

A nascent civil society within a transforming environment

**CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report
China (Mainland)**

NGO Research Center, SPPM, Tsinghua University
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FOREWORD

The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) project was implemented in China (Mainland) during 2003 - 2005. This is the first effort to evaluate the rapidly developing civil society in China in comprehensive dimensions. According to the CSI toolkit, a large scale field research and other methodology including media review, case study and literature research were carried out. Based on the various research data, the second NAG meeting was hold in May 2005, to get the China CSI diamond. NGO Research Center (NGORC) of School of Public Policy and Management (SPPM) in Tsinghua University acted as the NCO of the project.

During the research process, we found this program useful especially for its research-action objectives. It provides a set of indicators to evaluate civil society in a country. Most local stakeholders and other participators found that it is a good chance for them to think of civil society in comprehensive dimensions, and to rethink about their own work. Talking about the comparative study, we found the CSI result is comparable among countries in three points: First, we may find different degrees of balance of civil society development from the shape of the diamond. We can find out which is the weakest, which is the strongest, and whether it is a balanced model along the four dimension for all countries. Second, we may position each country in the Diamond pool. The position or rank rather than the absolute score is more meaningful for the comparative study. Third, one country may follow up its track to see the trend of development of civil society. In China, we hope to continue the comparative study with other countries.

Even though the CSI is a comprehensive index to measure civil society in one country, we must say that scores of the indicators are simpler than the abundant phenomena in the real world. We hope that this program will be a beginning for a deeper mutual understanding among civil society actors from countries around the world.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CS	Civil society
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
GONGO	Government organised non-governmental organisation
NAG	National Advisory Group
NCO	National Coordinating Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NGORC	NGO Research Center
NPO	Non-Profit organisation
SPPM	School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Currently, China is undergoing a dynamic process of social and economic transformation, in which civil society is playing an increasingly important role. Within such a fast developing context, the Civil Society Index (CSI) project was carried out to evaluate the current state of civil society in China.

Since 1978, civil society in China has greatly benefited from reform policies in the economic and social spheres. Particularly since the 1990s, the number and variety of civil society organisations (CSOs), and their role in society at large, has significantly increased. CSOs' activities cover a wide range of issues in China, while they are particularly well-represented in the fields of environmental protection, poverty alleviation, trade promotion and community development.


Officially, there are three types of CSOs within the Chinese context, which are called “Civilian Organisations” (Min Jian Zu Zhi). They are *social organisations*, which are membership-based entities; *foundations*, which are fund-based; and *civilian non-enterprise units*, which have a public interest objective, such as private schools, non-profit hospitals and social service agencies. At the end of 2005, there were 168,000 Social organisations, 146,000 Civilian Non-enterprise Units and 999 Foundations in China. Many of these organisations were set up by government and party authorities before the reform and open policies, and they are currently in the process of transformation. Since the start of the Reform process, a significant number of grassroots CSOs have emerged.

The Civil Society Index was implemented in China by NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua University from late 2003 to late 2005. Guided by a National Advisory group (NAG), the project collected a variety of data, including Regional Stakeholder Consultations covering 6 provinces and 11 cities, Community Surveys conducted in 6 provinces, media review with 5 different media, and the Secondary Data Review, etc. Based on the available data, the NAG met to score the 72 indicators that assess the status of civil society in four dimensions, namely the structure, environment, values and impact. The results for these four dimensions can be depicted in the form of a Diamond

(See figure 1).

Figure 1 shows the Chinese Civil Society Diamond, with the scores of 1.0 for the Structure dimension, 1.2 for the Environment dimension, 1.6 for the Impact dimension and 1.8 for the Values dimension. The graph reflects that Chinese civil society has achieved a medium or slightly above medium level in the areas of Impact and

FIGURE 1: Civil Society Diamond for China



Values, whereas its structure and environment are still rather weak.

The Civil Society Diamond depicts a better performance in its Impact dimension than in its Structure dimension, which seems to indicate that CSOs are able to exert stronger influence on society than their own organisational and sectoral structure and resources would suggest. The weakness in structure is particularly due to limited citizen participation, low levels of CSO membership, and limited organisation of CSOs in networks, umbrella and apex bodies and the inadequacy of resources.

Chinese civil society scores best on its Values dimension, which indicates that many CSOs are driven by positive values, such as organisational membership and gender equitable practices. Negative values, such as violence, intolerance and gender discrimination are not very visible in China. CSOs play a strong role in promoting commitments to poverty eradication and environmental causes; however, they are much less prominent when it comes to sensitive areas, such as democracy and government transparency.

With regard to civil society's external environment, civil society in the People's Republic of China scores well on the effectiveness of the state, as well as on the general attitude of the business sector towards civil society. On the other hand, the extent of political competition and other aspects of political and civic rights received a low score, since the Chinese government does not follow the principles of plurality and competition in its political philosophy. Instead, China currently focuses on social cohesion and building harmony within society. Also, legal constraints, particularly regarding the establishment of grassroots NGOs and umbrella bodies, remain in place and limit the growth potential for civil society.

Based on these findings, the CSI study identified three areas for recommendations for the future development of China's civil society. First, civil society's structure needs improvement, so that Chinese civil society can exert its full potential. If levels of citizen participation and organisational resources and structures within civil society were raised, civil society is likely to increase its role in society at large. More specifically, processes of diversification and networking within civil society need more attention and support. A more developed structure of networks and federations at different levels might contribute to further enhancing cooperation with government, the private sector and international partners.

Second, the environment for Chinese civil society's development, especially the existing legal provisions need to be improved: The current regulatory framework for international organisations is perceived to be overtly restrictive in terms of registration and scope of cooperation. It would also be desirable for NGOs to develop more standards and institutionalised mechanisms of self-regulation. In general, the relatively high effectiveness of the Chinese state indicates that there could be more space for the development of civil society without the danger of civil society causing disorder.

Third, the idea of civil society and its role in Chinese society needs to reach beyond the current group of well-educated urban residents. Partnerships with local government have shown some positive results in a few areas. However, exchange and dialogue with the corporate sector still needs significant improvement and corporate philanthropy has yet to take off.

Thus, currently China features a nascent civil society within a changing environment. There are various factors, such as increased social space, the emergence of an urban middle class, but also increased social concerns, that are likely to foster a growth in civil society activities in China in

the years to come. It is hoped that the CSI report could contribute to this growth process by providing relevant information as well as key recommendations on how to strengthen this increasingly important group of actors in China.

INTRODUCTION

In China, civil society has not been visible for quite a long time. It is just after the implementation of the reform and open-door policy in the early 1980s that Chinese civil society began to emerge. China's society has undergone fundamental changes through the reform and open-door policy: The economic and political parameters affecting the work of many civil society organisations have changed and the legal and cultural environment has improved. This has much facilitated the growth and diversification of civil society in China. Economically, the reform of the economy from the beginning of 1980s led to a step-by-step process of moving from the original system of planned economy toward a socialist market economy, from the single collective and state ownership structure to multiple forms like state-owned, collective and individual ownership. Economic production is improving, which advances the people's standard of living, and which can be regarded as the most profound cause of Chinese civil society's development.

The People's Republic of China has not yet a consolidated and well-implemented legal and policy framework for NGOs but efforts are under way and expert opinion has been collected from renowned Universities such as Tsinghua and Peking University. The high paced reform process provides for some experimental space and freedom for conducting different kinds of activities with or without proper registration. Politically, the persistent ongoing institutional reform policies of the Chinese government have created a more positive environment for the development of civil society: first of all, Chinese government attaches more and more importance to the rule of law and ruling by law, which secures the freedom of citizens to some extent. Second the government put efforts into decentralization as well as differentiation of state and society. Thirdly, the government transformed its functions, changed unlimited government to limited government and reduced its economic and social functions. The People's Republic of China witnessed a gradual devolution, privatization and outsourcing of economic and social activities to non-state organisations, some to commercial actors but others organisations of public benefit nature. Therefore, a significant space is left for the development of civil society.

While these economic, political, and legal changes contribute to the fast development of CSOs, Chinese civil society is still "in the process of growing". Currently, there are as many as 30 million CSOs of various kinds in the People's Republic of China including smaller, unregistered neighbourhood- and community-based groups which are active in all walks of life and are playing an active role in the construction of the causes of socialism and harmonious society.

What are the key parameters determining civil society development in China? The People's Republic of China is currently in a major process of reconfiguration of cooperation practices between Government, business and Civil Society in different fields. Government and research institutes are in search for best institutional fits and good practices for effective service provision and fostering of a harmonious society. Concerns about cohesion and respect prevail over pronounced claims for greater diversity and specific interests of social groups. Political consultation is sought in the context of the conduct of the Chinese People's Political Consultative

Conference and on various other occasions, including conferences and networking events. What is the status and what are the perspectives for civil society in such a reform context? China participated in the CIVICUS-CSI program attempting to evaluate civil society in China and find to identify the advantages strengths and disadvantages of Chinese civil society.

The CSO Research Center of Tsinghua University was responsible for the project's implementation in China, which was funded by the Ford Foundation. The project was led by the Center's Vice President Jia Xijin and also included Professor Wang Ming, four post-doctoral researchers, many doctoral students and graduates that is in charge of the project and the Ford Fund that sponsors it. The National Advisory Group, which advised the project implementation, was composed of 12 people from within civil society, government departments, institutions of higher learning and research institutes. (See Appendix for further details).

Structure of the Publication

Section I, the “Civil Society Index Project and Approach”, provides a detailed history of the CSI, its conceptual framework and its research methodology.¹

Section II, “Civil Society in China”, provides a background on civil society in China and highlights some specific features of Chinese civil society. It also describes the use of the civil society concept in China, as well as the definition employed by the CSI project. Lastly, it describes the exercise of developing a map of civil society, which was carried out as part of the CSI project activities in several regions in the country.

Section III, entitled “Analysis of Civil Society”, is divided into four parts—Structure, Environment, Values and Impact—which correspond to the four main dimensions of the CSI. The presentation of the results according to individual dimensions and subdimensions is intended to be a resource repository, and readers looking for an overall interpretation of the report should refer to the conclusion. This section also involves the case studies, described in detail in Annexes 2 and 3.

Section IV, entitled “Recommendations” provides recommendations for strengthening civil society in China.

Finally, the conclusion and next steps in Section V maps the Civil Society Diamond and offers an interpretation on the report's implications for the overall state of Chinese civil society.

¹ See also Appendix 1 The Scoring Matrix, and Appendix 2 A Survey of Methods.

I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT & APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index (CSI) originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics at the time, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI (Anheier 2004). The CSI concept was tested in 14 countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1.1).

Table I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005²

1. Argentina	19. Ghana	37. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Greece	38. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Guatemala	39. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Honduras	40. Russia
5. Bulgaria	23. Hong Kong (VR China)	41. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Indonesia	42. Serbia
7. Chile	25. Italy	43. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Jamaica	44. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Lebanon	45. South Korea
10. China	28. Macedonia	46. Taiwan
11. Cyprus ³	29. Mauritius	47. Togo
12. Czech Republic	30. Mongolia	48. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Montenegro	49. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Nepal	50. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Netherlands	51. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Nigeria	52. Vietnam
17. Georgia	35. Northern Ireland	53. Wales
18. Germany	36. Orissa (India)	

The NGO Research Center of the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University is dedicated to collecting, analyzing and researching social policy issues, promoting new initiatives and advocating for a more important role for civil society in governance. The CSI combines action-oriented research with a comprehensive set of instruments for an assessment of civil society, which results in concrete recommendations and action points for various stakeholders to strengthen civil society. The overall goal of the project in China is to assess the state of civil society in China, enrich the knowledge on civil society, increase awareness among all stakeholders on the importance of civil society and learn from comparing the project findings among countries participating in the project.

The preparations for the project implementation were intensive. In September 2003, a Chinese representative participated in a CIVICUS' training workshop in Johannesburg to acquire the

² This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted, as of January 2006.

³ The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

necessary knowledge for implementing the project. The next step was to secure the necessary financial resources, a large portion of which were provided by the Ford Foundation.

2. PROJECT APPROACH

The CSI is based on a broad definition of civil society and uses a comprehensive implementation approach, which utilises various research methods. In order to assess the status of civil society in a certain country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society: structure, environment, values and impact. Each dimension comprises a number of subdimensions, which include a number of individual indicators. The indicators represent the basis for data collection within the CSI. The data is collected through several methods: secondary data collection, a population survey, a civil society stakeholder survey, regional workshops, a media review, structured expert consultations and several case studies. The indicators are then separately assessed and discussed by the NAG. The outcomes of the research and assessment are also discussed by the representatives of the key stakeholders at the National Workshop. The task at the National Workshop is to identify the specific strengths and weaknesses and to provide recommendations for key actions aimed at strengthening civil society. The CSI project approach, the conceptual framework, research and assessment methodology are described in detail in this section.

Based on the analysis of field research and collected data, it was found that the CSI Indicator system is not fully applicable to the Chinese context, mainly with regards to questionnaire construction and choice of terms and concepts. For more details on this please see Annex 2.

2.1. Conceptual framework

How to define the civil society?

CIVICUS defines *civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests.*⁴ The CSI has two interesting features that contrast other civil society concepts. First, its goal is to avoid the conventional focus on formal and institutionalised civil society organisations (CSOs) by also considering informal coalitions and groups. Second, whereas civil society is sometimes perceived as an area with positive actions and values, the CSI seeks to assess both the positive and the negative manifestations of civil society. This concept consequently includes not only the humanitarian organisations and associations active in environmental protection, but also, groups such as skinheads and aggressive football supporter groups. The CSI does not only assess to what extent the CSOs support democracy and tolerance, but also the extent of their intolerance or even violence.

How to conceptualize the state of civil society?

To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state, as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and


⁴ In debates about the definition of civil society in regional stakeholder consultations, the NAG meetings and the National Workshop participants agreed to use the word *space* instead of *arena*.

- The *impact* of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of subdimensions which contain a total of 74 indicators.⁵ These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report. The indicator – subdimension - dimension framework underpinned the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report, the NAG’s assessment of Chinese civil society and the presentations at the National Workshop. It is also used to structure the main section of this publication.

To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool (see figure I.2.1 below as an example).⁶ The Civil Society diamond graph, with its four extremities, visually

FIGURE I.2.1: CIVICUS Civil Society Diamond



summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society. The diagram is the result of the individual indicator scores aggregated into sub- dimension and then dimension scores. As it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about how civil society looks like in a given country. As the Diamond does not

aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot, and should not, be used to rank countries according to their scores for the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time, as well as compare the state of civil societies across countries (Anheier 2004).

2.2. Project methodology

This section describes the methods used for collecting and aggregating of various data used in the project.

2.2.1. Data Collection

The CSI recognised that, in order to generate a valid and comprehensive assessment of civil society, a variety of perspectives and data should be included – insider, external stakeholder and outsider views, as well as objective data ranging from the local, the regional to the national level. The CSI therefore includes the following set of research methods: (1) Review of existing information, (2) Regional stakeholder consultations, (3) Population survey, (4) Media review and (5) Fact-finding studies.

It is believed that this mix of different methods is essential to generate accurate and useful data and information, and also accommodates the variations of civil society, for example in rural versus urban areas. The CSI also seeks to utilise all available sources of information to avoid ‘re-inventing research wheels’ and wasting scarce resources. Lastly, the research methodology is

⁵ See Appendix 1.

⁶ The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier 2004).

explicitly designed to promote learning and, ultimately, action on the part of participants. Besides feeding into the final national-level seminar, data collection processes also aim to contribute to participant learning. This is done, for example, through group-based approaches that challenge participants to see themselves as part of a “bigger picture”, to think beyond their own organisational or sectoral context, to reflect strategically about relations within and between civil society and other parts of society, to identify key strengths and weaknesses of their civil society and assess collective needs. It is important to note that the CSI provides an aggregate needs assessment on civil society as a whole, and is not designed to exhaustively map the various actors active within civil society. However, it does examine power relations within civil society and between civil society and other sectors, and identifies key civil society actors when looking at specific indicators under the structure, values and impact dimensions.

The China CSI study applied the complete list of proposed methods for data collection:

- Secondary sources: An overview of existing research data, consultations and other information relating to the issue of civil society development is summarised in the overview of civil society status in China.
- Regional stakeholder consultations (RSCs): Representatives of various stakeholders, who previously completed the questionnaire, were invited to participate in a one-day discussion on research outcomes for their respective region. The total number of participating representatives was 92.
 - The stakeholders are selected from 6 provinces (municipalities), 11 cities (districts) with different developmental levels, extending from east to west, south to north and coastland to inland. Participants come from almost all walks of life and are required to be familiar with the local civil society. Their number was limited to 20, with three quarters of them from different types of CSOs in different districts, such as countryside, community, regional, national and so on.
 - The result: among the selected 226 people, 80% were from the civil society arena, from 249 CSOs of various types. The remaining 20% were stakeholders from other fields, but were familiar with civil society. In terms of living areas, 95% are city residents. Two thirds were male; 93% were capable of speaking Putonghua; 6.6% have a religious belief; about 90% hold Han nationality; around 70% have completed a college education; 50% were between the age of 30 and 50, 20% between 50 and 60 and 10% were over retire age.
- Community Research: This survey involved a representative sample of citizens of the Republic of China, with respect to regions, age, gender, education and type of dwelling. The citizens were questioned about issues such as; CSO membership, donations, volunteering and attitudes towards CSOs. The total number of participates was 1000.
- Media review: The reporting of six daily newspapers on civil society was reviewed for a three months period.
- Expert consultations: More than 20 interviews with relevant representatives of civil society, state and academic community were carried out. Four of the interviews referred to the issue of CSO impact on particular policies.

2.2.2. Aggregating data

The project team collected various types of data for the draft report and structured them according to the CSI indicators, subdimensions and dimensions. Each indicator was attributed a score between 0 and 3 (0 being the lowest value and 3 the highest). Each potential indicator score (0, 1, 2 and 3) was described in either qualitative or sometimes quantitative terms. The NAG

scoring exercise is modelled along a “citizen jury” approach (Jefferson Centre 2002), in which citizens come together to deliberate, and make decision on a public issue, based on presented facts. The NAG’s role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence (or data) presented by the National Index Team (NIT) in the form of the draft country report.

The process of indicator scoring, performed by the NAG, was based on a discussion on the information provided for each indicator. Based on this discussion and the scoring matrix featuring the indicator score descriptions, the NAG decided on a score for each respective indicator. The National Workshop also played a role in validating the indicators, if an adequate rationale was provided, national workshop participants could decide to change the indicator score provided by the NAG. This only happened in one case, and national workshop participants were also asked to provide comments and inputs related to the CSI findings. As a result of the workshop, participants built a common understanding of the current state of civil society and recommended initiatives for civil society strengthening.

2.3. Linking research with action

The CSI is not a purely academic project. Its goal is to involve civil society actors in the research process, contribute to a discussion on civil society and provide recommendations on how to strengthen civil society. This categorises the project as action oriented research.

Various relevant stakeholders participated in the project implementation at several levels. The NAG included representatives from CSOs, the state, the corporate sector, foreign organisations and researchers. It discussed the definition of civil society, the project methodology and assisted with calibrating certain indicator score categories.

Another important component of the project was the regional consultations, organised to discuss the findings of a survey conducted in six regions. These consultations were held in Yunnan, Gansu, Hunan, Liaoning, Shanghai and Beijing, which represent different areas in China. Representatives of various CSOs, the state, the corporate sector, the media, researchers and foreign donors participated in these workshops, where they discussed key issues for China’s civil society, and identified regionally specific strengths and weaknesses.

The final component of the participatory CSI approach was the discussion of the draft CSI report at the National Workshop, in which participants were asked to identify overall strengths and weaknesses of China’s civil society and provide recommendations for future activities.

2.4. Project outputs

The CSI implementation in China delivered several products, including:

- A comprehensive report on the status of civil society in the country;
- A list of recommendations, strategies and priority actions developed by various stakeholders, aimed at strengthening civil society in China;
- A conference on key findings;
- Consultations with about 100 stakeholders discussing the status of civil society.

II CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA

1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

FIGURE II.1.1: Country Information

Country: China
Country size (in Km ²): 9596960
Population (in Thousands): 1315844
Population density:
Population under 15 years: 22.7%
Urban population: 38.6%
Form of government: Communist State
Seats in parliament held by women: 20.2%
Language: Chinese or Mandarin, Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghaiese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, others
Ethnicity: Han Chinese 91.9%, Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean, and other nationalities 8.1%
Religion: Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Christian 3%-4%, Muslim 1%-2% note: officially atheist (2002 est.)
HDI Score & Ranking: 0.755 (85th)
GDP per capita (US \$): 5003
Unemployment rate: 4%
Population living with less than US\$ 2 a day: 46.7% (2001)

From the perspective of modern Chinese history, the development of China's CSOs has undergone three stages. The first stage lasted from 1911 to 1949, the second stage from 1949 to 1978 and the third stage from 1978 to the present.

The different kind of social organisations that emerged in during the first stage can be classified into six types. The first type was *trade promotion associations*, such as guilds and institutions. The second type was *charity and mutual benefit organisations*, such as mutual help groups, cooperation groups and baby-nursing groups. The third type was *academic organisations*, such as

academies, research associations and learned societies. The fourth type of social organisation was *political organisations*, such as the Youth Federation. The fifth type was *culture and arts organisations*, such as theatrical companies, song and dance ensembles, chess groups and painting groups. The sixth were *clandestine associations*, such as “Hui Dang” “XX bang” or junto. In October 1932, the government promulgated a legal document, which was the first legal document on CSOs in China. In 1942, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed “Sketch of Shan Gan Ning non-governmental organisations” and “Registration of Shan Gan Ning Nongovernmental Organizations”.

The second stage covers the period from 1949 to 1978. After the CCP took power in 1949 and through the early 1950s, the existing NGOs (*minjian zuzhi*) were reorganised according to socialist principles. Provisional regulations for the registration of social organisations were passed in September 1950. This legal document defined social organisations by way of enumeration and provided procedural principles for social organisations` registration, including the principle of registration in different levels and Dual-Management (*shuangchong guanli*), both of which will be presented later in this report. Two other changes greatly influenced the development of China's NGOs. One was that some NGOs were politicised. Those with obvious political purpose were defined as political parties or movements. Examples of these include: “Democracy Parties and Groups” (*min zhu dang pai*), such as “the China Democracy Alliance” (*zhongguo minzhu tongmeng*) and “Nine Three Intellectual Groups” (*jiu san xueshe*). Another change was that some illegal social organisations were banned, such as some feudal organisations and anti-government organisations, including guilds, political parties, charities, and religious

organisations. From that point on, the non-political character of CSOs became an important feature of China's CSOs. After a period of renovation starting in 1949, China's social organisations developed rapidly in the period from the 1950s to 1960s. It is estimated that national social organisations increased from 44 to 100 and local social organisations increased to 6000 by 1965. The period of the Cultural Revolution brought the development of Chinese civil society to a complete halt.

The third stage began in 1978 and continues to present time. The ongoing reform policies have led to significant changes in almost every aspect for China, from the economy to politics, and from social life to cultural awareness. These changes are also reflected in the development of China's social organisations. In the 1980s, social organisations emerged and rapidly developed. According to the research of Ying Wang and others experts, social organisations in the Xiaoshan and Zhejiang provinces increased by 24 times from 1978 to 1990. Such rapid development in the 1980s can be attributed to the increased openness of the social environment, created by the economic development and reforms. In the 1990s, the market economic system was reaffirmed, and the government set "small government, big society" as a reform goal, which provided a larger space for CSOs to develop. In the 1990s, the development of China's CSOs reached a new climax. Statistics state that in 1998 there were more than 1,800 national social organisations and 165,600 local social organisations. The rapid development of Civilian Non-enterprise Units, such as private schools and private hospitals, since the mid 1990s, was a crucial process. With the development of a market economy, an increasing number of individuals and social forces began to sponsor schools, hospitals, social welfare institutions and research academies. In the 1990s, the number of various Civilian Non-enterprise Units reached over 700,000.

The legislation framework was formed in the 1950s, and is not able to meet the needs of social organisations in today's China. The legislation named "Provisional Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social organisations" was adopted in October 1989. This is the second law document on social organisations since the founding of People's Republic of China. The provisions on "Management Measures on Foundations" and "Provisional Regulations on Foreign Chambers of Commerce" were adopted in August 1988 and June 1989 respectively. In October 1998, the "Provisional Regulation on Registration and Administration of Civilian Non-enterprise Units" was promulgated, while the "Regulation on Registration and Administration of Social organisations" was revised. In August 1999, the "Law of Donation on Public Welfare" was also promulgated. Most of the current regulations or laws on NGOs were put in place in 1998 and 1999.

2. CIVIL SOCIETY CONCEPT IN CHINA

The term 'NGO' was introduced in China in the context of the United Nations World Women's Conference in 1995 in Beijing. While it might be difficult to apply the definition of CSOs, derived in a Western context, to China, since the 1978 reform in China, there definitely was a growth of civil society, as a different sector separate from government or the business sector. To describe the current situation in China, and for comparative purposes, it is important to take into

account those organisations that are located in the arena outside of the family, the government, and the market, which have certain features of voluntarism and are self-governing.

According to the definition above, three types of CSOs can currently be found in China. They are the following:

First, “Civilian Organisations” (Min Jian Zu Zhi) registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which are legally recognised as CSOs in China. They can be called “Officially Authorised CSO”. According to the current legal system, there are primarily three types of Civilian Organisations: membership based Social organisations, Foundations and the Civilian Non-enterprise Units. Social organisations obtain their legal status by registering under the Provisional Regulations for Registration and management of Social organisations (1998), which defines Social organisations as non-profit social organisations composed of Chinese citizens to realise the will of their members. Social organisations include: associations, leagues, academies and chambers of commerce. Thirty-three special organisations can possess such legal status without registering. They include 8 mass groups, which participate in the political conference, and 25 other social organisations approved directly by the state council. Foundations are registered according to Provisional Regulations for the Management of Foundations (1998). They also obtain the legal status of a Social Group. The Civilian Non-enterprise Units are registered according to the “Provisional Regulations for Registration and Administration of Civilian Non-enterprise Unit” (1998). They can be an individual, a main body or be a juridical person qualification according to particular circumstances. Civilian Non-enterprise Units include: private schools, private non-profit hospitals, private service organisations and institutes.

Many international NGOs have registered as Civilian Non-enterprise Units with the Department of Science and Technology as the professional leading unit. However, the Government of the People’s Republic of China is now seeking to bring most NGOs, with social objectives, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Civil Affairs with proper registration as membership-based organisation or foundation, rather than with the legal status of a non-profit enterprise


There are also organisations that do not possess the qualification as a juridical person, but can be considered a CSO in terms of the characteristic of being non-profit and non-governmental. They can be called “Grassroots CSOs”. Officially, an NGO is legal only when it is registered at the bureau of Civil Affairs as a “Civilian Organisations” (Min Jian Zu Zhi). However, there are more and more grassroots CSOs in China, which take on various forms. One is to carry out activities as a second grade of branch under certain institutions. Another popular type is to register and gain the qualification of an enterprise juridical person in the Ministry of Industrial and Commerce, then seeking to negotiate with the official for obtaining tax-benefits. Besides, there are still many community organisations, rural economic and technical coordination organisations, and other unregistered organisations carrying out activities like CSOs. These grassroots organisations are restricted in receiving donations or developing their activities because of their confused, or unclear legal status, but they also play very active roles in the social affairs of the communities within which they are based.

There are many organisations that are in a process of transformation towards becoming a CSO, such as institutions in transformation, community autonomy organisation of village committees and resident committees, owner committees and virtual communities on the Internet. These can be called “Unshaped CSOs”.

In addition, the political organisations and religion organisations should also be taken into account when talking about CSOs. However, they were excluded from the definition of CSOs in China since they possess a special status in the Chinese context.

The following figure shows the range of CSO categories in China.

Figure II.2.1: CSO in China



In terms of the number of CSOs in China, different numbers emerge based on the definition being used. “Civil Organisations” registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs are the officially authorised CSOs in China. By the end of December of 2005, there were 168,000 Social organisations registered. There were 146,000 Civilian Non-enterprise Units. The number of all kinds of Foundations is 999 and there is no exact statistical data for the grassroots CSOs. There may be as many or more than one million according to some estimates, which is far more than

the total number of the officially authorised CSOs. When the village committees, resident committees and some other unshaped CSOs are taken into account, the number may reach more than three to four million.

Checklist of categories of Civil Society Organisations:

1. Trade unions
2. Advocacy CSOs (e.g. civic action, social justice, peace, human rights, consumers' groups)
3. Social Service CSOs
4. CSOs active in education, training & research (e.g. think tanks, resource centres, non-profit schools, public education organisations)
5. Women's associations
6. Student and youth associations
7. Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups (e.g. poor people, homeless, landless, immigrants, refugees)
8. Social service and health associations (e.g. charities raising funds for health research/services, associations of people with physical disabilities)
9. Education
10. Professional associations
11. Trade promotion association or business organisations (e.g. chambers of commerce)
12. The Village committee and the Resident's Committees.
13. Community-level groups/associations (e.g. burial societies, self-help groups, parents' associations)
14. Economic interest CSOs (e.g. co-operatives, credit unions, mutual saving associations)
15. Ethnic/traditional/indigenous associations/organisations
16. Environmental CSOs
17. Culture & arts CSOs.
18. Social and recreational CSOs & sport clubs
19. Grant-making foundations & fund-raising bodies
20. Political parties
21. CSO networks/federations/support organisations
22. Farmer's Organisation
23. Religious Organisations

3. KEY DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY CONTEXT

China's CSOs showed rapid development in the 1980s, and witnessed another wave of development in 1990s. This development reflects the transition of the Chinese social structure.

Beginning with the rural economic reform in 1978, China has been experiencing a period of transition from planned economy towards a market economy with significant political, social and cultural implications. An important factor in this process of change was the gradual shift from collective to multiple and individual ownership. The transition happened step by step, covering all aspects of China's society. First, the reform of the economic system in rural areas took place, which carried out through the Household Contract Responsibility System, with remuneration linked to output, and the abolishment of the Commune system in rural areas. Then the reform of the economic system in urban areas took place, beginning in 1984. This changed the ownership of state enterprises to multiple ownership. Social reform progressed little by little, and was characterised by the reform of the unit system, especially the reform of institutions and the social welfare system. The government reform of the administrative system and transformation of their functions also progressed during the 1990s. All of these changes and reforms showed that China was in a state of transition from a centralised system to a system with a greater role for civil society. The transition is characterised by a process of "separation of government from enterprise", "separation of government from public institutions", "separation of government from society" and "separation of the Party from government". Together these meant a trend towards "limited government". During this process, the space for individuals' freedom is gradually widening in various ways, including economic activity, freedom of expression, self-organising and self-governing. Civil society is in the process of forming.

The basic change in the social structure is from the concept of total, or uniform, society a total society, with the "unit" (Dan wei) system. This means that all areas of society are organised by the government with similar structures, towards a concept of civil society with multiple faces and features. In communist China, the social structure was characterised by a government that had a strong hold on society and that strongly influenced people's everyday lives through the Danwei "unit" system. Everyone belongs to a Danwei unit and all his/her life, from cradle to grave, depends on the Danwei unit where she lives and works. The reform policies led to a gradual erosion of the Danwei system, which might be partly replaced by a well-structured civil society. This may be the case for several reasons. First, social organisations are in a process of transformation. There were only eight mass groups attached to the CCP in communist China, now there are more and more social organisations organised by citizens. Second, private non-profit enterprises are emerging, which indicate the development of social philanthropy. Third, the development of grassroots NGOs is gaining momentum, many of which are involved in advocacy work in one or the other way.

This transition also gives China's civil society a series of special features, which mainly relate to the following two points: First, the transition brings a growth of free space for individuals, but the space is incredibly flexible, without an explicit line between government and society. In the

western context, the emergence of civil society was part of the power-balance process and reflects the aim of maximizing the right of the individual vis-à-vis the state. However, in China, civil society emerged during the transition from Communism and during a period of government reform. The main stimulation and major space for its growth are social needs and social welfare issues, which are being transferred from the government. Generally speaking, civil society in China is inclined to provide social services. Yet, it lacks a conscience to advocate for a balancing of power and rights between the state and citizens. Second, the reforms began with economic reform. The economic space grew much earlier and more quickly than the social space or political freedom. Therefore, civil society in China comes from two directions, one is the “separation of government from society” reform, and the other is initiated by the market economy. Also, because of the delay of government reform or political reform, the great social needs to develop and strengthen Civil Society are severely restricted by the political environment.

It can be concluded that the key factors contributing to the development of CSO in China as the following:

1) The economic reform that began in 1978 has had many achievements. Along with the formation of a private sector, the demand for society’s self-governance and social supervision is gradually rising. This provides more space for China’s CSOs.

2) In the process of shifting government’s functions towards a “small” government and “big” society as its target, the functions that are taken away from the government require a strong civil society to take them on, since CSOs are the most important way to form social self-organising mechanisms.

3) The ongoing social reforms will certainly cause some new injustices, especially in addressing the needs of the poor. However, the Government has its own limitations when solving such problems and fulfilling such demands. Therefore, an invention of new organisational forms was needed and CSOs now play a non-replaceable role.

4) In the course of political democratization, additional voices should be heard, which are considered essential for a vital democratic political system. CSOs increasingly act as advocacy groups and become think-tanks engaged in political reform. Therefore, much more attention is paid to them.

5) China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 presents the strongest challenge to government so far. Joining into a globalised world, the existing pattern of administrative management by government, makes it difficult for government to deal with complex situations and various pressures from the outside world. The new public management paradigm, with multiple actors and stronger social self-organisation seems to benefit both society and national interests as a whole. This will be a significant change for civil society in China.

As a consequence of the factors outlined above, the number and variety of CSOs in China are increasing. There are large and small CSOs and membership and non-membership based organisations. Many of the larger CSOs are so-called government organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) and still function under the influence of the government administration and/or the party. The number of smaller organisations initiated by groups of citizens has significantly grown over the past years. Many GONGOs are facing reduced support from

Government and are currently engaged in a process of modernization. The Government also aims to encourage cooperation and exchange among larger and smaller organisations through the establishment of federation structures. The legal framework allows for registration of both membership based and non-membership based organisations. Registration requirements for social organisations (shehui tuanti) and foundations are relatively restrictive in terms of membership requirement and capital stock requirement. Public benefit orientation is a mandatory requirement for social organisations and foundations. So far, the establishment of major umbrella bodies happened through a top-down process rather than a bottom-up process and with the close involvement of the Government. Many CSOs are registered as private enterprises. A key feature of CSO supervision and management in China is the dual management system. Each CSO must register and it is required that there be an affiliation to a professional leading unit, a governmental or quasi-governmental body. The number of NGOs varies greatly among the provinces and counties throughout China. Most of the registered NGOs are located in urban areas. The largest number of NGOs is active in the field of education/academic, trade promotion, arts and culture. Those NGOs that receive internationally support are mainly active in the field of environmental protection and poverty reduction.

4. Mapping Civil Society in China

The results of Mapping of Civil Society in China are as follows:

- 28 forces represent Government, including 11 strong ones, 11 mid ones and 6 small ones.
- 2 forces represent Government, including 11 strong ones, 11 mid ones, and 6 small ones.
- 33 forces represent Government, including 13 strong ones, 10 mid ones and 10 small ones.

Among these, the strongest include: CCP and central government, the local government, the local People's Representative Congress, the People's Political Consultative Conference, officers; private enterprise, large international companies, foreign invest enterprise, market, Chinese large enterprise, bank; civil society, media, local election(democracy), university, scholars, trade promotion association, floating population, educational agency, environmental and poverty alleviation agency, global civil society and an autonomous agency.

Among all the forces, the most influential one was CCP and central government. Then it was private enterprise. The most ignored group included unemployed people and religions groups.

III ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY


In this section the bulk of the information and data collected during the course of the project is presented. The analysis is structured along the individual indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions. The scope of the issues to be addressed as part of the project was so broad, that we had to examine certain indicators less intensively than others. For example as far as the Environment dimension is concerned, we simply adopted the basic rating from sources recommended by CIVICUS (e.g. the Freedom House Civil & Political Rights, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index).

The section is divided along the four dimensions: **Structure, Environment, Values and Impact**, which make up the CSI Diamond. At the beginning of each part, a graph provides the scores for the sub-dimensions on a scale from 0 to 3. Findings for each sub-dimension are then examined in detail. A separate box also provides the scores for the individual indicators for each sub-dimension.

1. STRUCTURE

This section describes and analyses the overall size, strength and vibrancy of civil society in human, organisational, and economic terms. Chinese civil society's structure is somewhat weak (1.0). Figure III.1.1 provides the scores for the six subdimensions: extent and depth of citizen participation, diversity of civil society participants, level of organisation, inter-relations and civil society resources. At present, neither the breadth nor the depth of citizen participation is entirely satisfying, and the diversity in the membership and leadership of civil society organisations needs to be improved. Only few CSOs are engaged in formal networking structures with other CSOs. Many do not cooperate nor do they share information with one another. Communication with international organisations is even less frequent. Chinese civil society is poorly resourced, especially with regards to inadequate financial resources and infrastructure, which are some of the main factors that restrict civil society development.

FIGURE III.1.1: Subdimension scores in the Structure dimension



1.1. The Extent of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This section provides details on the analysis of survey data collected regarding various aspects of citizen participation in Chinese civil society. On the whole, Chinese citizens do not take part in all types of civil society activities, with participation in non-partisan political action being almost non-existent. The data reveals that although the share of charitable giving and volunteering reaches a medium level, it is always mobilised by the government or units.

Table III.1.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.1: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	0
1.1.2	Charitable giving	1
1.1.3	CSO membership	1
1.1.4	Volunteer work	2
1.1.5	Community action	1

1.1.1 Non-partisan political action. The election of villagers' committee and residential committees are widespread. Since the implementation of the revised *Law on Organizing of the Urban Residents Committees of the PRC* in November 1988, elections have been held in 27 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government. About 60 million peasants participated in these elections. In some areas the rate of participation was as high as 80%. Also, the *Law on Organizing of the Residents' Committee* was implemented in 1999, which introduced direct elections in urban communities.

However, under the present democratic situation in China, except for top-down organised activities, Chinese people are unlikely to be able to be conscious of the opportunity to participate in non-political activities that are spontaneously organised by nonofficial groups. The community survey shows that around 95% of participants never wrote a letter to a newspaper nor signed a petition, let alone attended a demonstration. The few participants who did assemble did so in an urban setting. It is possible some respondents may have undertaken the activities but refuse to mention it because of the present political atmosphere.

1.1.2 Charitable giving. A survey titled "Status Quo of Community Service and Residents' Demand" reveals that 60%-odd participants express willingness to donate money to the community while 8.5% are unwilling to do so. The Community Survey reveals that about 45% had donated in the last year. There are significant differences between urban and rural settings. In urban places like Beijing, Chongqing, and Yunnan Province, donors make up around 70% of respondents. However, in rural areas we find up to 80% of respondents not having made a donation at all in the last year. Most people donate money in irregular way. Many people in urban areas donate when required by the government, e.g. in a response to disasters.

1.1.3 CSO membership. The Community Survey found that 37% of respondents are members of at least one CSO. Marked differences exist among the regions of the country. In Chong Qing, Zehjiang and Beijing areas, the share is as much as 45%. The highest is 79% in the rural area in Shandong Province. However, in general, there are higher membership rates in urban area than in rural areas. Also, women participate a little more than men.

The largest membership figures were for farmer's associations (10%) and trade promotion associations (14%). There are different types of CSOs. In China, there are eight People Groups,

such as the Women's Federation, Labour Union, of which all the related person can be regarded as members. However, it can be debated whether the people groups can be regarded as CSO. Only few people are members of autonomous civil society organisations/grass-roots NGOs.

1.1.4 Volunteering. According to the statistics by Ministry of Civil Affairs, there are 15 million volunteers in China who make up 1.2% of the entire population. This proportion is much lower than in most other countries.

However, in the Community Survey, where volunteering is defined as any kind of help given to others, 57% of the respondents once did others a favour for free. For instance, in urban areas, people help neighbours by taking care of the old, the young, or the sick, looking after the house, do shopping and so on. Most of them provide such help not in a regulated way or formal style. In rural areas, people help each other with farm work, wedding ceremony, funeral affairs and so on. These types of assistance are rather frequent.

