms to fight transnational crime;

3.6 f Incorporate in legislation and support provisions in international agreements concerning protection of human rights when fighting terrorism;

3.6 g Ensure due process to those who are charged with terrorism, as reflected in international legal documents;

3.6 h Make greater use of the United Nations' and regional mechanisms of peaceful settlement of disputes;

3.6 i Consider recourse to the services of the International Court of Justice and other international and regional dispute settlement institutions; and

3.6 j Incorporate provisions concerning mechanisms of conflict prevention and consensus building in legislation.

4 Regional Action

Strengthening regional collaboration in democratic development by:

4.1 Drawing up a plan of action for the regions through regional inter-governmental organizations with the collaboration of governments and civil society.

4.2 Adopt regional declarations or charters that are more catered to the conditions in the regions and that focus on regional collaboration for the promotion and support of democracy.

4.3 Map out the relationship between the regional organizations and ICNRD and procedures that need to be followed for collaborative efforts.

4.4 Undertake a series of activities to exchange experiences on coping with political, economic and social challenges of globalization and its impact on democratic governance; social responsibility in a globalizing world; rural and urban development and local participation and representation; participation and representation in the design and implementation of environmental and development programs; policy and capacity development required to achieve the MDGs.

4.5 Agree on modes of mutual assistance in the development of democratic institutions; share experiences in the development of a democratic culture; and develop programmes of assistance for countries undergoing democratic transitions;

4.6 Organize regular regional events within the framework of regional organizations or fora to assess progress of countries in the region in their democratic endeavours;

4.7 Undertake a series of regional meetings and workshops with the participation of academia and civil society to discuss the need for governance and democracy assessments, exchange views on assessment methodologies and identify examples of good practice or innovative problem-solving in this area.

4.8 Create regional networks of policy-makers and civil society members to study conflict prevention and consensus-building in democracies and identify successful experiences to share with regional partners.

4.9 Undertake to set up regional networks of practitioners and stakeholders to promote democracy education curricula and share experiences in this area.

4.10 Promote regional dialogue on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and create or consolidate regional monitoring mechanisms to assess the state of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

4.11 Promote regional dialogue to share experiences on strengthening electoral and political party systems.

4.12 Use information technology tools to create databases of regional treaties, agreements and declarations and to share resources and experiences in democratic governance.

4.13 Promote development of international cooperation, particularly at the regional level, against corruption.

5 International Action

Recalling with appreciation the United Nations Secretary-General's Report (A/56/499, 23 October 2001) about the UN System's support to governments in order to promote and consolidate new and restored democracies, the Fifth ICNRD recommends that the United Nations General Assembly supports the following actions in support of promoting and supporting democracy:

5.1 Strengthen the Follow-up Mechanism by ensuring that:

5.1 a It is responsible for the follow-up on the implementation of this Plan of Action;

5.1 b The President or Bureau represent ICNRD at international fora when deemed necessary;

5.1 c The President of the Fifth ICNRD establishes, with the assistance of the United Nations, a working group to examine the conclusions of the Fifth Conference and proposals made in background papers submitted to and interventions made at the Fifth Conference with the aim of studying proposals for making the Conference even more effective and efficient and establishing a practical programme of work for future conferences;

5.1 d It coordinates with the International Civil Society Forum follow-up mechanism; and

5.1 e The President or the Bureau are urged to initiate discussions with the Chair of the Community of Democracies to exchange views on ways of bringing closer the two movements, in a complimentary manner.

Appendix 16: General Policies of the ICSF National Core Group

General Policies for the Preparation and Organization of the International Civil Society Forum on Democracy, Good Governance and Civil Society

Members of the CSF Core Group agree to abide by the following policies and regulations in understanding of the need to balance efficiency with democratic decision-making principles given the limitations of time.

One. Openness, Transparency, Accountability and Inclusiveness:

The Core Group and Task Force members shall follow the democratic principles of openness, transparency and accountability in all their activities related to the preparation for and organization of the ICS Forum.

Information Sharing:

- Understanding that timely and comprehensive information sharing is key to any joint effort and democratic involvement, members shall ensure that all relevant parties are informed fully and in a timely fashion,
- All meetings shall be announced well in advance to the extent it is possible, given considerations of time, to enable each member of the Core Group or Task Force to attend the meeting,
- In order to facilitate comprehensive and prompt information exchange and dissemination as well as develop a database where newcomers can go for information on previous activities and correspondence, all relevant information shall be sent to the Coordinator/Secretariat where it will be stored in a systematic and accessible manner.

