

# An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus

A Map for the Future

2005

## CIVICUS: CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX REPORT FOR CYPRUS

An international action-research project coordinated by  
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation



In Collaboration with



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With support from the  
**Bi-communal Development Programme,**  
funded by USAID and UNDP  
and executed by UNOPS



## FOREWORD

The Management Centre of the Mediterranean (MC-Med) was founded to support civil society organizations (CSOs) in the northern part of Cyprus as one of its major aims. Throughout the years, it became evident that identifying the current needs of CSOs and understanding the context in which CSOs function was necessary for civil society to become a stronger and more effective force in this young democracy. The CIVICUS Civil Society Index project (CSI), the results of which are presented in this report, seeks to contribute to this goal by providing an assessment of the current state of civil society in Cyprus.

Given the de facto division of the island, MC-Med approached Intercollege to implement the project in the southern part of the island of Cyprus. MC-Med implemented and coordinated the project in the northern part of the island with support from the Eastern Mediterranean University and EKart Ltd.

The CIVICUS Civil Society Index project conducted in Cyprus is the first of its kind. Although we drew on previous research, such studies were limited in scope. This study is a comprehensive assessment of civil society throughout the entire island. It is also one of the first projects in which two major institutions collaborated with each other from both the northern and southern parts of the island.

This project has proven its usefulness and relevance to civil society in Cyprus on a number of different levels. It initiated dialogue about the concept of civil society, leading to a specific definition for the context of Cyprus. The process of implementing the CIVICUS methodology allowed for participation amongst a wide variety of actors, who do not typically come together, to discuss issues about civil society and identify challenges and opportunities for civil society in Cyprus. The research and consultations were conducted with academics, CSOs, the general public, government officials, media and the respective Project Advisory Groups. The findings from this assessment of civil society in Cyprus will be useful for CSOs, government officials, donors, students studying civil society in Cyprus and the general public.

The project was implemented through a large collaborative effort between Intercollege and MC-Med to maintain paralleled studies. We see this project as a springboard for further dialogue, cooperation and initiatives in strengthening civil society.

Although MC-Med has been coordinating and collaborating with the various members of the team, each author is responsible for the contents of their section of the report. The two teams may not necessarily agree with the contents of the other's report.

Bülent Kanol  
Executive Director  
The Management Centre of the Mediterranean  
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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Civil Society Index (CSI) study was carried out by the Management Centre of the Mediterranean (MC-Med) in partnership with Intercollege in the southern part of Cyprus. The project's approach and research methodology were developed by the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The study was supported financially by the Bicomunal Development Programme, funded by USAID and UNDP and executed by UNOPS, CIVICUS, Intercollege, and the MC-Med.

Due to the de facto division of the island, the Project Index Team decided to conduct this research separately, but in parallel, in each of the two parts of the island. Therefore, there were two separate Project Advisory Groups (PAGs) for each community. The PAGs collaborated on the implementation of the Civil Society Index from the outset and supported the project throughout. We would like to take this opportunity to thank all of the members for the time and energy they put into the project:

### PAG from southern part of Cyprus:

Constantinos Christofides (Professor of Physics, University of Cyprus)  
 Areti Demosthenous (Director of the Institute for Historical Research for Peace)  
 Andreas Hadjikyriakos (Journalist, Director of Gnora, Communications Consultants)  
 Klairi Koni (Director of Banque Assurance, Laiki Group)  
 Eleni Koliou (Chair of the Kyrenia District Committee of the Pancyprian Welfare Council)  
 Stella Kyriakidou (Chair Europa Donna)  
 Stavros Olympios (Chairman of the Pancyprian Welfare Council)  
 Ioanna Panayiotou (Press Officer of the Green Party, Member of the Association of Organic Cultivators, Member of the Council of the Cyprus Regional Winemakers)  
 Andreas Pavlikas (Head of the Research Office, Pancyprian Labour Federation (PEO))  
 Nicos Peristianis (Chairman of the Cyprus Sociological Association, Executive Dean of Intercollege)  
 Panayiotis Persianis (Ex-Associate Professor of Education, University of Cyprus)  
 Sotos Shiakides (Training Officer A', Cyprus Academy of Public Administration)  
 Eleni Theocharous (Honorary President and Deputy Chair Foreign Affairs Committee of the Doctors of the World, Member of Parliament)

### PAG from northern part of Cyprus:

Meral Akıncı (President, Association of Women to Support Life (KAYAD))  
 Bekir Azgın (Assistant Professor and Vice Dean, Faculty of Communication and Media Studies, and Chair, Department of Journalism, Eastern Mediterranean University)  
 Aysel Bodi (President, Akova Women's Association)  
 Emine Erk (President, Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation)  
 Hüseyin Gürşan (General Director, Bayrak Radio & Television (BRT))  
 Fatma Kınış (Assistant General Manager, 'TRNC' Development Bank)  
 Ünsal Özbilenler (Former President, Businessmen Association)  
 Gülden Plümer Küçük (Former President, Cyprus Turkish Association of University Women )  
 Asaf Şenol ('Under-Secretary', 'Ministry of Health')  
 Ahmet Varoğlu (President, Patients' Rights Association)  
 Işıl Yılmaz ('Under-Secretary', 'State Planning Organisation')

A crucial source of data for the Civil Society Index were the community surveys, carefully and competently carried out in the southern part by Intercollege and in the northern part of Cyprus by EKart Ltd.

The intensive work of the media review was conducted by Constantia Soteriou in the southern part and by Erol Kaymak with the support of Mustafa Abitoğlu, Ratela Asllani, Derya Kiamil, and Dilek Latif in the northern part of Cyprus.

The project was implemented by the entire team and would not have been possible without the efforts of the authors, Efstathios Mavros, Monica Ioannidou and Erol Kaymak. The research would not have been possible if it were not for the unending cooperation and invaluable support of Judith Kallick Russell, Leda Ioannidou, Yücel Vural, Erhun Şahali, and Christos Zachariades throughout the entire project.

This report draws on ideas, arguments and examples brought up during the course of the work of the PAGs, discussions with colleagues at the MC-Med, Intercollege, the regional stakeholder consultations, and the final workshop which was held at the end of the project to discuss and build upon its findings. All these stakeholders and participants actively contributed to this report.

We would also like to recognize the extra support we received from Bekir Azgın and Derviş Baha in their competent facilitation of the regional stakeholder consultations in the northern part of Cyprus.

The constant support, flexibility, and good humor from Ece Akçaoglu at the Bicomunal Development Programme improved both the process and the product of this project.

Finally, we would like to thank the CSI team at CIVICUS, above all Mahi Khallaf and Volkhart Finn Heinrich, for their support throughout the project and for their valuable input and comments for this report.

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## **SPECIAL NOTE OF THANKS FROM INTERCOLLEGE**

This report would not have been made possible without the sustained, professional and unique support of Leda Ioannidou, to whom we are deeply indebted. We would also like to thank Christos Zachariades for helping with coordination issues, Constantia Soteriou for her work on the media review and all of our colleagues from the Management Centre of the Mediterranean for giving us the opportunity to work together on this project. Mahi Khallaf from CIVICUS was always very forthcoming and patient in her support.

Finally we would like to thank our colleagues here at Intercollege Limassol Campus for taking on some of our responsibilities while we were working on this project.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
BoC	Bank of Cyprus
BDH	Peace and Democracy Movement
BRT	Bayrak Radio and Television
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CTC	Cyprus Trading Corporation
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
CTP-BG	Republican Turkish Party - United Forces
CYMEPA	Cyprus Marine Environment Protection Association
CYP	Cyprus Pounds (local currency in southern part of Cyprus)
DISY	Democratic Rally
DP	Democrat Party
EDEK	Movement of Social Democrats
EDON	United Democratic Youth Association
EMU	Eastern Mediterranean University
EU	European Union
GCC	Greek Cypriot community
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IT	Information Technology
KAYAD	Association of Women to Support Life
KOYEE	Cyprus Federation of Business and Professional Women
KTAMS	Turkish Cypriot 'Public' Servants Syndicate
KTOEOS	Cyprus Turkish Secondary School Teachers' Union
KTOS	Cyprus Turkish Primary School Teachers' Union
MC-Med	Management Centre of the Mediterranean
MEI	Melkonian Educational Institute
MIGS	Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies
NGH	Nicosia General Hospital
OELMEK	Union of Secondary School Teachers
PAG	Project Advisory Group
PASYKAF	Pancyprian Association of Cancer Patients and Friends
PEO	Pancyprian Federation of Labour
PIT	Project Index Team
POED	Union of Primary School Teachers
POGO	Pancyprian Federation of Women's Associations
SEK	Cyprus Workers' Confederation
SME	Small- and Medium-size Enterprises
SOAR	Institute of Research and Cyprus Studies
TAK	Turkish News Agency
TCC	Turkish Cypriot community
TKP	Communal Liberation Party
TMT	Turkish Defense Organization
UBP	National Unity Party
UHH	National People's Movement
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
YTL	New Turkish Lira (local currency in northern part of Cyprus)

## DISCLAIMERS

- This country report is divided into two sections because of the de facto division of the island of Cyprus since 1974. Each section was prepared by a different team but a decision was taken to include them in a single document as a symbolic gesture of their commitment to a common future and a common polity that would be acceptable to the majorities in both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. The authors of each section are responsible for its contents only. This means that they do not necessarily agree with, and should not be therefore held responsible for, what the other section contains and the terminology that is used.
- This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its funders or member states. It is the fruit of a collaborative effort by a team of academics and consultants.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### **Executive Summary: Civil Society in the southern part of Cyprus** (AREAS CURRENTLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS)


The CIVICUS Civil Society Index project was undertaken during the period March – September 2005 by Intercollege and the Management Centre of the Mediterranean, aiming to analyse and assess civil society in Cyprus. Civil society was assessed in terms of what CIVICUS refers to as the four ‘dimensions of civil society’ – its **structure**, the **environment** in which it operates, the **values** it promotes and shares and its **impact**.

Due to the de facto division of the island and the segregation of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, it was necessary to undertake two separate studies. The two project teams (Intercollege for the southern part and the Management Centre of the Mediterranean for the northern part of Cyprus), followed the same methodology and the implementation of each project stage was conducted in parallel.

The results presented below concern the main findings of the Intercollege research team and the evaluation of civil society in the areas currently controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. The indicator scoring was carried out by a ‘Project Advisory Group’ (PAG) made up of thirteen persons of different backgrounds, based on the data collected by the research team and presented to the PAG in a scoring meeting that took place on 3 September, 2005.

The results of the scores given by the PAG are portrayed in a diagram, plotting the scores for the four dimensions: structure, environment, values and impact. The highest possible score was three and the lowest possible score was zero. The resulting Civil Society Diamond shows that:

- ❖ The **structure** of civil society is considered ‘slightly weak’, and is given a score of 1.3.
- ❖ The **environment** in which civil society is located was judged as ‘relatively enabling’ and was given a score of 2.1.
- ❖ The extent to which civil society practices and promotes positive social **values** was considered ‘relatively significant’ and given a score of 1.9.
- ❖ The **impact** of civil society on society at large was judged to be ‘moderate’ and was given a score of 1.8.

**FIGURE 1: Civil Society Diamond for the southern part of Cyprus**

Data concerning the **structure** of civil society show that levels of public participation in organised forms of volunteering (i.e. through organisations) are low. Even though a large percentage of the population survey sample stated that they had in the past donated to charity or engaged in some form of non-partisan political action, the percentage of those who had engaged in volunteering or were members of a civil society organisation was below 50%. Moreover, it seems that social groups such as ethnic or linguistic minorities, foreign workers and rural dwellers are largely excluded from the membership and leadership of civil society organisations. Only the affluent appear to be overrepresented in such organisations.

The research revealed a high concentration of civil society organizations (CSOs) in urban areas and more specifically, Nicosia, the capital. The lack of opportunity for citizen participation in rural areas seems to be accentuated by the fact that the majority of civil society organisations do not seem to be actively involved in local communities.

Turning to issues of civil society's infrastructure, the research found that CSOs belonging to a federation, umbrella organisation or network seem to enjoy somewhat higher levels of support. Nonetheless, many stakeholders believe that federations or similar networks are not highly effective. This could provide some justification for the rather small number of organisations that belong to a federation.

Generally speaking, cooperation and communication between different sectors of civil society is limited. Furthermore, the majority of organisations operate at a local or national level, while it is more common for trade unions and employers' organisations to be linked with international organisations than organisations from other sectors of civil society.

Finally, civil society organisations appear to be quite well resourced, although the PAG's view was that their financial resources were poor.

Civil society seems to operate in a relatively enabling **environment** in which political rights and civil liberties are safeguarded, where there is a clear separation of powers, a generally independent, well-respected judiciary and a comprehensive legal framework against fraud and

corruption. The majority of the population survey respondents show high levels of trust for the judiciary and the police.

Although there is a solid legal and institutional framework that safeguards human rights and civil liberties and gives the Republic of Cyprus the features of a modern democracy, there are areas of concern either because laws are ignored by the authorities or due to the way they are being implemented. The CSI team was able to find evidence of instances that continue to cause worry, such as, for example, the trafficking of women, police brutality, violation of the human rights of immigrants, the difficulty of journalists to obtain public documents, the pressures to which the holders of political office are subjected by powerful social and financial groups and the customer-provider type of relationship that exists between political parties and their voters.

Political parties have a huge impact on civil society with a great number of organisations having close relations to them, relations that often limit their autonomy. Relations between many CSOs and the state are largely determined by the connections that these organisations have with the political parties.

An important issue that emerged from the research concerned the lack of effective state monitoring of the finances of CSOs. Another issue was the lack of transparency in the mode of allocating state funds to CSOs.

The research also revealed a low level of corporate philanthropy. Compared to larger countries where the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is well developed, Greek Cypriot private companies do not seem to have such policies in place. A case study carried out by the research team concerning the level and nature of CSR shows that the only companies that have such policies in place are the three largest banks – the Bank of Cyprus, the Popular Bank and the Hellenic Bank. Thus, the low level of CSR could be attributed to the small size of the overwhelming majority of enterprises, which allows them to contribute to charities only on an *ad hoc* basis.

Regarding the extent to which civil society practices and promotes positive social **values**, it seems that in their majority, CSOs practice internal democracy, and are committed to gender equity and transparency. Nonetheless, they seem to do little to promote these values in the wider society. In fact, during the research period there were no examples of civil society activity dedicated to the promotion of government and corporate transparency, tolerance, democracy or the eradication of poverty. There were however, some examples of activity dedicated to the promotion of peace and non-violence, the protection of the environment and gender equity.

Finally, with regards to the **impact** of civil society on public policy and the wider society, the research has shown that this varies according to the nature of CSOs. On the whole, civil society is not considered to be very active in holding the state or private corporations accountable. Furthermore, it does not seem to be a generator of positive social norms, such as tolerance, trust and public spiritedness, since there is no significant variation in the attitudes of members of CSOs compared to those of non-members on these three norms. CSOs do, however, according to popular belief, provide better services to marginalised social groups than the state and are quick to respond to pressing social needs.

Interestingly, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) seem to be less trusted by the population than the President, police and army. On the other hand, NGOs appear to enjoy higher levels of trust than the press, television, the Parliament, the Trade Unions and political parties. However, the public seems to trust the Church more than NGOs. Thus, it is not possible to provide a general answer on the levels of trust that civil society enjoys.

Civil society does not seem to have a big impact on the levels of tolerance, trust and public spiritedness, since there is no significant variation on the views of members of CSOs compared to those of non-members on these three issues. In fact, when prompted to state the degree of trust they had for their fellow citizens, members and non-members of CSOs shared the view that only some people can be trusted. In addition, the levels of intolerance of members and non-members of organisations seem to be the same: both categories in their majority stated that they would not like to have people with cultural characteristics different to those of Greek Cypriots as neighbours. Also, the levels of public spiritedness seem to be equally high in both groups.

**Bi-communal cooperation** between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well as citizen participation in bicomunal events, seems to be very limited, with 82% of survey respondents saying that they had not participated in any kind of bicomunal activity during the last year. Furthermore, 57% of civil society stakeholders who took part in a separate study said that less than 20% of CSOs have participated in an activity jointly organised with a Turkish Cypriot organisation. The few examples of bicomunal cooperation that do exist mostly involve cultural events, discussions, research, exhibitions and other similar events.

The findings of the CSI study were discussed during a workshop among civil society stakeholders, where a number of seminal issues and recommendations emerged. First, it was pointed out that many CSOs do not seem to be aware of the benefits of synergies and are not particularly keen to form umbrella-organisations, networks and federations. Second, participants pointed to the urgent need to diversify CSOs' sources of income so that they become more effective and less dependent on those who fund them. This was particularly important as it was felt that state and party political funding reduced the autonomy of civil society organisations. Forming independent and 'intermediate' bodies that would provide information for funding opportunities and help organisations secure funds (particularly from the European Union) was considered of paramount importance. In order to cultivate a democratic ethos, the participants to the workshop proposed that civil rights education within the educational system should be rethought and further developed. At the same time, it was reiterated that CSOs must practise participatory democracy and conduct their affairs in ways in which their commitment to tolerance, dialogue and non-violence become evident in their everyday practices.

At different points of the full report attempts are being made to explain the factors that lie behind the multiplicity of phenomena, institutions and processes constituting civil society in the southern part of Cyprus. Important explanatory variables that account for the current shape of civil society as it is portrayed in this report include:

- the fact that Cyprus gained its formal independence in 1960 and it took its polity some time to acquire the features of a modern democracy such as notions of citizenship and respect for the human rights and civil liberties of all social groups;
- the intercommunal conflict and the involvement of Greek junta, Turkey and other countries in the political affairs of the country that culminated in the de facto division of the island, displaced thousands of people but also elevated 'the Cyprus problem' to the status of the most important topic of public debate;
- the dominance of political parties over virtually every aspect of the public sphere;
- the impressive growth of the economy but also its small size;
- the high levels of intolerance that permeate the entire fabric of social life and
- the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union with all that it entailed for the relationship between citizens and their state.

Although this list is by no means exhaustive, it is to factors such as these that we should turn our attention if we are to begin to understand the characteristics and dynamics of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus.


Civil society is, of course, anything but a homogeneous arena. Within civil society one can come across a variety of organisations ranging, for example, from welfare associations to trade unions; and from advocacy groups to sports clubs, choirs, religious associations and youth organisations. Attempting to approach civil society as a homogenous entity is riddled with difficulties and downplays the complexity of social reality. What this piece of research has hopefully achieved is to map a largely un-researched field, point to possible avenues for further research and provide all those active or interested in civil society with plenty of stimuli for reflection.

## **Executive Summary: Civil Society in the northern part of Cyprus**

From March to September 2005, the CIVICUS Civil Society Index project (CSI) collected information and input from a broad range of civil society representatives, citizens, experts and researchers on the state of civil society in Cyprus. As Cyprus remains de facto divided, the project team conducted the study separately in the southern and northern parts of the island, but used the same methodology and implementation approach. Using a comprehensive framework of more than 70 indicators and drawing on extensive data collected by the project team, the respective Project Advisory Groups (PAG) assessed the overall state of civil society on either side of the Green Line separately. As a result, in the case of Cyprus, two Civil Society Diamonds and two reports were produced.

This executive summary discusses the findings that emerged from the study of the northern part of Cyprus. In recent years much has changed in the northern part of Cyprus. The impending European Union accession prompted the international community to forestall the admission of a de facto divided island as a member to the union. The UN blueprint – commonly known as the Annan Plan – stirred Turkish Cypriot civil society into motion. The plan that aimed to reunite the island was first revealed in November 2002 and separate, simultaneous referenda were held in both communities in April 2004. The plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriot community but endorsed by the Turkish Cypriots. The role of civil society in mobilizing support for the plan and EU membership is widely believed to have been crucial. The findings reported in this report reflect the period immediately after the Annan debate.

For the first time for the community in the northern part of Cyprus, a comprehensive and participatory assessment of civil society has been carried out through the CSI project. Its findings seek to chart the way for civil society's progress in the years to come. As the CSI study has found, the further development of civil society in the community in the northern part of Cyprus will require a focus on structural features and on strengthening its impact on government in particular, if not society at large. Overall, the CSI results suggest that civil society's values are its greatest strength, and the environment may not be as debilitating a factor as is often assumed regarding the Turkish Cypriot community. The Civil Society Diamond which emerged suggests areas for further development, especially on the structure and impact dimensions of civil society. Significantly, it suggests that despite the extraordinary role of civil society in addressing the Cyprus problem, its overall impact is limited.

**FIGURE 2: Civil Society Diamond for the northern part of Cyprus**

The CSI project brought to light various insights on civil society in the community in northern Cyprus. These highlights are briefly summarized below.

The examination of civil society's **structure** in the community in northern Cyprus revealed that apart from the huge mass demonstrations for and against the Annan Plan — civic participation in civil society remains limited. Whereas a significant proportion of Turkish Cypriots belong to a CSO or may have undertaken some form of non-partisan political action, volunteerism, especially within civil society organizations (CSOs), is fairly low. Participation in bi-communal events – that is, events together with Greek Cypriots – is also low, although in this case the relative paucity of co-sponsored or organized events may be a contributing factor. Another challenge for a healthy structure of civil society is the exclusion of significant social groups such as minorities, poor people, and workers, if not “settlers” from Turkey in CSOs. Women were equally represented in their level of involvement in CSOs; however, men predominantly hold leadership positions.

During the time leading up to the referendum on the Annan Plan, support for the Plan was galvanized by ad hoc umbrella organizations. To the extent that these umbrella organizations exist, they have proven effective. A major inhibitor for the establishment of more formal umbrella organizations is legal constraints, since specific legal provisions for their establishment do not exist. Thus, aside from sports federations, which are numerous, such organizations are limited. Finally, inadequate levels of resources, be they financial, human or infrastructural, continue to hinder the development of civil society.

Less problematic than usually assumed appears to be the **environment** in which civil society operates. Despite the presence of tens of thousands of troops from mainland Turkey, as well as dependence on Turkey on a number of levels, civil society in northern Cyprus exists in an environment that is considered to be politically free and also where civil liberties are, for the most part, respected. Moreover, the socio-economic context is largely favourable, somewhat surprising in light of the fact that residents in northern Cyprus have been ‘isolated’ from the international community for more than 40 years. Generous transfers from Turkey have helped sustain the Turkish Cypriot community over the decades. However these transfers have caused dependency and an irrational ‘public administration’. Other problems are that rule of law is compromised by patronage, ‘state’ centralization - whereby the ‘state’ controls resources and is not accountable - and a lack of transparency within the public administration.

Dependency on Turkey also affects the 'state's' autonomy in policy making and implementation. This means that any 'government' in northern Cyprus must work in tandem with authorities in Ankara at various levels, to coordinate and implement policy. Since Turkey finances various projects, the 'state' has little leverage.

The above mentioned dependency on Turkey is not the sole deficiency for civil society's environment. Political parties lack internal democracy. Moreover, press freedoms are sometimes curtailed and journalists have been charged for various offences in military court. Acts of intimidation, arson and murder are rare but have been documented. Most debilitating for civil society are relations with the 'state' and particularly the private sector. In addition, corporate social responsibility is an area that needs improvement.

The CSI assessed the extent to which civil society practices and promotes positive **values** as moderate. A particular strength was detected in the commitment of civil society actors to non-violence. The project advisory group (PAG) also felt that society in northern Cyprus was a relatively tolerant society. Thus a variety of CSOs could be identified that often spoke out against the use of violence and in favour of inclusion. These are critical elements for fostering peace and understanding in ethnically divided Cyprus. Although not an aim of this study, as the various surveys did not address the question of tolerance vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots explicitly, the substantive issues related to a reunified Cyprus scenario can not be addressed here. Nor would it be fair to say that civil society actors and CSOs all share the same orientation. Indeed, a small group of CSOs and members of society remain committed to a more exclusive concept of society based on ethnicity, and for a few violence remains a legitimate means.

Finally, on the **impact** dimension the CSI assessed civil society's efforts to influence policy as relatively insignificant. Whereas CSOs played an extraordinary role in galvanizing support for the aforementioned Annan Plan, impact in other areas remains limited. For instance, it was revealed that teachers' syndicates may be effective in bargaining for wages, but are not as effective in curricular issues. Similarly, success in negotiating 'public' sector wages and minimal wages among trade unions does not translate into impact in the overall budgetary process.

One can draw a line between those CSOs that include trade and 'public' sector unions, as well as private sector chambers that strive for the interest and benefits of their members and are protected by special laws, on the one hand, and those NGOs which are working for the public in general such as environmental and health organizations that do not enjoy the protection and benefits of special laws, on the other.

In a number of areas, including environmental protection, traffic regulations, and other areas of concern to citizens, and where CSO lobbying efforts are apparent, policy changes are not always forthcoming. Not surprisingly, civil society is not successful in holding either the 'state' or private sector accountable. Where civil society seems more adept is in responding to social interests, and empowering citizens through information campaigns.

These and many other issues were raised in the final workshop that brought together a large number of stakeholders to discuss and interpret the CSI findings and come up with specific recommendations and priorities for the future development of civil society in Cyprus as a whole, and in the southern or northern parts of Cyprus, respectively. Nearly 50 people from CSOs, academic institutions and public administration participated in the workshop. Workshop participants identified the challenges and issues of civil society within their own communities and then throughout the entire island. They then produced recommendations regarding how to strengthen civil society, especially identifying the means of strengthening its structure and impact. Specific recommendations include the introduction of civic education curricula, and training for CSOs to equip members and leaders with the tools that will help

professionalize their organizations. The environment could be rendered more conducive with the introduction of advocacy centres, and legal counsel for CSOs, as well as with the introduction of 'legislation' that would make the establishment of umbrella bodies easier.

The full report contains these and other specific recommendations for the strengthening of civil society in the northern part of Cyprus, as well as those that address the needs of civil society in Cyprus more generally.

The CSI project provides the community of the northern part of Cyprus with a collectively generated and communally owned roadmap for the future. It is hoped that the participatory and knowledge-based nature of the CSI project has laid the groundwork for civil society and other stakeholders to act upon the goal of making civil society in northern Cyprus stronger and more sustainable in the future.

## INTRODUCTION

This document presents the results of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) in Cyprus, carried out from March to September 2005, as part of the international CSI project coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and currently implemented in more than 50 countries.<sup>1</sup>

This report constitutes a first attempt to analyse the state of civil society throughout the entire island of Cyprus. Taking into account the de facto separation of the island in 1974, civil society has developed basically independent within the two separate communities. Therefore, this report reflects the reality of the current situation for civil society in Cyprus today, with Section II focusing on southern Cyprus and Section III focusing on northern Cyprus. However, in the implementation of the methodology, both teams have been working closely together throughout every stage to complete this study.

This research aspires to begin a process of describing, understanding and quantifying the complexities of a largely under-researched area. In doing so, it mapped the field and raised questions that other researchers might subsequently pursue. As is often the case with enquiries into new areas, this piece of research raises as many questions as it answers.

The CSI is a participatory action-research project that assesses the state of civil society in countries around the world. The project links this assessment with a reflection and action-planning process by civil society stakeholders, aimed at strengthening civil society in those areas where weaknesses or challenges are detected. By seeking to combine a valid assessment, broad-based reflection and joint action, the CSI attempts to make a contribution to the perennial debate on how research can inform policy and practice.

In each country the CSI is implemented by a National Coordinating Organisation (NCO), guided by a National Advisory Group and the CSI project team at CIVICUS. In the case of Cyprus, there is a Project Index Team (PIT) consisting of Intercollege in the southern part of Cyprus and the Management Centre of the Mediterranean (MC-Med) in the northern part of Cyprus implementing the project within their communities, and overall coordination conducted by the MC-Med. For the purpose of this study there were two separate Project Advisory Groups (PAG), each representing and focussing solely on their own community.

The PIT collected and synthesized data and information on civil society from a variety of primary and secondary sources. This information was used by the PAG to score the 74 core CSI indicators which together provide a fairly comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society in Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> The findings were then discussed at a final workshop, where civil society stakeholders identified specific strengths and weaknesses of civil society and developed recommendations for strengthening civil society. The international CSI project team at CIVICUS provided training, technical assistance and quality control to the PIT throughout the project implementation.

The CSI is an international comparative project with more than 50 countries, parts of countries and regions from around the world participating in it. It was conceived with two specific objectives: (1) providing useful knowledge on civil society and (2) increasing the commitment of stakeholders to strengthen civil society. The first objective inherits a certain tension between country-specific knowledge and knowledge comparable cross-nationally on a global scale. CIVICUS sought to resolve this tension by making it possible to adapt the methodology and the set of indicators to country-specific factors.

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<sup>1</sup> For an online copy of this report, go to [www.mc-med.org](http://www.mc-med.org).

<sup>2</sup> Three indicators were added by the PIT in both the northern and southern parts of Cyprus. These indicators were scored by the PAG in the northern part of Cyprus but not by the PAG in the southern part.

The MC-Med decided to undertake this study as a basis for future NGO work. The findings of this study can be used as a road map by all who are interested in civil society in Cyprus. It is a way of putting numbers to the experiences of CSOs and helping to guide CSOs, government officials, donors and all those interested in civil society in Cyprus. It is hoped that this study can be used as a starting point, for strengthening civil society and democracy in Cyprus.

# I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT & APPROACH

## By The Management Centre of the Mediterranean

### 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 50 countries around the world. To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index. In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept. The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than 50 countries (see table I.1.1)

**TABLE I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005**<sup>3</sup>

1. Argentina	17. Gambia	35. Northern Ireland
2. Armenia	18. Georgia	36. Orissa (India)
3. Azerbaijan	19. Germany	37. Palestine
4. Bolivia	20. Ghana	38. Poland
5. Bulgaria	21. Greece	39. Romania
6. Burkina Faso	22. Guatemala	40. Russia
7. Chile	23. Honduras	41. Scotland
8. China	24. Hong Kong (VR China)	42. Serbia
9. Costa Rica	25. Indonesia	43. Sierra Leone
10. Croatia	26. Italy	44. Slovenia
11. Cyprus	27. Jamaica	45. South Korea
12. Czech Republic	28. Lebanon	46. Taiwan
13. East Timor	29. Macedonia	47. Togo
14. Ecuador	30. Mauritius	48. Turkey
15. Egypt	31. Mongolia	49. Uganda
16. Fiji	32. Montenegro	50. Ukraine
	33. Nepal	51. Uruguay
	34. Nigeria	52. Vietnam
		53. Wales

In Cyprus, the project was implemented by the Management Centre of the Mediterranean (MC-Med) from March to September 2005. Intercollege Limassol Campus worked with MC-Med in the design of the project and conducted the project in the southern part of Cyprus. The MC-Med applied to conduct the project due to the CSI's aim to combine a comprehensive assessment on the state of civil society with the identification of concrete recommendations and actions on part of civil society stakeholders. However, it was also with the intention of contributing to a better understanding between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, which have been de facto divided since the events of 1974.

<sup>3</sup> This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted. This is the complete list of countries participating in the CSI as of March 2006.

## 2. PROJECT APPROACH

The Civil Society Index uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a broad range of research methods. At the core of the CSI lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of subdimensions, which are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI data collection, which includes secondary data sources, a population survey, regional stakeholder consultations, a media review and a series of case studies. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by the PAG. The research and assessment findings are discussed at a gathering of key stakeholders, whose task is to identify specific strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations on key priority actions to strengthen civil society. The CSI project approach, conceptual framework and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.

### 2.1 Conceptual Framework

#### *How to define civil society?*

At the heart of the CSI's conceptual framework is obviously the concept of civil society. CIVICUS defines civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests (CIVICUS 2004). In this respect, and different from most other civil society concepts, the CSI has two interesting features. First, it aims to go beyond the usual focus on formal and institutionalised CSOs, and to take account of informal coalitions and groups. Second, while civil society is sometimes perceived as a sphere in which positive activities and values reign, CIVICUS seeks to also include negative manifestations of civil society in the assessment. The concept therefore covers not only charitable associations or environmental organisations but also groups such as skinheads and aggressive sports fans. The CSI assesses not only the extent to which CSOs support democracy and tolerance, but also the extent to which they themselves are intolerant or even violent.

#### *How to conceptualise the state of civil society?*


To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these dimensions is divided into a set of sub-dimensions which, combined, contain a total of 76 indicators.<sup>4</sup> These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report. The indicator–subdimension—dimension framework underpinned the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report, the PAG's assessment of civil society in Cyprus and the presentations at the Final Workshop. It is also used to structure the main part of this section and the publication as a whole.

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix 8 for the southern part of Cyprus and Appendix 16 for the northern part of Cyprus for the complete indicators list.

**FIGURE I.1.1: Civil Society Diamond tool**

To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool (see figure I.1.1 for an example).<sup>5</sup> The Civil Society diamond graph, with its four extremities, visually summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society. The diagram is the result of the individual indicator scores aggregated into subdimension and then dimension scores. CIVICUS notes that since it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about what

civil society looks like in a given country. CIVICUS also points out that, as the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot and should not be used to rank countries according to their scores on the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time as well as compare the state of civil society across countries.

## 2.2 Project Methodology

This section described the methods used to collect and aggregate the various data used by the CSI project.

*2.2.1 Data Collection.* The CSI recognized that, in order to generate a valid and comprehensive assessment of civil society, a variety of perspectives and data should be included—insider, external stakeholder and outsider views, as well as objective data ranging from the local, regional to the national level. The CSI therefore includes the following set of research methods: (1) Review of existing information, (2) Regional stakeholder consultations, (3) Population survey, (4) Media review and (5) Fact-finding studies.

It is believed that this mix of different methods is essential to generate accurate and useful data and information, but also to accommodate the variations of civil society, for example in rural versus urban areas. The CSI also seeks to utilize all available sources of information in order to avoid ‘re-inventing research wheels’ and wasting scarce resources. Lastly, the research methodology is explicitly designed to promote learning and, ultimately, action on the part of participants. Besides feeding into the final national-level seminar, data collection processes also aim to contribute to participant learning. This is done, for example, through group-based approaches that challenge participants to see them as part of a “bigger picture”, think beyond their own organisational or sectoral context, reflect strategically about relations within and between civil society and other parts of society, identify key strengths and weaknesses of their civil society and assess collective needs. It is important to note that the CSI provides an aggregate needs-assessment on civil society as a whole and is not designed to exhaustively map the various actors active within civil society. Yet it does examine power relations within civil society and between civil society and other sectors, and identifies key

<sup>5</sup> The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier.

civil society actors when looking at specific indicators under the structure, values and impact dimensions.

For the CSI study in Cyprus, it was possible to implement most of the list of proposed data collection methods, yielding an extremely rich information base on civil society. The specific methods are listed below.<sup>6</sup>

1. *Review of existing information:* Books, articles, reports, official statistics, newspapers and periodicals and electronic sources.
2. *Mapping civil society:* PAG members discussed and charted the power relations and levels of influence among civil society actors and in society at large.
3. *Regional stakeholder survey:* A total of almost 120 stakeholders were surveyed, approximately 60 participants each from the southern part and the northern part of Cyprus. Each group was made up of participants with a wide experience from different sectors of civil society, as well as journalists, academics, local government representatives and representatives of private business.
4. *Regional stakeholder consultations:* In four centrally located spaces, the same people were invited to participate in a day-long discussion on the results of the survey and other civil society related issues. These discussions took place in four consultations – in southern Cyprus participants came from Limassol/Paphos and Nicosia/Larnaca/Famagusta regions; in northern Cyprus participants came from Karpaz/Famagusta and Nicosia/Kyrenia/Morphou regions. During the consultations, participants were prompted to elaborate on their responses to the questionnaire so as to enable the research team to get in-depth information about the functioning of civil society and the participants' perceptions of the context of their activities and the nature of the challenges they face.
5. *Population survey:* This survey, called the *Civil Society Survey 2005*, refers to the sample for the southern part of Cyprus in Section II and the northern part of Cyprus in Section III. The responses are of a randomly selected sample of 1,072 (702 from the southern part and 370 from the northern part of Cyprus) men and women over the age of 18 from both rural and urban areas to a questionnaire that was administered through telephone interviews. The sample's size allows a confidence level of 99% and a confidence interval of approximately 5%.
6. *Media monitoring:* The findings of a systematic, daily review of six newspapers – in southern Cyprus: *Phileleftheros*, *Haravgi* and *Simerini*; in northern Cyprus: *Kıbrıs*, *Yeni Duze*, and *Güneş* – during the months of March, May, June 2005.<sup>7</sup> This review generated data on how civil society is portrayed by the press and provided information on various activities of CSOs.
7. *Key Informant Interviews:* Over 30 interviews were conducted with experts on specific issues which emerged through the various research activities. The interviewees were experts from different fields (e.g. lawyers, journalists, civil servants, local government employees, members of CSOs, and academics) who spoke about different policy issues and corporate social responsibility.<sup>8</sup>

**2.2.2 Data Aggregation.** The various data sources are collated and synthesized by the CSI project team in a draft final report, which is structured along the CSI indicators, subdimension and dimensions. This report presents the basis for the indicator scoring exercise, which is carried out by the PAG. In this exercise, each score is rated on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 being the lowest assessment possible and 3 the most positive. The scoring of each indicator is based on a short

<sup>6</sup> For more detailed information on each of the methods, see Appendix 3 for the southern part of Cyprus and Appendix 11 for the northern part of Cyprus.

<sup>7</sup> April was not included as it was a month during which the Turkish Cypriots elected their leaders and therefore considered an 'unusual' month in terms of the items that were likely to be covered by the press.

<sup>8</sup> These interviews were on condition of anonymity in the southern part of Cyprus.

description of the indicator and a mostly qualitatively defined scale of scores from 0 to 3.<sup>9</sup> The PAG scoring exercise is modelled along a “citizen jury” approach, in which citizens come together to deliberate, and make a decision on a public issue, based on presented facts. The PAG’s role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgment) on each indicator based on the evidence (or data) presented by the Project Index Team in the form of the draft report.

In Cyprus, the scoring process was conducted as follows: First, the members of the PAG scored each indicator individually. Then, an average of these scores was calculated for each indicator, from which the scores for the sub-dimensions and dimensions were calculated through averaging. A vote was also taken on the sub-dimensions and dimensions in case the average of the individual indicators and the result of an instant assessment of the whole sub-dimension or dimension by the PAG differed considerably. The final scores for the four dimensions (structure, environment, values and impact) were plotted to generate the Civil Society Diamond. The PAG then discussed and interpreted the shape of the Civil Society Diamond, as well as the potential causal relations among the scores for the four dimensions.

### **2.3 Linking Research with Action**

The Civil Society Index is not a strictly academic research project. As its declared objective is to involve the actors of civil society in the research process, to contribute to discussions about civil society and to eventually assist in strengthening civil society, it falls into the category of action-research initiatives.

First, from the beginning, a diverse group of advisors guided the project implementation as members of the PAGs. The group comprised representatives of CSOs, local authorities, politicians and specialists in civil society research. In the beginning of the project, the PAGs discussed and confirmed the definition of civil society used for the purpose of the project and provided input on the planned methodology. The PAGs followed interim findings from the project and in the end developed an assessment of the state of civil society in Cyprus.

Another interactive element of the CSI was four regional stakeholder consultations with representatives of CSOs and external stakeholders. The aim was to bring together representatives from different regions and a wide range of CSOs – representatives of cultural organisations, ecologists, social and health service providers, trade unionists and professional chambers – as well as stakeholders from authorities, business, universities and donor agencies. They were encouraged to discuss their views on civil society in Cyprus, its actors, the problematic behaviour in civil society and the role that codes of conduct and other regulations could play in the work and public profile of CSOs.<sup>10</sup>

Lastly, a day-long Final Workshop, with nearly 50 participants from all of Cyprus, was held at the end of the project. The morning session allowed time for each community to look at its own findings. The goals for this session were to engage stakeholders in a critical discussion of, and reflection on, the results of the CSI initiative in order to arrive at a common understanding of its current state and major challenges and for participants to use the findings as a basis for the identification of specific challenges as well as potential areas of improvement for civil society in Cyprus. The afternoon session brought together participants from both communities to learn about each other’s community and to discuss the state of civil society throughout the entire island and to identify challenges and potential areas of improvement.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> See Appendix 8 for the southern part and Appendix 16 for the northern part of Cyprus.

<sup>10</sup> For further information on the regional stakeholder consultations, see Appendix 2 for the southern part and Appendix 10 for the northern part of Cyprus.

<sup>11</sup> See the summary of outputs from the Final Workshop in Sections II.3, III.3 and IV.

Overall, every attempt was made to be as participatory and consultative as possible during the entire course of the project implementation. Although the PIT was very successful in bringing together a diverse group, the short timeframe of the project did limit building more support and reaching even more participants.

## **2.4 Project Outputs**

The CSI implementation in Cyprus yielded a range of products and outputs, such as:

- A comprehensive final report on the state of civil society;
- A list of key recommendations, strategies and priority actions for strengthening civil society in Cyprus, developed by a broad range of stakeholders;
- Consultative meetings with approximately 100 civil society stakeholders, discussing the state of civil society in Cyprus;
- A review of media coverage of civil society over the course of three months;
- Studies of corporate social responsibility and
- Studies of the impact of civil society on public policy.

## **STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLICATION**

Section I, the “Civil Society Index Project and Approach”, provides a detailed history of the CSI, its conceptual framework, and overall research methodology.<sup>12</sup>

Section II, “The southern part of Cyprus”, provides the historical context of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus. Its main part consists of a detailed analysis of the findings from the southern part as well as ideas generated in the mono-communal section of the final workshop and conclusion.

Section III, “The northern part of Cyprus”, provides the historical context of civil society in the northern part of Cyprus. Its main part consists of a detailed analysis of the findings from the northern part as well as ideas generated in the mono-communal section of the final workshop and conclusion.

Section IV, the “Island-Wide Recommendations & Next Steps”, summarizes the ideas generated in the island-wide section of the final workshop. In addition, it focuses on particular steps that might be taken based on the information from the CSI to further strengthen civil society within Cyprus.

Section V, “Conclusion”, provides an overall conclusion of the study and offers an interpretation on the report’s implications for the overall state of civil society throughout Cyprus.

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<sup>12</sup> For the specific methodology of the study conducted in the southern part of Cyprus see Appendix 3. For the specific methodology of the study in the northern part of Cyprus see Appendix 11.

## II THE SOUTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

(Areas Currently Under the Control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus)

### 1. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

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#### INTRODUCTION

This document presents the results of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) in the areas currently under the control of the Republic of Cyprus (i.e. the southern part of Cyprus), carried out from March to September 2005, as part of the international CSI project coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and currently implemented in more than 50 countries.<sup>13</sup>

This report constitutes a first attempt to analyse the state of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus. For reasons that will become clearer in Section 1.1 of this report, the subjects of this study are primarily Greek Cypriots, as the geographical area that this study covers is mainly inhabited by people of Greek Cypriot origin. A separate report for the Turkish Cypriot community that now lives in the northern part of the island has been prepared by a different research team comprised primarily of Turkish Cypriots and is published as a separate section of this publication. Both teams have been working closely together during most of 2005 to complete this study.

This is probably the first study of its kind in the island of Cyprus. Although different aspects of Cypriot society have been the objects of research endeavours in the past, to our knowledge no one has ever attempted to analyse the structure and context of civil society in the island. The opportunity to conduct this study was offered by an initiative of the Turkish Cypriot NGO Management Centre of the Mediterranean to secure funding for this study.<sup>14</sup> Intercollege, which is the largest private tertiary education institution in the southern part of Cyprus, with a track record of research and public interventions on topics of social concern, agreed to be a partner in this initiative.<sup>15</sup> The project provided researchers from both communities with the opportunity to work together, exchange ideas and learn from each other, while also contributing to a better understanding of an important aspect of the society within which they live.

Intercollege has undertaken many studies on the processes, institutions and phenomena constituting contemporary Cyprus, including the family, crime, football hooliganism, gender, the media, as well as, of course, the issues that have kept the island divided for over thirty years. The College's participation in this study is an expression of its continuous interest in informing public debate and its concern to contribute to a deeper understanding of the constitution of Cypriot society.

This report does not claim to be *the* definitive study of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus. It is rather a piece of research that aspires to be a humble attempt to come to grips with the complexities of a largely un-researched area within an extremely tight time schedule and in doing so, to map the field and raise questions that other researchers might subsequently

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<sup>13</sup> The terminology used to describe the geographical and political entity referred to in this part of the report has been determined by the funders and it is not necessarily endorsed by the authors.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.mc-med.org/>.

<sup>15</sup> [www.intercollege.ac.cy](http://www.intercollege.ac.cy). This study was carried out by researchers based in Intercollege Limassol Campus.

want to pursue. As is often the case with enquiries into ‘virgin’ areas, this piece of research raises as many questions as it answers.

In accordance with the CIVICUS methodology, Intercollege collected and synthesized the data and information on civil society from a variety of primary and secondary sources. This information was used by the Project Advisory Group (PAG) to score the CSI indicators which together, provide a fairly comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus.<sup>16</sup> The findings were then discussed at a final workshop, where civil society stakeholders identified specific strengths and weaknesses of civil society and developed recommendations for strengthening it. The international CSI project team at CIVICUS provided training, technical assistance and quality control to the NCO throughout the project implementation.

## **Structure of the Report on the southern part of Cyprus**

The subsection, “Some Theoretical and Methodological Issues Pertaining to the Report”, below provides a brief discussion of the strengths as well as the limitations of the project.<sup>17</sup>

Section 1, “Civil Society in the southern part of Cyprus,” provides a background on civil society in the areas currently under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and highlights some of its most seminal features. It also describes how civil society has been conceived in this particular project. Finally, it describes the exercise of developing a map of civil society, which was carried out by the PAG.

Section 2, entitled “Analysis of Civil Society in the southern part of Cyprus,” is divided into four parts: Structure, Environment, Values and Impact—which correspond to the four main dimensions of the CSI. The presentation of the results according to individual dimensions and subdimensions is intended to be a resource repository, and readers looking for an overall interpretation of the report should refer to the conclusion. The third section also makes reference to a range of case and overview studies, which are described in greater detail in Appendices 4 to 6.

Section 3, “Challenges and Issues of Civil Society in the southern part of Cyprus,” summarises the ideas, arguments and opinions raised at the final CSI Workshop, which was held on 24 September 2005 at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia. One important feature of the workshop was that it was divided in two parts to include a session where members of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities could jointly hear and comment on the findings of the two research teams.

Finally, the conclusion in Section 4 maps the Civil Society Diamond and offers an interpretation on the report’s implications for the overall state of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Three additional indicators pertaining to the relationship between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and CSOs were added. The PAG, however, decided not to give scores to those indicators. More about this is available in Section 2.

<sup>17</sup> See also Appendix 8 the Scoring Matrix, and Appendix 3, which discusses the sources of data that were used.

<sup>18</sup> The Civil Society Diamond is a visual tool developed by CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier, Director of the Center for Civil Society at the University of California, Los Angeles, which presents the overall findings of the CSI study in the form of a Diamond-shaped graph.

## Some Theoretical and Methodological Issues Pertaining to the Report

As any one who is familiar with social scientific research knows, the fruits of empirical research, such as this, are the product of factors that could be broadly classified into two categories: those that are *internal* to the research and those that are *external* to it. To put it differently, the quality, scope and breadth of every piece of social scientific research are *outcomes* of the interaction of internal and external factors that are too serious to be ignored. This sub-section focuses on some of these factors. Our purpose here is not to be dismissive of the CSI project but to offer a critical reflection on the nature of the project that was carried out. Reflexivity is essential in social scientific research as researchers are nowadays called upon to question and think of the implications of the research strategies they use (see for example, May 1998).

All enquires into the social world, including, of course, civil society, are based on a series of assumptions about the nature of the objects of knowledge, the nature of sound knowledge (some might call it science) and the appropriate ways of going about generating such knowledge (Crotty, 1998; May 2001; Robson, 2002; Cooper, 2001). What this really means is that a research project's underlying ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions determine the nature of the research questions posed, the kinds of data sought, the criteria of validity and reliability its findings are expected to meet, and also the *silences* of the research report (those areas that are not commented upon and the issues that are not touched). These issues are too complicated to be compressed within the limited context of this introduction but they are mentioned here as a reminder to approach this study for what it really is: a piece of research, guided by a specific methodology that appears to place very precise demands on the researchers. The methodology requires that data be sought from particular sources using a series of methods that it considers essential to the success of the project. As the study is part of an international comparative project, CIVICUS places a premium of importance on implementing partners following these core methods as closely as possible.

The CIVICUS methodology has many noteworthy attributes. It requires the use of a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, a mixture that enhances its capacity to generate rounded analyses. Furthermore, by demanding the use of a variety of data sources – from the media to legal documents, and from key informants to randomly selected samples – the project seems to acknowledge the breadth and depth of a complicated field of study and makes an effort to take them seriously into consideration. Finally, the CIVICUS methodology encourages researchers to 'adapt' their methods and instruments of data collection to the local environment, thus, introducing an element of flexibility into this immense comparative project.

Despite its ambitious prescriptions, however, the methodology proposed by CIVICUS is not, in our view, without its tensions and contradictions. For example, although the project conceives civil society as an arena where different groups of people interact, in several of the indicators it asks questions about civil society as if it was a socially homogeneous category, and in doing so it leads researchers to seek general answers. One of the consequences of this practice is to underestimate the significance of the diversity of organisations and groups occupying the 'arena' of civil society.

Furthermore, although the CSI project is presented as a comparative analysis of civil society across the world, it does not appear to have overcome the difficulties emanating from the fact that such an analysis may not be, after all, possible because the units of analysis are not comparable – postcolonial, rural societies are placed side by side with advanced industrial countries, established democracies are to be compared with post-communist countries, parts of nation states (e.g. Wales, Scotland, Orissa) are compared to entire nation-states and so on. In addition to the heterogeneity of the units of analysis that are to be compared, the CSI methodology appears to pay insufficient attention to the implications of its dictum that

research teams may modify the indicators and some of the instruments of data collection (e.g. the questionnaires, the kinds of media that are to be surveyed, the numbers of regional stakeholders consultations) to suit local circumstances. This is a wise decision and CIVICUS is to be applauded for this recommendation because context does matter. But there is no evidence of a sustained reflection on what the implications of this acknowledgement of context for the methodological integrity of the entire CSI project might be.

With regard to the sources and instruments of data collection, the CSI methodology does not appear to address, among other things, issues of generalisability when it requires that much of the information about CSOs be collected from a number of regional stakeholders who have not been randomly selected. In one sense, this is understandable as it is crucial to collect information from those who have insight information and knowledge and are therefore in a position to express informed judgements. Furthermore, it is only fair to acknowledge that CIVICUS does expect research teams to select a socially diverse number of stakeholders from a wide range of sectors of civil society. On the other hand, however, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether the fact that regional stakeholders have not been randomly selected affects the validity and reliability of the report's claims.<sup>19</sup>

For the project team, it was not at all clear what the postulated 'non-academic' nature of the project means. CIVICUS describes the project as action-research, a reference to the emphasis it places upon the active involvement of those who are researched. But action research is still *research* of the social world and it is not therefore exempted from its obligation to justify its epistemological, ontological and methodological preferences. This is especially true, because as Reason and Bradbury (2001:xxiv) point out in the preface to their collection of contributions on the topic, 'the action-research family includes a whole range of approaches and practices, each grounded in different traditions, in different philosophical and psychological assumptions, pursuing different political commitments.'

For the purposes of this report, and taking on board both the description of the project approach by CIVICUS and literature on action research, we have taken the view that although it is not necessary to adhere to the stringent standards of conceptual and methodological discipline that academic discourse is required to meet, the report should rely on data that have been systematically and methodically collected and analysed. 'Systematically and methodically': the collection and analysis of the data has been neither random nor ad hoc. At the same time, we have not really addressed the array of conceptual and theoretical issues with the rigour we would have done (and preferred) had this report been prepared for an academic audience. To the trained eye, this will become evident as it reads the pages of this report.

Turning now to a different but related topic, empirical research may well be determined by factors pertaining to the way it is conceived but it is also shaped by the *context* within which it is undertaken. The resources available to the researchers and the time constraints within which they have to work impose discernible limitations upon the final outcome. This particular study had to be undertaken within a very limited time period and with relatively few resources. The fact that part of the fact-finding activities had to be undertaken during the summer months when most people in Cyprus take their annual leave meant that information was not always accessible, informants were not available and time was limited to wait to find out whether certain data were actually available. Time and resources left to our mind their imprint upon this study despite our efforts to narrow whatever gaps existed in our knowledge with as much relevant data as possible.

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<sup>19</sup> This is not an argument for the use of quantitative research but rather a point about the importance of methodological reflexivity. In accordance with the prescriptions of the CSI methodology, the regional stakeholders selected did meet the criteria of diversity, inclusiveness and a thorough familiarity with different sectors of civil society. It should be noted, however, that during the final workshop some participants questioned the validity and reliability of the findings precisely on those grounds.

The tight time-frame also affected the extent of stakeholder involvement. To be sure, stakeholder participation in the CSI was ensured but it would have been greater had the project lasted longer. Given the relatively short period of time within which the project had to be carried out, the amount of consultation, dissemination and stakeholder engagement that would otherwise have taken place was limited. This is not to downplay the valuable role of stakeholder participation in the undertaking of this project. Throughout the entire course of the implementation process every attempt was made to involve those to whom the research was addressed. However, the tight time schedule, within which the research had to be carried out, did have its impact upon the execution of this project, as it was conceived by CIVICUS.

Another factor that clearly had an impact upon this project was the fact that the two research teams that undertook the studies in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus collaborated for the first time and it took some valuable time to 'fine tune'.

## **Project Outputs**

The CSI implementation in the southern part of Cyprus yielded a range of products and outputs, but most important of all a fairly comprehensive country report on the state of civil society including a list of key recommendations, strategies and priority actions for strengthening civil society in the southern part of Cyprus, developed by a broad range of stakeholders. Considering that this is an aspect of society for which little is known, this is by no means a negligible task. The policy impact studies, the media review, the study of corporate social responsibility and the report on the bicomunal workshop are also significant outputs of the CSI implementation.

## 1.1 Special Features of Civil Society in the southern part of Cyprus

As we saw earlier the CSI describes civil society as an ‘arena, outside the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests’. What is important to understand about this ‘arena’, though, is that its shape and character are fundamentally determined by its relationship to the state. Although civil society lies ‘outside’ the state, it is largely defined by it. The kind of arena civil society is depends, among other things, upon the legal provisions that are in place and the way they are enforced by state agencies; on the way citizens understand their role vis-à-vis the state; but also upon the extent to which citizens are aware of the existence and the potential of that arena. It is no accident, for example, that civil society is thought to function at its best in more established democracies where civil rights and civil liberties are safeguarded and notions of citizenship are more entrenched, and to be seen as less vibrant in societies with authoritarian, clientelistic political institutions of the sort that we find in many postcolonial societies.

The way political institutions function in such societies is regarded as fundamentally different from the way they do in the more established democratic political systems of what is usually referred to as the West (Potter 1997). In post-colonial societies the state often takes more authoritarian and ‘interventionist’ forms, political institutions take time to develop, particularly since many of these countries must address formidable structural problems pertaining to their economic development, their special kind of dependence upon the powerful countries of the globe and, often, their very political survival as they try to cope with internal strife and tension (Clapham, 1985). Thus, in order to come to grips with civil society in an island that was granted its formal independence in 1960, it is essential to understand the specificity of the country’s polity, society and economy. Cyprus is a unique case of a post-colonial society in at least two important respects.

First, although in 1960 Cyprus’ structural characteristics were those of an underdeveloped economy, it managed to develop its economy quite impressively and raise the standard of living to levels comparable to those of more ‘developed’ economies.<sup>20</sup> Thus, for example, compared to other postcolonial societies, Cyprus does not have high unemployment rates, shanty towns, widespread poverty of the sort that is found in many Asian and African countries, high illiteracy rates, poor health indicators or other indicators showing lack of

**Figure II.1.1: Country information**

**Country size** (CIA, 2005): 9.250 square kilometers (of which 5.895 are currently controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus)  
**Population** (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Service, 2001): 703.529 (Men: 49%, Women, 51%)  
**Population under 15 years** (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Service, 2001): 22%  
**Urban population** (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Service, 2001): 69%  
**Form of government:** Presidential Democracy  
**Freedom House democracy rating** (Freedom House, 2004a): 1  
**Seats in parliament held by women** (House of Representatives, 2005): 16%  
**Language:** Greek, Turkish and English  
**Ethnicity** (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Service, 2001): Greek (99,0%), Armenians (0,3%), Maronites (0,6%), Latin (0,04%) and Turkish Cypriots (0,06%).  
**Religion** (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Service, 2001): Orthodox (94,8%), Catholic (1,5%), Church of England (1,0%), Moslem (0,6%), Maronite (0,6%), Armenian (0,3%), atheist (0,2%) and other (1,0%).  
**HDI score and ranking** (UNDP, 2004): 78.2 (30<sup>th</sup>)  
**GDP per capita** (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2005): CYP 9.142  
**Unemployment rate** (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2005): 3.5%

<sup>20</sup> This by no means implies that some major structural problems such as, for example, an overdependence on services (particularly tourism), foreign sources of raw materials, low levels of productive investment, regional disparities, and a weak agricultural sector have been resolved (cf., for example, Mavros, 1989, 1993; Christodoulou, 1992, 1995).

widespread access to the means of communication and transport. One of the factors that led to the spectacular growth of the economy was the role of trade unions that managed to become respected partners in the developmental efforts of the government. The second feature of the specificity of the island has been the unwillingness of its inhabitants to accept the state that was established in 1960 as *their* state.

The Greek Cypriot-led 1955-59 anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus did not aim to create a Cypriot state but rather to unite the island with Greece (this is known as *enosis*). But *enosis* was clearly not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community, the members of which did not want to become citizens of the Greek State that they consider hostile to their culture. Within the Turkish Cypriot community we therefore find groups advocating *taksim*, the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. Greece and Turkey have been important factors in the formation of socio-political processes in Cyprus: They were, after all, 'the mother countries' - *culturally* the source of inspiration and an important reference point of the identity of many Cypriots, *materially* as a source of support but also, to many, a handy 'lifejacket' to help the two communities progress through the turbulent waves of international politics. No understanding of the formation and structure of the Cypriot public space and the civil society arena can afford to ignore the significance attached by many of the inhabitants of the island on their respective 'mother' countries. By the same token, one cannot ignore how the position of those two countries in the international division of labour and international politics, in conjunction with the specificity of their internal socio-economic and political problems, affected polity and society in the island of Cyprus.

Thus, for reasons that cannot be discussed within the limited context of this introduction, the fight against British rule failed to unite the Greek and Turkish Cypriots into an all-encompassing anti-colonial movement (Attalides, 1979; Pollis, 1979; Kitromilides, 1979). There were, of course, instances of bi-communal cooperation, but these were primarily among groups on the left of the political spectrum, especially the Trade Unions. There were also many more instances of cooperation between ordinary people as they were going about living their everyday lives in the villages. But the 'other' was certainly not included in the preoccupations of many of the leaders and their followers of both communities. The fact that the British employed Turkish Cypriots in the police force to counter the anti-colonial movement did not also help to reduce the inter-communal tension.

The state that emerged out of the anti-colonial struggle was a state that few people really wanted (Persianis, 2004). To many Greek Cypriots, the state that was established in 1960 was a compromise, as their aim to unite with Greece did not materialise. During the 1960's and early 1970's few social forces advocated notions of Cypriot citizenship. Meanwhile from 1963 until 1974 there was political unrest and armed conflict, both within the Greek Cypriot community itself and between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, culminating in the de facto division of the island in 1974 when a coup staged by the Greek junta, with the help of local extreme nationalist groups, led to a military intervention by Turkey. During the 1960's and early 1970's *within* the Greek Cypriot community the major division was between a minority that advocated pursuing *enosis* at all costs and challenged the legitimacy of the Cypriot state; and those who argued that international circumstances were not ripe to pursue the cause of *enosis*.<sup>21</sup> In the ideological sphere, however, no side really disputed that union with Greece was a worthwhile goal to be pursued (Mavratsas, 2001a). The critical issue, at least at the level of rhetoric, was on the timing and, for those who opposed the government, on whether those who advocated a slower progression towards this goal were sincere.

The impact of this peculiar political situation upon civil society was enormous. Not only did the new state have to overcome all the usual obstacles that newly established post-colonial states face but it had to address the suspicions of many of its citizens who at first viewed it

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<sup>21</sup> One other relevant factor here was that in 1967 there was a military coup in Greece. The Greek military junta supported the militant anti-government groups in Cyprus.

with reservation. Moreover, the state was challenged by armed conflict. Instances of bi-communal cooperation were few and were mainly found to the left of the political spectrum. Political parties did not really acquire the complexion of parties, as they are known in modern democracies until after 1974 (Papaioannou, 1981; Zavou, 2002). The Cyprus public sphere, including civil society, could be described as a place in a constant state of mobilisation where slogans and fanaticism prevailed.<sup>22</sup> Social criticism was absent (Attalides, 1993). Although the situation has changed over the years, until fairly recently there have been few attempts by citizens to hold the state and private corporations accountable for their actions. For many years, the prevailing argument was that, with the inter-communal conflict still unresolved and the very survival of the Greek Cypriots very much at stake, the Republic of Cyprus was going through difficult times, and citizens should be careful with their demands. The state had other preoccupations, or so the argument went, and citizens were not to raise issues that were not a priority.

In the arena of civil society one could find professional associations, welfare organisations and cultural and athletic groups emerging.<sup>23</sup> Another prominent presence in this arena has been the Church and faith-based organisations, the result of the Orthodox Church's critical role as the main articulating force of the interests of the Greek Cypriots during colonial times, and the influence of the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios who was also the head of the Church.

After 1974 the polity gradually began to acquire the complexion of a modern democracy with political parties, regular elections, and institutions and procedures in place that allowed greater state transparency and accountability. But notions of citizenship remained feeble and civil society was still very much a very peculiar arena (Mavratsas, 2001b, Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005) with a fairly strong trade union movement, many voluntary organisations in place and plenty of sports and recreational associations, but few human rights and advocacy groups. The omnipresence of the political in all spheres of social life was clearly the most telling characteristic of the public sphere in the southern part of the island. The sociologist Mavratsas (2001b, pp.48) writes:

*Cypriot society is characterised by a relatively underdeveloped civil society that prevents the creation of a liberal public ethic. As a result, the political sphere...is dominated by corporatist orientations that create a clientelistic hyperpoliticization and an excessive statism which essentially crush the concept of the citizen...State authority together with the party mechanisms that support it, constitute the dominant sphere of social life. To a great extent, politics control both the economy and, in a wider sense, the society.*

Similar comments can be found in a more recent report (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005, pp.46-47):

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<sup>22</sup> 'Public sphere' here refers to the areas outside the family and the market. It includes the sphere of politics and CS.