1.1.5 Collective community action. The community survey found that 43% of respondents can remember community meetings that took place to discuss issues during last year, but only 30% of them (13% of all) attended such a meeting. Similarly, 43.5% can remember people in their community coming together voluntarily to do some work for the benefit of the community last year, in which 35% of them (15% of all) participated.

1.2. Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

This subdimension examines the intensity of various forms of citizen participation in Chinese civil society. Table III.1.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.2: Indicators assessing depth of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Charitable giving / contributions	1
1.2.2	Volunteering	1
1.2.3	CSO membership	1

1.2.1 Charitable giving/contributions. At present, China has no statistics of the total amount of donation citizens contributed. In 2002, China Charity Federation raised funds, goods and materials and all of them could be converted to as much as 150 million RMB. Over the last years, the quality and quantity of Chinese charitable giving has made a big stride.

Among community survey respondents, less than 40% provide the amount they donated last year. Among donors, 150 yuan was the average for an individual, which is reduced to 60 yuan, if all respondents are included. In terms of differences between city and countryside, the annual amounts are 92.2 yuan and 31.5 yuan respectively. In 2003, per capita disposable income of Chinese people was 8,472 yuan, while in the countryside, per capita net income was 2,622. Therefore, the annual donation amounted to 1.1% in the city and 1.2% in the countryside. With regard of the distribution of donations, 16% donated no more than 50 yuan. The majority gave 50-100 yuan (9.6%) and 100-500 (12%). Two percent donated 1,000 yuan and one even donated as much as 5,000 yuan. (See below)

1.2.2 Volunteering. According to a survey in the city of Guangzhou, 43% of respondents agree that the disabled people need help most while 36% tend to think it is the old men and women without any help. Forty-one percent hold that the relatively reasonable time for volunteer work is

supposed to be within 60 hours, while 38% quoted 60 to 80 hours. CYVA estimates that in 1999 alone, Chinese volunteers worked for 3.1 billions hours, approximately equal to 1.1 million full-time employees' work.

In the community survey, 41.4% of respondents can roughly tell their volunteer service time in the past one month and the average period of time is about 16 hrs. The number decreases to 6.5 hrs if those who did not give out their volunteer time are included. The service hours concentrate mainly within 10 hours, of which 17.6% are no more than five, over 10% five to ten hours, 8% over 20 hours and 0.8% even over 100 hours. The utmost number is 100-odd, i.e., someone devoted to volunteer work over 100 hours in a week. However, the NAG thought this figure is inflated if defined as strictly voluntary time only. For example, in the rural areas people live together and many of them are relatives. They help each other with household affairs or take care of children or do farming together. This is different from the social voluntary participation and renders the number (the statistical mean) much higher than the real "average" (the mode). The "average" (mode) is 1 to 5 hours per month.

1.2.3 CSO membership. Within the past year, less than 50% of the community survey respondents were involved in a CSO and less than 40% in two or more CSOs. The utmost number of CSO involvement is 7 at the same time. Forty-six percent had not participated in any CSO at all.

When asked "do you participate in more or less organisations than you did before 1998?" 13% answered the former while almost the same answered the latter. Other 24.5% thought it was almost unchanged. Just a half didn't answer or say they don't know. This indicates that three quarters of ordinary people have no concept of CSO in their mind.

1.3. Diversity of Civil Society Participants

This subdimension examines the diversity and representativity of the civil society arena. It analyses whether all social groups participate equally in civil society, and whether there are any groups which are dominant or excluded. The diversity of civil society participants is moderate, with disadvantaged groups being under-represented in civil society. There is also discrepancy between the stakeholders in different areas. Table III.1.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.3: Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	1
1.3.2	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	1
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	1

1.3.1 Representation of social groups among CSO members. According to stakeholders' experience, groups differ a lot in the civil society members' representativeness. See Table III.1.5.

Table III.1.4: Representation of social groups among CSO members

	Female	rural population	minorities	Religious people	poor	Elite
Excluded	3□5	16.4	2.7	6.6	17.7	1.8
greatly under-represented	6.6	20.4	12.4	13.3	17.7	9.3
under-represented	25.2	11.5	19.5	8.8	8.0	16.8
equally	40.3	15.9	22.1	19	11.9	46.5
No answer	24.3	35.9	43.3	52.2	44.7	25.6

Thus, according to stakeholders' opinions, particularly rural and poor people are significantly underrepresented in CSOs.

1.3.2 Representation of social groups in CSO leadership. The major government affiliated NGOs are run by politically influential people with close connections to the party and the government. Some of the smaller grassroots organisations have charismatic individuals as leaders who often have spent some time in foreign countries. Many of the smaller organisations are highly dependent of the work of a few individuals with fund raising skills.

According to the official statistics, in the year of 2000, 454,314 in all took charge of national communities in China, among which women occupied 61,214 amounting to 13%. Among 31,926 leaders of Civilian Non-enterprise Units, females were 23% or 7,275 in number.

Stakeholders hold almost the same point of view about the representativeness of both the leaders and members in CSOs. Rural population, the poor are excluded, the women, the minority are not represent well. Generally speaking, the diversity is limited.

1.3.3 Distribution of CSO around the country. Stakeholders hold that CSOs are mainly concentrated in big cities. Only 33% agree that CSOs are in most or even all of the districts in China, and 6.6% answer that they don't know. The others think the CSO distribution is limited.

However, almost all provinces have a large number of CSOs. The figure below shows the distribution of CSOs across country; CSOs are over-represented in urban areas.

Table III.1.5: Distribution of CSOs in China

Province	No. ¹ / total ² (%)	No. ³ / total ⁴ (%)	Province	No. ¹ / total ² (%)	No. ³ / total ⁴ (%)
Beijing	1.45	1.18	Hubei	3.13	1.12
Tianjin	0.93	0.38	Hunan	2.91	5.04
Hebei	2.04	1.01	Guangdong	5.25	3.19
Shanxi	3.61	2.26	Guangxi	3.50	1.53
Inner Mongolia	5.27	3.96	Hainan	0.39	0.19
Liaoning	3.02	2.00	Chongqing	2.81	0.67
Jilin	1.49	0.91	Sichuan	4.87	5.15
Heilongjiang	2.50	1.30	Guizhou	1.56	0.50
Shanghai	7.57	8.80	Yunnan	2.44	0.65
Jiangsu	7.62	5.30	Tibet	2.03	2.59
Zhejiang	7.09	1.62	Shaanxi	4.10	6.86
Anhui	3.28	1.14	Gansu	3.84	1.90
Fujian	5.25	2.49	Qinghai	0.77	0.23
Jiangxi	2.24	1.80	Ningxia	0.46	0.13
Shandong	3.37	4.82	Xinjiang	1.55	0.86
Henan	3.64	1.36	Total	100.00	100.00

Note: No.¹: the number of CSOs in a specific district.

Total²: the total number of CSOs in all the districts.

No.³: the number of employees in a specific district

Total⁴: the total number of employees in all the districts

1.4. Level of Organisation

This subdimension looks at the infrastructure and internal organisation of CSOs in China. Table III.1.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.6: Indicators assessing level of organisation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of umbrella bodies	0
1.4.2	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	1
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	1
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	1
1.4.5	International linkages	1

1.4.1 Existence of umbrella bodies. According to the stakeholder survey, the number of CSOs that belong to federations or networks are relatively limited. Less than every seventh stakeholder considers that more than 40% of CSOs belong to a federation or network of CSOs. Slightly less than every 4th stakeholder think the % is below 20%, and around every 5th stakeholder considers the percentage to be between 20-40%, while a relative majority of 43% could not give an answer. Thus, in the views of stakeholders, the share of CSOs belonging to networks is seen as rather low.

1.4.2 Effectiveness of umbrella bodies. Most stakeholders hold positive attitudes regarding the effectiveness of CSO federations, networks or umbrella bodies in achieving their defined goals: 50% of them agree that they are effective and only 13% consider them largely ineffective or completely ineffective while a third cannot answer the question.

The effectiveness of existing federations, umbrella organisations and network bodies is considered to be high. The China Association for NGOs (CANGO), affiliated with CICETE, has provided many services to its member NGOs, including several trainings and issuing of a

newsletter. German Government supported experts work within CANGO and assisted in carrying out training activities. However, there are almost no autonomous network and umbrella bodies due to legislative restrictions. The federations and networks that are registered and affiliated with governmental organisations try their best to provide services but their acceptance among advocacy groups and grassroots NGOs is not always very high.

1.4.3 Self-regulation within civil society. Among the 249 organisations in which stakeholders have participated in, over 92% have established codes of conduct or other means of self-regulation. Nearly 90% of stakeholders think that CSOs did are making attempts to set up self-regulation systems, but only 22% assess that these systems have some impact.

There is a debate among academicians of NGO Research Center and some practitioners how to best develop a system of NGOs regulation and self-regulation. The Chinese experts are eager to study good practices in other countries, such as the one by the German CSO Deutsches Zentralinstitut fuer Soziale Fragen (DZI).

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. At the present time, the support infrastructure for CSOs in China includes:

(1) Networking organisations, such as some information web for foundations and NPOs (<http://www.ngocn.org/>), and CSO public website (<http://www.npo.com.cn>).

Another example is China Development Brief (www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org), an independent publication established in 1996 to report on social development and civil society in China. The initiative receives funding from a Hong Kong based NGO. It issues a newsletter, special reports and informs about government policies, global civil society issues and networking events. Nominal charges have recently been introduced to access special content in English.

(2) Resource-organisations, e.g. China Association for CSO Cooperation, which “with the cooperation of Chinese government, aims to provide consultation and convenience for cooperative partners to operate in China”, as mentioned in its mission statement. Another example is the China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), which “under the coordination of Chinese government, provide co-operators with consultancy and related service to promote activities.

(3) Research institutions, e.g. NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua University, Chinese Community Research Center of School of Government Peking University, Civil Society Organic Law Research Center of Peking University Law School, Research Center for Volunteering and Welfare of Beijing University, Research Center for CSOs in South China, Zhongshan University Research Institute for Guangdong Development, Center for Social Development, Fudan University; etc.

(4) Other support organisations, e.g. China Youth Development Foundation is a non-profit volunteer organisation which started early and develop quickly in China; Amity Foundation is a non-profit organisation sponsored by Christians in China and it has trained thousands of social workers in 16 years.

(5) Supporting institutions from private sector: at present, Chinese enterprises are beginning to supporting CSOs’ operation, such as: Bright China Foundation in Beijing and Jianguo Public Network-supporting organisations: including foundations and non-profit organisations’ information network, NPO public website and Chinese public welfare websites.

Although there are a number of support organisations, their number of is very small. In the regional stakeholder survey, 14.6% of stakeholders think that there is no support infrastructure for civil society at all, 63% think there is only limited infrastructure, and only less than 2% think the basis is well-developed.

1.4.5 International linkages. At present, CSOs in China are making more and more contact with international organisations. Seventeen percent of stakeholders think there are a significant number of Chinese CSOs joining international networks but over 40% still think that few or even none have done so. The remaining 40% did not answer this question. As for how many domestic CSOs participate in international affairs. Fifteen and one-half percent of stakeholders think none at all, 31.4% few, 22% several or many, 31.4% are unaware.

This assessment is supported by the findings of a survey report by CSO Research Center Tsinghua University, which reveals that among the investigated domestic CSOs, over 70% have never had contact with any foreign CSOs. Those with rather more international cooperation are mostly located in Beijing and Shanghai, especially organisations titled with China, or Chinese, for example, China Association for CSO Cooperation, Song Qing Ling Foundation. Some organisations in other provinces and cities receive international funds as well, for example, Yunnan Health and Development Research Association (YHDRA), Rural Area Development Association of Yilong County Sichuan Province, Aid-the-Poor Economic Cooperative of Yi County Hebei Province, and so on. Their organisational forms can be mainly classified into three types.

Foreign donors is the most frequent one as many national CSOs receive funding from foreign donors, which is often accompanied by the exchange of information, technology and staff training.

A significant number of foreign and international NGOs demonstrate interest in working in China with Chinese organisations and projects. Many major international NGOs are already active in China. Save the Children Fund is registered as a non-profit enterprise and works in the field of education. World Vision is only registered in Hong Kong and works through local organisations. World Vision was one of the major international donors to the victims of the natural disaster in Yunnan. World Vision has so far implemented about 88 relief and development projects in 16 provinces/municipalities across China. From 1989 to 2004, funds worth 636 million Yuan (USD 77.6 million) were used in different projects in China out of which 30 millions RMB in Yunnan province. The Yunnan province is considered to be one of the most progressive provinces in terms of freedom and scope for NGOs. Government agencies in Yunnan have demonstrated their commitment to various kinds of international partnerships. However, on the whole, the international linkages of Chinese CSOs remain weak and under-developed.

1.5. Inter-Relations within Civil Society

This subdimension analyses the relations amongst civil society actors in China. The data shows that the communication and cooperation among CSOs in China are limited at present. Table III.1.7 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.7: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	1
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	1

1.5.1 Communication between CSOs. Only a bit more than 6% of stakeholders think that CSOs are active in sharing information amongst each other, 26% think it is moderate, and a majority (59%) think it is really limited while 5% think there is no sharing of information at all.

1.5.2 Cooperation between CSOs. The cooperation between CSOs is just at the starting stage in a small scale. Nearly 40% of stakeholders think that Chinese CSOs have few or none cooperation with one another, slightly over 33% think they do cooperation to some extent, nearly nobody think they cooperate very well. However, in recent years, the cooperation is more and more frequent, especially in the newborn CSOs. Some examples are:

- (1) CSOs' united actions in the situation of the SARS crisis
- (2) The united actions by CSOs in 2002, with regard to the 2nd World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa.

The media paid much attention to the cooperation as well. The news on this amounts to 33 pieces, in which the national CSO cooperation cases are the most in number, 14 pieces in all.

Stakeholders provided additional examples, however most of them were not related to cooperating in an alliance or network of CSOs, but reflected the cooperation between CSO and government, economic organisations and individuals. Some even include the Internet or website as network of CSOs. That showed misunderstanding of the stakeholders. Thus, the level of actual cooperation among CSOs is likely to be even lower than assessed by stakeholders.

1.6. Civil Society Resources

This subdimension examines the resources available to CSOs in China. Being poorly resourced is currently the biggest problem Chinese CSOs are facing. However, due to certain problems with the sampling of the stakeholder survey and some misunderstandings regarding the concept of resources, the primary data do not fully support this conclusion, which was reached by the NAG. Chinese civil society is poorly resourced (0.73), Table III.1.8 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.8: Indicators assessing civil society resources

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Capital resources	1
1.6.2	Human resources	1
1.6.3	Technical and infrastructural resources	1


1.6.1 Capital resources. A survey by the NGO Research Center of Tsinghua University, "Investigation and Evaluation of Chinese CSO", reveals that in 1998, the main income of Chinese CSOs is the financial allocation or subsidy provided by the government, which amount to almost half of the total budget. The second highest component is membership dues, 21.18% of the entire income. The third is the business income, 6% on average; the fourth are patronage that enterprises offer and project funds, taking up 5.63%; the proportion of other kinds are all lower than 5%. It also reveals that Chinese CSOs are generally at a small expenditure scale. For 90% of CSOs, the budget is less than 500,000 yuan.

However, to this day, significant changes have taken place. We can see this from the data of stakeholder survey analysis: the funding sources of more than 33% CSO (249 organisations in all) contain government's subsidy and its volume takes up 51.7% of the annual income. Among them, 22 organisations are completely supported by the government. Nearly 46% of CSOs receive funds from enterprises, making up 48.3% of the annual total income. While 39

organisations have a majority of business funding (50%-95%), another 18 organisations are entirely funded by local enterprises. Few receive donation from foreign donors or individuals, but if an organisation receives such a kind of financial support, the donation is large in amount, on average, 39% and 49% respectively. Membership dues and paid service are still the main source for some organisations, both constituting a half averagely.

In regard to the whole situation, business support, government subsidy and membership dues are the main economic source of civil society in our country. (See figure III.1.2 below_)

Figure III.1.2: The proportions of different resources



There are still some restrictions for NGO fundraising in China. For example, the Provisional Regulations for Management and Administration of Foundations allows the establishment of fundraising foundations. However, the regulations require major capital for such organisations that seek to obtain legal fundraising status. Organisations that aim at raising funds at national level are required to show a capital requirement of 8 Million Yuan.

The assessment of stakeholders regarding the adequacy of financial resources is as follows: less than 38% think CSOs have an adequate or rather adequate financial resource, 56% think CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals or CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem, which shows that the financial situation is inadequate.

1.6.2 Human resources. Working staff in Chinese CSOs are composed of three different kinds: full-time staff, part-time staff and volunteers.

Stakeholder survey data shows that most hold positive view towards the human resource in their organisations, 16% think HR is adequate, with 58% thinking it is rather adequate. Just 20% think it is inadequate or completely inadequate.

Human Resource Development of NGOs is a relatively new topic. Social work is not yet a fully established academic discipline in the People's Republic of China. The two major Beijing based Universities, Tsinghua University and Peking University, both provide teaching on NGO management. The Tsinghua NGO Research Center was established in 1998, the Peking University Civil Society Center only in 2005. Thus, the NAG assessed that the human resource situation for most CSOs remains a serious problem.

1.6.3 Technical and infrastructural resources. Data of a research study undertaken by the NGO Research Center of Tsinghua University in 2001 showed that 46.6% of working offices of Chinese CSOs are provided by the governing departments, and 31.9% have independent offices. Of course, the latter include many official CSOs, whose offices are distributed directly by the government. Also, 18% of CSOs rent or have no special offices of their own. The offices of a few organisations are even in the houses of the leader or member.

Stakeholders' data reveal that, only 12% think CSOs have adequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals, 40% think rather adequate, 32% inadequate and 11% completely inadequate. This means the technological and infrastructural resources is not adequate enough.

CONCLUSION

The structure of Chinese civil society scores only a 1.0, indicating a rather weak structural foundation, both in terms of individual civic engagement as well as the characteristics of organised civil society.

Among the major challenge is the lack of breadth, and particularly depth of citizen participation in civil society activities. While forms of individual non-partisan action (e.g. demonstrating, signing petitions etc.) are almost absent in the People's Republic of China, the extent of volunteering and charitable giving is noticeable.


While there is a significant number of CSOs, many of them are organised by the government and feature a poor involvement of citizens. Grassroots organisations are generally very small and are not organised into any umbrella bodies or networks. Mainly due to political restrictions, not many NGOs are organised in umbrella bodies. However, the existing ones are seen as functioning rather well. Similarly, the levels of communication and cooperation among CSOs are still rather moderate.

Generally, the lack of financial, human and infrastructure resources is a key constraint for the work of CSOs. Many CSO highly depend on a single resource such as international donors or the government. However, the lack of technological resources and trained leadership can be seen as a bigger problem than the lack of money.

2. ENVIRONMENT

This section analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which civil society exists and functions. The external environment for Chinese civil society is in general not very conducive (1.2), especially concerning the political environment. Objectively speaking, the state has given civil society certain rights and autonomy, still the government intervenes more often than it opens up channels for dialogue with civil society. Yet, the Chinese government has devoted itself to improve the external environment for civil society. Also, the business sector has offered considerable financial support to civil society. Figure III.2.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Environment dimension.

FIGURE III.2.1: Subdimensions scores in Environment Dimension



2.1. Political context

This subdimension examines the political situation in China and its impact on civil society. Chinese are endowed with broad political rights and freedom by the Constitution. Various laws provide safeguards for the citizens' political rights. China is moving towards being a state ruled by law. However, the idea of "strong government" has become very important, which has undermined the rule of law concept in many ways. The People's Republic of China scores low on rule of law (2.3 out of 6 points in total) and Political participation (1.0 out of 6 points) in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 (www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de) The Index is not a highly recognised source of reference in the People's Republic of China. The Chinese legal system contains legislation (e.g. Administrative Litigation Law) that enables citizens to sue the state.

It may be important to know that the Chinese Government, compared to some Anglo-Saxon countries, is less concerned with accepting and fostering political, social and cultural diversity but more with building social cohesion and harmony.

