



# CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX REPORT

*Civil Society in Bolivia:  
From mobilization to impact*

## **Bolivia**

*Country Report*

## FOREWORD

This study responds to the need to better understand Bolivia, as a diverse society with its own needs and interests, ways of organising and ways of working towards joint action.

The Civil Society Index (CSI) project and methodology were developed by CIVICUS, an international NGO as an instrument to assess the state of civil society around the world.

The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) for Bolivia is the result of pooling resources involving the *Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado* (CIPCA) and Catholic Relief Services - Bolivia (CRS Bolivia).<sup>1</sup> These local and international non-governmental institutions work, in the case of CIPCA, directly with CSOs and the general population, and in the case of CRS with local partners working on social development. The CSI project was carried out between December 2004 and January 2006 and is part of a project coordinated by CIVICUS in over 50 countries. It should be pointed out that while this report was designed for comparative purposes, it nonetheless explores the specific characteristics of Bolivian civil society, particularly regarding the indigenous population.

The CSI is an action – research project that involves various stakeholders, who reflect on the current state of civil society in order to jointly propose an action plan to strengthen civil society in the country.

The project aimed to contribute to Bolivian civil society's self-understanding in order to develop a list of actions to address civil society's deficiencies. Thus, problems related to corruption within civil society and the limitations of civil society's values regarding gender equity, or respect for sexual minorities, were addressed in this project. Central to this analysis was measuring the limited success that Bolivian civil society has had in influencing public policy, despite its powerful mobilisation capacities.

It is important to also highlight that some of the data, on which this report is based, was obtained through surveys and interviews held during the period of social conflict from May to June 2005. This context allowed for high levels of participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) throughout the CSI implementation. The participation of men and women and organisation leaders, has enriched the study and generated rich discussions among civil society participants. We hope that the CSI presented the opportunity to broaden the perspectives of the diverse social actors involved in the project.

The publication of this report at the beginning of 2006 is of special significance, due to the landslide victory in late 2005 of a political party headed by the social leader, Evo Morales, indicating the strength of social movements and civil society's capacity to mobilise.

Finally, it is important to note that the Bolivian study identified a strong civil society within a weak state. It would therefore be interesting for future studies to explore how state-civil society relations develop over time, as many organisations now directly participate in the national, departmental and municipal governments.

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In order to adapt the methodology proposed by CIVICUS to the Bolivian context, PhD. Susana Rance reviewed the methodology, interpretation and scientific direction of the study; and PhD. Luis Tapia analyzed the concept of civil society, which, along with the input from the NAG, made the research distinctly Bolivian.

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CIPCA and CRS Bolivia, as the national organisations coordinating the research, refined the methodology, fundraised, implemented the project's components and reviewed the reports. They also contributed with their experience acquired from their own research and practical work. We would also like to highlight the valuable support of Juan Carlos Rojas, Head of the CIPCA Political Action Unit.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD.....	1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	2
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	3
TABLES AND FIGURES.....	4
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	8
INTRODUCTION.....	12
<b>I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT &amp; APPROACH.....</b>	<b>13</b>
1. PROJECT BACKGROUND.....	13
2. PROJECT APPROACH.....	14
<b>II CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOLIVIA.....</b>	<b>19</b>
1. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOLIVIA.....	19
2. THE CURRENT SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT IN BOLIVIA.....	22
3. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY.....	23
<b>III ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY.....</b>	<b>25</b>
1. <i>STRUCTURE</i> .....	25
1.1 The Breadth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society.....	25
1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society.....	28
1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants.....	29
1.4 Level of Organization.....	31
1.5 Inter-Relations within Civil Society.....	32
1.6 Civil Society Resources.....	33
2. <i>ENVIRONMENT</i> .....	35
2.1 Political Context.....	36
2.2 Basic Rights and Freedoms.....	38
2.3 Socio-economic Context.....	38
2.4 Socio-cultural Context.....	40
2.5 Legal Environment.....	40
2.6 State-civil Society Relations.....	42
2.7 Private Sector - Civil Society Relations.....	43
3. <i>VALUES</i> .....	44
3.1. Democracy.....	45
3.2 Transparency.....	46
3.3 Respecting Differences.....	47
3.4 Non-violence.....	48
3.5 Gender Equity.....	49
3.6 Poverty Eradication.....	50
3.7 Environmental Sustainability.....	50
3.8. Ethnic Equity.....	51
4. <i>IMPACT</i> .....	52
4.1 Influencing Public Policy.....	53
4.2 Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable.....	55
4.3 Responding to Social Interests.....	57
4.4 Empowering Citizens.....	58
4.5 Meeting Societal Needs.....	60
<b>IV STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BOLOVIAN CIVIL SOCIETY.....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>V RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>VI CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>66</b>
APPENDICES.....	69
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	107

## LIST OF TABLE AND FIGURES

### Tables

Table I.1.1	Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005	13
Table II.1.1	Country information	19
Table II.3.1	Types of CSOs included in the study	24
Table III.1.1	Indicators assessing the breadth of citizen participation	26
Table III.1.2	Membership in CSO types according to place of residence	27
Table III.1.3	Indicators assessing depth of citizen participation	28
Table III.1.4	Family income and amount given to charity (Bs. /month)	29
Table III.1.5	Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants	29
Table III.1.6	Participation of social groups per type of CSO (%)	29
Table III.1.7	Perceptions of leadership roles within CSOs by social groups (%)	30
Table III.1.8	Participation of people who live in rural disperse areas in CSOs (%)	30
Table III.1.9	Indicators assessing the level of organisation	31
Table III.1.10	Perceived quantity of institutions that support CSOs (%)	31
Table III.1.11	Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society	32
Table III.1.12	Level of communication and exchange of information among CSOs (%)	33
Table III.1.13	Perceptions of the existence of intersectoral coalitions or alliances among CSOs (%)	33
Table III.1.14	Indicators assessing civil society resources	34
Table III.1.15	CSOs funding sources (%)	34
Table III.2.1	Indicators assessing political context	36
Table III.2.2	Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms	38
Table III.2.3	Indicator assessing the socio-economic context	38
Table III.2.4	Indicators assessing socio-cultural context	40
Table III.2.5	Indicators assessing legal environment	41
Table III.2.6	Indicators assessing state-civil society relations	42
Table III.2.7	Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations	43
Table III.2.8	Private sector attitude to civil society	43
Table III.3.1	Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes democracy	45
Table III.3.2	Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes transparency	46
Table III.3.3	Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes respecting differences	47
Table III.3.4	Perceptions of civil society activities to promote respecting differences (%)	48
Table III.3.5	Indicators assessing the degree to which civil society practices and promotes non-violence	48
Table III.3.6	Perceptions of how many CSOs use violence to achieve their aims (%)	48
Table III.3.7	Perceptions on how often violent acts are reported by other civil society actors (%)	49
Table III.3.8	Indicators assessing the degree to which civil society promotes and practices gender equity	49
Table III.3.9	Indicator assessing the degree to which civil society promotes and practices poverty	50

eradication

Table III.3.10	Objectives of different types of CSOs	50
Table III.3.11	Indicator measuring the degree to which civil society promotes environmental protection	51
Table III.3.12	Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes ethnic equity	51
Table III.4.1	Indicators assessing influencing public policy	53
Table III.4.2	Indicators measuring civil society's success in holding the state and private corporations accountable	55
Table III.4.3	Indicators assessing meeting society's needs	57
Table III.4.4	Indicators assessing empowering citizens	58
Table III.4.5	Indicators assessing meeting societal needs	60

## Figures

Figure 1	Civil Society Diamond – Bolivia	8
Figure I.1.1	Civil Society Diamond Tool	14
Figure III.1.1	Subdimension scores for the structure dimension	25
Figure III.1.2	Frequency of non-partisan political action (%)	26
Figure III.1.3	Charitable giving	26
Figure III.1.4	Membership in CSO types	27
Figure III.1.5	Community action in urban and rural zones	28
Figure III.1.6	Hours dedicated to voluntary work in the previous month	29
Figure III.1.7	Perceptions of the proportion of CSOs with international linkages (%)	32
Figure III.1.8	Civil society resources (%)	34
Figure III.2.1	Subdimension scores in environment dimension	36
Figure III.2.2	CSO registration process	41
Figure III.3.1	Subdimension scores in values dimension	45
Figure III.3.2	Respecting differences within civil society (%)	47
Figure III.4.1	Subdimension scores in impact dimension	52
Figure III.4.2	Civil society's actions and success in promoting public policies (%)	53
Figure III.4.3	Civil society's actions and success in promoting State accountability (%)	55
Figure III.4.4	Civil society's actions and success in promoting corporate accountability (%)	56
Figure III.4.5	Public trust in CSOs	57
Figure III.4.6	Indicators assessing actions and success in informing/educating citizens (%)	58
Figure III.4.7	Civil society's actions and success in building capacity for collective action (%)	58
Figure III.4.8	Levels of interpersonal trust	59
Figure III.4.9	Bodies that provide better services to marginalized groups (%)	61
Figure VI.1.1	Civil Society Diamond – Bolivia	66
Figure A6.1	Items on civil society per media (%)	90
Figure A6.2	Image of the CSOs per type of media (%)	90
Figure A6.3	Image of the CSOs on the television (%)	91
Figure A6.4	Image of the CSOs in the printed media (%)	91

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

APROLAC	Asociación de Productores Lácteos (Dairy Producers Association)
CAMEX	Cámara de Exportadores (Exports Chamber )
CAO	Cámara Agropecuaria del Oriente (Eastern Agricultural Chamber)
CBH	Cámara Boliviana de Hidrocarburos (Bolivian Hydrocarbons Chamber)
CENCOOP	Central de Cooperativas de Café (Coffee Cooperative Association)
CIOEC	Comité Integrador de Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas de Bolivia (Bolivian Rural Economic Organisations Committee)
CIPCA	Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (Center for Peasants Research and Development)
CNE	Corte Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Court)
COB	Central Obrera Boliviana (The Bolivian Workers Federation)
COBORSE	Consejo Boliviano de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial (Bolivian Council for Corporate Social Responsibility)
CONALJUVE	Confederación Nacional de Juntas Vecinales (National Confederation of Neighbourhood Associations)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSI	CIVICUS Civil Society Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation(s)
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Trade Union Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia)
DFID	Department for International Development
EBRP	Estrategia Boliviana de Reducción de la Pobreza (Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy)
FEBOPI	Federación Boliviana de la Pequeña Industria (Bolivian Federation of Small Industries)
FECAFEB	Federación de Caficultores de Bolivia (Bolivian Federation of Coffee Producers)
FEJUVE	Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighbourhood Associations)
FENCA	Federación de Cooperativas Arroceras (Federation of Rice Cooperatives)
FENCOMIN	Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Mineras (National Federation of Mines Cooperatives)
FSTCCH	Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Campesinos de Chuquisaca (Departmental Federation of Rural Workers of Chuquisaca)
FSTMB	Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros of Bolivia (Bolivian Trade Union Federation of Miners)
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
GLBTT	Gay Lesbian Bi-sexual, Transsexual and Transgender Movement
INRA	Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Institute for Agrarian Reform)
MAS	Movimiento Al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)
MCS	Mecanismo de Control Social (Social Control Mechanism)
MCS – LP	Mecanismo de Control Social del Departamento de La Paz (La Paz Social Control Mechanism)

MNCS	Mecanismo Nacional de Control Social (National Social Control Mechanism)
MST	Movimiento Sin Tierra (Landless Movement)
NAG	National Advisory Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIT	National Index Team
NSCM	National Social Control Mechanism
OECA	Organización Económica Campesina (Rural Economic Organisation)
SCM	Social Control Mechanism
SCM-LP	La Paz Departmental Social Control Mechanism
SOBOCE	Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento (Bolivian Cement Society)
SWOT	Strengths, Opportunities, Weaknesses and Threats
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
V&T	Variables & Tendencias
WFP	World Food Programme



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the main results of the implementation of the Civil Society Index (CSI) in Bolivia, which was carried out by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Bolivia and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA) between December 2004 and January 2006.