<sup>23</sup> It is no accident for example that even today the overwhelming majority of CSOs are social and recreational associations and sports clubs amounting as they do to 30% of all the registered and unregistered CSOs that we were able to locate.

*The level of civic participation of the majority of the population of Cyprus is, once again, marked by the dominance of the 'national question' in the public sphere and by the role played by the political parties. The turbulent history of the island, culminating with the events of 1974, have greatly affected the generations of Cypriots which (sic) today would have manned (sic) the civil society in Cyprus...The Cypriots tend to think that almost everything has a political cause and expect from the politicians to deal with almost all issues facing society. Political power, as exercised by the state and the political parties, thus assumes a hegemonic role, controlling not only the economy but also the society at large, mostly evident in education, the media, cultural production and volunteer organisations (which are mainly charities) and resulting in the underdevelopment of the civil society...*

With these features of the specificity of the Cyprus case, we are now ready to examine more closely the concept of civil society in the southern part of the island.

## **1.2 Conceptualizing Civil Society in the southern part of Cyprus**

It should be clear by now that civil society has been developing under special circumstances in the country. During the first two meetings of the PAG the concept of civil society was extensively discussed and a number of issues relevant to the concerns of this report emerged.

The PAG pointed out that political parties should not be included in the definition of civil society because of their pervasive influence on many CSOs. This was not an easy decision as it was recognised that the nature and functioning of political parties could, under certain circumstances, qualify them for inclusion in the arena of civil society. However, as has been seen, political parties in the southern part of Cyprus constitute part of an all-encompassing power structure, with close links to the media and many CSOs and with extensive clientelistic networks that link their supporters to the various spheres of public life. As will be seen in Section 2 of the report the autonomy of many CSOs is eroded by their very dependence on political parties. This creates an image of inconsistency and lack of credibility among those who occupy the public sphere, whether in the realm of politics or in the arena of civil society. It is no accident, for example, that the Civil Society Survey 2005 shows that political parties enjoy low levels of public trust and that opinion polls indicate that the public considers them corrupt and in need of modernisation. To have included them in the definition of civil society would convey a distorted picture of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus, as it would effectively reduce the analysis to a discussion of the political parties. By excluding them from the definition, a much clearer picture of the strengths and weaknesses of civil society has emerged.

In view of the above, the definition of civil society that has been endorsed by the PAG is the following:

*'Civil society is the arena, outside the family, the state, the political parties and the market where people associate to advance common interests'*

Table II.1.1 below shows the kinds of CSOs that this definition encompasses.

**TABLE II.1.1: Types of CSOs included in the study**

1	Faith-based organisations	11	Economic interest CSOs
2	Trade unions	12	Ethnic / traditional / indigenous associations / organisations
3	Advocacy CSOs	13	Environmental CSOs
4	Service CSOs	14	Culture and arts CSOs
5	CSOs active in education, training and research	15	Social and recreational CSOs and sports clubs
6	Student and youth associations	16	Grant-making foundations & fund-raising bodies
7	Women's associations	17	CSO networks / federations / support organisations
8	Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups	18	Social movements
9	Professional and business organisations	19	1974 refugee associations
10	Community-level groups / associations	20	Miscellaneous CSOs not included in the above categories

### 1.3 Mapping Civil Society in the southern part of Cyprus

How does civil society look like in the southern part of Cyprus? How does it relate to broader social forces in the country? To explore these issues further, the PAG conducted a social forces and civil society mapping exercise. These mapping exercises which constitute part of the CIVICUS methodology and are based on participatory rural appraisal methods, seek to visually present the major forces within society and civil society, respectively, and to investigate the relations between these forces. The discussion was interesting and thoughtful and some of its conclusions are presented here - not as the 'definitive' mapping of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus, but as an analysis carried out by a group of knowledgeable citizens drawn from a wide spectrum of social life who do not necessarily agree among themselves on a wide range of political and social issues.

What emerged out of the long discussion among the PAG was that two kinds of CSOs, namely Trade Unions and the Church were considered to belong to the significant social forces in the country.<sup>24</sup> It is interesting, however, that when social forces were visually deployed it emerged that CSOs constituted a sphere of their own not very close to the state. The economic elite, the Banks and big private companies were placed nearer to the state agencies than the Trade Unions.

Voluntary organisations were thought to have moderate influence on society and so did football clubs.<sup>25</sup> Many other CSOs, however, such as professional associations, the consumers' association, women's groups, parents' associations, religious organisations, chambers of commerce and the employers' federation were deemed to have 'some influence'. Finally, refugee organisations, groups fighting for the rights of immigrant workers, student organisations and groups promoting the rapprochement of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were found to have 'minimal influence'. So, according to the view of the PAG,

<sup>24</sup> Our data show that the 140 trade unions that are currently registered constitute just below four percent of all CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus. The biggest of those are the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and SEK (Cyprus Confederation of Labour). Other powerful unions include, PASYDY (the Civil Servants' Union), the unions of primary and secondary school teachers, POED and OELMEK and ETYK (the Union of Bank Employees). The Civil Servants Union was singled out as a force with 'great influence.'

<sup>25</sup> As we shall see below, many football clubs have close connections with political parties and so football matches are often politically charged.

it appears that many CSOs do not constitute significant social forces and that only certain sectors of civil society are thought to have a significant impact on society. This is, of course, not surprising in view of what was said earlier about the complexion of the polity and society and its impact on civil society.

When the PAG proceeded to examine the arena of civil society more closely, it divided it into three broad sectors. In the first sector there is a cluster of Trade Unions, women's, students', youth and peasants' organisations. The most prominent of those are the left-wing trade union PEO and SEK.<sup>26</sup> The left-wing women's organisation POGO was also singled out as an influential CSO.<sup>27</sup>

In the second sector we find a cluster of CSOs, mostly dealing with welfare issues with the Pancyprrian Welfare Council, the most important umbrella welfare organisation, being singled out as the organisation with the greatest influence. Other influential CSOs in this sector include, anticancer associations, the heart association, foundations active in the field of mental retardation, the Cyprus Red Cross and parents' associations.

Finally in the third sector, there are mostly faith-based CSOs, with the Orthodox Church of Cyprus being portrayed as a force that exerts much influence. The bishoprics and monasteries are also thought to be influential actors within this sector of the civil society arena, as are the women's organisations of the Nicosia and Limassol dioceses.<sup>28</sup> This sector of civil society was viewed by the PAG as being closer to the 'welfare' sector but further away from Trade Unions.

There were three sets of other CSOs that were portrayed by the PAG as being somewhat isolated from these three clusters. Football clubs were set apart as a group in their own right with little contact to the three sectors. Cultural associations and advocacy groups were thought to have little influence, but set somewhat apart from the rest of the CSOs that were placed on the map. Professional organisations and associations were also placed apart from the rest, although they were portrayed as having some influence.

The mapping exercise undertaken by the PAG constitutes only one way of portraying civil society. It is the outcome of the perceptions and deliberations of people with insider knowledge of the field, and as such it has its value. However, it should not be seen as anything but a social 'construct' and should be treated as such. The next section of this report will look more closely at civil society and examine the evidence that was collected by the Intercollege research team.

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<sup>26</sup> SEK is a Trade Union to the centre-right of the political spectrum.

<sup>27</sup> The Pancyprrian Federation of Women's Organisations (POGO) has close links with AKEL, the biggest political party in the island, which basically dictates the organisation's policies. AKEL is to the left of the political spectrum. Interestingly the women's organizations of the other political parties were grouped together by the PAG into one category but one which was judged to have great influence within civil society.

<sup>28</sup> The leadership of the Church of Cyprus is made up of the Archbishop, the five bishops of Paphos, Kition (Larnaca), Larnaca, Limassol, Kyrenia and Morphou, who head the five bishoprics, the bishop of Kykkos Monastery, a very influential force in Cypriot society because of its financial clout, and the three assistant bishops of Salamis, Tremithus and Arsinoe. All these constitute the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.

## 2. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF CYPRUS


This section of the report presents the data collected for the analysis of civil society in terms of the CSI indicators, subdimensions and dimensions that CIVICUS has determined. As stated in the introduction, the analysis undertaken here should be seen as a first attempt to come to grips with a complex and largely un-researched field within a limited time period. At times the analysis is not as comprehensive as we would have liked either because there was no time to pursue a question further, because the data were simply not available or because the prescribed methodology required that only specific types of evidence be sought.

This section begins with an examination of the **structure** of civil society, proceeds with an analysis of the **environment** within which it operates and of the **values** that it promotes and practices, and ends with an investigation of the **impact** of civil society upon public policy and society in general.

### 2.1 Structure

This section analyses the overall size and strength of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus. It looks into the breadth and depth of citizen participation, the extent to which the membership and leadership of CSOs represent the social groups constituting society, the level of organisation and the inter-relations between civil society actors and finally the resources available to those who operate in the civil society arena. The overall score for this dimension is 1.3, indicating a slightly ‘weak’ structure. The subdimension scores in figure II.1.2 show that this is particularly the consequence of an insufficient depth of citizen participation, a lack of substantial diversity in the social background of civil society participants and the rather inadequate level of organisation, communication and cooperation between CSOs. The level of resources scored comparatively well and so did the breadth of citizen participation. But, overall, the picture emerging out of the data cited here is one of a structural weakness.

**FIGURE II.1.2: Subdimension scores in structure dimension**



#### 1.1 The Breadth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the extent of various forms of citizen participation in civil society. Table II.1.2 summarizes the respective indicator scores.


**TABLE II.1.2: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	<u>2</u>
1.1.2	Charitable giving	<u>3</u>
1.1.3	CSO membership	<u>1</u>
1.1.4	Volunteer work	<u>2</u>
1.1.5	Community action	<u>0</u>

*1.1.1 Non-partisan political action.*  
One of the questions in the Civil

**FIGURE II.1.3 Frequency of non-partisan political action**

Society Survey 2005 aimed at investigating the percentage of people that have ever undertaken some form of non-partisan political action, such as writing a letter to a newspaper, signing a petition, participating in a demonstration, or taking part in a strike. As can be seen from the figure II.1.3, 59% of the respondents have participated in a demonstration, around 46% have signed a petition, while 35% have taken part in strikes and only 16% have written a letter to a newspaper.




Fifty nine percent of respondents to the Survey have participated in at least one of these non-partisan political actions.<sup>29</sup>

Source: *Civil Society Survey 2005*

*1.1.2 Charitable giving.* This indicator examines the behaviour of charitable giving among the population. The Civil Society Survey 2005 found that an overwhelming majority (87%) of the sample has donated money or goods to charity within the past year. No statistically significant relationship between charitable giving and place of residence was found. Charitable giving mostly takes the form of contributions to fund-raising activities that usually take place at traffic lights, the purchase of lottery tickets issued by charities or tickets for gala dinners organised by (mainly) welfare organisations. People may also donate clothes, shoes, food, furniture or kitchen utensils to church welfare committees.

<sup>29</sup> A word of caution is in order here. A demonstration may appear to be non-partisan in form but in the context of the Greek Cypriot community its success is more often than not dependent upon the stance that political parties will take on its purpose. This is because, as we saw in the introduction to CS in the southern part of the island, political parties dominate the entire public sphere. If political parties 'approve' a demonstration they are likely to encourage or even ask their members to participate. Thus the fact that almost sixty percent of the sample said that they have participated in a demonstration does not necessarily mean that their participation is an indication of a non-partisan political action as they could have participated because they were asked by their political parties to do so.

**FIGURE II.1.4: Largest CSO categories**

Source: *Civil Society Survey 2005*

**1.1.3 CSO membership.** According to the Civil Society Survey 2005, 43% of the population were members of at least one CSO. The survey showed that CSOs concerned with health issues and welfare services have the largest membership, while ethnic minority organisations such as, for example, the Association of Greek Pontians and the Maronite Community Association, have the smallest membership. Thus, the data indicates that a large minority of people belong to at least one CSO. No statistically significant relationship was found between place of residence and the likelihood of membership in a CSO.

**1.1.4 Volunteering.** The same survey revealed that a little over half of the respondents (51%) have either assisted an organisation without pay or provided support of some kind to members of the community during the previous twelve months. What is interesting, however, is that only 7% said they have assisted a voluntary organisation without pay during the same period whereas 48% provided unpaid support to members of the community on an informal basis (e.g. shopping or cooking for low-income neighbours, giving elderly or disabled neighbours a lift to the hospital or the bank, providing clothes to needy neighbours).<sup>30</sup>

**1.1.5 Collective community action.** The Civil Society Survey 2005 found that 36% of the respondents were aware of formal or informal meetings taking place within the past year that aimed to discuss issues concerning their area. However, only 18% actually participated in any of these meetings. The Survey also probed respondents on whether during the past year people in their area came together voluntarily to do work for the benefit of the area. Exactly half of them stated that they could not recall such a gathering while 20% said that they did not know. Only 29% knew of such activities while 11% actually participated in such gatherings. These findings indicate that only a small percentage of the population (less than 30%) have participated in some form of collective community action during the past year.

## 1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the depth of various forms of citizen participation in civil society. Table II.1.3 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.1.3: Indicators assessing the depth of citizen participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Charitable Giving	1
1.2.2	Volunteering	1
1.2.3	CSO membership	1

**1.2.1 Charitable giving.** According to the Civil Society Survey 2005, the average value of donations to charities by people during the last twelve months was approximately CYP 110.<sup>31</sup>


<sup>30</sup> This percentage includes 30 individuals who had also said that they worked without pay for a voluntary organisation.

<sup>31</sup> It should be noted though that the figures in this indicator are those that were given by the respondents to the questionnaire. There is no way of telling whether what they answered is accurate.

Calculated as a percentage of annual income, on average, people spend 1.3% of their annual income on donations to charities.

**1.2.2 Volunteering.** The Civil Society Survey 2005 shows that more than half of the respondents (53%) did not spend any time on voluntary work during the past month while 39% spent time on volunteering in associations, groups and networks or in supporting other people. The majority (43%) of those respondents who did spend time on such activities said that they have dedicated less than 5 hours on volunteer work during the past month.

**FIGURE II.1.5: Hours spent on activities in associations, groups, networks or in supporting other people**



Source: *Civil Society Survey 2005*

**1.2.3 CSO membership.** The same Survey revealed that 36% of the respondents who are members of at least one CSO have multiple memberships in CSOs. Health and social services associations appeared to have the largest membership among the respondents accounting as they did for 21% of all those who said that they were members of at least one CSO. Trade union members accounted for 18% of CSO members, the same percentage as those who were members of sports associations.

### 1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants

This subdimension examines the diversity and representativeness of the civil society arena. It also examines whether all social groups participate equitably in civil society and the extent to which certain groups are dominant or excluded. Table II.1.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.1.4: Indicators assessing the diversity of civil society participants**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.3.1</u>	CSO membership	<u>1</u>
<u>1.3.2</u>	CSO leadership	<u>1</u>
<u>1.3.3</u>	Distribution of CSOs	<u>0</u>

**1.3.1 CSO membership.** This indicator looks at the extent to which significant social groups are represented in the membership of CSOs that exist in the areas under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Information was collected from a survey among 57 stakeholders, who are members of over one hundred different types of CSOs. Table II.1.5 below summarises their responses.

**TABLE II.1.5: Level of representation of different groups among the CSO membership**

Group	Level of Representation					
	Absent / Excluded (%)	Severely Under-Represented (%)	Somewhat Under-Represented (%)	Equitably Represented (%)	Don't Know (%)	Total (%)
Women	0	20	47	31	2	100
Residents of Rural Areas	10	45	32	11	2	100
Ethnic / Linguistic Minorities	26	36	18	11	9	100
Foreign Workers	55	15	9	6	15	100
Religious Minorities	8	26	28	23	15	100
Poor People	18	40	29	11	2	100
Upper Class / Elite	0	6	11	76	7	100
Youth	0	22	44	30	4	100
Senior Citizens	7	24	31	33	5	100

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

It seems, then, that the overwhelming majority of the surveyed stakeholders do not consider significant groups within society as being 'Equitably Represented' in the membership of CSOs. Foreign workers appear to be the category that is perceived to be the least represented but other significant social groups, particularly the poor and rural dwellers as well as members of ethnic/linguistic minorities, are reported as being either absent/excluded or severely underrepresented in CSOs. On the other hand, respondents to the questionnaire seem to believe by an overwhelming majority (76%) that only members of the upper class/elite are 'Equitably Represented' in the membership of CSOs. One of the explanations offered during the scoring meeting was that the people who are described as 'upper class/elite' have usually more time to spend on voluntary activities.

*1.3.2 CSO leadership.* The responses of civil society stakeholders to a question on the social composition of the leadership of CSOs yield similar answers as the question on membership, as they tend to indicate that significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles. Table II.1.6 summarises the stakeholders' answers:

**TABLE II.1.6: Level of representation of different groups among the leadership of civil society organisations**

Group	Level of Representation					Total (%)
	Absent / Excluded (%)	Severely Under-Represented (%)	Somewhat Under-Represented (%)	Equitably Represented (%)	Don't Know (%)	
Women	5	38	41	14	2	100
Residents of Rural Areas	16	57	9	11	7	100
Ethnic / Linguistic Minorities	35	27	16	9	13	100
Foreign Workers	69	13	5	2	11	100
Religious Minorities	15	31	18	18	18	100
Poor People	25	44	22	4	5	100
Upper Class / Elite	0	2	7	84	7	100
Youth	4	36	38	18	4	100
Senior Citizens	6	22	29	38	5	100

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Leadership positions of CSOs seem to be filled by the rich and the privileged with the respondents to the regional stakeholders questionnaire indicating by an overwhelming majority (84%) that the upper class/elite is 'Equitably Represented' in leadership positions of CSOs. During the scoring meeting, members of the PAG expressed the view that not only does this social group have the time to spend in CSO activities but it also has the *means* to pursue them through its networks, acquaintances and sheer knowledge of how the system actually works. This makes it appealing for many members of CSOs to vote people of such social background into leadership positions.

If the overwhelming majority of respondents considered upper social strata to be 'equitably' represented in leadership positions, a telling majority of 69% indicated that foreign workers are 'Absent/Excluded' from such positions. Although the percentage of those who thought that ethnic/linguistic minorities and the poor are 'Absent/Excluded' from leadership positions was smaller (34% and 25% respectively) it is nevertheless significant enough to attract attention especially if we take into account that those who answered that such minorities and the poor are 'Severely Underrepresented' accounted for 27% and 44% of the sample respectively. This means that over 60% of the respondents did not consider these two social groups to be equitably represented or even 'Somewhat Underrepresented'. It is also worth reporting that over 70% of the respondents answered that those who live in rural areas are either 'Absent/Excluded' from or 'Severely Underrepresented' in leadership positions of CSOs.

Overall, the percentage of those who answered that significant social groups such as women, the young, rural inhabitants, and minorities are 'Equitably Represented' in leadership positions was much lower than the percentage of those who answered that those groups are 'Somewhat' or 'Severely' underrepresented or even 'Absent/ Excluded'.

*1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs.* The available data suggest that CSOs are *not* evenly distributed throughout the country. CSOs appear to be concentrated in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, and Limassol, the second largest city. The two cities accounted for approximately eighty percent of all registered CSOs in 2003, the last year for which data are available: 60% in Nicosia and 20% in Limassol.<sup>32</sup> This dominance of the two major cities is mirrored in the stakeholder survey where, over two thirds of the respondents saw CSOs to be either largely concentrated in the capital (25%) or limited to the urban areas (39%). This is consistent with the under-representation of rural dwellers in CSOs which was discussed under the previous two indicators.

## 1.4 Level of Organisation

This subdimension looks at the extent of infrastructure and internal organisation within civil society. Table II.1.7 summarises the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.1.7: Indicators assessing the level of organisation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	<u>1</u>
1.4.2	Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	<u>2</u>
1.4.3	Self-regulation	<u>1</u>
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	<u>1</u>
1.4.5	International linkages	<u>1</u>

*1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies.* Identifying the number of CSOs that belonged to umbrella organisations or indeed the number of umbrella organisations has proved a rather arduous task. During the scoring meeting, it was pointed out that even the Pancyprian Welfare Council, one of the most prominent and influential umbrella organisations, does not have accurate information on the number of CSOs that belonged to an umbrella organisation. Thus, our finding that the percentage of CSOs belonging to a federation or umbrella body or network is approximately 28% should be treated with caution.<sup>33</sup> This finding is based upon the following data that we were able to collect:

- There are 137 federations / umbrella bodies / networks of CSOs. One hundred and seven of those are registered under the Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 57/1972).<sup>34</sup>
- There are 2.842 registered associations under the same law and 766 non-registered, a total, that is, of 3608. In both cases the numbers do not include federations.<sup>35</sup>
- The 47 largest federations have a total of 1.006 member organisations.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> This estimate is based on a list of all CSOs obtained by the research team from the Ministry of the Interior and local district offices.

<sup>33</sup> This percentage is an estimate only. As mentioned in the main text, only 47 of the 137 federations that are in existence could be contacted. However, the federations that could not be contacted are either small and thus their membership is small or inactive.

<sup>34</sup> It is probably the case that they are not registered either because they are not aware of the benefits of being a registered association or because, being small, they do not have the time or the resources to work on Memoranda of Association, registration procedures and so on.

<sup>35</sup> Our research shows that the majority of non-registered organisations are parents' associations. There are also non-registered youth centres, CSOs registered as non-profit companies, hunting clubs and small sports clubs.

<sup>36</sup> It has been impossible to contact the rest of the federations / umbrella bodies / networks. Most probably, however, they are either inactive or too small.

One possible explanation for this rather low percentage of CSOs belonging to a federation or an umbrella body that emerged during the scoring meeting was that some CSOs do not belong to umbrella organisations because they are worried about their resources being controlled by the latter.

*1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies.* In general, the existing umbrella bodies are rarely seen as effective. Exactly half of the surveyed stakeholders who answered the relevant question said that the effectiveness of federations or umbrella bodies was ‘mixed’ (neither completely effective, nor completely ineffective), while 27% said that these bodies were ‘largely ineffective’. The percentage of those who replied that it was ‘generally effective’ was 21%.

During the consultations it emerged that many stakeholders felt that no umbrella organisation is in a position to fully achieve its declared goals due to factors that are beyond its control, such as the government’s economic policy and the strength of other interest organisations advocating courses of action that are different from those proposed by the umbrella organisation.

*1.4.3 Self-regulation.* The findings about the extent of self-regulation among CSOs remain somewhat inconclusive. When asked whether there have been efforts within civil society to establish codes of conduct or other means of self-regulation, 29% of the surveyed stakeholders answered that ‘some mechanisms are in place but their impact is limited’ while another 16% replied that ‘preliminary efforts are in place however their impact is limited’. Another 13% answered that ‘there have been no efforts’. Only 13% of respondents answered that ‘mechanisms are in place and function effectively’. There was also an unusually high percentage (30%) of ‘don’t know’ answers among the surveyed stakeholders. The fact that almost a third of the respondents who were, after all, people with a long and active involvement in CSOs replied that they did not know, indicates that either the question was not clearly understood (which is rather improbable because the question was clear and the majority of the respondents were well-educated) or that issues of self-regulation are not widely discussed by a large number of CSOs.

It should be noted that certain professional organisations such as, for example, the Pancyprrian Medical Association, the Cyprus Bar Association, the Cyprus Architects Association, the Cyprus Union of Journalists and the Scientific and Technical Chamber of Cyprus abide by clearly defined regulations to which their members are expected to adhere.

During the consultations it emerged that the stakeholders believed that a CSO’s Memorandum of Association, which is a prerequisite for registration with the Ministry of the Interior, and its Constitution constitute sufficient means of self-regulation. This is because, according to Law 57 of 1972 on Associations and Foundations, the Memorandum of Association of an association or foundation, has to specifically state:

- The aim of the association/foundation, its name and headquarters.
- The conditions of entry, withdrawal and expulsion of members as well as their rights and obligations.
- The association/foundation’s sources of income.
- The methods of legal representation of the association/foundation.
- The administrative bodies, terms of resignation of officers and termination of office.
- The rules governing meetings and the decision-making methods.
- The ways in which the aims and provisions of the memorandum of association can be amended.
- The auditing methods of its accounts.
- The terms of dissolution including the handling of the association/foundation’s funds.

*1.4.4 Support infrastructure.* Civil society support infrastructure in the southern part of Cyprus is rather weak. One quarter (25%) of stakeholders responding to a question on the existing capacity building and support infrastructure for civil society in the regional stakeholders' survey answered that 'no such infrastructure exists' while another 37% answered that the existing infrastructure was 'very limited'. Another 30% described the infrastructure as 'moderate' and only 4% answered that it was 'well developed'.

There are some specific sectors of civil society that are generally seen as enjoying a higher level of support infrastructure than others. Capacity building for its member organisations is actively pursued by the Pancyprian Welfare Council, the coordinating body of social welfare organisations. It provides systematic training and contributes to the development of staff, volunteers and officials of its member organisations on a variety of issues such as EU funding opportunities, public relations and management methods. Trade unions are also active in the capacity building of their member organisations, by providing information through research, organising educational workshops, offering representation to international fora and youth services.

Thus, it seems that the main reason that some sections of civil society enjoy higher levels of support infrastructure and capacity building is the fact that they have formed umbrella organisations. During the consultations it emerged that some sectors of civil society are unwilling to form such organisations as they do not see any benefits or do not have the financial resources to do so.

*1.4.5 International linkages.* In the southern part of Cyprus only a limited number of CSOs have international linkages. Data from the London School of Economics Global Civil Society 2004/05 publication show that in 2003, 1,421 international organisations included Cypriots in their membership, during that year, while only 17 international organisations had their headquarters in the country (Anheier et al, 2005).

Only one fifth (20%) of the surveyed stakeholders stated that 'numerous' CSOs were members of international networks. Well over two fifths (45%) answered that 'some' CSOs were members of such international networks while another 29% said that the CSOs that belonged to them were 'very few'. These perceptions seem to reflect the fact that membership of international networks is largely confined to national-level CSOs, especially trade unions, professional organisations, and business associations.

## 1.5 Inter-Relations within Civil Society

This subdimension analyses the relations amongst civil society actors. Table II.1.8 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.1.8: Indicators assessing the inter-relations within civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication	<u>1</u>
1.5.2	Cooperation	<u>2</u>

*1.5.1 Communication.* In the southern part CSOs have limited channels of communication and do not regularly share information amongst each other. The majority (53%) of the surveyed stakeholders regard the level of communication between civil society actors as limited or non-existent. It should be noted, however, that the level of communication is not the same throughout civil society. Some organisations such as, for example, the Pancyprian Welfare Council, trade unions, employers' organisations, Chambers of Commerce, the Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies and football clubs have websites and/or publish newsletters, newspapers, or information leaflets and/or organize seminars and conferences for their members.

*1.5.2 Cooperation.* CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus seem to only occasionally cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Forty one percent of the surveyed stakeholders said that there were 'very few' examples of CSOs from different sectors of civil society forming alliances/networks or coalitions on issues of common concern while 34% answered that there were 'some' such examples. Interestingly, 13% answered that they did not know of such examples. On the other hand, 11% of respondents answered that such examples were 'numerous'.

During the regional stakeholder consultations, a number of examples of alliances, coalitions and networks between different types of CSOs were provided:

- The Limassol Chamber of Commerce and Industry invited environmental and cultural organisations to exchange views and work together on the future of Limassol.
- The Red Cross collaborated with parents' associations to offer school breakfast to children from socially disadvantaged backgrounds in the Limassol region.
- The non-profit, Limassol-based, cultural organisation RIALTO, organised a series of cultural activities in cooperation with the cultural office of AKEL, the communist Party of Cyprus and one of the two major parties, and the Pancyprian Anti-Drug Association to raise consciousness on drug abuse.
- The Fund of the Day of Love for the Child has at times funded the Committee for the Protection and the Welfare of the Child, parents' associations and projects that fall within its scope such as the project for the upgrading of schools for children with learning difficulties.
- The Bank of Cyprus Oncology Centre regularly cooperates with Europa Donna, the Pancyprian Association of Cancer Patients and Friends (PASYKAF) and the Make a Wish Foundation.
- Some environmental groups cooperate with women's associations for the organisation of cleaning campaigns.
- The Pancyprian Diabetes Association and the Pancyprian Heart Patients Association have in the past collaborated to regulate the prices of medicine and equipment for blood sugar analysis.

The media review revealed some further examples of cooperation:

- The Pancyprian Labour Federation (PEO), the biggest trade union on the island, and the Environmental Movement of Cyprus were among the many organisations that asked their members to participate in an anti-war demonstration, organised by the Pancyprian Peace Council.
- Consumers' organisations, trade unions, the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Shopkeeper Association were among the CSOs that, together with the Consumer Protection Service of the Ministry of Labour, organised an event to celebrate World Consumers' Day.
- A march aimed at raising money and increasing social awareness for the blind was jointly organised by a CSO that promotes the interests of the blind and the Lions clubs.
- Limassol and Larnaka port workers joined their European counterparts in a three-hour strike to protest against EU plans to privatise port services in the EU.
- Various agricultural associations jointly organised a vine-growers conference.

The number of examples may at first glance contradict the shareholders' opinion that there are 'very few examples' of networks/alliances or coalitions between different sectors of civil society. Nevertheless, a more careful examination of the majority of the examples will show that they mainly concern one-off events rather than more permanent alliances/coalitions, which seem to have been the benchmark assessed by stakeholders.

## 1.6 Civil Society Resources

This subdimension examines the resources available for CSOs. Table II.1.9 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.1.9: Indicators assessing the civil society resources**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.6.1</u>	Financial resources	<u>1</u>
<u>1.6.2</u>	Human resources	<u>2</u>
<u>1.6.3</u>	Technological and infrastructural resources	<u>2</u>

*1.6.1 Financial resources.* On average CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus seem to have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals. Stakeholders were rather divided in their assessment of the financial resources of the organisations they are involved in. An almost equal share of between a quarter and a third of respondents considered them to be 'adequate' (25%), 'rather adequate' (35%) or 'inadequate' (27%).<sup>37</sup>

Thus, 60% of the respondents describe financial resources of the organizations that they are mostly familiar with as either 'adequate' or 'rather adequate'. However, during the scoring meeting, the PAG expressed its surprise with the result of the survey as it was expected that the responses would indicate a much deeper dissatisfaction with the levels of funding. One of the points that was brought up is that the adequacy of financial resources varies from one CSO to the other. Professional associations, trade unions and CSOs linked to political parties have more adequate financial resources than smaller organisations. The impression of most of the PAG members was that lack of adequate funding *was* an issue for many sections of civil society.

<sup>37</sup> It should be noted that the reference here is to *responses* rather than organisations. This is because, in some cases, the information provided by the respondents concerned the same organisation. For example, a stakeholder with an active involvement in an anticancer group who was asked to participate in the research *because* of that involvement could also be a member of an advocacy group. When stakeholders were asked to comment on three organisations with which they were mostly familiar, that particular stakeholder would perhaps include that advocacy group in the three organisation s/he would provide comments. If, however, another stakeholder was invited because of his/her involvement in that same advocacy group, s/he would naturally include it in the three organisations he/she would provide comments. Thus there could be some overlap.

*1.6.2 Human resources.* On average, CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus seem to have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals: 73% of stakeholders judge them to be adequate and another 24% to be ‘rather adequate’, while only 2% judge them as ‘inadequate’. There is, however, variation between the responses of stakeholders from different regions. More specifically, stakeholders from the Nicosia district seem to be more satisfied with the human resources of their organizations, with 76% considering them ‘adequate’ and 24% ‘rather adequate’. On the other hand, 51% of the stakeholders from the Limassol and Paphos districts consider the human resources of their organizations ‘inadequate’ whereas 49% consider these resources as ‘adequate’ or ‘rather adequate’. This variation could be the result of the fact that the headquarters of many CSOs are in the capital and are well staffed in order to be able to accomplish their island-wide missions.

*1.6.3. Technological and infrastructural resources.* On average, CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus seem to have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals. Table II.1.10 below shows the responses of the regional stakeholders’ survey. The responses describing the equipment and infrastructure as ‘adequate’ amounted to 45% while those who described them as ‘rather adequate’ constituted 26%. Another 24% judge the equipment and infrastructure to be ‘inadequate’ whereas 2% describe it as ‘completely inadequate’. Thus, 71% of the responses to the question describe the technological and infrastructural resources of CSOs as either ‘adequate’ or ‘rather adequate’, indicating a well-developed technological infrastructure for CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus.

**TABLE II.1.10: Adequacy of equipment and infrastructure**

<b>Responses</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
Adequate	47	45
Rather adequate	28	26
Inadequate	25	24
Completely inadequate	2	2
Don't Know	3	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

However, a breakdown by region reveals some interesting differences. A majority (54%) of the Limassol and Paphos stakeholders describe the technological and infrastructural resources as ‘adequate’, whereas only 34% of their Nicosia, Larnaca and Famagusta counterparts do so. An almost equal percentage (32%) of the latter, describe them as ‘rather adequate’. This regional variation in the responses warrants further investigation but it should be seen within the context of a situation in which the headquarters of most CSOs are concentrated in Nicosia. It is therefore possible that the Nicosia stakeholders were less satisfied with their infrastructure because the demands placed on their headquarters are usually greater than the pressure exerted on the branches. This is by no means the only possible explanation and it is offered here simply as a hypothesis to be further explored.

## Conclusion

The analysis of civil society’s structure in the areas currently under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus reveals a number of weaknesses especially with regard to the depth of citizen participation, the diversity of civil society participants and the level of organisation within civil society. Those features largely account for the relatively low

score of 1.3. In contrast, and contrary to the expectations of many PAG members, it appears that many CSOs have relatively adequate resources to achieve their goals, although organisations linked to political parties have more adequate resources than smaller organisations.

Although almost 60% of the surveyed population said that they took some form of non-partisan political action, such as signing a petition, only 43% of that population belonged to a CSO and only 16% belonged to two or more CSOs. Furthermore, although voluntary work appears to have been undertaken by almost half of the survey respondents during the last year, more than half of those respondents did not spend any time on voluntary work during the last month. Finally, even though donations in money and in kind appear to be quite widespread among the population, monetary donations seem to represent only a tiny percentage of people's annual income.

The lack of significant depth of citizen participation should be seen in conjunction with the lack of diversity of civil society participants as they both undermine the strength of civil society. First, significant social groups, such as foreign workers and ethnic minorities, tend to be absent or excluded from CSOs, while social groups such as the poor and residents of rural areas tend to be severely underrepresented in the membership and leadership of CSOs. Second, CSOs are excessively concentrated in the capital, and to a lesser extent, in Limassol. The rather weak structure of civil society is also indicated by the relatively small number of CSOs that belong to umbrella bodies or have international connections, the absence of a supporting infrastructure for CSOs, inadequate self-regulation, limited communication between civil society actors and low levels of co-operation between different types of CSOs.

On the more positive side, we have seen that CSOs, on the whole, have most of the human and technological resources that they need to achieve their objectives. Over 71% of stakeholders said that CSOs have at least adequate equipment and infrastructure to carry out their activities.

Overall, then, the structural shortcomings of civil society in the areas currently under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus that were identified above will need to be addressed if civil society is to become stronger in the years to come.

## A Note on Two Additional Indicators that were not scored

The dimension of ‘structure’ includes two indicators that were added by the research team but were not scored by the PAG. Indicator 1.1.6 (Citizen participation in bicomunal events) and 1.5.3 (Level of cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organizations).

During the scoring meeting, the PAG expressed the view that although the material addressing the indicators that were added was interesting, the indicators should not be scored or included in the construction of the ‘diamond’. The view of the PAG was that, because of the peculiar situation in which Cyprus finds itself (the division of the island, the displacement of persons, the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of the island, the existence of a buffer zone, the unwillingness of many Greek Cypriots to provide legitimacy to what, to them, are the *fait accompli* created by the events of 1974 but also because of intolerance or fear of intimidation) many Greek Cypriots are unable or unwilling to participate in bicomunal activities or organize activities together with Turkish Cypriot organizations. The reasons Greek Cypriots may not participate in bicomunal events according to the PAG, are not only objective but also emotional, political, ethical and ideological. Greek Cypriots may therefore refrain from participating in bicomunal activities for any one (or combination) of those reasons. The gist of the PAG’s argument was that the data concerning these indicators should be seen in the context of a country that it is still divided and the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots view the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of the island as fundamentally wrong. Thus those indicators were not deemed to be relevant to what the PAG was asked to assess (i.e. the state of CS in the areas currently under the control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus) although the PAG felt that they could be included separately in the report. This is the information presented to the PAG for the scoring of the two indicators:

*1.1.6 Citizen participation in bi-communal events.* The respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 were asked whether they have participated in any bicomunal events during the past twelve months. The overwhelming majority (82%) of the sample stated that they have not taken part in any bicomunal event during the past year.

*1.5.3. Level of Cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot CSOs.* Fifty seven percent of the respondents to a relevant question in the regional stakeholder questionnaire stated that less than 20% of organisations in the sector of CS that they know best have taken part in an event organised jointly with the Turkish Cypriot Community. This indicates that a relatively small number of CSOs have participated in an event organised jointly with the Turkish Cypriot Community. The fact that one fifth of the respondents said that they did not know of any CSOs taking part in such jointly organised events tends to confirm this conclusion.

**TABLE II.1.11: Share of civil society organisations that have participated and/or have taken part in an event organised together with the Turkish Cypriot community**

<b>% of CSOs that have participated in an event with the TC community</b>	<b>%</b>
<20	57
21-40	18
41-60	2
Over 60	3
Don't Know	20
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Events jointly organised by CSOs or other civil society groups from both communities include cultural happenings, get-togethers of the inhabitants of certain villages or regions, and joint academic conferences, seminars and public discussions.

The level of cooperation between CSOs from both communities, as indicated by the distribution of responses to the question 'In the sector of civil society that you know best, how would you describe the level of cooperation between civil society organisations with the communities from the other side of the Green Line?' are presented in table II.1.12 below.

**TABLE II.1.12: Level of cooperation between CSOs and communities from the other side of the Green Line<sup>38</sup>**

<b>Level of Cooperation</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
Non-Existent	9	16
Limited	30	54
Moderate	8	14
Significant	4	7
Don't Know	5	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

<sup>38</sup> Distribution of responses to the question of the Regional Stakeholders Questionnaire: 'In the sector of civil society that you know best, how would you describe the level of cooperation between civil society organisations with the communities from the other side of the Green Line?'


More than half of the respondents describe the level of cooperation as 'limited' while another 16% consider it as 'non-existent.' Only one fifth of the respondents describe it as either 'moderate' or 'significant'. During the consultations, some participants expressed the view that cooperation with CSOs across the Green Line is difficult due to the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of the island. This could be one of the reasons behind the particular distribution of the responses.

Some examples of cooperation with CSOs across the Green Line were given by the respondents to the regional stakeholders' questionnaire and during the consultations. Apart from culture and sports, it seems that cooperation concentrates in areas such as the prospects for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, research (e.g. the cooperation of the Peace Centre with a Turkish Cypriot research centre on various bicomunal programmes), seminars organised by various research CSOs (e.g. the Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies bicomunal seminar "Gender in the Mediterranean"), humanitarian issues (e.g. Lions Clubs from both communities cooperate on cancer research) and business (e.g. business associations from the two communities meet regularly to discuss issue of common concern, especially in view of Cyprus's accession to the European Community or Greek and Turkish Cypriot shopkeepers from the Ledra street area in Nicosia work together in an attempt to revitalise the area).

## 2.2 Environment

This section describes and analyses the socio-political, economic, legal and cultural environment within which civil society functions. The PAG's score for this dimension was 2.1, indicating a relatively conducive environment for civil society. A recurring theme of this section is that in the southern part of Cyprus the constitutional and legal safeguards, the institutions, mechanisms, fora as well as the socio-economic conditions that would constitute an 'enabling' environment for civil society are in place but there does seem to be a problem in the enforcement of laws. The figure below shows the scores for each of the subdimensions of the environment. The political context and the relations between civil society and private enterprises received the lowest scores here.

**FIGURE II.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension**



### 2.1 Political context

This subdimension examines the political situation in the areas currently under the control of the Republic of Cyprus and its impact on civil society. Table II.2.1 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.2.1: Indicators assessing the political context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.1.1</u>	Political Rights	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.2</u>	Political competition	<u>3</u>
<u>2.1.3</u>	Rule of law	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.4</u>	Corruption	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.5</u>	State effectiveness	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.6</u>	Decentralisation	<u>0</u>

*2.1.1 Political rights.* This indicator assesses the degree of political freedom enjoyed by the citizens. The evidence that addresses this issue is divided in two parts. The first examines the formal, legal, framework within which political activity takes place while the second briefly explores the ways in which political rights may be circumscribed by informal processes.

Political rights are guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Cyprus and safeguarded by the country's membership to the European Union. The right to form political parties is legally sanctioned and enforced. Presidential and parliamentary elections are held at regular intervals and the integrity of the electoral process has not been questioned by any international or domestic organisations. The only formal restriction on citizens' political rights is placed by a law that makes participation in parliamentary and presidential elections compulsory. Freedom House (2005a) rates political rights and civil liberties in the Republic of Cyprus with the best score of 1 ('most free'). Other international assessments, such as Polity

IV (Marshall & Jagers, 2003) and the US Department of State (2004) come to similarly positive conclusions regarding the state of political rights in the Republic of Cyprus.

Thus, on the whole it seems that, compared to other well-established democracies, people have the full freedom to exercise their political rights and effectively participate in the political process. If there are any restrictions on the political rights of citizens these are to be found not in the legal framework within which political activity takes place, but in informal (and therefore difficult to investigate and substantiate) processes that aim to manipulate public opinion and mobilize public support for specific issues. Examples of these processes include officially undisclosed collaborations and 'understandings' between private media organisations and certain political parties and/or specific politicians resulting in disproportionate and unduly favourable publicity for certain issues, persons or organisations and the influence exerted by Governments upon the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. These processes are not conducive to an environment in which citizens exercise their political rights on the basis of accurate and adequate information.

Overall, then, it would appear that the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights. Their participation in the political process, though, could have been more meaningful if they were informed by a mass media that are less susceptible to political party or corporate interests.

*2.1.2 Political competition.* While it is not possible in the context of this report to fully analyse the party system in Cyprus, its main characteristics can be understood by focusing on four of its seminal features.

First, there are many political parties competing in the political arena. In the last parliamentary elections of 2001, eight political parties managed to elect representatives in the House of Representatives. By the summer of 2005 that number had increased to nine due to the formation of a new party (European Democracy) by members of parliament who were expelled or defected from the Democratic Rally party. Furthermore, in 2005 the New Horizons party, with one member in the House of Representatives, joined forces with members of the European Democracy party and other politicians to form the European Party. During the period of data collection the latter had four members in the House of Representatives.

Second, in terms of their share of vote in the last parliamentary elections there are two major political parties that account for almost seventy percent of the electoral votes: AKEL, the communist party of Cyprus (34,7% of the votes in the 2001 elections), and Democratic Rally (a party to the centre right of the political spectrum that gained 34.0% of the votes in 2001). The Democratic Party is the third major party with 14,8% of the votes and the Socialist Party EDEK the fourth with 6,5% of the votes.

Third, with the exception of the two major parties, most of the other parties rely heavily on the personality of their leaders who are usually their founders and a small number of other political figures. Those parties do neither have a large and socially distinctive support basis nor a unique ideology that would set them apart from the others. Even though they maintain a façade of internal party democracy, their decision-making processes are heavily influenced by their leadership. Thus it would be fair to state that most of the political parties are weakly institutionalised relying as they do on the personalities of their leaders. This phenomenon is further accentuated by the fact that Cyprus is a small country where people know each other and clientelistic networks, 'political friendships' and opportunistic and precarious political allegiances nurtured by intimate knowledge of political actors, constitute a seminal feature of its political sphere.

Fourth, even though the major political parties profess distinctive visions of the kind of society and economy they aspire to create, it is not always possible to predict their stance on

specific economic and social policies on the basis of their declared ideological identity. Furthermore, even though many political parties maintain that the major cleavage in the Greek Cypriot party political scene is not or should not be the product of the officially articulated party political ideologies but of the stance parties take on the ‘Cyprus problem’,<sup>39</sup> it is not always possible to predict electoral and parliamentary alliances simply by studying party positions on the Cyprus issue.

The lack of consistency in party policies and practices has seriously undermined the credibility of political parties. For example, a recent representative survey conducted on behalf of Gnora (Communication Consultants) (Phileleftheros, 2005a), revealed that:

- over 70% of the respondents said that political parties are in need of modernization;
- over 50% of the sample believe that political parties are corrupt;
- those who thought that political parties were credible constituted 42% of the sample and
- over 60% thought political parties serve their members.

These findings seem to be in line with the Civil Society Survey 2005. When asked how much confidence they had in political parties only 4% of the sample answered ‘a great deal’ and 22% ‘quite a lot’. The majority (42%) answered ‘not very much’ while another 26% replied ‘none at all’.

During the scoring meeting the PAG expressed the view that, despite its weaknesses, the party system was not very different from that of other democracies and decided to give this indicator the score of three.

The PAG’s high score of 3 does not seem to be warranted by the evidence cited here and it is the view of the research team that the PAG may have been rather generous on this particular indicator. The main point, as far as the PAG was concerned, was that the party system did have shortcomings but they were not unique to the case of Cyprus. The PAG therefore chose not to exclusively base its score upon the material that has been assembled for the purposes of this indicator and relied on its own judgement.

*2.1.3 Rule of law.* The evidence presented below shows that the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus have a moderately strong confidence in the rule of law. This indicator essentially asks us to assess the degree to which the rule of law is entrenched in the country and the levels of public confidence in its laws. Three pieces of information may prove useful in this assessment.

The country is a democracy that, as we saw earlier, is generally considered to be functioning well. The World Bank Governance and Anti-Corruption 2004 Country Report for Cyprus (Kaufman et.al., 2005) rates the country’s rule of law as 78.7 out of 100.<sup>40</sup> Law making is the business of democratically elected politicians and there is an independent judiciary. The media are legally free to scrutinise state actions and expose law breaking by officials (see indicator 2.2.3 below). The findings from the Civil Society Survey 2005 also show a relatively strong trust in the rule of law and its institutions:

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<sup>39</sup> Their analysis, that is, of the nature of the conflict with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community and the policies they advocate for resolving that conflict.

<sup>40</sup> The Bank’s rating is based on a survey of nine different sources, such as for example the Columbia University’s *State Capacity Project* and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s *Country Risk Service*. Furthermore, the Bank considers that the higher the values the better; and that the best quartile is over 75%.

- More than half (52%) said that they have ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in the justice attribution system while 29% said that the confidence they have in it is ‘not very much’. The confidence of the public in the judicial system is also shown in the Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2004): 61% of the respondents say that they tend to trust it.
- Almost two thirds (62%) said that they have ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in the police while 23% answered that their confidence in it was ‘not very much’. Interestingly this finding seems to be in agreement with a finding reported by Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2004), which shows that 62% of its respondents tend to trust the police.
- The overwhelming majority (74%) said that it is never justified to claim state benefits that one is not entitled to; or to inaccurately fill one’s tax forms (78%). Even though one should always be careful to distinguish between what people *say* they do and what they *actually* do, the responses of the sample on this particular issue should be seen as at least one additional piece of evidence to be evaluated in conjunction with the other pieces of information that are included here.
- The percentage of those who answered that they had either ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence to Parliament (the lawmaking institution) was 42%. On the other hand, 32% said their confidence in it was ‘not very much’. These responses should be seen in conjunction with the relatively low levels of confidence that the sample has in political parties: only 26% said that they had either ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in them.<sup>41</sup> Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2004) shows a similar percentage: only 26% are reported to be saying that they tend to trust political parties.

*2.1.4 Corruption.* The evidence that will be presented here shows that there is a moderate level of perceived corruption in the Republic of Cyprus’ public sector.

We have already seen in previous indicators that people generally seem to have confidence in the justice attribution system and the police. Moreover the responses to the Civil Society Survey 2005 revealed that 55% of the sample says they have ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in the Government. These responses are not, of course, directly relevant to levels of perceived corruption. They are, however, indirectly related to what is being assessed here presumably because in ‘highly corrupt’ countries the citizens would not trust their Government and those institutions that are directly related to law-enforcement. However, as these data on their own are not adequate, four other points are important here:

First, the European Commission’s *Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Cyprus’s Preparations for Membership for 2003* acknowledges that ‘Cyprus has a comprehensive legal framework against fraud and corruption’ (European Commission, 2003, p. 13). In that report, reference is made to the *Evaluation Report on Cyprus* of the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). The GRECO report states in its conclusion that ‘Cyprus appears to belong to the group of GRECO members that are least affected by corruption’ (Council of Europe, 2003, p.18). Both the authorities and representatives of civil society are reported to have told the GRECO Evaluation Team (GET) that corruption is not of a scale that

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<sup>41</sup> We have already seen in the previous indicator that people seem to believe that political parties serve primarily their own supporters. This ‘serving’ is primarily but by no means exclusively related to appointments and promotions in the civil service, the police and the army, the local government and the semi-public organisations such as the Cyprus Electricity Board, the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority and the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. This phenomenon is discussed by Vakis (1998), who points out that favouritism (*rousfeti* in Greek) is part of the culture of the society. Vakis, however, argues that meritocracy is not undermined by the attempts of politicians to influence appointments and promotions in the public sector alone but also by an institutional structure that to him badly needs modernization. The author has had a wide experience of the public sector and between 1991 and 1997 served as Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the body that is constitutionally responsible for appointments and promotions in the civil service and an object of frequent public criticism that its decisions are not based on the merit of candidates but on their political allegiances.

would classify it as a serious problem. ‘This appeared to be a genuinely held view, which was also supported to a large degree by official statistics’, the report states (Council of Europe, 2003, p.3). Later on, the report states that ‘according to all the indications at the disposal of GET, Cyprus appears to belong to the group of the more fortunate European countries that are not particularly affected by corruption’ (Council of Europe, 2003, p.13). Second, however, despite its generally favourable comments, the GRECO report notes ‘pitfalls in the manner in which some laws are applied’ (p.14).<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, the report states that ‘the GET’s attention was drawn to the customer-provider type of relationship that exists between political parties and their voters, the pressures to which the holders of political office are increasingly subjected by powerful social and financial groups and the over-deferential attitude displayed by some categories of civil servants vis-à-vis political figures and members of their families’ (Council of Europe, 2003, p.13).

Third, the World Bank *Governance and Anti-Corruption 2004 Country Report for Cyprus* (Kaufman et.al., 2005) states that, as far as the control of corruption is concerned, the country’s percentile rank is 79.3 out of one hundred.<sup>43</sup> However, the World Bank’s report states that, as far as the control of corruption measures are concerned, Cyprus is among those countries the rank of which has been declining between 1996 and 2004.

Finally, the *2004 International Corruption Perception Index (CPI)* of Transparency International (2004), an international NGO devoted to combating corruption, provides a ranking of 145 countries on the basis of their CPI score and places Cyprus on the 36<sup>th</sup> rank with a score of 5.4 out of 10.<sup>44</sup> It is perhaps important to note here that the score for 2005 has slightly increased to 5.7 (Transparency International, 2005).

Thus, taken together, the different data sources point toward a moderate, yet slightly rising level of corruption in the public sector.

*2.1.5 State effectiveness.* This indicator evaluates the extent to which the state is able to fulfil its defined functions. Although the issue of ‘effectiveness’ is difficult to define without specifying and justifying criteria of success or failure, an attempt will be made here to present evidence that will enable the undertaking of such an evaluation.

After 1974, the Cypriot state had to cope with the consequences of a war, an economy in shatters and many thousands of displaced persons in desperate need of shelter, food and work. By 2005, living standards have risen to high levels and the economy, despite its problems, is generally considered by international organisations as vibrant and dynamic. Transport and communications improved dramatically, the level of health and social services rose and the state has developed better forms of communication with the public (Ministry websites, information leaflets, hotlines, citizens’ service bureaus). Moreover, citizens may appeal to the Office of the Ombudsman if they feel that they have been poorly serviced by government departments. The country’s accession to the European Union in 2004 necessitated many changes and procedures in the functioning of state bureaucracy so that it met the minimum standards of effectiveness that the European Union required from the public administration of

<sup>42</sup> One of the examples it gives is that civil servants are not in practice required to declare their income and assets, as Law 1/1990 provides.

<sup>43</sup> The Bank’s rating is based on a survey of seven different sources, such as the Columbia University’s *State Capacity Project* and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s *Country Risk Service*. Furthermore, the Bank considers that the higher the values the better; and that the best quartile is over 75%.

<sup>44</sup> The CPI score is based upon the perceptions of the degree of corruption prevalent in a given country as reported by business people and country analysts. A score of 0 means that the country is perceived as ‘highly corrupt’ whereas a score of 10 means that it is perceived as ‘highly clean’. The score for Cyprus is based on four different surveys. For a country to be included in the CPI there must be at least three surveys and/or expert assessments referring to its corruption levels. More details on the methodology of Transparency International can be found at [http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/dnld/method\\_note\\_en.pdf](http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/dnld/method_note_en.pdf)

its member states. Thus, the World Bank *Governance and Anti-Corruption 2004 Country Report for Cyprus* (Kaufman et.al., 2005) regards the Cypriot government's effectiveness as relatively strong and shows its percentile rank as 82.7 out of 100.<sup>45</sup>

It is also interesting to note that 65% of the respondents of the Civil Society Survey 2005 said that they think voluntary organisations provide better services than state agencies to marginalized people. If one of a state's functions is to cater for the needs of the less privileged this percentage may tell us something about how the state is perceived to perform in this particular area. During the Limassol consultations, a number of participants commented that the state was able to fulfil its functions only to a limited degree. What they seemed to have in mind when they made this comment was government bureaucracy, lack of transparency in the handling of CSOs and absence of mechanisms of public control of publicly funded CSOs.

The PAG's score of this indicator was two as it was recognised that state bureaucracy was functional but perceived as incompetent or non-responsive.

*2.1.6 Decentralisation.* The sub-national share of government expenditure in the Republic of Cyprus is very minimal. Local authorities in the Republic of Cyprus are divided into two administrative categories – Municipalities and Community Councils. The former are geographical areas with over 5,000 constituents and account for 65% of the population. After 1974, when the island was divided, nine municipalities from the northern part of the island were relocated to the areas under the control of the Republic of Cyprus from where they have been operating since then. Today, there are 33 Municipalities in Cyprus (Union of Cyprus Municipalities, n.d.).

Community Councils are smaller geographical areas and represent 35% of the population. The budget of all local authorities is subject to approval by the central government. Local authorities enjoy partial fiscal autonomy vis-à-vis the central state.

In 2002 the Council of Ministers decided to raise the percentage of the annual grant to local authorities (Municipalities and Community Councils) from 1% to 1,5% of the net state revenue, with effect from January 2003 (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2003). This decision concerned the fixed percentage allocated to local authorities on an annual basis. In 2004, however, local authorities received 1,3% of the net budgeted state income and the Ministries of the Interior and Finance indicated that public funds allocated to local authorities would remain unchanged in 2005 and 2006.

## **2.2 Basic Rights and Freedoms**

This subdimension examines to what extent basic freedoms are ensured by law and in practice in the southern part of Cyprus. Table II.2.2 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

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<sup>45</sup> The Bank's rating is based on a survey of seven different sources, such as for example the Columbia University's *State Capacity Project* and the Economist Intelligence Unit's *Country Risk Service*. Furthermore, the Bank considers that the higher the values the better; and that the best quartile is over 75%.

**TABLE II.2.2: Indicators assessing the basic rights and freedoms**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	<u>2</u>
2.2.2	Information rights	<u>2</u>
2.2.3	Press Freedoms	<u>2</u>

2.2.1 *Civil liberties.* Evidently without adequately safeguarded civil liberties civil society cannot fully blossom. As far as the legal framework is concerned, civil liberties are formally safeguarded by the Constitution and a series of statutes. Freedom House (2005a) assigns the most positive score of 1 to the state of civil liberties in Cyprus. In order to become a member of the European Union, the Republic of Cyprus had to satisfy the former that it has an established institutional framework that effectively safeguards the civil liberties of its citizens. An important part of that framework is a whole array of conventions and treaties on human rights of which the Republic of Cyprus is a signatory (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

Civil liberties are safeguarded by an independent judicial system, the Attorney General and the Ombudsman, both of whom are independent officers of the Republic. Citizens may appeal to the Ombudsman if they feel that they have been mis- or unfairly treated by Government departments. Furthermore a National Organization for the Protection of Human Rights was established by the government to monitor, investigate and promote public awareness of human rights issues.

Notwithstanding the sound legal framework that safeguards civil liberties, in practice there are a number of incidents and issues that cause concern. For example, the Ombudswoman's *Summary Memorandum for the Reports Submitted in February 2005* (E.A. 5.30.01/15) (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudsman, 2005a), contains data showing that during the period 2000 –2003, complaints for human rights violations submitted to her, increased by 117%.<sup>46</sup> During the same period, the *total* number of the submitted complaints rose by 45%. In 2000, complaints concerning human rights violations constituted 3,6% of the total number of submitted complaints whereas in 2003 they represented 5,3% of the total number of submitted complaints. Table II.2.3 below summarises this information and shows that complaints regarding immigrants have also increased, although proportionately less than the complaints for human rights violations.

**TABLE II.2.3: Number of complaints concerning human rights violations and matters concerning immigrants submitted to the Ombudswoman: 2000–2003**

Type of Complaint	2000		2003	
	No.	% of the Total Number of Complaints Submitted to the Ombudswoman	No.	% of the Total Number of Complaints Submitted to the Ombudswoman
Human Rights Violations	45	3.6	98	5.3
Matters Concerning Immigrants and Migration	102	8.0	133	7.2

Source: *Information Taken from the Summary Memorandum for the Reports That Have Been Submitted in February 2005* (E.A. 5.30.01/15) (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudswoman, 2005a).

<sup>46</sup> This does not, of course, necessarily mean that the number of violations of human rights has increased because the Ombudswoman's figures refer to *complaints* for such violations.

Other issues of concern noted by the Ombudswoman and other investigators are the treatment of non-Cypriots prisoners and illegal immigrants, the trafficking of non-Cypriot women, and incidents of human rights violations in police custody.

The Ombudswoman describes the conditions under which non-Cypriots are held in custody as so bad that in some cases they 'reach the boundaries of humiliation' (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudsman, 2005a, p. 5). She also notes that nothing has been done to solve the serious problem of the trafficking of the thousands of non-Cypriot women who are brought to Cyprus under the pretext of working as 'artists' in night clubs in order to be forcibly led to prostitution (pp.46-47).<sup>47</sup> It should be noted here that the US State Department's *Trafficking in Persons Report 2005* (US Department of State, 2005) describes Cyprus as a Tier 2 Country, a country, that is, the government of which does not fully comply with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) but is making significant efforts to comply with those standards (this is a paraphrasing from the report). The report acknowledges that although 'the Government of Cyprus does not fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking' it is nevertheless 'making significant efforts to do so' (US Department of State, 2005, p. 92). Furthermore, 'Government recognition of the problem improved, and there was a perceptible shift in awareness among officials, the press, and the public' (US Department of State, 2005, p. 92). The Ombudswoman writes in her *Summary Memorandum*, that 'nothing has been practically done for the suppression of trafficking' and that the various government departments 'act in isolation and in a fragmented fashion' (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudsman, 2005a, p. 47).

The *Annual Report of the Ombudswoman for 2003* (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudsman, 2003), states that the system of investigating the complaints of citizens who have been tortured or mistreated under police custody is deficient and notes that the delay in the introduction of institutional measures to solve these 'chronic' (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudsman, 2003, p. 58), as the Ombudswoman calls them, problems undermines the safeguarding of the human rights of those under police custody. What the Ombudswoman writes is particularly important because one of the darkest aspects of human rights violations is police brutality. Year after year, the press and international and local official reports contain stories of police brutality and disrespect for civil liberties. These stories are by no means many. They are, however, disturbing enough to cast a shadow on the state of civil liberties in the country. In his Report to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly on Human Rights in Cyprus, Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights in the Council of Europe talks of 'the rather timid official reaction to allegations of police misconduct, particularly in those cases detected by independent national authorities' (Council of Europe, 2004, p.10).<sup>48</sup>

In the same report, Mr Gil-Robles raises various other issues pertaining to the treatment of illegal immigrants by the authorities, the excessively long alternative military service that conscientious objectors have to serve (42 months as opposed to the 26 months that the rest have to serve), the fact that those who are exempted from military service are provided with a certificate specifying in bold letters the grounds for the exemption (e.g. psychological reasons), a practice that violates their right to privacy and the privacy of their data and the conditions of the inmates in the Athalassa psychiatric hospital.

More recently, disabled people were stressing violations of their human rights, as witnessed in a report of the *Cyprus Mail* (Saoulli, 2004a).

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<sup>47</sup> The Ombudswoman's document estimates that every six months one thousand such women are 'imported' in Cyprus.

<sup>48</sup> The Report followed his visit to Cyprus in June 2003 and was presented to the Minister's Deputies of the Council of Europe in February 2004.

In conclusion, civil liberties in the Republic of Cyprus are legally safeguarded. Furthermore a system for monitoring the state of civil liberties and human rights violations is in place with the Ombudswoman, the National Organization for the Protection of Human Rights, the Attorney General and an independent judiciary constituting some of its most important components. Despite these, however, or perhaps *because* of these, it is possible to discern phenomena and issues related to attempts to erode, bypass, or ignore civil liberties that cause concern.

During the scoring meeting the PAG pointed out that the human rights of thousands of citizens of the Republic of Cyprus are being violated because they do not have access to their homes and property in the northern part of the island due to the presence of the Turkish army. Although strictly speaking these rights are not violated by the Republic of Cyprus and may not be relevant to the indicator, the PAG felt that it was a defining feature of the state of human rights in the country and asked that it be included in the report.

*2.2.2 Information rights.* The evidence cited below shows that the Republic of Cyprus has passed legislations regarding public access to information, however in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents. Article 29 of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus requires government departments to reply in writing within thirty days from the receipt of a written request or complaint by a citizen. This reply does not, of course, guarantee that citizens will receive the information they ask but the authorities are required by the same article of the constitution to fully justify their refusal or inability to provide the information requested.

The 1989 Press Law provides for the free access of journalists to official information. However, journalists to whom the research team spoke said it is not always easy to have access to public documents because, first, the majority are classified as confidential and, second, the Civil Service Law prohibits civil servants from disclosing information without permission from their supervisors. It could not, therefore, be said that, for those whose job is to inform the public about matters of public interest, access to official documents is easy.

On the other hand, many Ministries are increasingly making publicly available information of concern to the citizens. Thus it is nowadays much easier for the public to have access to official information. Furthermore, in accordance with the 1991 State Archives Law, some public records kept at State Archives are available to the public, although they are subject to a 30-year rule.