The rule of law may not always be well respected by government authorities but there is much and still growing emphasis on rule of law in the current political discourse. However, the political recognition of the need for reform does not mean that the reforms will all be carried out swiftly.

Government officials sometimes adopt a tough approach towards so called “radical social elements”. China has seen severe confrontation between the state and certain quasi-religious sects (particularly the Falungong). There is also a low-level tolerance in China toward pronounced, open and organised political dissent. Chinese history has chosen a one-party system. Corruption is a problem the Party and also the government is facing, but China’s national efficiency is still quite high.

The political context in which civil society exists and functions is somewhat disabling (1.29). Table III.2.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.1: Indicators assessing Political Context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.1.1	Political rights	1
2.1.2	Political competition	1
2.1.3	Rule of law	1
2.1.4	Corruption	1
2.1.5	State effectiveness	2
2.1.6	Decentralisation	2

2.1.1 Political rights. The March 2004 amendment of the Constitution explicitly codified the protection of human rights. *The White Paper on Human Rights in China* provides Chinese people with political rights, including the right to vote, a system of multi-party cooperation and consultation, grassroots democratic constructions and the like. In China, the share of people with the right to vote is about 90%. With the aim to protect people’s democratic rights as well as other legitimate interests, China has issued and implemented a series of important laws, such as the Constitution, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, General Principles of the Civil Law, Law of Civil Procedure, Administrative Procedure Law and so on. From 1979 to 1990, National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee had drafted 99 laws, 21 decisions on revising laws, and 21 resolutions. The State Council has issued over 700 administrative statutes. all provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government and the provincial and municipal peoples’ congress and the standing committees has drawn up a lot of local laws and administrative rules and regulations, among which those about human’s rights legislations amounted to 1000.

In the Freedom House 2005 Report, the Chinese political rights index is 7, indicating a not free state. The report states: “Chinese citizens cannot change their government democratically or express their opposition to its policies. The CCP holds all political power, and party members hold almost all top national and local governmental, police, and military posts. Direct election of officials, above the village level, is expressly forbidden. The parliament - the National People's Congress (NPC) - elects the top officials, but the NPC itself is controlled by the CCP. There is one opposition party, the China Democratic Party, but the government suppresses its activities and it exists, for all practical purposes, in theory only. The only competitive elections in China are for village committees, which are not in any case considered government bodies, and even these are tightly controlled by the CCP.”

However, the NAG scored this indicator with a 1, since the law provides political rights in principle, but needs to perform better in practice.

2.1.2 Political competition. In the Chinese political system, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the party in power while the eight democratic parties are the participating parties, subordinate and “cooperative”. They have been in a close relationship during the process of socialism construction. The Communist Party carries out with all domestic parties the principle of “long-

term coexistence, mutual supervision, treat each other with all sincerity, share the honour or disgrace.

Since neither the democratic parties nor the CPPCC are in competition, the NAG scored this indicator a '1'.

2.1.3 Rule of law. The People's Republic of China scores low on the Rule of Law in the Bertelsmann Index 2006 that focuses on separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, enforced penalties for abuse of office power, and to opportunities for citizens to seek redress for violations of liberties. The Index mentions that economic adjudication and the independence of the judiciary show improvement but criticises that the political monopoly of the CCP supersedes the rule of law, the CCP holds the de facto power to intervene in human rights affairs, the judiciary still lacks autonomy and corruption is yet persistent.

In this regard, the Index might not sufficiently reflect the specific features of the Chinese political system and recent efforts to improve the rule of law. The People's Republic of China is gradually embracing principles of rule of law and some separation of state powers. China is currently drafting a comprehensive civil code by drawing on highest level of national and international expertise.

Also, major capacity building initiatives for promoting a more independent judiciary are under way. With regard to international treaties, China has made considerable efforts in reviewing all the existing treaties and ratified or acceded to a great number of international conventions in various fields. To date, China is party to more than 270 multilateral treaties, out of which more than 239 treaties became applicable to China only after 1979. In other words, 92 percent of the treaties were joined by China after it adopted open policy.

In the human rights areas, for example, China has joined most international treaties. Out of six conventions on human rights, under which national reports on implementation should be periodically submitted, China accede to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Convention on Women) in 1980, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Convention against Racial Discrimination) in 1982 and signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Torture) in 1986 and ratified in 1988. In 1990, it signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child upon its adoption and became party in 1982. In 1997, China signed the International Covenant in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the following yeas (1998) signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It ratified the former in 2001. So, far China has submitted its national reports regularly to each of the experts committee for consideration.

The legislative work of China is being visibly influence by international standards and practice. In answer to the public call, in recent years we have adopted a few important national legislations aimed at improving good governance, for instance, Administrative Procedural law of 1989, the State Compensation Law of 1995, and Administrative Licensing Law of 2004.

The assessment of the rule of law in China in World Bank Governance Dataset is more or less stable at a moderately low level:

Figure III.2.2: Rank of rule of law in China by World Bank

Index	2004	2002	2000	1998	1996
Point (-2.5 to + 2.5)	-0.47	-0.26	-0.33	-0.22	-0.45
Percentage rank(0-100)	40.6	48.5	48.7	52.4	37.3
Variance	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.18	0.15
Survey No.	14	13	12	10	9

2.1.4 Corruption. International Transparency Organization designs CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) and BPI(Bribe Payers Index) for checking the bribery situation in countries. The two tables below illustrate the international comparison of Chinese CPI and BPI. BPI is ordered from 10 (extreme corruption) to 0 (extreme corruption).

Since the 15th Conference of CCP in 1997, the fight against corruption became more visible and effective. Seven hundred eighty thousand people have been subject to inner-Party or political disciplinary measures. According to a survey by the government in 2002, 13.4% of Chinese believe that “corruption trend has been contained in a certain range” and 20% have confidence in the success of the fight against corruption.⁷

2.1.5 State effectiveness. In a comparative study about values in East Asian counties, mainland Chinese have much higher trust on the political parties and organs of state power than any other East Asian country, which could be seen as indicating a strong trust in the government. (See below)

Table III.2.2. Trust of Parties in East Asia

	Strongly trust	Trust	Somewhat distrust	Distrust	Don't know
China(mainland)	69	25	2	0	4
East Asia	12	23	43	15	7
Thailand	10	37	39	6	8
MoCSolia	7	33	42	18	-
Philippine	5	30	45	20	-
Japan	1	9	58	25	7
Republic of Korea	1	14	53	32	-
Taiwan	1	15	52	14	17
Hong Kong	0	22	50	5	23

Table III.2.3: Trust of state in East Asia

	Strongly trust	Trust	Somewhat distrust	Distrust	Don't know
China(mainland)	58	31	1	0	10
MoCSolia	15	45	29	11	-
Thailand	13	42	31	5	10
East Asia	12	31	35	15	7
Philippine	7	37	44	12	-
Taiwan	2	18	44	21	16
Japan	1	12	58	23	6
Hong Kong	1	51	31	3	16
Republic of Korea	0	10	45	45	-

The effective performance of the state is also found in the World Bank's indicator of state effectiveness, where China scores a + 0.11 (on a scale from -2,5 to + 2,5) which ranks the country better than 60% of all assessed countries and indicates a moderately positive level of state effectiveness (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz'A2004/sc_chart.asp).

2.1.6 Decentralization. In late 1970s, decentralization became a notable feature of Chinese economic reformation. A great deal of policy-making power is transferred to local government. In the transformation, there is financial decentralization—the power of raising tax is transferred

⁷ <http://www.yfw.com.cn/shownews.asp?id=11793>

from the centre to the provinces, and also, administrative decentralization—the right to decide administrative affairs is transferred to local governments.

- (1) Financial decentralization: the total fiscal revenue has dropped by a large margin. The government's fiscal revenue, including that the extra-budgetary income decreased from 41% of GDP in 1979 to 16 in 1997 with the amplitude 60%. The proportion of public expenditure of the Central Government decreased from 47% of the whole in 1978 to 22.5% in 1978, and correspondingly, the local government's proportion increased from 53% to 77.5%.
- (2) Administrative decentralization: on cadre management, since late 70s, the right to recruit, promote and supervise cadres has been rendered to government departments of lower level, and thus, centralised to local officials. For ordinary economic policy-making, such as licenses, the examination and approving of projects, the distribution of rare resources (especially capital), government's large-scale contracts, the control of business affairs, the random embezzlement of public funds, the control of prices and some other issues are gradually being transferred to local governments. However, the allocation of finances still relies on the bargaining process between local and central governments, in which the local level is still rather dependent on the central one.

2.2. Basic Rights and Freedoms

This subdimension examines to what extent basic freedoms are guaranteed by law and in practice in China. The Constitution endows Chinese citizens with full freedoms, but similarly, these freedoms are sometimes deprived by national non-institutionalised processes. Table III.2.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.4: Indicators assessing basic freedoms and rights

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	1
2.2.2	Information rights	1
2.2.3	Press freedom	1

2.2.1 Civil liberties. The *Constitution of People's Republic of China* prescribes that the freedom of Chinese citizens include: political rights and freedom, freedom of religious belief, the freedom of person, the right and freedom to get educated and so on. At the same time, all this liberties should be enjoyed under the condition of leadership by the CCP.

In the Freedom House Report 2005: Chinese Civil Liberties Index receive a score of 6, indicating a not free status. The report states: "Freedom of assembly and association is severely restricted. Protests against political leaders or the political system in general are banned, and the constitution stipulates that assemblies may not challenge "Party leadership" or go against the "interests of the State." Security forces are known to use excessive force against demonstrators. All nongovernmental organisations must be registered with and approved by the government. Though the formation of political parties is not specifically discussed in any laws or regulations, the one opposition party that has formed, the China Democrat Party, has been targeted and suppressed by the government and has no real political power. Independent trade unions are illegal, and enforcement of labour laws is poor. All unions must belong to the state-controlled All China Federation of Trade Unions, and several independent labour activists have been jailed for their advocacy efforts. Collective bargaining is legal in all industries, but it does not occur in practice. Despite the fact that workers lack the legal right to strike, there has been a growing wave of strikes over layoffs, dangerous working conditions, or unpaid wages, benefits, or unemployment stipends. The reaction of local officials has been mixed, with strike leaders often arrested, while other strikers are given partial concessions. Chinese labour law mandates that

labour disputes be addressed first in the workplace, then by a mediation committee, then through a local government-sponsored arbitration committee, and finally, if still unresolved, through the court system; however, this procedure is rarely followed in practice(<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2005&country=6715>).

2.2.2 *Information rights.* China has developed a public information system through a series of major newspapers of the central or local governmental., Periodical publications like *Gazette of the State Council of the PRC*, *Law of the Peoples' Republic of China* and *Regulations of People's Republic of China* and so on as the support and all forms of laws and regulations as the complement. Besides, there is the *Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Reconsideration*, whose Clause 2 in Article 23 said the claimant have the right to check up the government's written reply, the evidence of reply and other relevant materials. The administrative department cannot reject the reply as well as it isn't against the state secrets, commercial secret, or private affairs of individuals.

Some scholars maintain that the main deficiencies in governmental information publication are:

- (1) Governmental information is relatively confidential.
- (2) There are too limited ways and channels for the government to provide information
- (3) There is no security or relief in the process citizens obtaining governmental information.

2.2.3 *Press freedom.* The Constitution makes prescribes that citizens are endowed with freedom of speech and press freedom. However, the state has issued legislations like *Interim Procedures of the Administration of Books and Periodicals Publication*, *Print and Publication*, *Interim Provision of Periodicals Registration* and so on to regulate these freedoms. Detailed regulations can be referred to in *Regulations on the Administration of Publishing Industry* (Promulgated by Order No. 210 of the State Council, PRC, and put in practice on February 1st, 1997) and *Interim Regulations of the Administration of Internet Publication* (Promulgated by Order No. 17, of Press and Publication Administration, Ministry of Information Industry, PRC, and put in practice on 1 August 2002), and so on.

World Bank Report 2005's assessment of Chinese Press Freedom Index is a weak 20%. Similarly, Freedom House assigns China a score of 82 (on a scale from 1 to 100), indicating a not free press. It explains: "In China, news media are tightly controlled by the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, especially concerning topic areas deemed by the party to be politically sensitive. Under the leadership of Politburo member Li Changchun, the Propaganda Department disseminates directives to media nationwide concerning mandatory use of state propaganda and indicating topics to be barred from reports. Communist Party control over the news media is supported by an elaborate web of legal restrictions. Administrative regulations, such as the 1990 Rule on Strengthening Management over Publications Concerning Important Party and National Leaders, make it illegal to report on any aspect of the lives of top leaders without permission from the Propaganda Department and other central government ministries. Statutes in the criminal code, such as the Protection of National Secrets Law, can make reporting on governmental affairs an offence punishable by prison sentences. Regulations and laws are vaguely worded and interpreted according to the wishes of the central party leadership. Although not usually enforceable, the constitution affords little protection for the news media. Article 35 guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, and publication. However, other articles subordinate these rights to the national interest, which is defined by party-appointed courts. (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16&year=2005&country=6715>).

The People's Republic of China operates an Internet police and a comprehensive censorship system that also targets political dissent. However, the growing communication infrastructure has provided citizens and the press with increasing opportunities to voice their opinion. Thus, press freedom has overall significantly improved over the past decades.

2.3. Socio-Economic Context

This subdimension analyses the socio-economic situation in China. China's overall economic situation is good, especially since the beginning of reform process. Since then the quality of citizens' lives has undergone a substantial improvement Table III.2.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.5: Indicators assessing socio-economic context

Ref.	Indicator	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	2

To operationalise the concept of civil society's socio-economic environment, eight indicators were selected, which represent the different means through which the socio-economic context can potentially impact civil society: 1) Poverty; 2) Recent war; 3) Severe ethnic or religious conflict; 4) Severe economic crisis; 5) Severe social crisis; 6) Severe socio-economic inequities; 7) Illiteracy and 8) Lack of IT infrastructure.

For each of these indicators a specific benchmark was defined, which explores whether they present an obstacle for further civil society development. The available data for these indicators is as follows:

1. *Widespread poverty*: According to www.sannong.gov.cn, at the end of 2004, the absolute poverty-stricken population in the countryside is 26.1 million, and the rate of poverty is 2.8%. The low-income population is 49.77 million, occupying 5.3% of the whole population in the countryside. Both the absolute-poverty and low-income population amounts to 75.87, (8.1%). The World Bank reports: In the year of 2002, the percentage of Chinese population below the poverty line (Population below \$1 a day) 16.1%.
2. *Civil war*: there has been no civil war in China in the past five years.
3. *Ethical/religious conflict*: "CIDCM peace and conflict" database mention Chinese Tibetan and Xinjiang problems. The dialogue on Tibetan problem is carrying on while in Xinjiang there exist extensive pressure, cultural discrimination, and even international terrorist activities.
4. *Economic crisis*: World Bank's data reveal that the ratio of the total amount of debt to GDP is 13.7% in 2003.
5. *Social crisis*: The rate of people affected with HIV/AIDS is on the rise. In February 2003, Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China estimated the number to one million, i.e. 0.1% of the population. However, in some districts, this rate is so high that "AIDS Villages" appear. However, significant tensions exist among marginalised groups such as laid-off workers, migrant workers, and rural folk.
6. *Unbalance in social stratification*: According to international convention, 0.4 is regarded as a benchmark of income distribution. In 1998, the Gini's coefficient of China was 0.386. The *Blue Paper* by Chinese Academy of Social Science reported that in 2004 the Gini to be over 0.465 while in 2005 it is approaching 0.47. This indicates that Chinese society is severely imbalanced, and it becomes severer and severer.
7. *Adult illiteracy*: the illiteracy rate in China has reduced from 80% at the period of new foundation to 8.7% in the year of 2002. But the absolute number is still as many as 8.5 billion. World Bank reports, the adults' illiteracy rate is 13.6% in 2002.

8. *IT infrastructure*: World Bank reports, in 2001, every 1000 Chinese people possess 137 sets of telephones and 19 computers.

2.4. Socio-Cultural Context

This subdimension examines the socio-cultural norms and attitudes which are conducive or detrimental to civil society. China has a profound cultural foundation, in which Confucianism passed from generation to generation and has accumulated rich social capital, such as mutual trust and tolerance. Though equally influenced by traditional culture, Chinese people do not have public spiritedness. The socio-cultural context in which civil society exists and functions is somewhat disabling (1.24) Table III.2.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.6: Indicators assessing socio-cultural context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.4.1	Trust	1
2.4.2	Tolerance	1
2.4.3	Public Spiritedness	1

2.4.1 Trust. The findings from the community survey show that more than half of the respondents tend to trust other people. But meanwhile, 40% think one should get along with neighbours as cautiously as possible. More urban people have this cautious view than the rural ones. According to a research by Sun Yat-Sen (Zhongshan) University Research Institute for Guangdong Development, Chinese mainly trust family members, as well as close friends. Judged from external forms, Chinese trust on others is basically “guan-xi self”(self of interpersonal relation)—it forms and builds up on the basis of congenital blood connection and acquired attachment. However, what works essentially is not the relationship itself, but the emotional ties of the “Guanxi”. One therefore can characterise social trust in China as a “relative” trust. How much people trust each other highly depend on the relationship between them. However, in general, social trust is rather low.

2.4.2 Tolerance. Chinese believe in the saying that “neighbours are dearer than distant relatives” and thus Chinese think highly of their neighbours. If choice of neighbours is possible, most of the interviewees can make their choices carefully. Of course, the criteria are their own habits and familiarity level. In Community Survey, those unwilling to be in the next door to people of a different race, religion and immigrants occupy low proportions: 11.4%, 17%, and 14.8% respectively. Comparatively speaking, City residents reveal more tolerance than rural people. However, towards people with HIV/AIDS and homosexuals, no one is tolerant. It is common that over 60% oppose having either as their neighbours. Also, it should be mentioned that the discrimination of peasant labourers is still widespread in society.

The tolerance index score of 2 (on a scale from 0 (widespread tolerance) to 5 (widespread intolerance) indicates a situation of moderate tolerance.

2.4.3 Public spiritedness. In 1995, Renmin University of China and Society Department of Statistics Bureau of Beijing City established a research group, conducting a survey in 18 districts in Beijing. The results are as follows: In the past one year, over 70% of the residents in Beijing participate in public service activities up to 10 times, less than 25% for 11-50 times, and merely 3% over 100 times. As for providing service for neighbourhood residents, for the young and the old and the injured and the disabled, for the ordinary people, those who do it once a week occupy 5%, 7%, 6%, and those who help twice or three times once a week occupy 3%, 6%, 5%. Of all the participants in public service activities for local residents, only 2% can persist every day.

Most Beijing residents participated in groups (61%). Among them, 22% are working with his unit or school. Twenty-two percent take part together with residential committee youth club members. Seventeen percent join in groups. In the next place, individual participation takes up 13%; thirdly, 10% take part with family or friends and 2% with neighbours.

The community survey found that most respondents did not approve of behavioural forms that do not conform to public spiritedness. Eighty-two percent of respondents found the behaviour of avoiding paying for public transport or cheating on taxes, as never justified. At the same time, people are quite passive about their own rights. Only one quarter insist on getting what they deserve; another quarter say it depends; and 20% think they would never strive for it. A quarter expressed no opinion. Aggregating this data into an index of public spiritedness, the score of 2.6 indicates a rather moderate public spiritedness, where only the behaviour of claiming of government benefits, to which one is not entitled to, received substantive support from respondents.

2.5. Legal Environment

This subdimension examines the legal environment for civil society and assesses to what extent it is enabling or disabling to civil society. Chinese CSOs face certain legal hurdles and constraints. The legal framework is not yet consolidated and NGOs are governed by a set of provisional regulations. Registration requires affiliation to a professional governmental or para-statal 'leading unit'. The professional leading unit must also be represented in the board of the organisation. Membership based organisations, comparable with associations in the civil law context, need to prove a membership of 30 institutional or 50 individual members. Foundations with fundraising status need to show significant capital, up to 8 million for obtaining a nationwide fundraising license. Some legal acts, e.g. Trust Act, have not yet been implemented in practice. International NGOs have difficulties to register in China. Few major international NGOs negotiated special agreements (e.g. Ford Foundation, Red Cross) or registered as Non-Profit Enterprises (Save the Children Fund). Some are working through local organisations or function as projects of national NGOs. Proper guidelines for auditing and accounting are not applied in many provinces.