The CSI assesses civil society in Bolivia by examining four analytical dimensions. Its organisational and participatory **Structure**, the **Values** it practices and promotes, the social and political **Impact** it achieves through its actions and the features of the socioeconomic and political **Environment** in which civil society functions.


The Civil Society Diamond (see figure 1) is based on this four-dimensional framework. The Diamond depicts the current state of civil society in Bolivia. The scores for each dimension were calculated based on research that brought together various primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included a community survey, a stakeholders' survey, consultations held with leaders from private, civil society and state organisations, in four cities around the country, a media review and four fact-finding studies, which provided data for 76 indicators that can be compared internationally. This information was used by the National Advisory Group (NAG), made up of recognised experts on civil society, to score each of the indicators that make up the four dimensions.

The Civil Society Diamond for Bolivia shows a rather well-balanced civil society, where all four dimensions receive a score below 2. The Impact and Structure dimensions received the highest scores, with both receiving a score of 1.8. The Values dimension scored a 1.7 and the Environment dimension received the lowest score, with a 1.4.

The **Structure** dimension shows that the level of citizen participation in civil society activities is rather widespread, and tends to increase during times of social conflict. Non partisan political action, such as demonstrations, street blockades and strikes, obtained the highest score in this dimension. The level of CSO membership was also rated as a strength, since a large majority of survey respondents belong to at least one CSO. Bolivians commonly join associations, mainly religious organisations, neighbourhood associations and indigenous-peasant groups. Additionally, there are a variety of CSOs representing different groups throughout much of the country through highly organised national and departmental umbrella organisations. These umbrella organizations bring together local associations and link them with national and international organisations. The activities of these umbrella bodies have proven fairly effective, especially when addressing political issues, such as the Constituent Assembly and the nationalisation of natural resources.

Additionally, although only a small minority of people undertake individual volunteer work on a regular basis, many people from the countryside and from poor neighbourhoods unite to

**FIGURE 1: Civil Society Diamond – Bolivia**



Source: CSI – Bolivia, 2005

address collective needs. Thus, the concept of philanthropy is not as relevant in a country like Bolivia, where the majority of the population's basic needs are unmet and people focus on seeking their own solutions to problems in order to ensure their survival. In this context, charity and volunteer work are not a priority for the poor, and these types of activities are mainly undertaken by wealthier sections of society.

The weaknesses observed in the structure of Bolivian civil society are especially evident when analysing CSOs' internal structure. On the one hand, the low levels of education and training appear to inhibit significant social groups from taking on leadership positions in CSOs, especially women and the poor. Likewise, CSOs are insufficiently prepared to comply with self-regulatory mechanisms. In many cases, codes of conduct are established informally and transmitted orally, which can lead to misinterpretations among members. Furthermore, although most CSOs have some technical resources, their lack of financial resources prevents them from meeting their organisational needs. Thus, poor internal conditions, expressed in limited financial and human resources, tend to weaken civil society's highly organised and politically engaged nature. On the other hand, civil society's great diversity, which can be considered an asset, becomes problematic when CSO leaders fail to build strong alliances among each other. For example, it has been observed that communication between CSOs appears to be limited and unsystematic, mainly due to power disputes among CSO leaders. As a result, while different CSOs come together to coordinate certain activities, especially in moments of great social conflict, these alliances are sporadic and short-term. This fragmented nature of Bolivian civil society was highlighted by many stakeholders. Finally, even though private companies support CSOs, such as international NGOs and foundations, their actions have yet to support CSOs' strength and sustainability, particularly since they are not addressing the aforementioned weaknesses.

Certain socio-economic, legal and political factors are crucial in defining the **environment** in which Bolivian civil society functions. This dimension obtained the lowest score of all four dimensions, which is mainly a consequence of widespread and pervasive poverty and its consequences. However, it is also a consequence of the political and legal context, which is characterized by a weak level of state institutionalisation and effectiveness. Bolivia is still one of the poorest countries of the region, with high rates of social inequality. It is also handicapped by an unfavourable bureaucratic environment, characterised by corruption and inefficiency. Additionally, the frequent violation of laws by both citizens and the state is one reason why many people seem to have little confidence in the legal system and its institutions. This situation affects state – civil society relations: as citizens' demands tend to overwhelm the state's capacity to respond, this relationship is generally marred by conflict. It is also evident that even though the state rarely interferes in CSO activities and often dialogues with a wide range of actors, in general, the relationship between civil society and the state is characterised by low levels of cooperation and support. Only a few CSOs receive state funding or other resources to support their activities.

Additionally, the relations between civil society and the corporate sector also present some challenges. According to the perceptions of CSO stakeholders, large corporations are indifferent to the social demands made by CSOs and rarely take into account the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations. This situation sometimes even provokes tensions between large corporations and CSOs.

In spite of these obstacles, consulted stakeholders agree that basic freedoms and rights are respected in the country and that legal constraints on CSO advocacy activities are minimal. Furthermore, although the main political parties lack a clear ideology and action plans, Bolivia has been able to establish a multiparty system, giving citizens a wide range of

political options. Civil society's socio-cultural context has also been rated positively, especially regarding the level of trust among citizens, which are higher in rural than in urban areas, and the rather high levels of tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities.

The assessment of civil society's **values** shows that Bolivian civil society is active in promoting and exercising important social values. For example, civil society actively promotes democracy, tends to exercise democratic values internally and is working towards poverty eradication and ethnic equity. Bolivian civil society is generally peaceful and only occasionally responds aggressively to state violence. All of these aspects give Bolivian civil society a relatively strong set of values. However, these values tend to become vulnerable during times of social and political crisis.

The "values" dimension also presented some weaknesses, such as rather widespread corruption within CSOs. Few organisations appear to be interested in making their accounts available to the public. Furthermore, even though some groups actively promote gender equity, women are still under-represented in CSOs' leadership positions. Another weak point is the value of environmental sustainability, which, due to lack of awareness, information and immediate economic worries, is not a priority for Bolivian civil society.

The last dimension shows that the **impact** of Bolivian civil society's activities is assessed as moderately strong. This dimension obtained the highest score of the four dimensions of the Diamond, mainly because Bolivian civil society is very active in performing various essential functions within society. For example, civil society is very active in both influencing public policy and providing the population with services that are not covered by the state. However, the impact of these actions is usually limited, since civil society exerts a strong but problematic influence in the political arena. The state is weak, lacks legitimacy and exists in a highly politicised society. The mobilisation of citizens through civil society actors is at times so strong that the existing social order is in danger of becoming out of hand. Despite these high levels of mobilisation, civil society does not succeed in significantly influencing the formulation and implementation of public policies or solve basic social and economic problems. In addition, civil society's weak capacity to control state and business is evidenced by the low indicator scores for these issues.

Areas where civil society's impact is stronger include its responsiveness to social interests and its success in empowering citizens. Bolivian civil society is strong in responding to social needs by carrying out community activities, especially in the rural areas and urban peripheral zones. These actions usually target widespread poverty and the lack of attention paid to this issue by the state, which has led to civil society solving its own problems through collective action. CSOs engage in a variety of activities, from informing and educating citizens, to providing capacity building on technical and political topics. Many CSOs also implement income-generating activities, which mainly benefit women and the poor, and are very active in lobbying the state to provide essential services. However, in spite of all these actions, the lack of significant impact in this area is the result of the vast needs of the Bolivian population, which cannot be solved by CSOs' interventions alone.

Based on these results, the key strengths and weaknesses of Bolivian civil society were identified at a National Workshop, carried out in November 2005, in which more than 120 CSOs and state representatives participated. Together, all participants identified and reflected on recommendations that might help civil society overcome its weaknesses. The key recommendations concerned the issues of building the capacity of CSO leaders and of improving information channels between state and CSOs. Along the same lines, the educational system should be oriented to promoting and addressing social values to address problems of corruption and intolerance. Another recommendation was to target the

fragmented nature of civil society by building stronger bonds and opening up spaces for dialogue between different civil society sectors. Such dialogue should be based on topics that address issues relating to all citizens, such as civil rights and obligations. However, all of these recommendations will not be successful, if the state does not work towards strengthening and transforming its political and legal institutions with the goal of establishing a reliable democratic system of governance. Furthermore, the improvement of the socio-economic conditions and the better redistribution of resources should become a priority in order to guarantee social cohesion and equity. Finally, there is a need to establish closer links between the state, civil society and private companies in order to enhance collaboration for the resolution of the various problems hindering Bolivia's development.

In conclusion, the CSI project has resulted in the collection and analysis of relevant information, which can be used to better understand the state of Bolivian civil society by considering the strengths and the weaknesses of the sector. Based on this analysis, recommendations have been generated, whose successful implantation would certainly lead to strengthening civil society in the country. This publication aims to be a tool for Bolivian CSOs, to help them better understand the civil society sector and strengthen their relations with government and private companies, so that the political, economic and social problems that the country is currently facing can be resolved. This publication will also contribute to the international debate on civil society by providing Bolivian results that can be compared with other participating countries.

## INTRODUCTION

The CIVICUS Civil Society Index for Bolivia (CSI) is the result of an inter-institutional alliance between the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA) and Catholic Relief Services - Bolivia (CRS). The final product of this work is this report, which will be presented to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and experts in the field.

The CSI is an action- research project that seeks to generate knowledge about civil society encouraging the reflections of various actors. Its aim is to put forward joint proposals for action to strengthen civil society in the country. The work was carried out between December 2004 and January 2006 by the National Index Team (NIT), which worked under the supervision of CIPCA and CRS. The CSI is a project coordinated by CIVICUS, which gave constant support and feedback to the NIT throughout the process. It was devised for international comparisons purposes, and is taking place in over 50 countries around the world. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that during the implementation of the CSI, the data was obtained through surveys and interviews held during the social conflicts of May and June 2005. Recalling René Zavaleta's notion that crisis is a favourable setting for reflection, this context offered an historic opportunity to enrich the interpretation that substantiates this report.

The research and report have one single goal: to contribute to Bolivian civil society's self-knowledge, so that a group of actions to address the apparent deficiencies can be implemented. The long term aim of this project is to observe impact of the results of this study in terms of public and state institutionalisation in Bolivia, and in strengthening civil society actors and organisations globally.

### Structure of the Publication

This publication is organised in six sections:

Section I describes the context and focus of the Civil Society Index (CSI) in Bolivia. The conceptual and methodological framework that guides the project is also addressed.

Section II puts the study in the context of the Bolivian reality, delving into the historical and conceptual vision of civil society in Bolivia and describes key characteristics of the different social actors.

Section III, entitled "Analysis of Civil Society", is divided into four parts: the **Structure** of the civil society, the **Environment** or socio-political, legal and cultural context in which it evolves, the **Values** upon which it bases its actions and the **Impact** on society and politics, which correspond to the four main dimensions of the CSI. The main results for the dimensions, subdimensions and indicators are presented along with their respective interpretation.