Discussions, Meetings and Decision-Making:

- All key issues related to the substance of the ICS Forum, agenda, structure, list of participants and funding shall be discussed at the Core Group and resolved through consensus (or majority vote),
- All key items such as logo, letterhead design and other public relations and representation materials shall be discussed and approved by the Core Group,
- Job descriptions of the Task Forces and list of responsibilities of individual Members of the Core Group (and Task Forces?) and policies and procedures for the organization of the ICS Forum shall be discussed and approved by the Core Group through consensus.
- All members of the Core Group and Task Forces shall strive to attend each meeting or, failing that, send in their comments and suggestions in written beforehand and retrospectively shortly afterwards.

Accountability:

- All Core Group Members/Heads of Task Forces shall submit progress reports in a timely fashion to the Coordinator and, when needed, to the funding agency. Reports shall be submitted to the funding agency after having been reviewed and approved by the Coordinator. Reporting terms shall be determined on project-by-project basis.
- The Core Group shall have monthly meetings to review work progress and review responsibilities of the Core Group Members/Heads of Task Forces in relation to past and upcoming work.
- In case a Core Group member is unable to fulfil his/her task, he shall inform the Coordinator and either, with the approval of the Coordinator, appoint another employee from his/her NGO or leave it up to the Coordinator to replace the given Core Group member (individual or the NGO).
- The Coordinator, given time limitations, shall have the authority to redistribute functions to members of the Core Group and discharge a member of the Core Group from his/her duty if the member repeatedly failed to fulfil his/her responsibilities agreed upon at the Core Group meeting or mandated by the Coordinator.
- The Coordinator shall have the right, in consultation with Core Group members, to select a new Core Group member NGO in place of the dismissed NGO.

- In case Core Group members are paid regular honoraria/salaries, the Coordinator shall have the right to hold them accountable through economic sanctions by deducting certain portions from established amounts in case the Core Group member failed to fulfil satisfactorily his/her responsibilities.

Inclusiveness and Public Education Campaign:

- All members of the Core Group and Task Forces shall seek to be inclusive, involving other NGOs to the extent it is possible and appropriate, recognizing that the organization of the ICS Forum is an opportunity for Mongolian NGOs and the public to improve their knowledge of the substantive issues such as democracy, good governance and civil society as well as their institutional capacity through becoming involved in the organization of an international event and developing linkages with other national and international organizations and individuals.
- All members of the Core Group and Task Forces shall seek to contribute to the public education campaign recognizing that the organization of such an international event is an important opportunity to improve Mongolian public's awareness on democracy, good governance and civil society as well as to raise Mongolia's profile internationally boosting its legitimacy as a country committed to democratic values.
- Recognizing that not all Mongolian NGOs or interested members of the public have a command of English, members of the Core Group and Task Forces shall strive to produce their information in both English and Mongolian to ensure that non-English speaking members of the Mongolian public do not become marginalized.

Two. Economic Considerations and Justice:

The Core Group and Task Force members shall support the development of fair free market competition by announcing open tenders on all business contracts over 5,000 USD. Winners shall be selected based on the quality and price. In very specific cases, this procedure may be waived due to considerations of time. Such exceptions shall be discussed and agreed upon by the Core Group members.

However, recognizing the opportunity to support income-generation projects for the poor, the Core Group and Task Force members shall seek to support, whenever possible and appropriate, such projects to contribute to the more equitable distribution of opportunities and wealth.

Three. Equality and Non-Discrimination:

Last but not least, all Members of the Core Group and Task Forces shall respect and observe international human rights standards and principles of gender equality and non-discrimination.

Discussed and Approved by the Core Group on January 6, 2003.

Signed: _____

Mrs. J. Zanaa

Core Group Coordinator

Appendix 17: Brief Information on CEDAW Watch/Center for Citizens' Alliance

CEDAW Watch/ICSFD Ulaanbaatar Secretariat to Center for Citizens' Alliance

Since 2003, the National CEDAW Watch Network Center (CEDAW Watch), a Mongolian non-governmental, non-partisan and non-profit organization, has functioned as the Secretariat for the ICSFD, International Civil Society Forum for Democracy, a civil society network that seeks to deepen democratic reforms worldwide via strengthening civil society partnerships globally. CEDAW Watch, in cooperation with the Globe International NGO, Zorig Foundation, Press Institute of Mongolia, Mongolian Women's Federation, Mongolian Women's Foundation, Political Education Academy and Liberty Center,[363] hosted and organized the International Civil Society Forum entitled "Civil Society Partnerships for Democracy" on September 8-9, 2003, in Ulaanbaatar. Following the forum, CEDAW Watch has led the implementation of the Civil Society Index action-oriented research project to implement concrete recommendations and decisions issued by the forum participants.