The number of initiatives and registered NGOs that complain about the lack of clear legal provisions and political freedom is relatively small though existent. Service oriented NGOs enjoy more support and cooperation than advocacy oriented NGOs that are involved in international campaigns and networking.

The assessment of the legal environment is the worst among all subdimensions of Chinese civil society's external environments and this is widely accepted by all the scholars, working staff within civil society and other stakeholders. In the majority's mind, the laws are meant to restrict CSOs or to be able for the government to intervene, instead to support civil society.

The legal environment affecting civil society is disabling (0.84).

Table III.2.7: Indicators assessing legal environment

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	1
2.5.2	Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	1
2.5.3	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	1
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	1

2.5.1 *CSO registration.* There is a lack of clarity regarding the NGO registration process. Successful registration requires a partnership with a professional leading unit.

In present China, CSOs do not enjoy a favourable legal environment with sufficient rights. Two problems are the dual management system in registration and the restriction on capital. For example, social organisations at the national level have to own more than 100 thousand RMB to be registered, while regional ones need to have more than 30 thousand RMB. Also, NGOs cannot set up regional branches. Lastly, NGOs cannot survive outside legal system. Those that do not register in Ministry of Civil Affairs are seized and declared “illegal organisations”.

However, interestingly, more stakeholders hold positive rather than negative views regarding 5 quality criteria of the CSO registration process.

Table III.2.8 Process of CSO registration

	No(%)	Yes(%)	Don't know(%)	Total(%)
Quick registration	17.3	42	40.7	100
Simple process	23.5	27.9	48.6	100
Acceptable charge	8.0	51.8	40.2	100
Action according to the rules	7.1	66.8	26.1	100
Equal treatment	9.7	41.6	48.7	100

There are big differences in the assessment of the registration process. The reasons are as follows: firstly, different organisations comply with different processes. Secondly, one differs from another in its actual operation; thirdly, most members do not take part in the registration work and they just have a rough understanding or take it for granted.

To sum up, Chinese CSOs mainly go through this process: consult-(prepare)-apply-check-examine and approve-certificate. While there is a generally positive attitude towards approving certificates at the bureau of Civil Affairs, this cannot be said about the entire procedure to register a CSO.

2.5.2 *Allowable advocacy activities.* While, in Chapter 20 in China's Agenda 21, Chinese government promotes the public participation in sustainable development, there are few advocacy oriented NGOs. Especially after “Falun Gong” events, the oversight over Chinese CSOs was strengthened. Consequently, Stakeholder Consultations reveal that over 70% think that the current laws have restrictively regulated the advocacy activities of CSOs, but 50% of them think the restriction is reasonable. Less than 9% think CSO are free to engage in advocacy. Twenty-one percent think it is somewhat restrictive.

2.5.3 *Tax laws favourable to CSOs.* In China, the tax privileges available for CSOs include exemptions from sales tax, land use tax, farmland use tax, housing property tax, value added tax,

vehicle tax, fixed assets investment regulation tax, agricultural tax, enterprise income tax, tax paid by the buyer according to the stipulation and so on. Non-profit hospitals, institutions for the aged, schools and so on, enjoy special Tax exemptions. However, as a whole, Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs and not applied in a systematic way. Special examination and approval are needed to be qualified to be exempted from tax.

2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy. There are tax benefits for NGOs in the law, which however lacks detailed regulations. The implementation of the regulations largely depends on a bargaining process between the NGO and the tax authority.

In 1998, *Welfare Donations of the People's Republic of China* was publicised, which is regarded as an important legal document to standardize charitable giving. However, the shortage of corresponding implementation policies prevents the preferential measures from being put into practice. In practice, the tax exempt qualification is differently applied from case to case. There are 25 NGOs with strong government background which enjoy the most benefits of tax exemption. Examples include, the Red Cross and the Chinese Charity Federation. Others vary depending on the area of registration and types of NGOs.

2.6. State-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state in China. The relationship between civil society and the state presents a dilemma: civil society is eager to get rid of state intervention however it also depends on the state. Civil society hopes for an equal dialog with the state but due to the lack of a system, both actors do not communicate well with each other. Relations between the state and civil society (whether conflicting or cooperative) are somewhat unproductive (1.15). Table III.2.9 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.9: Indicators assessing the relations between state and civil society

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.6.1</u>	Autonomy of CSOs	<u>1</u>
<u>2.6.2</u>	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	<u>1</u>
<u>2.6.3</u>	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	<u>1</u>

2.6.1 Autonomy of CSOs. Generally speaking, in China, as the government holds an overwhelmingly dominant position, some CSOs face constraints in independently determining their areas of activities and their partnerships with other organisations.

According to survey by CSO Research Center of Tsinghua University, among CSOs registered with the civil affairs department, 49.2% of respondents in charge are from the government, which shows the close relationship between many CSOs and the government. It is estimated that over 80% of Chinese registered social organisations have been set up by the government. However, the tendency for autonomous creation of social organisations is becoming more and more obvious.

A majority of stakeholders thinks that the government inappropriately intervenes in civil society. Eight percent feel the interference is frequent, 30% think it is occasional, and 14.2% think the interference is rare. Another 27.4% felt interference never occurred.

Most stakeholders think that it is understandable that the government intervenes in activities of CSOs given the current Chinese background. In addition, the borderline between government and civil society is not very clear, so the interference is inevitable. The government intervenes more in certain types of activities of CSOs, such as demonstrations and religious issues.

The media do not pay much attention to the CSOs' autonomy, and there is no negative report. Media reports frequently on NGO activities but they focus more on their thematic activities rather than on critical issues of institutional freedom.

2.6.2 Dialogue between CSOs and the state. The Political Consultative Conference is the main way through which Chinese citizens participate in managing the State. Regulations of National Community of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on Political Consultation, Democratic Supervision and Participation in Deliberating and Administration of State Affairs adapted at the Ninth Meeting of the Eighth Session of Standing Committee of National Community, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on January, 14, 1995) regulates that the main function of PCC is political consultation and democratic supervision, and the organisation of all the parties, communities and people to participate in the deliberation and implementation of state affairs.

In recent years, some CSOs were in dialogue with the government. The methods included: policy suggesting policy proposals, providing policy consultation and submitting policy proposals and so on. Some think-tank organisations appeared, such as Unirule Institute of Economics.

Stakeholders think that the dialogue channels between CSOs and the government are not smooth, let alone systemised. Sixty-three percent think the dialogue is limited or there is no dialogue at all. Less than 9% believe they have extensive dialogue.

In the media there are many reports of state dialogue with CSOs, especially those providing services (such as organisations in support of community development, culture and education, hygiene and health and social service), however there is no specific mechanism for a proper dialogue system.

2.6.3 Support for CSOs on the part of the State. According to the survey by NGORC of Tsinghua Uni., the financial allocation by the state is more than 50% of CSOs' income. However, only the Government-organised-NGOs receive resources from the government. Government procurement mainly focuses on projects, and little funding is given to social services. Also, as many grassroots NGOs are not registered at the Ministry of Affairs, the survey may over-evaluated the percentage of government support.

In general, Chinese civil society is characterised by co-existence of GONGOs and grassroots NGOs. Many GONGOs were initiated by the Government or the Party. While many of them rely on government resource, there are many grassroots NGOs that receive little resource from the government.

For the time being, a favourable cooperative relationship has been formed between Chinese government and many NGOs. The main fields include: women's development, protection of children's rights and interests, aid-the-poor programmes, environmental protection and legal assistance. This is defined by Chinese-specific tradition. Chinese CSOs concern themselves more with the economic development and the social progress of the country, which is good for strengthening their cooperation between government and public affairs institutions. There is no doubt that the government is supposed to improve the policy and regulations to guarantee the future development of Chinese CSOs.

Some researchers have coined the Government approach to NGOs as “instrumentalist”, meaning that Government cooperates with NGOs whenever convenient and in line with Government policies while creating hurdles and obstacles for NGOs which propose agenda items that are not in line with Government policies.

2.7. Private Sector-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between the civil society and private sector. According to the stakeholder survey, business donations represent CSOs’ largest financial resources. This reveals enterprises’ friendly attitude towards CS. However, civil society does not regard the private sector as a friendly ally. Score of this subdimension is 1.2. Details are explained as following.

Table III.2.10: Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations

Ref	Indicators	Score
2.7.1	Private sector attitude to civil society	2
2.7.2	Corporate social responsibility	1
2.7.3	Corporate philanthropy	1

2.7.1 Private sector attitude to civil society. Some NGOs have started to try to tap funds from the growing corporate sector but business philanthropy has still a long way to go in the People’s Republic of China.

Among civil society’s capital source, 46% of the CSOs have ever obtained donations from local enterprises, and the donations occupy 22% of the source. This data indicates that enterprises are, as a matter of fact, in general supportive of CSOs. This is corroborated by stakeholder survey data which showed that nearly 40% think that businesses hold a positive attitude towards civil society, 35% think enterprises tend to be indifferent towards CSOs, and nearly 15% hold a negative attitude. A majority of stakeholders thinks that business organisations sometimes or frequently participate in CSOs’ activities. Twenty-three percent think seldom, and 4% never. Also, most of the reports in media are positive about business civil society relations.

2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility. There are a series of Corporate Social Responsibility Programmes under way in the People’s Republic of China. It should be mentioned that during the times of the planned economy, social life centered around the professional unit, the Danwei. The Danwei structure is now eroding with the privatization of many state owned enterprises and outsourcing activities. NGOs may fill the gap in some cases, and certain elements of corporate social responsibility approaches may also be useful. The erosion of the Danwei structure poses a social challenge if not threat to many disadvantaged communities and people. The Corporate Social Responsibility concept is by many in China perceived as a marketing-oriented US-dominated approach to social responsibility of companies. It is indeed a challenge for many private companies to embrace social values towards their workers and the society. It is, however, questionable if the CSR approach is the suitable cultural gateway to better social performance of enterprises in the People’s Republic of China.

Seventy percent of the stakeholders feel the enterprises do not attach great importance to the social responsibility, and that they put limited efforts into changing the social environment. Fifteen percent think corporations’ attitude towards social responsibility is moderate, and just less than 3% think significant.

2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy. There is a growing discourse on how to promote business philanthropy. The new Chinese business community still has to go a long way in embracing a culture of giving. The prevailing practice for corporations may be called “forced philanthropy”. This means that corporations receive political requests or orders to donate to social organisations and foundations in their respective political constituency or for national fundraising programmes. However, corporate philanthropy is already rather widespread. Among civil society’s capital source, 46% of the CSOs have ever obtained donations from local enterprises, and the donations occupy 22% of the total funding sources. These statistics indicate that enterprises are, as a matter of fact, in support of the CSOs.

The research Group of the subject “Philanthropy of Enterprises and Cooperation” analysed the 500 largest enterprises according to sales income. Of these, 92.4% (465) have made donations. Merely 7.6%, 38 have donated nothing at all. Meanwhile, 66% of enterprises have donated in the year of 1999, with the amount of more than 97.86 million yuan, 298 thousand on average. Because of the differences in scale and economic power, the donation amount varies. The most is as much as 30 million.

However, judged from the reports in media, only a few CSOs once received the private enterprise support, which are those active in the areas of trade union, education, training, and research fields.

CONCLUSION


The environment dimension scores a rather low 1.2. There is significant room for improvement in the political environment for civil society. While, rights and freedom are safeguarded by the Constitution and by various laws, these laws are often not implemented. However, China is moving towards a stronger rule by law. The country has signed and ratified a large number of international conventions and is engaged in a process of judicial overhaul and capacity building. Yet there still exist serious legal constraints on CSOs regarding registration, and the establishment of autonomous network and apex body organisations. Tax incentives are not yet well developed. Corruption is considered to be a major problem. Freedom of information and the freedom of press are hampered by censorship. A distinct strength of Environment is the state’s effectiveness, which means there are still a lot of space for the development of civil society without the danger of leading to social disorder.

3. VALUES

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practiced by Chinese civil society. The value dimension scores highest with 1.8 out of 3, indicating a civil society which is somewhat active in practicing, but less active in promoting positive values. Only a few successful cases of civil society's value promotion with little overall impact can be observed.

Figure III.3.1 shows scores for seven subdimensions within the values dimension.

FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimensions scores in Values Dimension



3.1. Democracy

This subdimension examines the extent in which the civil society practices and promotes democratic values. The extent to which civil society practices and promotes democracy is limited (1.41). Table III.3.1 summarises the scores for individual variables.

Table III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy

Ref	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	<u>1</u>
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	<u>2</u>

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs. The stakeholder survey results reveal that the practice of democracy inside CSOs is relatively high, since 70% of the leaders are elected by the members while 3% are recommended by themselves, and those nominated are over 20%. The decisions in CSOs are not simply made by the leaders. Thirty-three percent of stakeholders think that members play the essential role. More than 20% think they have some impact but not the key. Forty percent think their impact is limited or insignificant.

3.1.2 Civil Society actions to promote democracy. Stakeholders know little about civil society's activities to promote democracy. Nearly 60% are unaware of any examples, while 30% can give only one example. Stakeholders' examples include promoting grassroots elections, women's participation in public affairs, and participation in legislation and so on. Considering the Effectiveness of democracy promotion by CSOs, 27.4% think their impact is insignificant.

Nearly 44% think it is limited, 10% moderate, a little more than 5% think it is significant. Another 14% say they don't know.

Even only a few CSOs in China devote their work to promoting democratic processes, their role in promoting China's democracy has become important over the last ten years. NGOs can be considered as agents for change in China. The following are some representative think tanks, which work in this area: Tianze Economy Research Institute, which composed of a group of famous economist, have significant effect in public policies; The Chinese Reform and Development Institute is another case, who make eminent effect in Hainan Province and also at national level; The World and China Institute played an active role in the first direct election at local level in the town of Buyun of Sichuan province, and published serials of *Reports on Grassroots Democracy in China*; Shining Stone is another case which is quite new, who promote participatory development in communities as a support centre for participatory community.

To make a conclusion, even if only a few CSO focused on democracy in China, they have some impact in this area.

3.2. Transparency

This subdimension examines to what extent civil society practices and promotes transparency. The extent to which civil society practices and promotes transparency is limited (1.42). Table III.3.2 summarises the scores for individual indicators.

Table III.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency

Ref	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within civil society	2
3.2.2	Financial transparency of CSOs	1
3.2.3	CS actions to promote transparency	1

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society. Civil society is a relatively "pure land" with few cases of corruption. Less than 9% of stakeholders think there are frequent or very frequent instances of corruption within civil society. Nearly 60% think they occur rarely or occasionally. The remaining third is unaware.

3.2.2 Financial transparency of the CSOs. CSO Research Center of Tsinghua University conducted a research in 2001 and found that 75% CSOs produce an annual financial report, but less than 15% have an external auditor (See table III.3.3 below)

Table III.3.3: CSOs' accountants auditing

Type	Percentage (%)
Accountants make the annual financial accounts in the year-end with no strict auditing	10.9
Accountants make the annual financial accounts in the year-end with internal auditing	50.4
Accountants make the annual financial accounts in the year-end with no strict auditing, and certified public accountants are responsible for external auditing.	14.7
No annual financial report except exceptional circumstances	10.5
Others	4.1
No answer	9.4


Among the 248 organisations mentioned by stakeholders, 73.4% make their financial accounts publicly available, while merely 12% do not. Many are not publicly available, but only open to the government.

3.2.3 Civil Society actions to promote transparency. There are only few examples of civil society actions in this regard. The media think the CSOs play a limited part in enhancing social

transparency. So do the stakeholders, although most of them do not know about this. The stakeholder survey data regarding civil society actions to promote transparency and their impacts is shown below.

In the examples listed, CSOs did something good in urging the government and corporations to enhance transparency. However, CSOs have undertaken more actions to promote enterprises' transparency than that of the government and they are in a fairly disadvantageous position when competing with the government.

Figure III.3.2 Civil society actions to promote transparency



3.3. Tolerance

This subdimension examines to what extent the civil society practice and promotes tolerance. The extent to which civil society practices and promotes tolerance is limited (1.27). Table III.3.4 summarises the scores for individual variables.

Table III 3.3.4: Indicators assessing tolerance

Ref	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	2
3.3.2	CS activities to promote tolerance	1

3.3.1 Tolerance in the civil society arena. The diversity of civil society in terms of thematic focus, organisational culture and leadership, is increasing in China. This is also an indicator for growing tolerance among civil society. Civil society activities have contributed to raise awareness and sympathy for minority groups and disadvantaged communities, including migrant workers. The growing tolerance and mutual respect also applies to cooperation between NGOs and government authorities. Some international NGOs have softened their radical approaches and their pronounced criticism on government authorities. Some of them developed a more tolerant approach to the Chinese political culture. Greenpeace is one example.

Forty-three percent of stakeholder survey respondents hold that the explicitly intolerant forces within civil society are not common, and 8.4% think they are exceptional cases. Less than 5% think there are some but not many intolerant forces. Another 43% have expressed no idea. At the same time, nearly 26% think the explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant forces are completely isolated and strongly denounced by civil society at large, 8% think they are a significant actor within civil society or even dominate it.

The media do not care much about this indicator. The five media selected have written no reports on this issue during the 12 months monitoring period.

3.3.2 Civil Society actions to promote tolerance. Stakeholders know little about CSOs' role in promoting tolerance. Nearly 75% have no idea, while just 12% can illustrate an example. According to 14.6%, CSOs have no actions dedicated to promoting tolerance. Although the stakeholders only give a few examples, they were all typical way that the CSO works, for example, to promote tolerance for the immigrant workers..

The overall assessment: 21.2% think civil society's impact is insignificant, nearly 32.7% limited, nearly 12% moderate, and a bit more than 3.5% significant. Those with no idea occupy over 30%.

3.4. Non-violence

This subdimension examines to what extent civil society practices and promotes non-violence. The extent to which civil society practices and promotes non-violence is moderate (2.14). Table III.3.5 summarises the scores for two variables that compose this sub-division.

Table III.3.5: Indicators assessing non-violence

Ref	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the CS arena	<u>3</u>
3.4.2	CS actions to promote non-violence	<u>2</u>

3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena. Stakeholder survey results reveal that CSOs' members strongly agree with non-violent ways to express their interests. Few believe that there are violent forces within the civil society arena. Nearly 37% think some isolated groups within CSOs resort to violence once in a while, but in the majority's (60%) eyes, forces are rarely employed. Consequently, no examples of violence within civil society are provided, but some mention that such organisations do exist in society, for instance, the gangs in some rural areas.

3.4.2 Civil Society Actions to promote non-violence. Chinese government authorities and media increasingly recognize the positive contribution of NGOs for the promotion of non-violence and peace. Confucianism and Buddhism experience a revival. Church groups and other religious organisations receive more positive appreciation than in the past decade as long as they do not engage in sectarian mass-mobilisation, such as, allegedly, the Falun Gong.

Results of the stakeholder survey show that Chinese civil society does influence to some extent the promotion of non-violent values, but it lacks of broad support or public awareness. For example, nine out of ten stakeholders do not know of any CSO which has worked on promoting non-violent or peaceful actions. Not more than 10% can give such an example. Similarly, more than 22% think that civil society's impact in promotion non-violence is insignificant, nearly 20% limited, 12% moderate, and less than 3% significant. Significantly, almost every second respondent could not answer this question about civil society's impact.

The case most frequently mentioned by stakeholders is anti-domestic violence. A typical example of anti-domestic violence is the public security departments in Xi'an City which, with guidance and financial assistance of UNIFEM and National Institute of Law, have started a project of strategic research and intervention regarding domestic violence against women. The department has established a working relationship with the government, women's organisations, and hospitals. An anti-domestic violence network has primarily formed (the coordinating organisations to maintain the lawful rights and interests of women and children, the working institution of anti-domestic violence, to establish a collegiate panel to maintain the lawful rights and interests of women and children, to set up law offices for defending women's legal rights and interests, to establish women's relief foundation), to carry out the anti-domestic violence training, to provide women's hotline and so on.

3.5. Gender Equity

This subdimension examines to what extent civil society practices and promotes gender equality. The extent to which civil society practices and promotes gender equity is moderate (2). Table III.3.6 summarises the scores for three variables that compose this subdimension.