Section IV briefly analyses the strengths and weaknesses of Bolivian civil society.

Finally, sections V and VI present the recommendations made by different social actors at the National Workshop held in November 2005 and addresses the main conclusions drawn from the study.

# I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT AND APPROACH

## 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS, 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo, 2001; Holloway, 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept (Anheier, 2004). The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1.1).

**TABLE I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005<sup>2</sup>**

1. Argentina	19. Germany	37. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Ghana	38. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Greece	39. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Guatemala	40. Russia
5. Bulgaria	23. Honduras	41. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Hong Kong (VR China)	42. Serbia
7. Chile	25. Indonesia	43. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Italy	44. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Jamaica	45. South Korea
10. Croatia	28. Lebanon	46. Taiwan
11. Cyprus <sup>3</sup>	29. Macedonia	47. Togo
12. Czech Republic	30. Mauritius	48. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Mongolia	49. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Montenegro	50. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Nepal	51. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Nigeria	52. Vietnam
17. Gambia	35. Northern Ireland	53. Wales
18. Georgia	36. Orissa (India)	

In Bolivia the project was implemented by an alliance between Catholic Relief Services - Bolivia (CRS) and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA). Both institutions became involved because of their interests in: increasing the level of knowledge and awareness of civil society in Bolivia; strengthening civil society actors through promoting dialogue, collective learning and networking and promoting civil society's participation in the effective monitoring of public policies. The research process was carried out between December 2004 and November 2005. One of CRS and CIPCA's first activities for implementing the CSI was to participate in the Latin American Workshop for National Coordinating Organisations in November 2003, where the project toolkit was discussed and later adapted to the Latin American context. Additionally, CRS and CIPCA fundraised to

<sup>2</sup> This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted, as of March 2006.

<sup>3</sup> The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

raise money for the project implementation. Once this was achieved, the project was launched in December 2004.

## 2. PROJECT APPROACH

The CSI uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a broad range of research methods. At the core of the CSI lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of subdimensions, which again are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI data collection, which includes secondary sources, a community survey, regional stakeholder consultations, a media review and a series of fact-finding studies. The indicators are also used for the assessment exercise undertaken by a National Advisory Group (NAG). The research and its findings are discussed throughout the stakeholders' consultations, whose task is to identify specific strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations on key priority actions to strengthen civil society. The CSI project approach, conceptual framework, and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.1 Conceptual Framework

#### *How to define civil society?*


At the heart of the CSI conceptual framework is obviously the concept of civil society. CIVICUS defines civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, where people associate to advance common interests (CIVICUS, 2004). In this respect and different from most other civil society concepts, the CSI has two interesting features. First, it aims to go beyond the usual focus on formal and institutionalised CSO, and includes informal coalitions and groups. Second, while civil society is sometimes perceived as a sphere in which positive activities and values exist, CIVICUS seeks to also include negative manifestations of civil society in the assessment. The concept therefore covers not only charitable associations or environmental organisations, but also groups such as skinheads and aggressive sports fans. The CSI assesses not only the extent to which CSO support democracy and tolerance, but also the extent to which they themselves are intolerant or even violent.

#### *How to conceptualise the state of civil society?*

To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of charitable giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state as

**FIGURE I.1.1: Civil Society Diamond Tool**



Source: Anheier, 2004

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed description of the CSI approach, see Heinrich (2004).

well as the private sector);

- The *values* practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The *impact* of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of subdimensions, which contain a total of 76 indicators.<sup>5</sup> These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report.<sup>6</sup> The indicator, subdimension and dimension framework underpinned the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report, the NAG's assessment of Bolivian civil society and the reflections at the National Workshop. It is also used to structure the main part of this publication.

To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool (see figure I.1.1 for an example).<sup>7</sup> The Civil Society Diamond graph, with its four angles, visually summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society. The diagram is the result of the individual indicator scores aggregated into subdimensions and then dimensions scores. As it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about what civil society looks like in a given country. As the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot and should not be used to rank countries according to their scores on the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time as well as compare the state of civil societies across countries (Anheier, 2004).

## 2.2 Project Methodology

This section described the methods used to collect and aggregate the various data used by the CSI project.

### 2.2.1 Data Collection.

The CSI recognizes that, in order to generate a valid and comprehensive assessment of civil society, a variety of perspectives, data and statistics should be included – from internal and external stakeholders opinions, to objective data ranging from the local and regional to the national level. The CSI therefore includes the following set of research methods: (1) Review of existing information, (2) Regional stakeholder consultations, (3) Community survey, (4) Media review and (5) Fact-finding studies.

It is believed that this mix of different methods is essential not only to generate accurate and useful data and information, but also to accommodate the variations of civil society, for example in rural vs. urban areas etc. Also, the CSI seeks to utilize all available sources of information to avoid 're-inventing research wheels' and wasting scarce resources. Lastly, the research methodology is explicitly designed to promote learning and, ultimately, action on the part of participants.

In addition to feeding into the final national-level workshop, data collection processes also aim to contribute to participant learning. This is done, for example, through group-based

<sup>5</sup> Originally the CSI was made up of 74 indicators; however, the Bolivian CSI has added two additional indicators to include indigenous people's rights.

<sup>6</sup> See Annex 7.

<sup>7</sup> The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier, 2004).



approaches that challenge participants to see themselves as part of a “bigger picture”, think beyond their own organisational or sectoral context, reflect strategically about relations within and between civil society and other parts of society, identify key strengths and weaknesses of their civil society and assess collective needs. It is important to note that the CSI provides an aggregate need assessment on civil society as a whole and is not designed to exhaustively map the various actors active within civil society. Yet, it does examine power relations within civil society and between civil society and other sectors and also identifies key civil society actors when looking at specific indicators under the structure, values and impact dimensions.

For the CSI study in Bolivia, it was possible to implement all of the proposed data collection methods, yielding an extremely rich information base on civil society. The specific methods are listed here in sequence of their implementation.<sup>8</sup>

- *Secondary sources:* Documented information, produced in Bolivia and relevant to civil society was constantly reviewed. In the initial phase a preliminary report was written systematising all of the information obtained. After drafting the preliminary report and during the field and analysis stage of the project, the literature review was expanded using additional secondary sources. Various unpublished documents and 39 CSO websites, representing the following sectors, were analysed: 1) business and trade; 2) unions; 3) neighbourhood associations; 4) indigenous groups; 5) professional associations; 6) women’s organisations; 7) environmental organisations; 8) NGO networks; 9) lodges; 10) political parties and 11) religious groups.
- *Regional stakeholders’ consultations:* The stakeholders are people experienced in leadership or academia within civil society. The consultations consisted first of filling out a survey designed by CIVICUS. To conduct the surveys in Bolivia, the company Encuestas & Estudios was hired. During the course of six weeks the company interviewed 123 representatives from different CSOs, from private companies and the state, who have knowledge of issues relating to civil society. The list of stakeholders was drawn up by the National Index Team (NIT) and included people from the departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Beni, Potosí and Chuquisaca. Those that filled out the surveys were then invited to consultation workshops. Four regional stakeholder workshops were held in the cities of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Sucre, in which a total of 55 people took part. The workshops lasted for six to eight hours each and participants discussed controversial topics raised in the surveys, as well as the preliminary results.
- *Community survey:* Again, the company Encuestas & Estudios was hired for six weeks in July and August 2005 to do the community survey. The survey, designed by CIVICUS, was used on a national sample of 642 people throughout the country, which showed a sampling error of  $\pm 4.62\%$  in a 95% confidence interval.<sup>9</sup>
- *A Media Review:* In May and June 2005 the company Multimedia Group & Entertainment was hired for six weeks to monitor the news on five television channels, three radio stations and in three newspapers. A total of 2,521 items on CSO news were monitored and the frequency, content, agenda and image of the CSO reflected in the media were analysed.
- *Fact-finding studies:* Four fact-finding studies on the following issues were carried out:

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<sup>8</sup> See Appendix 3 for more detailed information on each of the methods.

<sup>9</sup> This value means that if the same sample is taken 100 times, 95% of the time it will yield 4.62% above or below its real value.

- Fact-finding study on Land and Territory Public Policies: Yuquises Case Study;
- Fact-finding study on Human Rights: The events of February and October 2003;
- Fact-finding study on Social Control of Budgets: La Paz Department Social Control Mechanism and
- Fact-finding study on Corporate Social Responsibility.

### 2.2.2 Data Aggregation

The various data sources are collated and synthesized by the National Index Team in a draft country report, which is structured along the CSI indicators, subdimensions and dimensions. This report presents the basis for the indicator scoring exercise carried out by the NAG. In this exercise, each score is rated on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 being the lowest assessment possible and 3 the most positive. The scoring of each indicator is based on a short description of the indicator and a mostly qualitatively defined scale of scores from 0 to 3.<sup>10</sup> This NAG scoring exercise is modelled along a “citizen jury” approach (Jefferson Centre, 2002), in which citizens come together to deliberate and make decisions on a public issue, based on presented facts. The NAG’s role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence (or data) presented by the National Index Team in the form of the draft country report.

In Bolivia, the scoring process was conducted on 12 October 2005. Prior to the meeting, the NAG members read the draft country report and scored each indicator individually before discussing any differences in the group. The meeting was characterised by the exchange of ideas of the scores, especially in those indicators where there were great differences. An average of the scores was calculated for each indicator, from which the scores for the subdimensions and dimensions were calculated through averaging to finally plot the Bolivian Civil Society Diamond.

## 2.3 Linking Research with Action

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is not a strictly academic research project. As its declared objective is to involve the actors of civil society in the research process, to contribute to discussions about civil society and to eventually assist in strengthening civil society, it falls into the category of action-research initiatives.

In the case of Bolivia, widespread stakeholder participation in the CSI took place on several levels:

First, members of the NAG represent sectors of civil society, the academia and the state. Throughout the entire process, the NAG was actively involved in revising the concept and methodology of the Bolivia CSI. The group was included in decision-making during various phases of the project, such as deciding on the issues to be researched in the fact-finding studies.

Another space for action was the consultations with the stakeholders, held in four areas throughout the country where important issues about Bolivian civil society were discussed and a participative analysis of the results was carried out. In one case a SWOT analysis of Bolivian civil society was conducted.

Finally, a National Workshop was held with 120 participants, with representatives from civil society, the state and private companies, to discuss the results obtained for the different dimensions of the diamond and to propose future actions for strengthening Bolivian civil

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<sup>10</sup> See Annex 7.

society. NAG members also participated in this workshop and contributed with further reflections.

Overall, a concerted effort was made to make the project participative and consultative throughout its implementation.

## **2.4 Project Outputs**

The implementation of the CSI in Bolivia yielded a wide range of outputs and results:

1. An Overview Report based on available secondary research;
2. A conceptual document on civil society in Bolivia;
3. A methodological document on the relevance of the CSI in Bolivia;
4. Four reports on fact-finding studies;
5. A report on the results from the media review and its database, clippings, audio cassettes and DVDs with the newscasts reports;
6. A report on the results from the community survey and its database;
7. A report on the results from the stakeholders survey, its database and the reports from the workshops;
8. Reports from the workshops held with the National Advisory Group and the National Workshop and
9. A comprehensive Country Report on the state of civil society in Bolivia in Spanish and English.