The inception of CEDAW Watch took place in 1996 with the founding of a CEDAW Club affiliated to the Liberal Women's Brain Pool. In 1997, this initiative led to the establishment of the CEDAW Watch Network of Mongolian Women's NGOs.[364] In 1998, the CEDAW Watch Network Center was set up, which intensified and regularized activities aimed at monitoring the implementation of CEDAW at the national level, raise public awareness on CEDA Wand conduct training programs on how to use CEDAW for lawyers, journalists, actors, public servants, local government officials and women's NGOs. CEDAW Watch has actively engaged in research and policy advocacy in order to introduce provisions of international conventions on women's and children's rights in everyday life of Mongolians. One of the main examples of this work is the shadow report developed by CEDAW Watch in 2001 on the implementation of CEDAW in Mongolia, which was presented to the UN CEDAW Committee in New York alongside the Mongolian Government report. CEDAW Watch thus became the first Mongolian NGO to produce an independent assessment of the government performance on the implementation of conventions that Mongolia is signatory to and presented a parallel report at UN level.

Although CEDAW Watch has focused mainly on women's rights, it has always viewed this issue area as inseparably linked to the overarching goal of ensuring Mongolia's democratic development and protection of human rights understood holistically. Therefore, since its inception, CEDAW Watch has taken an active part in combating and condemning gross violations of human rights, deepening and expanding democratic reforms and fostering the development of civil society on a larger scale. A clear example of this work is the Open Forum on Human Rights and public awareness raising activities championed by CEDAW Watch in 2002 in response to the government's flagrant violations of civil and political rights of peaceful protestors demanding for the restitution of their economic rights breached by the newly passed land laws. Furthermore, within the framework of preparations for the ICSF-2003, CEDAW Watch and its partner NGOs produced and aired a series of TV and radio programs on topics such as democracy, good governance, civil society, human rights and civic journalism as well as organized several workshops and discussions on these issues. These actions made an important contribution to the development of civil society in Mongolia.

Moreover, in the last 3 years, CEDAW Watch has participated in a comparative research project on civil society development in Mongolia, China, Vietnam and Kazakhstan with support from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of Japan. Within the scope of this endeavour, CEDAW Watch has conducted several in-depth case studies examining NGO-Government communication and cooperation on various policy issues. For the duration of the last year, CEDAW Watch has led the CSI project aimed at producing a comprehensive assessment of the state of Mongolia's civil society as well as strengthening networking and cooperation

[363] Although 10 NGOs were initially selected into the National Core Group, soon thereafter 2 of them dropped out voluntarily. Thus, the ICSF-2003 was organized by the joint efforts of 8 NGOs.

[364] Initially, the following 7 women's NGOs joined to transform the CEDAW Watch Club into a CEDAW Watch Network: Liberal Women's Brain Pool, Mongolian Social Democratic Women's Movement, Mongolian Women's Federation, Women for Social Progress Movement, Foundation in Support of Rural Women, Women Lawyers' Association and Women's Information and Research Center.

among CSOs, improving their analytical capacity and developing concrete strategies and a national plan of action for the further strengthening of Mongolia's democracy and civil society.

In 2005, CEDAW Watch reviewed the work it has so far performed and the role it has so far played in the society and resolved to transform itself into the Center for Citizens' Alliance in order to bring greater clarity to its programs and increase the effectiveness and impact of its activities in the future. The Center for Citizens' Alliance shall implement two main programs that fall under its overall mission of fostering the development of a humane, democratic and civil society in Mongolia: *Civil Society Support Program* and *Gender Equality and Human Rights Program.*

Both programs shall aim at mainstreaming gender equality issues into activities geared towards strengthening democracy, civil society and human rights protection and promotion based on a holistic understanding of and approach to social transformation and a belief that gender equality cannot be effectively promoted without the basis of a strong humane and democratic political system, sound mechanisms for ensuring human rights and a vibrant civil society just as a humane, democratic civil society is unimaginable without ensuring gender equality.

Within the scope of the *Civil Society Support Program*, the Center shall promote the establishment of a national civil society network of communication and cooperation, conduct regular assessments of the state of civil society at aimag and national levels, promote the development of a justice system within the non-governmental non-profit sector, produce analysis and research as well as influence public policy on issues related to democracy and civil society development. Within the scope of the *Gender Equality and Human Rights Program*, the Center shall continue its work on developing a draft Law on Gender Equality with support from the EMPOWER Foundation of the Columbia University, USA, carry on its cooperation with the UK Save the Children Fund to amend the Package of Laws on Education to make them more consistent with the principles of the UN convention on children's rights and conduct other research, public education and policy advocacy activities to promote gender equality, children's rights and human rights.

Both programs shall pay special attention to disseminating necessary information and providing technical and programmatic support to rural civil society organizations.

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Note: some sources are kept anonymous to protect the individual from potential harm.