Table III.3.6: Indicators assessing gender equity

Ref	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the CS arena	==
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	<u>2</u>
3.5.3	The role of CS in the promotion of gender equality	<u>2</u>

3.5.2 *Gender equitable practices within CSOs.* The result of a survey by the CSO Research Center of Tsinghua University reveals that among the interviewed CSOs staff (including both part-time and full-time) the male vs. female proportion is 194:100. Thus, there are roughly twice as many men than women in these CSOs.

According to stakeholders' assessment on sex discrimination in civil society, the inequality of the sexes is not very serious. Fifty-six percent think gender discrimination within CSOs does not exist, 6.6% think it is limited, and only 7.5% think that is somewhat serious or fully serious. Another 30% express no idea. Looking at a different angle, namely at the extent to which gender discrimination within CSOs is denounced by civil society at large, only 11% think it is actually denounced, nearly 37% think rarely or never and 52% don't know.

However, on a more positive note, in the 225 organisations stakeholders mentioned, there are roughly equal shares of CSOs who have and have not a policy regarding equal pay for equal work.

3.5.3 *The role of civil society in the promotion of gender equality.* There are significant activities by Chinese CSOs to promote the value of gender equity in society. For example, the All-China Women's Federation and Women's Funds are both national female organisations whose tenet and tasks cover all aspects of the security of women and children's rights and interests. Other female CSOs, such as Maple Women's Psychological Counselling Center, China Population Welfare Foundation, Family Planning Association of China and Chinese Population Daily initiated the "Happiness Project" to support mothers living in poverty.

However, the media carried only a limited number of reports on this issue. The stakeholders are not familiar with CSOs' activities to promote gender equity, either. Nearly 70% don't know, while only 15% can give related examples. Seventeen percent think CSOs carried out no activities to propose gender equality at all last year. Similarly, 21% of stakeholders think CSOs play an insignificant role in this regard, 23% think it is limited, 20.4% moderate, and merely 10%-odd significant. About 25% choose Don't know. Stakeholders' examples reflect CSOs' actions in this area, but most have relationship with local Women's Federation. However, in the community survey, a significant number of respondents mentioned the example of a CSO working in their community which helped women.

3.6. Poverty Eradication

This subdimension examines to what extent the civil society promotes the reduction of poverty in the society. The extent to which civil society promotes poverty eradication is moderate (2.18). Table III.3.7 shows scores for this subdimension.

Table III.3.7. Indicator assessing poverty eradication

Ref	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	CS actions to eradicate poverty	2

3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty. In China, CSOs have long participated in help-the-poor programme, and been influential. The overall commitment to poverty eradication among Chinese civil society is moderate but high compared to other indicators. A great number of CSOs are active in eradicating poverty. Some of them are specialised in undertaking activities, and also some conduct comprehensive projects. Chinese CSOs' extensive activities in this field have created interest from various parties. Major international institutions consider NGOs as suitable agents for delivering services to poor people and have accordingly channelled substantive funding to NGOs (e.g. Asian Development Bank) and introduced special schemes for supporting NGOs in China (e.g. World Bank Development Market Place 2006).

Not only does the media report significantly on these activities, but surveyed stakeholders are also much more familiar with this than the previous issues. While still 40% say they don't know about civil society's work in this regard, around a half can illustrate the work with an example and merely 7.5% think CSOs conducted no activities in the last year. The overall assessment of civil society's role is slightly more positive than with other indicators under values: 14.2% of stakeholders think CSOs play an insignificant role, 35% think it is limited, 31% moderate, and merely 3.5% significant. The remaining 16.4% choose Don't know.

Correspondingly, stakeholders give rather many examples. Therefore, it can be concluded that CSOs' activities in this area are frequent and the impact is rather significant. However, most organisations working on poverty issues have an official background, for example, League Committee, China's Disabled Persons' Federation, Hope Project and so on. Some foreign organisations and domestic foundations also work in this area. For instance, three provinces (municipalities directly under the Central Government) have mentioned the Oxfam's activities for helping the poor.

In community survey, 8.3% of respondents remember an example of a CSO assisting their communities in the last year in a help-the-poor program such as increasing the residents' income, improving poor family's situation.

3.7. Environmental Sustainability

This subdimension examines to what extent civil society exercises and promotes the protection of the environment in Chinese society. The extent to which civil society promotes environmental protection is overall moderate (2.18) in China. Table III.3.8 shows the score of this subdimension.

Table III.3.8: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability

Ref	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	CS actions to sustain the environment	<u>2</u>

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment. For the time being, it is in the environmental protection field that the CSO have been the most active and developing fastest.

The cooperation between various kinds of NGOs and the Government has contributed to a gradual policy shift in environmental management. Experiences show that some state sponsored agencies have oriented their work more towards preventive, analytical actions rather than waiting for the government's intervention. For example, the Environmental Protection Bureau in Shenyang has launched blogs on their work in 2006, seeking more interaction with citizens and NGOs. Regulations have been issued that authorise the public to participate in environmental law making. NGOs have in many ways demonstrated their ability in accessing indigenous communities, introducing participatory approaches and tapping international resources. Government agencies and state sponsored institutions have entered into various types of partnerships with international and local NGOs. Government policies have shown increasing responsiveness to concerns voiced by NGOs.

There are at least 2000 to 3000 environmental NGOs in China, but only 100 to 300 have serious influence. Many grassroots organisations and neighbourhood committees working on this issue are not registered. Among the most important environmental NGOs are Friends of Nature, Global Village, Green Home, Shannuo Society, and Green Earth Volunteers. They are engaged in voluntary action for environmental protection, conduct campaigns about environmental protection and engage in policy dialogue. There are many environmental NGOs that are mainly active at the provincial, city or county level.

Media reports show that there are a lot of CSOs working on environmental protection, which obtain wide-ranging social support and play a dominant role in society. The stakeholders know more about CSOs' environmental protection activities than they do on most of the previous issues, except for poverty eradication. Only slightly more than half cannot provide any example, while about 40% can give examples. The stakeholders' overall evaluation of civil society's work on this issue is as follows: 15.5% think CSOs' efforts are insignificant in sustaining the environment, 30.1% limited, 29.2% moderate; 4.4% significant, 20.8% don't know.

Based on this evidence, it can be said that CSOs have had some impact on environmental protection. The organisations taking part in environmental protections are mainly grassroots organisations and their activities are chiefly within the following types: firstly, promotion; secondly, forestations; thirdly, garbage classification; fourthly, animal protection, and fifthly, influencing the government and participating essential decision-making on environmental protection.


Conclusion

Chinese civil society scores rather high in its Values dimension. Civil society organisations, on average, show a significant commitment towards the respect of non-violence, gender, poverty alleviation and environmental protection (scores are 2). The scores for civil society's promotion of democracy, transparency and tolerance are lower (1), while issues of violence, gender discrimination are not seen as important problems in China.

The chart below looks at the internal values of civil society as assessed by stakeholders. It reveals that values (including democracy and financial transparency) are all rather well practiced inside CSOs and that behaviours violating these values are rare and are mostly denounced by the rest of civil society. However, the proportion of those who are indifferent, choosing "Don't know", is high, suggesting that these values are not very prominent or even not accepted by Chinese CSOs.


The two charts below show that, contrary to the active practice of these values internally, civil society's promotion of these values in society at large is relatively poor. As shown in the chart above, many of these values are not seen as very important for CSOs. Therefore, CSOs do not currently focus on promoting these values, with the exception of poverty eradication and environmental protection, which are seen as important issues in China's current situation.

Figure III.3.2 Comparison among CSOs' promotion activities



The following chart substantiates the findings from Fig. 3.3. Since civil society's actions on these issues are few, civil society's impact is seen as less than satisfactory. Therefore, the proportion of negative assessments (limited and insignificant impact) is much higher than that of positive (medium and significant impact). Again, civil society's role is recognised to some extent in promoting the values of poverty eradication and environmental protection.

Figure III.3.4 Comparison among activity achievements




Thus, it can be concluded that civil society' internal commitment to values may be high in China but expressive pro-active promotion of values falls short in comparison with other societies. The value commitment of Chinese civil society is most pronounced in the field of poverty eradication and environmental protection. Chinese CSOs also show some concern for minority groups and gender issues.

4. IMPACT

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions in Chinese society and politics. Civil society is playing a more and more apparent role in influencing policy, especially in some specific areas. Civil society does also work to hold state and private corporations accountable, but with no fruitful results. Civil society concerns itself with the burning issues in society, but it also face the problem that it is not highly recognised as an important actor. As for providing information for special groups, helping education and employment, improving ability and meeting the needs, civil society makes great efforts and has achieved certain accomplishment, but still further development is needed. The impact of civil society is moderate (1.57). Figure III.4.1 presents the scores for the five subdimensions within the Impact dimension.

FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimensions Scores in Impact Dimension



4.1. Influencing Public Policy

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy. In this sub-dimension, civil society's level of activity and impact in influencing public policy are evaluated by four typical cases in three specific areas. The results shows an optimistic situation, but because the chosen cases are representative only for the few fields, in which civil society is relatively active in present China, the overall situation is not as positive as conveyed by the case study results.

However, civil society has become relatively active in the policy sphere. The national survey of CSOs in the year of 2001 conducted by CSO Research Center, Tsinghua University reveals that nearly 60% CSOs put forward policy proposals to the governments.

The extent to which civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy is assessed as limited (1.27).

Most of the stakeholders consider that civil society has positive influence on state policy. Taking the fields of trade, environmental protection and maintenance of the rights and interests of disadvantaged groups for example, over half think CSOs are somewhat active or active in these three fields, including around 5% thinking very active. Only a minority (15%, 19.5%, 26%

respectively) considers civil society to be inactive. As for the effectiveness, the proportion of those agreeing with somewhat effective or effective reaches as high as 60%, 55%, 47%. Almost none of them think very effective and the proportion of “ineffective” is again between 15%-20%.

Table III.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing social policy

Ref	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Social policy impact	1
4.1.2	Human rights impact	1
4.1.3	Impact on national budget process	=

4.1.1 Social policy impact. Three cases were chose to examine the social policy impact of civil society: business associations, environmental protection organisations and think tanks.

Case 1. Business associations

Shenzhen Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment (SZAEFI) was founded in 1989, with the purpose of serving the business community. SZAEFI provides comprehensive policy information and other services that bridge the government and enterprises to its member enterprises. Qingdao Ship owners' Association (QSA) was spontaneously founded by domestic and foreign ship companies and representative institutions in Qingdao, and ship agencies. In order to maintain its members' interests, norm the market orders and promote the port trade in Qingdao, QSA has communicated and negotiated with Qingdao Government and Ministry of Communications of PRC. It submitted to Qingdao Government *Report on the Change of Joint Inspection's Influence on Sailing Schedule at Qingdao Border Check post*, and *Report on Request for Postponing the Examination and Approval of Ship Companies Opening Near-Sea Shipping Line* and *Report on Proposal of Cancelling the addition of 20% Port Charge at Qingdao Port* to International Shipping Administration of Water Transportation Department, Ministry of Communications of PRC. Their suggestions make the government's policy accord better with the interests of its member units, greatly promoting local economy.

Case2: Environmental protection organisations

Several environmental protection organisations such as Friends of Nature, Global Village, Green House invited experts to appraise Three Gorges Project and conducted advocacy activities, which found a strong echo in the society. Likewise, the Sichuan Green-river Environmental Protection Foster Association aims at promoting and organising the activities on natural environmental protection in the upriver regions, promoting the protection of natural environment, enhancing the environmental consciousness and ethics of the whole society, and striving for the sustainable development of society and economy in that region. It brought forward a lot of suggestions on the building up of Qinghai-Tibet Railway and saving the Tibetan antelopes. Friends of Nature was established in 1994, with the purpose of improving the public's environmental consciousness. It attempts to cooperate with the Government and solve some environmental problems within its power. On Feb. 1st, 1999, it submitted *Report and Suggestions on Saving the Tibetan Antelopes* to the State Environmental Protection Administration and State Forestry Administration. With reference to its suggestion, State Forestry Administration took a massive joint action to control the poaching of Tibetan Antelopes in three provinces from Apr. 12 to early May. Important achievements were made in these activities.

Case 3: Think tanks

China's Institute of Reform and Development in Hainan was established in 1991 through a joint investment of government and cooperation's. It concentrates on research mainly on transition economics and policy and it has held an international forum on reform and more than 120 additional academic conferences, published and compiled more than 120 works (in Chinese or

English version), submitted over 90 reports on reforming suggestion and published academic over 1000 papers.

4.1.2 Human rights impact. The case that was chosen was defending rights of disadvantaged groups. The Migrant Women’s Club uses publications, legal assistance and other means to monitor and influence the implementation of the government’s policy. Legal Assistance CSOs like the Center for Legal Assistance to Victims, the Center for Women’s Law and Legal Services of Peking University submit legal proposals on these issues. For instance, the Center for Women’s Law and Legal Services of Peking University submitted more than 30 legal suggestions and propositions to related departments, to some of which the related departments attach great importance or even submit a document of approval and reply. Another example is the case of Hui Ling Community Services for Disabled People and Xinmin Education Research Center are revising the Law on the Protection of the Handicapped together.

Unirule Institute of Economics is a non-governmental research institute, where gathers the outstanding researchers on economy and social science work. Since its founding in 1993, it has played a positive role in influencing China’s economic and social policy. For example, it put forward suggestions on refugee acceptance system. In May 2003, several researchers of UIE, together with scholars from Peking University, National School of Administration, submitted a proposal to the NPC Standing Committee on Sun Zhigang Case and the implementation of the system of handling of indigent migrants. World and China Institute influences the promotion and practice of public policy from the aspect of grassroots democracy and published the annual report titled with *Report of Chinese Lower Level Government*.

4.2. Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable

This subdimension analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable. CSOs are somewhat active in holding state and private corporations accountable. While there are some successful cases, the overall effects are not satisfactory, but are better with regards to private corporations than with regards to the state. The extent to which civil society is active and successful in holding state and private corporations accountable is limited (1.41). Table III.4.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.2: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable

Ref	Indicators	Score
4.2.1	Holding state accountable	<u>1</u>
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	<u>2</u>

4.2.1 Holding the state accountable. Thirty-five percent of stakeholders regard CSOs as inactive in holding the state accountable, 33.6% think somewhat active and merely 10% think active. As for their effectiveness, 25.2% assess them as unsuccessful, 43% somewhat successful and less than 30% don’t know. There are a number of media items related to this indicator. Most items have a positive or a neutral attitude towards CSOs’ activities in holding the state accountable. In general, Chinese CSOs are active in this area but their impact is very limited, because they mainly resort to the CPPCC (Chinese People’s Consultative Conference) or submit a written requirement to a higher authority to solve the problem. Dialogues on an eye-to-eye level between the state and civil society are not common. One successful example of wider citizen participation is the municipal construction program in Nanning city.*4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable.* Civil society is more active in holding private corporations accountable than in the government. As many as 44% of stakeholders believe that civil society is somewhat active while only 24% consider it to be inactive. In terms of its effectiveness, 21% regard civil society to be

unsuccessful in holding private corporations accountable, while 47% think somewhat successful. Nearly 30% choose don't know.

4.3. Responding to Social Interests

This subdimension analyses to what extent civil society actors are responsive to social interests. In general, Chinese CSOs are responsive to social concerns and in particular areas, they play a rather important role, but still the citizens do not trust them. The extent to which civil society effectively responds to priority social concerns and is trusted by the public is moderate (1.68). Table III.4.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.3 - Indicators assessing responding to social interests

Ref	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	<u>2</u>
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	<u>1</u>

4.3.1 Responsiveness. According to the Media Review, the media paid great attention to the responsiveness of CSOs. There are 50 media items on this issue. Among them, half showed a positive attitude toward civil society's responsiveness, the other half showed neutral attitude. This indicates that CSOs play rather satisfactory role in the responding to social problems. From the reports we see that almost all kinds and types of CSOs are responding to social interests and concerns. The issues include conflict resolution, natural disasters, wars, sexual protection, media and so on. The concerns specially focus on health, business, volunteer, education and training, social responsibility of enterprises and citizen rights.

Secondary data suggests that Chinese CSOs plays a role in addressing burning issues such as poverty relief and development, protection of women's rights, environmental protection, social democracy, economic agency and the like. However, the voice of civil society is weak in sensitive areas, such as government corruption.

4.3.2 Public trust in CSOs. In the Community survey, respondents showed surprisingly high trust in "public or state-owned" organisations or individuals such as the army, policemen, government, leader, newspaper and magazine, TV, Hope Project and so on (more than 75% have a great deal of confidence). No distinguishable differences are found between urban and rural area. However, towards "private" organisations such as the temple, church, labour union, democratic parties, advocacy organisation, large-scale companies, the respondents' level of trust is significantly lower. On the one hand, respondents may not know much about them, so many answered they do not know or even gave no answer (over 50%). On the other hand, it is clear that many respondents do not trust these institutions. For example, the trust in temples and churches is nearly 0%. The proportion of people with some minimal confidence does not exceed 10%, which roughly equals the share of people with religious belief.

With no doubt Chinese CSOs have obtained certain social recognition. However, public trust toward them is still limited since CSOs have very little social capital. Problems still exist regarding the government's control of CSOs and meanwhile, there is no guiding system or policy to encourage public support or participation in CSOs. What's more, the public is still biased and has doubts about these new forms and approaches to undertaking social activities. For example, in the community survey, when the residents are in need of help, nearly no one chooses to go to voluntary organisations. Those holding the view that "it is the state that provides help for the disadvantaged groups" are nearly ten times those choosing voluntary organisations. These doubts and lack of trust make it difficult for CSOs to become seen as an important public actor and attract the support of the people.

The Hope Project by the Chinese Youth Foundation aimed at providing financial support to children who are unable to go to school, is one of the few relatively successful projects. It is outstanding in the aspects of public reputation and trust. In many social surveys, city residents who "know about" Hope Project take up as much as 93.9% (in community survey, it is 80%). Over 50% know about the important events in Hope Project's history. When asked about the best activity Communist Youth League of China has organised, 37% answer Hope Project, and another 11% even mention its affiliated activities. As for the work of Hope Project institution, 56% are satisfied while less than 7% unsatisfied.

4.4. Empowering Citizens

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens to shape decisions that affect their lives, especially traditionally marginalised groups. The extent to which civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives is moderate (1.83). Table III.4.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.4: Indicators assessing empowering citizens

Ref	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing / educating citizens	<u>2</u>
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems	<u>1</u>
4.4.3	Empowering marginalised people	<u>2</u>
4.4.4	Empowering women	<u>2</u>
4.4.5	Building social capital	<u>2</u>
4.4.6	Supporting / creating livelihoods	<u>2</u>

4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens. The media pay attention to this indicator and the related reports amount to 40 out of a total of 340 items. CSOs publicise their information by various means, such as books, media and other activities. Typical examples are a coordinating organisation of skilled training sponsored by the societal power in Hebei Province, the Training Center for Reemployment of Laid-off Workers of Hubei Labour Union, Chinese Animal Husbandry Veterinary Science Association Disease of Poultry Branch, which run public information and education courses. The media image is that CSOs have contributed a lot to the public education on a variety of issues and performed an important role. There are many successful cases.


Stakeholder survey data reveals that: 21% of stakeholders think civil society is not active in this area, 43% somewhat active and 18% very active. Two-thirds of stakeholders consider civil society to be rather or fully successful, but only a few could give an example of success. In their examples, many tend to think that the education activities held by civil society are equal to community school education. More appropriate examples concentrate on kinds of promotion,

lectures, training, consultation and so on. Some mentioned the example to strengthen revolutionary education and strengthen the education system in poor districts, etc.

In the community survey, a significant proportion of 14.4% of respondents remembered a public education event held in the community, for example, direct election, AIDS and so on.