*2.2.3 Press Freedoms.* The mass media in the southern part of Cyprus operate freely as stipulated by the law. Article 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provides for free speech and freedom of expression in any form. Holding opinions and receiving and imparting information and ideas without interference from public authorities and regardless of frontiers are also safeguarded by the Constitution. The 1989 Press Law provides for the freedom of the press, the unfettered circulation of newspapers, magazines and periodicals, the right of journalists to preserve the anonymity of their sources as well as the journalists' right to have access to official information. This Law does not distinguish between the rights of Cypriot and non-Cypriot journalists.

The website of the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus states that 'criticism of persons in office, public figures, state institutions and government policies, and the freedom to expose malpractices where these occur, are accepted as a healthy manifestation of democracy'.

All newspapers are permitted by law to circulate without restrictions. For this reason, distribution agencies and kiosks as well as other places where printed media are being made available are required to ensure that these media are available to the public without any discrimination and irrespective of their political views. The Law however allows the

authorities to refuse access to information if it concerns state security, public order, public morals or the protection of the honour and reputation of third parties. Furthermore, journalists are legally required to disclose their sources if they publish information concerning a criminal offence and they are ordered to do so by a Court of Law. There are clearly stated conditions under which a Court may issue such an order.

Overall, a legal framework safeguarding press freedoms is in place. Moreover, journalists abide by a code of conduct and their Union has a Committee that monitors its implementation. The free conditions under which the press operates in the Republic of Cyprus are recognized by Freedom House (2005b) in its *Freedom of the Press Report* where the country is given the score of 22, a score that indicates that the media is free.

Despite the liberal legal framework within which the media operate, it should be noted that reports of interference by Governments on the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation are frequent. Such reports mention that the Presidential Palace and the parties that are in power influence staffing decisions, sometimes even the inclusion, exclusion or form of presentation of particular items in the news bulletins of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation. These allegations are difficult to substantiate even though they constitute ‘common knowledge’ among the citizens of the country including its journalists, as some of them confirmed to the research team.

Furthermore, journalists with a long, wide, and varied experience informed the research team that:

- There are regular attempts to influence the work of journalists. Ministers, Members of Parliament and other politicians as well as big corporations upon whose advertising budget media organizations depend, attempt on a regular basis to influence what is printed or transmitted. Often this interference in the work of journalists comes from their employers, the owners of private media organizations, who have their own political agendas and connections and who are the recipients of the representations of the politicians and the corporations.<sup>49</sup>
- The freedom of the press is also curtailed by practices of selective briefing adopted by the Government and the Police. This creates a group of ‘privileged’ journalists who have access to sources of information but also develop ties of dependence with those who hold power.
- It is not always easy to have access to public documents because, first, the majority are classified as confidential and, second, the Civil Service Law prohibits civil servants from disclosing information without permission from their supervisors.

## 2.3 Socio-Economic Context

This subdimension examines the socio-economic situation and its impact on civil society. Table II.2.4 shows the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.2.4: Indicator assessing the socio-economic context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	3

*2.3.1 Socio-economic context.* This indicator assesses the extent to which the socio-economic context constitutes a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. In accordance with the CIVICUS methodology, ‘socio-economic context’ is analysed through an examination of

<sup>49</sup> For example, there are press reports of collaboration between certain private media organisations and political parties or specific members of political parties that result in a disproportionate publicity of specific politicians or political parties.

eight conditions the presence of which is considered to be potentially detrimental to the effective functioning of civil society: 1) Poverty; 2) Civil war; 3) Severe ethnic or religious conflict; 4) Severe economic crisis; 5) Severe social crisis; 6) Serious socio-economic inequities; 7) Illiteracy and 8) Lack of IT infrastructure.

For each of those conditions a specific benchmark was set. If that benchmark is met that condition is considered to be placing a *barrier* to the effective functioning of civil society. The analysis of the Republic of Cyprus socio-economic environment showed that none of the following conditions constitute a barrier to civil society.

*1. Widespread poverty: Do more than 40% of Cypriots live on less than US\$ 2 per day?*

No. The country has enjoyed stable economic growth during the past two decades. During the period 1998-2002 the average rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), at constant prices, was 4.3% while unemployment and inflation were kept at low levels (Republic of Cyprus Planning Bureau, 2002). Although there are no data on the number of people with severe financial problems, according to some reports, 15.3% of the population lives on less than 60% of the average per capita income (Politis, 2005a).

*2. Civil war: Has the country experience any armed conflict during the last five years?* No.

*3. Is there a severe ethnic or religious conflict?*

Although it is not clear what 'severe' means in this context it could be said that there is a 'severe', albeit non-violent, ethnic conflict between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots that preserves the division of the island. The publication of the University of Maryland's Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, *Peace and Conflict 2005* (Marshall & Gurr, 2005) rates Cyprus with a score between -1 and 0.<sup>50</sup> Apparently this score was based on the long dispute between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities that culminated to the division of the island in 1974.

*4. Severe economic crisis: Is the external debt more than the GDP?*

No. The total external debt for 2003 was 38.4% of GDP (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2004).

*5. Severe social crisis during the last two years?*

No. There has not been any severe social crisis in the last two years.

*6. Severe socio-economic inequities: Is the Gini coefficient > 0.4?*

No. Although recent data on the Gini coefficient<sup>51</sup> are not available, according to the Planning Bureau's *Economic Outlook 2003* publication (Republic of Cyprus Planning Bureau, 2004), the Gini coefficient in 1996/1997 was 0.324. With regard to living conditions, in the Cyprus Statistical Service's *Population Census 2001* (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Service, 2001), it is reported that almost 100% of all households both in urban and rural areas have basic housing amenities such as kitchen, bathroom, toilet facilities, piped water and hot water.

*7. Pervasive illiteracy - are more than 40% of the adult population illiterate?*

No. Adult literacy rates in Cyprus are estimated at about 96.8% by the *Human Development Report 2004* of the United Nations Development Programme (2004).

<sup>50</sup> The lowest possible score is -1 and the highest 1.5. The score for each country takes into account the success or failure of governments in settling self-determination conflicts from 1985 through 2004. Cyprus is placed among those that countries that, according to this publication, either have '(a) non-violent self-determination movements in early 2005 but no track record of accommodating such movements in the past 20 years; or (b) violent self-determination movements in early 2005 and a track record of accommodating other such movements in the past 20 years.' (p. 9)

<sup>51</sup> The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality ranging from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). See <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=oi=defmore&q=define:Gini+coefficient>.

#### 8. Lack of IT infrastructure – are there less than 5 IT hosts per 10.000 inhabitants?

No. The World Bank estimates that in 2003 there were 337 Internet users per 1.000 people in Cyprus, while the number of personal computers per 1.000 persons in 2002 was 269 (World Bank, 2005).

Overall, then, the evidence cited here shows that civil society is operating in a very conducive socio-economic context. None of the barriers that the CIVICUS methodology is concerned with appears to be present.

## 2.4 Socio-Cultural Context

This subdimension examines the extent to which the socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table II.2.5 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.2.5: Indicators assessing the socio-cultural context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.4.1	Trust	<u>2</u>
2.4.2	Tolerance	<u>2</u>
2.4.3	Public spiritedness	<u>2</u>

2.4.1 *Trust*. The collected data showed that there is a moderate level of trust among members of the population in the southern part of Cyprus. The respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 were given a list of statements concerning their fellow citizens and were asked to state with which they agree most. Table II.2.6 shows the list of statements and the percentage distribution of the responses.

**TABLE II.2.6: Trust in fellow citizens**

Statement	%
All people can be trusted	1
Most people can be trusted	10
Some people can be trusted	76
No one can be trusted	10
Don't Know	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>


Source: *Civil Society Survey 2005*

An overwhelming majority (76%) stated that only 'some' people can be trusted. A very small percentage (1%) felt that all people can be trusted while only one in ten answered that *most* people can be trusted. These data indicate that there is only a moderate level of trust among the members of the society.

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2.4.2 *Tolerance*. Despite the fact that many Greek Cypriots would publicly deny that they are intolerant, the available evidence seems to indicate otherwise. In order to assess the levels of tolerance among the members of the society, the Civil Society Survey 2005 asked respondents to identify which groups among a pre-defined list they would *not* like to have as neighbours. The respondents were allowed to choose more than one group if they wished. Thirty percent of the respondents stated that they would not mind being neighbours with any of the groups they were presented with. Figure II.2.2 shows the percentage distribution of the responses of those who stated that they would not like to have at least one group type as neighbours. It is striking that almost half of the responses concern groups whose cultural characteristics are perceived as different from those of the Greek Cypriots, such as foreign workers and people of different religion. More importantly perhaps the fact that 70% of the respondents replied that they would not like to be neighbours with at least one of the groups mentioned in the list indicates quite a widespread level of intolerance among the members of the society.

**FIGURE II.2.2: Level of tolerance among members of society<sup>52</sup>**




Source: Civil Society Survey 2005

Figure II.2.2 shows the percentage distribution of the responses of those who stated that they would not like to have at least one group type as neighbours. It is striking that almost half of the responses concern groups whose cultural characteristics are perceived as different from those of the Greek Cypriots, such as foreign workers and people of different religion. More importantly perhaps the fact that 70% of the respondents replied that they would not like to be neighbours with at least one of the groups mentioned in the list indicates quite a widespread level of intolerance among the members of the society.

These findings confirm the results of the *Eurobarometer in Candidate Countries 2003* (Coenders, et al., 2003), which revealed that resistance to a multicultural society in Cyprus is quite high, in fact higher than the average resistance of the (then) 13 candidate countries (10 countries that acceded in 2004 plus Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey). Additionally, the report's findings show that there is a strong view in Cyprus that legal immigrants should not be granted any civil rights. It seems that this view is higher in Cyprus than in the majority of the rest of the countries examined in the report.

**FIGURE II.2.3: Level of public spiritedness**



Source: Civil Society Survey 2005

2.4.3 *Public spiritedness*. Citizens of the southern part of Cyprus have a moderate level of public spiritedness. Figure II.2.3 shows the attitudes among Civil Society Survey 2005

<sup>52</sup> Responses to the question: ‘Which of the following would you not like to have as neighbours?’ The Figure shows the percentage distribution of those who stated that they would not like to have as neighbours people of at least one of the categories listed.

respondents towards a set of three questions related to public norms.<sup>53</sup>

On the whole, a significant majority of the respondents rejects the three kinds of behaviour violating public norms. To the extent that this response could constitute an indicator of the strength of public spiritedness among the population, it would seem that the level of public spiritedness is pretty high. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that a noticeable proportion said that it is sometimes justified to claim state benefits to which we are not entitled or to avoid paying parking fees.

## 2.5 Legal Environment

This subdimension examines the legal environment for civil society and assesses to what extent it is enabling or disabling to civil society. Table II.2.7 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.2.7: Indicators assessing the legal environment**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.5.1</u>	CSO registration	<u>2</u>
<u>2.5.2</u>	Allowable advocacy activities	<u>2</u>
<u>2.5.3</u>	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>2.5.4</u>	Tax benefits for philanthropy	<u>2</u>

*2.5.1 CSO registration.* The CSO registration process in the Republic of Cyprus is relatively supportive, although there are a few difficulties that CSOs face. According to the Associations and Foundations Law 57/1972 every association has to be registered with the Record of Associations and Foundations of the Ministry of the Interior. The application for registration has to be accompanied by the names and addresses of the Executive Committee, the Memorandum of Association signed by at least twenty members, the emblem of the association and a description of its assets during the period of application, signed by the Executive Committee. The constitutional documents must include the aim, the name and the headquarters of the association, the terms of accepting and rejecting members, the members' rights and obligations, the association's sources of funding, the auditing of its accounts, the legal representation of the association, the rules governing its annual meetings and the terms of its dissolution with special reference to the benefactors of its financial assets.

Clubs are registered directly to the Record of Clubs of their district, according to the Law on Clubs (Chapter 112).<sup>54</sup> The District Officer is responsible for the registration and renewal of license of Clubs. For registration, a form needs to be completed, accompanied by a list of members (at least 21), the Memorandum of Association and a small fee (for Clubs with headquarters in the Municipalities the fee is CYP 5 for the application and CYP 15 for the registration Certificate. For those with headquarters in other areas the fee is CYP 3 for the application and CYP 10 for the registration Certificate).

Table II.2.8 shows the responses, from the stakeholders' assessment, to the registration process. Even though a high percentage of the respondents (45%) stated that the procedures

<sup>53</sup> Responses to the question: "Is it 'Always Justified', 'Sometimes Justified' or 'Never Justified' to Claim State Benefits we are not Entitled to, to Avoid Paying a Parking Fee and to Complete our Tax Forms Inaccurately." The figure shows the percentage of the respondents who stated that it is 'never justified' to do any of the above.

<sup>54</sup> A CSO may choose to register either as an association or a club. Associations are only registered once, by completing the relevant forms and presenting their Memorandum of Association to the Ministry of the Interior. Clubs, on the other hand, have to register every year by presenting their Memorandum of Association to their District Office. Furthermore, clubs, as opposed to associations, are required to have premises to house their activities.

for registering a CSO are **quick**, a relatively high percentage (35%) seems to believe that this is not the case. In addition, the majority of the respondents (52%) believe that the registration process is **not simple**. Regarding the **cost** of the registration procedures, the majority of the respondents (56%) stated that it is not very high, while an overwhelming majority (76%) believes that the procedures follow the **legal provisions**. Finally, the majority of the stakeholders (54%) stated that the registration process is **consistently applied**. Nonetheless, a relatively high percentage of the respondents (32%) stated that they did not know whether or not this is the case.

**TABLE II.2.8: CSO registration procedures**

Response	How would you describe the procedures for registering a CSO?				
	Are they Quick?	Are they Simple?	Are they Not Very Costly?	Do they Follow Legal Provisions?	Are they Consistently Applied?
Yes	45	31	56	76	54
No	35	52	20	4	14
Don't Know	20	17	24	20	32
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Thus, the available evidence supports the conclusion that the registration of CSOs does not pose too many problems, even though the majority of stakeholders believe that it is not a simple process. During the consultation it emerged that the simplicity of the procedures was related to the type of organization to be registered. Clubs and Trade Unions have a different registration procedure compared to associations and Foundations even though this procedure is more or less of the same level of complexity.

*2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities.* CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus face minimal constraints when it comes to their advocacy activities. A legal framework that allows advocacy and criticism of the government is a feature of liberal democracies, linked as it is to the core principles of freedom of speech, beliefs and assembly. As stated earlier, when discussing indicators 2.1.1, 2.2.1, and 2.2.3, the Republic of Cyprus has a constitutional and legal framework that enables citizens to assemble, organise, advocate and criticize freely.

The majority of the surveyed stakeholders (42%) stated that the existing law places reasonable restrictions while another 13% replied that there were 'no restrictions' on advocacy activities. It should be noted that a relatively high percentage (34%) replied that they did not know whether or not there are any legal restrictions on this type of activities, an indication perhaps that one third of the respondents were either not involved in advocacy activities, or, if they were, they did not encounter any restrictions.

During the consultations, however, civil society activists engaged in advocacy activities (such as, for example, defending immigrants' rights or protecting rare species) said that they have been harassed by the authorities. Harassment apparently took the form of verbal insults and innuendos that they are traitors; long delays in responding to requests for access to information or persons detained or processing of applications; and instigation of legal proceedings against activists who work in the public sector on the grounds that their activities are incompatible with their position as public employees. These political activists are likely to make up a major part of the 11% of the respondents who describe the Law as placing 'unreasonable restrictions' on advocacy activities.

*2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs.* According to the Income Tax Law of 2002 (Law 118 (I)/2002), the income of charities and of religious and educational foundations of a public nature is exempted from taxation (Part III, Art. 8 (13)).

An official of the Ministry of Finance informed the research team that organizations wishing to acquire the status of charity and thereby benefit from tax deductible donations and contributions must apply to the Ministry of Finance, presenting their Memorandum of Association, which has to specifically state that in case of dissolution the founders will not be able to use the organization's money. The Memorandum of Association also has to specifically state the non-profit nature of the organization. The process is relatively simple and quick although there is no legally specified time frame within which it operates. There are currently 287 approved charities by the Ministry of Finance. The work of these 287 charities mainly concerns health and social welfare, cultural and environmental issues, sports, religion, minority rights, advocacy, research and social activities (i.e. Scouts, Guides).

*2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy.* According to the Income Tax Law of 2002 (Law 118 (I)/2002), donations to charities approved by the Ministry of Finance are deducted from the taxable income of companies and individuals (Part III, Art (9) (f)), provided that the donor presents the Inland Revenue Department with the relevant receipts.<sup>55</sup> It is stressed that tax deductions for contributions to charities are only available when the money is granted to the 287 approved charities that, as we saw in the previous indicator, are currently registered. Donations to these charities are exempted from tax in their entirety. No other incentives are offered to companies or individuals to encourage financial contribution to charities.

## 2.6 State-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state. Table II.2.9 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.2.9: Indicators assessing the State – civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.6.1</u>	Autonomy	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.2</u>	Dialogue	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.3</u>	Cooperation / support	<u>2</u>

*2.6.1 Autonomy.* In order to address the issue of the autonomy of civil society vis-à-vis the state it is important to understand a number of seminal features of the polity of the Republic of Cyprus. The first is that, as we saw earlier, freedom of speech, assembly, beliefs and advocacy are safeguarded by the country's legal framework. Because of this framework CSOs are legally able to function freely. The second is that the political system of the Republic is a presidential democracy. The President is elected directly by the voters. However, after the death of the first President, Archbishop Makarios, all Presidents had to rely on the support of political parties for their election. Thus even though, strictly speaking, a political party never has executive power, political forces are divided between those that support the President and those who oppose him/her. This has important repercussions on Greek Cypriot civil society as many CSOs are closely affiliated with political parties.<sup>56</sup> In fact the dominance of political

<sup>55</sup> An official of the Ministry of Finance informed the research team that organisations wishing to acquire the status of charity and thereby benefit from tax deductible donations/contributions must apply to the Ministry of Finance, presenting their Memorandum of Association, which has to specifically state that in case of dissolution the founders will not be able to use the organization's money. The Memorandum of Association also has to specifically state the non-profit nature of the organization.

<sup>56</sup> For example the three major trade unions are closely associated with different political parties. During the elections of the teachers' unions, members choose between different groups of their colleagues that are associated with different political parties. Political parties show an interest in the

parties over civil society is of such magnitude that the PAG after a long and considered discussion decided to exclude them from the realm of civil society.

The fact that the majority of CSOs are funded and/or controlled by political parties means that the practices of or the views expressed by CSOs are almost always in line with the line of the political party to which they are linked. To put it differently, the relationship of political parties to governments largely determines the attitude of many CSOs towards the state. So the first element of the answer to the question of the autonomy of civil society is that this autonomy is undermined not necessarily by the legal framework, but from the dependence of many CSOs to political parties.

The autonomy of CSOs, however, is also restricted by the state through its funding mechanisms. During the consultations, reference was made to the fact that there are no publicly known and transparent criteria for the public funding of CSOs. This creates a fertile ground for the development of clientelistic networks and, according to some stakeholders, silences CSOs which opt for acquiescence in order to preserve their levels of public funding. Since the referendum for the acceptance of the Annan Plan, some CSOs that were advocating votes in favour of the plan felt that the government, which explicitly urged citizens to reject the plan, is engaging in a smear campaign by leaking information suggesting that such CSOs were financed by foreign sources and were not looking out for the best interests of the country.<sup>57</sup> Nothing was said by the government about the finances of those CSOs that were promoting the rejection of the plan. Some commentators expressed the view that this was an attempt to terrorise citizens' groups into 'falling in line'.

In the regional stakeholder survey, respondents mostly assessed state interference to be rare (50%) or taking place 'sometimes' (22%). A significant percentage (25%) said that they did not know whether the state unduly interferes in civil society activities. Thus, it seems that although there is no perceived direct and unwarranted intervention in civil society by the state, the autonomy of many CSOs vis-à-vis the state is, at times limited because of their dependence upon political parties and the informal endeavours by governments to control them. However, the PAG's view was that CSOs were legally autonomous and free to pursue their objectives and gave this indicator the score of 2.

*2.6.2 Dialogue between CSOs and the state.* In modern democratic societies the state is expected to engage in a meaningful dialogue with its citizens and their organisations. The form in which this dialogue takes place varies, of course, from country to country.

Asked to assess the dialogue between civil society and the state, 52% of the surveyed stakeholders regarded it as 'limited'. Just over a quarter of the respondents (27%) said that it is 'moderate', while 13% said that it is 'significant'. A small percentage (7%) said that it is non-existent. These responses should be viewed within the context of a society in which neither the concept of the state nor that of civil society are coherent. The state consists of different branches that may have organisational cultures and policies, which are not necessarily similar. By the same token, civil society is not socially homogeneous: welfare

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election of their members to the executive committees of students' unions. Within parents' associations, attempts are being made by political parties to secure the election of persons who are thought to be their supporters. Football clubs are known for their close association with political parties (people who would define themselves as left-wing will support only selected 'left-wing' football clubs while those on the right will support 'right-wing' football clubs). Human rights violations by the police are treated lukewarmly by the CSOs that are associated with the parties that support the government and with vehemence by those who are linked to the parties in opposition. And so on.

<sup>57</sup> On 24 April 2004, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were called to vote on a referendum of whether or not to accept the Annan Plan (named after the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan) as a solution to the 'Cyprus Problem'. The majority of the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan while the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour.

organisations coexist with recreational groups, and advocacy groups operate side by side with professional associations, faith-based organisations, trade unions and so on. Furthermore, the groups and organisations constituting civil society vary in strength and influence. Thus when we try to assess the dialogue between the state and civil society it is important to be aware of and sensitive to the complexity of the phenomena and institutions to which we are referring.

Be that as it may, it is only fair to say that within the broad public sector there are plenty of committees, consultative and decision-making bodies that deal with labour, educational, health and welfare issues which include in their membership representatives from civil society organizations (CSOs). For example:

- Trade unions participate in a number of committees of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance (e.g. the Labour Consultative Body, the Social Insurance Council, and District Labour Office Councils), the Port Labour Councils and the Road Transport Committee of the Ministry of Communications and Works, the Economic Advisory Committee and the Technical Committee determining the Retail Prices Index of the Ministry of Finance, and the Price Committee of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.
- The Employer's Federation is a member of several government committees dealing with industrial, labour and financial policies.
- Welfare associations through the Pancyprian Welfare Council (PWC) have access to many government consultative bodies and have regular meetings with the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance for the exchange of information on development in the field of social welfare.
- Student unions are represented through the Pancyprian Federation of Student Unions (POFNE) in relevant educational committees of the Ministry of Education and Culture.
- The Pancyprian Parents' Federation participates in various educational committees.

Even though there are examples of CSOs participating in governmental decision-making and consultative bodies, it is important to note that it is difficult to measure the influence that CSOs have in those committees especially because many of those committees do not meet regularly and do not have rules on how to conduct their business.

Thus, the state's dialogue with civil society is not uniform: some CSOs have more opportunities to engage in a dialogue with it than others. CSOs such as trade unions, student unions, welfare and sports associations have traditionally been in close cooperation with the government. The less privileged, the immigrants, the many foreign housemaids, those who live in remote areas and those who advocate 'unfashionable' causes are less likely to be found engaged in a dialogue with state agencies. The 52% of the stakeholders who described civil society's dialogue with the state as 'limited' seemed to be having this more complex picture in mind when they answered the way they did.

*2.6.3 Cooperation / support.* State support to CSOs varies, however, overall, a moderate range of CSOs receive state resources. Different kinds of CSOs receive financial assistance from different branches of the state. For example, cultural organizations and groups receive funding from the Cultural Services of the Ministry of Education and Culture. Sports federations and clubs receive public funds through the Cyprus Sports Organization while welfare organizations receive financial assistance through the budget of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance.

The *Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion of Cyprus (2003)* indicates that the government subsidies on non-governmental programmes in 2001 (last recorded date) was CYP 3.5 million. The same report shows that during 2002, a total of 231 non-governmental organisations received state grants (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance & European Commission Directorate of Employment and Social Affairs, 2003). This represents something like 6% of all registered CSOs. The Social and Welfare Services fund voluntary welfare organisations for activities that are judged as essential by the state. The funding covers up to 50% of building construction and building improvement expenditure and up to 60% of purchases of furniture.

A 2002 publication of the Ministry of Finance (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Finance, 2002) states that state funding for sports and culture is budgeted annually and constitutes a significant part of total public spending. However the amount to be allocated to non-governmental bodies is not clarified.

Based on the responses in the regional stakeholder survey, during the financial year 2004, 41% CSOs received funding from the state (see table II.2.10).

**TABLE II.2.10: Percentage of CSO income from State sources: 2004**

% of income derived from state sources	No. of CSOs	% of CSOs
1-19	17	37
20-39	15	33
40-59	3	6
60-79	4	9
80-100	7	15
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Almost two fifths (37%) receive less than 20% of their income from state sources while a third (33%) receives between 20 to 39% of their income from such sources.

## 2.7 Private Sector-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and private business. Table II.2.11 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.2.11: Indicators assessing the private sector – civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.7.1</u>	Private sector attitude	<u>1</u>
<u>2.7.2</u>	Corporate social responsibility	<u>2</u>
<u>2.7.3</u>	Corporate philanthropy	<u>2</u>

*2.7.1 Private sector attitude to civil society.* The attitude of private sector towards civil society in the southern part of Cyprus is generally indifferent.

The stakeholders' assessment of the attitude of the private sector attitude towards civil society is split. While 40% of those surveyed stated that this attitude is indifferent, another 40% claimed that it is favourable. The way the private sector is perceived could be perhaps further clarified by examining how stakeholders rate the activities of major companies regarding corporate social responsibility. More than half (56%) described it as 'limited' while another 13% rated it as 'insignificant'.

It seems, then, that, on the whole, the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors is perceived as neither supportive nor positive. This is probably because civil society is not a homogeneous category (and neither is the 'private sector' for that matter). Different CSOs have been probably having different kinds of experience with different types of private business. Welfare organizations, for example, and sports clubs have more sympathetic supporters among the business community than, say, advocacy groups or trade unions. The general feeling from the consultations was that stakeholders thought that whenever private businesses do come to support CSOs, they do so for public relations purposes.

*2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility activities.* There are different definitions of the term corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the literature but they all basically boil down to the commitment that corporations exhibit (or are expected to exhibit) through their deeds and written statements to the wider social, cultural and environmental settings within which they operate and their responsibility towards society in general.

When assessing CSR in this society one has to note that, according to official figures, 95% of all enterprises in Cyprus employ less than 10 persons and 99% employ less than 250 persons (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, 2004). In essence, that is, the economy of the island is dominated by very small units and 'corporations' are few. In fact, the Association of the Commercial Banks of Cyprus estimates that there are only fifty-three corporations in Cyprus that could be categorized as large (ACCB, 2005). This feature of the economy has obvious implications for the way CSR is understood and practiced. To put it simply, CSR presupposes corporations and corporations are few in the country.

In accordance with the CSI methodology, a study of the CSR activity of the ten largest companies listed in the Stock Exchange was carried out.<sup>58</sup> The study has shown that of the ten largest corporations, only the three major Banks – the Bank of Cyprus (the largest), the Popular Bank (the second largest) and the Hellenic Bank (the fourth largest) – appear to have a planned annual CSR policy.<sup>59</sup> The activities carried out by these three Banks as part of their CSR policy range from health services (like the creation of the Oncology Centre, the Home Care Centre and the Arodafnousa Palliative Care Centre by the Bank of Cyprus), to culture (the Cultural Foundation and the Historical Archives of the Bank of Cyprus, the Cultural Centres of the Popular Bank and the Hellenic Bank), major charity events (the Bank of Cyprus supports the Christodoula March, the Popular Bank supports the Radiomathon and the Hellenic Bank supports Telethon) to environmental and educational initiatives. The remaining companies contribute to charities and cultural events on an *ad hoc* basis and when prompted by the research team they did not seem to have a systematic CSR policy in place.<sup>60</sup> For example, although Cyprus Airways has limited its contributions to charity, offers discounts on air fares on people who travel for medical reasons and their escort, while the rest contribute to charities like Telethon, the Radiomathon and the Christodoula March as well as smaller charity campaigns.

It is interesting to note in this respect that, when they were asked to rate the work of major companies in the area of CSR, 56% of stakeholders described it as 'limited' while 13% said that it was 'insignificant'. Only 7% answered that it was 'significant' and 15% described it as 'moderate'.

<sup>58</sup> The list was drawn by establishing their turnover in 2004 as it appears in the website of the Cyprus Stock Exchange.

<sup>59</sup> The third largest company is Cyprus Airways that has recently limited its CSR activities due to financial problems.

<sup>60</sup> For example: Cyprus Airways Ltd, Louis Public Company Ltd, Cyprus Trading Corporation Ltd, Petrolina Public Ltd, Libra Holidays, Orphanides Public Company and Chris Cash and Carry Public Company.

In conclusion, examples of CSR are rather limited mainly due to the lack of a significant number of large corporations in the country.

*2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy.* As with corporate social responsibility, the level of corporate funding of civil society is also rather limited. The data suggest that a moderate range of CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus receive funding from the private sector. During the financial year 2004, 22 out of the 113 civil society organisations represented by the participants in the regional stakeholder survey, received financial contributions from private business (see table II.2.12).

**TABLE II.2.12: Percentage of income from contributions by corporate organisations: 2004**

<b>% of income from contributions by corporate organisations</b>	<b>No. of CSOs</b>	<b>% of CSOs</b>
1-19	16	73
20-39	5	23
60-79	1	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

The above table shows that the percentage of income of the majority of the CSOs (73%) deriving from contributions from the private sector ranged from 1 to 19%. Regarding the types of organizations that are usually the recipients of such contributions, we have already seen (in indicator 2.5.3) that only 287 (mainly welfare) organisations are entitled to tax-deductible donations. Furthermore, the CSR study has shown that large companies, that are the main source of such donations to CSOs, usually support charity events organised by health and social welfare organisations. Although it is not mentioned in the CSR study, sports team sponsoring is also quite popular among private sector companies, especially when it comes to football teams.

## **Conclusion**

The major recurrent theme of this section is that civil society in the southern part of Cyprus functions in a political, legal, economic, social and cultural environment that is relatively conducive, although there is still room for improvement for it to become 'fully enabling'.

In many respects, postcolonial Cyprus has come a long way since it was granted its formal independence in 1960. Compared to other postcolonial societies, human rights and civil liberties are safeguarded by law, political competition is regulated by norms that are accepted by all, the media is legally free to criticise those who have power and expose corruption, while economic growth has led to high standards of living and affluence. The country has its institutions, procedures and mechanisms to ensure that political leadership is changeable and accountable and the citizens are protected from state arbitrariness. Within this context, it is at least legally possible for advocacy groups to function effectively and, more generally, for civil society actors to autonomously engage in whatever activities they choose.

On the other hand, however, both the evidence cited here and the scores of the indicators comprising this particular dimension show that the environment within which civil society has to function is not fully enabling. The reasons are many but could be broadly grouped into five categories:


(1) Insufficient implementation of the country's laws, particularly regarding human rights and civil liberties;

- (2) Absence of established procedures and legal provisions, for example for broad-based and institutionalised dialogue between the state and CSOs, as well as for regulating state financing to CSOs;
- (3) Negative social attitudes, such as low public trust and high levels of intolerance even though public spiritedness appears to be rather high;
- (4) Problematic mode of cooperation between private business and CSOs. Notions of corporate social responsibility in an economy that is primarily constituted by small enterprises are rather underdeveloped; and
- (5) Consequences of the de facto division of the island. This is an issue that should not be overlooked or underestimated. For many Greek Cypriots (and no doubt an equally large number of Turkish Cypriots but for different reasons) strongly feel that their human rights are being violated because they cannot return to their homes and properties even though their analyses for the reasons of their predicament do vary.

## 2.3 VALUES

The values that are promoted and practiced by civil society constitute the subject of this section of the report. The score given to this dimension by the PAG was 1.9 indicating that there is room for improvement in this area, particularly in the areas of transparency and tolerance (see the figure below).

**FIGURE II.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension**



## 3.1. Democracy

This subdimension examines the extent to which civil society actors practice and promote democracy. Table II.3.1 summarizes the respective indicator scores.


**TABLE II.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	<u>2</u>
3.1.2	Civil Society actions to promote democracy	<u>2</u>

### 3.1.1 Democratic practices within

CSOs. How internally democratic are CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus in terms of leadership selection and members' influence over organizational decision-making? The regional stakeholders' survey provides some data on this question. It showed that an overwhelming majority of CSOs (80%) select their leaders democratically through election by the members, while, according to the stakeholders, the members of the majority of CSOs (64%) have a substantial level of influence on decision-making. Two issues need to be clarified here: First,

**FIGURE II.3.2: Methods of selecting the leaders of CSOs**



Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

it is clear from the survey responses that the legal framework of most CSOs allows for their members to exert influence by choosing their leadership. Second, however, it seems that in practice the story may be different for the following reasons: During the consultations, some

participants expressed the view that ordinary members of CSOs in some sectors of civil society do not show an active interest in the electoral processes of their organisation.

The leadership of some CSOs in practice ‘takes advantage’ of this passivity to ensure that it perpetuates itself. One indication of this is the fact that the leadership of many (particularly welfare) organisations has not changed for many decades.<sup>61</sup>

The PAG’s score of two reflects this ambivalence of the situation: On the one hand, the acknowledgement of the existence of provisions for democratic elections and on the other, the realization that in practice ordinary members of CSOs do not have much control over decision-making.

*3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy.* As we have seen in the analysis of the environment dimension, the Republic of Cyprus is a functioning democracy. There are, of course, problems with the way the polity functions and the way the rights of citizens are safeguarded and respected in practice and there are CSOs struggling to remedy those problems. However, *promoting democracy* is a very different type of activity in a non-democratic country from activities that take place in a country with established democratic institutions. This point is important for placing the evidence that will be cited below in context.

The majority (51%) of the surveyed stakeholders could think of at least one example of civil society campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to the promotion of democracy while 20% said they could think of several examples. While this was the case, only a few vague examples were listed in the questionnaire responses, some of which were:

- Campaigns on the rights of patients and foreign workers by CSOs
- Women’s CSOs information campaigns on the rights of women
- Information campaigns by various CSOs on the referendum for the acceptance of the Annan Plan

During the period of March, May, and June 2005 the media review did not reveal any actions or campaigns by CSOs dedicated to the promotion of democracy. During the consultations it emerged that public campaigns by CSOs dedicated to democracy are not as widespread as stated in the questionnaire. An explanation given to this phenomenon by the stakeholders present was that the public was indifferent towards such campaigns.

Thus, it seems that there are only limited cases of action by CSOs dedicated in promoting democracy. Because of this, plus the fact that public visibility of such initiatives seem to be lacking the PAG decided to give this indicator the score of two.

## 3.2. Transparency

This subdimension analyses the extent to which civil society actors practice and promote transparency. Table II.3.2 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.2.1</u>	Corruption within civil society	<u>2</u>
<u>3.2.2</u>	Financial transparency of CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>3.2.3</u>	Civil society actions to promote transparency	<u>1</u>

<sup>61</sup> Information provided to the research team by a key informant with long experience in welfare organisations.

*3.2.1 Corruption within civil society.* Corruption is defined here as the exploitation of one's position within an organisation for the pursuit of personal interests or the breaking of a country's laws by the officials or members of an organisation for the pursuit of an organisation's goals.

The responses of stakeholders to a question on the frequency of corruption within civil society varied. However, for more than half of those who answered the question, instances of corruption within civil society are by no means unusual: a quarter of the respondents said they were 'very frequent' while another 29% described them as 'frequent'. Those who said that they were 'occasional' amounted to 29% while 13% answered that corruption cases are 'very rare'. Corruption levels do not seem to be uniform in all sectors of civil society. These cases seem to be more frequent in CSOs that handle large amounts of money, like charities and sports clubs and less common in associations that are concerned with culture or social issues like human rights.

During the consultations, some examples of corruption were given by the participants to support the view that there have been in the past some instances of corruption within civil society. An example given in the Limassol consultation was the case of the owner of an old people's home that was tricked into selling the home's logo to an advertising agency for CYP 1.000. For one year the advertising agency was collecting money supposedly on behalf of the home, by selling tickets to a film screening that never took place. Another incident regarded the selling of Christian icons for CYP 10 each for a charity while only CYP 0.05 per icon was going to the actual fund. Reference was also made to the lack of accountability for the finances of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.<sup>62</sup> What is interesting, however, is the fact that although corruption cases within civil society are *perceived* by the majority of the stakeholders to be frequent, when probed they were unable to come up with many concrete examples.

The stakeholders in Limassol argued that the incidents of corruption arise due to inadequate state control and the absence of a public body that would monitor fundraising activities. This view, however, was later contradicted during the Nicosia consultation, where the stakeholders argued that public control of fundraising activities is sufficient.

The PAG did not consider the incidents of corruption within civil society to be frequent but neither did it view them as rare, hence, the score of two for this indicator.

*3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs.* This indicator was assessed by examining the extent to which CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available. Eighty seven percent of the surveyed stakeholders stated that the CSOs they know best, keep financial accounts (Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss). In a question whether these accounts are made publicly available, 66% of the stakeholders replied affirmatively. However, during the regional stakeholders' consultations, participants commented that there is not sufficient state regulation concerning the transparency of the finances of CSOs. While according to the Associations and Foundations Law 57/1972, for a CSO to register with the Ministry of the Interior or the district authorities, it is necessary to submit for approval its Memorandum of Association clearly stating the method of auditing the organisation's accounts, the state has not developed

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<sup>62</sup> The Orthodox Church of Cyprus is exempted from paying taxes. The mishandling of Church property (particularly of the Archbishopric and the Bishopric of Limassol under the previous Bishop) has been the subject of many media reports. A special investigative committee headed by a former high court judge was appointed by the Synod of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus to investigate the handling of the Archbishopric's finances. In its 400-page report the Committee has reportedly found instances of fraud and mismanagement of the Church's finances. In certain cases criminal proceedings were instigated. According to reports many prominent figures of public life (politicians, journalists, senior civil servants) as well as relatives of the Archbishop received 'preferential' treatment by being offered Church land at ridiculously low prices.

sufficient mechanisms to monitor the implementation of these methods, or indeed exercised any sort of control over the finances of CSOs.

During the scoring meeting, the Chairman of the Pancyprian Welfare Council said that when the Council asked the government to check the accounts of welfare CSOs the latter objected. Apparently welfare organisations consider the checking of their balance sheets by the State (or an umbrella-organisation) as an erosion of their autonomy. The PAG felt that even though many CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available they do not constitute such a large majority to justify a score of three; hence the score of two.

*3.2.3 CSOs actions to promote transparency.* Transparency is about openness. It is about being accessible and being subject to public scrutiny. In modern democracies both the state and business organisations are increasingly expected to be open about their procedures, their policies, their products and their services.

The respondents to the regional stakeholders' questionnaire were asked to describe the role of civil society in promoting government and corporate transparency. A majority (57%) of respondents believe that actions to promote government transparency by CSOs are either 'limited' or 'insignificant'. Furthermore, a majority of respondents (63%) could not think of any examples of CSO action aiming to promote government transparency. Although about a third (30%) said they could think of either 'many' or 'several' examples, very few were actually given. Those were:

- The Cyprus Union of Journalists lobbying the government to pass the Press Law of 1989 and thereby ensure freedom of access to information for all citizens.
- The Movement on the Rights of Patients' lobbying the government to pass the law on the right of patients who have been treated by state hospitals to have access to their personal files.

During the consultations, reference was made to the fact that the criteria of allocating public funds to CSOs are not transparent and state aid can be used as a tool of political patronage. When asked why CSOs were not more assertive and demand transparency, the response was that people feared that they may be 'penalised' for being assertive with fewer funds.

With regard to corporate transparency, it seems that a majority (48%) of the respondents think that the role of civil society in promoting issues such as transparency is either 'insignificant' or 'limited'. It is important to note that 27% of the respondents stated that they did not know how to assess the role of CSOs in promoting corporate transparency. When asked whether they could think of examples of CSO actions dedicated to promoting corporate transparency, 69% of the stakeholders answered that they could not think of any. About a quarter (24%) could think of one or two examples, while only 7% could think of several. The only example given by (several) stakeholders was the intervention of the Pancyprian Consumers' Association regarding bank advertisements on low interest rates that the Association felt they were misleading the public into believing that loans could be secured with low interest rates.

The lack of CSO action dedicated to promoting government and/or corporate transparency is also evident from the absence of any press references on such actions in the three newspapers monitored during March, May and June 2005.

Thus, both the responses of the stakeholders and the absence of references in the press, suggest that there have not been many recent examples of CSO actions or campaigns dedicated to promoting government or corporate transparency. During the scoring meeting it was pointed out that only the mass media have a track record of promoting transparency. One possible explanation for the lack of civil society activities in this area is the fact that notions of transparency are particularly important to political cultures in which citizens actively assert their right to know and be informed and states take their citizens seriously. In Cyprus, citizens

have only recently begun to assert the information and monitoring aspects of their citizenship rights.

### 3.3 Tolerance

This subdimension examines the extent to which civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance. Table II.3.3 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	<u>2</u>
3.3.2	Civil society actions to promote tolerance	<u>1</u>

*3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena.* Intolerance is about denying those who are different from ‘us’ (for example because of their colour, gender or sexual orientation) or happen to hold views and beliefs that are not the same as ours, to enjoy the rights and privileges that we do as citizens of a country. Intolerance is about attempting to silence, suppress, marginalize, ignore or even extinguish the ‘other’. Intolerance is linked to the notion that ‘we’ (whoever those ‘we’ may be) ‘know better’, that ‘we’ are ‘obviously’ correct and that the ‘other’ should acknowledge this.

The respondents to the regional stakeholders’ survey were asked to evaluate the significance of racist and intolerant forces within civil society. The majority (52%) of the respondents believe that such forces are either ‘limited’ or ‘insignificant’. A noticeable 25%, however, describe them as ‘significant’ and another 9% as ‘moderate’. Examples of intolerant or racist behaviour within civil society mentioned during the Limassol consultation included the behaviour of members of football fan clubs and the Church. However no specific cases were mentioned regarding the exact type of intolerant or racist behaviour that has been demonstrated. In fact, during the Nicosia consultation it was stated that the fact that a fifth of the respondents answered that racist or intolerant forces within civil society are significant could be due to a misinterpretation of the question. The analysis of socio-cultural norms under the environment dimension, however, indicates that there is evidence of both racism and intolerance within society.<sup>63</sup> This emerges in one of its ugliest forms when people holding opposing views on ‘the Cyprus problem’ use terms such as ‘traitor’ or ‘nationalist’ to smear their opponents. But it is also present in the way, for example, immigrants are treated by the police, and those whose religious beliefs differ from those of the Orthodox Church (the ‘heretics’ as they are called in Cyprus) are treated by the official Church or the public in general.

The stakeholders were also asked to state how they perceive the relationship of these intolerant or racist forces to civil society at large. Almost half (49%) of the respondents describe them as either ‘marginal’ or ‘isolated’. But over a third (36%) consider them ‘significant’ or ‘dominating’. On the other hand, the 15% who said that they did not know may indicate, among other things, that these forces are marginal (thus people are not aware of their activities) or that they are significant but their activities did not fall in the respondents’ attention. If the number of respondents who answered that they did not know is excluded, the results change as shown in table II.3.4.

<sup>63</sup> The President of the National Organisation for the Protection of Human Rights who also happens to be the Law Commissioner, is reported to have told the *Cyprus Mail* that there was a problem of xenophobia and prejudice in Cyprus; that the problem was not confined to a particular social class but could be found across society ‘although no one admits it’; and that prejudice existed even among government officials (Evripidou, 2004a).

**TABLE II.3.4: Relation of racist or intolerant forces to civil society at large**

Response	%
They Dominate Civil Society	6
They are a Significant Actor Within Civil Society	36
They are a Marginal Actor Within Civil Society	45
They are Isolated and Strongly Denounced by Civil Society	13
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Forty-two per cent of the respondents believe that intolerant or racist forces either dominate or are a significant actor of civil society, while the rest (58%) believe that these forces are either a marginal actor or are strongly denounced by civil society. The assessment of the PAG was that intolerant forces within civil society do exist but they are isolated, hence the score of two.

*3.3.2 Civil society activities to promote tolerance.* This indicator looks at the role of civil society in promoting tolerance. Almost a quarter of the surveyed stakeholders stated that the role of civil society in promoting tolerance is significant, while over half (51%) stated that it is either 'limited' or 'moderate'. When asked whether they could think of any examples of civil society campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting tolerance during the past year, 51% of the respondents could not think of any while 48% could think of at least one. None of the examples given were specific, as reference was made to general types of activities such as bicomunal events organised by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot CSOs, the programmes of the Cyprus Youth Forum and the Movement for the Support of Foreigners, and festivals on the culture of foreign workers. One example mentioned during the consultations was the multi-cultural event on the 'Culture of the Minorities of Cyprus' organised by the Pancyprian Federation of Women's Associations in collaboration with the Maronite, Armenian and Latin Communities. The same CSO has in the past organised a number of seminars on the culture of the minorities in Cyprus.

Neither has there been in the three newspapers monitored in the period of March, May, and June 2005 any significant number of references of CSO actions dedicated to promoting tolerance. Specifically there were only two references to such type of actions:

- The conference organised by the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and the Turkish Cypriot Revolutionary Trade Unions Federation (DEV-IS) on 'The Position of Greek and Turkish Cypriot Women: Perspective in a United Cyprus'.
- The annual ten-day events of the United Democratic Youth Association (EDON) with the message 'Under the Same Sky'. The events aimed to bring the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, particularly the young, together.

Thus, the assessment of the majority of the stakeholders that the role of civil society in promoting tolerance is limited is supported by the small number of references of such actions in the press during the monitoring period.

### **3.4. Non-violence**

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which civil society actors and organisations practice and promote non-violence. Table II.3.5 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.3.5: Indicators assessing non-violence**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the civil society arena	<u>2</u>
3.4.2	Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace	<u>2</u>

*3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena.* What is the significance of forces within civil society that use violence to express and advance their interests? The overwhelming majority (79%) of the surveyed stakeholders considers that the use of violence within civil society is either a rare or an occasional phenomenon and is used by isolated groups. The rarity of civil society groups resorting to violence is evident from the lack of references to this kind of phenomena in the press. There have not been any references to acts of violence within civil society in the three newspapers monitored during the period March, May, and June 2005. Nonetheless, during the consultations, participants pointed to examples of violent behaviour by organised football fans.<sup>64</sup> When asked whether these acts of violence are publicly denounced by other civil society actors, 44% of the surveyed stakeholders answered ‘frequently’ and 35% ‘sometimes’, while 19% said either ‘rarely’ or ‘never’. A small percentage (4%) stated that they did not know.

Thus, while it seems that violent behaviour within civil society is rare, according to the stakeholders, whenever violent acts do occur, they are denounced by other civil society actors. On the other hand, however, during the scoring meeting it was pointed out that football violence is significant enough to be ignored, hence the score of two instead of three.

*3.4.2 Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace.* As seen above, civil society in the southern part of Cyprus is a rather peaceful space of interaction. This indicator now examines the general role of civil society in promoting non-violence and peace in the wider society. A quarter of the stakeholders who participated in the survey assessed this role as ‘significant’, while 36% answered that it is ‘moderate’, 25% ‘limited’ and 7% ‘insignificant’.

Furthermore, the majority of those stakeholders (74%) could think of at least one example of civil society campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting non-violence and peace during the previous year. The only examples of such actions given by the respondents, however, concerned various bicomunal events. The remaining 26% of the respondents stated either that they could not think of any examples or answered ‘don’t know’.

The monitoring of three newspapers during March, May and June 2005 resulted in a small number of examples of civil society initiatives dedicated to promoting non-violence and peace, which mainly concerned bicomunal events. Some stakeholders, however, commented that even though there have been some civil society initiatives dedicated to the promotion of non-violence and peace their coverage by the press has been limited. This view was shared by the PAG which opted to give this indicator the score of two.

### 3.5. Gender Equity

This subdimension analyses the extent to which civil society actors practice and promote gender equity. Table II.3.6 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

<sup>64</sup> Football violence is considered to be a serious problem in Cyprus. Many football clubs are closely associated with political parties and football matches are often highly ‘politicised’ events in the sense that during the games the supporters chant political slogans and waive the flags of Greece or Cyprus (as symbols—the first of those who give primacy to the ‘Greek’ aspect of their identity and the latter of those who emphasise their ‘Cypriotness’). For a recent analysis of football violence in Cyprus see Peristianis (2002).

**TABLE II.3.6: Indicators assessing gender equity**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the civil society arena	<u>2</u>
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	<u>2</u>
3.5.3	Civil society actions to promote gender equity	<u>2</u>

*3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena.* Civil society in the southern part of Cyprus does not contain powerful sexist or discriminatory forces against women (or so the surveyed stakeholders seem to believe). On the other hand, the presence of women in CSO leadership positions is weak. A majority of the stakeholders (57%), said that they would describe the significance of sexist or discriminatory forces against women within civil society as either ‘insignificant’ or ‘limited’. The only case of discrimination against women within civil society reported by the respondents to the questionnaire is the under-representation of women in the leadership positions of CSOs.<sup>65</sup> Reference was also made to the policy of ‘gentlemen’s clubs’ like the Rotary and the Lions, not to admit women as members. The insignificance of such sexist or discriminatory practices within civil society is underlined by the absence of references to any such practices in the three newspapers monitored during the period March, May, and June 2005. It is important to note, however, that when asked whether sexist practices within civil society are publicly denounced, a large majority of the respondents (71%) answered ‘rarely’.

The evidence cited here shows that although only a minority of CSO leaders are women, there have not been any other signs of sexist or discriminatory behaviour against women within civil society. This is evident both from the absence of references to such behaviour in the press and the responses of the stakeholders to the questionnaire. On the other hand, however, and bearing in mind the heterogeneity of civil society, it is worth noting that women are to be found more active in some sectors of civil society, such as faith-based and welfare organisations and charities and less prominent in others (e.g. trade unions, professional associations and economic-interest organisations). Ultimately, however, the position of women within civil society cannot be that different from the position of women in the wider society. And, even though the legal framework for gender equity is there, women in the Republic of Cyprus have a long way to go before they could claim substantial equality in public life.<sup>66</sup>

*3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs.* The surveyed stakeholders were asked to state whether the CSOs they know best have written policies regarding equal opportunities and equal pay for equal work for men and women. They were asked to comment for up to three organisations. According to their responses, out of 64 CSOs that have paid employees, the majority (60%) has such policies in place.

*3.5.3 Civil society actions to promote gender equity.* It is evident both from the stakeholders’ survey, and the references found in the media, that there is a number of examples of civil society actions dedicated to promoting gender equity. This type of activity enjoys wide press coverage.

<sup>65</sup> Strictly speaking this is not necessarily a result of discrimination (i.e. of a deliberate practice, a regulation or law that prevents women from occupying leadership positions because of their gender). It may well be the case that women, with all the housework responsibilities that they still have (Peristianis et. al., 2004), simply do not have the time to become actively involved and seek leadership positions in CSOs. This is, however, a topic that needs further research.

<sup>66</sup> It is no accident, for example, that there are only a handful of female Members of Parliament, there have rarely been women members of the cabinet and few women in top managerial positions. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Auditor General and Commissioner for Data Protection are occupied by women and so is the Chair of the National Organisation for the Protection of Human Rights. Women’s pay is still lower than men’s, female unemployment is higher than male unemployment and women are more likely to be found in part-time employment (Soumeli & Trimikliniotis, 2004).

The media review of three newspapers revealed that during the period of March, May and June 2005 there has been a number of references to civil society initiatives dedicated to promoting gender equity and raising public awareness on gender issues. Those references concerned meetings, discussions, information campaigns and conferences organised by women's associations and trade unions. More specifically, during the press monitoring period, two of the largest women's federations, the Pancyprian Federation of Women's Associations (POGO) and the Cyprus Federation of Business and Professional Women (KOYEE) organised events on gender equity and women's issues. Furthermore, during the same period, two Trade Unions, the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and the Democratic Labour Federation of Cyprus (DEOK) held events dedicated to promoting gender equity.

- POGO held conferences in the districts of Limassol, Larnaka and Famagusta on Women's Day (8<sup>th</sup> of March) aiming to emphasize the role of women in Cypriot society.
- The Larnaka and Famagusta district committees of POGO also organised a common event on Women's Day where issues of gender equity were discussed.
- KOYEE held a conference in March regarding the strengthening of women's enterprise skills, aiming to contribute towards higher levels of gender equity in the workplace.
- PEO held a conference in March on women's achievements through the years and the evaluation of the 1995 Peking Declaration on gender equity, development and peace.
- DEOK dedicated one week of March to women, during which it carried out various information campaigns aiming to raise public awareness concerning the new gender equity laws.

When they were asked to assess the general role of civil society in promoting gender equity, a fifth of the surveyed stakeholders stated that it is significant but 62% described it as either 'moderate' or 'limited'. Furthermore, just over half of the respondents (51%) could think of at least one example of civil society campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting gender equity during the previous year. The remaining 49% either stated that they could not think of any examples or answered 'don't know'. While no specific examples of such campaigns were given, the respondents referred to the work of women's organisations such as POGO and KOYEE. Reference was also made to the work of the Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS) and the Women's Cooperative Bank.

### 3.6. Poverty Eradication

This subdimension examines to what extent civil society actors promote poverty eradication. Table II.3.7 presents the indicator score.

**TABLE II.3.7: Indicator assessing poverty eradication**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	Civil society actions to eradicate poverty	2

*3.6.1 Civil society actions to eradicate poverty.* Both the answers of the stakeholders survey as well as the absence of a significant number of media references to civil society actions, campaigns or programmes dedicated to the eradication of poverty suggest that during the previous 12 months civil society's role in eradicating poverty has been limited.

A majority of the stakeholders who participated in the survey (62%) stated that the role of civil society in reducing poverty is either 'limited' or 'insignificant', while only 7% said that

it is 'significant'. Furthermore, the majority (60%) could not think of any examples of civil society actions, campaigns or programmes dedicated to the eradication of poverty during the previous 12 months, while only 2% could recall 'many' such examples. Almost a quarter (24%) could think of 'one or two examples' and 15% could think of 'several'. However, the majority of the examples of action dedicated to the eradication of poverty provided by the stakeholders concerned fund-raising for the benefit of groups affected by poverty outside Cyprus, like the children in Africa, the Tsunami victims in South-East Asia and the Palestinians.

Some stakeholders commented that the media coverage of civil society actions, campaigns or programmes dedicated to the eradication of poverty is limited and the review of three newspapers during the period of March, May and June 2005 tends to confirm their impression: References to such activities constituted less than 1% of the total number of references to civil society activities that were identified. One such reference is to the 27<sup>th</sup> of March fund-raising campaign organised by the Lyceum of Polemidia, in the Limassol region, in collaboration with the school's parents' association and the Co-Operative Banks of Ypsonas, Lofou and Kato Polemidia in support of students from low-income families and students with disabilities enrolled in the school.

Another reference is to the establishment of a 'National Network Against Poverty' during a meeting of the 'Pancyprian Coordinating Committee for the Protection and Welfare of Children' with the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO), the Cyprus Workers' Confederation (SEK) and the Democratic Labour Federation of Cyprus (DEOK). Finally, reference is made to the proposed support plan of the Union of Cypriot Farmers for the improvement of the living conditions of farmers.

The PAG's score of 2 does not seem to be warranted by the evidence cited here. This inconsistency between the PAG's score and the information presented for this indicator must be, and it is, recorded. The PAG's score has to be seen within the context of a small country with a thriving economy and a high standard of living that has eradicated absolute poverty.

### 3.7. Environmental sustainability

This subdimension analyses the extent to which civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability. Table II.3.8 presents the indicator score.

**TABLE II.3.8: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	Civil society actions to sustain the environment	2

*3.7.1 Civil society actions to sustain the environment.* Our enquiries found that there is a moderate number of CSO actions dedicated to protecting the environment, evident both by the answers to the regional stakeholders' survey and the references in the press during the monitoring period. A quarter of the surveyed stakeholders considered the role of civil society in protecting the environment as 'significant', while only 5% described it as 'insignificant'. The majority (66%) describes it as 'moderate' or 'limited'.

When asked whether they could think of examples of civil society campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to the protection of the environment, an overwhelming majority of 93% of the respondents could think of at least one example, while 54% of those could think of 'several'. The examples provided by the respondents included the following:

- The annual cleaning of the coasts organised by the Cyprus Marine Environment Protection Association (CYMEPA)
- The campaign of the Federation of Environmental and Ecological Organisations against genetically modified food.

- The campaign of the Federation of Environmental and Ecological Organisations against the creation of golf courses in the Paphos region.
- The protests organised by the Cyprus Green Party in collaboration with residents of the Akrotiri village aiming to remove the communications antennas<sup>67</sup> installed in the area by the British military.<sup>68</sup>
- The various protests by environmental CSOs and neighbourhood committees aiming to remove mobile telephony masts from residential areas that are thought to release radiation.<sup>69</sup>

There have also been some references in the three newspapers monitored during March, May and June 2005 to such actions by both environmental and other CSOs such as, for example,<sup>70</sup>

- the protests by the residents of three villages (Sia, Mosfiloti and Alambra) in the broader Nicosia area about the erection of an Hellas Sat antenna in their area
- the organisation of an environmental and cultural festival by the Paphos Committee of Green and Cleanliness in collaboration with the elementary schools of Polis Chrysochous, in the Paphos district.
- the protest by environmental associations in collaboration with the local authorities and residents of Pomos village in the west of Cyprus, against the relocation of the village cemetery near a water dam that could result in the pollution of the drinking water in the future.

## Conclusion

Civil society's internal practice and external promotion of positive social values is assessed as moderate. More specifically, the study indicates that civil society is not terribly active in promoting transparency, tolerance and poverty eradication. Demands for transparency presuppose a strong sense of citizenship, a sense that has been rather underdeveloped in Cyprus.<sup>71</sup> Tolerance, on the other hand, is a much more complicated matter and needs to be further researched. What has to be reiterated here is that the empirical evidence of widespread intolerance among the population of Cyprus is too strong to be dismissed. With regard to poverty eradication, it seems that civil society is not very active, at least during the period that this particular piece of research was conducted. This phenomenon has to be seen within the context of a society that is perceived to be affluent (at least according to conventional economic indicators) and is characterised by a blindness towards the 'other'. The 'other' in this instance is immigrants, senior citizens and the people of rural areas.

On the 'brighter' side, this section of the report has shown that democratic practices in civil society are rather well entrenched, that corruption in CSOs does not seem to be widespread; and that civil society appears to be more active in promoting non-violence, gender equity and environmental sustainability, although in none of these areas its activities are extensive and sustained.

One final point is in order here. Ideas of what is right and proper and just (our 'values') constitute part of a historically specific cultural system that is also shaped by socio-political

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<sup>67</sup> The antennas are thought to have damaging effects on the health of the residents of the Akrotiri village, which is located just a few metres nearby.

<sup>68</sup> A part of the Akrotiri peninsula constitutes the Western British Sovereign Base Area.

<sup>69</sup> Mobile telephony masts are thought to adversely affect the health of people who live or work near them.

<sup>70</sup> There are 32 registered and 3 non-registered environmental CSOs out of a total of 3.753 CSOs. There has been an increased tendency of CSOs that are not primarily concerned with the environment, such as animal protection organisations, neighbourhood and school committees to deal with environmental issues.


<sup>71</sup> To demand transparency is to assert one's right to know. When people see themselves as citizens with legally safeguarded rights and responsibilities and not as subjects that are simply told what to do, they can assert their 'right to know' and demand that those who hold power justify their actions.

and economic processes. More importantly, cultures, economies, societies and polities contain a mixture of both 'traditional' and 'modern' elements. The symbiosis of those elements is not always unproblematic and smooth and this is true even for the more advanced industrial societies with long traditions of democracy and tolerance. The fact that different aspects of the CSI's 'value system' have been allocated different scores is to some extent a reflection of this 'coexistence' of different values.

## 2.4 IMPACT

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions within the areas under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. Although the PAG's overall assessment was that the impact of civil society is 'moderate', hence the score of 1.8, it should be noted that in some areas, such as the budgeting process, empowering marginalized groups and building social capital its impact was deemed to be limited. Overall, as can be seen from the figure below the scores of the subdimensions indicate that there is no powerful discernible impact of civil society.

**FIGURE II.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension**



### 4.1 Influencing Public Policy

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy. Table II.4.1 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.4.1: Indicators assessing the influence on public policy**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Human rights impact	2
4.1.2	Social policy impact	2
4.1.3	Civil society's impact on national budgeting process case study	1

*4.1.1 Human rights impact.* As an initial step to assess the impact of civil society on human rights policy, a question in the regional stakeholders' questionnaire asked the respondents to state how active and successful civil society is in influencing public policy regarding human rights in general. A significant percentage of the respondents stated that civil society is 'active' or 'somewhat active' in influencing human rights public policy (34% and 39% respectively), whereas 46% said that it is also 'somewhat successful' in doing so.

In order to further investigate the impact of civil society on this issue, and in accordance with the CSI methodology, the research team conducted a specific case study on what is regarded as one of the most important current human rights issues in Cyprus – that of the rights of the 30,000 or so foreign workers (see Appendix 7 for a detailed report). The research revealed that although there are specific laws in place safeguarding the rights of foreign workers (e.g. the Law on the Combat of Racial and Some Other Inequalities (Law 42(1)/2004), the Law on Equal Treatment (Racial or National Descent) (Law 59(1)/2004) and the Law on Equal Treatment at the Workplace (Law 58(1)/2004)) (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudsman, 2005b), there is an obvious lack of mechanisms that would ensure their effective implementation.

The two largest trade unions in Cyprus, the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and the Confederation of Cyprus Workers (SEK) have on numerous occasions stressed the need for

more effective government legislative and institutional mechanisms that would secure the improvement of the working conditions of foreign workers and the practical implementation of EU employment directives, now incorporated in the national legislative framework. Their efforts, however, have not produced substantial tangible outcomes. The two Unions occupy prominent positions within civil society and more generally the public sphere. They are regularly consulted by government and participate in many consultative committees or councils. Despite their strength, however, they have not succeeded in persuading successive governments to effectively protect the rights of foreign workers.

*4.1.2 Social policy impact.* Social policy is decided by the government that is in power at any given point in time. The Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and the Ministry of Health are primarily responsible for the various facets of social policy benefits, health and support for low income families. The two Ministries submit their annual budgets to the Ministry of Finance in order to be incorporated in the Budget that the government submits to the Parliament for approval.