The databases, as well as the individual studies, will be made available to the public in the CIPCA library and on its website.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> [www.cipca.org.bo](http://www.cipca.org.bo)

## II CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOLIVIA

### 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOLIVIA

Bolivian civil society was strongly influenced by the events that took place at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. These events led to a process of economic, political and social change: a) Political action which was previously the arena of military *caudillos* moved into the hands of civil society when the *caudillos* lost legitimacy after being defeated by the Chilean army in the Pacific War (1879); b) Private mining companies proliferated, and, with strong links to the state, propagated the subjugation of the peasant-indigenous population and the prevailing conditions of serfdom; c) The economic, political and social axis moved away from the countryside to the cities of La Paz-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz as the economy grew increasingly dependent on mineral resources. A middle class, influenced by different European and mestizo cultures, rose up and became protagonists of the national cultural and political debate, accompanied by education becoming public and opening up to sectors previously excluded, such as women and indigenous peoples.

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the first signs appeared of what was to become the miners' ideological and political influence in Bolivian CSOs.<sup>12</sup> Their hegemony was consolidated with the Revolution of 1952 and began to slump at the end of the 1980s. The miners' leadership was backed by the welfare state structure, which set up an economy based on the nationalised tin mining industry. Other state components included the expansion of citizen participation, through the introduction of the Universal Vote (1952), and Agrarian Reform (1953). However, it is important to note, that during this period the relationship between the state and Civil Society was marked by *clientelist* practices, with the peasants' movement primarily linked to the ruling party.

During the so-called "State of 52", civil society joined together under a nationalist flag; however, a pact restricted participation to employees of the state, excluding a large part of the peasant-indigenous sectors and women. This pact was formed by unions under the leadership of the umbrella workers association, the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB). The COB was the protagonist in the intense fight for democracy during the 18 years of military dictatorships, a

**TABLE II.1.1: Country information**

<b>Country size:</b> 1,098,580 Km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Population:</b> 8,300,460
<b>Population density:</b> 8 per km <sup>2</sup>
<b>Population under 14 years:</b> 38%
<b>Urban population:</b> 62%
<b>Form of government:</b> Parliamentary and Participatory Democracy
<b>Freedom House Democracy Rating:</b> Free
<b>Seats in parliament held by women:</b> 17.8% (as of December 2005).
<b>Main languages:</b> Spanish (74%), Quechua (26%), Aymará (18%)
<b>Main ethnic groups:</b> Quechua 30%, Aymará 25%, Mestizo 30%, White 15%
<b>Religion:</b> Catholic 80%, Protestant 10%, other 10%
<b>HDI Score &amp; Ranking:</b> 0.67 (114th.)
<b>GDP per capita:</b> 2,300 \$US

Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, National Institute of Statistics, 2004, Bolivian Political Constitution and Freedom House.  
Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Labour unions in Bolivia had a big boom during the 30s, when the "socialist military" government of the time, enforced norms that enabled the creation of workers unions. However, the first cohesion signs of the miners appeared in 1944, when the *Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros of Bolivia* (FSTMB) was created.

result of the post-revolutionary and conservative restoration process of 1964, the military dictatorships cycle finished in 1982 when Bolivia returned to democracy. As in any dictatorship, the civil society sector became repressed and political rights were the object of systematic prosecution. This situation led to the proliferation of charitable organisations under the initiative of the middle classes.

In 1985, the Bolivian state began a process of structural adjustment. The main state mining centres were closed and 35,000 workers were laid off from the nationalised mines. The welfare programmes were reduced and became part of the social organisation union schemes. As a result, a powerful indigenous peasant movement emerged in the 1950s. Since then, the indigenous peasant movement led a process of political, ideological and identity restructuring of Bolivian civil society, mainly expressed in its fight for the recognition of differences and cultural justice. The indigenous peasant movement is accompanied by marginalised urban sectors, which includes rural migrants who, faced with dwindling land resources resulting from Agrarian Reform, are seeking better opportunities in the cities.

In the past 15 years, changes in the legal system have altered the make-up of the state, and therefore the dialogue with civil society. One of the most important changes was the ‘municipalization’ of the country (1994), which increased the presence of the state, throughout the national territory. Political representation was later expanded to include Citizens Associations and Indigenous Peoples (2004) and referendums were incorporated as a mechanism of direct governance. Meanwhile, the traditional party system has been losing legitimacy since 2000.

Generally, Bolivian civil society is made up of popular social forces. The peasant organisations, despite representing small land owners, have an organic structure that works under the concept of unions and is mainly supported by the deterioration in the small-scale peasant economy in the east of the country. Its most influential branch is the *Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (CSUTCB). The peasant CSOs are highly visible in politics. Instead of using the traditional workers’ form of protest, strikes, they stage roadblocks.

Over the last ten years many CSOs have been supported by organisations identifying themselves as indigenous, mainly located in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia. They feel that the Agrarian Reform of 1953 did not benefit the indigenous peoples of the eastern lowlands and are fighting for redistribution of lands, provoking actions that seek to demonstrate that large landowners’ property is illegally registered. Within this framework CSOs have been confronted by the business sector, mainly agro business, organized into different chambers and supported by Departmental Civic Committees with enormous political clout fighting under the flag of regional autonomy. Among the most influential corporate organisations are the *Cámara Agropecuaria del Oriente* (CAO), the *Cámara de Exportadores* (CAMEX) and the *Cámara Boliviana de Hidrocarburos* (CBH).

Over the past few years, social organisations, also indigenous in their make-up, have emerged in the more traditional rural zones of Bolivia, in the central Altiplano region where organisational structures are closely related to community associations traditionally known as “*ayllus*”. These are new manifestations of social identification based on the acknowledgement of territory and traditional and cultural values.

The peasant-indigenous arena has been made even more complicated by the emergence of the coca economy in the Chapare (Cochabamba) and los Yungas (La Paz) regions, which attracted many displaced miners after 1985, although within a context of violent confrontations generated by the police. The strategic geographical location of this sector has given the coca growers’ associations tremendous opportunities to block highways and

paralyse national economies, which eventually led the coca sector to confrontations with the to fruit producers. The unions affiliated to these associations gave rise to the growth of a peasant-indigenous political movement, the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS), which plays a decisive role in national politics today.

The urban CSOs that focus on migrants from the countryside who have moved to the cities, mainly comprise those populations that, despite their expectations of opportunities to be found through migration, could not find employment. These CSOs are made up of Neighbourhood Associations, which represent peri-urban neighbourhoods and when grouped together, give rise to Federations. The most representative are found in the city of El Alto (bordering the city of La Paz) and have a great capacity to exert power by blocking strategic urban roads leading from the seat of the government to the interior of the country. Within this framework, the federations have met head-on with small or medium-businesses, mainly located in residential areas in the city of El Alto. The Neighbourhood Associations' Federations are affiliated to the *Confederación Nacional de Juntas Vecinales* (CONALJUVE), which has a membership of approximately 7,200 neighbourhood associations around the country.

All of the organisations mentioned above are affiliated with the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB), whose ability to convene people has fallen in the last three decades, except for during times of great conflict, when their leadership is requested, such as during the conflicts in October 2003 and May to June 2005.

There are also women's organisations, among which is the *Federación de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia* "Bartolina Sisa", whose influence, over the last few years, has moved mainly to the coca growing region of the Chapare, where it is an important stakeholder. Over the past few years an urban organisation called the *Federación de Mujeres de El Alto* was established as a key player in the social conflicts of October 2003, especially defending and promoting human rights. The emergence of women's organisations typically arises from the resistance to the exclusion that women are often subjected to from traditionally masculine spaces. However, it is also the result of some male leaders working towards strengthening their organisations through increased participation of women. The role of some NGO promoters, working in leadership positions, and women's participation, should also be recognized. Within the peasant movement this has sometimes led to mixed organisations where women occupy central roles in political action, such as in the *Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Campesinos de Chuquisaca* (FSTCCH) where women leadership is evident with some, even becoming members of parliament.

Finally, given the economic characteristics of Bolivian social debates, small-scale, family-based commercial organisations have emerged to include micro enterprises, artisans or peasant producers. Over the last five years, as a group, these actors have joined together to fight for social and political demands, which, in many cases, question the current development model in Bolivia. Similarly, within this diverse group of CSOs are national NGOs or Private Development Institutions which number around 660 throughout the country (Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance, 2003). These organisations are characterised by their heterogeneous nature seen through their political stances, resources they have and where they focus their activities. There are also religious organisations, which promote human rights, voluntary work and charity alongside other volunteer organisations. Finally, in Bolivia there is a wealth of various types of organisations, from sports to professional organisations, and an infinite number of groups that seek to resolve more material challenges and gain cultural recognition, reflecting society's high degree of political participation.

## 2. THE CURRENT SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT IN BOLIVIA

The relationship between state and society in Bolivia occurs within an extremely precarious framework of institutional mediation mechanisms. This situation is the result of the patrimonial character of the political parties and the limited credibility that political mechanisms inspire. Furthermore, since the country lacks a system of institutional mediation, many alternative forms of organization exist. In some cases these forms of mediation are guided by moral systems upheld by the Catholic Church.<sup>13</sup> In other cases, they are based on new organisational factors assumed by the media, especially the visual, which generates cultural, political and social viewpoints that greatly influence civil society. Additionally, there are private mediation systems between the public and domestic arenas, such as the NGOs, which, during the 1990s were the principal allies of the state, in modernisation and development initiatives.

Due to these characteristics, Bolivian civil society is focused on mobilization and campaigning, and has tended to express itself collectively, through actions that go straight to the political arena. Thereby, CSOs tend to make the state their main target and become a “demanding force” that sometimes acts beyond its institutional borders (Tapia, 2005). These characteristics lead to civil society’s political polarisation, and are an expression of the unfavourable living conditions in Bolivia, particularly in the rural areas. Paradoxically, these are the same characteristics that lend Bolivian civil society a certain degree of conservatism, especially in the area of individual rights, when issues such as tolerance to sexual minorities or HIV/AIDS are at stake.

Over the last few years, civil society has been influenced by three other aspects, which have led to its reconfiguration. One is related to the toppling of the socio-political structures generated within the 1952 “Social State” framework, based on the nationalised mining economy, which collapsed in the mid-1980s, because of the fall in the price of minerals on the international market. Until then only an internal market existed, which was accessible to small and medium-scale producers. However, labour de-socialisation caused a shift in the economy to family units and small-businesses, mainly in the commercial or services sector, where the female workforces are predominant (UNDP, 2005). Under these conditions the labour market has become unstable and volatile and is characterised by the emergence of informal ways of exploitation of social relations. The primary victims of these conditions are typically blue-collar women.

Over the past few decades, there has been a breakdown of union organisations, leading to large scale social and political fragmentation. This went hand in hand with the transformation of Bolivian society through the emergence of collective affiliation forms, forged among ethnic identities entering the public arena. At the same time the state pact of 1952 began to crumble, and political and regional divisions sprung up between the western and eastern regions in Bolivia. The 1953 policies gave rise to a business sector that was linked to agro business, especially strong in the eastern part of the country. Eastern entrepreneurs seeking to enhance their economic and political power made explicit demands for decentralization of public administration and regional autonomy, which would mainly benefit the development of such a region. Parallel to these demands, in the west, the peasant-indigenous movement set forth other types of political demands. These demands embraced the nationalisation of gas, including the fair distribution of its sales revenues and the implementation of the “Constituent

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<sup>13</sup> The Catholic Church heavily influenced the emergence of social organisations, especially peasant organisations, and is a key actor in the field of educational policy. Over the last few years it has also entered into scenes of political conflict, as mediator, where its intervention has played a decisive role in guiding the organisations towards peaceful and democratic actions. It is the institution that enjoys the highest level of public confidence.