In the Stakeholder survey, we specially listed Sun Zhigang Case, grassroots election and Hope Project in the stakeholder survey. As for the evaluation of their effects on public education, it is the grassroots election that the highest proportion of people regards as unsuccessful case. In community research, the most successful one is thought to be Hope Project. And the least people are aware of Sun Zhigang Case. (See figure III.4.2 below)

Figure III.4.2: Comparison of CSOs' educating citizens



4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action. Regarding civil society's activities in building capacity for collective action, 22% of stakeholders think CSOs are inactive, compared with 41% who think that their efforts are limited and 12% who consider them to be active or very active. Meanwhile, 12.8% think no civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected, 40.3% think certain impact can be detected and nearly 40% are unaware. The stakeholders give a great number of examples related to this area, for example, the owner's Committee in a community. Also, in the community survey, 8.5% of respondents mentioned that some CSOs help with organising the residents to solve collective problems.

4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people. Poverty alleviation is one of the most active and successful areas for NGOs in China. In China, the history of NGOs' participation in poverty alleviation activities is relatively long, and its influence is the greatest among all fields. The first CSO in this field, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, was founded in China in 1989. As early as 1993, CSO began to carry out poverty alleviation through micro-finance. There are many CSOs actively working in the field of poverty alleviation, such as the nationwide foundations and associations such as China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, China Population

Welfare Foundation; The Women's Federation and the Communist Party Youth League systems; and some poverty alleviation NGO in western region in China, such as Yunnan and Sichuan provinces.

However, only 20% of civil society's social service activities, which stakeholders were aware of, were targeted towards the poor. In terms of the result of these efforts, 3.5% of stakeholders think it is unsuccessful, 44.2% think it is rather successful, 14.2% think it is successful and only 3.1% think they are a great success.

4.4.4 Empowering women. The Women's Federation is one of the eight mass groups established after 1949. It is the most active mass group and most close to the community. The National Women's Federation even registered as a NGO with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, for the reason of World Women's Assembly in 1995 in Beijing. The national and many local Women's Federations carried out a lot of international projects and play a active role in poverty alleviation, rights protection of women, etc. There are also quite a lot of grassroots NGOs which work on women issues, for example, Legal Aid Line for Women and the Network of Anti-Violence for Families.

Among the stakeholders, 44.2% consider civil society's efforts in empowering women to be rather successful and only 14.2% to be limited. The media review found a number of articles dealing with this issue, such as CSOs devoted to eliminating illiteracy among women, improving women's quality of life, helping them get jobs and safeguarding their legal rights and interests. These activities all respond to women's rights and interests and enable them to take control of their lives.

4.4.5 Building social capital. Based on community survey data, a comparison of public trust among CSO members and non-members was conducted to detect whether the involvement in civil society correlates with higher public trust (as a proxy for social capital). Among CSO members, 58.3% trust other people, while among non-members the share is slightly lower (55.2%). Thus, only a slight difference between CSO members and non-members in their social capital can be detected.

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods. Many NGOs, that work for disabled people, women or immigrant workers, help them with job opportunities, either by creating a job directly for them, or by providing them with job information and training courses. For example, in Hainan Province, there was Floating Population Association, whose aim is to provide living and working conditions for immigrant workers. Many government-organised NGO also take the problem of unemployment as an important part of their work.

In community survey, among the 25 cases that the respondents mentioned regarding CSOs providing services in the communities, 8% were related to supporting employment or generating income for the members in their community.

4.5. Meeting Societal Needs

This subdimension examines the extent to which the Chinese civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially needs of poor people and other marginalised groups. As for meeting societal needs, especially those of the marginalised groups, CSOs have made certain achievements. However, they still hold a relatively disadvantageous position, compared with the state, so they do not achieve as much as they can in meeting societal needs. The extent to which

civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of traditionally marginalised groups, is moderate (1.67). Table III.4.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.5: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs

Ref	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	<u>1</u>
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	<u>2</u>
4.5.3	Meeting needs of marginalised groups	<u>2</u>

4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provisions. The stakeholders were not able to provide many examples of civil society lobbying for state service provision. Many of them focus on petty things. The given 20-odd examples can be classified into two types: (1) civil society advocacy to enhance the citizens' welfare, for example, free-driving on the Loop Road Five, free volunteer guide in the zoo, free tickets to the park and so on, (2) civil society advocacy for the state to provide assistance to disadvantaged or difficult groups, e.g. solve the problem of overdue payment of migrant workers' wages, to provide economic assistance for citizens without low-level social security, to fight HIV/AIDS, to take care of the children whose parents are serving prison sentences, to help the unemployed get employed again and so on. As for the effects of the lobbying, 7% of stakeholders think no civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Eighteen percent think its impact is limited, and nearly 75% don't know.

The only case mentioned in the media review is that of about 35 privately-owned express companies in Shanghai that organised to send in a memorial to the NPC Standing Committee and Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, appealing to the *Postal Law* under revision to enlarge the space for their management, and proposing the establishment of Express Association.

4.5.2 Meeting societal needs directly. Stakeholders' assessment on the impact of civil society in directly meeting the needs of society is somewhat more positive: while 16.8% think there is no discernible impact, a majority of 63% thinks that civil society has some impact, and only 3.5% think it plays an important role. Examples are CSOs' role in SARS prevention, in helping poor persons, etc.

Among community survey respondents, 45% would turn to the state when in need of help, while only 3.5% would take the civil society as their first choice for help.

4.5.3 Meeting the needs of marginalised groups. In China, civil society is not very developed and the government is still the strongest actor in providing services or meeting social needs. In the community residents' point of view, a majority of 61.2% still regards state organs as better able to meet the needs of marginalised groups, while only 7% agree that civil society has provided better help for the disadvantaged groups.

However, in the area of service for marginalised groups, CSO play a more and more active role in the recent years. A lot of examples are found in secondary materials, for example, migrant workers' autonomous organisations, organisations of service for mental handicapped, AIDS prevention organisation and so on.

CONCLUSION

Impact scores a moderate 1.6 in China. While people still mainly trust government institutions, civil society is increasingly active in meeting social needs and empowering people. However, civil society's capacity to hold the government administration, state and private corporations accountable is still limited. However, corporate social responsibility is an emerging topic and is likely to receive more support from international development cooperation. Civil society organisations play already a non-negligent role in informing and educating citizens, especially in the field of environment, health and social policy. Civil society organisations also contribute to empowering women and marginalised people, such disabled persons, migrant workers, pollution victims and HIV-AIDS infected people. Civil society organisations make some contributions to the formation of social capital and sustainable livelihoods in the wake of eroding traditional social structures such as the *Danwei* which evolved around the work place.

IV RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the findings, the following recommendations were made:

Firstly, civil society's structure needs improvement so that Chinese civil society can exert its full potential: the indicators scores show that Chinese civil society has played a more influential role than the strength of its structural foundations suggests. Therefore, if participation and organisation levels in civil society were to be raised, civil society is likely to have more effects on society at large. Thus, the process of diversification and networking among and within the civil society structure needs more attention and support. A more developed structure of networks and federations at different levels may contribute to further enhance cooperation with government, with the private sector and with international partners.

Second, the environment for Chinese civil society's development, especially the legal environment conducive to facilitating the development of NGOs, needs to be improved: The current regulatory framework for international organisations is perceived to be overtly restrictive in terms of proper registration and scope of cooperation. It would also be desirable if NGOs would develop more standards and institutionalised mechanisms of self-regulation. One strength to build on is the effectiveness of the state, which should therefore be able to allow civil society more space.

Third, the idea of civil society and its role in Chinese society needs to go beyond the well-educated urban residents. Partnerships with local government have at least shown some positive results in a few areas while exchange and dialogue with the corporate sector still needs significant improvement. Business philanthropy is yet to take off.

To sum up, the key to strengthening Chinese civil society lies in enhancing levels of civic participation, developing federations and international linkages, increasing the resource base for CSOs, and promoting partnerships. The development of Chinese civil society needs not only more breadth, but also more depth so that people can cultivate habits of civic participation. There is already a foundation for a stronger civil society structure in place; however, what most needs strengthening is an extensive civil society network, including CSO federations, international linkages, resources, state and private companies' support and cooperation.

V CONCLUSION

General Observations

The space for civil society initiatives and the number and variety of CSOs in China have significantly increased over the past decade. The People's Republic of China is experiencing a well-steered process of transition toward a market economy and a more limited state. More autonomous NGOs have emerged and mass organisations which are affiliated to the political leadership have started to modernize with respect to human resource development, fundraising strategies and networking with corporations as well as other NGOs at the international level. The government administration has facilitated dialogue and cooperation among different kinds of organisations.

The political leadership of the People's Republic of China recognises that civil society can contribute a great deal to the provision of public goods. Efforts are under way to seek a more structured cooperation between the state and some new as well as well-established organisations. The Chinese leadership demonstrates a growing interest in developing – rather than restricting or subjugating – civil society. There is a wide-reaching consensus throughout the country that social cohesion and harmony are vital for the sustainable development of the country. Thus, state administration and civil society are in process of searching for acceptable forms of policy dialogue and program partnerships in different sectors. As a general rule, however, government aims to promote and, at the same time, control civil society activities.

The Government welcomes civil society initiatives that address social and environmental problems in a problem-solving and consensus-oriented way. Harsh criticism on government policies and on representatives of the political system is usually not tolerated. NGOs are believed to be capable of making significant contributions to eradicating poverty, fighting HIV-AIDS, protecting the environment, and safeguarding the rights of marginalised groups. Experts have recognised some specific strengths and advantages of NGOs, such as flexibility, good access to vulnerable and minorities groups, competence in social work and engagement in international exchange.

Those in the People's Republic of China who have founded or run independent organisations often enjoy higher education and have some overseas experience. Some of the leaders of autonomous NGOs would like to see some restrictive regulations for networking and federation building abolished. The State and the Party, however, wish to retain their influence. Academics seek to promote institutional and systematic self-regulation through legal statutes and codes of conduct, in accordance with international standards. In this sense, international exchange is very important for Chinese civil society; and, in principle, the political leadership is well-disposed towards forging international links.

The state of civil society in the People's Republic of China

The Civil Society Diamond of the People's Republic of China, which represents the four dimensions of structure, external environment, values and impact, shows some imbalances and is still of relatively moderate size. The main findings for Chinese civil society are as follows:

1) The score of Chinese civil society's structure is a rather low 1.0, which reflects the following weaknesses: low levels of citizen participation in CSOs and in various forms of non-partisan


political action; limited ‘depth’ of participation, including charitable giving, volunteering, CSOs membership etc; weak CSO federations, international linkages and limited resources.

2) The score for civil society’s external environment (1.2) indicate a rather conducive context. Here, factors related to the legal environment score worst, since obvious problems exist in CSO registration, CSO tax laws tax benefits for philanthropy, etc. In addition, dialogue between state and civil society, as well as practices of corporate philanthropy, remain limited. A strong point is the rather high effectiveness of the state in performing its key functions.

3) The values practiced and promoted by Chinese civil society were assessed as a moderately strong 1.8. While there are no obvious deficiencies in the values practiced by civil society, civil society’s level of activity in promoting certain of these values in society is rather low, particularly with regards to sensitive values such as democracy and transparency. However, Chinese civil society is rather committed and active in areas such as promoting poverty eradication, environmental protection, and gender equity issues.

4) The impact of Chinese civil society is assessed as a moderate 1.6. Civil society plays a limited role in influencing public policy, holding the state & private corporations accountable, but is somewhat stronger in responding to social interests and empowering citizens. Its role in social service provision is still clearly secondary to dominant efforts by the Chinese state.

FIGURE IV.1.1: Civil society diamond in China



Thus, while the main strength of China’s civil society lies on the effective practice of important values in civil society, there are three main weaknesses that stand out for China’s civil society. First is the weakness in citizen participation. Although many people give money or time for public benefit issues, they are usually mobilised by their institution and by the government. Membership rates in independent CSOs are very low.

The second weakness relates to the weak levels of organisation within Chinese civil society. Although there is a significant number of “civilian organisations” in China, their networks, umbrella and apex bodies, support infrastructure, as well as communication among CSOs both at national and international level is still very limited.

The final weakness concerns civil society’s external environment. Besides problems with the very limited political competition in China, it is mainly the disabling legislation on civil society issues, which hinders the growth of grassroots CSOs.

NEXT STEPS

On 24 March 2006 a CSI workshop was held among Chinese stakeholders, where the final results of the CSI implementation were shared with participants. The next steps of the project include the compilation of a book presenting the results of the project in Chinese. It is also hoped that the study will be used to promote civic participation and the building of linkages among CSOs, between civil society and government and the business sector, as well as between Chinese and international civil society.

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ANNEX 1 List of National Advisory Group Members

Mr. Huang Haoming, Secretary-general of China Association for NGO Cooperation.
Mr. Li Tao, Director of Culture and Communication Center for Facilitors.
Mr. Lifan, Director of Institute of World and China.
Mr. Wu Yuzhang. Professor of China's Academy of Social Science.
Ms. Guo Xiaohui, vice Executive Secretary-general of Association for the Overseas Investment Corporation.
Ms. Meng Weina, Director of the Huiling Services for Persons with Learning Disabilities.
Ms. Miaoxia, Secretary-general of China Population Welfare Foundation.
Ms. Yuan Ruijun, Professor, Executive director of Social Organization Research Center in Peking University.

The following attended part of the project:

Mr. Mao Shoulong, Professor of RenMin University
Ms. Song Qinghua, director of Shining Stone
Mr. Qiu Haixiong, Professor in Zhongshan University
Mr. Wang Xinzheng, vice director of CIDR
Mr. Hu Jia, a volunteer.

ANNEX 2 OVERVIEW OF CSI RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

In the Chinese CSI field research, the general principle of sampling is: to have a highly representative sample. Therefore, as far as the geographical distribution is concerned, representatives were chosen from east to west, south to north and coastland to inland. In terms of development, the following were included: eastern developed districts to western underdeveloped districts, villages and cities and plains and mountainous areas. Each selected individual sample is representative, from villagers to workers, from the illiterate to the intellectual, from ordinary people to experts and scholars, from laid-off workers to the state cadres and from civil society members to laymen. The following details the selection process.

Community survey

Selected samples of community surveys are more representative than that of the stakeholder consultations. Questionnaire statistics show that 43.2% of the communities are formal and programmed, and another 30% are informal but programmed. Over 93% of participants enjoy convenient transportation in their residences. Nearly 100% are provided with mass electricity, and over 70% are provided with mass water. However, around 40% live in one-storey houses and an almost equal percent in multi-storey buildings. There is a lack of representatives from the poorest regions in the samples.

Table: A.2.1 Community survey sample

Serial number	Name	Type	Regional distribution	Investigator
01	Old industrial base community in Jilin city, Jilin Province	Old industrial base	Northeast	Liu Guangjun
02	Open Economic Zone in Hengshui city, Hebei Province	Area joining town and country	Middle	Lin Zhigang
03	Villages under the jurisdiction of Songcun Township in Wendeng city, Weihai, Shangdong Province	Developed rural community	Eastern coastland	Pan Jianhui
04	Villages under the jurisdiction of Balu Township in Pizhou, Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province	Coastland rural community	Southeast coastland	Lv Haibo
05	Yikang Road Community in Wuhua District, Kunming, Yunnan Province	Urban community	Western	Lv Haibo
06	Liushui Community in Tiancheng District, Wangzhou, Chongqing City	Small township, Migrant community	Southwest	Huang Yan
07	Villages under the jurisdiction of Xinshi Township, Zaoyang County,	Village in undeveloped region	Middle	Gao Li

	Xiangfan City, Hubei Province			
08	Wuning Street in Dongyang City, Zhejiang Province	Coastland urban community	Southeast coastland	Zhang Linlin
09	Chunshu Garden in Beijing	Developed municipal community	Northern	Zhang Yun
10	Villages under the jurisdiction of Xincheng Township, Jiayu Pass, Gansu Province	Village in undeveloped region	Northwest	Chen Jiagang

01. Tongtan West Districts (Northeast old industrial base, city, officially planned, mid-level infrastructure and economic development.) were established since 2000, mainly to solve the housing problems of partial employees in Jilin Chemical Industrial Company (JCIC). There are 2,140 households in the community, but it is composed by a single structure—the majority is working staff at JCIC. Many workers were laid off due to the business recession, so they are discontent with the society and not interested in social affairs, let alone this consultation. The community is officially planned, with convenient transportations and complete facilities of water, electricity and gas.

02. Dong'an Residents' Committee, Open Economic Zone in Hengshui city, Hebei Province (Middle, Area joining town and country, non-officially planned, mid-level infrastructure, low economic development). It was set up in October 2003, as part of the reconstruction plan by the administrative village according to plan. It covers 1.2 square kilometres, in charge of Dongtuanma Village and Dong'an Community. Residents include 1,761 households, 6,144 people in all. Most of the infrastructures such as roads, water, electricity and so on are non-officially planned. Only in Dong'an Community, infrastructures are officially planned. There are about 200 households in Dong'an. The whole community is under development, and the villagers hardly have source of income.

03. Yaoshantou Village & Xiaotan Village, under the jurisdiction of Songcun Township, Wendeng City, Weihai, Shandong Province (Eastern coastland developed rural community, relatively high economic level, developed villagers' economic organisations). The two villages are neighbouring and transportation is convenient. Because of the fertile soil, vegetable planting is relatively concentrated here, rather than in other villages in Songcun Town. Around 500 households are doing in the vegetable trade. Most villagers in the vegetable trade have participated in the activities held by the local vegetable association. The whole town is supplied with mass electricity, closed-circuit television and broadcast. There are 2,136 households in these two villages, with a population of over 5,000.

04. Balu Village & Shidian Village, under the jurisdiction of Balu Township in Pizhou, Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province (Southeast coastland rural community, high-level infrastructure and economic development). There are six villages under the jurisdiction of Balu Villagers' Committee, 1,200 households and a population of 4,679. The per capita income is 3,745 Yuan, mainly from agriculture, labour export and business trade. There are four villages under the jurisdiction of

Shidian Villagers' Committee, with 446 households and a population of 1,982. The per capita income is 3,900Yuan, mainly from agriculture, aquaculture and labour export.

05. Residents' Committee of Yikang Road Community in Wuhua District, Kunming, Yunnan Province (Southwest urban community, officially planned), is the combination of the original Yiyang Road Committee and Yongchang Road Committee. It covers 0.186 sq kilometres, and is responsible for 5,000 households with a population of 10,332. The facilities in the community include: 600m² greenbelt for activity and 2 community clinics. Its aim is to build a new-type of community with a beautiful environment, convenient lifestyle, good order and that fosters harmonious personal relationships. For this, the community provides resident-oriented service for all the residents and free services for those with preferential treatments and the lonely, the old, the sick and the disabled. Also, it solves the residents' urgent problems and difficulties and organises some popular cultural and sports activities.

06. Liushui Community Committee in Tiancheng District, Wangzhou District, Chongqing City (Southwest small township, officially planned, infrastructure under construction, medium-middle economic development, new-type migrant town), located in the hinterland of the new town in the Tiancheng Migrant Open Economic Zone. In 1995, the original village was replaced by a residents' committee. There are in total 24 organic units, 1,786 usual households with a population of 4,500. Currently, there are about 1,000 laid-off workers, 700 unemployed, 4 households enjoying the five guarantees, 50 disabled people, 150 households enjoying the lowest guarantees, 360 persons and 150 individual industrial and commercial households in all. In 2003, the township enterprises were valued at over 200 million Yuan. The net income of the collective economy was more than 50 thousand, and the per capita income of residents was more than 2,000 Yuan, which reached the medium standard of living in the Wanzhou District.

07. Xingzhou Village & Zhoulou Village under the jurisdiction of Xinshi Township, Zaoyang County, Xiangfan City, Hubei Province (middle, rural community, low-level infrastructure and economy, agricultural village in poverty-stricken mountainous area). Xinshi Town is located in the northwest section of the Hubei Province and is an agricultural town in a mountainous area with fruits and peanuts as the main crops. In Zaoyang Town, its economy is just at medium level.. The annual net income is 2,170 yuan per capita. The two villages are next to each other, lying between hills and mountains. In Xingzhou Village, there are 223 households, 823 residents and 1,480-acres of arable land, while in Zhoulou Village, there are 330 households, 1,142 residents and 2,905-acres of arable land. Most of the youth and mid-aged work outside of the village. The annual rainfall is low and the main crops are wheat, rice, peach and peanuts.