In assessing the impact of CSOs on social public policy it is important to note that some organisations are more influential than others because of the number of their members, their connections, resources and so on.<sup>72</sup> Although there are provisions for consultations with CSOs active in the areas of health and welfare, it is not clear how much and to what extent the views of those CSOs are taken into account by governments when formulating social policy. Quite often the argument of public officials is that the will is there but the funds are simply not available.

In order to further investigate the impact of CSOs on social policy, and in accordance with the CSI methodology, the research team conducted a specific case study on the activity of CSOs on one of the most publicised social policy issues of the last couple of years – the decision of the Ministry of Health to close down the main centre providing medical treatment to cancer patients, the Nicosia General Hospital Oncology Ward, by November 2004 (see Appendix 4 for a detailed report).

In early 2004 the Ministry of Health announced its intentions to gradually close down the oncology ward of the Nicosia General Hospital, claiming that cancer patients could be adequately serviced by a new oncology ward that was to be created in the Limassol General Hospital in November of the same year (originally intended to service cancer patients from the Limassol and Paphos regions), the Bank of Cyprus (BoC) Oncology Centre that is based in Nicosia and the Arodaphnousa Palliative Care Centre also based in Nicosia. The announcement was met with fury by cancer patients who argued that the BoC Oncology and Arodaphnousa Centres would not have the capacity to accommodate the additional patients from Nicosia.

The decision led to the mobilization of the Coordinating Committee of Cancer Patients and Relatives of the Oncology Ward (of the Nicosia General Hospital). This organization's activities included a number of campaigns and protests in various forms and places during a yearlong battle. The biggest of those was the thirty-day or so long vigil of cancer patients, relatives and friends outside the Presidential Palace. The organization also filed a lawsuit in November 2004 against the government decision to close down the ward. In June 2005, the Supreme Court ruled against the decision of the government, ordering the return of the nursing staff and the ward to its original capacity. Today, the hospital's oncology ward is functioning in its original capacity, and, whereas there is still, admittedly, much to be done on the issue of cancer treatment services by the government, the mobilization of those CSOs and

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<sup>72</sup> For example, a notable partner in the dialogue between the state and CSOs has been the Pancyprian Welfare Council, an umbrella organisation established by Law to co-ordinate the activities of welfare organisations.

their success in overturning the governmental decision could be considered as an indicator of the impact of civil society on social policy.

*4.1.3 Impact on national budgeting process.* Article 167, of the Republic of Cyprus Constitution states, that the responsibility for compiling and preparing the government budget lies with the Minister of Finance (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Finance, n.d.).

As is often the case, the process of the preparation of the budget involves the entire public sector. The budgetary process in the Republic of Cyprus takes the following steps.

- Around May each year all government departments and independent offices and services of the Republic, such as the Public Service Commission and the Office of the Attorney General, are called upon to submit their budgets for the following year to the Department of Budget and Fiscal Control of the Ministry of Finance. The latter subsequently consolidates the proposals in one budget and submits it to the Council of Ministers.
- Once approved by the Council of Ministers the budget is submitted to Parliament. The Parliamentary Finance Committee is the body that subjects the budget to scrutiny before it appears before the House. It is often the case that government departments are invited to appear before the Committee to defend their budget requests.
- The budget is then presented to a plenary session of the House for approval. This takes place around September each year.
- Once the budget is voted upon, a Budget Law for the year in question is drafted.

As stated earlier, civil society consists of all sorts of organisations and groups and it is difficult to treat it as if it were a homogeneous whole. It is possible that some organisations such as trade unions and employers' organisations may have more say in the budgetary process than, for example, a non-profit research centre or an advocacy group. Despite this reservation, it is important to note here that 36% of the respondents to the stakeholders' survey describe civil society as being 'inactive' in influencing the budgeting process and another 39% describe it as 'somewhat active'. Only 22% consider it to be 'active' or 'very active'. Similarly 35% replied that civil society was 'unsuccessful' in influencing the budgeting process and 49% as 'somewhat successful': only 7% describe it as 'successful' and no one stated that it was 'very successful'. Thus there seems to be a limited level of activity as various groups and organisations strive to secure funds for their causes but without much success. This was also confirmed during the deliberations of the PAG for the scoring of this indicator. The Pancyprrian Welfare Council, for example, is apparently informed but does not participate in the budgetary process. These responses need to be placed within the context of a budgetary system in which there is no institutionalised and transparent procedure for the participation of CSOs in the budgetary process, which partially explains the limited role, civil society plays in the process.

## 4.2 Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable

This subdimension analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable. Table II.4.2 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.4.2: Indicators assessing the degree of holding the State and private corporations accountable**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state accountable	<u>2</u>
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	<u>2</u>

*4.2.1 Holding the state accountable.* An important feature of modern democracies is that citizens and their organisations are free to scrutinise, challenge and criticise public policy, request that state agencies provide them with answers to their questions and mobilise public

opinion in favour or against specific state actions. This indicator assesses the degree to which civil society is active and successful in holding the Cypriot state accountable.

As we have already seen in previous indicators, in the Republic of Cyprus a legal framework that safeguards the right of citizens to assemble, freely express their views and criticise the government is in place. This means that the *context* for holding the state accountable is there. However, when the surveyed stakeholders were asked to indicate the degree to which they believe civil society is active in holding the state accountable, almost half of the respondents (48%) stated that civil society is ‘somewhat active’ while 18% said that it was ‘inactive’. Almost a third (32%) stated that civil society is ‘active’ in holding the state accountable. The stakeholders were also asked to assess the extent to which civil society is successful in holding the state accountable. The majority of the respondents (53%) replied that it is ‘somewhat successful’; while 27% said that it is ‘unsuccessful’. Those who answered that it was ‘successful’ constituted 18% of the respondents.

It seems, then, that only a relatively small percentage of the respondents thought that civil society is successful in holding the state accountable. What needs to be reiterated though is that ‘civil society’ is not a socially homogenous whole. Nor is it sociologically prudent to treat the state of any society as if it were a unified category because it has different branches that may be more or less responsive to popular demands or susceptible to public scrutiny. One of the implications of this is that different sectors of civil society may be more or less active and successful in holding the state accountable.

Several examples of activities by citizens aiming to hold the state accountable were found in the March, May and June 2005 newspapers that were reviewed. The following list is indicative:

- Wheat producers demonstrating for higher public subsidies.
- The Union of doctors who work in the public sector issuing an ultimatum to the Ministry of Finance that its members will go on strike if their demands for better conditions and the creation of more positions are not met.
- An NGO promoting antiracism and defending the rights of immigrants publicly accusing the police for deporting a Nigerian woman and her three children who came to Cyprus to visit her husband. The NGO asked for the expenses of this woman and her children to be paid by the State together with a suitable compensation.
- The staff of the duty-free shops in the two airports going on strike to protest against what they view as the government’s insensitivity to their position.<sup>73</sup>
- The owners of land in the Amathus region to the east of Limassol staging a demonstration to protest for what they describe as the unfair compensation they will get from the government for the expropriation of their land.<sup>74</sup>
- Taxi drivers at Larnaca airport threatening to go on strike if the government does not keep its promises to them.
- The owners of land near the area where the campus of the University of Cyprus is being built warn the government that they will go to court and, if necessary to the European Court of Human Rights, if the status of their land, as defined by the Town Planning and Housing Department, does not change. The change will mean that the value of the land will increase.
- Kidney patients in the Larnaca-Famagusta region gathered outside Larnaca General Hospital, asking the government to keep its promises to them.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>73</sup> The government had made a deal with a private company that would essentially hand the running of the airport to the latter in exchange for renovations that will be carried out by the company.

<sup>74</sup> Excavations in the Amathus region revealed a series of valuable antiquities and the government wanted to proceed further and make parts of the area archaeological sites accessible to the public.

<sup>75</sup> Among other things the patients complained that there is only one nephrologist at the hospital.

- The board of directors of the association of Paphos construction companies met with the Ministry of Labour to ask that the visas of foreign workers are renewed/issued promptly otherwise they will have to close their business.
- The consumers' association asked the government not to increase the price of water and demands that water prices become the same in all districts.
- Cancer patients take the government to the Supreme Court for its decision to close down its oncological ward. The court ruled in favour of the patients and asked the government to reopen the ward.
- The Chair of the wheat growers association publicly accuses the government for not sticking to everything that was agreed between the two. He publicly states that many wheat growers have not yet received their promised compensation by the government.

During the PAG scoring meeting it was pointed out that the media more than anything else are probably the institution that manages to hold the state accountable. Although the research findings presented under this indicator may appear to contradict the data collected for the indicators on the promotion of government transparency, there is a plausible interpretation of this apparent inconsistency. The data gathered from the stakeholder questionnaire and the consultations, as well as the media review, have led the researchers to tentatively conclude that transparency and accountability are seen as two distinct and not so related concepts. While the data from the research show that transparency is perceived to be linked to decision-making processes, accountability is seen as being more closely related to the implementation phase of a policy. That is, it is only when policies are deemed unfavourable or inefficient that CSOs are mobilized.

*4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable.* In modern societies private corporations are under increased scrutiny by a variety of CSOs such as, for example, consumer and environmental groups, trade unions, and residents' associations. This indicator assesses the extent to which civil society in the southern part of Cyprus has been active and successful in holding private corporations accountable.

The opinions of the surveyed stakeholders on this issue were divided into two: 46% described civil society as 'inactive' whereas 45% stated that it was 'somewhat active' (34%) or 'active' (11%). Furthermore, 46% of the respondents describe civil society as being 'unsuccessful' in holding private corporations accountable, 38% say that it is 'somewhat successful' and only 7% describe it as 'successful'.

Nevertheless, the monitoring of three newspapers during March, May and June 2005 revealed that there are numerous examples of civil society activity in holding private corporations accountable. The list below is indicative:

- The trade unions representing the interests of Cyprus Airways employees, urging their members to go on strike as a reaction to the decision of the Board of Directors to make redundant 22 staff members.
- The protest of the workers of the Hellenic Copper Mines (Skouriotissa Mine) outside the Archdiocese in Nicosia urging the Church to become more sympathetic to the problems they are facing.<sup>76</sup>
- The protest of the residents' of Anafotida village against the operation of a dairy farm within the residential area of the community.<sup>77</sup>
- The trade unions representing the interests of the employees of a hotel in the Famagusta region accusing the hotel owners that instead of rehiring those of their employees that were laid off, they hired cheap labour from Eastern European countries, especially Poland and Slovenia.

<sup>76</sup> The Church is the owner of the majority of the company's shares.

<sup>77</sup> Anafotida village is situated in the Larnaka region.

- The published article of the Famagusta District Secretary of the Union of Hotel Employees (SYFKA/PEO) that employers in the region make highly paid staff redundant with the blessing of the local staff of the redundancy fund.<sup>78</sup>
- The public statement of the trade unions representing the construction workers of the Paphos region that construction companies lay off skilled permanent employees to replace them with cheap unskilled and temporary workers.
- The protest by the residents of Pegeia village and Coral Beach, both in the Paphos region, in reaction to a private corporation's construction plans in their areas because of what they see as the adverse impact of those plans upon the environment.

Thus, although a significant proportion of stakeholders believe that civil society is neither active nor successful in holding private corporations accountable, the number of references to such cases in the press during the monitoring period, shows that there is a significant number of instances of civil society activity in this area. The main difference between accountability and transparency in the context of the southern part of Cyprus has been outlined in the previous indicator. It has been argued that, while CSOs do not seem to be active in promoting the transparency of state decision-making processes, they have frequently become mobilized in the policy implementation phase, especially if policies were perceived as unfavourable to specific groups. Likewise, civil society has not been active in promoting private corporation transparency. It has, however, managed to become mobilized in cases where private companies were perceived to pursue policies that adversely influence specific groups of the population.

### 4.3 Responding to Social Interests

This subdimension analyses the extent to which civil society actors are responsive to social interests. Table II.4.3 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.4.3: Indicators assessing the response to social interests**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	<u>2</u>
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	<u>2</u>

*4.3.1 Responsiveness.* The media review during the months of March, May and June 2005 revealed that there have been a large number of civil society actions responding to social concerns during that period, ranging from health issues to road repairing. The following are some specific examples:

- The Europa Donna donation of a mobile breast-cancer testing unit to the Ministry of Health, for screening purposes in the rural areas.
- The conference organised by the Cyprus Union of Farmers in March to inform farmers on the European Union agricultural policy, the problems of agriculture in Cyprus and how the Union proposed to resolve them.
- The residents' of the village of Kalo Chorio request that the road from Larnaka to their village is repaired, since it was at that time in a very bad condition.
- The parents' association of the Melkonian Educational Institute (MEI) in Nicosia, one of the few Armenian schools in the world, which in collaboration with its alumni

<sup>78</sup> It is the practice of many employers in Cyprus to make highly remunerated employees redundant so as to reduce their labour costs. The Law clearly specifies the conditions under which an employee should be made redundant and if these are not satisfied the employee will not receive redundancy payment from the state. In such a case the employee has the right to appeal to the Labour Court, which will decide whether the redundancy was genuine.

association and friends of the school have joined forces to stop the closure of the school.<sup>79</sup>

- The parents' association of the Geroskipou elementary school in the Paphos district, which in cooperation with the school authorities and the students of the school requested that Cyprus Electricity Authority wires are removed from areas near the school, since in their view high voltage electricity could cause health problems.

The respondents to the regional stakeholders' survey were asked to assess how *active* civil society is in undertaking public information and public education activities. The overwhelming majority of stakeholders (89%) said that it is either 'active' or 'somewhat active', while 4% said 'very active'. Only 5% said that it is 'inactive'. Furthermore, respondents were asked to state the degree to which civil society has been successful in undertaking public information and public education activities. A large majority of stakeholders (82%) believe that civil society has been either 'somewhat successful' or 'successful' in undertaking public information and public education activities.

The respondents were then asked to assess the success of civil society campaigns against drug use.<sup>80</sup> Once more, the majority of the respondents replied that they believed the campaigns to be somewhat successful (55%), 27% said that they are successful, 9% very successful, while 7% said that they are unsuccessful. A small percentage of 2% said that they did not know.

It is evident from both the references in the press during the monitoring period and the responses of the regional stakeholders to a number of questions in the questionnaire that civil society is perceived to have demonstrated high levels of activity and success in responding to priority social concerns.


*4.3.2 Public trust in CSOs.* This indicator investigates the level of public trust in CSOs and contrasts this with the trust levels enjoyed by other institutions. Figure II.4.2 provides the trust ratings of the Civil Society Survey 2005.

Overall, it seems that the Church and NGOs enjoy more confidence (58% and 53% respectively) than political parties, the Parliament, the media and the Unions. However, other institutions of Cypriot society, such as the National Guard, the President and the Police, seem to enjoy higher levels of confidence than the Church and NGOs. Figure 2.II.4.2 shows the percentage of respondents who stated that they trust the following institutions 'A Great Deal' or 'Quite a Lot'.

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<sup>79</sup> This is because the USA-based Armenian organisation Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), which administers some 22 Armenian schools worldwide, decided to close down the school on the grounds that it was excessively costly.

<sup>80</sup> Anti-drug campaigns by different types of CSOs are frequent in Cyprus because there is widespread public concern that drug abuse, especially by the young, may grow out of hand. Concerts, public speeches, visits to schools and information leaflets distributed by CSO members in the streets, the placing of posters in public places, are some of the forms that anti-drug campaigns take.

**FIGURE II.4.2: Trust in institutions**

Source: *Civil Society Survey 2005*

Further research is probably needed to interpret these findings. It is interesting to note, however, that data from the *Eurobarometer* (European Commission, 2004) support the above data. The majority of the respondents (66%) to the Eurobarometer questionnaire stated that they tend to trust voluntary or charity organisations at about the same level as the police (64%) and the National Guard (69%).

The responses clearly indicate how careful one should be when referring to ‘civil society’. For some sectors of civil society enjoy significantly higher levels of public trust than others. Thus, one has to be cautious in making overarching statements regarding civil society as they could put the complexity of the civil society landscape at risk.

#### 4.4. Empowering Citizens

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalized groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives. Table II.4.4 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.4.4: Indicators assessing the empowering of citizens**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	2
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems	2
4.4.3	Empowering marginalized people	1
4.4.4	Empowering women	2
4.4.5	Building social capital	1
4.4.6	Supporting livelihoods	1

**4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens.** Civil society in the southern part of Cyprus is rather active when it comes to informing and educating citizens about public issues. The Civil Society Survey 2005 asked respondents whether they could remember any CSO activity in their area. The 144 respondents (i.e. 21% of the sample) who could recall such an activity were then asked about the type of activity (-ies) carried out by the CSO(s). Forty-eight respondents (i.e. 7% of the sample) replied that this activity was about a CSO informing people on an important issue.

The respondents to the stakeholders’ survey were also asked on their opinion on how *active* they think civil society is in undertaking public information and public education activities. More than half (54%) of the stakeholders replied that it was ‘somewhat active’, 35% said that it was ‘active’ and 4% ‘very active’. Only 5% said that it was ‘inactive’.

Some of the examples listed by the stakeholders regarding CSO activity in informing and educating citizens on various issues were

- activities organised by the local parents' associations on issues concerning their communities
- various information campaigns by sports clubs and cultural associations
- information campaigns on smoking, drugs, AIDS and blood donations
- information campaigns by student organisations on educational issues

Subsequently, the respondents were asked to assess the degree to which civil society has been *successful* in undertaking public information and public education activities. Table II.4.5 below shows the distribution of the responses, indicating that civil society is generally perceived to be somewhat successful (57%) or even fully successful (25%) in this area.

**TABLE II.4.5: Percentage distribution of responses to the Stakeholder Survey question: 'To what extent is civil society successful in undertaking public information or public education activities?'**

Response	%
Unsuccessful	9
Somewhat Successful	57
Successful	25
Very Successful	5
Don't Know	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

The stakeholders were also asked to assess the level of success of the public education campaigns on drug abuse carried out by a number of CSOs.<sup>81</sup> The majority of the respondents replied that they believed the campaigns to be 'somewhat successful' (55%), 27% said that they are 'successful', 9% 'very successful', while 7% said that they are unsuccessful. A small percentage of 2% said that they did not know.

The PAG's view was that although civil society is active in this area its impact is limited. No examples of significant success could be detected. This is not unrelated, of course, to the difficulties often encountered by the social sciences when 'impact' is to be evaluated.

*4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems.* In order to assess how active civil society is in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems, the Civil Society Survey 2005 asked whether respondents could remember any CSOs that became active in any way in their area of residence. Only 4% of the respondents replied that they remembered a CSO assisting to convene the community in order to solve a common problem.

The surveyed stakeholders also assessed how active and successful civil society is in building the capacity of local communities. Civil society is mainly seen as somewhat active (47%) or fully active (27%) as well as somewhat successful (48%) or fully successful (18%). The respondents to the regional stakeholders' survey listed a few examples of such activities. One

<sup>81</sup> Anti-drug campaigns by different types of CSOs are frequent in Cyprus because there is widespread public concern that drug abuse, especially by the young, may grow out of hand. Concerts, public speeches, visits to schools and information leaflets distributed by CSO members in the streets, the placing of posters in public places, are some of the forms that anti-drug campaigns take.

example was the mobilization of agricultural communities to demand a state heating allowance. Another example was the protest of people who resided near a factory in the area of Dhali and wanted the factory to be transferred. Protests about factories in residential areas that are thought to pollute the environment and endanger the health of the residents have been organised by CSOs in other areas of Cyprus as well.

In conclusion, there is evidence of a certain level of activity of CSO in local communities with 73% of the stakeholders stating that civil society has been either 'active' or 'somewhat' active. Furthermore, 66% of the stakeholders believe that civil society has been 'successful' or 'somewhat' successful in building the capacity of local communities. Nonetheless, only a fifth of the respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 seem to recall CSO activity in their area, and a tiny proportion stated that the activity was dedicated in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems.

*4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people.* Foreign workers, immigrants, the Roma, old people in remote rural communities, foreign housemaids are the social groups that could be said to mostly constitute the marginalized population of Cyprus.

The majority of the respondents to the stakeholders' survey (73%) seem to believe that civil society is either 'active' or 'somewhat active' in building the capacity of local communities, while 66% believe that it has also been successful in building such a capacity (see indicator 4.4.2 for details). Out of the 702 respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 however, only a fifth (21%) could recall any civil society activity in their area. Out of those, only 47 persons (or 7% of the sample) replied that CSOs helped poor people improve their lives, when they were asked to state the type of activity carried out by CSOs in their area.

Thus it seems that although stakeholders consider CSOs to be both active and successful in building the capacity of local communities, only one fifth of the surveyed citizens could recall such an activity, while a third of those reported activities were described as being dedicated to empowering marginalized people. It is interesting, however, that those activities concern only some groups of the marginalized population while large sections (e.g. the immigrants, the Roma, foreign housemaids) seem to be left out. This was also the assessment of the PAG who gave this indicator the score of one, in order to underline the fact that civil society activity is limited in the areas of empowering marginalized groups.

*4.4.4 Empowering women.* Modern societies are generally considered to be more sensitive to the position of women. This is reflected in both state policies but also in the activities of many CSOs dedicated to gender issues. As with the previous indicator, only a very small percentage of Civil Society Survey 2005 respondents (2%) could recall a CSO activity in their community aiming at helping women in the community to improve their lives.

One of the examples of CSO activity aimed at empowering women reported by the respondents to the regional stakeholders' questionnaire was the research carried out by the Peace Centre on women of various ethnic backgrounds in Cyprus. The various campaigns organised by the Pancyprian Federation of Women's Associations aimed at informing businesswomen on entrepreneurship issues were also mentioned as an example.

A few examples of CSO activity aiming to empower women were covered by the three newspapers monitored during the period March, May, and June 2005. Those were:

- The June 2005 bi-communal women's conference 'The Position of Greek and Turkish Cypriot Women: Perspectives in a United Cyprus'. The conference was organised by the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and the Turkish Cypriot organisation DEV-IS.

- The June 2005 breast cancer awareness campaign by the Cyprus Forum of Europa Donna. The members of the organisation placed 320 women's silhouettes (to represent the annual average number of breast cancer cases in Cyprus) outside the Presidential Palace as a reminder to women of the importance of testing for breast cancer regularly.
- The publication of the book 'The Gender and Media Handbook: Promoting Equality, Diversity and Empowerment' by 'The Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies' in May 2005. The handbook is a useful reference guide on issues regarding gender equality and differentiation.
- The dedication of one week in March to women and gender equity by the Democratic Labour Federation of Cyprus (DEOK). The trade union's officials were to hold meetings in various locations in order to provide the public with information on the new gender equity laws.

Only a fifth of the respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 recalls an activity aiming at building the capacity of local communities, while only a very small percentage of those activities were dedicated to empowering women. Finally, even though the media review has shown that there have been some examples of CSO activity in empowering women in March, May and June 2005, the number of such examples is limited (about seven). The PAG unanimously chose to give this indicator the score of two even though the evidence cited here warrants a lower score. Apparently the assessment of the PAG was that within the context of the country the number of activities recorded was not small.

*4.4.5 Building social capital.* Social capital has been defined as 'those stocks of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems' (Sirrianni & Friedland, n.d.). This is by no means the only definition of the term that can be found in the literature (Lin, 2001; Smith, 2001) but for the purposes of this exercise it is sufficient to note that many analysts and international organisations, such as the World Bank (n.d.), believe that social capital is generally seen as an essential precondition for a vibrant civil society and the creation of closely knit communities where cooperation, inclusion and social support thrive. Trust, tolerance and a sense of responsible citizenship are core features of social capital and by extension of such communities. Using Civil Society Survey 2005 data, the research team sought to establish whether members of a CSO exhibited significantly different levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness from those of non-members.

For each question, the answers of the two groups were analysed using t-tests in order to ascertain whether there was a statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups. No significant statistical difference was found for any of the following issues:

1) Trust: Seventy-four per cent of CSO members and 77% of non-members stated that only 'some people can be trusted'. Thus the majority of respondents regardless of whether they are members of a CSO believe that 'some people can be trusted'.

2) Public Spiritedness: For all three different behaviours which would violate public norms, both members and non-members replied in their majority that they are never justified. Specifically, 75% of members of CSOs and 71% of non-members stated that it is never justified to claim state benefits you are not entitled to, 69% of members and 66% of non-members said that avoiding to pay a parking fee could never be justified and 76% of members and 76% of non-members said that not completing your tax forms honestly is never justified.

3) Tolerance: Finally, the respondents were given a list of social groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, homosexuals, aids carriers, religious minorities) and were asked with whom, if any, they would not like to be neighbours. Only 30% of CSOs members and 31% of non-members replied that they would not mind being neighbours with any of the groups listed.

Thus the findings of the Civil Society Survey 2005 do not support the conclusion that membership of a CSO has any significant impact upon people's levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness. The opinions of members of CSOs with those of non-members were in all three cases similar.

*4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods.* Only 2% of the Civil Society Survey 2005 respondents could recall a CSO activity aimed at helping people in the area to increase their income, while another 2% said they could recall activity aiming at helping women in their area improve their lives. Meanwhile, 66% of stakeholders describe civil society as 'successful' or 'somewhat' successful in supporting livelihoods.

## 4.5 Meeting Societal Needs

This subdimension examines the extent to which civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalized groups. Table II.4.6 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE II.4.6: Indicators assessing the meeting of societal needs**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	<u>1</u>
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	<u>2</u>
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalized groups	<u>2</u>

*4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provisions.* This indicator examines civil society's activity and success in lobbying the state to provide basic social services.

When examining this issue, it is important to bear in mind that civil society is constituted by different types of organisations and groups that operate in different kinds of civil society 'territories' (for example, trade unions, faith-based organisations engaged in charity work, local associations striving to solve problems of local communities, advocacy groups aiming to improve the welfare of vulnerable members of the society such as the immigrants, senior citizens groups fighting to secure better living conditions for the elderly poor). It is therefore possible that some of these organisations and groups may be more or less active in lobbying the state and more or less successful in the pursuit of their demands. Thus one needs to approach this issue with care in order to avoid unwarranted generalisations.

Interestingly, only half of the surveyed stakeholders were able to assess the extent of civil society's activity and success in lobbying the state to provide basic social services. The fact that so many stakeholders were not in a position to answer the question may indicate, among other things, that the question was not understood (which is rather unlikely because it was clear and the respondents are educated); that respondents did not know how to assess 'success'; or that they did not engage in such lobbying themselves and therefore were not in a position to answer. Nevertheless 20 of the respondents (71%) who did provide an answer said that civil society is either 'successful' or 'somewhat successful', while 5 respondents (18%) answered that it was 'unsuccessful'. When asked whether they could think of examples of civil society lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs, only 22 of the 57 respondents answered affirmatively: this represents 38% of the total. Again the fact that the majority of the respondents could not think of any examples should lead us to analyse the findings with some caution.

However, instances of civil society advocacy for state provision do exist. During the regional stakeholder consultations, participants referred to the creation of community medical centres and the development of a nutrition plan for the elder residents of rural areas. Furthermore, in the three newspapers that were monitored during March, May and June 2005, we find references to instances of civil society lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs such as, for example:

- the campaign of the Pancyprian Association of Cancer Patients and Friends (PASYKAF) and the Cyprus Forum of Europa Donna aiming to collect one thousand signatures from people demanding a permanent solution to the problems facing the Bank of Cyprus Oncology Centre regarding the working conditions of its staff.
- the Citizens' Movement's lobbying the government to develop non-smoking Elementary and High Schools so as to create an anti-smoking culture among the students.
- the strike of the students of Aglantzia High School, supported by the parents' association of the school, demanding from the government to urgently carry out repairs to the school's buildings.

*4.5.2 Meeting societal needs directly.* Many Greek Cypriot CSOs aim to cater for the needs of different social groups and/or communities. Some of the means that these organisations use to achieve this objective include: charity events, donations, shelters, blood donations, free counselling, hotlines, public information campaigns, petitions to the authorities and publication of information material. This is mirrored in the findings of the stakeholders' survey, where one third of stakeholders describe civil society's activities in meeting societal needs as 'significant' and another third as 'moderate'. A similar assessment was made of civil society's success in this area, where four fifths of stakeholders regard it as either successful or somewhat successful. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority (85%) of the surveyed stakeholders could identify a specific example. Some examples provided by the respondents were:

- The variety of services offered to patients by health and welfare organisations, such as the Anticancer Association and the Heart Patients Association, and their information campaigns for the wider public.
- The three biggest annual charity events in the country (Radiomathon, Telethon and the Christodoula March) that are organised by CSOs in collaboration with private corporations.
- The help to women who have experienced domestic violence by the women's shelter 'Apanemi'.
- The provision of wheelchairs and financial contributions to hospitals by the Cyprus Red Cross.
- The information provided to the public by the Cyprus Consumers' Association on prices and health issues related to products sold in the market
- The various anti-drugs campaigns usually organised by CSOs active in this field.

Even though the majority of the surveyed stakeholders assess civil society's role in directly meeting societal needs as moderate to significant and regard CSOs to be both active and successful in providing services to the community and meeting pressing societal needs, the answers of the respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 do not support that view. More specifically, when asked whether they could remember any CSOs becoming active in any way in their area of residence, only 4% of respondents could recall a CSO being active to directly solve a specific problem.

The available evidence, then, indicates that although civil society appears to be active in meeting societal needs, the activity recorded has not been very significant.

*4.5.3 Meeting the needs of marginalized groups.* In order to assess the extent to which CSOs are perceived as more or less effective compared to the state in delivering services to marginalized groups, the respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 were asked to state

which of the two they believe to be more effective in providing such services. A large majority of 65% stated that CSOs are more effective than the state, while 11% stated that they did not know. The remaining 24% thought the state to be more effective.

Furthermore, respondents who turned to either a CSO or a state agency for assistance during the past twelve months were asked to say which of the two had been more helpful. Of the 163 respondents who said that they had turned to both of the above for assistance, 42% stated that the CSO had been more helpful, whereas 21% answered that it was the state agency that was more helpful. A significant proportion (37%) stated that they did not know.

The PAG gave this indicator the score of two to signal its assessment that CSOs are only *slightly* more effective than the state. One explanation offered during its deliberations was that CSOs are nearer to the people and are therefore in a better position to identify problems.

## **Conclusion**

Measuring the ‘impact’ of a social force or process upon policy has never been an easy and unproblematic undertaking in the social sciences, mainly because social phenomena, processes and institutions are subjected to a variety of simultaneous influences. Nevertheless, the discussion of this dimension of civil society has shown that civil society in the southern part of Cyprus does not have a significant impact upon policy and society. This, however, does not mean that CSOs are a negligible force. The PAG’s assessment that the impact of civil society is ‘moderate’ is an acknowledgement that steps are being taken and efforts are being made to respond to social needs and influence the course of public policy. That said, there are many areas where the impact of civil society is limited. The budgetary process, the empowerment of the marginalized, the building of social capital, the support of livelihoods and the lobbying for state provision are the main areas in which CSOs have a limited impact. On the other hand, the impact of civil society on social and human rights policy is modest but noticeable. Similarly its responsiveness to social interests appears to be fairly prompt while many public education and information campaigns are considered successful. This needs to be seen in conjunction with the fact that certain sectors of civil society, notably the Church, voluntary and charity organisations appear to enjoy the confidence of the public. Overall, it would be fair to say that certain sectors of civil society have more impact on public policy than others. During the final workshop, however, it was pointed out that the impact of civil society seems to be somewhat overestimated by the CSI assessment. Final workshop participants felt that an excellent indicator of civil society’s impact is its influence on the national budget. In the southern part of Cyprus this impact is very limited, an indication that civil society has not succeeded in transforming government promises into fiscal policy.

## A Note on One Additional Indicator that Was Not Scored

The dimension of ‘impact’ includes one indicator that was added by the research team but was not scored by the PAG Indicator 4.1.4 (CS’s impact on solving the Cyprus problem). The PAG’s view was that this indicator was not relevant to what was asked to assess (see also its reasoning for not scoring the two additional indicators in the dimension of Structure) although it asked that the data collected by the research team be included in the report. This is what was presented to the PAG:

*4.1.4 Civil society’s impact on solving the Cyprus problem.* The ‘Cyprus problem’ (or how to find a way to co-exist with the Turkish Cypriot community) has been at the centre of a public debate in the Greek Cypriot community for decades. The origins, nature, and the solution of this problem have been the cause of heated arguments, political divisions and endless discussion. Apart from the politicians, the problem has been discussed and researched by human rights groups, citizens’ action groups, non-profit research centres, various refugee organisations that were formed after 1974, faith-based organisations, and many other CSOs.

The regional stakeholders’ survey included a question on the activity and influence of CSOs on public policy regarding the Cyprus problem. Table II.4.7 below shows that only 18% of the surveyed stakeholders think that CSOs have been ‘inactive’ in this area. However, only 16% said that it was ‘very active’. If we add this percentage to the 30% who answered that it was ‘somewhat active’ and the 32% who describe it as ‘active’, we find an impressive percentage of respondents (78%) who recognise some sort of activity in this area. This activity takes different forms: conferences, public discussions, annual gatherings of displaced persons, exhibitions, concerts, demonstrations, vigils, public announcements and petitions are just some examples of the forms that activity may take.

**TABLE II.4.7: Percentage distribution of responses to the question: ‘How active has civil society been in influencing public policy regarding the Cyprus problem?’**

Response	%
Inactive	18
Somewhat Active	30
Active	32
Very Active	16
Don’t Know	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Regional Stakeholders’ Survey*

Subsequently, the respondents were asked to comment on how successful CSOs were in influencing public policy on the Cyprus problem.

Almost thirty percent say that civil society has been ‘unsuccessful’ in influencing public policy on the Cyprus problem while 36% describe it as either ‘very successful’ or ‘successful’. It is not, of course, clear how the respondents understood ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in this context. During the consultations, however, some participants expressed the view that the fact that the Annan plan was rejected by the majority of Greek Cypriots in April 2004 was an indication of the success of those CSOs that opposed it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is a reference to the intense mobilisation of many CSO’s during the period preceding the referendum of April 2004 in an attempt to persuade voters to reject the plan.

## **2. CHALLENGES AND ISSUES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF CYPRUS**

The findings of the CSI assessment in the island of Cyprus were presented at a final workshop, held on the 24<sup>th</sup> of September 2005 at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone that separates the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. During the first half of the day, CSO representatives and other stakeholders from the southern and northern parts of the island held their own workshop which focused on the particular part of Cyprus in which they now live. The participants of the mono-communal workshop had the opportunity to comment on the results, ask for clarification on theoretical and methodological issues and offer their interpretation of the scores given to the indicators and dimensions. Subsequently, participants were asked to discuss ways of overcoming the problems faced by civil society actions to strengthen its role and measures to enhance its capabilities. This part of the report discusses some of the most seminal issues raised during the workshop on civil society in the southern part of the island.

Discussion in the Greek-Cypriot mono-communal workshop focused mainly on three issues – the role of umbrella-organisations and coordinating bodies, civil society funding sources and democracy.

### **Umbrella Organisations and Coordinating Bodies**

Although there is a small number of efficient coordinating bodies such as the Pancyprian Welfare Council and the Coordinating Council of the Limassol Cultural Associations and umbrella-organizations such as the Cypriot Confederation of the Handicapped Persons' Associations, there is clearly a need for a larger number of CSOs to form some sort of network or federation in order to be able to achieve their objectives more efficiently. Many organisations appear not to be aware of the benefits of cross-organisational synergies. During the discussion it emerged that many CSOs are reluctant to form or join networks/federations/umbrella organisations from fear of losing their autonomy. Other workshop participants maintained that smaller groups are more flexible, and thus more likely, to achieve their objectives if they act independently. To those participants network/federation/umbrella organisations would adversely affect the effectiveness of their members. This view, however, was not shared by all as other participants did see benefits accruing from inter-organizational collaborations.

### **Funding**

Dependency on the state, political parties and private sector funding makes CSOs vulnerable. Economic crises, change of governments and shifts in policy priorities have an impact upon the funding levels of CSOs but also upon their ability to function autonomously. For example, available state funding for sports, culture, welfare, health and so on is not fixed and obviously varies according to each government's fiscal policy.

A great many of the CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus are funded and/or controlled by political parties. This means that CSOs are almost always in line with the political party to which they are linked. Political parties have frequently attempted to promote their ideology or specific cause through the CSOs they support. The period leading to the referendum for the Annan Plan for example found those political parties in favour of the Plan trying to influence the public to cast a positive vote through CSO activities. Similarly, political parties opposed to the Plan encouraged CSOs linked to them to encourage the public to cast a negative vote.

A potential dependency on private sector funding could also affect a CSO's sustainability. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is not a widespread notion in the southern part of

Cyprus and it is doubtful if it will ever become entrenched in private companies' agendas. This is due both to the small size of the economy and to the informal structures upon which most businesses in the southern part of Cyprus are built. The small size of the economy means that the majority of companies are categorised as 'small and medium size enterprises' (SMEs). In fact a large majority employ five employees or less. This has led to the development of a business environment that is characterised by informality. Even though the majority of companies state that they do not have a CSR policy in place, most of them donate on an *ad hoc* basis. This however entails risks for CSOs depending on private funding as private sector donations fluctuate.

Some suggestions to address the problem of civil society's financial dependency concerned the formation of independent bodies to manage the distribution of state funding to CSOs, the creation of information banks and networks to enable CSOs to learn about funding opportunities (particularly in the EU), develop competencies such as how to draft research proposals for EU funding and the managing of projects.

## **Democracy**

The general consensus among final workshop participants was that democratic behaviour is developed very early on in someone's life. For this reason some participants pointed to the need to create schools characterized by tolerance and dialogue in a democratic and all-inclusive environment. Furthermore, more efficient methods of educating students on their civil rights need to be developed. The current method of teaching these rights has proven somewhat inefficient due to the fact that it is taught as part of the civic education course, which students see as a "requirement" rather than an opportunity to become aware of their rights.

Moreover, it was pointed out that democratic structures within civil society need to be improved. The regional stakeholder consultations and final workshop participants as well as key informants informed the research team of the long terms of office of many CSO executive committees and the low levels of involvement of ordinary members in the affairs of their organization. Another issue was the inability of executive committees to involve those members in decision-making processes. This, according to the participants in the workshop, could be achieved by educating civil society actors on organisation and planning methods as well as efficiency improvement techniques. Finally, an issue that was raised by some of the participants was that a democratic ethos should characterize the ways in which civil society actors conduct their affairs. Democracy, it was pointed out, is not only a matter of procedures but also a matter that is evident in the everyday practices of all of us.

## **3. CONCLUSION FOR THE SOUTHERN PART OF CYPRUS**

This section attempts to pull the threads together and offer some concluding remarks about the state of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus. As stated right from the beginning of this report, this is by no means *the definitive* analysis of civil society in the southern part of the island, but an attempt to map a largely unresearched field using the tools of a specific methodology within a very tight timeframe. It is the fate of research into previously untouched fields to raise as many questions as they answer; and this report is no exception.


The brief historical introduction of the development of civil society in section I pointed out some of the most important distinguishing characteristics of the Cyprus case. Civil society in the southern part of the island is of a very particular sort because advocacy, notions of citizenship and social tolerance are still in the process of developing in an island that was only granted independence in 1960, was shaken by inter- and intra-communal conflict, divided by a war, and is still trying to find ways of building a lasting peaceful future for all its inhabitants. The Republic of Cyprus was a polity that was not accepted at the beginning by

the majority of its citizens and political parties took some time to take the complexion of parties as we know them in Western democracies. When they did they dominated the entire fabric of social life. Indeed the dominance of the political upon civil society, in particular, and the wider society in general is crucial for understanding the shape of the former.

## CIVIL SOCIETY DIAMOND IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF CYPRUS: 2005

The diagram visualising the state of civil society in the southern part of the island in the form of a diamond is rather well balanced and of moderately large size. The scores for civil society's environment, values and impact are all slightly higher than the numerical average. Here, particularly its relatively strong impact comes as a surprise, given the historical legacy of a dominating state and political system.

**Figure II.4.1: Civil society diamond for the southern part of Cyprus**



The structure dimension received the lowest score, slightly lower than the numerical average, which is a consequence of several factors. According to the Civil Society Survey 2005, only a minority of Cypriots living in the southern part of Cyprus were members of at least one CSO and less than twenty percent were members of more than one CSO. Voluntary work appears to be undertaken by people, but not to a very large extent and people say they donate only a small percentage of their income. With regard to the CSOs themselves, we have seen that despite their rather satisfactory human and infrastructural resources, they appear to be facing problems of sustainable funding, limited cross-organisational communication, and weak self-regulation. There are few umbrella bodies and the connections of CSOs with the outside world leave a lot to be desired. Finally, the membership and leadership of CSOs does not equitably represent the social groups constituting the society in the southern part of Cyprus. Within this 'structure' there are, of course, variations: some CSOs, such as the Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, the Church and the Pancyprian Welfare Council, are more effective and well-resourced than others. Nonetheless, overall, civil society's structure, has some problematic features, such as the depth and diversity of citizen participation, and the communication between civil society sectors. These structural weaknesses should provide a cause for reflection by and elicit action from stakeholders in order to ensure an even stronger and more sustainable civil society in the future.

The score of 2.1 in the environment dimension reflects a 'relatively enabling' environment. This is not surprising. Several factors contribute to a positive context for civil society: The areas currently under the control of the Republic of Cyprus boast a vibrant economy and a functioning democracy that safeguards the freedoms and rights of its citizens through a series of statutes, institutional arrangements, bodies, fora and provisions. This cannot but have a positive impact on civil society because there are few, if indeed any, legal restrictions on their functioning and, in some instances, the state and CSOs engage in a meaningful dialogue. On the other hand, the moderately positive score of two indicates that there are still areas in need of improvement. These have to do with the ways legal provisions are enforced by the authorities. Violations of human rights, particularly but by no means exclusively of immigrants, are rare but noticeable enough to find their ways in public reports. And

clientelistic networks and patronage undermine the ability of notions of citizenship to be entrenched in the population.

With regard to the socio-cultural context within which civil society operates, the data presented in this report show that levels of public trust are rather low and that the population sample that was surveyed appears to be quite intolerant of people with different cultural characteristics than its own. However, the population exhibited a fairly strong level of public spiritedness. Overall, then, the socio-cultural environment is characterised by social norms and attitudes that do not encourage engagement in CSOs. Consequently the rather weak levels of civic engagement, mentioned as a negative feature in the structure dimension, do not come as a surprise.

Turning now to the relationship between civil society and the business sector, we have seen that corporate philanthropy is not particularly systematic and that, on the whole, civil society stakeholders do not think very highly of the attitude of the private sector towards CSOs. This particular aspect of the environment needs to be seen in the context of an economy in which the overwhelming majority of the enterprises employ less than ten persons and the 'corporations' that can design and implement a policy on corporate social responsibility are few.

The values and impact dimension are both close to the score of two. Tolerance, transparency and poverty eradication do not seem to be high in the agenda of most CSOs although civil society appears to be more sensitive to issues of gender equity and environmental sustainability. On the other hand, the evidence cited shows that most CSOs elect their leaders although during the final workshop it was pointed out that democracy should be inscribed in the everyday practices of civil society actors and not be confined to the constitution of CSOs. Non-violence is reportedly condemned. Nevertheless football violence is not unknown in the southern part of Cyprus.

Overall, the values of civil society need to be seen within the context of a society in which citizens have not yet learned to act as members of a polity who have the right to know, to assert, to be informed and be well treated by state agencies but who also have responsibilities both towards their fellow human beings and towards the state. Civil society's role in promoting transparency and holding the state accountable but also in cultivating tolerance and greater sensitivity towards less privileged groups cannot be explained without a reference to such considerations.

The impact of civil society on governance and society at large is by no means negligible but neither is it impressively strong. Although there is some civil society activity in the areas of human rights, citizen education, and social policy, there is not much evidence of a significant impact on the budgeting process, on empowering marginalized groups, building social capital and supporting livelihoods. In particular, there is very little discernible impact of civil society upon the empowerment of foreign workers, the immigrants, or the elderly in rural communities, and these social groups continue to be largely marginalized. Furthermore, only one-fifth of respondents to the Civil Society Survey 2005 recall an activity aiming to build the capacity of local communities, and moreover a very small percentage of those activities were dedicated to empowering women.

The moderate impact of civil society is likely to be related to its rather weak structure. The fact that the impact dimension received a slightly higher score than the structure dimension is also probably due to the fact that within civil society some CSOs, such as those connected to political parties, may be more effective in achieving their objectives than others.

A recurrent theme of this report is that civil society is not and should not be conceived as a socially homogenous space. Civil society is not a 'thing' or a 'subject' that 'acts', 'promotes' or 'engages in a dialogue'. Civil society is an abstraction from a multiplicity of organisations,

groups, phenomena, and practices. Those who would like to generate knowledge about civil society that would guide practice (and policy) have therefore no option but to be sensitive to the nature of the landscape of civil society and the diversity of CSOs and other social ensembles that are to be found there. The data collected and analysed for the purposes of this project provide sufficient grounds to support this conclusion. The objectives, social composition, mode of conduct, and impact of the different CSOs comprising civil society in the southern part of Cyprus vary and so do the resources they have at their disposal. Together they constitute a fascinating object of study. This report has hopefully paved the way for more detailed studies to follow. The potential benefits for a society that has not been studied with the thoroughness that it deserves would be truly enormous.

### III THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

#### 1. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

By: Dr. Erol Kaymak with support from Yucel Vural and Erhun Sahali

##### 1.1 Historical Overview of Civil Society in the northern part of Cyprus<sup>82</sup>

FIGURE III.1.1: Regional information

The division of the island, since 1974, and the separate development of the respective communities on the island, makes a separate analysis of civil society in each community necessary.<sup>83</sup>

The role of civil society in the community of the northern part of Cyprus also deserves study because, unlike other societies, it does not have an internationally recognized government, thus it lacks diplomatic relations. This anomaly is addressed below. The lack of an internationally recognized government has limited the access of local civil society to many international legal and institutional resources. Although some international networks have been inclined to consider the appeals of local civil society, an

<b>Region size:</b> 3355 sq km
<b>Population:</b> 215,790
<b>Population density:</b> 66.6 per sq km
<b>Population under 15 years:</b> n.a.
<b>Urban population:</b> n.a.
<b>Form of 'government':</b> 'Parliamentary Democracy'
<b>Freedom House Democracy rating:</b> 2
<b>Seats in 'parliament' held by women:</b> 6%
<b>Language:</b> Turkish
<b>Ethnicity:</b> Turkish 98%, Greek Cypriot 0.2%, Maronite 0.1%, other .9%
<b>Religion:</b> atheist 0.2%, Muslim 92.2%, Orthodox 3%, other
<b>HDI Score &amp; Ranking:</b> n.a.
<b>GDP per capita:</b> \$6000*
<b>Unemployment rate:</b> 2%
* According to the local authorities the current figure is closer to \$9000 as of 2005.

internationally isolated regime in the northern part of the island did not always support efforts of civil society to develop international linkages. This also limited the role of international civil society in showing solidarity with civil society in the northern part of the island. This situation led to the formation of a sui generis civil society whose direct interaction with international community was largely limited.

In the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, civil society has played an important role historically, given that various clubs and associations that predate the establishment of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus. Significant among these are foundations, or *vakıf*, especially the Evkaf. Also, the *Kardeş Ocağı* (Hearth of Brethren or Fraternity Home) Club in Nicosia – and its forerunners - played an important role in imparting on Turkish Cypriots a sense of political community. Turkish nationalism was inspired by the Young Turk movement and later Kemalism (Nevzat 2005).

Prior to ethnic strife on the island, there is some evidence of collaboration with Greek Cypriots on issues of mutual interest, including uprisings against various colonial masters. However, in lieu of a political project that could sustain a unified civil society, and especially

<sup>82</sup> The northern part of Cyprus is currently administered by the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ('TRNC'), which is solely recognized by Turkey. The reference made to any 'authorities', 'ministries' and 'bodies' in northern part of Cyprus does not imply recognition of the self-proclaimed 'TRNC'

<sup>83</sup> Figure III.1.1 provides statistics for the geography of the northern part of Cyprus. Sources: The World Fact book 2004, HumanDevelopment Report ([hdr.undp.org/statistics/data](http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data)), Freedom House.

following the events of 1974, civil society has developed independently on either side of the Green Line that divides Cyprus.

The development of the Turkish Cypriot community has been affected by numerous factors. The liberalization process that took place during the initial period of British colonial rule, during which there emerged a nascent civil society in Cyprus, inspired Orthodox Christian and Muslim intellectuals to articulate critical ideas about colonial policies on economic and administrative issues.<sup>84</sup>

Local media and social clubs (e.g. the Ottoman *Kiraathane*-club and Orthodox Christian *Kiraathane*-club, both forms of coffee houses) were the venues through which particular ideas were transmitted in opposition to the secular, modernist and centralised policies of the colonial administration. Activities of the above actors concentrated on issues such as providing better education for children, expanding community control on education or preserving the traditional privileges granted to the community institutions during the previous centuries.<sup>85</sup> It is important to note that religious institutions (the *Orthodox Church* and the *Mufti*), elected members of the legislative organ and *Evkaf* foundation were also the main supporters of the aforementioned criticisms of the colonial policies. Therefore, it can be argued that civil society's activities were mainly concerned with defending community interests against colonial rule.

One of the most important community interests that mobilised Cypriot intellectuals related to the representation of locals in the newly established political institutions.<sup>86</sup> In fact, the inauguration of some liberal institutions and legislation, early in the British rule (1880s) such as the establishment of a 'legislative' organ and the imposition of new laws on education, activated civil society in both communities.

The first Cypriot constitution introduced by the colonial administration in 1879 prescribed that there was equal representation for both communities in the Legislative Assembly. This legal arrangement was welcomed by Muslim intellectuals; however Orthodox Christian intellectuals complained that it was unjust and illiberal. When this provision of the constitution was amended in 1882, in order to provide a system of proportional representation, the Muslim intellectuals aired their dissatisfaction and demanded the restoration of Ottoman legacy in the island while Orthodox Christian intellectuals acclaimed it with satisfaction.

In the 1920s the establishment of multi-communal organizations such as trade unions paved the way for a unified civil society. The activities of such organizations proved that cooperation between religious or communal groups could be based on a '*common interest*'. As a result of peaceful relationships between the two communities the social organizations solidified their multi-communal character in the 1940s.

The year 1931, however, marked the onset of oppressive measures by the colonial government to secure its political control of the island. In that year the colonial administration

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<sup>84</sup> Beginning in the early years of British rule, the Orthodox Church, as well as Moslem leaders, began to insist on certain traditional rights. Among others, the first basic claim included the exemption of sacred properties, of religious institutions of both communities, from governmental taxation. See Yücel Vural, 1998 '*Ethnic Politicisation and Interethnic Relations in Cyprus Under British Rule*', Ismail Bozkurt, Huseyin Atesin, M. Kansu (eds.) *Proceedings of the Second International Congress For Cyprus Studies* - Papers Presented in English, EMU Printinghouse: Magusa, Vol. 1a, pp. 169-185.

<sup>85</sup> Moslem media of the island aired the idea in this period that the most important problem of Moslem community was to establish an effective educational system available for more children. See *Kibris* (*Cyprus*, a weekly paper published in Ottoman Turkish), 13 March 1893.

<sup>86</sup> Moslem intellectuals used to blame the colonial government for providing no real power for people's representatives to deal with political issues. See '*Ifade'i Mahsusa*,' (in Ottoman Turkish), *Kibris*, 5 November 1894.

encountered a militant uprising under the leadership of the Orthodox Church. As a response to heavy taxes imposed by the colonial government the Church leadership organised demonstrations in the largest Cypriot towns to declare its opposition to colonial administration. The demonstrators burnt down the Government House in Nicosia, the capital city of the island. The Legislative Assembly was dissolved, municipal elections were terminated, political parties were closed down and the colonial government established censorship over the local media.

Gradually the British became less heavy handed, and during the 1940s, in addition to the community organizations such as the Orthodox Church and KATAK, mono-communal and multi-communal organizations flourished.<sup>87</sup> The rise of bi-communal labour unions was significant. Despite the activities of community leaderships such as the Orthodox Church and Mufti and mono-communal institutions, individuals from both the Muslim and Christian communities maintained social relationships. The highpoint of bi-communal civil society collaboration during the 1940s was when thousands of workers from both communities took part in strikes against the colonial government for better economic and social rights. Various political groups began to contest for seats in the municipal elections. Various segments of society such as artisans, workers, farmers and intellectuals began to take part in professional organizations demanding socio-economic and political rights from the colonial government. Almost all civil society organizations had members from both communities. A new political party, *AKEL*, whose membership structure extended beyond communal boundaries, was established as the successor of the communist party which was banned in 1931 by the colonial administration.<sup>88</sup> The political mobilization of the masses marked civil society actions in the 1940s and early 1950s. It is important to note that unified or multi-communal actions of civil society used to exert pressure on the colonial authorities for common interests, while mono-community actions usually concentrated on communal interests and consequently lead to opposition from the other community.

The emergence of opposing nationalist movements affected society in Cyprus, challenging cohabitation and the vitality of bi-communal associations. Beginning in the middle of the 1950s, the nationalist organizations in both communities began to gain control of community affairs. Prior to the armed violence between the two communities, EOKA initially targeted the colonial rulers intending to end colonial regime and unite Cyprus with Greece (*Enosis*). A counter armed struggle was initiated by Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı or Turkish Defense Organization (TMT) as response to pro-Enosis activities in order to support the idea of *Taksim*, partition of the island between Greece and Turkey.<sup>89</sup> The colonial government contributed to communal conflict by recruiting Turkish Cypriots into the police force to counter armed attacks from EOKA. Even though Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot trade unions appealed for peace in 1957, in the face of growing ethnic tensions and acts of violence, regional politics took its toll on communal relations.

During 1957 to 1958 inter-communal fighting dominated politics in Cyprus. On the eve of independence, civil society was intimidated into obeying the orders of nationalist leaderships who demanded absolute obedience from their community members. Moreover, the nationalists attempted to eliminate the intra-community *opposition* who advocated for peaceful relationships between the two communities.

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<sup>87</sup> It stands for Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu- Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus.

<sup>88</sup> An expert on Cyprus History, George Hill argues that the establishment of AKEL is a landmark in Cypriot politics. Hill 1952 *A History of Cyprus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 435.

<sup>89</sup> TMT stands for Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı – Turkish Resistance Organization

Turkish Cypriots set up a number of mono-communal institutions in the 1940s and 1950s, prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Many of these organizations were quasi-political and some morphed into outright political parties. The establishment of the *Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu* or Turkish Minority Association of the Island of Cyprus (KATAK) in 1942 was significant. During the same period, the first Cypriot trade union was formed. In 1949 the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Organizations was formed, and the Turkish National Party was established in the same year. The influential Turkish Cypriot daily, *Halkın Sesi*, was also established in this period by Fazıl Küçük, who would later become Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus. The establishment of trade unions and related boards was taking place in parallel to political mobilization. For Example, a doctors' association was established in 1956, and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce was established in 1958.

As a result of a series of international initiatives, an independent state, the Republic of Cyprus, was established in 1960 to replace the British colonial regime. The new state was a kind of partnership between the two communities based on the principle of functional federalism. Between 1960 and 1963 civil society began to flourish anew. Non-nationalist parties and the media began to play roles, and demanded legal protection of individual rights, rejected ethno-cultural segregation, struggled against the use of violence as a means of political action and began to function independently of community leadership. The main feature of civil society in the first three years of independence was its opposition to nationalist policies of community leaderships.

Inter-communal fighting, which began in late 1963, took its toll once more on civil society. During the inter-communal fighting and the political tensions that continued until 1967, civil society nearly disappeared and the community authorities penetrated almost all social activities. The demands and actions of social organizations at this time were redesigned by nationalist doctrines.

A great handicap, for the development of an independent civil society was the establishment of paramilitary organizations on the island. Among Turkish Cypriots, the establishment of the *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* or Turkish Defense Organization (TMT) that had the effect of securitizing various aspects of Turkish Cypriot society should be noted. No doubt, the case of northern Cyprus has been further complicated by the presence of the Turkish military since 1974. Despite this, Turkish Cypriot civil society did flourish in certain areas, including various teachers' syndicates, which often were at odds with the TMT and other nationalist Turkish Cypriot organizations from the 1960s onward. To this day the Cyprus Turkish Teacher's Trade Union (KTÖS) sees its historical role as having struggled for a transition from 'military' to 'civilian' rule.<sup>90</sup>

It could be argued that an ironic by-product of the fighting of 1974 was the establishment of more transparent regimes in both communities. Territorial divisions separated the Turkish Cypriot community from Greek Cypriot community and this division led to the emergence of separate civil societies in the island. After 1974, a number of new autonomous organizations were established in northern Cyprus, including Chambers related to industry, engineering and architecture, and so forth. As the society in northern Cyprus developed and modernized, so did CSOs, which proliferated in the 1990s. For instance, the Hoteliers Association was established in 1991 as tourism became a more important sector in the economy.

The absence of violent inter-communal conflicts led political authorities to soften strict nationalist control on civil society. Since 1974 there have been local and general 'elections' to

<sup>90</sup> <http://www.ktos.org/tarihce-7.php>.

elect political leadership in both communities. Modern ‘legislation’ was adopted to provide legal protection for individual rights.<sup>91</sup> Although there have been important restrictions imposed by political and military leaderships, the oppositional parties and groups found more opportunity to air alternative views to nationalistic policies than prior to 1974. As a result, many civil society organizations were established to represent different segments of society.

Civil society became an important element of political opposition in the Turkish Cypriot community. Despite the physical and de facto political division on the island, civil society managed to develop a common language towards supporting peace, bi-communal political unification and represented a common feature for communities of Cyprus. Throughout the decades, civil society actors from both communities met to develop joint actions.

The 1990s also coincided with the rise of NGOs interested in bi-communal activities, as well as various organizations committed to environmentalism, women’s issues, human rights and other issues associated with ‘new’ social movements. To some extent the burgeoning number of associations was related to ‘legislative’ changes in northern Cyprus, as well as the enticement of foreign funding, especially to promote bi-communalism through sponsorship of various projects. It is important to note that many of these new organizations were opposed to the paternalistic ‘state’ and its apparent intransigence with respect to solving the Cyprus problem.

The most significant development to date, however, was the role of various civil society organizations in promoting the UN blueprint, popularly dubbed the Annan Plan, to settle the Cyprus problem. Even before the UN plan was officially revealed, civil society had played an important role in forming ad hoc umbrella associations to support a settlement that shared many of the features of the subsequent Annan Plan. For instance, the Chamber of Commerce took the lead in forging “The Common Vision of the Turkish Cypriot Civil Society.” The Common Vision, signed by 91 civil society organizations, emphasized the urgency of solving the Cyprus problem before the Republic of Cyprus acceded to the EU.

The prominence of the Chamber of Commerce is noteworthy, as it is one of the few Turkish Cypriot institutions that the international community is willing to work through, given UN Security Council resolutions that make cooperation with the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) authorities problematic. For instance, the EU’s Green Line Regulation, designed to manage trade across the Green Line that divides Cyprus, vests authority in the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce to validate certificates. The special status of the Chamber has to do with the fact that it was established prior to 1974, and thus is internationally recognized.

Prior to the Common Vision, the “This Country is Ours” platform had already garnered the support of numerous civil society organizations and political parties (a grand total of 17,980 individual signatures) in opposition to an economic package tabled by Ankara and endorsed by the then ‘government’, which introduced a number of unpopular austerity measures in 2000. Additionally, “This Country is Ours” called for self-governance of the Turkish Cypriots and demilitarization, as well as a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem. The platform leaders were loyal to the idea that Cypriot communities could share the same political entity on the basis ‘*inter-communal peace*’ which has been the historical objective of Turkish Cypriot leftist movement.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> In recent times, there have been strong political inclinations in both communities of Cyprus to democratize the political system according to EU criteria.

<sup>92</sup> Yücel Vural 2003 ‘*Cyprus problem and the Turkish Cypriot left*’, (in Turkish), *Birikim*, March 2003, pp. 39-43.

These same coalitions later led masses of Turkish Cypriots to demonstrate in favour of the Annan Plan. “This Country is Ours”, however, emerged as the more influential mobilizing platform. An important feature of civil society in northern Cyprus is the influential position of white-collar unions. In fact, among the more than fifty organizations in the “This Country is Ours” movement, the teachers’ unions (KTÖS and KTOEÖS) and civil servants’ union (KTAMS) played a crucial role in intensifying and maintaining civil society actions because of their strong organizational structures.

There were, of course, efforts on the part of the ‘government’ and ‘president’ Rauf Denktaş to respond with ‘civil society’ initiatives of its own. One that backfired was the *Ulusal Halk Hareketi* (UHH) or National People’s Movement, which bore some imagery reminiscent of the TMT. The goal of UHH was to convince the populace, especially settlers, that the Annan Plan was inimical to their interests and that they should embrace the ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’.

It is worth noting that the media also played a crucial role in mobilizing thousands of people to attend the rallies. Private media, especially the Kıbrıs Media Group and its daily, Kıbrıs, which enjoys double the circulation of all other dailies combined, was probably a determining factor. However, anti-Annan media also proliferated. In the end, the pro-Annan media held sway with the masses. The ‘people power’ associated with the period raised the profile of Turkish Cypriot civil society.

However, the association between “This Country is Ours”, and the Turkish Republican Party (CTP) raises questions on the autonomy of the movement from the political establishment. This question is more relevant today following the ousting of the National Unity Party (UBP) from power and the rise of CTP and Mehmet Ali Talat, who now serves as ‘president’ of the ‘TRNC’. As discussed later in this report, there are also allegations of ‘government’ interference into the affairs of the Chamber of Commerce where Ali Erel lost the presidency in an election to Erdil Nami. Ali Erel had articulated policy positions regarding the delinking of two proposed EU regulations designed to lift the isolation of the community in northern Cyprus, and in doing so fell astray of official policy.

It is necessary to stress that the organic relationship between the leading unions and the leftist parties is another important characteristic of Turkish Cypriot civil society. Some prominent labour union leaders actually ran on CTP’s ticket and won seats in ‘parliament’ in the crucial 2003 ‘elections’.

Since CTP forged a coalition with the Democratic Party the ‘street’ has been remarkably quiet, especially with respect to the urgency to solve the Cyprus problem. As the popularity of the Annan Plan is often portrayed as having derived from grassroots support the imagery of the period is one of ‘people power’ expressed in the form of large rallies in city squares, hence it is now noted that the *meydan* (square or street) has been ‘quiet’. No doubt this is also in response to the lack of enthusiasm for the plan, both among the Greek Cypriot leadership and the populace. Most recently, of note is the establishment within the ‘TRNC presidency’ of the Civil Society Communication Platform. ‘President’ Mehmet Ali Talat maintains that he will henceforth be holding regular meetings with civil society organizations to get input on a wide range of policy issues.