Assembly” that would allow for the participatory revision and transformation of the Bolivian Constitution. In that sense, Bolivian society finds itself at a turning point within the spectrum of two scenarios. One of them is: to advance democracy through the implementation of the Constituent Assembly scheduled for 2006, or further political and social fragmentation and the collapsing Bolivian institutional structures through unresolved discrepancies between the east and the west. The latter has been identified as a possible moment of “political breakdown” (Seligson, 2005; Costa y Rojas - Ortuste, 2004).

### **3. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY**

In this study, civil society was defined as “the heterogeneous public arena, outside the state and the private sector, that results from the association, representation and participation dynamics of institutions, throughout which collective identities are constituted and allow for differentiation” (Tapia, 2005).<sup>14</sup> The concept of civil society implies a collective, historical condition, where the “public” arena is separated from the “private” arena, among which different political, social and economic structures are created as mediation mechanisms. Therefore, analysing civil society always implies analysing the state and the peculiarities of each country. The concept of citizenship always takes into account the existence of legal, social, economic and cultural interventions within the framework of state-national cohesion that guarantees the sovereignty of the individual. On this basis, the notion of civil society dates back to the origins of modernism and capitalism, where the state was defined as synonymous with civil society and vice-versa. The state was considered a result of the voluntary association of the citizens to guarantee a system that would allow harmonious relations, based on rational structures that provide security for the citizens. Laws and rights were central to these structures. The state, then, should embody the individual will, freedom and equity that make up the social contract, in order to overcome the primordial ties which bind together the pre-state community.

This concept has taken off over time in societies where capitalism has reached high levels of development; where the state has managed to become institutionalised and has led to the creation of a civic and regulated culture to which society adheres. This culture, however, has been supported by the productive potential of capitalism and therefore the incorporation of society through employment and salaried work. The constitutional pact that the state has made with society implies ways of social integration that, in the case of the workers, makes them subordinate. .

Within this framework the concept of civil society embraces the corporate organisation, which arises from the private arena, non-state or outside the state, but which has achieved some level of organisation. Civil society has become more complex within the framework of capitalist-driven economy and productivity; its expansion and cultural transformation. Therefore, civil society is not a homogenous sector, but rather a sector in conflict, due to social and economic interests. It embraces the social ruptures or divisions that emerge because of disputes over resources inherent to different social groups (Tapia, 2005). Within this context, a new concept emerges suggesting that the state is organised, as a product of these conflicts and differences. Thus, civil society is not the state, even though the state arises from the very heart of civil society and forms the roots of its conflicts.

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<sup>14</sup> This definition was worked on by the National Advisory Group on 7 April 2005 and expanded by Luis Tapia in May 2005 in a specific document. Finally, the expanded version was fine-tuned as the research process was on going.



CIVICUS defines civil society as “*the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests*”. Throughout the discussions on this definition, the NAG in Bolivia felt a need to underscore civil society’s heterogeneity generated by the diverse institutions and their respective dynamics in the public arena. The definition also aims to acknowledge the dynamics of association and particular interactions within society through a sense of collective – if heterogeneous – identity, which the Bolivian case is well known for.

CIVICUS drafted a list of 20 types of CSOs to operationalise the civil society definition, to be used in the regional stakeholder survey and consultations. The task of the NAG was to adapt the list to the Bolivian context. The resulting list of CSOs is as follows:

**TABLE II.3.1: Types of CSOs included in the study**

1 Business or trade associations	6 Political Parties	11 NGOs
2 Professional Associations	7 Cultural Associations	12 Community Associations
3 Unions	8 Education Groups	13 Environmental Groups
4 Neighbourhood Associations	9 Sports Clubs	14 Civic Groups
5 Religious or Spiritualist Groups	10 Women's Organisations	15 Youth Associations

Source: CSI – Bolivia, 2005

### III ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY


In this section the main findings of the project are presented. The analysis is structured along the individual indicators, subdimensions and dimensions. The scope of the issues to be addressed as part of the project was so broad that there was a need to examine certain indicators less intensively than others.

This section is divided along the four dimensions: **Structure**, **Environment**, **Values** and **Impact**, which make up the CSI Diamond. At the beginning of each part, a graph provides the scores for the subdimensions on a scale from 0 to 3. Findings for each subdimension are then examined in detail. A separate box also provides the scores for the individual indicators for each subdimension.<sup>15</sup>

#### 1. STRUCTURE

This section describes and analyses the breadth, depth and diversity of citizen participation as well as the level of organisation, resources and civil society inter – relations. The score for this Dimension is 1.8, indicating that the structure of civil society in Bolivia is moderately strong. The graph below presents the scores for the six subdimensions that belong to this dimension: Breadth of citizen participation; depth of citizen participation; diversity of civil society participants; level of organization; inter-relations and resources.

**FIGURE III.1.1: Subdimensions scores for the structure dimension**



#### 1.1 The Breadth of Citizen Participation

The score for this subdimension is 2.2 showing that citizen participation in Bolivian civil society is significant with a tendency to increase in times of social conflict. Table III.1.1 summarizes the respective indicator scores:


<sup>15</sup> For a more detailed description of indicator, subdimension and dimension scores refer to Annex 7.

**TABLE III.1.1: Indicators assessing the breadth of citizen participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	3
1.1.2	Charitable giving	2
1.1.3	CSO membership	3
1.1.4	Volunteering	1
1.1.5	Community action	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005


**1.1.1 Non-partisan political action.** The results of the CSI community survey shows that 76.3% of those interviewed had undertaken at least one of the following political actions: written or verbal requests to authorities; participated in demonstrations, protest marches or assemblies or sent written letters to a newspaper. The percentage breakdown is seen in figure III.1.2. These results are also supported by the media review carried out during the May to June 2005 protests, which showed that 30% of the articles were about citizen participation in demonstrations. Although

**FIGURE III.1.2: Frequency of non-partisan political action (%)**

Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005

citizen participation in non-partisan political action is moderately widespread, there are differences between regions. Of those living in the western region (La Paz, Oruro and Potosí), 89% undertook one or more of these forms of political actions, as opposed to 67.3% of those in the east (Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando) and 77.3% of those from Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija. Additionally, 83.9% of those living in rural areas have resorted to non-partisan political actions and 75.1% in the urban areas.

**1.1.2 Charitable giving.** The data obtained from the community survey revealed that 72.1% of the population have given a donation to charity in the previous month, in one of the following ways: alms, donations in kind and/or contributions to the church. Figure III.1.3 shows that alms-giving is the most common way of giving to charity, followed by tithing and then donations in kind. Considering that tithing may not necessarily be a charitable donation it is observed that 64.7% of the respondents donated through alms - giving or in kind. Although the percentages decrease slightly, it can still be seen that a significant segment of Bolivia's population gives to charity. This percentage is similar to that found in the *Así Piensan los*


**FIGURE III.1.3: Charitable giving**

Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005

*Bolivianos 2002* study, where 56.1% of people said that they had given money or goods to charities in that year.

**1.1.3 CSO membership.** The survey results show that 70.2% of respondents belong to at least one CSO, of which religious organisations are the most popular (figure III.1.4). Participation levels in rural areas are higher than in urban areas, for some types of CSOs and where participation is mainly concentrated in neighbourhood groups, women's organisations and, to a greater extent, community associations (table III.1.2).

**FIGURE III.1.4: Membership in CSO types**



Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005

**TABLE III.1.2: Membership in CSO types according to place of residence**


Type of CSO	Urban (%)	Rural (%)
Business or trade associations	55.6	44.4
Professional Associations	63.3	36.7
Unions	58.3	41.7
Neighbourhood Associations	46.3	53.7
Religious or Spiritualist Groups	52.2	47.8
Political Parties	44.8	55.2
Cultural Associations	42.3	57.7
Education Groups	55.4	44.6
Sports Clubs	48.7	51.3
Women's Organisations	42.2	57.8
NGOs	85.7	14.3
Community Associations	32.0	68.0
Environmental Groups	81.8	18.2
Civic Groups	60.0	40.0
Youth Associations	65.4	34.6

Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.

**1.1.4 Volunteering.** The community survey reveals that 48.4% of respondents have done volunteer work for their neighbourhood or community at some time in their life. Of these, 83.4% did volunteer once in the past 12 months, which represents 40.3% of the total sample. It can also be seen that the percentage of people who had worked as volunteers for at least four hours per month rose to 12.5% of the total respondents. The same sample shows that participation in a CSO is usually voluntary. Less than 2% of those belonging to a CSO earn a salary and 100% of those who participate in neighbourhood associations and around 99.8% of those belonging to youth, community or ethnic associations and religious groups do so voluntarily – without receiving any payment for their participation.

**1.1.5 Community action.** 34% of community survey respondents asserted to have taken part in community action in their neighbourhoods, 18% answered negatively and 47% did not remember such an action taking place.<sup>16</sup> This high percentage alludes to the fact that most community action is based on necessity and is therefore not voluntary as the survey question suggests. When analyzing the responses of those that did remember such an action, 64% responded positively, with 74% taking part in rural areas and 55% taking part in urban areas. Similarly, the *UNDP Human Development Report 2002* establishes that 42% report having worked or sought to resolve a problem in their community and that of this 42%, 94% are from the rural areas. Thus, community action is mainly evident in the rural and peri-urban zones where communal or neighbourhood needs demand collective solutions. This finding was confirmed by participants at the National Workshop who stated, “Urban participation is mainly seen in poor neighbourhoods, more than in the south zone of La Paz (residential neighbourhood). The poorest people tend to join together to look to improve their living conditions” (National Workshop, 09.11.2005). Figure III.1.5 also shows that of those who responded that voluntary community work is carried out in their neighbourhood or community, participation both in the rural and urban areas is higher than 50%. This figure tends to rise, if non - voluntary community action is taken into account.

**FIGURE III.1.5: Community action in urban and rural zones**



Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.

## 1.2 Depth of Citizen Participation in Civil Society

The depth of citizen participation in Bolivian civil society is reflected in the score of 1.7, as a result of the average calculated from each of the indicators in this subdimension (table III.1.3).

**TABLE III.1.3: Indicators assessing depth of citizen participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Charitable giving	2
1.2.2	Volunteering	1
1.2.3	CSO membership	2

Source: Civil society Index – Bolivia, 2005

**1.2.1 Charitable giving.** The community survey shows that the average amount donated to charity is Bs. 35.66 (US\$ 4.5) per month. The annual GDP per capita in Bolivia of US\$ 2,304 (UNDP, 2004) translates into an average monthly income of \$US 192. The average percentage of income donated is therefore 2.3%. Taking into account the responses made by those interviewed in the framework of the CSI in Bolivia, it can be observed that the estimation of the percentage donated is not very different from the former one: since the average monthly income of CSI respondents is Bs. 1.390,68 (US\$ 171), the percentage donated would be 2.5%. To further the analysis, it was considered important to separate the percentage donated by income, which then revealed that over 60% of those interviewed had donated less than Bs.50 in the previous month and very few had donated over Bs. 100:


<sup>16</sup> 1% did not answer

**TABLE III.1.4: Family income and amount given to charity (Bs. /month)**

Amount donated to charity in the previous month	Monthly family income (%)					
	Less than 250 Bs.	251 - 500 Bs.	501 - 1000 Bs.	1001 - 2000 Bs.	Over 2000 Bs.	N/A
Less than 50 Bs.	93,8	83,7	78,8	71,0	63,8	75,0
51 - 100 Bs.	3,1	2,9	5,9	6,0	8,5	4,7
Over 100 Bs.	0,0	1,9	0,8	13,0	14,9	4,7
N/A	3,1	11,5	14,4	10,0	12,8	15,6

Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.