08. East Street Community in Wuning Street in Dongyang City, Zhejiang Province. (southeast coastland urban community, officially planned, high-level infrastructure and economic level), was founded in October 2002. There are currently 1,894 households, 4,607 residents, 15 co-construction units (sponsored by City Committee Office), 1 medium-large-sized enterprise, 4 middle schools and primary schools, 1 kindergarten, 3 nurseries, 2 clinics, 4 entertainment places, 1 medium-large-sized shopping mall and 7 hotels and inns.

09. Chunshu Garden in Xuanwu District, Beijing (northern developed municipal community, officially planned, high-level infrastructure and economy, domestic community). There are in all 18 buildings with complete business facilities and perfect service functions. There are also about 2,330 households and over 10,000 residents. There are a health station, a community service centre, a youth centre, a one thousand square meter gym and entertainment square and library, an elder's school, a cultural activity room and a law-book corner. The residents organise a residents' committee and the party's committee in the community. Its autonomy, grassroots democratic self-construction and its capacity to build party and spiritual civilization are all strong. In 2001, Chunshu Garden won the title of "Safe and Civilized Committee in Capital" and was also ranked among top ten "municipal best green communities". During Beijing's bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, Chunshu Garden was honourably inspected by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).

10. Seven Administrative Villages under the jurisdiction of Xincheng Township, Jiayu Pass, Gansu Province (Northwest rural village, poor natural conditions, non-official, unplanned). There are 2,105 households. The total area is 224 km², composed of farmland, woodland, deserts, Gobi and waters. In 2001, network electricity became available, but transportation is not convenient. In 2003, the rural per capita disposable income was 3,997 yuan, mainly from agriculture. Onions, seeds, watermelon, melon, vegetable and the breeding industry are the town's pillar industries.

The interviewees in the survey are chosen randomly. The following steps were followed:

- 100 households were randomly selected.
- The total number of all the families was divided by 100, and thereby the interval of random sampling N ($N \geq 15$) was obtained.
- The sampling begins with four different starting points in every community.
- From these four points, following the snake-shaped route, enough families by N were selected. (Taking into account that some houses should be empty because of all the family left for work elsewhere, we always selected over 120.)
- If family A was out, its right or left neighbours would take the place. If this still could not meet the needs, it would be abandoned, recorded and the next one would be interviewed.
- One interviewee was selected from one household
 - The interviewee must be over 16.
 - The number of male and female interviewees was kept equal, that is to say, if the previous interviewee was male, the next time the interviewee would be female.
 - From those with the right gender, the one who is nearest to his/her birthday celebration was selected.
 - If the interviewee was out, they would be revisited. If he/she is out again, the interview would be abandoned and recorded.

The result: 1,000 people were selected from the 10 communities above. The proportion of male and female was nearly 1:1. Ten percent of interviewees have a religious belief—a percentage a bit higher than that of stakeholders. The majority is believers of Buddhism or Christianity

(around 50%). Ninety-seven percent hold Han nationality. Nearly 80% are local people, born and brought up there. Only in the urban communities of Kunming and Beijing were there many immigrants. More than 40% of respondents' native home and place of birth were not their present residence. In the immigrants' community under the jurisdiction of Wanzhou District in Chongqing, the population of immigrants reaches 10%. This reflects that in China, the population flow is basically one-way (from countryside to city); 43.7% earn less than 3,000 yuan per year, which is of higher reliability compared with stakeholders' income, but still it cannot accurately reflect the real situation. There also exists the problem of misinterpretation in some communities. The survey questionnaire does not directly reflect the interviewees' level of education, but according to the difficulties of answering questions, there is a significant gap between the stakeholders' level of education. Over half encountered difficulties in answering the questions, more in the rural communities than in the urban communities.⁸ The reasons for this, aside from the limited knowledge of the interviewees, include the deficits in questionnaire design and wrong or inaccurate interpretation of interviewers. Over 20% consulted others for advice. The attitude towards the survey reflects the profile of the community residents. More than 80% were kind and cooperative and there was rarely enmity or lack of corporation, which shows that ordinary people are friendly. However, because the contents of the survey are far from their daily life, only half of them showed interest. Contrary to all other results, the rural community clearly had a more positive attitude to the survey than the urban community. This in turn reveals the simple nature of Chinese countrymen.

Stakeholder consultations

The stakeholders are selected from 6 provinces (municipalities), 11 cities (districts) with different developmental levels, extending from east to west, south to north, and coastland to inland. Conferees come from almost all walks of life and are required to be familiar with the local civil society. Their number is limited to 20, with three quarters from different types of CSOs in different districts (such as countryside, community, regional, national and so on.) They hold various social statuses, such as leader, general secretary, director, staff and membership. The remaining quarter of participants are non-CSO members. All the conferees vary in gender, age and nationality (see figure A.2.2 below).

⁸ The difficult questions are mainly the Warmup2□1.1□V130□V510□V610□V710□8□9.2□9.3 in the questionnaire of community surveys.

Table A.2.2: Stakeholder consultations sample

Province (Municipality)	City District	No. of Conferees		No. of CSOs	Investigator	Remarks
			No. of People from			
Liaoning Province	Shenyang	20	15	19	Wang Ming □Deng Haifeng LiuYe, Zhu Yansong	Northeast
	Anshan	18	11	12		
Hunan Province	Changshan	25	19	33	JiaXijin, Sun Long Li Yilin, Peng Jing	Middle
	Yiyang	21	20	28		
Gansu Province	Lanzhou	20	20	28	Wang Ming, Liu Peifeng Sun Chunmiao	West
	Tianshui	30	22	27		
Yunnan Province	Kunming	17	15	17	Wang Ming, Xie Lei, Lv Haibo, Zhang Mingming, Qiu Junping	Southwest
	Qujing	18	17	24		
Shanghai	Downtown	21	18	26	Wang Ming, Deng Haifeng Dong Yanping, Zhu Yansong	Southeast
	Jingshan District	17	14	16		
Beijing	Downtown	19	14	19	Jia Xijing, Deng Haifeng	North
Total	11	226	185	249		

Difficulties with the CSI research process within the Chinese context

Based on the analysis of field research and collected data, it was found that the CSI Indicator system is not fully applicable to the Chinese context, mainly with regards to questionnaire construction and choice of terms and concepts.

These problems relate to two sets of issues:

1. Inapplicability of the indicator system

It was felt that the CSI Indicator system was designed from a western perspective of civil society. For example, certain aspects such as 1.4.1 existence of CSO federations, 1.4.2 effectiveness of CSO federations are not applicable to China, since, at present, Chinese current governments policy is not conducive to the organisation of a federation. Likewise, 3.1 democracy, 3.2 transparency, 3.3 tolerance, 3.4 non-violence, 3.5 gender equity and their indicators are not very relevant in China, since they are not regarded as major social problems. Hence, there are not many Chinese CSOs that are taking action to promote those values. Similarly, the indicators on civil society's watchdog role (4.2.1 and 4.2.2) have are not yet become one of Chinese CSOs' main tasks.

2. Inapplicability in the survey

The fact that a high proportion of respondents choose "Don't know" or even do not answer at all shows that some aspects of the stakeholder survey questionnaire are problematic. The

questionnaire, generally speaking, is the realisation of indicator system in real life. Hence, the inapplicability of some the indicators has important consequences for the applicability of the questionnaire.

B4, B5, D1-D19, E3-E6. The corresponding indicators of these questions are not applicable in China. If there are no roots, it can not possibly be fruitful.

A1, V110. Not all of the types of organisation provided in these two questions conform to Chinese actual conditions. On the one hand, there is no such a type in China, for instance, non-profit media, political community, etc.; on the other hand, some Chinese types are not included like consultation agency, sale-of-work organisations, official organisations and so on.

V710, V809, V810, V811. Because the interviewees (especially residents in rural community) are not so educated, most of them cannot interpret the questions.

V230, V320. These two do not accord Chinese mode of thinking. Chinese do not tend to be too serious but things like “almost”, “about” are fine for them, so it is difficult or impossible for most of them to tell the exact amount of volunteer time per month, charity donation per year, etc. It is not practical to ask annual income per capita in rural community, for one thing, villagers’ income is not all in currency and for another, their family income is that of all the family members, so it is unfair to count one person’s income.

V931-V933. These questions cannot reflect the indicators, that is, public spiritedness is not much correlated to people’s attitude towards those who avoid paying for public transport or cheat on taxes or ask for government’s compensation.

E1, E2, E7. These three are designed according to the actual situation of the country, and they represent the localization of the projects, but improper operation may result in false results. We list them here to emphasise that the designer of questionnaire should take the whole situation of Chinese civil society into consideration so as not to be biased in case selection.

Besides, the questionnaire is too long and there are too many open questions which causes many people to choose not to answer, or to answer in a careless way.

ANNEX 3 MEDIA ANALYSIS

In terms of the media, a lot of effort went into choosing those that are more representative. The report selected mainly two types: Newspapers and TV. (See figure A.3.1 below for the names of media and their features). The report reviews the first quarter of 2004. Four newspapers were recorded while for the TV media live recording and Internet searches were combined. In all, 340 reports on civil society were collected.

Table A.3.1: Media selection

Media	Type	Property right	Political tendency	Reach	Viewership scale	Preference	No. of Reports
News Hook-up	TV	State-owned	Official	national	wide	Strongly political preference, influential events	60
People's daily	newspaper	State-owned	Official	national	wide	Political, influential events	86
News weekly	newspaper	State-owned	official	national	wide	Strongly political preference	15
Xinmin Evening News	newspaper	community	Non-official	national	wide	Entertainment Populace-oriented	156
Nanfang Weekend	newspaper	community	Non-official	national	wide	Deep report	23 / 340

The main findings from the Report include:

In recent years, along with the fast development of Chinese CSOs, the media have paid certain attention to Chinese civil society. Totally there are 340 items related to CSOs were found in the media. Among the 340 items, about 10% are in the prominent position of the media (the first three pages of newspaper, the first three pieces of news or comments in TV news programs, forewords by the editor, and so on); the form of reports are various, including news, story, picture, interview, etc., of which 70% are reports in the form of brief news and news story.

Chinese civil society is active in many fields. In the 340 reports, the first five issues frequently mentioned are: business, education and training, health, enterprise's social ability and its citizens' rights and volunteering. However, Chinese civil society has not covered issues such as conflict resolution, natural disaster, war and terrorism, which are issues that CSOs of some other countries positively impact. According to the categorization in the CSI project, Chinese media have made relatively more reports on the following types: service organisations of civil society (58 pieces), social service and health associations (53), the organisations active in education, training and research fields (34), women's association, civil society organisations of culture and arts, trade union, CSOs network/federations/support organisations, professional business organisations and economic interests

From the four dimensions, the Chinese media reported on structure, environment, values and impact, of which the reports on structure were the most in number, followed by impact and values received the least amount of coverage. This is consistent with the rating of answers in the stakeholder consultation questionnaire. Meaning, stakeholders' awareness is positively related to

the visibility of reports. As for the detailed indicators, in the structure dimension, the variety of citizens' participation is obvious, but the depth, mutual relationship and resources are insufficient.

With regard to environment, the overall environment for Chinese civil society's activity is not good, especially the relationship between private enterprises and civil society, enterprises' charitable giving.

There are not many reports on values, but they revealed Chinese characteristics, focusing on indicators such as poverty eradication, environmental protection and gender equity, but there were no reports on democracy, tolerance or non-violence.

Chinese civil society's actions have impacted Chinese society. Sometimes, there are successful cases (positive reports) about empowering citizens and meeting societal needs. However, Chinese civil society needs to work harder on having an impact. Of the 72 indicators, the top ten most frequently reported in the media are: informing and educating citizens, responding to social interests, volunteering, meeting pressing societal needs directly, existence of CSO federations, CSOs membership, the variety of civil society participators, cooperation/support, meeting needs of marginalised groups and autonomy. These frequencies are consistent with the answers from stakeholder consultation questionnaire. The attitude of media, to a large extent, is in accordance with the stakeholders' attitude towards CSOs' activities. All in all, the situation reflected in Chinese media reports has almost no difference from local stakeholder consultations, community sample survey and the final results of CSI projects.

It was also found in the research that different media obviously hold different preference when reporting on civil society: *People's Daily* and *News Hook-up* mainly promote CPC and the government, which are the representatives of the official side. Their reports are stiff and most are in the form of news. Their reports concentrate on the state and provinces. Those about CSOs rarely appear on an important page, showing that the officials have not attached great importance to them. The themes reveal no obvious tendency, but relatively speaking, they focus on issues like international affairs, the national economy, people's livelihoods, such as education and health, and the state's policy. They both hold positive attitude towards civil society, especially in the *People's Daily*, nearly all the reports are positive (in *News Hook-up*, neutral). This, to some extent, reflects Chinese government's attitude to civil society at present.

Nanfang Weekend is well-known for its in-depth reporting. This paper paid a significant amount of attention to civil society, in which over 20% reports are on the important pages. The themes are similar to the *People's Daily*, showing that Chinese mainstream media is consistent in its concerns. *Nanfang Weekend* mostly holds neutral attitude towards civil society.

Xinmin Evening News is a type of local newspaper. Though its reports are mostly confined in the local fields, their forms are various. Fifteen percent appear on the important pages. The themes are more diversified, with relatively more on enterprises' social responsibility and interests, local

government, education, health and volunteering. In terms of the attitude, neutral and positive were nearly equal.

ANNEX 4 THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

1 – STRUCTURE

1.1 - Breadth of citizen participation

Description: How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engage in civil society activities?

1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

Description: What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

A very small minority (less than 10%).	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.2 - Charitable giving

Description: What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.4 - Volunteering

Description: What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A small minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A minority (31% to 50%)	Score 2
A majority (more than 50%)	Score 3

1.1.5 - Collective community action

Description: What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% -50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.2 - Depth of citizen participation

Description: How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?

1.2.1 - Charitable giving

Description: How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

Less than 1%	Score 0
1% to 2%	Score 1
2.1% to 3%	Score 2
More than 3%	Score 3

1.2.2 - Volunteering

Description: How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

Less than 2 hours	Score 0
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2 to 5 hours	Score 1
5.1 to 8 hours	Score 2
More than 8 hours.	Score 3

1.2.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

***Description:* How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?**

1.3.1 - CSO membership

Description: To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	Score 2
CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.2 - CSO leadership

Description: To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.	Score 2
CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

Description: How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	Score 0
CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	Score 1
CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	Score 2
CSOs are present in all areas of the country.	Score 3

1.4. - Level of organisation

***Description:* How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?**

1.4.1 - Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 70%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 70%)	Score 3

1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

Completely ineffective (or non-existent)	Score 0
Largely ineffective	Score 1
Somewhat effective	Score 2
Effective	Score 3

1.4.3 - Self-regulation

Description: Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Score 0
Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Score 1
Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Score 2
Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.	Score 3

1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

Description: What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 0
There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	Score 1
Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	Score 2
There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 3

1.4.5 - International linkages

Description: What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

Only a handful of “elite” CSOs have international linkages.	Score 0
A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 1
A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 2
A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.	Score 3

1.5 - Inter-relations

***Description:* How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?**

1.5.1 - Communication

Description: What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

Very little	Score 0
Limited	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Significant	Score 3

1.5.2 – Cooperation

Description: How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 0
It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 1
CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 2
CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 3

1.6 – Resources

***Description:* To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?**

1.6.1 - Financial resources

Description: How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.	Score 3

1.6.2 - Human resources

Description: How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.	Score 3

1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

Description: How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.	Score 3

2 - ENVIRONMENT⁹

2.1 - Political context

Description: What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

2.1.1 - Political rights

Description: How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	Score 0
There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Score 1
Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	Score 2
People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.	Score 3

2.1.2 - Political competition

Description: What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

Single party system.	Score 0
Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Score 1
Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction.	Score 2
Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.	Score 3

2.1.3 - Rule of law

Description: To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	Score 0
There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	Score 1
There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Score 2
Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.	Score 3

2.1.4 - Corruption

Description: What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

High	Score 0
Substantial	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Low	Score 3

⁹ For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

2.1.5 – State effectiveness

Description: To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).	Score 0
The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	Score 1
State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	Score 2
State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.	Score 3

2.1.6 – Decentralisation

Description: To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Score 0
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Score 1
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.	Score 2
Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.	Score 3

2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

***Description:* To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?**

2.2.1 - Civil liberties

Description: To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

Civil liberties are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	Score 1
There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Score 2
Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.2.2 - Information rights

Description: To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Score 0
Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Score 1
Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Score 2
Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.	Score 3

2.2.3 - Press freedoms

Description: To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

Press freedoms are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	Score 1
There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Score 2
Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.3 - Socio-economic context¹⁰

***Description:* What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

Description: How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict	Score 0
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¹⁰ This subdimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The subdimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)	
Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 1
Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 2
Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.	Score 3

2.4 - Socio-cultural context

Description: To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?

2.4.1 - Trust

Description: How much do members of society trust one another?

Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	Score 0
There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 1
There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 2
There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 3

2.4.2 - Tolerance

Description: How tolerant are members of society?

Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Score 0
Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Score 1
Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Score 2
Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).	Score 3

2.4.3 - Public spiritedness¹¹

Description: How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5).	Score 0
Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5).	Score 1
Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5).	Score 2
High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5).	Score 3

2.5 - Legal environment

Description: To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?

2.5.1 - CSO registration¹²

Description: How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	Score 0
The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent.	Score 1

¹¹ The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

¹² This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for subdimension 3. The indicator scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	Score 2
The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.	Score 3

2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

Description: To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticize government?

CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	Score 0
There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Score 1
Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	Score 2
CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.	Score 3

2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

Description: How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	Score 0
The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations).	Score 1
The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	Score 2
The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.	Score 3

2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy

Description: How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Score 0
Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 1
Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 2
Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 3

2.6 - State-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?**

2.6.1 – Autonomy

Description: To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

The state controls civil society.	Score 0
CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	Score 1
The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	Score 2
CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.	Score 3

2.6.2 - Dialogue

Description: To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	Score 0
The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	Score 1
The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Score 2
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.6.3 - Cooperation / support

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 2
The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?**

2.7.1 - Private sector attitude

Description: What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

Generally hostile	Score 0
Generally indifferent	Score 1
Generally positive	Score 2
Generally supportive	Score 3

2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility

Description: How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Score 0
Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 1
Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Score 2
Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 3

2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy¹³

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 2
The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

3 - VALUES

3.1 – Democracy

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs

Description: To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 0
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 1
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 3

¹³ The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy

Description: How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.2 – Transparency

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?**

3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society

Description: How widespread is corruption within CS?

Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.	Score 0
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	Score 1
There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Score 2
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.	Score 3

3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs

Description: How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?

A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 0
A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 1
A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 3

3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency

Description: How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.3 – Tolerance

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?**

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Score 0
Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	Score 2
Civil society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	Score 3

3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance

Description: How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.4 - Non-violence

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?

3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena

Description: How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Score 0
Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	Score 2
There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.	Score 3

3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace

Description: How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility	Score 3

3.5 - Gender equity

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?

3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Score 0
Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Score 1
Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Score 2
Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.	Score 3

3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs

Description: How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

A small minority (less than 20%)	Score 0
A minority (20%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

3.5.3 – Civil society actions to promote gender equity

Description: How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.6 - Poverty eradication

Description: To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?

3.6.1 – Civil society actions to eradicate poverty

Description: To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.7 - Environmental sustainability

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?

3.7.1 – Civil society actions to sustain the environment

Description: How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

4 - IMPACT

4.1 - Influencing public policy

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.1.3 - Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components. ¹⁴	Score 1
Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?

4.2.1 - Holding state accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

¹⁴ The term "specific budget component" refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the *overall* budget.

4.2.2 - Holding private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.3 - Responding to social interests

Description: How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?

4.3.1 - Responsiveness

Description: How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 0
There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 1
There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 2
Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 3

4.3.2 - Public Trust

Description: What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

A small minority (< 25%)	Score 0
A large minority (25%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-75%)	Score 2
A large majority (> 75%)	Score 3

4.4 - Empowering citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?

4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

Description: How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.3 - Empowering marginalised people

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalised people?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.4 - Empowering women

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.5 - Building social capital¹⁵

Description: To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Score 0
Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Score 1
Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Score 2
Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.	Score 3

4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

Description: How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5 - Meeting societal needs

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

Description: How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Description: How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Description: To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

CSOs are less effective than the state.	Score 0
CSOs are as effective as the state.	Score 1
CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	Score 2
CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.	Score 3

¹⁵ To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see subdimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

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