Today, given the disappointment associated with the failed Annan Plan, and its aftermath, there is reason to be concerned that civil society organizations will tend to fray instead of coalesce and that their common agenda will shift away from EU induced reforms and perhaps portend a revival of nationalist politics.

## 1.2 The Concept of Civil Society in the northern part of Cyprus

In the public and expert discourses in the community in northern Cyprus, civil society usually refers to a positive association of people independent of the 'state', contributing to the development of civic values and social capital, and taking a generally constructive stance towards democracy as a social order.

Different from the CSI definition of civil society, uncivil types of association and citizen activities are not usually seen as part of civil society and fall into the category of extremism, nationalism, racism or illegal activities. In contrast to the broader definitions of civil society (e.g. within the framework of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project, see Salamon, Anheier et al 1999, or the CIVICUS CSI definition), the civil society discourse in the Turkish Cypriot community employs a more narrow definition of civil society, which covers only those organisations which have the legal form of association, foundation or pious foundation fund or non profit company. More informal organizations are, by default, neglected. In the community of northern Cyprus, the concept of civil society is used in a relatively restricted way due to 'legal procedures' of establishment and categorization that affects discourse. Accordingly, the concept is conflated with 'non governmental organization'.

Non governmental organizations are studied under three headings in this handbook. These are: associations, foundations and non profit companies. Non governmental organizations in principle are organizations that can be independent, run by boards of directors and serve the public good through working for the society and increasing the standard of living by filling up the gaps in the society. They, including non profit companies, work for the benefit of the society. They do not represent the interests of any occupational group and are independent of the 'state', commercial organizations and political parties. They have democratic elections and management structures as well as independent budgets.<sup>93</sup>

At present, in response to the prospect of EU accession, new concepts of civil society are being discussed within the community. Since the events leading to the division of the island, the two communities have been functioning in isolation of each other. However, it is anticipated that in a reunified Cyprus there will be civil society participation across communal lines. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have been induced to discuss in earnest what a reintegrated Cyprus might look like, and what exactly the role of Greek Cypriots might conceivably be in a reunified island. Currently laws circumscribe membership in various associations to 'citizens' of the 'TRNC'. The scope of civil society and how inclusive it is are concepts that are coming to be scrutinized.

### The Concept of Civil Society Used in this Study

As mentioned in Section I.2.1., the civil society definition proposed by CIVICUS is characterised by a very broad scope encompassing 'positive' and 'negative' organisations, as well as informal forms of citizen participation. Putting this civil society concept into practice was no easy task. During the PAG meeting, where the definition of civil society was discussed at length, the group was divided between those that felt political parties should be included in the definition of civil society and those that felt they must be omitted. In the absence of consensus the Project Index Team (PIT) produced the following working definition,

*Civil society is the arena outside the family, the government, political parties and the market, where people associate to advance common interests.*

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<sup>93</sup> NGO Guidebook and Directory, Management Center of the Mediterranean, 2004

This definition also entailed a certain degree of controversy with respect to the meaning of ‘common interest’, where some maintained that public interest did not imply, say, collective bargaining, as was the case with syndicate or trade unions, that aimed to advance the economic interests of their membership. In the end, however, the more inclusive definition was adopted. Table III.1.1 lists the various types of CSOs captured by the definition employed for this study.

**TABLE III.1.1: Types of CSOs included in the study**

1. Traders or Business Association	10. Health Group / Social Service Association (eg. Association for the Disabled)
2. Professional Association (eg. doctors, engineers)	11. Sports Association
3. Trade Union or Labour Union	12. Youth Organization
4. Neighbourhood/Village Committee	13. Women’s Association or Group
5. Religious or Spiritual Group	14. Civic Group/Human Rights Organization
6. Cultural and Arts Organisations	15. Ethnic-based Community Group
7. Socializing Clubs (eg. Rotary, Lions)	16. Environmental or Conservational Organization
8. Cooperative Organizations or groups	17. Hobby Association or Group
9. Educational Group (eg. Parent-Teacher Association, School Committees)	18. Social Advocacy Group
	19. other Associations or Groups

### 1.3 Mapping Civil Society in the northern part of Cyprus

How does civil society look like in the society of northern Cyprus? How does it relate to broader social forces in the northern part of the island? To explore these issues further, the PAG conducted a social forces and civil society mapping exercise. Drawing on participatory rural appraisal methods, these mapping exercises seek to visually present the major forces within society and civil society, respectively and to investigate the relations between these forces. In the social forces map, the larger the circle, the more power this actor is believed to wield. The different shades denote the societal sectors to which the respective actor belongs: the ‘state’, political parties, civil society, business (market), or external forces.<sup>94</sup>

The map shows a strong predominance of ‘state’ actors, such as the executive, but also acknowledges the important role of the Turkish embassy and military. Rauf Denktash, former ‘president’ and long time communal leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, also features as a unique actor within civil society and was categorized as his own ‘state’ actor. His circle overlaps with the military and Turkey, implying that he is increasingly aligned with Turkey, as opposed to more indigenous social forces.

It should be highlighted that the Turkish Embassy and the military were treated not as external forces per se, since in the context of northern Cyprus the PAG found it difficult to adopt conventional demarcations. Therefore, whereas Ankara (i.e. the Turkish government) and Turkey as a whole were treated as external forces, the Turkish Embassy was considered embedded in the northern Cyprus community affairs.

By comparison, the mapping exercise assigned a marginal role to the legislative and judicial branches of ‘government’. The same can be said of civil society and the private sector. Civil society, in turn, appears to be divided, or even polarized, into NGOs on the one hand, and trade and professional organizations on the other. In the latter cases these social forces are closer to the private sector. Private media and universities were treated as market social forces. Private media, owing to its association with political parties, is depicted as relatively influential.

<sup>94</sup> Given the relationship with Turkey, as well as other external influences, the PAG agreed to map external forces separately.




The map (see figure III.1.2) shows that professional organizations and trade unions feature prominently among civil society forces. They are linked to social market forces, the executive and the European Union. Farmers associations, the Türk Sen syndicate, as well as the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce are clustered around the professional organizations and trade unions. It should be pointed out that the unions are embedded within the ‘state’ apparatus, and public sector trade unions are regulated by their own specific laws, thus enjoy privileges as well as instruments to better economic benefits. Moreover, professional or occupational organizations also have a charter given by ‘parliament’ and are able to obtain obligatory membership dues, which makes them financially stable and able to run a professional organisation. Such organizations (with the exception of the ‘This Country is Ours’ platform discussed in this report) focus on members’ interests and members are compelled to contribute membership fees. Overall, these structural features allow these organizations a certain degree of influence on policy.

Distant from this cluster are the NGOs. The PAG decided to classify NGOs as dedicated to culture and health, the environment or as ‘new social movements’. Of the three, environmental NGOs were deemed the least influential. It should also be noted that these organizations lack the privileges enjoyed by the professional organizations and trade unions mentioned above, and thus lack the financing, which tends to inhibit their ability to set up a professionally run organisation. The new social movements were most closely associated with international donors, such as UNOPS and UNDP. The map depicts veterans associations as polarized against the NGOs mentioned previously, and aligned with the military and the ‘state’.

In reflecting on the mapping exercises, PAG members felt that the resulting pictures of social and civil society forces portray the current power relations within the Turkish Cypriot community rather well.

**FIGURE III.1.3: Civil society map**



## 2. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS


In this section, the bulk of the information and data collected during the course of the project is presented. The analysis is structured along the individual indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions. As stated in the introduction, the analysis undertaken here should be seen as a first attempt to come to grips with a complex field, lacking previous research, within a limited period of time. At times, the analysis is not as comprehensive as would have been liked either because there was not enough time to pursue a question further, because the data were simply not available or because the CSI methodology required that only specific types of evidence be used.

This section begins with a study of the **structure** of civil society, proceeds with an analysis of the **environment** within which civil society operates, continues with an examination of the **values** that civil society promotes and practices and ends with an investigation of the **impact** of civil society upon public policy and society in general.

### 2.1 Structure

This section describes and analyses the overall size, strength and vibrancy of civil society in human, organizational and economic terms. The score for the Structure dimension is 1.1, indicating a relatively small civil society. The graph below presents the scores for the six subdimensions within the Structure dimension: extent of citizen participation; depth of citizen participation; diversity of civil society participants; level of organization; inter-relations and civil society resources.

**FIGURE III.1.4: Subdimension scores in structure dimension**




#### 1.1 The Extent of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension looks at the extent of various forms of citizen participation in civil society in northern Cyprus. Table III.1.2 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.1.2: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	2
1.1.2	Charitable giving	1
1.1.3	CSO membership	2
1.1.4	Volunteer work	1
1.1.5	Community action	1
1.1.6	Citizen Participation in Bi-communal Events	1

*1.1.1 Non-partisan political action.* As part of the project, the Management Centre of the Mediterranean with EKart Danismanlik ve Bilgi Pazarlama Ltd., conducted the Civil Society Survey 2005, a community-wide representative survey where 370 respondents were interviewed on their civic attitudes and behaviour. The survey revealed that a third of the population have ever signed a petition, around 30% have taken part in a demonstration, while 21% have taken a part in a strike and only 9% have written a letter to the editor (see figure 3.II.1.2). Overall 35% of the citizens of northern Cyprus have participated in one of these four forms of non-partisan political activities.

**FIGURE III.1.5: Frequency of non-partisan political action**

Source: Civil Society Survey 2005

During the period when the Annan Plan – the UN Blueprint proposed to solve the Cyprus problem – was debated, between November 2002 and April 2004, an unprecedented degree of political action was recorded, with mass rallies for and against the plan. Although there is no consensus on actual figures, the largest of the rallies was estimated to have anywhere between 30,000 to 70,000 people participating. The higher figure suggests that a significant percentage of the overall population (roughly 200,000 citizens or up to 30% of the total population) participated in a single event.

*1.1.2 Charitable giving.* The same survey revealed that a very high number of respondents (88%) reported that they have donated either money or a gift to charity over the last 12 months.


In addition to giving money to charity, Turkish Cypriot people contribute to charities through blood donations and by buying lottery tickets from charities (Helping those with Cancer

Association).<sup>95</sup> Some people provided food (especially meat of sacrificed animals) and clothing for abandoned or orphaned children during religious holidays. Additionally, there is the *fitre* almsgiving, a donation to the poor on the part of the more wealthy during the month of Ramadan. Although a secular society, the Turkish Cypriot community (TCC) began to transform religious requirements into such charity donations. The schools, especially those located in the rural areas, have charitable status. People give money as well as new and used educational materials to the school children of poor families. Some CSOs, including the Nicosia Capital City Lions Club Association, organize *kermes* (a kind of fair) where monies raised from the sale of textiles and foods are earmarked for causes such as provision for poor and otherwise needy groups. However, this is an indirect form of charity, as is the system of buying of lottery tickets for charity.

Some PAG members, however, felt that the statistic of 88% for charitable giving was rather high. Overall the PAG members remained sceptical on the reported level of charitable giving in the Civil Society Survey 2005, based on their experiences and therefore assigned a lower score to this indicator. For instance, some felt that the *fitre* should not count as charity, as it is part of an individual's religious duty among the faithful. Here PAG members focused more on the amount given in charity rather than charitable acts. Thus, PAG members felt that the 88% score was not credible. Some PAG members also felt that a 'halo' effect, whereby respondents prefer to seem more charitable than they really are to the interviewer, may be prompting respondents to declare higher levels of charity than is actually the case.

*1.1.3 CSO membership.* Overall, about half of all respondents in the Civil Society Survey 2005 are members of at least one CSO. The survey showed that Turkish Cypriots are more likely to be members of trade unions than any other CSO type. According to the survey 17% of respondents claimed to be members. Membership is also relatively high on school committees (14%), followed by membership in cooperatives (11%), and sports organizations (9%). However, membership in human rights organizations, by contrast, is low (2%).

**FIGURE III.1.6: CSO Categories with the largest membership**



Source: Civil Society Survey of Northern Cyprus 2005

<sup>95</sup> This is the most important contribution for those who suffer from Mediterranean anaemia, Thalassaemia.

*1.1.4 Volunteering.* The Civil Society Survey 2005 showed that 21% of citizens did voluntary work within an organisation during the last year. However, when looked at more broadly, to include those that volunteered outside of organisations, the number climbs to 72%.

Some PAG members suggested that there probably was a declining trend with respect to volunteer work attributable to rising levels of economic well-being. This may be counterintuitive, but according to the PAG in the case of the community in northern Cyprus the reason appears to be that as Turkish Cypriots were once 'enclaved' (between 1964 and 1974) they relied heavily on one another within the community. However, with prosperity, PAG members felt that alienation had set in with the fraying of the social fabric. This may also be related to the inequitable distribution of formerly Greek Cypriot owned properties<sup>96</sup> and other assets that serves to erode trust within the society.

Others contend that this trend may be true of urban residents, but that volunteerism may remain robust in the rural areas, which led to some variations in the scoring. Volunteer work within organisations varied, but PAG members did mention reliance on volunteers for a number of activities, including fund raising and other events. However, ad hoc volunteerism may also entail something as simple as helping elderly neighbours with groceries and so on, which the majority of PAG members felt were most likely an overestimation.

*1.1.5 Collective community action.* Results from the Civil Society Survey 2005 revealed that about 37% of citizens were involved either as a promoter, volunteer or organiser of various events in the community related to issues and problems where the respondent resides.

Although some PAG members were inclined to score the indicator higher than suggested by the data, citing the mass rallies associated with the Annan Plan, a UN blueprint proposed to reunite Cyprus, ultimately this period was deemed the exception to the rule. The mass rallies related to the Annan Plan may have been unprecedented in size, but rallies and other public acts including strikes are common tactics employed syndicates. Some activities may be classified as non-partisan, but political. Generally, less militant activities are staged by women's groups and other NGOs. An example of genuinely non-partisan community action was the participation of residents of *Demirhan* village where a protest was organized by the villagers calling for the removal of an existing roundabout in the highway that passes through the village, alleging that it had caused many traffic accidents.

*1.1.6 Citizen participation in bi-communal events.* The survey also revealed that 25% of those surveyed have taken part in at least one bi-communal event over the past year. As Cyprus remains divided, one avenue of reconciliation is the holding of bi-communal events. Prior to the opening of the Green Line to crossings in April 2003 contacts between members of the communities was subject to restrictions. Thus, opportunities were limited. Relatively few people could participate and the venues were usually confined to the buffer zone (e.g. Ledra Palace Hotel). In short, the environment was not conducive.

Today crossings are more or less free, although there are formalities such as the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot authorities that anyone leaving or entering northern Cyprus fill in a 'visa'. Overall, especially given the momentum toward reunification in the Turkish Cypriot community during the Annan Plan period, one might anticipate greater degrees of citizen participation in bi-communal events.

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<sup>96</sup> As Cyprus was divided in 1974 and entailed the transfer of populations, Greek and Turkish, respectively, many Turkish Cypriots who arrived from the southern part of the island were 'compensated' for their losses in the north. Later, however, the system would degenerate into wholesale distribution of properties to individuals who lacked equity in the south, including to 'settlers'. The northern property regime remains internationally and domestically contentious, and is one of the bitter sticking points in any negotiated settlement to the Cyprus problem.

There are debilitating factors inhibiting participation. Some are psychological or ideological. Many Greek Cypriots, reportedly more than half, have not crossed to the north. Among this group are those that cite the indignity of filling out a ‘visa’ in their ‘own country’. Bi-communalism has also been stigmatized to some extent, associated with an imposed solution to the Cyprus problem, conflicting with prevailing historiographies that maintain that communal antagonism on the island was imported, hence that there is no need to hold bi-communal events.<sup>97</sup> Another reason for relatively few crossing on the part of members of the Greek Cypriot community is the lack of economic incentives. Whereas the European Union’s Green Line Regulation is in effect, trade in goods across the Green Line is limited in practice. As the Green Line does not constitute an external border of the EU, the Green Line Regulation was passed by the European Council in lieu of a settlement on the island after accession to the European Union in 2004. The goal is to regulate crossings between areas over which the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control (i.e. the southern part of the island) and areas where the EU’s *acquis communautaire* remains suspended (hence outside of the customs union and fiscal territory of the EU, among others) pending a settlement on the island (i.e. the north).

Turkish Cypriots, by contrast, have proven far more willing to cross south of the Green Line. Some of this is related to the economic incentive of finding employment. However, “settlers” (in practice Greek Cypriot authorities determine this by checking IDs, identifying those born in Turkey) are forbidden to cross the Green Line.

Following the failed referenda on the Annan Plan bi-communalism hit the lowest point. One example was the failure of the Civil Initiative that was meant to have been bi-communal. Spearheaded by Mustafa Damdelen of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, the movement eventually renamed itself the North Civil Initiative, having failed to persuade Greek Cypriot counterparts that the time was ripe for civil society to play a leading role in consolidating the “yes” vote in the north, while at the same time building momentum for support for the Annan plan framework in the south, despite the resounding “no” it received from the Greek Cypriot electorate.

Some examples of bi-communal events included musical performances by the Bicomunal Chorus, bi-communal youth camps, bi-communal festivals, gathering of people from both communities who once lived in the same village or town, and bi-communal academic-professional workshops and conferences.

PAG members felt that with the opening of crossings over the Green Line since April 2003 contacts had increased, and that the types of people who now meet are different than during the heyday of the bi-communal movement, which included relatively few people. Thus, based on this trend, PAG members were tempted to score the indicator somewhat higher, especially if conceived as spontaneous activities that included people from either community, as opposed to organized events.

## **1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society**

This subdimension looks at the depth of various forms of ‘citizen’ participation in civil society in northern Cyprus. Table III.1.3 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

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<sup>97</sup> Constantinou, C. & Papadakis, Y. (2001) The Cypriot State(s) in Situ: Cross-Ethnic Contact and the Discourse of Recognition, *Global Society*, 15(2), pp. 125–148.

**TABLE III.1.3: Indicators assessing the diversity of civil society participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Charitable Giving	1
1.2.2	Volunteering	2
1.2.3	CSO membership	1

*1.2.1 Charitable giving.* The Civil Society Survey 2005 conducted in northern Cyprus reveals that almost half of those surveyed contributed less than YTL 150 (USD 111) over the course of the previous year. 55% claimed to have only donated between YTL 0 and 150 (USD 0 and 111<sup>98</sup>). A further 21% claimed to have donated in the range of YTL 151 and 450 (USD 112 and 333). Those contributing more substantial amounts, meaning more than YTL 900 (USD 667), represent a low 3% of the total sample. On average, contributions as a percentage of average annual income amount to 2%.

*1.2.2 Volunteer work.* The Civil Society Survey 2005 revealed that, 49% of the respondents said that they volunteered five hours or less per month. Volunteering seems to be moderate among Turkish Cypriots, with 9% reporting to contribute more than ten hours per month. Only a dedicated 1% claimed to have contributed more than 60 hours per month. Overall, the survey showed that respondents worked an average of 7 hours per month devoted to volunteering.

In another study, conducted by the Institute of Research and Cyprus Studies (SOAR)<sup>99</sup> in 2002, it was reported that 31% of CSOs rely on salaried staff and 69% is contributed by volunteers. Overall the report found that 118 CSOs relied on 1795 volunteers. The number of volunteers reported per organisation varied from 0 to 180.

The PAG felt that the problem with volunteering was attrition. They suggested that a relatively small number of individuals did the hard work, and when the workload increased, previously enthusiastic volunteers would drop out.

*1.2.3 CSO membership.* The Civil Society Survey 2005 showed that 27% of the total respondents and 56% of CSO members said that they belong to multiple CSOs. Significantly, membership in trade/labour unions, cooperative organisations or groups, as well as education groups (such as parent-teacher associations) is greater than for other types of CSOs. Thus membership in the nascent NGOs that deal with environmental issues or bi-communal events attract relatively fewer members.

### 1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants

This subdimension examines the diversity and representativity of the civil society arena. It analyses whether all social groups participate equitably in civil society or whether there are any groups which are dominant or excluded. Table III.1.4 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.1.4: Indicators assessing the diversity of civil society participants**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	1
1.3.2	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	1
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	1

<sup>98</sup> All conversions to U.S. Dollars refer to an exchange rate of YTL 1.35 = USD 1.00.

<sup>99</sup> *NGO's Organizational Capacity Building Needs in TC Community*, Institute of Research and Cyprus Studies Ltd (SOAR), 2002.

*1.3.1 Representation of social groups among CSO members.*<sup>100</sup> In the Civil Society Survey 2005, there was exactly the same number (25%) of men and women who said they were members of at least one CSO. However, a much larger proportion of respondents from urban areas said they were members of a CSO (36%) than those who were from the rural areas (14%).

In addition to the general Civil Society Survey 2005, 46 stakeholders representing 85 different CSOs, as well as members of the ‘government’, media, and academia, came together in Regional Stakeholder Consultations. In a survey distributed to each participant, they ranked how they perceived the level of membership of social groups in civil society organizations within the Turkish Cypriot community to be. The following table is a summary of their responses.

**TABLE III.1.5: Level of representation of marginalized groups in CSOs**

Group	Level of Representation			
	Absent / Excluded (%)	Severely Under-Represented (%)	Somewhat Under-Represented (%)	Equitably Represented (%)
Women	2	24	44	30
Residents of Rural Areas	30	32	23	16
Ethnic / Linguistic Minorities	65	6	24	6
Foreign Workers	89	3	8	0
Religious Minorities	58	13	21	8
Poor People	60	7	24	10
Upper Class / Elite	0	28	8	65
Youth	10	36	36	19
Senior Citizens	12	32	34	22

Source: Civil Society 2005 Regional Stakeholder Survey

The findings suggest that various groups are virtually excluded from CSOs. These include foreign workers, and to lesser extents, ethnic/linguistic minorities, women, poor people, and religious minorities, in that order. Foreign workers, in this context, imply workers from Turkey, many of whom are seasonal and – until recent legal amendments and enforcement – illegal workers without permits. It is hardly surprising that persons without legal status are not usually members of CSOs. As for the two categories of minorities, there may be a degree of overlap, as ethnic and religious minority may denote Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in northern Cyprus, for instance. The meaning attributed by respondents to these categories can only be hypothesized upon, as the questionnaire does not make this explicit.

*1.3.2 Representation of social groups among CSO leadership.* In the Regional Stakeholders Consultations, participants expressed a wide range of different opinions regarding the extent of gender equity in CSO leadership. While 20% reported that women are excluded, 29% reported that women are equitably represented. However, on the question of minorities, almost two-thirds of the respondents (63%) expressed the view that minorities are excluded from positions of CSO leadership. In this context, minorities imply Maronites and Greek Cypriots, thus there is a strong correlation between this statistic and that for religious minorities, which also implies Christians. Seventy-four percent agree that minorities are either entirely excluded or severely underrepresented. Only 6% maintain that there is equity in representation. Similarly, the findings demonstrate that stakeholders felt that there was a

<sup>100</sup> As the PAG identified a close connection between these two indicators, it decided to examine these together. Thus, the two indicators are also presented together in this report.

strong correlation between socioeconomic status and representation. Fifty-nine percent of stakeholders maintained that people with lower income were excluded. The highest level of agreement was that 88% felt that foreign workers, meaning mostly people who have come to northern Cyprus from Turkey since 1974, were said to be excluded.

*1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs around the country.* The findings from the Regional Stakeholder Consultations suggest that CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas. In fact 60% of respondents felt that CSOs were largely concentrated in major cities. A full 87% agreed that CSOs were limited to urban areas, and only 4% thought that CSOs were present in even remote areas. A comprehensive CSO list confirms that depending on the type, CSOs are more or less concentrated in urban areas. Not surprisingly, sports clubs are probably the only CSO type which is well represented in all regions.

## 1.4 Level of Organisation

This subdimension looks at the extent of infrastructure and internal organisation within civil society in northern Cyprus. Table III.1.6 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**Table III.1.6: Indicators assessing the level of organisation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of umbrella bodies	0
1.4.2	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	1
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	1
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	1
1.4.5	International linkages	0

*1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies.* CSOs in the Turkish Cypriot community tend to be unaffiliated. The Regional Stakeholder Consultations revealed that most respondents agreed that CSOs are not usually a member of an umbrella organisation. A majority of the respondents considered that only up to 20% of CSOs belong to a federation, umbrella body, or network of CSOs. A further 28% felt that the percentile is somewhere between 20% and 40%. Only 10% think the figure is more than 60%.

Umbrella organizations include various trade union federations, such as *Kuzey Kıbrıs Hür İşçi Sendikaları Federasyonu* (North Cyprus Federation of Free Workers' Trade Unions), *Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Sendikaları Federasyonu* (Cyprus Turkish Federation of Workers' Trade Unions), *Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Federasyonu* (Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions Federation). There are also many sports federations. The more ad hoc social movements, including the 'This Country is Ours Platform' and the 'Common Vision' also deserve mention as umbrella associations dedicated toward a solution with the Greek Cypriots.

Part of the problem, identified by the PAG members, was that no legal status existed for umbrella organizations. For instance, although a PAG member had been actively involved in trying to set up a patient's group no legal provisions were available to establish an *umbrella* CSO. In practice, special registration procedures for umbrella bodies, as opposed to the general provision for common associations, are required. Another way around the problem is to set up a non-profit company where the members are CSOs, as opposed to individuals. Legal limitations in this respect extend to business as well, given the lack of provisions for holdings, for instance. Moreover, the non-profit companies also enjoy tax deductions or exemptions upon the decision of the Council of 'Ministers'.

*1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies.* The Regional Stakeholder Survey suggested that umbrella organisations are somewhat effective. Sixty-two percent rated such organisations as either partly or generally effective, as opposed to 38% that considered them largely ineffective or completely ineffective. However, the number of umbrella bodies is very low

and therefore this issue was barely touched upon in the Regional Stakeholder Consultations. The most evident success story is that of the ‘This Country is Ours’ mass mobilization of support for the Annan Plan in the form of mass rallies of tens of thousands in the streets of Nicosia and events elsewhere. However, the regional stakeholder survey results suggested that this was more of an exception to a rule.

A three month review of the media was also conducted for this study. In this media review CSO umbrella organisations were seen as somewhat effective. Four of the five news items about the CSO umbrella body activities’ effectiveness, suggested that they have a strong or considerable impact in influencing the desired outcome.

*1.4.3 Self-regulation within civil society.* According to the Regional Stakeholder Survey, participants felt that efforts to establish a code of conduct or other means of self-regulation within civil society are being made, though 61% felt that its impact is limited. By contrast only 7% report that mechanisms of self-regulation are in place and effective. However, the same survey revealed that more than two-thirds (74%) of CSOs have and abide by some form of self-regulation.

The 2002 SOAR report shows the types of governing bodies of CSOs are 89% executive committee, 12% management committee, 3% board of directors, 5% board of trustees, and 7% other committees.<sup>101</sup>

*1.4.4 Support infrastructure.* The Regional Stakeholder Survey revealed that CSOs suffer from an inadequate support infrastructure. Eighty-eight percent of stakeholder assess that there is either no or very limited infrastructure for civil society. No respondent maintained that a well-developed infrastructure existed. Whereas the problem of infrastructure was mentioned in the regional stakeholders consultations, infrastructure was seen more of an attribute of individual CSOs rather than something provided for the whole sector. As such, some CSOs were considered better endowed than others.

*1.4.5 International linkages.* The Regional Stakeholder Survey suggested that relatively few CSOs partake in international civil society events or maintain international links. Seventy-four percent assessed that very few CSOs are members of international networks. Similarly, 77% maintained that CSOs participate in few, if any, international civil society events. Indeed, isolation of the community in northern Cyprus from the international community has been detrimental to the development of linkages. Whereas some CSOs enjoy status in the international arena, especially those established prior to 1974, such as the Chamber of Commerce, those established and registered since may not be regarded as legally registered CSOs.

It should be pointed out that CSOs based in northern Cyprus frequently encounter resistance from their counterparts based in the southern part of the island. For instance, AEGEE-Magusa (European Students Forum-Famagusta, a student club) based in northern Cyprus was initially rejected by AEGEE due to pressure from groups based in southern Cyprus. However, the example also demonstrates that where CSOs based in northern Cyprus have persisted, they also may persevere. AEGEE-Magusa was eventually admitted to AEGEE as a local association (i.e. “antennae”). Similar examples are applicable to Rotary Clubs and many other types of CSOs that seek international linkages. It should also be noted that in some instances particular linkages may not have been encouraged by previous ‘governments’, thus not all of the isolation should be attributed to obstacles emanating from southern Cyprus. Today, in the aftermath of the failed Annan Plan referenda, we see greater demand on the part of CSOs based in northern Cyprus to establish linkages, and a concomitant expressed commitment

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<sup>101</sup> *NGO’s Organizational Capacity Building Needs in TC Community*, Institute of Research and Cyprus Studies Ltd (SOAR), 2002.

from the international community, including the European Union, to facilitate the lifting of the isolations.

### 1.5 Inter-Relations within Civil Society

This subdimension analyses the relations amongst civil society actors in northern Cyprus. Table III.1.7 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.1.7: Indicators assessing the inter-relations within civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	1
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	2
1.5.3	Level of Cooperation between G/C and T/C CSOs	1

*1.5.1 Communication between CSOs.* According to the Regional Stakeholder Survey, the level of communication and information sharing between civil society actors is limited. Sixty percent felt that such communications were either limited or non-existent. Thirteen percent, on the other hand, maintained that communications were significant.

Part of the problem may be rivalries between CSO leaders, who also have overlapping agendas. Many CSOs have political leanings, and there are CSOs where the leaders are closely associated with political leaders. Funding also is a source of rivalry that dampens communications. Funding, even from international sources, may be politicized, as it is for bi-communal projects through the UN's Bicomunal Development Program, subject to approval by local political authorities. As political authorities are widely alleged to favour the projects of CSOs 'affiliated' with the 'government', 'opposition' CSOs' projects may be rejected, although international funders have been careful to maintain a balance despite efforts by the authorities to block funds. However, the upshot is that various CSO leaders may prefer not to share information in order to maintain their privileged position vis-à-vis rival CSOs.

*1.5.2 Cooperation between CSOs.* The Regional Stakeholder Consultations suggest that alliances among civil society actors and CSOs across sectors are very limited. Forty-five percent considered that such coalitions were few in number. Thirty-three percent thought there was somewhat more. Twelve percent thought there were no examples of cross-sector alliances. At the other extreme, 10% believed there to be numerous cases. Among the cases mentioned were several joint events, including bi-communal activities, many sponsored by UNOPS, some dealing with cultural issues like music and folklore. Numerous events were also held by professional organizations representing architects and engineers.

The media review provides a somewhat more optimistic picture of cooperation. Specifically there was evidence of labour union cooperation on salaries; CSO cooperation on the issue of traffic accidents (a very salient issue in northern Cyprus); support for strikes by flight attendants and their syndicate; and also support from various CSOs for the cause of graduates from the pre-school teaching program at Near East University. There were up to 110 examples of news in the monitored media related to cross-sectoral CSO alliances and coalitions. This shows that there is a strong tendency to cooperate. Nevertheless the examples show that CSOs did not cooperate regularly, and only sporadically on occasional issues of common concern.

*1.5.3 Level of cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot CSOs.* This indicator has been created specifically for the context of Cyprus. The Regional Stakeholder Survey revealed limited cooperation with civil society actors from both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. A full 73% considered it very rare that CSOs cooperated in such a manner. Seven percent, however, considered such activities significant and numerous. Additionally, among those CSOs represented at the Regional Stakeholder Consultations, relatively few felt that Turkish Cypriot CSOs have participated in an event with the Greek

Cypriot community. Fifty-six percent of respondents suggested that the actual figure is less than 20%. A further 24% said that between 20% and 40% have participated. More than 80%, thus, believed participation to be less than 40%.

### 1.6 Civil Society Resources


This subdimension examines the resources available for civil society organisations in northern Cyprus. Table III.1.8 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.1.8: Indicators assessing the civil society resources**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	<u>1</u>
1.6.2	Human resources	<u>1</u>
1.6.3	Technical and infrastructural resources	<u>0</u>


*1.6.1 Financial resources.* A majority of CSO respondents report that resources are either inadequate or completely inadequate to achieve their organisation's goals (see figure III.1.7).

**FIGURE III.1.7: Level of financial resources of CSOs**



Source: Civil Society 2005 Regional Stakeholder Survey

According to the Regional Stakeholder Consultations, for some CSOs up to 51% of financial resources are reported to come from foreign donors. Generally, though, a majority of CSOs report that they derive about 66% of resources from membership fees. A small minority of CSOs derive, on average, 29% of funding from 'government'. Whereas these findings may suggest a relatively stable funding environment, we must differentiate between CSOs which derive membership dues by law, such as trade unions, and other CSOs which cannot rely on membership dues.

**FIGURE III.1.8: CSO funding sources**

Source: *Civil Society 2005 Regional Stakeholder Survey*

These findings are corroborated by other studies. According to the Institute of Research and Cyprus Studies Ltd (SOAR) report, *NGOs' Organizational Capacity Building Needs in TC Community*, 84 CSOs point to membership fees as the single most important source of revenue. Forty-eight CSOs pointed to private organisations as a source, whereas a total of 34 CSOs reported that they derived funds from fund-raising activities. Only 17% of CSOs reported that they were recipients of international funding. Similarly, only 17% reported local funding. It should also be pointed out that certain CSOs, including trade unions, enjoy greater resources as they receive membership fees by law. Therefore, we can differentiate between trade unions and professional associations that derive significant funding from membership fees, and other CSOs that do not enjoy this privilege. Overall, however, CSO funding can be regarded as insufficient.

**1.6.2 Human resources.** According to the Regional Stakeholder Survey most respondents did not consider there to be a grave deficit in terms of human resources. Nearly half (49%) reported that staff skills in their organisations were adequate. Whereas 27% considered staff skills inadequate, no respondents considered skills to be completely inadequate. The PAG members, however, took issue with the findings here, citing their experiences with recruiting and working with employees and volunteers. Generally the view was that it was difficult to find qualified personnel, and in practice a few competent and committed individuals tended to do the work within CSOs.

**1.6.3 Technical and infrastructural resources.** According to the Regional Stakeholders Survey, 52% of respondents felt that equipment and infrastructure was either inadequate or completely inadequate to achieve respective CSO goals. By contrast, 25% felt that equipment and infrastructure were adequate. In the 2002 SOAR study, 45% of CSOs report that they have computers. Thirty-three percent have internet connections, and 11% a digital camera. Overall, infrastructure is limited, but there is variation among CSOs in terms of resources.

## Conclusion

There are many deficits in the structure of civil society, both at the level of individual civic engagement and at organisational level of civil society. The analysis of civil society's structure reveals that apart from the unprecedentedly large rallies in favour of the Annan Plan, among members of the Turkish Cypriot community, participation in civil society remains limited. Whereas formal membership in CSOs, such as syndicates, is of a moderate level, most members are passive. Furthermore, participation in bi-communal events is also relatively low, especially in contrast with the robust support for reunification among the Turkish Cypriot community in the run up to the referendum of April 2004. Another problem with civil society's structure proved to be the dearth or exclusion of significant social groups, such as minorities, poor people and workers, as well as "settlers" from Turkey. Women were equally represented as members of CSOs, however, leadership positions are predominantly held by men.


During the time leading up to the referendum on the Annan Plan, support for the plan was galvanized by ad hoc umbrella organizations. To the extent that these umbrella organizations exist, they have proven effective. A major obstacle for the establishment of more formal umbrella organizations are legal impediments, since specific legal provisions for their establishment do not exist. Finally, inadequate levels of resources whether financial, human, or infrastructural continue to hinder the development of civil society.

Overall we note a relatively weak structure for civil society in northern Cyprus. We conclude that whereas citizen participation suggests potential for growth, the low diversity of participants, weak level of organization, inadequate resources, and rivalry between various CSOs prove to be problematic for civil society's structure, and more broadly, problematic for the long term growth and sustainability of Turkish Cypriot civil society. At the same time and despite certain rivalries between CSOs, there are cooperative relationships between various CSOs, which could be further enhanced through infrastructure developments to increase communications among CSOs. The especially limiting low level of organization could be abetted by facilitating greater international linkages with CSOs outside of northern Cyprus, including greater collaboration with CSOs in southern Cyprus.

## 2.2 Environment

This section describes and analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which civil society exists and functions. The score for the Environment Dimension is 1.6, indicating an environment that, while moderately conducive for civil society, also entails limitations. Figure III.2.1 below presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Environment dimension.

**FIGURE III.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension**



### 2.1 Political Context

This subdimension examines the political situation in northern Cyprus and its impact on civil society. Table III.2.1 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.2.1: Indicators assessing the political context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.1.1</u>	Political Rights	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.2</u>	Political competition	<u>2</u>
<u>2.1.3</u>	Rule of law	<u>1</u>
<u>2.1.4</u>	Corruption	<u>1</u>
<u>2.1.5</u>	State effectiveness	<u>1</u>
<u>2.1.6</u>	Decentralisation	<u>0</u>

*2.1.1 Political rights.* Citizens of the self-proclaimed 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ('TRNC') are generally free to participate in the political process, although there are some problems with the practice of vote buying, citizenship criteria, and the role of media.

Freedom House ranks northern (Turkish Cypriot) Cyprus as 'free' (2).<sup>102</sup> The Freedom House scale runs from 1 to 7, where 1 denotes the greatest degree of freedom.

The US Department of State, in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004, finds that the December 2003 'parliamentary' elections were "generally free and fair."<sup>103</sup>

<sup>102</sup> Freedom House. *Freedom in the World-2005* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers). pp. 729-731. Available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm>.

According to this same report, Turkish Cypriots enjoy the right to peacefully change their 'government', which was demonstrated following the 2003 election.

As northern Cyprus is not internationally recognized, international organizations and governments do not organize election observation missions. In lieu of this the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo sent a team recruited by the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) to observe the 2003 elections.<sup>104</sup> NORDEM found that the electoral rules and the procedures for administering the elections 'corresponds to international standards, though certain aspects of the system is open to criticisms and should be reconsidered.' Furthermore, NORDEM found no evidence of significant irregularities concerning the conduct of the elections, or related to the counting of votes and the tabulation and announcement of results. However, NORDEM did find problems with the granting of citizenship, voters' rights and lists, and the possibility of undue influence buying.

Moreover, some NGOs maintain that elections in northern Cyprus could never be free and fair, in light of the role Turkey plays and the various irregularities that were said to mar elections.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, the Civil Society Impact Studies repeated the widespread view that democracy in northern Cyprus is only skin deep, since critical public policy questions are settled in Ankara, not Lefkosa.

Significantly, according to the studies mentioned above, the financing of the 'TRNC' 'government' by is used as leverage to influence which 'government' is in power or not. A Coordination Council, comprising military officers, the Turkish Ambassador, as well as political leadership, has the impact of interfering in the day to day affairs and policies within the 'TRNC'.

*2.1.2 Political competition.* Parliamentary democracy and a multi-party system has been a fixture of politics in northern Cyprus for decades, and there are many political parties representing the ideological spectrum. Seven political parties contested the latest 'parliamentary election' held in 2005. Four political parties are currently represented in parliament. Moderate right-wing parties include the National Unity Party (UBP) and Democrat Party (DP). Smaller, electorally insignificant far-right parties also exist. Left-wing parties include the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the Communal Liberation Party (TKP), and the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH). Parties of the left tend to be pro-European Union and favour a solution to the Cyprus problem to be negotiated via the mediation efforts of the UN. The party system witnessed the predominance of the National Unity Party (UBP) as ruling (coalition) party for many years, thus little turnover in 'government'. Currently the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) is ascendant and has displaced the UBP in 'government'. Part of CTP's recent electoral success – aside from the popularity of the Annan Plan that it championed - can be attributed to its successful transformation from a communist party to a party with broader appeal to groups that it once shunned, including the business elite. CTP has run in the past two elections under the banner The Republican Turkish Party-United Forces (CTP-BG).

Recent elections have attested to the increased popularity of the latest UN blueprint known as the Annan Plan.<sup>106</sup> As these elections turned on the popularity of the plan, candidates

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<sup>103</sup> US Department of State (2004) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004, Cyprus*. Available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41676.htm>.

<sup>104</sup> Aanund Hylland: *Northern Cyprus: Parliamentary Elections December 2003*. ISBN: 82-90851-70-7

<sup>105</sup> Cyprus Action Network, 2004. 'Election 2003: How the Turkish Cypriots were prevented from expressing their free will'. [www.cyprusaction.org](http://www.cyprusaction.org).

<sup>106</sup> Lacher, Hannes and Erol Kaymak (2005) Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus. *Mediterranean Politics*, 10(2), pp. 147-166.

favouring the plan gained seats in parliament at the expense of naysayers. This culminated in the rise of CTP-BG to power, and Mehmet Ali Talat to 'president'. In fact, in northern Cyprus the most significant demarcation between right and left is the respective position towards the Cyprus problem, with right-wing parties favouring a 'solution' that entails the maintenance of close relations, if not integration, with Turkey, and left-wing parties favouring a federation (i.e. a form of re-unification) with the southern region of the island and the Greek Cypriot community.

On the other hand, intra-party democracy tends to be weak, with little turnover in leadership despite the holding of ostensibly democratic party conventions on a regular basis.

*2.1.3 Rule of law.* The US Department of State considers the legal framework in place to be largely respectful of human rights, and these laws are generally adhered to in practice.<sup>107</sup> The 'judiciary' is independent. However, 'state' practice in implementing law and 'judicial' decisions is inconsistent. From mundane traffic violations through the serving of criminal sentences individuals, who have 'connections', enjoy a degree of immunity. Most prominent is the case of businessman Salih Boyaci, father-in-law of Serdar Denktash, the current 'deputy prime minister' and 'minister' for foreign affairs. Although Mr. Boyaci has been convicted of a financial crime, in practice he has been serving his sentence in Turkey, in a hotel. Ostensibly he has health problems that require expertise in Turkey. Although Mehmet Ali Talat and his party, the UBP, have been critical of privilege and of Mr. Boyaci, since joining in a coalition 'government' with Serdar Denktash, they have ignored the issue. This and similar cases raise serious doubts about the degree to which 'judicial' decisions are actually implemented by the authorities.

The Civil Society Survey 2005 revealed that a majority of people (60%) claim to either trust or very much trust the 'judicial' system. In northern Cyprus civil disobedience is relatively uncommon, and most people generally abide by rules, although there may be cynicism among people regarding the equity of the system. It is widely assumed that personal qualifications matter less than connections (a matter of who you know, not what you know). Also, tax evasion and other financial irregularities are widespread.

PAG members were of the view that in practice 'state' practices were below par with respect to implementing the law. Some were of the view that as long as the local authorities lacked autonomy, the likelihood of consistent application of the law remained low.

*2.1.4 Corruption.* Corruption does not often feature as high profile cases in northern Cyprus, although 'corruption, cronyism, and lack of transparency are perceived to be serious problems' in the 'legislative' and 'executive branches'.<sup>108</sup> There are also allegations of individual cases of misappropriation, if not serious corruption and bribery, in other institutions, including the police force.

The PAG also agreed that high profile corruption was not a key problem for the 'state'; however, it was understood that corruption was endemic in the functioning of the bureaucracy, and that bribes helped the processing of files and other mundane issues. Thus, corruption is embedded in the 'public' system. Generally a lack of transparency allowed public sector officials a degree of anonymity. Cases of corruption may be on the increase, with the growing economic activity, including in narcotics. Recently a couple of police officers were arrested in connection with drug trafficking. Also, given the growth in the economy and lack of effective regulation, it is widely believed that businesses wield increasingly more clout

<sup>107</sup> US Department of State (2004) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004, Cyprus*. Available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41676.htm>.

<sup>108</sup> US Department of State (2004) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004, Cyprus*. Available at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41676.htm>.

with 'government' and 'state' officials, hence the potential for corruption. Finally, lack of transparency makes it difficult to detect cases of corruption. For instance, information on the recipients and amounts of funds and loans from the Development Bank are not in the public domain.

*2.1.5 State effectiveness.* A particular problem in northern Cyprus is the degree of autonomy of the 'state' bureaucracy, as well as its overall effectiveness and responsiveness. According to the Civil Society Impact Studies the 'government' and bureaucracy in northern Cyprus is beholden to Ankara. Thus, whereas bureaucracy may be functional, it is not especially responsive to the needs of the people.

Some areas are more problematic than others. Generally, 'state officials' do not feel obliged to share information with citizens, and this opaqueness contributes to relatively low responsiveness. It might also be useful to remember that the Chief of Police, for instance, reports to the general in charge of the 'security portfolio', himself from Turkey, and not directly to the 'Prime Ministry'. Another notable shortcoming is that the post of 'Governor of the Central Bank' is appointed by the Turkish Central Bank. These are issues that are widely debated in Turkish Cypriot media, especially among the left leaning editorial columns. Indeed, Mustafa Akinci, a prominent politician who was serving as 'Deputy Prime Minister' in a coalition in 2000 is reputed to have cost his party its coalition status by disputing the status of the police with the then commander of the Security Forces Command of northern Cyprus, General Ali Nihat Ozeyranli.

Recently the 'government' has been introducing a number of measures to enhance bureaucratic responsiveness and services to the public. For instance, in September 2005 the first phase of the 'e-state' was supposed to have been on-line.

Although northern Cyprus is not part of the EU, the 'government' has been preparing for that eventuality.<sup>109</sup> For instance, an EU Coordination Centre, under the 'Prime Ministry' has the mandate of overseeing a number of reform projects related to public sector activities. Similar activities are being conducted by the 'State Planning Office'. That said, many of the EU-oriented reforms are on hold, since to enact some of them would require a 'constitutional' amendment, which would rely on the development of political activity and political will.

*2.1.6 Decentralisation.* Fiscally the system in northern Cyprus is centralized. What is more, the 'government' is largely subsidized by Turkey, having the effect of further centralizing executive discretion in terms of expenditures. Many projects bankrolled by the 'TRNC Development Bank' require approval of Republic of Turkey state officials, thus enhancing the status and role of the Turkish Embassy in economic affairs. Although northern Cyprus has a number of districts (Nicosia, Kyrenia, Famagusta) and local authorities, the 'municipalities' have limited financial resources

According to the 'Statistical Yearbook – 1998' published by the 'TRNC State Planning Office' 'government' contributions to 'municipalities' annually was nearly 3 trillion TL (approximately \$2.25 million).<sup>110</sup> 'Municipal' revenues in aggregate, including 'government' contributions, amount to nearly 7 trillion TL. This is approximately 4% of revenues of the overall 'government' budget.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>109</sup> As the Cyprus problem remained unresolved at the time of Cyprus' accession to the EU, the European Union decided to suspend the *acquis communautaire* in the northern part of Cyprus, where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, pending a settlement.

<sup>110</sup> 'TRNC' 'Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation' (1998) *Statistics and Research Department. Statistical Yearbook – 1998*. p. 257.

<sup>111</sup> Overall revenues and expenditures for the government in 1998 amounted to just over 260 trillion TL in 1998.

## 2.2 Basic Rights and Freedoms

This subdimension examines the extent to which existing freedoms and rights are conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.2 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.2.2: Indicators assessing the basic rights and freedoms**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	<u>1</u>
2.2.2	Information rights	<u>1</u>
2.2.3	Press Freedom	<u>2</u>

*2.2.1 Civil liberties.* Freedom House ranks northern (Turkish) Cyprus as 'free' (a score of 2) on civil liberties. According to the US State Department report on human rights in Cyprus, civil liberties were generally recognized under law and respected in practice. Under the 'constitution', freedom of speech and expression is protected<sup>112</sup>, however, there are subsequent clauses that limit freedoms 'in the interests of national security'.

Freedom of association is mostly respected, although the March 2003 Doganci village demonstration led to the arrests of many organizers. During the demonstration a symbolic referendum was held to signify the fact that Turkish Cypriots are denied the opportunity to vote on the Annan Plan. The UN blueprint dubbed after the secretary general who sponsored it was meant to have been submitted to simultaneous, separate referenda on either side of the 'green line' that divides Cyprus and its respective communities. Whereas Kofi Annan called on the sides to submit the plan to referenda, the Turkish Cypriot political leadership refused. Although this gathering was peaceful, the police was commanded to disperse the crowd by using violence and to detain the leaders who had been active in the platform's activities.

Prohibitions on freedom of movement apply most adversely to minorities, including the Greek Cypriots and Maronites. Since 1974 a dwindling number of Greek Cypriots have been 'enclaved' in the Karpas region. Until recently Greek Cypriots authorities prohibited the Greek Cypriots from maintaining secondary education institutions in northern Cyprus. Students who chose to pursue an education in the south were subsequently prohibited from returning to northern Cyprus to reside on a permanent basis.

Refugees are frequently deported, and the law does not provide for the granting of asylum in accordance with the international 1951 UN convention or its 1967 protocol. The cooperation of public authorities with UNHCR is also uneven.<sup>113</sup>

*2.2.2 Information rights.* There are no laws providing public access to 'government' information. However, the current 'government' has introduced a bill to 'parliament' for approval that will oblige the 'state' bureaucracy to provide information on various documents, although its scope is not known at the time of writing this report.

*2.2.3 Press freedom.* The 'constitution' provides for freedom of speech and the press, and for the most part this is respected in practice. It should be pointed out, however, that there are certain restrictions on the freedom of speech originating in laws from the colonial period. In the case of activities deemed threatening to national security Court Martials have also been a means of stifling the press. In September 2004 the relevant law was amended, so henceforth journalists will not risk facing a military magistrate.

There are numerous media outlets, including a dozen newspapers, as well as independent radio and television stations. Media played an important role in mobilizing thousands to

<sup>112</sup> Constitution of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', Article 24, Part II

<sup>113</sup> U.S. Department of State, 2004. *Cyprus Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004*

participate in unprecedentedly large mass rallies in favour of the Annan Plan, a UN blueprint to reunite the island that was eventually rejected by the Greek Cypriot community in a referendum.<sup>114</sup>

On the other hand, there are also cases of journalists charged criminally for insulting the army before a military court. Charges of libel and defamation are also filed against journalists. Freedom House has also noted such activities, including the detonation of bombs by unknown assailants against the pro-settlement Kibris newspaper and other acts of intimidation and threats in the lead up to the referendum to unite the island in 2004.

Recently, though, particularly after the change of 'government' following the December 2003 elections, freedom of press and association has become less problematic.

The Civil Society Impact Study on Human Rights, written as a part of this study (Appendix 12), was dedicated to the very question of freedom of thought and expression in the media and the role of civil society in promoting it. The experts interviewed were generally of the view that journalists and media could be coerced de facto by authorities.

As mentioned above, journalists have been criminally charged or sued for libel for statements attributable to them. Additionally, some media, especially the Afrika newspaper, has been subject to attacks by unknown arsonists. Afrika is an outspoken critic of the regime and of the Turkish military. It espouses the view that the division of Cyprus is artificial and in line with the interests of external powers (i.e. imperialists).

The case of Afrika shows two sides of the same coin regarding freedom of the press. On the one hand, Afrika is both prosecuted and persecuted. On the other, it continues to publish despite such problems. In fact, Afrika's predecessor, Avrupa, had been shut down, however the very next day Avrupa was renamed Afrika.

Some PAG members saw a trend toward greater press freedoms, given the political climate, although it was also pointed out that the colonial laws that allowed for prosecution of journalists and media still persist. Thus, change is seen through restraint on the part of the 'Attorney General' rather than through an improvement of the legal framework. Other PAG members suggested that given the financial problems faced by some publishers, and the issue of ownership, it is inevitable that press is manipulated, thus undermining press freedoms in practice. Due to limited resources media tends to rely on and reproduce TAK (Turkish News Agency, the 'state' news agency) news items, which were said to distort information. As local newspapers passively receive information from TAK and pass it on to readers, any distortions or omissions by TAK, may be overlooked by media. On the other hand, it was conceivable that rival, private sector news agencies could be established, since they are not prohibited by law, although it may be prohibitively expensive to set them up.

### 2.3 Socio-Economic Context

This subdimension examines the extent to which existing socio-economic situation is conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.3 shows the respective indicator score.

**TABLE III.2.3: Indicator assessing the socio-economic context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	2

<sup>114</sup> Ridder/Braden, Inc., Politicks, Index and Dr. Erol Kaymak. (2005) "The Annan Plan 2004: A Study of the Information Environment & an Outline of International Referendum Standards."

To operationalise the concept of ‘socio-economic environment’, eight indicators were selected, which represent the different means through which the socio-economic context can potentially impact on civil society: 1) Poverty; 2) Civil war; 3) Severe ethnic or religious conflict; 4) Severe economic crisis; 5) Severe social crisis; 6) Serious socio-economic inequities; 7) Illiteracy and 8) Lack of IT infrastructure.

A specific benchmark was defined for each of these indicators, which indicated that the respective indicator presents a socio-economic barrier to civil society. The benchmarks and data for these eight indicators for northern Cyprus are presented below:

Overall, only a couple of conditions listed above posit a limitation on civil society in terms of the prevalent socio-economic situation.

1. *Widespread poverty - do less than 40% of people in northern Cyprus live on less than 2 US\$ a day?* No. Abject poverty is not an issue in northern Cyprus, although there is a problem with large numbers of seasonal and illegal workers who live at subsistence levels. There is no widespread poverty in northern Cyprus.

2. *Civil war - did the country experience any armed conflict during the last five years?* No. Although there continues to be no solution to the physical division of the island since 1974, there is no recent armed conflict.<sup>115</sup> An estimated 30 to 40 thousand Turkish mainland troops are stationed in northern Cyprus. Despite the large number of munitions the security dimension of the situation in Cyprus has been relatively stable, and thus few incidents of physical violence between the two communities.

3. *Severe ethnic or religious conflict?* Yes, but not very severe. Severe ethnic or religious conflict is measured through the CIDCM's Peace and Conflict Data set 'self-determination' indicator. On self-determination, Cyprus was rated with a score of -1, or yellow. A score of -2 is designated red, and the lowest possible score of zero is flagged green. The yellow icon in the case of Cyprus was ostensibly accorded due to its classification as a country where there was evidence of the persistence of a non-violent self-determination movement (i.e. the Turkish Cypriot entity) in early 2005, but no track record of accommodating the movement in the past 20 years. The score for Cyprus was based on the 45-year long dispute between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.<sup>116</sup> Alternatively, the CIDCM also provides a scale running from 1 to 3, with Cyprus scoring 2<sup>117</sup>. It is equivalent to the report statistic cited with a slightly different scale.

4. *Severe economic crisis – is the external debt more than the GDP?* No. In the case of northern Cyprus, international organisations like the World Bank do not provide data on basic socio-economic indicators. Imports outweigh exports in excess of 300 million US dollars annually, which is financed through transfers to the 'government' of northern Cyprus from Ankara. Although in theory the 'government's' external debt to Turkey is high, in practice loans can be treated more as grants<sup>118</sup>.

<sup>115</sup> See the Uppsala Conflict Dataset at [www.pcr.uu.se/database/countries.php](http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/countries.php).

<sup>116</sup> Marshall, Monty G. And Ted Robert Gurr (2005) Peace and Conflict – 2005, Report for The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC05print.pdf>

<sup>117</sup> <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=35201>

<sup>118</sup> 'TRNC Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation', Statistics and Research 'Department', [http://www.devplan.org/eng\\_ind.html](http://www.devplan.org/eng_ind.html)

5. *Severe social crisis?* No. Northern Cyprus has not experienced any severe social crises recently.

6. *Severe socio-economic inequities, i.e. is the Gini-coefficient > 0.4?* No. Socio-economic inequities exist, but are not very problematic. The 'TRNC State Planning Office' calculated a Gini coefficient of 0.37, a figure similar to that of the UK or Italy, and somewhat lower than the US.<sup>119</sup>

7. *Pervasive illiteracy - are more than 40% of the adult population illiterate?* No. Adult literacy is quite high. Enrolment in primary and junior high school is mandatory. Enrolment in high school is 95%.<sup>120</sup>

8. *Lack of IT infrastructure – are there less than 5 IT hosts per 10.000 inhabitants?* No. IT infrastructure is not the best, but sufficient. The current 'government' is investing in an ADSL system as well as CDMA (wireless networking) for areas lacking infrastructure.

The analysis of civil society's socio-economic environment showed that only IT infrastructure needs to be improved in northern Cyprus as it constitutes a socio-economic barrier. Thus, civil society in northern Cyprus is operating in a relatively conducive socio-economic context.

Whereas the PAG scored according to the data presented above, many members were of the view that northern Cyprus represented an anomaly (a *sui generis* case not fully captured by the indicator), insofar as the population suffers more in a psychological sense than from a lack of material well-being. The Cyprus problem and its ancillary effects including uncertainty were said to constitute a constant, thus a chronic problem, as opposed to a 'crisis' as defined in some of the conditions above.

## 2.4 Socio-Cultural Context

This subdimension examines the extent to which existing socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.4 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.2.4: Indicators assessing the socio-cultural context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.4.1</u>	Trust	<u>1</u>
<u>2.4.2</u>	Tolerance	<u>2</u>
<u>2.4.3</u>	Public spiritedness	<u>3</u>

*2.4.1 Trust.* The population survey revealed that only 2% of the population in northern Cyprus think that all people can be trusted.<sup>121</sup> A further 13% feel that most people can be trusted. However, a large majority believe that people are not, for the most part, trustworthy (85%). Mistrust is therefore widespread in the society of northern Cyprus. This phenomenon is difficult to explain, other than a proclivity among population to orient themselves toward family members rather than civic institutions.

PAG members were divided with some commenting that the figures seemed too low. Others felt that people did indeed not trust one another. The PAG members who felt that trust was

<sup>119</sup> 'TRNC Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation', Statistics and Research 'Department'. Results of the Household Income Distribution Survey 1998, p. 75. ISBN 975-19-2489-8

<sup>120</sup> 'TRNC Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation', Statistics and Research 'Department', [http://www.devplan.org/eng\\_ind.html](http://www.devplan.org/eng_ind.html)

<sup>121</sup> Question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in your dealings with other people?

limited among people in northern Cyprus cited a tendency of community members to gossip, and thus people were said to be on guard. This limited forthright discussion. As the population got richer, trust was in shorter supply, as many might feel compelled to conceal the source of wealth. On the other hand, a couple of PAG members felt that levels of trust were higher than that presented by the pessimists.

*2.4.2 Tolerance.* Residents of northern Cyprus are generally not likely to express xenophobia, as evidenced by the Civil Society Survey 2005. Especially with respect to religiosity, those polled tended to be fairly tolerant (i.e. only 2% reported that they would not like someone of another religion as neighbours). However, tolerance toward homosexuals is significantly lower (18% reporting that they would not like members of this group as neighbours). What is more, a large number of respondents (14%) indicated 'others' as a group of unwanted neighbours. It may be that 'others' is proxy for Greek Cypriots. Overall, the study shows that the society of northern Cyprus has a moderate level of tolerance, with the tolerance indicator calculated at 1.8.<sup>122</sup>

On this indicator, however, the PAG felt that the statistics did not do justice to a society that based on the judgment of those familiar with it is among the 'most tolerant'. One PAG member noted that international observers have considered the community of northern Cyprus as the 'most tolerant Muslims', citing sociological studies that corroborate this.<sup>123</sup> However, the definition of tolerance by the PAG was more related to a superficial level of tolerance. They also mentioned that although residents in northern Cyprus would not have difficulty with their neighbours of different social groups, they would not interact with them or include them in their lives in any way.

*2.4.3 Public spiritedness.* Most polled in the Civil Society Survey 2005 do not agree that it is right to violate laws, or do not admit to this. Only 2% feel that it is justifiable to pursue privileges, despite not having the legal right. A further 17% agree that it is fair under some circumstances. 74% declare that it is always wrong. Similarly, 85% say it is wrong to avoid paying traffic fines. Stronger yet, 94% say tax evasion is always wrong.

These statistics may imply a 'halo' effect, however, considering that in practice acts of 'public spiritedness' differ from what would be suggested by the attitudinal survey data presented for this indicator. The pursuit of personal interest through backdoor channels and patronage (known as *torpil*) is widespread, and although condemned is not overlooked as a means. Whereas people in northern Cyprus may feel compelled to pay traffic fines, avoiding detection of speeding, for instance, is abetted by other drivers who flash oncoming traffic to alert them to the presence of a concealed police officer. Finally, on tax evasion, as 'public' sector employees have taxes automatically deducted from pay checks it is generally not conceivable to avoid taxes. However, private sector employers often hire staff officially at 'minimum wage' levels so as to avoid paying more in social security contributions.

According to our findings, residents in northern Cyprus score a 2.9 for this index, showing a high level of public spiritedness.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Indicator 2.4.2 was scored by the PIT in consultation with CIVICUS. The PAG was not able to score this due to insufficient information at the time of the scoring meeting.

<sup>123</sup> Tenzel, James H., and Marvin Gerst. "The Psychology of Cross-Cultural Conflict: A Case Study. (The Psychocultural Aspects of a Conflict.)" (Paper prepared for the 125th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Dallas, May1, 1972.)

<sup>124</sup> Indicator 2.4.3 was scored by the PIT in consultation with CIVICUS. The PAG was not able to score this due to insufficient information at the time of the scoring meeting.

## 2.5 Legal Environment

This subdimension examines the extent to which existing legal environment is conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.5 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.2.5: Indicators assessing the legal environment**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	2
2.5.2	Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	2
2.5.3	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	2
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	1

*2.5.1 CSO registration.* CSO registration is inclusive of all citizens. According to the Article 33 of the constitution all citizens may establish an association.<sup>125</sup> Article 53 states that all eligible citizens have the right to form a trade union without prior notice or permission. Apart from the general ‘constitutional’ arrangements, there are also a number of relevant laws which regulate the registration processes, functioning, property ownership, organisational issues of the CSOs such as ‘Law on Trade Unions’, ‘Law on Unions and Associations’ and ‘Law on Foundations’.

There are three types of CSOs: associations, foundations, and non profit companies. Associations are, by law, not for profit and members are volunteers. Establishing an association is fairly easy and inexpensive. The same can be said of the establishment of a non profit company. Foundations are transfers of movable or immovable property from individuals to be used for societal, religious, social, and cultural services. The three foundation types (subsidiary, pious, and modern) are also fairly straightforward. Although setting up a foundation of any type (subsidiary, pious or modern) is also easy, in comparison to setting up an association or non-profit company, it is more costly and time-consuming. Registration is usually not problematic, although there have been some reported cases where applications were arbitrarily delayed or there was unwarranted interference with the naming of CSOs. Recently, since the change in ‘government’, treatment has been fairer.

These findings are supported by the Regional Stakeholder survey. CSO registration is regarded as relatively quick (62% of respondents state «Yes»), easy (74%), legally uncumbersome (95%), and procedures are seen as consistently applied (72%). However, respondents considered it relatively costly to establish CSOs (68%). Subsequent data analysis produced a CSO registration index of 4.1 (on a scale of 5, where 5 means the CSO registration is unproblematic and easy).