**1.2.2 Volunteering.** The community survey reveals that the average number of hours dedicated to voluntary work in the previous month among volunteers was 5.3 hours. If all of those participating in the survey are taken into account (642 people), the average time spent volunteering drops to 2.5 hours per month. However, a breakdown of these figures reveals that a minority of respondents who volunteered for more than eight hours causes the average time to rise despite the fact that a small majority of respondents dedicated less than two hours (figure III.1.6).

**FIGURE III.1.6: Hours dedicated to voluntary work in the previous month**

Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.

**1.2.3 CSO membership.** Among the 70% of respondents, who are a member of a CSO, 64.0% belong to two or more CSOs; 27.6% belong to three or more CSOs; 17.1% belong to four or more and 9.6% belong to five or more.

### 1.3 Diversity of Civil Society Participants

The score obtained for this subdimension is 1.7. The table below shows the scores obtained per indicator:

**TABLE III.1.5: Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	2
1.3.2	CSO Leadership	1
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

**1.3.1 Representation of social groups among CSO members.** The secondary data review carried out for this study demonstrated that the Bolivian CSOs reflect the diversity of the social groups found in the country rather well. Furthermore, the media review identified approximately 731 CSOs, and observed that they represent the different social groups around the country: the Association of Transformers of Illegal Cars, Passengers Held Up at the Bus Station, Federation of the Bolivian Unemployed, Federation of the Blind, Afro – Bolivian Movement, Landless Movement, Homeless Movement, Guarayo Women’s Federation, and the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transsexual Movement, among others. Likewise, the data from the community survey show that internally CSOs tend to be very homogeneous and that they fail to represent the national ethnic and regional diversity. This situation has led to the existence of a great diversity of organisations representing the different social groups in the country as observed in (table III.1.6). As shown in the table, traditionally excluded groups participate in various CSOs in spite of being underrepresented in some, such as: professional associations, environmental groups, civic groups and, to a certain degree, sports organisations.

When the overall average of participation in these groups in CSOs is calculated, it can be seen that approximately 35% of women, ethnic groups other than white or mestizo and people with monthly incomes below Bs. 500 belong to CSOs. Therefore, even though there are social groups which are underrepresented in many CSOs, they have found places to come together in their own CSOs.

**1.3.2 CSO Leadership.** The data obtained for this indicator correlates with the previous one where it can be seen that some social groups represent themselves in their own CSOs. However, it is more evident that there are groups that are underrepresented in positions of leadership within the CSOs, which is reflected in the

**TABLE III.1.6: Participation of social groups per type of CSO (%)**

CSO Type	Women	Ethnic group not white or mestizo	Income less than 500 Bs.
Business or trade associations	60.0	32.3	34.3
Professional Associations	43.3	35.5	6.9
Unions	39.3	32.2	31.8
Neighbourhood associations	51.7	50.3	48.3
Religious or spiritual groups	54.5	42.6	39.3
Political parties	28.6	36.8	38.0
Cultural associations	30.8	40.4	26.5
Education groups	57.7	40.0	32.0
Sports associations	28.3	34.5	34.2
Women's organisations	96.9	40.6	41.3
NGOs	40.0	50.0	38.5
Community associations	20.8	56.0	37.5
Environmental groups	8.3	0.0	25.0
Civic groups	0.0	15.0	20.0
Youth groups	37.3	32.0	31.4

Source: CSI - Community survey – Bolivia, 2005

**TABLE III.1.7: Perceptions of leadership roles within CSOs by social groups (%)**

	Women	Peasants	Indigenous Peoples	Sexual Minorities	Poor	Elite
None	8.2	6.6	9.8	47.1	27.3	10.7
Low	44.3	32.8	41.8	32.2	40.5	15.7
Middling	40.2	44.3	32.0	3.3	19.0	19.8
High	6.6	13.9	14.8	5.8	11.6	52.9

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005

perceptions of the stakeholders consulted: 19.7% thinks that the women, indigenous peoples, peasants, sexual minorities and the poor are not represented at all in CSO leadership positions, 38.3% thinks that the level of representation is low, 27.8% thinks that the participation of these groups was moderate and 10.5% thinks it is high. According to 38.3% of the stakeholders, women, indigenous peoples, peasants, sexual minorities and the poor do not participate enough as leaders of CSOs. The Table below shows the results by groups:

According to National Workshop participants, the difficulty some social groups have in accessing information and training is one of the main causes of this situation. Although the score for this indicator may seem low, members of the NAG agree that participation in leadership roles of marginalised groups is improving as the representative of the *Federación Departamental de Mujeres Campesinas de Tarija “Bartolina Sisa”* stated.

**TABLE III.1.8: Participation of people who live in rural disperse areas in CSOs (%)**

Business or trade associations	25.0
Professional Associations	36.7
Unions	40.5
Neighbourhood Associations	48.3
Religious or Spiritual Groups	41.4
Political Parties	48.3
Cultural Associations	50.0
Education Associations	37.7
Sports Clubs	43.4
Women's Organizations	54.7
NGOs	14.3
Community Associations	68.0
Environmental Groups	18.2
Civic Groups	40.0
Youth Groups	25.0

Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.

*1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs around the country.* The data obtained from secondary sources and unpublished information show that the headquarters of CSOs are mainly located in large cities. However, there are CSOs everywhere throughout the country. For example, the CSUTCB has 200 branch offices sub divided in farming unions throughout the country including the rural disperse zones. Likewise, the *Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia* is composed of main and branch offices spread throughout rural areas in the Bolivian east. The *Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Marcas del Qullasuyu* is made up of over 150 ayllus (or communities) in the west of the country and the *Confederación Nacional de Juntas Vecinales* is aggregated into 7,200 neighbourhood associations throughout the country. This information is backed up by the community survey, where it is seen that people who live in rural disperse areas belong to different types of CSOs (table III.1.7). Even though there seems to be quite an array of CSOs in rural disperse zones, according to the perception of the majority of the stakeholders consulted, most of the CSOs are concentrated in department capitals or urban areas. This perception may arise because in general, CSOs umbrella bodies are more visible.

## 1.4 Level of Organisation

The score given to this subdimension is 2 as result of the average obtained from each indicator value:

**TABLE III.1.9: Indicators assessing the level of organisation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	2
1.4.2	Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	2
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	2
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	2
1.4.5	International linkages	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies.* The CSOs Diagnosis carried out in 2001 by *Variables & Tendencias (V&T)*, a national sample of 241 representatives of CSOs, shows that 59% of the CSOs in Bolivia belong to national umbrella organisations and 75% belong to departmental organisations. Likewise, a small majority of stakeholders consulted thought that over 40% of CSOs belong to an umbrella organization. These results show that the majority of CSOs are represented both at the national and departmental levels, mainly the following: neighbourhood organisations, unions, business or trade associations, indigenous and ethnic organisations and some professional organisations.

*1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies.* According to the same V&T study, 37% of the leaders surveyed were of the opinion that the umbrella CSOs are moderate in achieving their goals, 24% rated the advances as relative and 17% as limited.<sup>17</sup> Comparing these results with the perceptions voiced by the stakeholders interviewed, it can be seen that the umbrella bodies are moderately effective. According to the stakeholders, the reasons may be economic factors and internal organisational problems, although they may also be related to the fact that the effectiveness of umbrella bodies is

**TABLE III.1.10: Perceived quantity of institutions that support CSOs (%)**

CSO support bodies	%
Many	7.0
Some	30.0
Very few	45.0
None	16.0

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

<sup>17</sup> The scale is composed of 5 categories: great advance, moderate advance, relative advance, limited advance and no advance.



mainly aimed at political goals rather than resolving immediate needs of the population.

*1.4.3 Self-regulation within civil society.* 90.8% of stakeholders say that the CSOs to which they belong have a code of conduct and of those, 54% says that it is respected. Similarly, 30% of the respondents think that the self-regulatory efforts of CSOs has limited impact; 33% mention that these efforts had some impact and 24% believe that these mechanisms had a high level of impact within the CSOs. In the case of many Bolivian CSOs, codes of conduct result from tacit agreements among members, which are neither written nor registered, but verbally legitimised by both leaders and members. Sometimes norms are not clearly defined nor unanimously follow. This situation shows that in general, the codes of conduct applied do not have substantial impact on CSO self-regulation.

*1.4.4 Support infrastructure.* In Bolivia, over the last few years there has been an increase in different bodies, generally private, supporting CSOs, such as: international organisations, foundations and NGOs. There are few state institutions that support CSOs. These findings are backed up by the majority of the stakeholders, as can be seen in Table III.1.10. On the other hand, according to the members of the NAG the support of many of these

bodies does not necessarily generate self-sufficiency but rather provokes dependence of the CSOs on them: “there are many bodies supporting the CSOs but how many promote their strengthening and to what degree are these efforts effective?” one of the members of the NAG asked. The NAG concluded that there are few institutions that succeed in supporting the strengthening and self-sustainability of CSOs.

*1.4.5 International linkages.* The data obtained from CSI – Bolivia show that some CSOs have links and participate in international events, mainly umbrella organisations. Some members of the NAG affirmed that many of the existing linkages are with neighbouring countries, for example the “Amazon network” or the “network of Guarani peoples in Paraguay, Bolivia and the north of Argentina”. The responses of the stakeholders consulted reflect these affirmations (figure III.1.7). These results show that some CSOs have international linkages and that they are sponsored by organisations with offices at the national or departmental levels. The more local and smaller CSOs are, the fewer the chances to make international linkages.

## 1.5 Inter-Relations within Civil Society


The score for this subdimension is 1.5 based on the average scores of the indicators as seen in the Table below:

**TABLE III.1.11: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	1
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

**FIGURE III.1.7: Perceptions of the proportion of CSOs with international linkages (%)**



Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

*1.5.1 Communication between CSOs.* In terms of means of communication most frequently used by members of the CSOs, V&T Civil Society Organisations Diagnosis (2001) shows that

**TABLE III.1.12: Level of communication and exchange of information among CSOs (%)**

Level of communication and exchange	%
Significant	11.0
Moderate	41.0
Limited	38.0
Non-existent / Insignificant	8.0

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

53% of the organisations prefer to use the telephone and 27% prefers meetings. Additionally, the same source asserts that 90% of the organisations surveyed are in permanent contact with other CSOs. On the other hand, for the majority of stakeholders consulted by the CSI, the communication and exchange among CSOs is significant or moderate (table III.1.12). The difference in results may be due to the fact that the CSI Stakeholder Consultations sought to find out how extensive and systematic was the communication and exchange of information among CSOs. The results show that it tends to be less than the sporadic contact among organisations. At the National Workshop, for example, it was highlighted that the CSOs have the need to expand their levels of communication and the fact that in many cases the power disputes among leaders adversely affects the exchange and dialogue among CSOs. The NAG stated that extended and systematic communication tends to take place among CSOs with similar goals, whereas opposing sectors do not communicate among themselves.

**TABLE III.1.13: Perceptions of the existence of intersectoral coalitions or alliances among CSOs (%)**

Intersectoral coalitions or alliances	%
Numerous	25.0
Some	36.0
Very few	29.0
None	6.0

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

Given the above, if there is a moderate level of communication and exchange of information among CSOs, the disputes among sectors and leaders are obstacles to relations between CSOs being extended and systematic.