*2.5.2 Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government.* Based on expert interviews and review of current laws, although CSOs are legally prohibited from engaging in politics, the right to criticize ‘government’ and freedom of expression is safeguarded by relevant laws. Significantly, no CSO has been shut down so far by the authorities.<sup>126</sup> There have been cases

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<sup>125</sup> The article maintains that “every citizen has the right to form associations without prior permission. The manner and method of exercising this right shall be laid down by law.” However, “the law may impose restrictions in the interests of national security, public order and public morals.” Moreover, “associations may, where provided by law, be closed down by an order of a judge; and in cases where a delay is considered objectionable from the point of view of safeguarding national security, public order or public morals, an association's functions may be suspended until a decision is given by a judge, by an order of the authority expressly empowered by law.”

<sup>126</sup> Emine Erk, interview 8 July 2005. However, one may point to the shutting down of the Hava Kurumu (a semi-official organization). This issue was actually discussed during the national workshop on one panel where participants agreed that it did not classify as a CSO.

where the authorities have prevented a trade union from going on strike, ostensibly in the name of the public good, but can be seen as a rather mild form of intervention. Furthermore, there were reported attempts by the authorities to restrict the international contacts of particular CSOs in the past, especially those that favoured collaboration and reconciliation with Greek Cypriots, although under the current 'government' this is no longer the case.

According to the Regional Stakeholder Survey, 39% of stakeholders consider that there were no restrictions on CSOs with respect to criticizing 'government'. A further 42% considered there to be only reasonable restrictions. By contrast, a minority of 17% felt that restrictions were unreasonable.

PAG members agreed that the trend was toward greater freedom to criticize 'government' and its policies. The recent change in 'government' was a harbinger for greater freedoms in this regard. Some of the PAG members were themselves opponents of the previous 'government', and have ties to the current 'government'. However, there were dissenters among the PAG membership that felt that as long as northern Cyprus remained dependent on Turkey, for instance, freedoms would always be curtailed.

*2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs.* Tax advantages relate to all CSOs if their main activity is non-profit-making, but does not relate to subsidiary profit-making activities. The 'government' has the right to declare a CSO as a charitable organisation and this CSO then becomes tax exempt from income tax and also from value added tax (VAT). Associations cannot carry out profit-making activities. Foundations can be engaged in profit making activities and, in contrast to the general assumption in the society, they also pay tax accordingly. Donations, endowments, grants, membership fees and contributions from public funds are not subject to income tax. This applies to both foundations and associations.

*2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy.* Foundations have to disburse grants over a certain percentage of their annual income. They are obliged to spend their income for their defined goals and for the improvement of the fixed properties they may have. There is no regulation related to tax exemption for an individual in case s/he makes a donation or a contribution for community development.

If an individual makes a donation with a charitable motivation for community building, there is no mention in the legal system to clarify whether he/she will get a tax benefit or not. In this case, it should be assumed that an individual does not get any tax benefit since there is no legal measure for that.

However, the private sector is encouraged to make donations and contribute to civil society by some regulations in the 'Law on Taxation'. A private company receives tax deductions, the amount of which depends on the company's annual gross income, if it donates up to 5% of its annual gross income. Recently within this year this has increased to 10% to further encourage philanthropic giving. On the other hand, the newly passed 'Law on Sponsorship' allows private companies to financially support social, cultural, environmental, arts, sports events with up to 60% of their annual gross income and receive tax reductions for these sponsorships. Since these two changes took place only in this year, there is not yet any example to measure whether that will further encourage corporate giving or not. Generally, though, as few corporations actually declare profits, tax incentives are irrelevant as incentives in practice.

Based on the practice, the PAG was of the view that the score should be lower rather than the evidence suggests. PAG members agreed that tax incentives were irrelevant in a context where private sector tax evasion remained high.

## 2.6 State-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension examines the extent to which existing 'state'-civil society relations are conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.6 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.2.6: Indicators assessing the State –civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.6.1</u>	Autonomy of CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.2</u>	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.3</u>	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	<u>1</u>

*2.6.1 Autonomy of CSOs.* According to the Regional Stakeholder Survey there is little consensus on the degree of 'state' interference in civil society affairs. Many respondents claim that the 'state' sometimes interferes in civil society activities (49%), while, on the other hand, another 49% consider interference to be rare or non-existent.

In response to open-ended questions, many respondents pointed to restrictions on the right to strike, and other forms of interference to the right to peaceful demonstration. Several mentioned the heavy handed tactics of the 'police' in breaking up a protest held by a union representing airport personnel and flight attendants (Hava-Sen). Whereas examples of interference attributed to the previous 'government' featured, there were also cases of the current CTP-led 'government' and 'municipalities' interfering. Prior to the current 'government' authorities also kept a wary eye on the activities of various bi-communal CSOs, and the 'foreign ministry' kept tabs on CSOs receiving international funding.

According to experts, some CSOs are subservient to the current 'government', and, indeed, that some of the leaders of CSOs serve to prevent civil society from becoming influential. In other words, some CSOs may reflect the hidden agenda of political parties to control civil society vicariously. For example, there are times when a union leader may hold a 'public' office, and continue to maintain his/her leadership position in the union. It can be argued that part of the reason the 'street' has been quiet since the Annan Plan vote has been the lack of leadership from some CSOs that appear to be 'co-opted' by the ruling coalition. This is not universally true, however.

Most controversial of all, however, has been the elections for the general assembly and executive of the Chamber of Commerce during the Chamber's Annual General Meeting. The presiding President prior to recent elections, Ali Erel, himself a very prominent character in the lead up to the Annan Plan referendum, has alleged that the 'government', and CTP in particular, orchestrated opposition to his executive board in order to render the Chamber of Commerce subservient to 'government' policy. The controversy revolves around a lack of congruity between the 'government' and the Chamber on the policy of whether or not to de-link the EU proposed regulation for northern Cyprus on trade and aid. Of course, the Chamber of Commerce is a unique CSO in the northern Cyprus context, in that unlike the 'government' it enjoys an international status, and trade across the Green Line is regulated by the Chamber, and not the 'government'.

The rather low number of articles (17) classified under this indicator in the media review suggests that CSOs operate freely. The most criticised and publicized 'government' interference to a civil society activity has been the use of excessive force against Ercan airport personnel by 'TRNC' military forces.

*2.6.2 Dialogue between CSOs and the state.* Stakeholders were divided in their assessment about the extent of dialogue between the 'state' and civil society. It was seen as either

moderate (48%), limited (28%) or extensive (20%). Fifty-nine percent claim that the 'state' sometimes takes into consideration the views of civil society. A further 7% maintain that the 'state' frequently does so. By contrast, 28% believe that the 'state' rarely considers the opinions of civil society, and 7% claim that civil society input is never considered.

The Civil Society Impact Study on Secondary Education suggests that even where there are formal means and channels of consultation, such as the 'Council of Education' (Eğitim Şurası), policy makers often disregard such advisory bodies. Although the 'National Education Law' provides a general framework for educational activities, the strategic decisions relating to the secondary education in general are under the responsibility of the 'Ministry of Education and Culture'. That is, whereas by law one might anticipate greater degrees of collaboration, in fact the Ministry acts autonomously. There are both formal (the 'Council of Education') and informal channels by which civil society has opportunity to have a say to influence public policies relating to the educational issues. The extent to which the advice of the 'Council of Education' is implemented is questionable, since many of the key demands of the education syndicates that emerge from the *Şura* are effectively disregarded in actual formulation of policies.

The media review suggests that there are a wide range of civil society interlocutors with the 'state'. Specifically, a number of news items featured discussions with various syndicates, including KTOEOS and KTOS, both teachers syndicates, as well as civil servant syndicates and workers syndicates. Disabled persons associations also featured, together with women's associations, as well as advocacy groups (e.g. Association for the Prevention of Traffic Accidents) all engaging in talks with 'government'. During the period covered, bargaining took place between the trade unions, mentioned above, and a cost of living adjustment was agreed to.

*2.6.3 Support for CSOs on the part of the state.* There is a wide range of CSOs which received 'government' support. According to the Regional Stakeholder survey, during the last financial year 88% of surveyed CSOs reported that they received more than 10% of their funding from 'government'. According to the CSI definition, 10% or more funding from 'government' is considered substantive funding.

CSOs that received funding tended to be those involved in education and health services. The Education Foundation, Association to Help Those With Cancer, the Protect Those With Thalassaemia Association, the Blind Persons Association, and others that dealt with disabled persons were recipients.

## 2.7 Private Sector-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector. Table III.2.7 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.2.7: Indicators assessing the private sector–civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.7.1</u>	Private sector attitude to Civil Society	<u>1</u>
<u>2.7.2</u>	Corporate social responsibility	<u>1</u>
<u>2.7.3</u>	Corporate philanthropy	<u>1</u>

*2.7.1 Private sector attitude to civil society.* According to the Regional Stakeholder Consultations private sector attitudes towards civil society are mainly suspicious (47%). An equal minority of one-fifth of respondents considered the attitudes to be either favourable or indifferent. The major insight from the consultations is the general belief or perception that the private sector does not consider the civil society as a partner or as a player. The private sector rather sees the civil society as a group of actors which usually opposes corporate interests. According to the same survey results, business associations' participation in broader

civil society initiatives are rather significant. Fifty percent maintain that such associations sometimes participate, with a further 26% of the view that participation is frequent. 24% believe that participation is rare.

The media review reveals some news items covering private sector attitudes that are more positive than not. One notable example is the cooperation between Turkcell (a cellular/mobile phone service company) and the *Karpaz Dostlari Dernegi* (Friends of Karpas Association) where Turkcell assisted the association to clean the turtle nesting grounds at the Alagadi beach. Not all cases may be as straightforward. We note Mustafa Haci Ali Ltd. and Kazim Ahmet Rasit Ltd. supporting *Kuzey Kibris Turing Otomobil Kurumu* (rally organizers), although it is debatable whether such 'sponsorships' really count toward support for CSOs or whether they are simply done to promote the profile of the company among consumers of their products.

*2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility.* Corporate Social Responsibility in the context of northern Cyprus may seem to be an insignificant issue, since the 'public' sector is relatively large in the overall economy, and there are very few large corporations or industry. However, in recent years local corporations have been developing with unprecedented levels of economic growth.

The Corporate Responsibility Study Report (CSR) dealt with the companies concern for the community rather than the environment. With respect to responsibility to the community, only 4 out of 10 corporations were found to have carried out any act of responsibility. It is mainly the service CSOs such as cancer association, disabled association, blind people's association, a number of foundations, parents' associations and sports clubs which receive the highest figures of donations.

According to the Regional Stakeholder Consultations corporate social responsibility is not very high. In fact, 36% maintain that the work of companies in taking account the social and environmental consequences of their activities are insignificant. A further 34% rated social responsibility as limited. Only 30% felt that corporate social responsibility was moderately developed among businesses

The PAG noted that on environmental issues corporate responsibility was notably low, but that corporations did play a role in supporting the arts, as well as book publications.

*2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy.* Corporate philanthropy is fairly low. According to the Regional Stakeholder Consultations, only 38% of surveyed CSOs report receiving 10% or more of financial resources from the corporate sector. According to the CSR report, most recipients of corporation donations were service CSOs, such as cancer associations. Foundations, parent's associations, and sports clubs were also recipients. The media review confirms that corporate philanthropy is fairly insignificant. In fact, there was only a couple such news items recorded during the entire three months monitored.

## Conclusion

The conclusions we draw for the environment for civil society in northern Cyprus are rather paradoxical. On one hand, the external conditions for civil society are not as detrimental as is often assumed, given the predominance of Turkey and the presence of Turkish troops. On the other hand, there are limitations to civil society's autonomy, with evidence of 'state' interference in the activities, policies, and governance of CSOs, which is continuing to this day, despite the change of 'government'. We find that various CSO leaders have morphed into politicians, and we also see politicians trying to affect CSOs. Generally, relations with the 'state' and private sector are weak, thus not very enabling. We may draw that conclusion

that whereas the public and private sectors recognize CSOs as interlocutors, relations remain strained.

The socio-economic context is also surprisingly more conducive than conventional wisdom might suggest. Whereas it is often assumed that Turkish Cypriots are impoverished (by contrast to their Greek Cypriot counterparts) the findings here suggest that the problems CSOs face are more psychological than material. That is, the socio-cultural context proves to be more debilitating than the socio-economic context. A general lack of trust among members of the community is a major disabling factor for the development of civil society.


Whereas the legal environment is somewhat conducive, nevertheless the lack of 'legislation' that would enable umbrella associations is a liability.

Overall then, the external environment for civil society in northern Cyprus is less problematic than is often assumed. Despite the continuing 'isolation' of northern Cyprus from the international community, as well as despite its dependency on Ankara, civil society exists in a context of democratic 'governance' and respect for civil liberties. However, there are also documented cases where civil liberties have been curtailed, and there are some questions about CSO autonomy.

## 2.3 Values

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practiced by civil society in northern Cyprus. The score for the Values Dimension is 1.6, reflecting a moderately positive value basis of civil society in northern Cyprus. Figure III.3.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Values dimension.

**FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension**



### 3.1. Democracy

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote democracy. Table III.3.1 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	<u>2</u>
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	<u>1</u>

*3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs.* According to the Regional Stakeholder Survey in the vast majority of CSO leaders are elected by the membership (94%). Rarely are leaders selected through appointment (6%). Similarly, the SOAR report states that 89% of CSOs are governed by executive committees. Forty-eight percent of respondents to the regional stakeholder survey also consider the members of organizations as having substantial influence over the organizational decision-making. A further 22% considered the influence of members to be moderate. Seventeen percent and 12% felt that members' influence was limited or little to none, respectively. This suggests that CSO leaders are democratically elected, and that membership considers itself as somewhat influential in the organizational decision-making processes.

However, the Civil Society Impact Studies revealed that many CSOs have leaders who actually inhibit activism. CTP, which is the major party in the current Turkish Cypriot 'government', was the most influential organization in the 'This Country is Ours Platform' (BMBP) campaign. The party used to expand its influence through its party members or associates who were the active members of the civil society organizations. This enabled CTP to convince civil society actors to follow its own political priorities. Most importantly, on the eve of December 2003 elections the leading figures from Teachers' and Public Servants' Trade Unions, from commerce and industrial sectors and from the media were recruited as candidates into the CTP electoral lists. Some of them were elected either in the December 2003 or in the February 2004 'elections'. And many of those who failed to be elected to

'parliament' were appointed to the highest bureaucratic positions. This enabled CTP to develop a degree of leverage over civil society activities. CTP, in a public statement by its former party leader and the elected president declared that there should be a silent period or an interval in the activities of the civil society because almost all targets of the BMBP were achieved and more activism would be harmful to the community. Notably, current 'prime minister', Ferdi Sabit Soyer, has suggested that the 'street' will come alive again, in response to policies pursued by the Greek Cypriot leadership internationally. This implies that should events take place that such civil society 'initiatives' would be influenced, if not directed, by the ruling coalition. Overall this suggests that CSOs are not necessarily autonomous, and that despite having elected leaderships, CSOs work in tandem, if not at the behest, of political leadership.

*3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy.* On the matter of the promotion of the democracy through civil society public campaigns, actions or programmes, the regional stakeholder consultations reveal that most respondents believe such activities to be few (44%) or none whatsoever (30%). Twenty-three percent could point to several examples, while 2% claimed they could show many examples of such activities. Respondents considered the general role civil society plays in the promotion of democracy within society more favourably, with 30% actually rating its role as significant. A further 28% considered the role moderate, while 33% and 9% felt that the role was limited or insignificant, respectively.

Many respondents to the regional stakeholder consultations felt that the activities of the "This Country is Ours" platform and the "Common Vision" served to promote democracy, both especially active during the Annan debate. PAG members also mentioned the role of trade unions. Trade Unions have played a prominent role in articulating the view that Turkish Cypriots desire to resolve the Cyprus problem, as well as require a substantive form of self-determination which the current regime does not provide. Syndicates were among the organizers of the "peace bonfires" that spread across northern Cyprus during the Annan Plan debate, and in the case of the 'Doganci' incident some CSO leaders were arrested for their efforts to stage a symbolic referendum on the Annan Plan. Meanwhile, many of these same syndicates joined forces under the umbrella organization This Country is Ours Platform that shared this view on the status of democracy in northern Cyprus. More recently, some CSOs have protested the presidency for allowing Turkish citizens entering the 'TRNC' with only ID cards.

However, according to the Civil Society Impact Studies CSO activities that pushed for a settlement based on the failed Annan Plan is the exception to the rule. That is, generally speaking, CSOs are not actively committed to democracy as an agenda item.

The media review also finds that civil society did not actively engage in promoting democracy. The examples of the CSO activities involved mere criticism of the current state of affairs expressed in newspaper articles or columns. Generally, CSOs do not play a sustained role in promoting democratization, with the noteworthy exception of the debate over the Annan Plan.

### **3.2. Transparency**

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote transparency. Table III.3.2 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within civil society	<u>2</u>
3.2.2	Financial transparency of the CSOs	<u>2</u>
3.2.3	Civil Society actions to promote transparency	<u>1</u>

3.2.1. *Corruption within civil society.* The regional stakeholder survey suggests that instances of corruption within the civil society are very rare (64%). Thirty-three percent felt there were occasional instances. Only 3% maintained they were very frequent instances.

However, those participants of the regional stakeholder consultations who argued that there are instances of corruption within civil society, be they occasional, or frequent, were not able to give specific examples since they did not refer to any case of corruption which was taken to litigation. Their view on this issue reflects solely their perception and is likely to be based on some rumours only. The media review did not reveal any cases of corruption.

3.2.2. *Financial transparency of the CSOs.* According to the regional stakeholder consultations, 92% of CSOs have written financial accounts (i.e. balance sheets, profit and loss) and these are presented to their annual general assembly meeting for approval by the members. Similarly, the SOAR report showed 92% of CSOs have annual accounts. Seventy-one percent of the annual accounts are externally audited, and 58% of CSOs prepare and annual budget.

PAG members were divided in their assessment of this indicator. Those advocating a lower score claimed that as financial accounts are mandated by law the existence of such accounts is not the issue, as they are a mere formality. Transparency is limited in practice and the financial accounts are not detailed. Thus, PAG members considered the presentation of financial accounts to constitute a mere legal formality, and in practice there was little accountability.

3.2.3. *Civil Society actions to promote transparency.* As for the promotion of ‘government’ transparency, 65% of stakeholders believed that civil society’s role was either limited or insignificant. One example which a respondent shared in the RSC survey, was the ‘civil initiative’ to stamp out entry into the country with IDs (without ‘visa’), as well as efforts to deal with forged documents. The ID issue is related to the phenomenon of illegal workers from Turkey exploiting laws that allowed for Turkish citizens to travel to northern Cyprus without a visa. Many times such persons would remain on the island indefinitely, without work permits, affecting the labour market, as well as contributing to crime and other social problems.

When it comes to corporate transparency, 78% of the respondents in the regional stakeholder survey felt that civil society’s role in promoting corporate transparency was insignificant. Not surprisingly, only one person mentioned an example in the same survey.

The media review provided no evidence of any CSO that has a specific mandate to promote transparency which takes special actions for this end. There was neither a coalition nor a public campaign dedicated to the issue.

### **3.3 Tolerance**

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote tolerance.

**TABLE III.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	<u>2</u>
3.3.2	Civil society activities to promote tolerance	<u>1</u>

*3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena.* Respondents to the regional stakeholder survey felt that the significance of racist, discriminatory or intolerant forces within civil society was limited (48%). Twelve percent claimed that such forces were insignificant. However, 31% and 10% believed that such forces were moderate to significant, respectively. Many respondents considered the National People's Movement (UHH) and related organizations to exhibit xenophobia and intolerance. The UHH is a relatively new organization used rhetoric and imagery reminiscent of the TMT. TMT was a paramilitary organization that served as a rival to EOKA, the Greek Cypriot militia of the 1950s. Other groups mentioned were the Grey Wolves movement, Cyprus Turkish Association of Fighters. All these groups are known for their nationalist orientations. The Grey Wolves, for instance, are pan-Turkic. Most respondents felt that such forces, including the UHH, were marginal (45%) to completely isolated (26%) forces in relation to civil society at large.

Respondents, however, also pointed to discrimination on the part of 'indigenous' Turkish Cypriots towards mainland Turks (i.e. settlers). Such discrimination is usually discrete, whereby Turkish Cypriots, for the most part, do not socialize with the 'settlers', especially those of lower income. Also, an interesting finding is the lack of cases uncovered by the media review on intolerance.

Overall we may conclude that civil society generally exhibit tolerance of diversity, with notable exceptions. Overt xenophobia is a hallmark of some of these particular organizations.

*3.3.2 Civil society activities to promote tolerance.* Survey respondents were split in their assessment of the role of civil society in promoting tolerance, with 46% saying they considered it to be limited and 45% saying the role was moderate to significant.

Some respondents mentioned the Mediation Association and other organizations as helping promote tolerance. In Cyprus the notion of resolving disputes through mediation is a recent and novel idea. On either side of the Green Line new 'legislation' is in various stages of development to allow for mediation as an alternative to litigation. Generally the Turkish Cypriot CSOs were thought to have helped promote tolerance vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriot community. One example was the condemnation of the bombing of the Saint Mamas church in 2004.

According to the Civil Society Impact Study on Secondary Education CSOs, the teachers' unions have played an active role in trying to promote new curricula that takes universal human rights as its moral centre. Although this has not yet translated into policy, the new 'government' did take a step towards it by producing a revised history textbook ostensibly more empathetic than its predecessor.

Only one news item in the media review was concerned with tolerance and reconciliation within the society. In Kibris newspaper Ali Yaman, from the Mediation Association, wrote about the importance of tolerance and conciliation within the society.

Whereas there is some evidence of efforts to promote tolerance, they are far and few in between. Further, it is yet to be shown that these efforts are sustained. The condemnation of the St. Mamas church can be seen as 'one off', relatively easy act, as opposed to a sustained effort to engage in discourse regarding discrimination and intolerance.

### 3.4. Non-violence

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote non-violence. Table III.3.4 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the civil society arena	3
3.4.2	Civil society actions to promote non-violence	2

*3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena.* The Regional Stakeholder survey reveals that most respondents consider the use of violence by CSOs to be exceptionally rare (68%). A further 24% believe that it is a case of isolated groups occasionally resorting to violence, as opposed to significant mass based groups. Here, UHH and other right-wing organizations were again mentioned as CSOs that promote violence. Other examples included violence associated with the banking crisis of 2000-1. At one point angry depositors actually stormed and occupied 'parliament' outraged over their lost savings. This was exceptional in the history of Turkish Cypriot society.

Respondents to the survey also said that acts of violence are frequently (56%) or usually (36%) denounced by other civil society actors. The media review found few cases of CSOs declaring intent to use violence as a means. One group associated with the TMT Association stated that they violence could be used if necessary. In the context of the Annan Plan, this implied that resistance might continue despite a democratically endorsed resolution to the Cyprus problem if the terms were not acceptable to the organization.

Overall, non-violence characterizes the behaviour and values of mainstream civil society and most CSOs. Only a handful of groups espouse different values.

*3.4.2 Civil society actions to promote non-violence.* Despite the relatively low degree of violent activity, the regional stakeholder survey suggests that the role of civil society actors in promoting non-violence is moderate (44%) with a significant minority actually rating the role significant (20%). Examples mentioned in the consultations overlap greatly with those provided for indicator 3.3.2 above.

The Annan Plan period represents the halcyon days for CSOs as promoters of non-violent mass demonstrations. Through preaching tolerance, the teachers unions have also played an important role. As a result, a significant number of youngsters were mobilized to participate in these non-violent demonstrations in favour of the Annan Plan since the teachers also went on strike during these demonstrations.

Examples of civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace included strong criticisms by a number of CSOs such as 'This Country is Ours Platform', Human Rights Association and Doctors Association against increasing criminal events and spiralling violence. Similarly, Basin-Sen criticized the bombing of the Near East University. With regard to CSO activities to promote peace on the island, the Cyprus Policy Center organized a bi-communal seminar. The analysis of the news items demonstrates that actions to promote non-violence and peace were largely limited to strong criticisms of the increasing amount of criminal activities and violence in the island, aside from the organizing of bi-communal seminars.

### 3.5. Gender Equity

This sub-dimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote gender equity. Table III.3.5 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equity**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the civil society arena	<u>2</u>
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	<u>1</u>
3.5.3	Civil society actions to promote gender equity	<u>1</u>

*3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena.* According to the regional stakeholder survey gender discrimination in the form of sexism is not especially problematic. Sixty-six percent rated such social forces as insignificant. However, this statistic contradicts the actual experience of the Project Index Team (PIT) when trying to recruit women to participate in the regional stakeholder consultations. Moreover, it proved even more difficult to recruit women holding leadership positions.

During the regional stakeholder consultations, most participants (men and women alike) expressed the view that there was gender equity. As the PIT pushed the group to discuss specific examples, it became clear to many that there actually was not gender equity. This discussion revealed the need for more awareness on this issue.

A majority of respondents believe that civil society's response to sexist practices among civil society actors is always (36%) or usually (24%) denounced. Most RSC participants were of the view that such practices are publicly condemned and to some extent, this, in and of itself, limits further potential types of gender discrimination.

*3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs.* The regional stakeholder survey reveals that only 24% of respondents report that their CSOs have written policies in place regarding equal opportunity and/or equal pay for equal work for women. Those CSO representatives without a written policy argued that this is not an issue for them since they claim that they follow the basic principles of equality.

*3.5.3 Civil society actions to promote gender equity.* Overall, according to the survey, despite the lack of public campaigns, respondents rated the role of civil society in promoting gender equity as moderate (28%) to significant (42%).

Women's Day activities sponsored by CSOs such as the Association of Women to Support Living (KAYAD), an NGO committed to human rights in general and women's issues particularly, were mentioned by stakeholders as well as in the media. Furthermore, the inclusion of significant numbers of female candidates in the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH) electoral list for the December 2003 campaign was also highlighted. Also cited was the Hands Across the Divide's proposal regarding the Annan Plan. Hands Across the Divide is a bi-communal women's association. However, the media review suggests that there is no concerted campaign to promote equity.

Generally, gender equity is not an overt issue in northern Cyprus. Whereas there may be awareness of inequity in the number of 'parliamentarians' and other posts, inequity is not treated as an issue of great urgency.

### **3.6. Poverty Eradication**

This subdimension examines to what extent civil society practices and promotes poverty eradication. Table III.3.6 presents the indicator score.

**TABLE III.3.6: Indicator assessing poverty eradication**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	Civil society actions to eradicate poverty	<u>1</u>

*3.6.1 Civil society actions to eradicate poverty.* Respondents from the regional stakeholder survey felt that civil society did not play a significant role in the eradication of poverty. A majority (61%) rated the role as insignificant (39%) or limited (22%). This is because respondents felt that poverty is not considered to be an issue in northern Cyprus. This is not to deny that there are various people who live at subsistence level, but most of these are illegal settlers that may not be regarded as part of the fabric of society per se, thus are neglected in the public discourse.

Trade unions have secured tax immunity for people who have minimum wage level incomes. However, possibly due to the fact that the level of private sector unionization is dismal, there has not been a concerted effort or campaign promoted by CSOs to eradicate poverty. The media review did not capture any activity related to the agenda of eradicating poverty.

However, PAG members did note efforts to help inner city children (*Arabahmet* neighbourhood), in collaboration with the Nicosia municipality, and limited but targeted scholarships granted through the Education Foundation were also mentioned. There have also been efforts on the part of the Nicosia Capital City Lions Club in holding *kermes* (fairs) where proceeds go to the needy. Ultimately, as northern Cyprus does not generate a statistic for poverty levels, targeting poor people is mostly done on an ad hoc basis.

### **3.7. Environmental sustainability**

This subdimension examines to what extent does the civil society practice and promote environmental sustainability. Table III.3.7 presents the indicator score.

**TABLE III.3.7: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.7.1</u>	Civil society actions to sustain the environment	<u>2</u>

*3.7.1 Civil society actions to sustain the environment.* A majority (53%) of those polled in the regional stakeholder survey believe that civil society played a moderate or significant role in the protection of the environment. Many respondents referred to efforts to clean beaches, especially as it related to sea turtle hatcheries, including the Friends of Karpas Association. Mining, construction, and tree planting campaigns were also mentioned. The media review revealed that Environmental Day activities sponsored by KAYAD, as well as other environment related CSO activities did feature in the press. However, no campaigns, as such can be gleaned. Most activities were informative seminars as opposed to protests.

## **Conclusion**

The analysis of the values of civil society suggests that whereas CSO practice in various areas is fairly good, there is less in the way of promotion of values in society at large. We note that whereas much of civil society and related CSOs espouse non-violence and tolerance, actions to promote these values are far and few in between. CSOs are generally democratic, but not very effective at promoting democracy or transparency. Similarly CSOs tend to be tolerant, but are less effective in its promotion. Civil society seems to be especially committed to non-violence. However, efforts to practice and promote gender equity, as well as campaigns to eradicate poverty sustainability are less evident.

This may be partly due to a lack of demand to engage with society on certain issues and norms, even among CSOs. While poverty may be a social problem it is not always portrayed as being a pressing one. Democratization is a general theme, but one that came to be synonymous with promotion of the Annan Plan. Whereas transparency is a big problem, at present there is no CSO dedicated to this cause overtly. Tolerance, or rather the lack of, is also


not perceived to be a significant problem. It may be that as CSOs are not very representative of marginalized groups, as was demonstrated in the 'structure' dimension, discrimination may not be well articulated by existing CSOs.

Overall, the values practised by civil society in northern Cyprus augur well for the future, insofar as CSOs sustain democratic practices and to the extent the values of non-violence and tolerance can be channelled to foster campaigns to promote empathy and inclusiveness. Especially considering the need to build trust within the community, and toward the Greek Cypriot community, as well, these values appear to be civil society's greatest asset. However, these internal values need to be utilized more strongly for promoting similar values, norms and behaviours in society at large.

## 2.4 Impact

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions within society in northern Cyprus. The score for the Impact Dimension is 1.2, reflecting a relatively low level of impact for society in the northern part of Cyprus. Figure III.4.1 presents the scores for the five subdimensions within the Impact dimension.

**FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension**



### 4.1 Influencing Public Policy

This subdimension examines the extent to which the civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy. Table III.4.1 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.4.1: Indicators assessing the influence on public policy**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Human rights impact	2
4.1.2	Social policy impact	2
4.1.3	Impact on national budgeting process	1
4.1.4	Impact on the Cyprus problem	2

*4.1.1 Human rights impact.* The indicators above were investigated through a number of means. Various questions in the regional stakeholder survey touched on the issue of civil society's policy impact. The media review also provided frequencies for the coverage of civil society's activities on particular types of policy issues. Finally, specific case studies were conducted. These are the human rights impact case study, the social policy impact case study, the case study of civil society's impact on the budgetary process, and an analysis of the impact of civil society in solving the Cyprus problem.

Until the shift in 'government' that saw the left-wing Republican Turkish Party (CTP) come to power in the general elections, the rightist National Unity Party (UBP), which dominated Turkish Cypriot politics for more than thirty years, used to be loyal to the 'governments' of mainland Turkey and their policies and approaches relating to the Cyprus dispute. During the

period between 1974 and 2003 those who aired ideas that deviated from officialdom were declared to be 'traitors'. There is a widespread belief aired by knowledgeable people that the existence of a 'limited democracy' disabled the civil society towards being influential in affecting public policies. According to this view almost all 'public policies', including immigration (from Turkey), education, property ownership (related to property left by Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus) and health policy have been imposed by 'external forces' (i.e. Turkey). This perspective also included the idea that not only the civil society but also the community leadership or the 'elected officials' have not been able to determine policies relating to educational issues. The political realities deriving from the Cyprus problem have functioned in such a way to restrict the role of civil society and the elected officials.

CSOs have played a significant role in raising awareness of various causes, including human rights violations. Here the cases of the role of CSOs in affecting political change, and in defending freedom of speech are examined. In both cases we note the prominence of the umbrella organization 'This Country is Ours', comprised of many civil society organizations, including the strongest trade unions (Cyprus Turkish Primary School Teachers' Union-KTOS, Cyprus Turkish Secondary School Teachers' Union-KTOEOS and Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants' Trade Union-KTAMS). Starting from the late 1950s, the Turkish Cypriot community leadership was rather restrictive on human rights, including the freedom of journalists and writers to express their ideas challenging the official perspectives. The assassination of two journalists who were critical of the ultra-nationalist orientation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership is an indication of the prevailing public policy on this issue in the 1960s. After 1974 there have been some attempts towards liberalizing the stance of the political authority towards this issue. The constitution, for example, guaranteed the freedom of thought and the freedom of the media. Despite such institutional arrangements, however, there have been some taboos that created restrictions for journalists. The political regime in the northern part of Cyprus continued to demand obedience from the journalists in respect to the Cyprus problem and Turkey's political and military role in Cyprus. During the 1980s and 1990s journalists and political leaders were investigated, accused and tried for political reasons. Moreover, the law on the Court Martial enabled the authorities to intimidate journalists and the media. Daily papers and their editors-columnists also became the target of violent actions by unknown perpetrators whose identity has never been revealed by the security forces. There have been widespread beliefs among civil society actors that the 'deep state' is responsible for such violent attacks against the opposition media. Although the Turkish Cypriot community does not have its own 'legislation' relating directly to the freedom of the media, except for general provisions in the constitution, there are specific laws, which have been in force since the colonial period and applied indirectly to the subject. According to this 'legislation', civilians, including journalists, could be court-martialled for activities violating national security. Recently, in September 2005, the 'legislature' amended the law on the Court Martial to rule out such cases.

Human rights in general and the freedom of the media in particular, were one of the public policy fields which led to intense discussions between civil society actors and public authorities in the Turkish Cypriot community. Starting in the late 1950s, the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community was rather restrictive on human rights, including the freedom of journalists and writers to express ideas that were challenging the perspectives of the leadership. The assassination of two journalists who were critical of the ultra-nationalist orientation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership was an indicator of the prevailing 'government' attitude and behaviour on this issue in the 1960s.

Since 1974 there have been some attempts to liberalize the attitudes of community political authority towards this issue. The constitution, for example, guaranteed the freedom of thought and the freedom of the media. Despite such institutional arrangements, however, there continued to be certain taboos restricting the work of journalists. For example, the political

regime in northern Cyprus continued to demand obedience from the journalists in respect to Cyprus problem and Turkey's political and military role in Cyprus.

During the 1980s and 1990s journalists and political leaders continued to be investigated, accused and tried for political reasons. Moreover, the law on the Court Martial enabled the authorities to intimidate journalists and the media. Daily papers and editors and columnists also became the target of violent actions by unknown perpetrators whose identity has never been revealed by the security forces. There have been widespread beliefs among civil society actors that the 'state' was covertly responsible for such violent attacks against the opposition media.

Before 'This Country is Ours' was set up the banking and finance sector encountered difficulties that resulted in a dramatic collapse of private banks in 2000. This dramatic result of economic crisis in the Turkish Cypriot community generated the idea in different segments of the community that economic dependency on Turkey was worsening the local economic situation. Turkey and Turkish officials began to be criticised publicly and this criticism dominated civil society actions and activities between 2000 and 2004. The popular slogan 'Peace and solution' to the Cyprus dispute which appeared as an alternative to the Turkey-dominated political-administrative structure in the Turkish Cypriot community became the symbol of civil society actions.

'This Country in Ours' was successful in organizing mass demonstrations against the rightist-nationalist 'government' which resisted international initiatives aiming at resolving the Cyprus dispute. As a result of such demonstrations the rightist-nationalist 'government' lost its popular support in 2003 and 2005 general elections and was replaced by a new 'government' led by left oriented Republican Turkish Party (CTP). The success of this party in elections was, in part, derived both from its successful strategy to include many leading figures from the civil society organizations into its electoral lists and its effective incorporation of civil society demands into its short-run policy priorities. Therefore, the rise of CTP, which managed to increase its electoral support to 45%, represents a radical impact of the whole civil society on community politics in general and on the Cyprus problem in particular.

Although the opposition parties and civil society organizations have been critical of restricted human rights and of 'limited democracy' in northern Cyprus, the individual initiatives demanding more democracy and human rights culminated in only nominal improvements. When a leading columnist from leftist daily Yeniduzen was assassinated in 1996 only a militant-leftist group organised a protest meeting and raised the issue of the freedom of the media. After 'This Country is Ours' was founded, the issue of human rights was given top priority on the agenda of civil society. This development, however, emerged randomly when the editor and journalists from the daily Avrupa were arrested by the police in July 2001 after they were indicted for espionage on behalf of Greek Cypriot authorities (i.e. the Republic of Cyprus) in southern Cyprus. The 'This Country is Ours' came to the support of the journalists. The mobilization of civil society towards demanding more democracy resulted in a symbolic amendment in the law which stamped out a legal procedure that the authorities to trial civilians in the Court Martial. Despite this development, however, the right of journalists in collecting and disseminating news, opinions and ideas could be restricted in the name of 'national interests'.

According to the Regional Stakeholder Survey, 54% of the respondents consider the level of activity on human rights issues to be on the lower side of the scale, the remaining 46% are inclined to rate the level of activity on the higher side. On the question of civil society's impact on human rights policy, the Regional Stakeholder Survey reveals that respondents believe the impact to be limited (82%).

The discussion above suggests a fairly robust and active civil society, especially since the aforementioned banking crisis and during the Annan Plan debate. Whereas impact is clearly evident with respect to the change in ‘government’, the change in policy regarding freedom of expression and the press remains ambiguous, thus showing rather limited impact.

*4.1.2 Social policy impact case study.* There have been debates and discussions on the content and nature of secondary education curriculum in the Turkish Cypriot community since 1970s. The official approach has insisted on maintaining a nationalistic perspective in the secondary school education encouraging and extolling ethnocentrism while civil society has been supportive of a more universalistic education according to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The importance of this issue increased radically especially in the peace process which required public authorities to reformulate their policy and approaches towards the philosophy of history textbooks. In September 2004 new history textbooks began to be used in all secondary education institutions. Despite the organizational strength of Cyprus Turkish Primary and Secondary School Teachers’ Trade Unions (KTOS and KTOEOS) civil society failed in influencing secondary education curriculum to change the content of history textbooks whose content was at odds with the principles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There had been an ideological confrontation between the then ‘government’ and the teachers’ trade unions about the content of curriculum. While the former had usually been supportive of a curriculum stressing the ‘historical enmity’ between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, the latter stressed the necessity of universal principles such as friendship, anti-chauvinism and mutual understanding as the basic values on which school curriculum should be based. The teachers’ trade unions and their leading members published strong anti-chauvinist polemics but could not exert any meaningful impact on the education policy till the December 2003 elections through which the CTP came to power. In September 2004 history textbooks were replaced by new ones which were ostensibly more empathetic than the predecessor. This development, however, has not satisfied the expectations of Teachers’ Trade Unions because they are arguing that the community authority still lacks real power to make its own decisions because of the political dependence on Turkey.

Overall then, impact over policy is relatively weak, despite strong organization and commitments on the part of CSOs. This points to related and potentially debilitating environmental factors, as were discussed under indicator 2.6.2. Despite a change in government, where control over the ‘Ministry of Education’ is now in the hands of CTP, civil society is not effective in reforming various aspects of school curricula.

*4.1.3 Civil society's impact on national budgeting process case study.* The annual budget is a major issue of discussion not only between the opposition and the ‘government’ parties but also between civil society and public authorities. Northern Cyprus was in an extremely poor economic situation, especially since the end of the 1990s. The collapse of the banking system, increasing unemployment and the decline of major economic sectors led to widespread dissatisfaction among the population. In this context, CSOs organized massive demonstrations and managed to activate many people to demand from the policy makers an effective protection of the people’s economic rights. In July 2000 a protest meeting led by the victims of the banking crisis resulted in a strike in the Turkish Cypriot parliament. In the same year trade unions went on strike and 41 civil society organizations organized demonstrations against the ‘government’ arguing that ‘decisions relating to economic and budgeting issues are taken by the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia’ and that ‘Turkish Cypriot community lacks necessary instruments to rule the country.’

The regional stakeholder survey reveals that civil society's impact on budgetary policy is seen as negligible (97% rate it as unsuccessful or only somewhat successful). The making and implementation of the community’s budget requires both ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ decisions. While the ‘legislative’ has power to accept, modify or reject the budget, the responsibility of implementing it belongs to the ‘executive’. The ‘executive’ draws up the

annual budget defining public revenues and expenditures and introduces a bill on the annual budget, which is submitted to the approval by the 'legislative'. The 'government' cannot stay in power after a rejection of annual budget by the 'legislature'. Discussions and debates on the annual budget are at the top of the agenda every year, which involves both 'legislative-executive' procedures and political actions and reactions of civil society. The annual budget is a major issue of discussion not only between the opposition and the 'government' parties but also between civil society and the public authorities.

The northern part of Cyprus was in an extremely poor economic situation in the end of 1990s. The collapse of the banking system, the increasing number of unemployment and the decline of major economic sectors created strong dissatisfaction among the population. CSOs organized massive demonstrations and managed to mobilise many people to ask the policy makers to protect the people's economic rights. In July 2000 a protest meeting led by the victims of the banking crisis resulted in a strike in the Turkish Cypriot parliament. In the same year trade unions went on strike and many CSOs organized demonstrations against the 'government' arguing that 'decisions relating to economic and budgeting issues are taken by the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia' and that 'Turkish Cypriot community lacks necessary instruments to rule the country.'

Respondents considered that there was very little activity with respect to the budgetary process. Eighty-six percent considered civil society either inactive or only somewhat active on this issue.

According to the Civil Society Impact Study on the Budgetary Process the basic problem CSOs face is the structure of the overall economy and budget. Especially as certain parts of the budget, such as decisions on investments, are largely the domain of 'state officials' from Turkey, CSOs are limited to pushing for salaries and social transfers. Such collective bargaining usually enhances the salaries for public sector employees, but does little for private sector labour. Further, the CSOs are not successful in getting the authorities to divert greater resources to education or health in the overall budget.

The civil society participates in the overall budgeting process but its effects are usually confined to salaries and wages. The trade unions created important impacts on expanding economic interests and rights of public servants. Workers' trade unions, however, are not influential in the 'Minimum Wage Commission'. Therefore, the 'state' and private employers have the final say on the minimum wage policy.

The trade unions contested the decision by the 'Minimum Wage Commission' and tried to have it changed in 2001 by taking the case to the court but failed because of the length of legal proceedings. During the collective bargaining the teachers' and public servants' trade unions are able to strike for increase in salaries and economic rights. However they failed to exert any 'influence on 'issues other than economic interests of public servants and teachers. The basic reason of this failure, according to the impact study, is that major decisions about budget issues are taken by Turkish officials in Ankara who are not accessible to Turkish Cypriot civil society a regular influence.

The media review found little evidence of a direct role for CSOs aside from talks between the syndicates and 'government' to negotiate wages in collective bargaining on behalf of 'public sector' employees.

These findings suggest that due to the structure of negotiations civil society, a represented by trade unions, only discuss issues related to salaries and wages of public sector employees, and does not have a say in the overall distribution of resources in the budget. Hence, transfers for education and health care are not effectively lobbied for. Overall then, the impact of civil society on the budgeting process must be considered negligible.

*4.1.4 Civil society's impact on solving the Cyprus problem.* With respect to the impact that civil society has on the Cyprus problem and related policies, a clear majority (64%) of Regional Stakeholder Survey respondents thought that civil society has been successful or very successful. Civil society organisations were seen as especially active with respect to policy regarding the Cyprus problem (56% rated CSOs very active and a further 42% rated them active).

According to the Civil Society Impact Studies the one area where CSOs have been influential was in garnering support for the Annan Plan and putting pressure on politicians to follow suit. The Annan Plan proposed a comprehensive settlement of all outstanding issues so that Cyprus could join to European Union as a whole. It proposed a federal system of governance as well as a number of transitional features. The plan was submitted simultaneously to each of the two communities through a referendum. In the referenda held in April 2004 65% of Turkish Cypriot electorate expressed their support while the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriot community (more than 75% voted 'no').

The civil society in northern Cyprus exerted informal influences on the political authorities in the community. Starting just after the Annan Plan was published in November 2002, more than fifty organizations including a number of trade unions, political parties, youth and women organizations, chambers of commerce and artisans, clubs and cultural associations marched several times in the streets of capital city-Nicosia- in 2002 and 2003 to declare their unconditional support for the plan. In addition to the massive demonstrations during which thousands of people demanded immediate resignation of the right-wing 'government' and the nationalist community leader Rauf Raif Denktas, thousands of leaflets and brochures stressing the necessity to accept and implement the Annan Plan were distributed throughout the country. Journalists, academics and representatives of the civil society organizations appeared on TV and radio programs to support the plan and explained its possible benefits and contributions to the community. All these activities created pressures on the political authorities and resulted in the opening of crossing point along the Green Line separating the two communities. After sections of the Green Line were opened, thousands of people from both sides began to line up at the crossing points to visit the other side. The official-nationalist doctrine that the two communities could not live together was challenged by people who demanded easy access to the other side.

The discussion above suggests a fairly robust civil society with respect to the influence and impact of civil society in pushing for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. However, when scoring this indicator, the PAG members considered that since the Cyprus problem remained unsolved the 'impact' of civil society must be treated as limited.

## **4.2 Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable**

This subdimension examines the extent to which the civil society is active and successful in holding 'state' and private corporations accountable. Table III.4.3 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.4.2: Indicators assessing holding the State and private corporations accountable**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>4.2.1</u>	Holding the state accountable	<u>1</u>
<u>4.2.2</u>	Holding private corporations accountable	<u>0</u>

*4.2.1 Holding state accountable.* The Regional Stakeholder Survey results suggest that civil society is not especially active in holding the 'state' accountable. In fact, 78% of respondents believe that civil society is either inactive or somewhat inactive in this regard. As for the success of civil society in actually holding the 'state' accountable, the survey reveals that the

vast majority (84%) think that civil society is either unsuccessful or only somewhat successful.

Civil society activities to hold the 'state' accountable included the criticisms of various CSOs as well as 'This Country is Ours Platform' against increasing violence and criminal events and the lack of an effective 'government' response. The 'government' was called to stop entry to the island with ID (as opposed to passport). The outcome has been limitation of the residence duration and a criterion was developed for the entrance, thus limiting the number of illegal workers. The other major issue for which the 'government' was held responsible was the increase in the number of traffic accidents. Per capita deaths on roads in northern Cyprus are exceptionally high. Civil society actors, including CSOs established for the expressed purpose of advocating traffic safety, have had limited impact on policy and outcomes.

However, we do see some efforts on the part of CSOs to affect outcomes themselves, if not hold the 'state' accountable per se. Near East University, for instance, provided courses for self-appointed deputies to observe traffic and note traffic law violators. Despite receiving diplomas for their efforts, there seems to be little in the way of data gathering or dissemination. Ostensibly the dissemination would serve to 'shame' violators. Nor is there an effort to ask why civil society is assuming a responsibility on behalf of public traffic wardens.

On the legal front there have been some recent developments. The 'government' adopted new, stiffer penalties for traffic offenders, designed to deter motorists from breaking the law. Furthermore, the Traffic Accidents Prevention Association has signed a protocol with the International Road Safety Academy (IRSA), and the 'government' has been working with the CSOs to promote training programs for traffic educators at Eastern Mediterranean University.

Furthermore, the situation of the Near East University's students whose diplomas were not accredited by the 'Ministry of Education' occupied the agenda for a long period and the 'state' was called on to find a solution to their case. Suppression of the strike of the airport personnel with the interference of the military let the criticism of 'government' and regarded as a 'government' fiasco. The long-standing strike of the teachers unions' over the increase of salaries ended with the victory of the unions.

However, in cases where civil society interests diverge, there may be less success in holding 'state' authorities accountable. A recent case is where a bird flu originating in Asia that may have led to a global pandemic prompted the 'government' to suspend hunting season, however the 'government' soon relented to pressure from the influential Hunters Association despite the views of the Doctors Union and public concerns more generally.

The cases above suggest that whereas civil society spends time and effort lobbying for provision of 'government' services and policies, it does not serve effectively as a 'watchdog' regulating the actions of 'government'. Few reports from civil society are produced, although there are a few significant exceptions, including reports from the Chamber of Commerce on a variety of issues.

*4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable.* The regional stakeholder survey suggests that civil society is not especially active in holding private corporations accountable. In fact, 95% believe that civil society is either fully inactive or somewhat inactive in this regard. As for the success of civil society in actually holding private corporations accountable, the survey reveals that the vast majority (98%) think that civil society is either unsuccessful or only somewhat successful.

The major view on this issue both during the RSCs and among the PAG members was that civil society is inactive primarily because it lacks self-confidence and awareness to demand

accountability from private corporations. It was also stated that civil society mainly deals with the 'state' and falls short of maintaining strong relations with the private sector.

Both during the RSCs and the PAG, the most commonly repeated example to show the inactivity of the civil society in holding the private corporations accountable was the case of the bankrupt banks during the economic crisis of 2001. This is to say that since all the account holders were later compensated, there was no significant civil society activity to question why and how these banks went bankrupt. Did they all encounter bankruptcy due to the economic crisis or was it also an outcome of mismanagement and perhaps some sorts of corruption? Civil society never posed these questions, nor put forward an organised action to demand accountability from the banks.

### 4.3 Responding to Social Interests

This subdimension examines the extent to which the civil society is active and successful in meeting responding to social interests. Table III.4.3 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.4.3: Indicators assessing the response to social interests**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	<u>1</u>
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	<u>1</u>

*4.3.1 Responsiveness.* The media review shows civil society actors respond to priority social concerns especially issues on health and education. These are the crucial concerns of the population which were also reflected in CSO activities. Other social concerns are labour and crime. CSOs responsiveness to these issues is also discernable. The property issue did not occupy the CSOs agenda although it is a major concern for the population, given the anxiety associated with Greek Cypriot lawsuits being filed against Turkish Cypriots who occupy Greek Cypriot properties that remain in northern Cyprus.

The regional stakeholder survey produced a number of results designed to assess the degree to which civil society is responsive to priority social concerns. Whereas the media review revealed coverage of CSO activity in the areas mentioned above, those surveyed found that in some areas responsiveness was insufficient. On whether respondents to the regional stakeholder survey could think of any examples of civil society lobbying for 'state' provision of services a majority (53%) replied affirmatively.

There was no consensus among respondents on the type of service provision demanded and lobbied for, hence the responses were varied, with several overlapping on the general theme of 'infrastructure' provision, although specific examples, such as the establishment of an oncology centre did feature in line with the quantitative survey results.

Whatever the issue was, civil society was not very successful in lobbying for its provision (70% think rated the efforts unsuccessful or only somewhat successful).

Civil society campaigns in education are deemed to have been less than successful or sufficient. Fully 73% of those surveyed rated educational campaigns as either unsuccessful or only somewhat successful.

As for roadways and traffic related issues, civil society was also seen as falling short (an equivalent statistic of 74%).

Where respondents felt that civil society was most responsive to societal needs is in the provision of informative campaigns, especially on health issues. For instance, in the area of campaigns dealing with cancer civil society was seen as markedly more resourceful. A

majority (58%) considered civil society campaigns related to cancer to be either successful or even very successful.

Similarly, respondents considered favourably the activeness of civil society in undertaking public information or 'public' education activities generally. The survey finds that a majority (54%) believe civil society to be active or very active in this area. However, with respect to success in the undertaking as a whole, the survey also finds that respondents are not convinced that civil society has succeeded in responding to needs adequately (60% consider activities unsuccessful or somewhat unsuccessful).

Many respondents felt that CSOs had done a good job of informing the public on the Annan Plan. More specific areas included efforts to educate on agricultural practices and traffic. There was also specific mention of the Management Centre of the Mediterranean for its efforts in putting together various types of seminars and workshops.

Overall, we find that civil society is active in some areas, respondents to the regional stakeholder survey considered CSOs successful in terms of providing informative campaigns. To this extent it is responsive to social concerns, especially in health care. By contrast, civil society is deemed to have been less responsive in traffic safety issues, for instance. However, the media review did uncover a significant amount of activity in areas of concern to the general public.

*4.3.2 Public trust in CSOs.* In the northern part of Cyprus low degrees of overall social trust reflect in rather low levels of trust for CSOs and other institutions. However, there are some exceptions, as some institutions related to the 'state' enjoy rather large degrees of public trust. Results of the Civil Society Survey 2005 show that the highest degree of trust is in the armed forces (81%). Other groups which received fairly high levels of trust are the police (74%), the 'Presidency' (65%) and the 'judiciary' (60%). This seems to reflect a degree of paternalism among those living in northern Cyprus.

Meanwhile, the relatively lower levels of trust in 'government' (48%) and political parties (25%) may reflect cynicism toward politics. Although somewhat higher than the Civil Society Survey 2005 results, the Eurobarometer surveys also reveal relatively low degree of trust toward political parties (40%).<sup>127</sup>

Trust in the religious affairs foundation was surprisingly low (22%). Private sector companies are also not trusted (20%). Syndicates only garner 32%. Associations outside of the 'government'/'state' are also not seen as very trustworthy (22%).

PAG members were at first surprised by the relatively high level of trust toward 'state' institutions (e.g. the police and presidency). They subsequently opined that the Turkish language questionnaire text prompted the interviewees to consider their degree of 'confidence' in these institutions as opposed to 'trust'. The PAG felt 'trust' conveyed a different meaning than 'confidence'. Thus, if the question is one of 'trust', as the indicator suggests, the indicator would have to be scored lower.

#### **4.4. Empowering Citizens**

This subdimension examines the extent to which the civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens. Table III.4.5 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

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<sup>127</sup> Eurobarometre 63.4, Spring 2005. National Report, Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot Community

**TABLE III.4.4: Indicators assessing the empowerment of citizens**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	2
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems	2
4.4.3	Empowering marginalized people	0
4.4.4	Empowering women	2
4.4.5	Building social capital	2
4.4.6	Supporting/creating livelihoods	0

*4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens.* As discussed in the indicator on responsiveness, there is evidence of civil society and CSOs engaging in a number of informative campaigns to educate the general public on an array of issues. As much as 78% of respondents to the CSI Civil Society Survey 2005 remembered instances of CSOs running information campaigns in their area. Thirty percent of CSOs reported that media was a useful means of promoting a message. To a lesser degree CSOs also felt that media could help promote events (22%), and even help recruit volunteers (14%) and new members (12%), if not funds (9%).

The SOAR report finds that, in 2002, CSOs tend to prefer to issue press releases as a means of disseminating information (79% report to have utilized this method). Forty-two percent report 'word of mouth' as an effective means. More costly in financial terms, 35% report putting ads in the newspaper, 25% radio ads, and 21% TV ads. Thirty-four percent report the holding of press conferences. 33% produced leaflets for distribution. Only 29% produce newsletters and only 25% maintain websites. Only 32% communicate via email.

The media review provides examples of civil society activities to inform and educate citizens include traffic, cancer and other health issues, environmental concerns, and drugs. Various CSOs undertake very helpful seminars to inform and educate citizens on specific issues. Besides, Management Centre of the Mediterranean organized seminars to educate active CSO members.

Generally, we find that CSOs do run a number of informative campaigns, and many successfully utilize local media to propagate and to articulate a number of concerns.

*4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems.* Seventy-five percent of citizens polled in the Civil Society Survey 2005 contend that CSOs have facilitated the bringing of people together to discuss an issue.

However, the regional stakeholder survey suggests that the level of civil society activity in building the capacity of local communities is fairly low, with 92% of respondents rating civil society as either inactive or only somewhat active. Similarly, the survey reveals that civil society is deemed to be unsuccessful or only somewhat successful in contributing to local community building capacity (94%). Presumably the disparity in the results between the citizen and regional stakeholder survey are related to different questions. Bringing people together may be construed as something quite different than the building of capacity, which is an investment.

Examples of civil society activities in the media review to build capacity for collective action are KTOS's invitation to discuss educational policies together and the call from various CSOs to protest and cooperate against criminal activities, especially following an attack against one particular medical doctor. However, there are no remarkable instances of civil society initiative to organize themselves and mobilize resources for a common problem. There is only evidence that CSOs discuss these topics.

*4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people.* In the context of northern Cyprus, marginalized people may objectively refer to any number of groups, including certain 'settlers' and illegal

workers, as well as ‘enclaved’ Greek Cypriots, and others. However, respondents to either the Civil Society Survey 2005 or regional stakeholder survey apparently consider marginalized people to be primarily the poor or underprivileged.

A large majority (67%) of Civil Society Survey 2005 respondents said that CSOs have organised events to help people of low incomes. No doubt many of those surveyed were aware of such events covered in the media, including the various *kermes* (fairs) that are organized by CSOs such as the Nicosia Capital City Lions Club.

However, the regional stakeholder survey reveals that civil society efforts to assist people are not very differentiated and do not target marginalised people per se. Specific civil society activities aimed at providing services to the population are usually directed at the general population (88%). That is, the respondents to the Regional Stakeholder survey discounted the significance of one-off events, such as the holding of a *kermes*, and do not believe that particular segments of society are targeted properly. For instance, although poor schoolchildren of the *Arabahmet* neighbourhood in Nicosia have been recipients of some aid, ultimately poor students are not targeted categorically. That is, there is no sustained effort to deal with the issue.

The Civil Society Impact Studies suggest that as CSOs tend to cater mostly to the interests of public sector employees in the form of collective bargaining for salaries and other benefits, CSO efforts do not tend to target marginalised people. Media review news items reflect the ‘governments’ accomplishment to give jobs to 397 disabled people. This reflects a level of impact but the news item also suggested that there still remained 346 more unemployed disabled people waiting for job opportunities to arrive. Donations for the benefit of disabled people is also an issue that appeared in the news items. The ‘government’ and ‘municipalities’ are taking steps to suit the interest of marginalized people but the impact of CSOs remains limited.

Overall we note evidence of activities, but there is disagreement about the degree to which activities are targeting marginalized people in a sustainable way.

*4.4.4 Empowering women.* The regional stakeholder survey revealed that civil society efforts to assist people are not very differentiated and do not target women per se. Specific civil society activities aimed at providing services to the population are usually directed at the general population (89%). The Civil Society Survey 2005 suggested that CSO efforts to enhance the status of women are not very common; only 25% of respondents knew of such an activity in their community. Additionally, RSC respondents found it difficult to mention concrete examples. In the media review a total of 7 news items relevant to this indicator are about the celebration of the 8<sup>th</sup> of March Women’s day. There were no specific activities reported in the media which empower women and help them gain any control over their own lives.


Some PAG members, however, felt that efforts to empower women were bearing fruit, pointing to the role CSOs had in the election of a woman to the post of Speaker of the Parliament. Others countered that this was the exception that made the rule, pointing to the lack of appointments of women to various posts of authority otherwise.

*4.4.5 Building social capital.* Civil society can play a role as a source of social capital for its members, which we have assessed by comparing the level of general trust of CSO members with the one of individuals who are not members of any CSO. As the Civil Society Survey 2005 shows, the level of trust for members of CSOs is marginally higher: the view that most or everyone can be trusted is expressed by 19% of CSO members to only 12% of non-members. The overall level of mistrust is high, irrespective of CSO membership.

**TABLE III.4.5: Level of trust**

	Everyone can be trusted (%)	Most people can be trusted (%)	A few people can be trusted (%)	No one can be trusted (%)
Non-member of CSO	3	9	82	6
Member of CSO	1	18	76	6

In terms of public spiritedness, interestingly CSO members were actually more likely to express the view that it is justifiable to claim 'state' benefits to which one is not entitled (23% to 15%), and for other areas of 'public spiritedness' there is virtually no differences to note between the groups.

**FIGURE III.4.2: Level of public spiritedness**

Some PAG members felt that CSOs provided experience, skills, and know-how, thus catapulting some of its members to positions of authority and leadership elsewhere. For instance, one of the PAG members was a former CSO activist who now heads the 'state' run radio and television. Others, however, countered that this was not what was meant by 'social capital', since the promotion of its membership is not what is at stake, but the degree to which CSOs and civil society more generally can impart values onto society.

**4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods.** The Regional Stakeholder Survey reveals that civil society efforts to assist people are not very differentiated and do not typically target a particular group. Specific civil society activities aimed at providing services to the population are usually directed at the general population (89%). What is more, there is little in the way of activities on the part of CSOs to assist poor people with income generation.

The Civil Society Impact Studies suggest that as CSOs tend to cater mostly to the interests of public sector employees in the form of collective bargaining for salaries and other benefits, CSO efforts do not tend to target marginalised people. In the media review news items demonstrated that 397 disabled people were employed by the 'government', the private sector and 'municipalities'. The results from the media review indicate that civil society has no active role in supporting livelihoods.

## 4.5 Meeting Societal Needs

This subdimension examines the extent to which the civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially the needs of the poor and other marginalized groups. Table III.4.6 summarizes the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.4.6: Indicators assessing the meeting of societal needs**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	1
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	2
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalized groups	1

*4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provisions.* Of the respondents to the Regional Stakeholder Survey the majority (53%) could think of any examples of civil society lobbying for 'state' provision of services.

There was no consensus among respondents on the specific type of service provision demanded and lobbied for. As a result responses to the question were varied. A number of respondents made reference to 'infrastructure' provision, with some mentioning an oncology centre in particular.

Whatever the issue was, civil society organizations rate themselves as not very successful in lobbying for its provision: 70% rated the efforts unsuccessful or only somewhat successful.

The media review demonstrated that CSOs lobbied the 'government' to meet societal needs such as the prevention of increase in the number of traffic accidents or the prevention of increasing criminal activities and violence. Various CSOs also lobbied to increase the minimum wage and work quality. Health services were also dealt with.

Overall civil society is not seen as especially effective in lobbying for the provision of 'state' services.

*4.5.2. Meeting societal needs directly.* The Civil Society Survey 2005 revealed that CSOs are somewhat active in engaging with social problems directly. Sixty percent of respondents could think of a CSO addressing a social problem in their community.

The direct provision of services to the general population by civil society is common according to the results of the regional stakeholder survey where 87% of respondents could think of specific examples of such provision. The target of the said services was, according to the survey, the general population (87%). As for the success of the provision of services, the survey found that a majority tended to view it as a success or very successful endeavour (53%). Some examples include the efforts of the Traffic Accidents Prevention Association, cancer screening through the Support for those with Cancer Association, as well as the services of the Mediation Center. Generally, CSOs were also credited with providing for a forum through which the Cyprus problem and, more generally, democratization, could be discussed.

Overall the role of civil society in directly meeting societal needs is deemed moderate to significant (74%).

*4.5.3. Meeting the needs of marginalized groups.* Members of the community were not likely to ask for assistance from either the 'state' or CSOs. Only 10% had done so over the previous year, according to the survey. Of those that did, more than two thirds opted to approach a CSO.

According to the Civil Society Survey 2005, the 'state' is seen as worse provider of social services to marginalised people than voluntary organisations. Thirty percent mentioned 'state' organisations as the better provider to 45% who considered volunteer associations to be providing a better service to marginalised people, be they impoverished, minorities, elderly, or disabled.

Some PAG members considered the indicator to represent a false dichotomy, insofar as neither the 'state' nor civil society was said to provide any services of the sort for marginalized people. That is, they felt that it was still a bit of an injustice to rank CSOs as better providers of service, as supply was limited overall. The truth of the matter was that in certain areas, such as health care, it is the private sector that provides service. Public hospitals, for instance, are avoided by all but the poor who have no other option.

## **Conclusion**

Civil society's impact on 'governance' and society is assessed as weak, especially when considering the marginal role played in the overall budgetary process. As we have seen, this is partly due to the environmental constraints as well as dependence on Turkey that renders the 'state' less responsive than it otherwise might be. The upshot is that trade unions, who are the CSOs actively engaged with 'government' in the process, are relegated to negotiating salaries and wages for public sector employees, rather than discussing the overall budget and expenditure priorities.

Civil society has more impact through information campaigns, and potentially in building capacity for collective action, than it has as a watchdog or in lobbying for the provision of services. This may be, in part, related to a relative lack of professionalism among CSOs (something elaborated on subsequently in the final workshop to be discussed in subsequent sections of this report). In other words, here we identify a structural limitation. Developing the skills to monitor and report on 'state' implementation of policy may prove more difficult than lobbying for the adoption of new policies.

Finally, we should point out that low public trust in CSOs may be a debilitating factor. This may also relate to the sometimes adversarial relationship between rival CSO leaders and the relative lack of professionalism just mentioned.

### 3. CHALLENGES AND ISSUES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

This section summarises the main outcomes of the CSI workshop that was held on 24 September 2005. Nearly 50 people from CSOs, academic institutions and the public administration participated in the workshop. Since civil society was studied separately on each side of the Green Line, the CSI project's results were first presented separately to stakeholders of the respective communities on the island during the morning session. After the presentation of findings in northern Cyprus, participants were asked to identify the main challenges for civil society, and produce recommendations for strengthening civil society. Participants worked in four small groups, each examining a single dimension of the CSI: structure, environment, values and impact. Though each group focused on a different dimension, certain common topics and issues were identified among them.

The morning session was followed by an island-wide gathering where the results of both studies were presented to a joint audience. Following the presentations of the results for each part of the island, participants were encouraged to comment on the project and offer recommendations relevant to civil society in Cyprus as a whole.

The final workshop, regional stakeholder consultations and the discussions within the PAG proved that CSO representatives are not only capable of examining their external environment (e.g. the conduct of companies, the public administration, politicians), but were also willing and able to self-examine and scrutinize themselves and their activities and conduct in civil society as a whole. When participants at the final workshop discussed the strengths and weaknesses, they frequently focussed on the weaknesses more than on the strengths. Critical discussions also took place at the regional stakeholder consultations and in the PAG meetings. Some comments regarding the results focused on the methodology. Various participants expressed concern that the data from the Civil Society Survey for Northern Cyprus 2005 data.

During the final workshop a number of issues were identified as problematic, and a number of deficiencies in civil society were identified. These are presented below along the four dimensions of civil society.

#### ***Structure***

Structural impediments to civil society appear to be a great challenge. A recurring theme raised by various groups was that many CSOs lack autonomy from politics. Affiliations and close relations with political parties, in 'government' or opposition parties, limits the impact of CSOs overall. This, in turn, results in rivalries among advocacy groups who could otherwise collaborate given their similar interests and agendas. Similarly CSO leadership was also scrutinized. Many participants pointed out the 'personalized' style of various CSO leaderships and their lack of professionalism. CSO leaders habitually exhibit self-centred behaviours, which constitutes a significant barrier to a professional running of CSOs. Thus, an overall lack of transparency and accountability was ascribed to CSOs.

Several other challenges were also raised, such as financial resources, lack of participation, enthusiasm and societal mistrust. On a more basic level, CSOs were said to lack adequate financial resources. Furthermore, citizen participation is insufficient to sustain volunteerism. Added to this was the relatively low level of citizen participation in rural areas, although this was disputed by some participants who claimed that the workshop may be underestimating the vibrancy of civil society in peripheral areas. Unfortunately, high levels of societal mistrust in general, and toward CSOs in particular, inhibit further cooperation and participation.

These problems tended to be magnified for advocacy groups who were considered to be disadvantaged vis-à-vis the unions and professional associations that enjoyed greater impact

on policy. CSOs that pursue more narrow agendas related to the interests of their memberships are more influential than NGOs and other advocacy groups of general social interests. CSOs in general, and especially these advocacy groups, which tend to remain ‘outsiders’ and are distant from ‘government’ and authoritative decision making bodies, thus wielding little influence. Suggested reasons for the lack of societal participation and the low levels of commitment among CSO membership included: the lack of effective impact and dampening enthusiasm of membership.

It should be pointed out that some workshop participants noted that, where CSO members were properly trained, CSOs attained greater degrees of competence and professionalism that enhanced impact, regardless of whether they were advocacy groups or syndicates. One participant from KAYAD, a women’s group, noted how training had helped her and her organization develop the necessary skills to produce policy proposals and lobby effectively for their adoption. Generally, however, CSOs rarely had the opportunity to attend such trainings and lacked links to international networks that might also enhance their capacity.

### ***Environment***

Participants highlighted problems related to the environment within which CSOs operate. The political context, which while not as debilitating as in the past, still presents difficulties. For instance, despite a change in ‘government’ the ‘foreign ministry’ still keeps tabs on CSOs that receive international funding for various projects, or maintain links to the international community or the Greek Cypriot community. As mentioned above, given a context where many CSOs, especially advocacy groups, remain distant from the ‘state’ administration, a critical stance toward ‘government’ policy does not translate into any impact.

By contrast, trade unions have a stronger position, as they are embedded within the ‘state’ apparatus. The public sector trade unions have their own laws from ‘parliament’, thereby entitling them to privileges as well as to economic benefits. Moreover, professional or occupational organizations also have their charter given by ‘parliament’ and are recipients of obligatory membership dues. Thus, to the external environment for the trade unions is far more conducive than for most other types of CSOs.

The ‘state’ bureaucracy is not very attentive to the needs and demands of civil society, especially of the advocacy groups, and does not include civil society as a ‘partner’ in the system of governance, nor is the ‘executive’ responsive to civil society. It tends not to implement laws fully, partly as a result of the weakness of civil society in monitoring the ‘government’s’ policy implementation.

The legal system is similarly far from supportive. CSOs lack access to legal advice and counsel that could otherwise be provided as a public service. Furthermore, whereas the legal environment may not be overtly disabling, neither is it enabling. CSOs, in turn, tend to be ignorant of the relevant rules, laws and regulations.

### ***Values***

The analysis of civil society shows that its values, overall, are the strongest dimension. It is not surprising that many of the deficiencies in the values dimension noted in the final workshop overlapped with structural deficits. For instance, participants pointed to the generally low levels of participation among CSO members. A lack of long term dedication and commitment to their causes was seen as undermining CSO efforts. According to many participants, CSO members were not reliable, and often could not sustain efforts in long term projects and causes.

CSOs, as noted above, also tend to be governed in a ‘personal’ style, rather than in a professional manner. In other words, various CSOs’ democratic deficit relates directly to the lack of participation of their members. It was suggested that CSOs lack transparency, and this

contributed to a public perception that CSOs are not reliable. Another factor behind the public mistrust in CSOs was their inability to publicize their efforts effectively. On a positive note, participants agreed that tolerance and non-violence are values deeply embedded in civil society.

### ***Impact***

The analysis of civil society in northern Cyprus revealed impact to be the weakest dimension of the diamond, overall. Participants at the CSI workshop corroborated this finding. There were a myriad of reasons articulated by participants for these weaknesses. From a structural standpoint, dependency on Turkey looms large, especially on budgetary matters where civil society's impact remains marginal. Participants also noted linkages to political parties as limiting civil society's autonomy, thereby impeding its influence in many cases. For instance, it was noted that CSOs aligned with 'government' often remained silent, or were otherwise uncritical of policy, whereas 'opposition' CSOs were often disregarded. Overall, it was suggested that CSOs are open to external interference and manipulation. Other structural liabilities included a lack of institutionalization and financial problems. CSOs were said to lack the means and capacity to monitor policy implementation. Further, CSOs were said to lack direction and strategy, and were thus bereft of clearly defined goals.

Impact is also hampered by a system of social values that was said to be authoritarian and passive. Members of CSOs are not likely to hold their own leaderships accountable. Moreover, the general lack of trust (pervasive through society) in CSOs to actually play an important role in society dampens 'public' enthusiasm for CSO initiatives, because people do not believe the initiatives will be successful. Participants felt that a dominant perception in society is that Turkey ultimately determines policies.

## 4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

The recommendations presented in this section are recommendations made by participants of the final workshop, regional stakeholder consultations and by the PAG. These recommendations are made public so that readers and civil society stakeholders can reflect on these matters and choose how to act upon them. They are specifically addressed to civil society itself, to the public administration and politicians, and strongly correlate with the specific challenges mentioned above.

The challenge that most participants agreed upon was the general lack of professionalism among CSOs and civil society actors. It was suggested that education could play a pivotal role, both as a means of educating CSO leaders and members about professional norms, and in providing the general public with curricula that emphasizes civic education. Thus, CSOs could presumably recruit younger individuals who had benefited from such curricula. Some participants maintained that the goal of education should be to promote “thick citizenship”, thus contributing to a transformation of the current authoritarian political culture in democratic culture. Here concrete participatory mechanisms for citizens could play a crucial role. Currently, participation and volunteerism are adversely affected by a lack of trust among members of society in general, as well as towards CSOs in particular. The problem is, therefore, both one of transparency (on the part of CSOs) and of cultural leanings not to trust, which translates into low levels of public responsibility among the citizenry who prefer to ‘leave things’ to the authorities. Thus, civic education of CSO staff, and the public at large would not only enhance accountability of CSOs but also build their capacities, and contribute to building stronger values of civil society overall.

In the context of the Cyprus problem a specific recommendation was to make the teaching of Greek and Turkish as a second language mandatory in the respective communities. This would allow new generations of Cypriots to engage in enhanced discourse and enable them to deal empathetically with members of either community. The recommendations listed above are undoubtedly long term recommendations that will necessarily span generations.

Education for CSO leaders and members should include incentives, such as accreditation of training seminars, so that it becomes a ‘value’. This would allow trainees to pursue progression routes, as opposed to one-time trainings. If accredited programs became available, CSOs would be able to select among recruits trained in such programs, and promotions could also be tied to the successful completion of seminar requirements. Similar training programs were recommended for public sector employees, who often lack an in-depth understanding of civil society. Volunteerism could be increased through ‘legislation’ that encourages volunteering. This could even be part of rehabilitation systems for convicted criminals (where sentences could be reduced, for instance, in return for community service). A further tool could be to increase linkages to civil society organizations outside of Cyprus, especially those based in Europe. Participants felt that since Cyprus had acceded to the European Union, a regional orientation for CSOs would be worthwhile. Also, European CSOs are likely to have knowledge relevant to the needs of CSOs based in Cyprus.

The upshot of all these recommendations would be improvements in CSOs’ administrative capacity and professionalism, hence greater effectiveness. Also, increased capacity would allow CSOs to better strategize, through greater awareness of the political context and external opportunities. CSOs might also be better positioned to utilize media more effectively to promote programs and disseminate information. Specific recommendations included the establishment of an island-wide advocacy centre to help civil society with advocacy issues and provide legal aid. Advice on funding for European Union financed projects through some form of non-profit consultancy service was also recommended.

With regard to issues of civil society's environment, the need to draft new 'legislation' for umbrella organizations, which currently does not exist, was pointed out. It was also suggested that 'legislation' be enacted that either compelled, or provided incentives, to corporations to contribute to civil society. Similarly, a charities commission could also prove useful.

One general environmental factor that surfaced in the discussions during the CSO workshop was the view that the 'state' is too big and centralized. Thus, some participants recommended 'minimizing the state' as a remedy. From this view the 'state' should play the role of facilitator in the economy and other areas. Whereas this idea found supporters, others maintained that the real problem was accountability and discretion, regardless of the size of the administration.

Civil society's relations with the 'state' or administration were also discussed. While recent ostensible enhancements, including 'president' Mehmet Ali Talat's initiative to hold regular meetings with CSOs, are a step in the right direction, bolder steps might need to be taken. Boundaries between civil society (i.e. the 'third sector'), the market, and the 'state' could be less of a hindrance to improved civil society-'state' relations if mechanisms were developed that allowed for the drafting of documents in policy areas of concern to particular CSOs, perhaps drawing on international level experiments, such as the recent Clinton Global Initiative. Accordingly, if there was a forum to which all interested parties or stakeholders contributed, and through which commitments would be articulated and outputs monitored, then CSO participation in policy making and implementation would be improved.

One major obstacle for the strengthening of civil society is the general lack of funds. It should be recalled that most CSOs obtained their greatest source of funding from membership dues. One proposal was for 'government' funds that are currently earmarked for political parties to be partially reassigned to CSOs. The rationale for providing such funds for the coffers of political parties could be extended to CSOs. That is, if it is in the public interest to provide subsidies to political parties, similarly it could be argued that it is in the public interest to sustain CSOs. Specifically, it was recommended that initially a third of the funds currently going to political parties be redirected to civil society immediately, with a greater share allocated in a graduated system over the next decade. While this idea resonated with some, others contended that given the perception of a lack of accountability and democracy regarding CSOs in general, the priority might be to increase transparency before providing CSO entrepreneurs with a means of claiming further funds from 'government'.

Reflecting on the discussions at PAG meetings, regional stakeholder consultations and the final workshop, two specific themes emerged: capacity and trust. The following paragraphs offer some interpretations on these issues and how they could potentially be addressed.

With respect to capacity, the theme of professionalism surfaced time and again, throughout the project, at the various venues where the project team met with civil society stakeholders. Building capacity, however, is not simply a function of improving the legal environment. It is a long term process of investing in human capital. That is why many of the recommendations listed above emphasize the importance of education. Civil society is a relatively new set of actors to northern Cyprus. Northern Cyprus is in various ways unique, given its 'isolation' from the international community, and yet similar in some ways to countries of Eastern Europe in that its citizenry (and belatedly its leadership) strategically chose to pursue European Union membership as an avenue to development and reform.

The professionalism and other aspects of CSO reform, envisioned in the recommendations listed above can only be possible if international linkages are strengthened. Fostering a nascent civil society, such as the one in northern Cyprus, can only be achieved if local CSOs advance relations with CSOs internationally. Yet, there remains a chicken-egg dilemma in that, building capacity seems currently related to external initiatives. For instance, many of

the training seminars conducted for the benefit of CSOs are sponsored by international agencies. Thus, a significant portion of the population regards such initiatives with a certain degree of mistrust, suspecting foreign interests behind them. Given the general levels of mistrust in society it is unfortunate that efforts to professionalize civil society give rise to further mistrust in some quarters.

Furthermore, there may be a naïve perspective that European Union membership is a panacea for all that ails northern Cyprus and its civil society. Awareness of the ‘democratic deficit’ that afflicts the EU is low, hence there are few questions about the relationship between the goal of strengthening civil society and EU membership. The bigger and more recent threat is the general apathy and disillusionment that has affected members of the Turkish Cypriot community following the failure of the Annan Plan and the admission of a de facto divided Cyprus to the European Union. Whereas, the European Commission was given the mandate to lift the ‘isolations’ on the community in northern Cyprus, political and legal disagreements within the EU (which since May 2004 has included the Republic of Cyprus) forestalled the implementation of various measures (i.e. proposed regulations) drafted by the Commission. Thus, not only is mistrust high among Turkish Cypriots, but the pro-EU movement in northern Cyprus now faces a crisis.

Mistrust, as was found throughout the study, is pervasive in the society of northern Cyprus, and not unique to civil society. In fact, our analysis revealed that there was no statistically significant difference in this regard between members of the community at large and civil society members, implying that the roots of cynicism are deep. It could be argued that greater transparency in ‘government’ and in CSOs would help people overcome their lack of confidence in fellow citizens, and thus CSOs. It is interesting to note that in this regard the parallel study conducted in southern Cyprus among the Greek Cypriot community reveals similar levels of mistrust. Thus, European Union membership and its related reforms, in and of themselves, might prove insufficient to overcome this problem.

Petty rivalries and political competition take their toll on CSOs. The politicization of the civil society arena is often widely denounced, but accepted as a fact of life for the most part. That is, the community in northern Cyprus may lament politicization but in practice there is a great degree of cynicism. Paranoia about the true intent of rivals is rife. Thus, many ‘rival’ CSOs treat the initiatives of other CSOs with suspicion, often alleging a political motivation. This form of ascription and lack of trust is problematic, since it prevents civil society actors from coalescing around issues, and instead raises suspicion that behind any initiative there is a political agenda. Such accusations are sometimes quite high profile, as are those alleged by ousted Chamber of Commerce leader, Ali Erel, who alleges he was deposed by a ‘government’ conspiracy for political reasons, for instance.

The view that CSOs, especially NGOs that have international linkages, are beneficiaries and recipients of large amounts of funding from abroad contributes to mistrust. This is a pattern that is also relevant in the context south of the Green Line and the Greek Cypriot community. Especially during the Annan Plan referendum period, opponents of the plan on both sides of the island did their best to discredit supporters of the plan by pointing to the role of international financing of CSOs.

It is for these reasons that many of the recommendations discussed above related to ways and means of increasing professionalism and trust. If CSOs are run by properly trained leaders and members, it is possible to buck the trend of using CSOs as vehicles for personal and political career advancements. In the long term, investments in civic education are considered to be an indispensable ingredient to inculcate values of trust and collaboration.


## 5. CONCLUSION FOR THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

The conclusion draws together the main findings and recommendation of the CSI project in northern Cyprus. It offers a concise interpretation of the state of civil society in northern Cyprus as depicted in the Civil Society Diamond and then engages with some of key findings and recommendations resulting from the CSI project.

### CIVIL SOCIETY DIAMOND IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS 2005

The diagram visualising the state of civil society in northern Cyprus in the form of a diamond reveals that all dimensions are areas in need of development and growth. The impact and structure dimensions stand out as being particularly weak with the values and environmental dimensions being assessed as somewhat stronger.

**FIGURE III.5.1: Civil Society Diamond for the northern part of Cyprus**



The further development of civil society in northern Cyprus will require a particular focus on the structure dimension, particularly on increasing participation, voluntary work, communication among CSOs and increasing the number of umbrella associations. CSOs need to enhance their professionalism and accountability, by providing more assistance to citizens and proving itself to be reliable hence trustworthy. Thus, CSOs could position themselves as potential partners for the 'state', corporations and society alike.

The weakest dimensions, impact and structure, could well be related to each other: Impact is weak despite the fact that civil society has relatively strong values and proved to be effective in mobilizing masses of citizens to participate in unprecedented large rallies, such as the rallies in favour of the Annan Plan. The diamond shows that the reason for the relatively weak impact can perhaps be found in the weak structure of civil society. Whereas CSOs may actually have moderate levels of membership in aggregate, depth of participation remains low. Insufficient levels of volunteerism and a general lack of funding hinder CSO efforts. Furthermore, poor relations between CSOs and the limited number and opportunities for the establishment of umbrella organizations inhibit the impact of civil society.

It is also interesting to compare the weakest and strongest dimensions, structure and values. Values emerged as the strongest dimension of the diamond. It stands to reason that if buttressed with a stronger structure, civil society could prove more effective given its values and orientation. That said, throughout this study one may note a certain discrepancy between the internal values practices by the CSOs and their external value promotion. On the one hand Turkish Cypriot civil society appears to embrace positive values as evidenced by its level of tolerance and its denouncement of violence. On the other hand many CSOs exhibit a competitive orientation vis-à-vis rival CSOs and often fail to cooperate. It raises the question as to how 'deep' these values run within civil society, and gives an impression of superficiality. Cynicism regarding the motives of civil society actors among the wider public is a matter of concern and may impede the structural improvements required for civil society. Civil society must overcome this obstacle if there is to be subsequent progress.

The CSI project provided a myriad of data, interpretations, assessments and recommendations. Focusing specifically on actionable and policy-oriented recommendations, two specific themes emerged from this comprehensive analysis of the state of civil society in northern Cyprus. First, civil society needs to address issues of professionalism and build organizational capacity. Second, societal trust and trust among CSOs must be fostered so that the latent values of tolerance and inclusion may take stronger root in the community.

## IV ISLAND-WIDE RECOMMENATIONS & NEXT STEPS

### By The Management Centre of the Mediterranean

#### 1. ISLAND-WIDE RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the bi-communal nature of this study, the Management Centre of the Mediterranean (MC-Med) felt it important to include an island-wide discussion about the findings on the state of civil society during the final workshop. Therefore, the second half of the full day final workshop was committed to a discussion about issues and challenges relating to civil society in the island as a whole. The results of the CSI study for the northern and southern parts of the island were presented, giving the opportunity to participants to familiarize themselves with conditions prevailing throughout the island. It was an excellent opportunity of getting to know the 'other' not through prejudice and preconceptions but through the concrete findings of social research.

Following a brief methodological overview and a discussion of the main findings of each report, participants were asked to state ways in which civil society could be improved and strengthened island-wide. The following are the specific recommendations of the participants.

##### Capacity Building

There was a common recognition that CSOs throughout the island are working well, but have a clear need to build their capacities, particularly in management, advocacy and promoting citizen engagement.

##### Specific Suggestions by Participants:

- *Accredited Training Courses:* Support more efficient and effective work within CSOs through accredited progression training courses;
- *Advocacy:* Train CSOs in advocacy skills;
- *Citizenship and Engagement:* Work with CSOs in ways to build a stronger sense of community responsibility and to encourage civic participation;
- *Consultancy Group on Access to Funding:* Create a consultancy group which would serve as a support centre for CSOs to learn how and where to apply for European funding.

##### Networking and Establishing Links with Similar Organizations

Participants identified the need for CSOs to work together and support each other, both locally and internationally, to strengthen their efforts.

##### Specific Suggestions by Participants:

- *International Links:* Establish links with international CSOs active in the same field, especially Europe networks;
- *Trust among local CSOs:* Promote mutual respect between CSOs within Cypriot communities;
- *Dialogue between local CSOs:* Facilitate dialogue between similar organisations in the two communities to improve understanding;
- *Expand bi-communal activities:* Increase the participation levels in bi-communal activities to promote trust and communication between the two communities.

### Establishing Links with Other Sectors

The relationship between CSOs and the authorities from their community are not strong on either side of the island. Strengthening these ties will encourage more support from other sectors and give more legitimacy to the activities of civil society.

Specific Suggestion by Participants:

- *Link with Authorities:* Create a ‘Charities Commission’ as an intermediary between CSOs and authorities.

### Human Rights

There was a particular emphasis on the need for youth to learn and understand about their civil rights within the island. In addition, some participants pointed to the need to coordinate publicity and advocacy for human rights issues throughout the island.

Specific Suggestions by Participants:

- *Civil Rights Education:* Educate youth about their civil rights through the educational system;
- *Publicize discrimination:* Need for more publicity around issues of discrimination and disrespect;
- *Island-wide Advocacy Centre:* Create one sole advocacy centre that would promote human rights throughout the island, bringing together residents from northern and southern Cyprus to work on common issues.

### Transparency and Accountability

Participants pointed toward a need to address the lack of transparency and accountability within civil society organizations to strengthen their credibility and effectiveness.

Specific Suggestions by Participants:

- *Improve regulatory framework:* Create a task force to improve regulating CSO activities;
- *Code of Ethics:* Develop a joint Code of Ethics to encourage self-regulation, transparency and accountability.

There was also emphasis on the importance of developing bi-communal connections. As these CSOs work together, either in trainings, through networks, or on particular projects together, they will be strengthening the ties and communication between these two communities which are currently physically divided.

## **2. NEXT STEPS**

With the publishing of this report, all civil society stakeholders and researchers will be able to use the information generated from this project to support them in their work. This qualitative and quantitative overview of civil society in Cyprus will provide a map of the current situation and help to point towards ways forward for those working on civil society in Cyprus.

The Management Centre of the Mediterranean (MC-Med) sees this study as a springboard for a variety of activities. MC-Med, with Intercollege, hope to publicize the information through the media, as well as, given availability of funds, provide copies of the study to all interested parties. We expect that the information will be available on the MC-Med and Intercollege websites. MC-Med, as a centre which provides services to civil society organizations (CSOs), will use this information extensively as a base for future planning of its programs as well as

incorporate it into its trainings to encourage other CSOs to use the information to their benefit.

Although this study may be the most comprehensive to date, we feel that the findings raise many more questions which should spark further research and activities, such as:

- *Complexity of Civil Society:* The findings of this study provide a broad understanding of the state of civil society in Cyprus. In the initial PAG meetings, a mapping exercise of civil society was conducted to learn about the different actors within civil society. (See II.1.3 and III.1.3) This map just touches the surface of the influences of different civil society organizations. In Sections II.2 and III.2, the indicators do not sufficiently distinguish between groups of CSOs.
- *Island-wide Analysis of Findings:* Given the time pressures and availability of resources, this study lacks a comprehensive analysis of the findings for Cyprus as a whole. What are the similarities and differences according to gender, age and geographic location? What points of commonality can we find to encourage more understanding and cooperation between the different CSOs and communities?
- *CSO Coaching:* Similar to management coaching which is conducted in the private sector, CSOs in Cyprus could benefit dramatically from such specific and intensive support to help professionalize the organizations.
- *Encourage Collaboration with Authorities:* In many countries, as in Cyprus, CSOs and governments tend to have an adversarial relationship. However, for democracy to flourish, civil society and government must complement each other. In this regard, the findings show a weakness in the relations between civil society and Cypriot authorities. Focus on further understanding and improving relations between these two actors will help to build mutual trust and understanding.
- *Encourage Collaboration with the Private Sector:* In the case of the relationship of CSOs and the private sector, it seems that there is very little interaction. Unlike the adversarial relationship with the authorities, CSOs have an almost non-existent relationship with the private sector. Research could be conducted to look at positive ways in which civil society and the private sector work together throughout the world, as well as within Cyprus. Activities which would be of interest to both CSOs and the private sector could be implemented with CSO – private sector partners.

More generally, we will also encourage officials at all levels to use this information when considering policies related to civil society. Attempts will be made to work with the private sector, to raise awareness of its potential role in supporting civil society as well as through more widespread and sustained corporate social responsibility activities. We hope that this publication will serve as a reference text for students and academics working in the field of civil society. In addition, the information will be available for donors and international stakeholders to help plan future programs and policies related to civil society in Cyprus.

In its English version, this publication will serve as the basis for international comparisons within the framework of the Civil Society Index project as a whole. The report will be published with approximately 50 other countries around the world and cross analysis will be conducted by CIVICUS. A global CSI conference is planned in 2006 which will convene all national teams which participated in the Civil Society Index as well as other project partners. CIVICUS will then evaluate and refine the methodology employed on the basis of current experience and findings and plans to repeat the project in the future.

In Cyprus, there have been some limited studies on various aspects of civil society. However, this is the first time that such a comprehensive, island-wide study has taken place. We hope that this information is a valuable tool for those working or interested in civil society in Cyprus. A dialogue has begun among civil society stakeholders. It is now up to those stakeholders to take advantage of this information and use it as a basis for action.

## V CONCLUSION

### By The Management Centre of the Mediterranean

This study was conducted throughout the entire island of Cyprus. Given the de facto division of the island since the events of 1974, the study was implemented in parallel within each physically separated community. The two communities had almost no interaction from 1974 until 2003. Even with this separation and ethnic differences, the overall findings from within the two communities are quite similar. Recognizing these similarities will encourage better understanding of each others' communities, as well as point to ways in which the two communities might work together.

The findings show that throughout the island, structure is the weakest dimension. Limited citizen participation, exclusion of minorities and rural areas, and low levels of membership to networks and umbrella organizations are common throughout the island.

Although the political contexts are rather different in the two sides of the island, the environment in which they function, given the CSI parameters, is rather similar. Both societies are seen as generally free, showing respect for civil liberties and a favourable socio-economic context. Political parties have an extremely strong influence on civil society. Authorities have low levels of transparency and allocation of funds to CSOs. And corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility are at fairly low levels.

The values of civil society are seen as the strongest, relative to the other dimensions. The findings show that there is minimal corruption and that CSOs practice democracy and transparency within their own organizations. Although most do not promote these values outside of their organizations, a handful of CSOs do promote peace and non-violence.

When looking at the impact dimension, it becomes very clear that a weakness of this methodology is the lack of distinction between various types of CSOs. This is particularly clear when looking at unions, which have a fairly strong influence on policy within both communities, while environmental or health CSOs do not enjoy nearly the same level of influence. In addition, CSOs are not active, and therefore not effective, in holding the authorities and private corporations accountable.

The concept of civil society is fairly new not only in Cyprus but for many other societies. Therefore the meaning of this concept is also rather weak for most. This was very apparent in the case of this study in Cyprus. Therefore there is a need for academics, international organizations such as the UN, EU and others to also work harder to specify and clarify what is meant by the notion of civil society and what could be the role for the Civil Society Organizations in contributing to the development of societies. Only a clear understanding of the meaning and role of civil society will help governments and private sector organizations to help empower this emerging sector to be more effective and useful in search for more freedom peace and welfare for humanity.

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## **APPENDIX 1**

### **PROJECT ADVISORY GROUP**

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Constantinos Christofides (Professor of Physics, University of Cyprus)

Areti Demosthenous (Director of the Institute for Historical Research for Peace)

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Eleni Koliou (Chair of the Kyrenia District Committee of the Pancyprian Welfare Council)

Stella Kyriakidou (Chair Europa Donna)

Cleri Koni (Manager, Group Bancassurance, Laiki Group)

Stavros Olympios (Chairman of the Pancyprian Welfare Council)

Ioanna Panayiotou (Press Officer of the Green Party, Member of the Association of Organic Cultivators, Member of the Council of the Cyprus Regional Winemakers)

Andreas Pavlikas (Head of the Research Office, Pancyprian Labour Federation (PEO))

Nicos Peristianis (Chairman of the Cyprus Sociological Association, Executive Dean of Intercollege)

Panayiotis Persianis (Ex-Associate Professor of Education, University of Cyprus)

Sotos Shiakides (Training Officer A', Cyprus Academy of Public Administration)

Eleni Theocharous (Honorary President and Deputy Chair Foreign Affairs Committee of the Doctors of the World, Member of Parliament)

## **APPENDIX 2**

### **REGIONAL STAKEHOLDERS: NICOSIA/LARNACA/FAMAGUSTA**

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1. Ms Tonia – Olivia Antoniou  
Associate of the Representative of the Maronite Community to the Parliament  
Member of the Public Relations Committee of the Cyprus Association of Human Resource Management
2. Mr Andreas Antoniadis  
Manager of Industry of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry
3. Ms Maria Vassiliadou  
Member of the Children’s Observatory  
Secretary of the Social Democratic Party Committee on Education
4. Mr Aris Georgiou  
Chairman of the Pancyprian Peace Movement
5. Ms Maria Pelekanou Danezi  
Researcher at the Institute of Labour of the Pancyprian Workers’ Federation (INEK)
6. Ms Aphrodite Dometiou  
Member of the District Committee of the Pancyprian Federation of Greek Primary School teachers (POED)  
Member of the Association for the Protection and the Welfare of the Child  
Member of the Family Planning Association (Youth Section)  
Member of the Education Society
7. Mr Evangelos Evangelou  
Famagusta District Secretary of the Pancyprian Workers’ Federation (PEO)
8. Ms Tatiana Zachariadou  
Member of the Executive Committee of the Cyprus Sociological Association  
Member of the Association of Single-Parent Families  
Part-Time Instructor at the Cyprus School of Nursing
9. Mr Panayiotis Theodorou  
Member of the Executive Committee of the Ayioi Omoloyites Cultural Workshop
10. Ms Julia Kalimeri  
Chairwoman / General Co-Ordinator of the APANEMI Centre (Centre of Information and Support for Women)  
President of ESTIA
11. Ms Rena Kofou  
Vice-President of the Women’s Association of the Kyrenia District
12. Ms Kalliopi Koufetta  
Treasurer of the Coordinating Committee of Christian Women’s Associations of the Archdiocese  
Member of Christian Women’s Association of Psimolofou

13. Mr Costas Manouchos  
 Assistant Treasurer and Member of the Executive Committee of the Nicosia Branch of the Cyprus Diabetes Association  
 Member of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants  
 Member of the Association of Certified Accountants in Cyprus  
 Member of the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority Employee Trade Union
14. Ms Anna Michaelidou  
 Health Officer of the Association of Parents and Friends of Children with Heart Diseases.
15. Ms Natalia Michaelidou  
 Vice-President of the Cyprus Anti-anaemia Association
16. Mr. George Nikolaou  
 Chairman of the Lyrical Stage  
 Member of the Executive Committee of the Movement for the European Future of Cyprus  
 Member of the International Ad Hoc Committee / Chairman of the Ad-hoc Committee of FIJET (UNESCO)  
 Secretary of the Association of Private Radio and Television Stations  
 Press and Public Affairs Secretary of the Coordinating Committee of Municipalities, Community Councils and Organizations of the Kyrenia District  
 Member of the Executive Committee / Chairman of the Ad-hoc Committee of the Pancyprian Organization of Refugees  
 Member of the Executive Committee / Chairman of the Ad-hoc Committee of the Association for the Advocacy of Refugee Civic Rights  
 Member of the Executive Committee of the Association for the Advocacy of Citizens' Rights  
 Member of the Executive Committee/ Chairman of the Ad-hoc Committee of the Cultural Council (Consultative Body to the Government)  
 Chairman of the Initiative Group for the Restoration of the Aikaterini Kornaro Palace  
 President of the Refugee Association "Diorios"  
 President of the Development Association for Gourri
17. Ms Skevi Pasha  
 Secretary of the Pancyprian Federation of Women's Movements (POGO)  
 Member of the Association of Single Parent Families and Friends  
 Member of the Association for the Protection and the Welfare of the Child
18. Ms Susanna Pavlou  
 Project Administrator, Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (Intercollege)
19. Mr George Penintaex  
 President of the Make a Wish Foundation  
 Chief Editor of the Cyprus News Agency  
 General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Karaiskakion Foundation  
 Vice-Chairman of the Friends of the Karaiskakion Foundation Association  
 Member of the Public Relations Committee of the Christou Steliou Ioannou Foundation  
 Member of the Executive Committee of the Movement for the Advocacy of Patients' Rights

20. Mr Doros Polykarpou  
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Movement for Equality, Support and Anti-Racism
21. Mr Socrates Socratous  
Chairman of the Pericles Demetriou Union in Agros
22. Dr George Christodoulides  
Former Governor of the Lions Club  
Founding Member of the Bicomunal Academic Forum  
Member of the New Cyprus Association
23. Dr Maria Hadjipavlou  
President of the Peace Centre  
Founding Member of the Hands Across the Divide Foundation  
Member of the Educational Reform Association  
Member of the Cyprus UN Organisation  
Assistant Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cyprus
24. Ms Elli Geroloemou  
President of the Association of the Welfare of Senior Citizens
25. Ms Olivia Patsalidou  
Administrative Officer, Pancyprian Welfare Council
26. Mr Pantelis Metaxas  
President of the Federation of Environmental and Ecological Associations of Cyprus
27. Mr Spartakos Kaltsides  
President of the Youth Centre of Greek Emigrants in Cyprus  
Secretary of the Confederation of Cyprus Workers
28. Mr Alexis Koutsoventis  
President of the Agros Youth Centre
29. Dr Nicos Trimikliniotis  
Director, Institute of Labour of the Pancyprian Workers' Federation (INEK)
30. Mr Antonis Mavrides  
Member, Pancyprian Diabetic Association  
Member of the Royal Aeronautical Society  
Member of the "Kormakitis" Association

## REGIONAL STAKEHOLDERS: – LIMASSOL/PAPHOS

1. *Mr Tony Antoniou*  
Chairman of the Limassol Chamber of Commerce and Industry
2. *Mr Evanthis Aristidou*  
Chairman of Rotary Club (Curium)  
Chairman of the Anti-Leukaemia Organisation
3. *Mr Loukas Psillakis*  
Scientific Associate of the Laona Foundation  
Associate of the Cyprus Conservation of the Environment Foundation  
Member of the Limassol Committee for the Natural Environment  
Member of the Federation of Environmental Associations  
Member of the Friends of the Earth
4. *Mr Melios Georgiou*  
President of the Pancyprian Federation of Artisans and Professional Shop Owners (POVEK)
5. *Mr Kyriakos Yiannopoulos*  
Editor (Epikairoites Newspaper)
6. *Dr Annabel Drousiotou*  
Assistant Professor at Intercollege (Limassol Campus)  
Member of the Limassol Branch of the Cyprus Red Cross Society  
Member of the Limassol Branch of the Cyprus Anticancer Society  
Member of the Committee of the Cyprus Federation of Amateur Swimming
7. *Ms Sara Drousiotes*  
Member of the Cyprus Red Cross Limassol Committee  
Member of Limassol Branch of the Red Cross Society  
Member of the Executive Committee of the Cyprus Girl Guides  
Member of the Welfare for the Blind Association  
Member of the Limassol Branch of the Cyprus Anticancer Society  
Member of the Antidrugs Association “Friends of Ayia Skepi”  
Member of the “Solomon Panayides Foundation”  
Member of the Pancyprian Heart Patients Association  
Member of the Kidney Patients Association  
Member of a charity and a ladies’ association
8. *Mr Artemakis Zachariou*  
Chairman of the Limassol Branch of the Cyprus Anticancer Society  
Member of the Cyprus Red Cross Committee  
Former Assistant Governor of the Limassol Rotary Club
9. *Mr Ioulios Theodorides*  
Chairman of the Coordinating Council of Cultural Associations of Limassol  
Secretary of the Board of Directors of the Rialto Theatre (non-profit organisation)  
Member of the Limassol Film Club  
Member of the Limassol Theatrical Development Society

10. *Mr Stephanos Theodorou*  
Inspector of Primary Education (Paphos)  
Member of the Association of Inspectors of Primary Education  
Member of the Paphos District Child Welfare Council
11. *Mr Thomas Katsionis*  
General Manager of the Theotokos Foundation  
Member of the Executive Committee of the Limassol Folklore Association  
Member of the Club of Greek Citizens in Cyprus
12. *Ms Maria Kafouri*  
Technician at the Blood Bank of the New Hospital in Limassol
13. *Ms Marina Martin*  
Assistant General Secretary of the Ecological – Environmental Movement  
Vice-President of the Council of Wine Products  
Member of the Ecological Movement  
Member of the Scientific and Technical Chamber of Cyprus
14. *Ms Georgia Detzer*  
Artistic Director of the Rialto Theatre  
Member of the Limassol Theatrical Development Society
15. *Ms Dora Onoufriou*  
General Manager of the Kanika Group of Companies  
Member of the Board of Directors of the Human Resources Development Authority  
Member of the Association of Women Entrepreneurs  
Member of the Association of Directors  
Member of the Association of Land Developers
16. *Mr Michalis Papaevagorou*  
Journalist / Manager of Channel 6 Radio Station  
Member of the Executive Committee of the Day of Love for the Child Fund  
Member of the Nautical Club of Limassol  
Member of the Limassol Theatrical Development Society
17. *Mr Michalis Paphitanis*  
President of the Association of the Self-Employed
18. *Mr Nikos Rossos*  
Chairman of the Association for the Confrontation of Social Problems  
Chairman of the Children's Camping Association
19. *Mr Kyriakos Hadjitofis*  
Mayor of Ayios Athanasios
20. *Mr. George Christophides*  
Chairman of the Committee for the Restoration of Human Rights Through Cyprus  
President of the World Federation of UNESCO Clubs, Centres and Associations (WFUCA)  
President European Federation of UNESCO Clubs, Centres and Associations (EFUCA)

President Cyprus Federation of UNESCO Clubs, Centres and Associations (CYFUCA)

President NEMESOS

Former President of the Lyrical Stage

Vice Chairman of the Lawyer's Council, Committee on Human Rights

21. *Ms Chryso Soteriadou*

Member of the Antidrug Association ASPIS

Member of the Scientific Committee of the Antidrug Association KENTHEA

Member of the Secondary School Teachers Union (OELMEK)

22. *Ms Sophia Charalambous*

Senior Lecturer, Intercollege (Limassol Campus)

23. *Ms Maria Kostaki*

Member of the Council of the Association of Autistic Persons or Persons with Autistic Characteristics

24. *Mr Christos Athanasiades*

Member of the Limassol District Committee of the Secondary School Teachers' Union (OELMEK)

25. *Ms Stella Michaelidou*

President of the Centre for the Support of AIDS Carriers

26. *Mr Elias Myrianthous*

President of the Paphos Federation of Parents Associations

27. *Mr Demos Demosthenous*

District Secretary of the Union of Cyprus Farmers

## APPENDIX 3

### RESEARCH METHODS OVERVIEW

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The following research methods were used as part of the Civil Society Index (CSI) project:

1. Literature review / collection of secondary data
2. Regional stakeholders' survey
3. Regional stakeholders' consultations
4. Population survey
5. Media review
6. Policy impact studies
7. Key informant interviews

In this Appendix, an attempt is made to explain the main sources of information upon which this report is based. The emphasis here is on the more 'technical' aspects of the research rather than on the methodological issues raised by the CIVICUS CSI methodology. Important though such issues are for the quality of the data, they are not discussed here, as they would appear rather 'esoteric' to readers who are not familiar with debates in the social sciences. The fact that they are not discussed in this Appendix does not, of course, mean that they are not relevant to the concerns of this project.

#### 1. Literature review / collection of secondary data

The initial step of the CSI project was to identify existing literature on the subject of civil society both, in general, and in relation to civil society in the southern part of Cyprus in particular. At that stage, data were collected from a variety of sources, such as international organisations (e.g. the European Union, Council of Europe, World Bank), international NGOs (e.g. Transparency International, Freedom House), Republic of Cyprus and foreign government publications (e.g. Ombudsman reports, Ministry websites), civil society sources (e.g. trade union and welfare organisations publications) and academic sources. The literature review led to the compilation of a bibliography on existing sources and the identification of gaps in the literature. Since civil society in Cyprus is a field that has not been systematically researched before, it was not always easy to locate relevant material.<sup>128</sup>

The review of the literature and the collection of secondary data was an ongoing process as new sources were located and the research team's attention was drawn to new material. While every attempt was made to crosscheck and triangulate data, it was not always possible to verify them because of the paucity of information.

#### 2. Regional stakeholder survey

The regional stakeholder survey was administered in June 2005 in two phases. The first phase covered the districts of Limassol and Paphos and was carried out during the first two weeks of June. The second phase covered the districts of Nicosia, Larnaka and Famagusta and was carried out during the last two weeks of June.

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<sup>128</sup> Data on the structure of CS were especially difficult to gather since registries of organisations were not computerised or classified in a systematic manner. The fact that registries were held in more than one places depending on the nature of organisation (e.g. association registries were kept at the Ministry of the Interior, clubs registries were held by District Officers and sports club registries were provided to the research team by the Cyprus Sports Federation) meant that the tracing of all registered CSOs was extremely time-consuming. A major problem was the identification of non-registered CSOs. Those were traced through registered federations and personal contacts of the research team.

In accordance with the CSI methodology, respondents to the questionnaire were individuals, who were knowledgeable about civil society. The majority of the respondents were employed by CSOs (38%) as opposed to private sector employees who were actively involved in civil society (29%) and public administrators with an active involvement in CSOs (24%). It should be noted here, however, that most respondents were members in more than one organisation. In many ways this proved an advantage, because they were people with a good knowledge of civil society who could provide insightful information. The fact that some of those people served as active members of CSOs while others held positions of authority in those organisations (e.g. members of their executive committees, Chairs) added to the richness of the information that they provided to the team.

The criteria for selecting the survey participants were twofold. The first criterion was that participants were knowledgeable about civil society. The second criterion was that the participants represented a wide range of sectors within and outside civil society. Special care was taken to ensure that those invited to participate reflected the actual distribution of CSOs in the southern part of Cyprus.

In total, 107 people were invited to participate by means of a formal letter, fax or email, followed by a telephone call. Out of those, 57 completed and submitted the questionnaire – 27 from the Limassol and Paphos districts and 30 from the Nicosia, Larnaka and Famagusta districts. The 53% response rate was not necessarily due to the unwillingness of the rest to take part in the research, but to them having other commitments (e.g. meetings, conferences, workshops) during the research period.

The 57 respondents were members in at least 113 organisations (organisations that they stated they knew well). These were mainly health and welfare organisations (20%), professional associations (12%), civic groups (11%), neighbourhood/village committees (10%) and cultural groups (8%). Overall there was a difficulty approaching people from rural areas. Due to time constraints, the research team could not visit rural dwellers in person, in order to assist them with completing the questionnaire or to collect the completed questionnaires from more remote areas. Hence, only a small percentage of the respondents (5%) were residents of rural areas. Difficulties were also encountered in our efforts to approach groups representing ethnic minorities. Although they were approached, there was no interest on their part to participate in the survey. Finally, despite the efforts of the research team to have a gender-balanced sample, almost 60% of the respondents were men. This had more to do with the fact that the respondents to the questionnaire were invited to the regional stakeholders' consultations on a Saturday (see below), and a significant number of women declined the invitation to participate due to domestic responsibilities. The main reasons given to the research team were, grocery shopping and spending time with family.

### 3. Regional stakeholder consultations

The respondents to the regional stakeholder survey were invited to attend a consultation meeting in June 2005 – the respondents from the Limassol and Paphos districts were invited to participate in the Limassol consultation on 11 June 2005 and the respondents from the Nicosia, Larnaka and Famagusta districts were invited to the Nicosia consultation on 25 June 2005.

Due to time constraints, and after consultation with CIVICUS, it was decided that the consultations should specifically focus on the survey answers and specific examples to the open-ended questions due to their importance for the indicator scoring. The consultation focused on those survey responses which the research team felt were in need of clarification or elaboration. Thus, after the introductions and a quick briefing on the overall project, stakeholders were invited to discuss their answers to the questionnaire and, where needed, provide examples to illustrate their answers.

Out of the 57 respondents to the questionnaire, 44 attended the consultations – 21 participants attended the Limassol consultation and 23 attended the one in Nicosia. The number of male participants was again higher than the number of female participants; however, there were more female participants in the Nicosia consultation than in the Limassol consultation. Overall, the percentage of male participants was 59%.

While the two consultations had the same purpose, differences in the group dynamics led to a greater discussion on conceptual and methodological issues in the Nicosia consultation. The Nicosia participants appeared more suspicious of the international interests behind the project. For example, some concerns were voiced regarding the potential use of the project results by American-interest organizations. The Limassol participants, however, appeared more eager and open to discuss and share experiences regarding the state of civil society in the southern part of Cyprus.

One possible explanation is the different backgrounds of the participants: the participants of the Limassol consultation were mainly representatives of welfare and cultural associations, while a significant number of participants in the Nicosia consultation were representatives of advocacy and pressure groups.

#### 4. Population survey

The population survey (CS Survey 2005) was carried out among 702 adults (18 years old and older) from all of the districts of the areas currently under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. The sample was stratified according to the district of residence, gender and type of area of residence (urban/rural), based on the last population census (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Service, 2001). The results have a confidence level of 99% and a confidence interval of 4.87.

The telephone interviews were carried out during the last two weeks of July 2005 by interviewers trained by the research team and covered issues such as membership in CSOs, charitable giving, public trust, tolerance, volunteering and participation in community-level events. The interviews were carried out in two shifts – the morning shift between the hours 9 am to 1 pm and the afternoon shift between the hours of 4 pm and 8 pm. The questionnaire was tested on a small number of citizens (50) before taking its final form.

The main constraint encountered during the research was the time frame in which the interviews were conducted. July is a holiday month and a large number of people were away from their homes. Many phone calls were therefore left unanswered. However, the fact that many people were taking time off from their workplace during this time meant that there were more men and women under 50 years old at home rather than work during the morning and early afternoon hours than would have been the case under normal circumstances.

The research team found that the research topic raised suspicions among many citizens and was left with the impression that the rejection rate was higher than other less sensitive surveys. The main source of suspicion, as reported by the interviewers, was the lack of knowledge of what exactly civil society is. However, the rejection rate was also highly influenced by the length of the questionnaire, which took about 10-15 minutes to complete.

#### 5. Media review

The media review was carried out during the months of March, May and June 2005 and it aimed primarily at investigating the manner in which civil society is presented in the media. For this purpose, three daily newspapers, *Haravgi*, *Simerini* and *Phileleftheros*, representing both different ideologies and target audience were selected for monitoring. The research team provided training on monitoring the print media for civil society related news and the

classification and electronic recording of the clipped news items according to the CIVICUS classification system.

#### 6. Policy impact studies

In order to assess the impact of civil society on public policy, the CSI methodology required the research team to select three issues from different policy fields and evaluate the success or failure of civil society in influencing the policy outcome on the respective issue. Thus, a social policy issue that has been prominent two years prior to the research, an issue area from civil society's traditional advocacy field of human rights, and the impact of civil society on the national budget process needed to be researched.

Based on consultations with key informants from civil society and public administration, the research team established that the most prominent social policy issue of the last couple of years was the decision of the Ministry of Health to close down the main Nicosia General Hospital Oncology Ward. The most important current human rights issue was the violation of the rights of foreign workers.

Once the two issues were identified, the research team drafted a separate report for each one of them. The two reports on the human rights and the social policy issues were conducted in August and were mainly based on newspaper articles and interviews with key informants.

Concerning the report on the national budget, it became evident after consultations with government officials and civil society stakeholders that there is no institutionalised and transparent procedure for the participation of CSOs in the budgetary process and therefore it is not possible for civil society to have a clear impact on the formation of the national budget. The research team informed CIVICUS of this and a decision was reached not to write this third report.

#### 7. Key informant interviews

Throughout the final stages of the project, the research team held a number of interviews with people who were knowledgeable about different aspects of civil society and its environment (e.g. journalists, civil society stakeholders, government officials, accountants and lawyers with an in-depth knowledge of civil society). Key informant interviews proved useful as they helped to fill significant gaps in the information that was accumulated by the research team. The interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity.

## APPENDIX 4

### **SOCIAL POLICY IMPACT STUDY - THE REACTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO GOVERNMENT PLANS TO CLOSE DOWN THE ONCOLOGY WARD OF THE NICOSIA GENERAL HOSPITAL**

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#### *Introduction*

Until recently, treating cancer patients in the Republic of Cyprus was the responsibility of the Nicosia General Hospital (NGH) and the Bank of Cyprus (BoC) Oncology Centre, also based in Nicosia.<sup>129</sup> The interests of cancer patients were catered by a number of CSOs. This is a study on the impact of some of those CSOs upon a government decision to close down the oncology ward of the NGH.

#### The Case

In early 2004, the Ministry of Health announced its intention to gradually close down the oncology ward of the NGH. The Ministry claimed that cancer patients could be adequately serviced by a new oncology ward that was to be created in the Limassol General Hospital in November of the same year (originally intended to service cancer patients from the Limassol and Paphos regions), the BoC Oncology Centre and the Arodaphnousa Palliative Care Centre which is based in Nicosia.

The decision revealed the inadequacy or, as the media described it at the time, the “complete absence of public policy or planning in the field of health care” (Cyprus Mail, 2005). The situation was described as a major social problem by civil society, the media and DISY, the right-wing opposition party, while the Patients’ Rights Association warned that the Government’s decision would have disastrous effects on the quality of health care in Cyprus (Saoulli, 2004b).

The closure of the oncology ward raised three major issues regarding cancer treatment:

- First, the BoC Oncology Centre and Arodaphnousa Centres were seen as unable to accommodate all of the patients who would be turning to them after the oncology ward of the Nicosia General Hospital was closed down, due to their limited capacity. Those fears were confirmed by BoC officials who stressed that at the time (June 2004) the Centre had thirty-two beds and could only increase the number of beds to forty.
- Second, the small number of nurses working that the BoC Oncology Centre would not be able to service all cancer patients adequately.
- Third, the plans for a new hospital in Nicosia did not include a specialized oncology ward. This raised important questions on the future of cancer treatment in Cyprus but more importantly, the government’s health care policy (Saoulli, 2004c).

The mobilization of the Coordinating Committee of Cancer Patients and Relatives of the Oncology Ward (hereafter referred to as the ‘Committee’) took place immediately after the ward was closed. Since the day the decision to close down the oncology ward was announced,

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<sup>129</sup> The Oncology Centre was co-founded by the Bank of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus in 1998. The land the Centre was built on and its equipment were donated by the Bank, while its operation expenses are partly covered by an annual state grant (Bank of Cyprus, n.d.) .

the Committee organised a number of activities aimed at raising awareness on the issue and reversing the decision. The biggest activity was a thirty day-long vigil from September to October 2004 (Simerini, 2004c). A number of public figures supported the protesters, such as Green Party leader Mr. George Perdakis, who visited the protesters on site. The Green Party also donated tents to the protesters. The Nicosia Municipality showed its support for the protesters by providing them with a portable toilet. Huge support was also shown by members of the public (Saoulli, 2004d).

The most important step of the Committee however, was its decision to take the Ministry of Health and the NGH to Court in November 2004 for their refusal to admit patients and their liability for any related deaths (Saoulli, 2004e). In June 2005, the Supreme Court ruled against the decision of the Government to downsize the oncology ward of the NGH, and ordered the return of the nursing staff and the ward to its original capacity (Phileleftheros, 2005d). While the decision was hailed by the opposition, as well as the Committee, the need for a plan to radically improve the services to cancer patients was stressed.

### **Conclusion**

Even though it is difficult to separate the impact of civil society on the outcome of the mobilisation from the impact of other factors such as the media, political pressures and public outcry, the immediate and strong reaction of the Coordinating Committee of Cancer Patients and Relatives of the Oncology Ward was a great contributor to the restoration of the oncology services offered by the state, and raised public awareness for the need to have a solid health care policy. What this case study also shows is how the existence of an 'enabling' environment enhances the activities of CSOs. The country's laws 'enabled' demonstrations, appeals to courts, access to information but they also 'enabled' the media to inform the public and thereby contribute to the mobilization of public opinion.

Today, the hospital's oncology ward is functioning in its original capacity, and, while there is still, admittedly, much to be done on the issue of cancer treatment services by the government, the mobilization of those CSOs and their success in overturning the governmental decision could be considered as an indicator of the impact of civil society on social policy.

## APPENDIX 5

### CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

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#### Overview

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) promotes the voluntary role of private corporations to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment beyond their financial and capital commitments (Small Business Europe, n.d.).

The CSR study carried out by the research team as part of the CSI project (and according to the CSI methodology) revealed that Cyprus lacks both a coherent public policy and structured activity by private corporations on CSR.<sup>130</sup> This could, and should, be attributed to the relatively small size of the island's economy that does not allow for the growth of large corporations, which are usually the ones that have the drive and capacity to pursue CSR activities.<sup>131</sup>

When asked to rate the work of major companies in CSR, 56% of the regional stakeholder survey respondents described it as 'limited' while 13% said that it was 'insignificant'. Only 7% answered that it was 'significant' and 15% described it as 'moderate'.

In the CSR study, it emerged that only three of the ten largest companies have shown substantial activity in the field of CSR.<sup>132</sup> They are the three major Banks on the island – the Bank of Cyprus, the Cyprus Popular Bank and the Hellenic Bank.

The activities carried out by these three Banks, as part of their CSR policy range from health services (like the creation of the Oncology Centre, the Home Care Centre and the Arodafnousa Palliative Care Centre by the Bank of Cyprus), to culture (the Cultural Foundation and the Historical Archives of the Bank of Cyprus, the Cultural Centres of the Popular Bank and the Hellenic Bank), major charity events (the Bank of Cyprus supports the Christodoula March, the Popular Bank supports the Radiomathon and the Hellenic Bank supports Telethon) to environmental and educational initiatives.

The remaining companies contribute to charities and cultural events on an *ad hoc* basis, and when prompted by the research team they did not seem to have a systematic CSR policy in place.<sup>133</sup> For example, Cyprus Airways has offered discounts on air fares of people who travel for medical reasons and their escort, while the other companies contribute to charities like Telethon, the Radiomathon and the Christodoula March, as well as smaller charity campaigns.

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<sup>130</sup> One component of the CIVICUS CS Index research methodology is the analysis of the CSR activities of the ten largest companies in the country (as indicated by their turnover), in a Corporate Social Responsibility Study.

<sup>131</sup> According to official figures, 95% of all enterprises employ less than 10 persons and 99% employ less than 250 persons (Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, 2004). In essence, that is, the economy of the island is dominated by very small units and 'corporations' are few. In fact, the Association of Commercial Banks of Cyprus estimates that there are only fifty-three corporations in Cyprus that could be categorized as large (ACCB, 2005).

<sup>132</sup> The ten largest companies in Cyprus were identified by establishing their turnover for the year 2004 as was reported in the Cyprus Stock Exchange (Cyprus Stock Exchange, 2004). The annual reports of those ten companies gave an insight into their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices in 2004. In those cases in which the annual reports did not contain sufficient data, further information was obtained through telephone interviews with company representatives and other sources such as newspaper articles and company websites.

<sup>133</sup> i.e. Cyprus Airways Ltd, Louis Public Company Ltd, Cyprus Trading Corporation Ltd, Petrolina Public Ltd, Libra Holidays, Orphanides Public Company and Chris Cash and Carry Public Company.

## Study Findings

The largest public company in Cyprus is the Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd.<sup>134</sup> The Bank has an established policy on CSR, which primarily focuses on issues concerning youth, the arts and specific social groups. The Bank's most significant contribution is an established charity event, the "Christodoula March", which was launched in 1999 and is a campaign to promote cancer awareness. Through the "Christodoula March", the company has managed to raise around CYP 654,000 for the year 2004. These funds were used to partially cover: the operating expenses of "Arodaphnousa" Palliative Care Centre, which provides free medical and nursing care, as well as psychological support to more than 250 cancer patients every year; the operating expenses of the Home Care Service, which covers the whole of Cyprus and offers free personal care and psychological support to 600 cancer patients at their own home; the operating expenses of the Day Care Service in Nicosia and Limassol, which serves around 80 cancer patients; to provide financial assistance to 238 low income families of cancer patients, to public campaigns concerning cancer and for improvements, renovations and additions to Arodafnousa Palliative Care Centre and Day Care Centre. Throughout the years the Bank has also established two centres – the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, which assists in rescuing the island's cultural heritage, and promoting the Hellenic culture of Cyprus at a professional and scholarly level and the Oncology Centre, a hospital that specializes in the cure of cancer and participates in prevention and early detection programmes. The Bank's other activities include the organization and sponsoring of various events such as a vocational fair "Career 2004", the education of the public on economic and financial topics through the "New Manager" programme, the Italian Month, the sponsorship of the Historical Exhibition and the annual Art Dialogues event. In addition, the website / programme «Oikade» which was established in 1999, aims to educate children and teenagers in over 100 schools worldwide, by fostering communication between them. Finally, the Bank's Historical Archives, established in 2001 aim to identify, document and preserve archives that have to do with the organization's development over the years as well as the financial history of the island.

The Cyprus Popular Bank Public Company Ltd is the second largest public company. One of the declared aims of the Bank is to improve the quality of life of citizens through the support of education, sports and culture. The Bank's social responsibility policy involves sponsoring as well as organising events which address the needs of various social groups. During the past few years, special attention was paid to activities that contribute to children's welfare, particularly the welfare of children with special needs. The most important event organized by the Bank together with the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, is the Radiomathon. The Radiomathon is one of the biggest charity events in Cyprus and raised about CYP 14.000.000 during the past 14 years, for the benefit of children in need. In 1993, the Bank established its Cultural Centre. The Centre's main activities include the organisation of exhibitions and events, luxury publications, sponsorships, Museum Education Programmes in all government controlled areas of the island and its three major collections (Works of Art, Rare Books, Photographs-Postcards). In 2004, the Bank sponsored for the 15th consecutive year the European School Competition, which was organised by the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Students of all ages from primary, secondary and technical schools are eligible to participate in the competition and express their thoughts, views and visions for the future, in particular as Cyprus was preparing to join the European Union. The competition also includes an Internet Award Scheme that is organised within the framework of the Europe at School programme of the Council of Europe.

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<sup>134</sup> The term public here is used to describe a company listed in the stock market.

Cyprus Airways Ltd, the third largest public company maintains a CSR policy, although the depth of the company's contribution has been reduced for the time being, due to financial difficulties. The company offers discounts on airfares to people who are sent by the government for medical treatment abroad. The discount covers 30% of the air ticket for the patient and their escort. A similar scheme has been adopted for the blind and the physically challenged, in the form of a 50% discount on their plane tickets. The same discount is offered to their escort. Apart from offering discounts, the group sponsors various cultural, musical and other artistic events.

The fourth largest company, the Hellenic Bank Ltd states that it has maintained a CSR policy for years. The Bank argues that a social and cultural contribution to society is an integral part of the company's culture and claims to play an active role, mainly in the area of sponsoring and organising various cultural events. Through its Cultural Centre, the Bank supports the arts as a step towards the preservation of history and culture. In 2004, the Bank published the *History of the Presidential Palace* and co-organised an arts exhibition with the Embassy of Greece. During the same year the Bank contributed financially to the Institute of Genetics and Neurology in an effort to enhance Telethon, a charity event that raises money for the sponsorship of research on rare genetic disorders. The Bank also cooperates with the environmental organization Cyprus Marine Environment Protection Association (CYMEPA) and the Museums of Palaeontology and Marine World.

Louis Public Company Ltd, fifth in rank, does not make a specific mention of any CSR activities in their 2004 annual report. Company employees however, informed the research team through telephone conversations that the company contributes to charities on an occasional basis.

The sixth largest company, the Cyprus Trading Corporation Ltd has established a CSR committee, which holds monthly meetings. CTC contributes financially to various philanthropic events such as the Telethon and the Radiomathon. No further details were made available to the research team.

Ranked seventh is Petrolina (Holdings) Public Ltd. In 2004, the company contributed financially to the Association of Cancer Patients and Friends, the Radiomathon, the Cyprus Red Cross, the Ioannou and Paraskevaides Foundation, the Love Fund, the Association of Children with Special Needs, the Cans for Kids Association, the Cyprus Police Torch Run and the Blind Association.