*1.5.2 Cooperation between CSOs.* The stakeholders consulted share the opinion that there is cooperation among CSOs and that this type of relations tend to arise at times of conflict. Among the most frequently mentioned examples were: the unity pact made by indigenous organisations and labour unions around the topic of gas nationalisation and the coalition of neighbourhood associations in El Alto set up around the water conflict. The results of the media review, for example, register that 5.3% of articles show examples of alliances among CSOs, mainly to do with the nationalisation of gas and call for the Constituent Assembly. Despite the existence of sectors that work together, civil society has a fragmented character. Table III.1.13 shows that a majority of stakeholders believe that there are some inter-sectoral alliances or coalitions among CSOs, but almost 30% think that there are very few. This information backs up what was seen in the previous indicator where in many cases the inter-sectoral and leadership disputes mentioned above also lead to the fragmentation of civil society.

## 1.6 Civil Society Resources


This subdimension received an average score of 1.7 as a result of the scores from the indicators:

**TABLE III.1.14: Indicators assessing civil society resources**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	1
1.6.2	Human resources	2
1.6.3	Infrastructural resources	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*1.6.1 Financial resources.* Most of the stakeholders consulted felt that the financial resources of CSOs are not enough for them to achieve their goals (figure III.1.8). According to these respondents, the majority of CSOs are financed thanks to donations or fees paid by the members, some are financed by international donors and very few by the government and private corporations, as shown

**FIGURE III.1.8: Civil society resources (%)**

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

**TABLE III.1.15: CSO funding sources (%)**

CSO income sources	Answers (%) <sup>a</sup>
Membership fees	52.9%
International donors	34.0%
Local Donations	26.0%
Sales	24.0%
Government	12.5%
Private corporations	6.7%

<sup>a</sup> The sum does not equal 100% since many CSOs have more than one funding source

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

in table III.1.15. In that sense, CSOs seem to have inadequate financial resources. Some of the NAG members stated additionally, that these resources are not enough to satisfy the financial needs of the organisations: “although the members make an effort to make personal contributions, this does

not always cover the needs of the organisations” (NAG, 12.11.2005).

*1.6.2 Human resources.* Figure III.1.8 shows that for the majority of the stakeholders the CSO human resources are generally enough; however, the V&T study demonstrates that 28% of the respondents mention that their organisation’s main requirement is training for their staff. Members of the NAG reflecting on the findings argued that although these resources may be sufficient, in many cases the staff do not have the tools and skills needed to handle the challenges faced by the CSOs and so there is a need for better training.

*1.6.3 Infrastructural resources.* For almost 40% of stakeholders CSO’s infrastructure is just about enough to satisfy their needs and for 34% the infrastructure resources are sufficient (figure III.1.8). The V&T study also shows that 30% of the respondents state that there is a need for infrastructure, mainly physical spaces. Although this is the situation, members of the NAG pointed out that in general the CSOs both in the urban and rural areas have at least one room where they can meet, debate and make decisions.

## Conclusion

The structure of Bolivian civil society is relatively strong. This dimension is the second strongest, of the four dimensions of the Civil Society Diamond. This can mainly be attributed to the widespread affiliation of citizens with CSOs, with citizens participating not only in individual and collective activities, but also in different forms of non-partisan political action.

A variety of CSOs exist in Bolivia, representing different groups throughout the country. There are also highly organised national and departmental umbrella organisations that gather together more local and sub regional associations. These umbrella bodies have proved to be fairly effective, especially in the political arena and seem to be the inter-institutional linkage between more locally based organisations and national and international organisations.


Even though the data shows a small minority of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis, a majority, especially from the countryside and from poor neighbourhoods, seem to participate in collective efforts geared at addressing community or neighbourhood problems. Thus, the results from the community action indicator reveal that people come together to address collective needs and therefore the concept of philanthropy is less relevant. Charity and volunteering are secondary priorities for the majority of Bolivians, as they focus on collective actions for survival. For instance, 74% of rural Bolivian community survey respondents took part in some form of collective community action.

In spite of these positive traits, the structure of Bolivian civil society has shown some weaknesses, especially within CSOs' internal structures. First, women and the poor are particularly excluded from leadership roles within CSOs. Low levels of education and training within Bolivian society at large appear to be an underlying factor contributing to the lack of diversity within civil society. Many people believe that CSOs' human resources are not sufficiently prepared to face the challenges that arise or comply with self-regulating mechanisms. In many cases, codes of conduct are informally established and orally transmitted, which leads to misinterpretations among CSO members. Second, while most CSOs have some type of infrastructural resources, their lack of financial resources prevents them from satisfying their organisational needs. Finally, Bolivian civil society appears to have a fragmented character. For example, it has been observed that communication between CSOs appears to be limited and unsystematic, mainly due to power disputes among CSO leaders. Such situations result in different CSO alliances, resulting from efforts to come together and coordinate actions, especially in moments of great social conflict. However, these efforts tend to be sporadic and short term.

Thus, poor internal structures, and conditions of limited financial and human resources tend to weaken civil society's highly organised and politically engaged nature. Additionally, the great diversity of CSOs seems to become a problem when CSO leaders fail to build strong alliances among each other. Finally, even though private bodies that support CSOs, such as international NGOs and foundations exist, their actions have not yet guaranteed the strengthening of CSOs, especially with regard to the afore-mentioned weaknesses.

## **2. ENVIRONMENT**

This section describes and analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which Bolivian civil society exists and functions. It also investigates the relationship between civil society and the state and private companies. The score for the Environment Dimension is relatively low at 1.4. Figure III.2.1 presents the results obtained for each of its subdimension:

**FIGURE III.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension**

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

## 2.1 Political Context

The political context scored 1, according to the scores obtained for each indicator as shown below:

**TABLE III.2.1: Indicators assessing political context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.1.1</u>	Political rights	2
<u>2.1.2</u>	Political competition	2
<u>2.1.3</u>	Rule of law	1
<u>2.1.4</u>	Corruption	0
<u>2.1.5</u>	State effectiveness	1
<u>2.1.6</u>	Decentralisation	0

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

**2.1.1 Political rights.** According to the scores, Bolivian citizens enjoy fundamental political rights and significant opportunities to participate politically because of a multiparty democracy open to citizen and indigenous participation. It should be highlighted that since 1994, the Constitution has allowed for the election of constituency members of parliament, representing neighbourhoods. Additionally, the Constitutional Reform in 2004 set up participative forms of democracy such as the Referendum, the Citizen Legislative Initiative and the Constituent Assembly. Popular representation has also been expanded to include Citizens Coalitions and Indigenous Peoples, where a total of 2,869 candidates running for Councillors (incumbent and new) participated in the municipal elections in 2004, and 10,508 from political parties. Another important advance was the Quotas Law passed in 1997, where 30% of political candidates must be female. Indigenous participation is not restricted, which can be seen in the Chamber of Deputies where since 2002 approximately 25% of the Deputies are indigenous. The main limitations to political rights in Bolivia are the difficulties related to registering births, the issuing of identity cards and inclusion on the electoral role, which restricts people's right to vote. According to the 2001 Census, between 7 and 9.58% of the

population is not officially registered and/or lacks an identification document. Another negative factor is the military and police repression used to contain social protests, which was considered in the ranking carried out by Freedom House, considering Bolivia “partly free” from 2003 through 2004. This was the only year during which Bolivia was not rated as “free” (Freedom House, 2004).<sup>18</sup>

*2.1.2 Political competition.* In Bolivia the national political system is one of multiple parties thanks to Law No. 1983 of Political Parties passed on 25 June 1999 and the Citizens Coalitions and Indigenous Peoples Law passed in July 2004. There are currently 15 political parties registered with the Electoral Court and approximately 344 Citizen Coalitions that took part in the 2004 municipal elections (CNE, 2005). Although there is a multiparty system, the political parties in Bolivia are still linked to a persistent attitude of paternalism, which hinders the modernisation and institutionalism of the democratic system and of governance. According to Barreda and Costafreda, another important characteristic of the Bolivian political parties is their lack of a clear ideology and a plan of action, which tends to be covered up by large-scale *caudillismo* in the leadership, generally vertical and personal, a situation that undermined the role of mediators between the state and society (Barreda and Costafreda, 2004).

*2.1.3 Rule of law.* Bolivia has made significant efforts to institutionalise the public apparatus and to guarantee the rule of law by signing international agreements, for example. Nevertheless, there is still little public confidence in the law and it is recognised as respected neither by citizens nor the state (Seligson, 2004). The violation of rights is seen in the delays in the justice processes, the withholding of justice, the not observing of procedural norms, and judgement being carried out by incompetent courts. In its 2003 annual report, the Ombudsman’s Office stated that 43.4% of the complaints received by this office had something to do with the violation of political rights of labour organisations, women groups, neighbourhood associations and indigenous communities.

*2.1.4 Corruption.* There is a high level of corruption in Bolivia. Studies carried out and presented in October 2004 by Transparency International rank the country as the 122nd most corrupt country out of 146 countries surveyed, with a score of 2.2 out of 10 on the Corruption Perceptions Index.<sup>19</sup> According to data from the *Latinobarómetro* (2004), 45% of the population said that it was possible to bribe the police, 34% a judge and 32% a member of staff from a ministry.

*2.1.5 State effectiveness.* The bureaucratic capacity in Bolivia is extremely limited. According to the state Effectiveness Index (World Bank, 2003), Bolivia scored -0.53 in 2002.<sup>20</sup> In the global ranking for governmental capacity to formulate and implement effective policies, Bolivia holds position 83 of 196 in 2000/1 (Prats, 2004.) One of the greatest problems is that it is impossible for state policy to reach the most isolated communities (BTI, 2003), since its heavy centralist apparatus is still inefficient. Additionally, the fact that policies and the justice system are discredited affects state effectiveness, although an important step forward has been taken towards institutional changes such as the creation of the Judiciary Council and the Constitutional Court. These changes attempt to make the Administration of the Judiciary Power more effective. Another factor affecting state effectiveness, however, is the lack of

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<sup>18</sup> Since 2003, the highest rating needed to rank a country as “Partly free” was 5.0. The aspects taken into consideration to rank political rights are: (a) Electoral process; (b) Political pluralism and participation; (c) Functioning of government. For civil liberties the following are taken into consideration: (a) Freedom of expression and belief; (b) Associational and organisational rights; (c) Rule of law; (d) Individual rights (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls>).

<sup>19</sup> This index defines corruption as an abuse of public position for private benefit.

<sup>20</sup> This index describes the capacity of governments to effectively provide public services and make policies. The index values vary from -2.5 to 2.5, where the higher the value, the more efficient the government.

continuity in public administration, which is subjected to constant changes in government staff and authorities.

*2.1.6 Decentralisation.* According to the World Bank, the proportion of public spending in 2001 made by prefectures and municipalities reached 12% and 13% of governmental expenditure respectively. Data from the National General Budget for 2005 show that public spending at the regional, prefectural and municipal levels reaches 18%.

## 2.2 Basic Rights and Freedoms

This subdimension scored 2, as a result of taking the average from the scores for each indicator.

**TABLE III.2.2: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	2
2.2.2	Information rights	2
2.2.3	Press freedom	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*2.2.1 Civil liberties.* Freedom House reports that civil liberties in Bolivia are respected less than political rights. Civil liberties were ranked as 3 (out of 7), with 1 being the lowest score. According to this source, the score obtained is the result of a weak judiciary system due to high levels of state corruption and inefficiency, together with harsh and inadequate prison conditions. It is necessary to point out here the violation of the rights of girls, who are victims of sexual abuse and are caught up in a highly inefficient public system to punish rapists (Calla et. al, 2005). This situation corroborates that legal impunity is one of the greatest problems that limits the appropriate exercise of civil liberties.