The Libra Holidays Group, ranked eighth, does not have a written policy on CSR. However, it does contribute financially to the three main charity events in Cyprus – the Christodoula March, the Radiomathon and Telethon. The company also states that it helps financially school children from low-income families during the Christmas and Easter holidays.

Orphanides Public Company Ltd, ranked ninth, reports that it has an established CSR policy. During 2004 it provided financial aid to the Tsunami victims and often offers its premises for philanthropic events and blood donations. The company also states that it offers a 5% return on the monthly grocery shopping of families with more than three children.

The tenth largest company is Chris Cash and Carry Public Company. The company does not have a written policy on corporate philanthropy. Company employees however informed the research team that the company often helps low-income families, foundations and the church. It also contributes to all three major charity events (Telethon, Radiomathon, Christodoula March) and other charity activity as the need arises.

**Summary**

The small number of companies that show substantial activity in the field of CSR is largely the result of the small size of the majority of enterprises. Size matters if only because small companies are highly unlikely to engage in CSR activities due to financial constraints, but also because an important factor leading companies to engage in CSR activities is marketing (i.e. the 'image' of the company): larger companies are more likely to invest in their image than smaller firms.

## APPENDIX 6

### CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MEDIA

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*(This report was prepared by Constantia Soteriou and Monica Ioannidou  
and translated by Dr Christos Pavlides)*

The media review covering the months of March, May and June 2005<sup>135</sup> aimed at investigating the manner in which civil society is presented in the media. For this purpose, three daily newspapers, *Haravgi*, *Simerini* and *Phileleftheros*, representing both different ideologies and target audience were selected to be monitored. The three newspapers were not selected at random. *Haravgi* embodies the expressive thought of the communist party AKEL and hence, we deduced that it would have increased sensitivities as far as civil society is concerned. *Simerini* is a newspaper with rightist tendencies even if it does not constitute the expressive body of a particular party and *Phileleftheros*, the largest in circulation newspaper, is considered "neutral" and addresses a wide range of readers, from different social classes.

The fact that only three print media were covered was a severe shortcoming of the media review not only because of the differences in the role of print media as opposed to that of electronic media (especially in the presentation and the depth of examination of issues), but also because of the importance of electronic media in the journalistic affairs of the country. Furthermore, the time span of the media review (just three months) constituted another important drawback, as this time period was not sufficient to give a comprehensive image of the manner in which civil society is presented in the media. Nonetheless, despite its limitations this study provides an initial attempt at highlighting the main features of the media's perception of civil society. It will potentially serve as a basis for further research on the relations between the media and civil society in the southern part of Cyprus, which has so far not been studied.

The references to civil society were analysed in relation to:

- ❖ the type of the news item (i.e. character of article/report, short/long report, interview, analysis),
- ❖ the topic of the item (i.e. education, labour issue, welfare, human rights, environment),
- ❖ the type of CSO (i.e. types of organisations that appear in the item either as primary or secondary actors based on a list of 21 organisations),
- ❖ the geographical scope of the item (i.e. international, national, regional, local),
- ❖ the prominence of the item within the newspaper (i.e. items relating to civil society published in first pages or less important pages) and
- ❖ the presentation of civil society (i.e. positive/neutral/negative).

The review showed that the manner of coverage of civil society events differed from newspaper to newspaper. The research showed that *Haravgi*, a leftist publication as stated earlier had, for the period examined, the highest coverage for civil society, whereas *Phileleftheros*, despite the fact that it is considered the newspaper that provides coverage for all social events, ranked second. *Simerini* had the fewest references of the three.

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<sup>135</sup> The month of April was excluded from the media review after a suggestion from the Turkish-Cypriot team. It was believed that the election campaigns during that month would affect the presentation of CS in the media.

**TABLE A.6.1: Percentage distribution of references to civil society events per newspaper**

Newspaper	%
<i>Haravgi</i>	41
<i>Phileleftheros</i>	33
<i>Simerini</i>	26
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Media Review*

The reason that *Haravgi* had the most references is directly related to the fact that due to its affiliation with AKEL, it tends to cover all the events that have to do with trade union and other matters like events by the women's organization POGO and youth events related directly or indirectly with AKEL. On the contrary *Simerini*, despite the fact that it is an opposition paper and, as such, covers civil society events that are in opposition to the government, did not dedicate many pages to issues relating to civil society. *Phileleftheros*, in keeping with its image, kept a balanced attitude.

From the results it emerged that, in any case, civil society is not a priority issue for the Press since civil society events were not covered in the first or so-called 'important pages' of the newspapers. As the review has shown, only 7% of civil society news was printed on the first pages despite the fact that during the period examined there were important protest events of civil society. At the same time, a large percentage of press coverage was found in the less important pages.<sup>136</sup>

With regard to the type of reporting, the overwhelming majority (94%) related to news stories which merely report the activities and events of civil society. A much smaller percentage (2%) was allotted to brief news-announcements and a still smaller coverage, to opinion articles. A small percentage was devoted to interviews (1%), and letters to the editor (0,2%).

With reference to the news items relating to civil society, most of the coverage (34%) concerned labour and trade union issues. Next were issues on education (8%) followed by health (8%), advocacy (6%), regional issues (6%), labour issues (business) (5%), and agriculture (4%). The topics that were presented in smaller percentages in the newspapers included, among other subject, issues of conflicts (0,2%), the mass media (25%) and national issues (25%).

*Haravgi*, as mentioned earlier, embodies the expressive thought of the communist party AKEL and gives emphasis to trade union issues that relate to the powerful Pancyprian Workers Federation (PEO) to which the members of the party belong. During the monitoring period, 54% of newspaper coverage referring to civil society dealt with issues of labour and trade unions. Forty-three per cent of coverage in the rightist newspaper *Simerini*, was also associated with the same two issues. This high percentage can be attributed to the good relationship of *Simerini* with the right-wing Cyprus Workers' Confederation (SEK), which is the second strongest labour federation in Cyprus. At the same time, only 39% of the 'neutral' *Phileleftheros* gave coverage to such issues.

<sup>136</sup> According to information we received from the newspapers that were used in the review, the three most important pages per newspaper are the following: *Haravgi*: pp. 1, 5, 6; *Phileleftheros*: p. 1, last page (the number of pages differs with each publication), two inside pages; *Simerini*: pp. 1, 7, 8.

Twenty-eight per cent of references concerned professional and business associations, 16% concerned community level groups, followed by issues concerning economic interest groups (12%), student and youth associations (11%) and health and social welfare organisations (8%). The activities with the lowest coverage in these newspapers were education groups (1%), social movements (0,44%) and philanthropic organisations (0,22%).

Most news reports on civil society in the newspapers related, in essence, to references dealing with national issues for the most part (60%) while of importance were also events that dealt with local topics. The table that follows shows the ‘geographic scope’ of issues:

**TABLE A.6.2: Percentage distribution of references to civil society per geographic scope**

Geographic Scope	%
National	60
Local	27
Regional	8
International	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Media Review*

The table above shows that a very large majority of the news items identified could be classified as national news. This percentage, however, also deals with trade union activities, which were particularly intense during the period under review (trade union and other labour disputes, which in their majority stemmed from the Cyprus accession to the EU). News of local interest also had a high percentage of coverage. Of interest here is the fact that the newspapers did not cover international civil society news or civil society activities. Those international events that enjoyed coverage were related, in the majority, to Cypriot civil society events in collaboration with international CSOs.

With regard to the civil society dimensions, the majority of topics related to the ‘Impact’ dimension (67%).

**TABLE A.6.3: Percentage distribution of references to civil society by dimension**

Dimension	%
Impact	67
Values	13
Structure	11
Environment	9

Source: *Media Review*

As the results of the research indicate, the majority of references in the newspapers related to the extent of the impact and, more specifically, to national issues, civil society, and local issues. The indicators in these cases refer initially to holding the state accountable (Indicator 4.2.1). It is worth noting that *Phileleftheros* had the largest number of references (89 of the total of references examined), while *Haravgi* had the lowest number (74 references), while *Simerini* had 76. This can be explained if one considers *Haravgi*’s relationship with the coalition government.

The references concerning the ‘Empowering of Citizens’ (Subdimension 4.4), were also numerous and in this particular case *Haravgi* had the largest number of references (68) in relation to *Phileleftheros* (40) and *Simerini* (34). Articles that concerned the ‘Support of

Livelihoods' (Indicator 4.4.6), were published often and *Haravgi* had the largest number of references (27) while *Simerini* had 22 and *Phileleftheros*, 14.

The manner in which the newspapers recorded civil society events reflected their rather neutral stance towards it. The references showed that, in general terms, the newspapers presented civil society in a neutral/objective manner in the majority of cases (86%). It is remarkable to note, however, that the positive references (12%) were by far more than the negative ones (2%).

*Haravgi* had the most positive references with regard to civil society (a total of 29), a fact which can be explained if one considers that many of its references dealt with trade union organisations which *Haravgi* supports. Nonetheless, *Haravhi* also has the most negative publications for civil society (4), which does not leave margin for valid conclusions. Analytically, the manner of presentation (positive, negative or neutral) of the publications on the civil society, per newspaper, is the following:

**TABLE A.6.4: Percentage distribution of civil society references according to manner of presentation per newspaper**

Newspaper	Manner of Presentation		
	Negative	Neutral	Positive
<i>Haravgi</i>	4	130	29
<i>Phileleftheros</i>	1	123	10
<i>Simernini</i>	2	92	11

Source: *Media Review*

The fact that the majority of items depict civil society in a neutral manner is justified given the fact that the majority of civil society items monitored were in the form of news stories. These types of stories in most cases do not include the author's opinion but rather include an account of an event or activity.

The abundance of neutral references related to the 'Impact' dimension (367) and, a smaller percentage, to the 'Values' dimension (53). However, nine publications that related to the 'Impact' dimension were deemed negative while no references to the 'Structure' dimension were considered negative. On the contrary, 21 references concerning the 'Structure' dimension were considered positive.

Civil society was generally covered in a relatively satisfactory manner by the three newspapers during the monitoring period. The left-wing newspaper *Haravgi* gave a wider coverage of civil society news than *Simerini* and *Phileleftheros*. This, as was observed, was not as much a result of its leftist sensitivities, but the fact that it gave press coverage to organisations related to the party interests that it supports. Generally speaking, news concerning civil society were generally treated as less important than political news that were the ones that usually received the lion's share of publicity in the front, important' pages of the three newspapers. News items related to civil society were typically found in the internal pages of the three newspapers, thus acquiring a 'secondary' status. The references to civil society during the monitoring period mainly concerned news coverage. There was no obvious interest in covering civil society activity in depth, through a variety of means (interviews and research). The issues that were covered related to a large extent to trade union and labour events. As a result, the leading figures of civil society were individuals associated with trade unions. The references to civil society in the three newspapers were in general neutral and objective while the positive references to civil society were by far more than the negative ones. This reflects on the one hand, the neutral role of civil society, which is unable to give some type of stigma (positive or negative) and, on the other hand, the weakness of the Press to criticise civil society and those actors involved in it.

## APPENDIX 7: HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IMPACT STUDY – THE ACTIVITY OF TRADE UNIONS REGARDING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS

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### Introduction

The right to fair and just working conditions is included in the European Union's 2000 Charter on Fundamental Rights (Council of the European Union, 2000). In modern societies, immigrant workers are generally considered a most vulnerable social group precisely because their working conditions are neither 'fair' nor 'just'. This is a case study of how the two biggest trade unions in the southern part of Cyprus tried to protect the interests of immigrant workers in a society that has the legal capacity to do so but apparently it does not utilise it.

### The Case

According to a 2003 article by the Cyprus Labour Institute of the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) in the European Industrial Relations Observatory Online, the total number of legal immigrant workers in Cyprus was 29.730 (Trimikliniotis, 2003), while the Confederation of Cyprus Workers (SEK) reports that between 1999 and 2004, there has been an 130.70% increase in the number of immigrant workers (Politis, 2005b).

The issue of the mistreatment of foreign workers (Trimikliniotis, 2003) in Cyprus came to light with Cyprus's accession to the European Union (EU) in May 2004. This is not to say that the poor working conditions and employment terms of foreign workers were not widely known among the Cyprus public before. However, EU membership transformed the problem into a European one, especially since a significant percentage of foreign workers comes from other member-states of the EU, like the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.

The prospect of accession to the EU necessitated the adoption by the Republic of Cyprus of a series of EU directives concerning human rights and their incorporation in the national legal framework.<sup>137</sup> Research carried out in the context of the CIVICUS project, has revealed that although the country has specific laws in place safeguarding the rights of foreign workers (e.g. the Law on the Combat of Racial and Some Other Inequalities (Law 42(1)/2004), the Law on Equal Treatment (Racial or National Descent) (Law 59(1)/2004) and the Law on Equal Treatment at the Workplace (Law 58(1)/2004)) (Republic of Cyprus Office of the Ombudswoman, 2005b), there is an obvious lack of mechanisms that would ensure their efficient implementation.

The two largest trade unions in Cyprus, the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and the Confederation of Cyprus Workers (SEK)<sup>138</sup> have on numerous occasions stressed the need for more effective government measures for the improvement of the working conditions of foreign workers and the actual implementation of EU employment directives, now incorporated in the national legislative framework.

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<sup>137</sup> A total of twenty-one new laws on employment concerning thirteen EU directives have been implemented by the Government as a result of Cyprus's EU accession.

<sup>138</sup> The two trade unions represent large numbers of the population and have been regarded by successive governments as highly respected partners in public policy-making. They participate in a number of government committees and consultative bodies that do not only deal with employment matters but also issues of wider social welfare.

The problem of the mistreatment of foreign workers, as mentioned at the PEO 24<sup>th</sup> Conference (PEO, 2004), is more evident *‘in those sectors of the economy where there is no trade union representation, where foreign workers experience the constant violation of their human rights by their employers, in the areas of wages, overtime, employers’ contributions, social security and provident funds’* (PEO, 2004). There have also been a number of complaints for cases of violent and/or racist behaviour of employers against foreign workers, restrictions on their time-off and interference in their private lives. PEO ascertains that to combat this social problem it is essential for the government to develop an information infrastructure that will increase awareness among foreign workers of their legal and employment rights. Furthermore, PEO has been arguing that there is a pressing need for the modernisation of the Aliens and Immigration Law and the revision of the employment policy for immigrants and demands that the principle of equal treatment is implemented in practice (Trimikliniotis, 2003).

On the other hand, SEK has repeatedly called for the effective implementation of employment laws, especially for sensitive groups such as immigrant workers, through the creation of a solid legal and law-enforcing framework. It also argues that although the legislation is there in theory, the way it is implemented leaves much to be desired (Phileleftheros, 2005b). SEK has also been campaigning for the basic terms of collective agreements between the employers and the workers to become legally binding through a new legislation (Simerini, 2004a, Evripidou, 2004b, Phileleftheros, 2005c).

It should be noted that SEK’s position has not been widely accepted and has in fact at times been judged as problematic. Specifically, and perhaps predictably, the Employers and Industrialists’ Federation (OEB) has on a number of occasions described the situation that would be created if SEK’s demands were adopted by the state as inelastic (Simerini, 2003a, Simerini, 2004b). This seems to be in agreement with PEO’s opinion that in cases in which trade union membership is high, such as in Cyprus, there is no legal regulation on collective negotiations since that would have serious repercussions on the trade union power and ‘leave out of the game the essential role played by the Trade Unions in the procedure of negotiations, signing and implementation of the agreements’ (Pavlikas, 2003).

## **Conclusion**

The issue of the rights of foreign workers is ongoing and up to this day remains unresolved even though one of the declared aims of the current government as announced in 2003 was the in-depth study of the labour market and the implementation of a new policy framework that would ensure the equal treatment of foreign workers (Simerini, 2003b). The two trade unions however, participate in a number of governmental committees and consultative bodies of many Ministries and are often called upon to appear before parliamentary committees in which such issues are discussed. It is important to note, however, that despite their strength and overall position in society, they have not as yet managed to persuade successive governments to protect the rights of foreign workers.

## APPENDIX 8

### CSI SCORING MATRIX FOR THE SOUTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

		Score
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>1 STRUCTURE</b>	<b>1.3</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.1 Breadth of citizen participation</b>	<b>1.6</b>
INDICATORS	1.1.1.Non-partisan political action	2
	1.1.2 Charitable giving	3
	1.1.3 CSO membership	1
	1.1.4 Volunteering	2
	1.1.5 Collective community action	0
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.2. Depth of citizen participation</b>	<b>1.0</b>
INDICATORS	1.2.1 Charitable giving	1
	1.2.2 Volunteering	1
	1.2.3 CSO membership	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.3. Diversity of civil society participants</b>	<b>0.7</b>
INDICATORS	1.3.1 CSO membership	1
	1.3.2 CSO leadership	1
	1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs	0
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.4. Level of organisation</b>	<b>1.2</b>
INDICATORS	1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	1
	1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	2
	1.4.3 Self-regulation	1
	1.4.4 Support infrastructure	1
	1.4.5 International linkages	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.5. Inter-relations</b>	<b>1.5</b>
INDICATORS	1.5.1 Communication	1
	1.5.2 Co-operation	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.6. Resources</b>	<b>1.7</b>
INDICATORS	1.6.1 Financial Resources	1
	1.6.2 Human Resources	2
	1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources	2

		<b>Score</b>
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>2 ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>2.1</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.1. Political context</b>	<b>1.8</b>
INDICATORS	2.1.1 Political rights	2
	2.1.2 Political Competition	3
	2.1.3 Rule of law	2
	2.1.4. Corruption	2
	2.1.5. State effectiveness	2
	2.1.6. Decentralisation	0
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.2 Basic freedoms &amp; rights</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	2.2.1 Civil liberties	2
	2.2.2 Information rights	2
	2.2.3 Press freedoms	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.3. Socio-economic context</b>	<b>3.0</b>
INDICATOR	2.3.1 Socio-economic context How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?	3
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.4. Socio-cultural context</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	2.4.1 Trust	2
	2.4.2 Tolerance	2
	2.4.3 Public spiritedness	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.5. Legal environment</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	2.5.1 CSO registration	2
	2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities	2
	2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs	2
	2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.6 State-civil society relations</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	2.6.1 Autonomy	2
	2.6.2 Dialogue	2
	2.6.3 Co-operation/support	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.7. Private sector-civil society relations</b>	<b>1.7</b>
INDICATORS	2.7.1. Private sector attitude	1
	2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility	2
	2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy	2

		Score
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>3 VALUES</b>	<b>1.9</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.1 Democracy</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs	2
	3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.2. Transparency</b>	<b>1.7</b>
INDICATORS	3.2.1 Corruption within civil society	2
	3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs	2
	3.2.3 Civil society actions to promote transparency	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.3. Tolerance</b>	<b>1.5</b>
INDICATORS	3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena	2
	3.3.2. Civil society actions to promote tolerance	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.4. Non-violence</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena	2
	3.4.2 civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.5. Gender equity</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena	2
	3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs	2
	3.5.3 civil society actions to promote gender equity	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.6. Poverty eradication</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	3.6.1 civil society actions to eradicate poverty	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.7. Environmental sustainability</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	3.7.1 civil society actions to sustain the environment	2

		<b>Score</b>
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>4 IMPACT</b>	<b>1.8</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.1 Influencing public policy</b>	<b>1.7</b>
INDICATORS	4.1.1 Human rights policy impact case study	2
	4.1.2 Social policy impact case study	2
	4.1.3 civil society impact on national budgeting process case study	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.2. Holding state &amp; private corporations accountable</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	4.2.1. Holding state accountable	2
	4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.3. Responding to social interests</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	4.3.1 Responsiveness	2
	4.3.2 Public Trust	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.4. Empowering citizens</b>	<b>1.5</b>
INDICATORS	4.4.1 Informing /educating citizens	2
	4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action	2
	4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people	1
	4.4.4. Empowering women	2
	4.4.5. Building social capital	1
	4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.5. Meeting societal needs</b>	<b>1.7</b>
INDICATORS	4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision	1
	4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly	2
	4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalised groups	2

## **APPENDIX 9**

### **PROJECT ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS**

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Meral Akıncı  
President, KAYAD (Association of Women to Support Life)

Bekir Azgın  
Assistant Professor and Vice Dean, Faculty of Communication and Media Studies  
Chair, Department of Journalism, Eastern Mediterranean University)

Aysel Bodi  
President, Akova Women's Association

Emine Erk  
President, Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation

Hüseyin Gürşan  
General Director, Bayrak Radio & Television (BRT)

Fatma Kınış  
Assistant General Manager, 'TRNC' Development Bank

Ünsal Özbilenler  
Former President, Businessmen Association

Gülden Plümer Küçük  
Former President, Cyprus Turkish Association of University Women

Asaf Şenol  
'Under-Secretary', 'Ministry of Health'

Ahmet Varoğlu  
President, Patients' Rights Association

Işıl Yılmaz  
'Under-Secretary', 'State Planning Organisation'

## APPENDIX 10 PARTICIPANTS IN REGIONAL STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATIONS

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### Nicosia-Kyrenia-Morphou Region

NAME	ORGANIZATION/CONTACT INFO
1. Layık Topcan Mesutoğlu	'Department of City Planning'
2. Ceren Günalp	Kemal Saraçoğlu Fdt.
3. Selma Işıktaş	KTAMS
4. Burak Maviş	KTÖS
5. Ahmet Billuroğlu	KTOEÖS
6. Şerife Gündüz	SEED, Lefke University (EREC)
7. Dogan Sahir	Green Peace Movement
8. Özgül Gürkut Mutluyakalı	TAK, TKÖD, Basın-Sen
9. Seziş Okut	Chamber of Commerce
10. Dr.Mehmet Necdet	Chamber of Mining, Metalurgical and Geological Engineers
11. Mevhibe Hocaoğlu	Cultural and Scientific Research Association
12. Caner Potinci	Cultural and Scientific Research Association
13. Esin Işıltay	KAYAD
14. Ali Dayioğlu	Near East University
15. Aziz Kaya	Lefke Region Peace Initiative
16. Reşat Eratam	Lefke Community Centre

**Famagusta - İskele Region**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION&amp;CONTACT INFO</b>
1. Zarişen Menteşođlu	Cancer Association
2. Ercan Saymen	Multiple Sclerosis Association
3. Tanju Üngör	KTÖS
4. Necmi Karakılıç	KTAMS
5. Kürşat Öztürk	KTOEÖS
6. Gülizar Erođlu	Friends of Karpaz
7. Mustafa Ergün	Pensioners' Association
8. Zehra Ertay	TÜHAK
9. Sevgi Yalman	KIBRIS
10. Hasan Yalman	Bee Producers' Union/Lawyer
11. Halil Hepşen	Mehmetçik Cultural Association
12. Hasan İnce	Chamber of Commerce
13. Özay Öykün	Fishermen's Union
14. Rasime Uygurođlu	Eastern Mediterranean Primary School Parents Assoc.
15. Zehra Nalbantođlu	Hands Across the Divide / EMU
16. Sunakan Lama	Cyprus Turkish Women's Union
17. Ahmet Alptuđ	Beyarmudu Credit Cooperative
18. İsmail Cemal	Tourism Sector / Friends of Karpaz
19. Dr.Mehmet Emin Karagil	Community Activist
20. Durali Elal	'TRNC' Refugees' Association

## **APPENDIX 11**

### **RESEARCH METHODS OVERVIEW**

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In northern Cyprus, the CSI project employed the following research methods to collect data and assessments on civil society issues: regional stakeholder survey, regional stakeholder consultations, representative population survey, media review, and desk studies including expert interviews.

#### 8. Literature review / collection of secondary data

The initial step of the CIVICUS research project was to identify existing literature on the subject of civil society both, in general, and in relation to civil society in the northern part of Cyprus in particular. At that stage, data were collected from a variety of sources including ‘TRNC’ publications, foreign government and organization reports - although in the case of northern Cyprus there is a general paucity of data from international organisations – CSOs based in northern Cyprus, and academic sources. The literature review helped create a bibliography of helpful but limited secondary sources.

#### 9. Regional stakeholders’ survey

The regional stakeholder survey was carried in June 2005 in two waves. The first wave was conducted in the Famagusta and İskele regions, the second in the regions of Nicosia, Kyrenia and Morphou. The aim was to contact a diverse group of approximately 30 participants in each region, who would represent the full range of CSOs. The selection of the respondents was based on (a) a list of 19 types of organisations<sup>139</sup>, (b) the headquarters of the organisation as we did not want all the organisations to be based in the capital of the region, and (c) a contact of the organisation’s manager. There were no other criteria used during the selection process. In total, 47 questionnaires were sent out and all but one were completed and returned. The respondents represented a wide spectrum of CSOs.

#### 10. Regional stakeholders’ consultations

The respondents to the regional stakeholders’ questionnaire, as well as some other stakeholders, were invited to attend a consultation meetings in June 2005 – the respondents from the Famagusta and İskele (Karpas) districts were invited to participate in the Bogaz consultation on the 18<sup>th</sup> of June and the respondents from the Nicosia, Kyrenia and Guzelyurt (Morphou) districts were invited to the Nicosia consultation on the 21<sup>st</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> of June.

Due to time constraints, and after consultation with CIVICUS, it was decided that the consultations should specifically focus on the answers to the questionnaire and the specific examples to the open-ended questions because of their importance to the scoring of the indicators. Emphasis was placed on those responses to the questionnaire that the research team felt were in need of clarification/elaboration. Thus, after a quick briefing on the CIVICUS project and the necessary introductions, the stakeholders were invited to discuss their answers to the questionnaire and, where needed, provide examples to illustrate their answers.

A total of 37 stakeholders attended the consultations – 17 participants attended the Nicosia consultation and 20 attended the one in Bogaz. Both groups confirmed the definition of civil society and the CSI framework. Both groups stressed the influence of political parties raising

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<sup>139</sup> See. Table III.1.1

concerns about the autonomy of CSOs. The Nicosia consultation participants were also curious as to the make-up of the PAG, but did not raise any objections once the identities of the PAG members were revealed to them.

#### 11. Community sample research

The community sample research or population survey was carried out among 370 adults (18 years old and over) from all districts of northern Cyprus. The sample was stratified according to the district of residence, gender and type of area of residence (urban/rural).

The telephone interviews were carried out during the last two weeks of July 2005 by EKart Ltd. The interviews covered issues such as membership to organisations, charitable giving, public trust, tolerance, voluntary activity and participation to community-level events.

#### 12. Media review

The media review was carried out during the months of March, May and June 2005 and it aimed primarily at the investigation of the manner in which civil society is presented in the media. For this purpose, three daily newspapers, *Gunes*, *Yeniduzen*, and *Kibris* - representing the political spectrum (pro-‘government’ and main opposition party papers) and the most widely read daily - were monitored.

The monitoring was carried out by a team of four post graduate students based at the Eastern Mediterranean University in Northern Cyprus. The media monitoring process was guided by the criteria outlined by CIVICUS which involved an initial screening of the media for civil society related news, followed by the classification of this news according to standardized criteria. Then, the data was inputted into an MS-Access database which was used to analyse the data.

#### 13. Policy impact studies

In order to assess the impact of civil society on public policy, the CIVICUS methodology required the research team to select three issues from different policy fields and evaluate the success/failure of civil society in influencing the policy outcome on the respective issue. Thus, a social policy issue that has been most prominent two or so years prior to the research, an issue area from civil society’s traditional advocacy field of human rights, and the impact of civil society on the national budget process needed to be researched.

Following consultations with key informants from the fields of civil society and public administration, the research team established that the most prominent social policy issue of the last couple of years was the efforts of teachers unions and other stakeholders to revise public school curricula. The most important current human rights issue was freedom of the press.

Once the issues were identified, the research team had to write a separate report on these issues giving a background and outlining the activity of civil society concerning each of them. The three reports on the budgetary process, human rights, and the social policy issues were conducted in July and were mainly based on newspaper articles and interviews with key informants.

#### 14. Key informant interviews

The research team held a number of interviews with journalists, civil society stakeholders and ‘government’ officials, lawyers with an in-depth knowledge of civil society, legislation and contemporary issues in general.

Most of these expert interviews and shorter consultation meetings were held on specific topics, primarily for the policy impact studies. We would like to thank the following persons for agreeing to be interviewed. They are not responsible for the accuracy or truth of the information or opinions contained in this report.

Mehmet Altınay (academician, former ‘minister’ of national education and culture)  
 Hüseyin Angolemlı (retired teacher, the chairman of Communal Liberation Party)  
 Turgay Avcı (academician, ‘MP’ from National Unity Party)  
 Mehmet Bayram (former ‘minister’ of economy and finance)  
 Salih Coşar (former ‘minister’ of economy and finance)  
 Emine Erk (President, Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation)  
 Tahir Gökçebel (Secondary school teacher, secretary-general of the Cyprus Turkish Secondary School Teachers’ Trade Union-KTOEÖS)  
 Hasan Hastürer (columnist)  
 Özer Hatay (columnist)  
 Gürdal Hüdaoğlu (academician)  
 Şener Levent (Editor, columnist)  
 Zeren Mungan (‘undersecretary’, ‘Ministry’ of Economy and Finance)  
 İbrahim Özejder (academician)  
 Mehmet Seyis (trade unionist)  
 Sevgül Uludağ (journalist).

## APPENDIX 12

### SOCIAL POLICY IMPACT STUDY

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CONDUCTED BY YUCEL VURAL

#### Civil Society Impact on the Secondary Education Curriculum in Northern Cyprus

##### Introduction

This study tries to understand to what extent the civil society in the Turkish Cypriot community is active and successful in influencing public policy relating to the content and nature of secondary education curriculum. The specific target of the study is to measure the effects of civil society towards protecting an important principle of Universal Declaration of Human Rights that education ‘shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups’.

The findings of this report are largely based on a series of in-depth interviews with key informants (leading figures of educational community, trade unionists and former ‘Ministers’ of Education).<sup>140</sup> Each participant is contacted at a suitable place (office, home) and a number of scheduled questions were asked in a face to face communication. Their answers were recorded. The participants first expressed their views on the general aspects of the issue and then answered the specific questions.

Although the National Education Law provides a general framework for educational activities, the strategic decisions relating to the secondary education in general and specific policy issues in particular are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Culture. There are both formal (the ‘Council of Education’-Eğitim Şurası) and informal channels by which civil society has opportunity to have a say to influence public policies relating to the educational issues.

##### Background of the Policy Issue

There have been continual debates and discussions on the content and nature of secondary education curriculum in the Turkish Cypriot community since 1970s. The official-public approach has insisted on maintaining a nationalistic perspective in the secondary school education encouraging and extolling ethnocentrism while civil society has been supportive of a more universalistic education parallel to the principles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The importance of this issue increased radically especially in the peace process which required public authorities to reformulate their policy and approaches towards the philosophy of history textbooks. In September 2004 new history textbooks began to be used in all secondary education institutions.

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<sup>140</sup> Interviewees: **Huseyin Angolemli** (retired teacher, the leader of Communal Liberation Party), **Tahir Gokcebel** (Secondary school teacher, secretary-general of the Cyprus Turkish Secondary School Teachers’ Union-KTOEÖS), **Turgay Avcı** (academician, MP from NUP), **Mehmet Altınay** (academician, former minister of national education and culture)

### **Actors Involved**

A wide range of civil society actors including Teachers' Unions, political parties, youth organizations, Parents' associations, academics and Trade Unions have involved in such debates and discussions on educational issues.

### **Study Findings**

The key informants regarded the civil society as having a particular capacity to attempt to influence the public policy relating to the secondary education curriculum. This capacity, however, was associated with the 'organizational ability' to organize particular activities and to express effectively the philosophy, objectives and principles of the desired public policy. In other words the civil society lacks appropriate channels to influence the policy makers to change or modify the related public policy. The organizational ability made the civil society (mainly Teachers' unions) an important actor of the educational community. Therefore, participation of the related civil society organizations in particular processes of policy making could not be denied by the policy makers. In addition, there has been no regular basis for civil society participation. This participation does not mean that the civil society has been successful to exert important influence on educational issues including secondary education curriculum. However, it is stated by the key informants that Teachers' trade Unions have managed to have a huge amount of influence on economic and social rights of teachers. Some key informants stated that the civil society demonstrated partial and symbolic achievements and that such achievements did not affect the essence of the public policy.

It is believed that the civil society has achieved its objectives on the Cyprus problem two years ago. But they failed to affect general educational policies. The Teachers' Trade Unions have been very active and sensitive towards supporting the UDHR principles but could not be successful in affecting public policy in this respect. Most key informants believe that, despite the efforts of civil society the secondary education curriculum has been full of chauvinism.

An MP from the former ruling party (NUP-UBP) aired a different idea that the civil society organizations, especially Teachers' Trade Unions were very active two-three years ago implying that CSO are manipulated by the leftist political groups and parties against the NUP 'governments'. He stated that the current 'government' changed the curriculum without informing the civil society but since its pro-'government' orientations the civil society that once was very active against the previous 'government' did not show any response to this anti-democratic decision of the current 'government'.

### **The Reasons Behind the Failure of the Civil Society**

‘We have a trumpet but its sticks are used by the others’  
(Davul bizde, tokmak başkalarının elinde’)

The above proverb means that a) Turkish Cypriot community leadership lacks 'authority' to make decisions on community affairs b) there is a relationship of dependency between 'we' (Turkish Cypriot community) and 'others' (Turkey or Turkish government).

#### *An Example*

'National Security' is a compulsory course in the secondary school curriculum which is completely unnecessary in contemporary education. The Teachers' Trade Union showed huge efforts to remove this course from the curriculum but since such issues were and are still decided by Turkey there have been no successful impact on it.

According to the key informants there have been important impediments to the impact of civil society. These impediments could be classified into the following categories:

*Political culture*

There is an understanding in society that the 'state' should decide on everything. This perspective was raised by those who believe that the failure of civil society derives from political culture. Other factors did not mentioned by this group of key informants.

*Institutional reasons*

It is argued that the institutional mechanisms for civil society participation are extremely weak and ineffective. Although the 'Council of Education' seems to be an important advisory channel for civil society participation, its decisions have usually been ignored by the policy makers.

*The existence of a non-democratic regime*

Most key informants focussed on regime characteristics and their effects on the civil society impact. They raised the following arguments which were laden with serious criticisms:

- Educational system is designed according to the decisions and principles made by Turkey. The Ministry of Education and Culture does not have any real control on curriculum issues such as the content of textbooks. Authorities in mainland Turkey used to decide on such subjects.
- The existence of a limited democracy disabled the civil society towards being influential in affecting public policies. But the Teachers' Trade Unions have been the most influential groups because of their organizational capabilities.
- All public policies such as those related to immigration (from Turkey), education, property ownership (related to property left by G. Cypriots in the North) and health have been imposed by 'external forces' (Turkey).
- Not only the civil society but also the community leadership or the elected officials have not been able to determine policies relating to educational issues. The political realities deriving from Cyprus problem have functioned in such a way to restrict the role of civil society and the elected officials.

**So-called success of civil society**

There are particular activities and actions such as decisions made by the 'Council of Education' in which the related CSO are represented. Recently, an important decision was taken by this organ towards reorganizing the structure and duration of secondary education. Civil society involved in the decision making process which seems to be a democratic decision but later on it was understood that there were similar plans in Turkey towards changing the duration of secondary education. It is stated by the knowledgeable people that without taking the approval of Turkey, the Ministry of Education and Culture cannot make, change or modify any educational policy.

**Real success of the civil society**

Despite their criticisms explained above the key informants underlined the following remarkable accomplishments of the civil society:

- The civil society organizations deterred the 'state' to oppress individuals with respect to Cyprus problem two years ago. However the same influence could not be seen in other areas of public policy.
- Civil society succeeded in making the 'government' abolishes the 'entrance exams' in the secondary school. (However, this was not fully ascribed to the civil society and was not described as a great success of it)

**The accountability of the 'state'**

The community authority ('state') for key informants is not accountable. The key informants tended to associate accountability of the community authority with the structure of the political regime in the north.

*“In order to be accountable you have to have capacity to be accountable. There is no political intension to be accountable. The regime in the North Cyprus is not respecting international law. Almost all public policies are against local and international law. The political authority in the north is not designed in such a way to be accountable.”*

### **Campaign against private lessons**

The key informants also analyzed the performance of civil society in the campaign towards putting an end to private lessons given by public teachers. It is stated that the educational system creates and is still maintaining this problem.

- The civil society especially Teachers' Trade Unions did everything against such private lessons but the 'state' did not develop any serious public policy to eliminate this problem.

### **Conclusion**

The prominent idea of the key informants is that the civil society is active towards public policies as regards the educational issues in general and secondary school curriculum in particular. This activeness, however, did not lead to a healthy interaction between the civil society and the community authority. Most key informants pronounced regime-related difficulties and obstacles that prevented the civil society from exerting influence on the policy-making process. The arguments relating to political regime-related impediments to democratic participation point out the existence of a 'democratic despotism' in which only token involvement of the civil society is allowed.

It seems that the political circumstances (the continuation of Cyprus dispute, the active involvement of Turkey's officials in community affairs) produced a kind of civil society activity profile in which demands and expectations of the civil society are filtered to block any 'intolerable' perspective detrimental to the 'national cause'. Education seems to be the most sensitive issue which is used to shape and reshape collective identity. The failure of the Turkish Cypriot civil society in influencing secondary education curriculum can be associated with this sensitivity. In other words, despite their political-organizational strength, the related CSO could not exert any pressure to modify history textbooks whose contents were obviously at odds with the principles of UHRD till the radical alteration in the 'government'. Although this alteration has generated particular effects on the civil society performance, the essence of restrictions that prevented the civil society from functioning democratically are still effective.

## **APPENDIX 13**

# **CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS**

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### **CONDUCTED BY ERHUN ŞAHALI**

Despite its different implications, it is almost an overall consensus in the relevant literature that the concept of corporate social responsibility has three main aspects: a responsible approach to employees, a responsible approach to the environment, and a responsible approach to the community within which a company operates. However, in many cases the third aspect is regarded as the most significant one and those who are making advocacy of corporate social responsibility and corporate giving argue that the private sector should feel responsible about the community development and give the necessary support to CSOs as much as it can.

One fact which we should perhaps state at the end may be stated right at the beginning: It is difficult to talk of a high degree of corporate social responsibility of the Turkish Cypriot private sector. Most companies, even if they are large in scale and profitable, still think that not much falls on them in terms of supporting the civil society activities in the country. The regional stakeholder consultations questionnaire findings and debates during these meetings have also revealed clearly that there is the assumption which the private sector's attitude towards civil society is either hostile or suspicious. Only few respondents or participants argued that the private sector has an indifferent (neutral) approach towards civil society and, as a matter of fact, nobody said that the private sector is supportive to the civil society activities.

Upon the CIVICUS guidelines and suggestions regarding this study, a list of 10 largest companies of northern Cyprus was generated. Although the suggested criterion to be taken into account while determining this list was the 'sales' figures of the last year (2004), it has not been possible to access this data despite the fact that every effort has been put forward. Therefore, the list of 10 largest companies was determined through some individual contacts and the database of the 'Department of Income and Taxation' and it somehow reflects the list of companies who paid the highest amount of tax in the year 2004. We are aware of the fact that being the most profitable and therefore paying the highest amount of tax does not necessarily mean having the highest sales figures but still we believe that the list we generated reflects the reality to a large extent.

The information about the concept itself in general and about these companies' level of corporate social responsibility in particular was gathered via a number of academic articles, telephone conversations with experienced economists, face-to-face interviews with high rank members of the company staff, consumers' groups and through the companies' websites.

Before getting into the details of the 10 largest companies' notion and perception of corporate social responsibility, it seems useful and necessary to refer to some legal regulations which aim at encouraging corporate giving and thereby developing the relationship between the private sector and the civil society. The Law on Taxation used to rule that a company can make donations to civil society organisations up to 5% of its annual gross income and receive tax deductions for that. With the recent change which took place within this year, this percentage has been increased to 10% while allowing the private sector to make more donations and receive higher tax deductions in return. Another recently passed law is the Law of Sponsorship which also came into effect in this year. Within the framework of this law, the private companies are able to provide financial support to civil society activities up to 60% of their annual gross income and again receive tax deductions. Since this is a very recent

development, its outcomes are yet to come. It should be kept in mind that in all cases, the companies are free to donate or sponsor more than the stated percentages but they would not receive tax deductions for the excess amount they may have donated.

Having said that the legal measures in place encourage corporate giving to a remarkable extent, still it has been disappointing to observe that 4 out of 10 largest companies did not carry out any activity in relation to corporate social responsibility within the year 2004. Among the remaining 6 companies, the figures and nature of donations and contribution to civil society vary greatly. It is mainly the service CSOs such as cancer association, disabled association and blind people's association, a number of foundations, parents' associations and sports clubs which receive the highest figures of donations. For instance, company A made 11,048 YTL of donations last year and 3518 YTL of that amount was above the 5% upper limit which was not taken into account while determining the tax deductions. Company B donated 13,079 YTL last year and did not go over the 5%. Company C donated only 200YTL in 2004. Company D presented the best example of corporate social responsibility and philanthropic giving and donated 183,191 YTL to a diverse list of institutions within the last year and has also gone over the 5% by 38,200 YTL. Company E donated 1200 YTL to Turkish Cypriot Education Foundation only. Company F donated 12,451 YTL to different groups in the year 2004.

It has been observed that most companies do not have a written policy on corporate social responsibility and institutional structures on this matter are very few. The companies' managers in some cases appeared to be hesitant about releasing information on the issue and it almost created embarrassment for most of them to talk about corporate philanthropy. We must state here that this gave the researchers the impression that they actually feel that they have the capability to do more on corporate social responsibility but unfortunately they refrain to do so. However, in comparison to the previous decades, the private sector in Turkish Cypriot community has a higher degree of awareness on corporate social responsibility but still has a long way to go for having a healthy relationship between the private sector and civil society which would be based on the grounds of dialogue and cooperation.

## APPENDIX 14

# CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MEDIA IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

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CONDUCTED BY EROL KAYMAK

With Mustafa Abitoğlu, Ratela Asllani, Derya Kiamil and Dilek Latif

### Introduction

The mass media in northern Cyprus plays an important role in informing the public and conveying messages and facts about social issues. Thus, it forms a vital means to promote the activities of civil society. As part of the CSI project, a specific study on the representation of civil society in the media was conducted. The study draws on data collected from the media in northern Cyprus over a period of four months. The monitoring was carried out by a team of four post graduate students based at the Eastern Mediterranean University in Northern Cyprus. The media monitoring process was guided by the criteria outlined by CIVICUS which involved an initial screening of the media for civil society related news, followed by the classification of this news according to standardized criteria. Then, the data was inputted into an MS-Access database which was used to analyse the data.

The PIT selected three different media: Kibris, Yeni Duzen and Gunes newspapers. The selection of these media was based on considerations of spread in ideology, ownership and type of media. The exclusion of media other than in print form was due to budgetary limitations and time constraints. In southern Cyprus, three Greek Cypriot dailies were analyzed in parallel to this study of media in northern Cyprus.

Appendix 2 contains further information on the research methodology. This summary report describes the main findings of the media analysis.

### 2. Research Findings

In the following, we present the main findings and recommendations of the civil society in the Media Study.

*Quantity:* Civil society issues receive a fairly extensive coverage in northern Cyprus. Over a period of four months, a total of 376 news items were found to be related to civil society issues in the three media. The frequency of reporting varies considerably among the three media. The Kibris newspaper has by far the largest number of items related to civil society, which reflects the relevance of civil society.

*Form:* Examining the form of reporting on civil society reveals that civil society is rarely a focus of media analysis beyond news reporting. The large majority (77.81%) of items monitored were news stories relevant to civil society. Interestingly, only 4.66% items were opinion pieces about civil society activities. Linked to this, only a small share of items directly quotes civil society actors. Thus, CSOs' ability to put their own views forward in the media is limited. The data indicates that civil society in the Turkish Republic seems to be a superficial object of media coverage, yet not an influential shaper of public opinion through the media.

Type of news story	Average score
Editorial	0.51%
Letters to the Editor	0.64%
Feature	0.57%
Opinion piece	4.66%
News stories	77.81%

*Issues:* In the media's reporting on civil society, only one major issue can be distinguished. There is substantive coverage of economic issues, such as labour, corporate news and unemployment, mostly connected to reporting on trade unions and business associations. Comparing the four dimensions of the Civil Society Diamond, the value dimension clearly receives the most extensive coverage, whereas structure and particularly impact are rarely the subjects of media reporting.

Results of the Four Dimensions of the Civil Society Diamond: (Environment: 1.4, Values: 1.7, Structure: 1.1, Impact: 1.2)

*Actors:* There are differences in the frequency and prominence of reporting on different types of CSOs. Due to their diverse activities professional associations, trade unions and CSO networks receive the most coverage in the media. Advocacy CSOs, women and culture organizations are the most frequently covered types of CSOs. While it is difficult to hypothesize about the causes for the lower coverage of other civil society groups, such as social service NGOs, foundations, environmental organizations probable possible reasons could be their less media-worthy activities.

### 3. Conclusion

The findings of the media study indicate that certain civil society issues have a space and prominence in the media outlets examined. Here, professional organisations, trade unions and CSO networks, clearly dominate the reporting. Most of the coverage involve civil society actors themselves and is not limited to a factual presentation of events. Civil society groups and individuals seem to have sufficient space and clout to present their own views in the media. Generally, treatment of civil society issues in the Turkish Cypriot media is positive.

The CSI media study assisted to get a better understanding of the media's perception of civil society issues and actors. The findings of the media study show that a considerable proportion of CSOs is represented in the media. However, CSOs could better utilize the media by providing reporters with more and better information beyond press statements, and many could also enhance their internet presence as a means of providing information beyond print and visual media.

## APPENDIX 15

### HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IMPACT STUDY

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CONDUCTED BY YUCEL VURAL

#### Civil Society Impact on Human Rights in Northern Cyprus

##### Introduction

This study aims to explain the performance of Turkish Cypriot civil society towards influencing public policy in the area of human rights. Although the study focuses on human rights in general, its specific target is the freedom of thought in the media. This subject retained its popularity for a long time and occupied the agenda of the public discussions between 2000-2003 in the Turkish Cypriot community (TCC).

The data used in this study come from a series of in-depth interviews with key informants (two academics and four editors-columnists-journalists)<sup>141</sup>. Each participant is contacted at a suitable place (office, home) and a number of scheduled questions are asked in a face-to-face communication. Their answers were recorded. The participants first expressed their views on the general aspects of the issue and then answered the specific questions. This enabled them to articulate their distinct individual perspectives both on general and specific aspects of the issue.

Although Turkish Cypriot community do not have its own 'legislation' relating directly to the freedom of the media except the general provisions in the constitution, there are specific laws, which have been in force since the colonial period applied indirectly to the subject. According to such 'legislation' the civilians, including journalists, used to be court-martialled for their activities violating national security. Recently, in September 2005, the 'legislative' organ amended the law on the Court Marital to stamp out such treatments.

##### Background of the Policy Issue

The human rights in general and the freedom of the media in particular have been one of the fields of public policy which led to intense discussions between civil society actors and public authorities in the Turkish Cypriot community. Starting from the late part of the 1950s, Turkish Cypriot community leadership appeared rather restrictive on human rights, including the freedom of journalists and writers to express their ideas challenging the official perspectives. The assassination of two journalists who were critical of ultra-nationalist orientation of Turkish Cypriot leadership was the indicator of the prevailing public policy on this issue in the 1960s.

After 1974 there have been some attempts towards liberalizing the attitudes of community political authority towards this issue. The constitution, for example, guaranteed the freedom of thought and the freedom of the media. Despite such institutional arrangements, however, there have been some taboos that created restrictions for the journalists. The political regime in the North Cyprus continued to demand obedience from the journalists in respect to Cyprus problem and Turkey's political and military role in Cyprus.

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<sup>141</sup> Interviewees: **Şener Levent** (Editor, columnist), **Hasan Hastürer** (columnist), **Özer Hatay** (columnist), **Ibrahim Özejder** (academician), **Gürdal Hüdaoğlu** (academician), **Sevgül Uludağ** (journalist).

During the 1980s and the 1990s journalists and political leaders were investigated, accused and tried for basically political reasons. Moreover, the law on the Court Martial enabled the authorities to intimidate journalists and the media. Daily papers and their editors-columnists also became the target of violent actions by unknown perpetrators whose identity has never been revealed by the security forces. There have been widespread beliefs within the civil society actors that the 'deep state' is responsible for such violent attacks against the opposition media.

### **Actors Involved**

A wide range of civil society actors including the journalists' unions and associations, columnists, writers, trade unions, political parties, the written media and human rights associations have involved in the debates and discussions on human rights and the freedom of the media.

### **Study Findings**

Most key informants stressed the idea that TC civil society has not been active enough to affect the public policy towards eliminating barriers before the freedom of the media. It is stated that the civil society became active on an overall change of political status quo in the recent years. However, the civil society voice towards influencing public policy relating to any issue other than Cyprus problem has been extremely feeble. There is a majority view that the media have not been free and the activities of journalists can easily be restricted by the 'state'. The key informants were not interested in explaining the intensity of civil society efforts towards creating impacts on the related public policy but rather attempted to question the reasons of civil society inactivity in this area of public policy. There are interesting arguments in this respect:

- The current leaderships of CSO are preventing the civil society from being influential in the policy-making processes.
- Prior to the Annan plan referendum civil society created a massive mobilization, but, later on a pro-'government' tendency began to dominate CSOs.
- Independent CSOs are extremely weak and lack instruments to influence the public policy.
- The 'state' manipulates the civil society. The civil society is under the control of the 'state'.
- The media cannot disseminate some news. For example a traffic accident where an army vehicle involves cannot appear on the media. Military authorities have a crucial control in the regime.
- The media is not free. There are de-facto restrictions on the media. Journalists, usually refrained from criticising Turkey for fear that their life, personal and job security would be in danger. There has been a militaristic regime in Turkish Cypriot community and even after the recent alteration in the 'government' the militaristic control is still the prevailing element of the regime. There is only a change on the surface.
- In the recent years the ordinary individual began to gain power against the 'state' but this was not achieved through the activities of civil society. But rather it was an indirect positive result of globalization (increased relationship between TCC and the external world) which empowered the individual with the support of international community to resist local restraints.
- Marginal groups did not gain any opportunity to air their demands because the civil society did not focus on their problems.
- The community authority is not accountable because the civil society does not have any influential control on it.
- There is a 'limited democracy' and the real ruling power is in the hands of 'Ankara'. For this reason it is not possible to talk about the impact of civil society. However the

civil society was influential during the alteration of power. However this alteration is only on the surface.

- The leaders of CTO began to benefit from public positions. For this reason this alteration has not culminated in institutionalization of civil society.
- EU citizenship empowered ordinary citizens against the 'state'.
- Since the North Cyprus is under the occupation one can not talk about the freedom of the media.
- The prevailing public policy aimed to conceal the facts from people.
- The journalist cannot express any view against the official perspective.
- The increasing role of civil society in the Cyprus problem has led to an indirect positive effect on the capacity of the civil society to defend individual rights.
- Without reducing the dependency of TCC on Turkey, civil society will not be able to create any positive impact towards human rights.

## **Conclusion**

The views and evaluations of key informants show that the civil society impact on human right issues including the freedom of the media or the right to free speech in the mass media has been extremely problematic in the Turkish Cypriot community. It is necessary to stress that the period on which this study focus to question the civil society impact coincides with a political transition period. This automatically predisposed the key informants to attempt to identify the characteristic elements of recent alteration in the political structure. Although it is still problematic to develop a prominent idea characterizing the new period in terms of civil society impact on public policy because the transition process has not yet completed, the new period is identified with the increasing power of the political authority/elite within the entire political system.

As most key informants expressed clearly the Turkish Cypriot civil society could not develop any remarkable action till the transition period creating any meaningful effect on the public policy relating to human rights. Except trivial developments, the rights of journalists in collecting and disseminating news, opinions and ideas have been restricted in the name of 'national interests'. Those who criticize Turkey and its policies on Cyprus were treated as traitors. However, there is unanimous view that during the initial period of the transition started three years ago the civil society managed to exert influence that fostered transition.

Besides the effects of civil society activity on the transition period it is apparent that there has been a premature civil society in the TCC. The distinct political conditions in Cyprus such as the political division, foreign control, the lack of democratic values, the isolation of the civil society initiatives from the international collaboration and solidarity, the militaristic tendencies in politics and the existence of ultra nationalist tendencies in the community administration are important reasons leading to an immature civil society.

## APPENDIX 16

### BUDGETTING PROCESS POLICY IMPACT STUDY

CONDUCTED BY YUCEL VURAL

#### Civil Society Impact on the Budgeting Processes in Northern Cyprus

##### Introduction

This study tries to understand to what extent the civil society is active and successful in influencing overall budgeting process in the Turkish Cypriot community. A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with key informants including former ‘ministers’ of economy and finance, bureaucrats and trade unionists.<sup>142</sup>

Each participant is contacted at a suitable place (office, home) and a number of scheduled questions are asked in a face-to-face communication. Their answers were recorded. The participants expressed their views on the general aspects of the issue and then answered the specific questions. This enabled them to focus on a particular aspect of the related policy and provide their distinct individual perspectives.

The making and implementation of community budget requires both ‘legislative’ and executive decisions. While the ‘legislative’ organ has power to accept, modify or reject the budget the whole responsibility of implementing it belongs to the executive organ. The executive draw up annual budget defining public revenues and expenditures and showing how much money will be spent on investments, social transfers and salaries of public personnel. The ‘executive’ introduces a bill on annual budget and submits it to the approval of the ‘legislative’. The ‘government’ cannot stay in power after a rejection of annual budget by the legislature. Discussions and debates on the annual budget are at the top of the agenda every year, which involves both ‘legislative-executive’ procedures and political actions and reactions of the civil society.

##### Background of the Policy Issue

The annual budget is a major issue of discussion not only between the opposition and the ‘government’ parties but also between the civil society and the public authorities. The north Cyprus was in an extremely poor economic situation especially starting in the end of 1990s. The collapse of the banking system, the increasing number of unemployment and the decline of major economic sectors created strong dissatisfaction among masses. Under such developments the civil society organizations organized massive demonstrations and managed to activate many people to affect the policy makers to protect economic rights of the individual. In July 2000 a protest meeting led by the victims of banking crisis resulted in a strike in the Turkish Cypriot parliament. In the same year trade unions went on strike and 41 civil society organizations organized demonstrations against the ‘government’ arguing that ‘decisions relating to economic and budgeting issues are taken by the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia’ and that ‘Turkish Cypriot community lacks necessary instruments to rule the country.’

<sup>142</sup> Interviewees: **Salih Cosar** (former minister of economy and finance), **Mehmet Bayram** (former minister of economy and finance), **Mehmet Seyis** (trade unionist), **Zeren Mungan** (undersecretary, minister of economy and finance)

### **Actors Involved**

Trade unions, private employers, the legislature, the executive, judiciary and the ministry of economy and finance.

### **Study Findings**

Budgeting process is one of the most important area in which the civil society impact is obvious for most key informants. However they stated that budgeting includes several elements and as a result of internal and external economic and political circumstances, the community authority used to decide on issues relating to salaries of public personnel and social transfers. Investments, according to the key informants, have been under the control and guidance of Turkey. For this reason the activity of Turkish Cypriot civil society in the budgeting process tended to concentrate on the policies and approaches of the community authority towards public personnel salaries and social transfers.

### **Successes and Failures of the Civil Society**

Key informants aired positive arguments about the impact of civil society on the budgeting processes in TCC. This impact, however, does not cover all important issues. Using diverse perspective, the key informants argued that investments are controlled by Turkey and that civil society impact on such investments is nearly zero. The arguments raised by key informants are as follows:

- Collective bargaining process enabled especially the teachers and public servants' trade unions to have a say on the particular procedures of budgeting process. For this reason they were influential in determining salaries.
- The civil society participates in the overall budgeting process but its effects are usually confined to salaries and wages. The trade unions created important impacts on expanding economic interests and rights of public servants. Workers' trade unions, however, are not influential in the 'Minimum Wage Commission'. Therefore, the 'state' and private employers have the final say on the minimum wage policy. The trade unions contested the decision by the 'Minimum Wage Commission' and tried to have it changed in 2001 by taking the case to the court but failed because of the length of legal proceedings.
- During the collective bargaining the teachers' and public servants' trade unions are able to strike for increase in salaries and economic rights. However they failed to exert any 'influence on 'issues other than economic 'interests of public servants and teachers.
- Tax immunity for the people whose wage or salary is behind the 'minimum wage' is an important success of the civil society.
- The workers who work for private employers receive 'minimum wage' and represent a marginal position in the TCC. The economic and social benefits of such marginal groups could not be improved by the activities of the civil society.
- In the public sector trade unions managed to develop as strong organizations with capacity to activate their members into action against the policy makers. In private sector, on the other hand, the trade unions can not easily organize activity to influence the policy makers because they have limited number of members to exert pressure.
- Although there is a consensus on the impact of civil society in terms of budgeting process, it is broadly accepted that the community authority is not accountable for its spending, policy choices and method of implementation.

**Conclusion**

The impact of the Turkish Cypriot civil society on the budgeting process is obviously successful in regard to salaries and wages of public servants and teachers. Key informants did not hesitate to state clearly that this impact was a direct result of CSO's organizational strength, which could be used against the 'government'. The same organizational strength, however, could not be used to exert influence on the way the financial resources are allocated between various public activities. For example, despite its huge expectation and efforts the civil society could not manage to increase the share of education or health services in the community budget. This does not show that the civil society is politically inept at exerting collective influence but rather it shows the reverse of the medal, namely, the community authority is sensitive to financial issues so as to maintain its popular support. Therefore, we may say that in a particular case where political accountability is available the community authority is responsive to the demands and expectations of the civil society.

In the light of the perspective expressed above, it is possible to argue that the impact of the civil society on particular issues related to budgeting process indicates the existence of a democratic procedure in which the community authority is politically controlled by the civil society. The absence of such democratic procedure automatically leads to a decline in or total absence of civil society impact on the policy issue.

## APPENDIX 17

### CSI SCORING MATRIX

#### FOR THE NORTHERN PART OF CYPRUS

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		<b>Score</b>
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>1 STRUCTURE</b>	<b>1.1</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.1 Breadth of citizen participation</b>	<b>1.3</b>
INDICATORS	1.1.1 Non-partisan political action	2
	1.1.2 Charitable giving	1
	1.1.3 CSO membership	2
	1.1.4 Volunteering	1
	1.1.5 Collective community action	1
	1.1.6 Citizen Participation in bi-communal events	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.2. Depth of citizen participation</b>	<b>1.3</b>
INDICATORS	1.2.1 Charitable giving	1
	1.2.2 Volunteering	2
	1.2.3 CSO membership	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.3. Diversity of civil society participants</b>	<b>1.0</b>
INDICATORS	1.3.1 CSO membership	1
	1.3.2 CSO leadership	1
	1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.4. Level of organisation</b>	<b>0.6</b>
INDICATORS	1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	0
	1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	1
	1.4.3 Self-regulation	1
	1.4.4 Support infrastructure	1
	1.4.5 International linkages	0
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.5. Inter-relations</b>	<b>1.3</b>
INDICATORS	1.5.1 Communication	1
	1.5.2 Co-operation	2
	1.5.3 Level of Cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot CSOs	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>1.6. Resources</b>	<b>0.7</b>
INDICATORS	1.6.1 Financial Resources	1
	1.6.2 Human Resources	1
	1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources	0

		<b>Score</b>
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>2 ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>1.6</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.1. Political context</b>	<b>1.2</b>
INDICATORS	2.1.1 Political rights	2
	2.1.2 Political Competition	2
	2.1.3 Rule of law	1
	2.1.4. Corruption	1
	2.1.5. State effectiveness	1
	2.1.6. Decentralisation	0
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.2 Basic freedoms &amp; rights</b>	<b>1.3</b>
INDICATORS	2.2.1 Civil liberties	1
	2.2.2 Information rights	1
	2.2.3 Press freedoms	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.3. Socio-economic context</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATOR	2.3.1 Socio-economic context How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.4. Socio-cultural context</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	2.4.1 Trust	1
	2.4.2 Tolerance	2
	2.4.3 Public spiritedness	3
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.5. Legal environment</b>	<b>1.8</b>
INDICATORS	2.5.1 CSO registration	2
	2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities	2
	2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs	2
	2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.6 State-civil society relations</b>	<b>1.7</b>
INDICATORS	2.6.1 Autonomy	2
	2.6.2 Dialogue	2
	2.6.3 Co-operation/support	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>2.7. Private sector-civil society relations</b>	<b>1.0</b>
INDICATORS	2.7.1. Private sector attitude	1
	2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility	1
	2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy	1

		Score
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>3 VALUES</b>	<b>1.6</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.1 Democracy</b>	<b>1.5</b>
INDICATORS	3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs	2
	3.1.2 civil society actions to promote democracy	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.2. Transparency</b>	<b>1.7</b>
INDICATORS	3.2.1 Corruption within civil society	2
	3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs	2
	3.2.3 civil society actions to promote transparency	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.3. Tolerance</b>	<b>1.5</b>
INDICATORS	3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena	2
	3.3.2. civil society actions to promote tolerance	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.4. Non-violence</b>	<b>2.5</b>
INDICATORS	3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena	3
	3.4.2 civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.5. Gender equity</b>	<b>1.3</b>
INDICATORS	3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena	2
	3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs	1
	3.5.3 civil society actions to promote gender equity	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.6. Poverty eradication</b>	<b>1.0</b>
INDICATORS	3.6.1 civil society actions to eradicate poverty	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>3.7. Environmental sustainability</b>	<b>2.0</b>
INDICATORS	3.7.1 civil society actions to sustain the environment	2

		<b>Score</b>
<b>DIMENSION</b>	<b>4 IMPACT</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.1 Influencing public policy</b>	<b>1.8</b>
INDICATORS	4.1.1 Human rights policy impact case study	2
	4.1.2 Social policy impact case study	2
	4.1.3 Civil society impact on national budgeting process case study	1
	4.1.4 Civil society's impact on solving the Cyprus problem	2
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.2. Holding state &amp; private corporations accountable</b>	<b>0.5</b>
INDICATORS	4.2.1. Holding state accountable	1
	4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable	0
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.3. Responding to social interests</b>	<b>1.0</b>
INDICATORS	4.3.1 Responsiveness	1
	4.3.2 Public Trust	1
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.4. Empowering citizens</b>	<b>1.3</b>
INDICATORS	4.4.1 Informing /educating citizens	2
	4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action	2
	4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people	0
	4.4.4. Empowering women	2
	4.4.5. Building social capital	2
	4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods	0
<b>SUBDIMENSION</b>	<b>4.5. Meeting societal needs</b>	<b>1.3</b>
INDICATORS	4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision	1
	4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly	2
	4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalised groups	1

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