*2.2.2 Information rights.* It can be seen that the right to information is present in the national juridical regulations. On 31 January 2004, a Supreme Decree was passed that guarantees all citizens the possibility to access governmental information (Birbuet, 2004). Nevertheless, according to the NAG, in practice it is still difficult to access some information, mainly because some institutions lack systematised data or do not have proper systems of information sharing.

*2.2.3 Press freedom.* Freedom of the press in Bolivia is widespread and unrestricted except for in times of extreme conflict such as in October 2003 when even then it was only slightly restricted. According to a study on Press Freedom 2003, carried out by Freedom House, between 1999 and 2002 Bolivia was rated as "Free," and in 2003 was "Partly Free", probably because of the restrictions and threats many journalists faced under the Sánchez de Lozada regime during the social conflicts of October that same year.<sup>21</sup>

## 2.3 Socio-Economic Context

The score obtained from the socio-economic context is 1, with poverty and unequal distribution of resources being the most important characteristics.

**TABLE III.2.3: Indicator assessing the socio-economic context**

Ref. #	Indicator	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	1

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

<sup>21</sup> The study examines the degree of press freedom taking into account three factors: legal environment, political environment and economic environment. The ranking scale is as follows: between 0 and 30, the press is rated as "Free;" scores between 31 and 60 as "Partly Free;" and 61 to 100 as "Not Free".

### 2.3.1 Socio-economic context. Eight variables were examined:

- 1) *Poverty* – According to the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS, 2002), the national poverty rate is 58.6%, affecting rural populations more (90.8%) than urban populations (39.0%). According to the latest Human Development Index (2005), the conditions of poverty in Bolivia are so extreme that even as the per capita gross domestic product grew by 0.3%, the number of poor increased by 174,419 per year (UNDP, 2005).
- 2) *Civil war* – There have been no conflicts or civil wars in the last five years in Bolivia.
- 3) *Ethnic conflicts* – There have been no ethnic conflicts in the last five years in Bolivia; however, some attitudes and behaviours are still marked by ethnic prejudices.
- 4) *Economic crisis* – Between 1998 and 2003 the economy grew by an average of 1.9% per year. The GDP per person in 2004 was \$US 903. As a percentage of the GDP, the external debt is 73.4% and the internal debt 21.7%.<sup>22</sup> One of the factors that led to the macroeconomic crisis was the social security system reform whose fiscal cost was 5% of the GDP. Another problem was the non-financial public sector deficit, which in 2002 rose to 8.9% of the GDP, which later fell but at the expense of new taxing systems applied to the middle-class. In 2003 the main factor was due to recurring expenditure (14.4%) whereas public investment was only 2.3%. In that year 65% of the deficit was financed with external credits and the remaining 35% with internal loans.
- 5) *Severe social crisis* – The most relevant information here is related to food insecurity in Bolivia. 48% of Bolivian municipalities are exposed to high vulnerable conditions, 25% to medium vulnerability and the remaining 27% to low vulnerability (WFP, 2001). Another indicator of social crisis is limited access to potable water services, especially in cities with high rates of demographic growth. Furthermore, there is a necessity for irrigation systems in their peri-urban zones. On the other hand, Bolivia has been subject to important social demonstrations, which began with the “Water War” in the city of Cochabamba in 2000. This conflict originated due to increase price for drinking water and ended with the breaking of the contract with a multinational company. That same year, a lengthy blocking of main roads took place, with the cities of La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro being isolated from the rest of the country. Later, in 2003, there was a high-risk confrontation between groups from the army and the police, which left a gap in public security systems. Also in October 2003, the “Gas War” led to the resignation of the then President of the Republic, Sanchez de Lozada. Finally in May and June of 2005, another wave of protests led to the downfall of President Carlos Mesa, the constitutional successor to Sanchez de Lozada. During these past five years there have been smaller road blockades, mainly organised by coca growers in the Chapare region (Cochabamba) and los Yungas (La Paz), as well as other conflicts that mainly take place in the city of La Paz, the seat of the government.
- 6) *Socio-economic inequities* – The national Gini index score is 0.61, with the urban index being 0.54 and the rural index 0.64 (UDAPE, 2005.) According to CEPAL (2004), 40% of the poorest of the population only brings in 9.5% of the total income whereas the richest 10% enjoy 41.0% of the total income. According to the 2005 Human Development Index, the poorest 10% of the population has access to only 1.3% of the total income whereas the richest 10% takes 32%. This means that the richest 10% has an income 25 times higher than the poorest 10% (UNDP, 2005).
- 7) *Adult illiteracy rates* – According to the 2004 Human Development Index, the adult illiteracy rate (15 years old and above) is 14%.

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<sup>22</sup> [www.bcb.gov.bo](http://www.bcb.gov.bo)



8) *Lack of IT infrastructure* – the same source states that 30% of respondents uses computers “sometimes” or “daily” and that e-mail is used by 10% of the population. According to International Communication in 2003 there were a total of 7,080 servers in Bolivia, which implies 8.42 per 10,000 inhabitants. There was a total of 190,000 PCs, or 2.28 per ten inhabitants (International Telecommunication Union, 2003).

## 2.4 Socio-Cultural Context

The score given to this subdimension is 2, taken from the average of each of the indicators and as shown below:

**TABLE III.2.4: Indicators assessing socio-cultural context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.4.1	Trust	2
2.4.2	Tolerance and pluralism	2
2.4.3	Public spiritedness	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*2.4.1 Trust.* In Bolivia there is a moderate level of trust among people, especially in the rural areas where 66% of those surveyed by the 2001 HDI said that they had friendly relations with their neighbours, which dropped to 38% in the urban area. According to the National Electoral Court (CNE) in 2004, 67% of the population said it trusted its neighbours. On the other hand, the social crisis affecting Bolivia when the CSI community survey was being implemented seems to have affected the population’s levels of trust as only 56.1% of the respondents said that neighbours trusted each other.

*2.4.2 Tolerance and pluralism.* Bolivia is characterised by having a moderate level of tolerance. The Tolerance Index obtained through the community survey is 1.72 where 0 represents intolerance. This ratio is derived from the following data: high tolerance for people of other religious beliefs (84.2%), other race (78.6%) and from other countries (75.5%). The scores drop when referring to tolerance of people living with HIV/AIDS (43.9%) and sexual minorities (36%). According to the CNE, 2004 the percentages for religious tolerance (64.6%) and racial tolerance (63.1%) are higher than those for political tolerance (56.2%). And that tolerance of people living with HIV/AIDS (28.4%) and sexual minorities (23.9%) is much lower. These results demonstrate the conservative nature of Bolivians, especially when referring to individual rights.

*2.4.3 Public spiritedness.* According to the World Bank, in Bolivia there is a weak culture of legality which is expressed in different ways, for example, not caring much about abiding by the law (World Bank, 2000) or not willing to abide by a decision made by an authority when the decision goes against personal interest (only 6% reported being willing, according to the CNE, 2001). On the other hand, the community survey established that the Public Honesty and Dignity Index is 2.5 in a 0 to 3 scale, where 0 means a lack of public spiritedness.<sup>23</sup> This score reflects that 42% of those interviewed emphasised people’s obligations to pay taxes and 75% said that people should not bribe the police.

## 2.5 Legal Environment

Based on the data obtained from each of the indicators in this subdimension, a score of 0.8 was obtained with this being the lowest scoring subdimension in the Environment indicator.

<sup>23</sup> The Public Honesty and Dignity Index is the average of the replies obtained from the following question: To what point do you accept people: a) not paying taxes; b) asking the State for money that does not correspond to them, and c) bribing the police to get paperwork done faster? The Index was calculated using data from the community survey database.

**TABLE III.2.5: Indicators assessing legal environment**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	0
2.5.2	Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	2
2.5.3	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	1
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	0

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

### 2.5.1 CSO registration.


According to the CSI regional stakeholder survey, the process for legally registering a CSO is not quick, simple or consistently applied and it is expensive. Although the Law should make this paperwork easier, it still tends to be dependent on “who you know” to get it done (figure III.2.2). This situation proves that the country’s institutional systems are still plagued by favouritism. Many participants at the National Workshop

addressed the need to register the CSOs, in order to be “recognised” in society, even if the process has its limitations. They argued that only with institutional reforms, such processes would become easier.

**2.5.2 Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government.** Bolivian law does not restrict CSO lobbying and advocacy actions. The stakeholders consulted back up this fact in that for 54% there are no restrictions and for 23% the restrictions are acceptable. However, for 18% there are restrictions, which are unacceptable. Although there are no legal restrictions, there are restrictions in practice. For example, some sectors do not know about existing mechanisms for lobbying parliamentary administration such as the Public Audiences, Participative Encounters for Decision-Making, Direct Representation of Sectoral Interests and the Citizen Interest Forums. Although some of these mechanisms are not clearly regulated, they still do enable a certain amount of civil society lobbying state structures, such as the Quotas Law, the promotion of the Consumers Law, the Dialogue Law 2000, and others (PARC/SUNY-USAID and Coordinadora de la Mujer, 2005). However, the lack of information on these mechanisms tends to restrict civil society’s activities in this arena.

**2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs.** Only some CSOs are exempt from paying taxes, under the tax system in Bolivia. For example, Tax Law No. 843 and Tax Reform Law No. 1606 hold nonprofit organisations exempt; and some CSOs fall in the category of nonprofit organisations. These organisations do not pay taxes on earnings (Section III, Chapter II); as long as their statutes show that the organisations use their income and assets for charitable means. However, all of this is subject to submitting proof that the CSO engages in charitable activities, which is not the case of many CSOs, such as neighbourhood associations or labour unions. Furthermore, the bureaucracy of this paperwork, the cost and the lack of information available mean that many CSOs cannot enjoy these tax benefits, with the most affected being those CSOs that do not work for a charity and those that are not legally registered.

**2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy.** In Bolivia, individuals and companies may write off taxes for charitable donations. The only related tax regulation is found in Paragraph 18 of Supreme

**FIGURE III.2.2: CSO registration process**

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

Decree No. 24051 from 1995, which establishes that donations and/or the transfer of property must be submitted as “non deductible” to determine the taxable net income. These deductions must be supported by documents confirming the donation by the receiving institution.

## 2.6 State-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension score rose to an average of 1.7 of the three indicators that it comprises.

**TABLE III.2.6: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.6.1	Autonomy of CSOs	2
2.6.2	Dialogue between CSOs and the State	2
2.6.3	Cooperation / support	1

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*2.6.1 Autonomy of CSOs.* Although 40% of the stakeholders consulted say that the state often tries to control the activities of CSOs, the weakness of the state means that it is difficult to co-opt the CSOs. Among the examples mentioned are the actions used by the state to restore public order during protests or marches by tear-gassing protesters and by using the armed forces to break up blockades or street demonstrations. Some stakeholders also mentioned that in some cases the state seeks to control civil society by buying off leaders and placing spies within CSOs. Some members of the NAG backed this up by saying that, by “bribing” or “corrupting” CSOs leaders they can be controlled. On the other hand, 40% of the stakeholders who believe that the state never or rarely controls civil society’s lobbying actions criticise the extreme liberty CSOs have to protest against any situation. This criticism is backed up by some NAG members, who said: “CSOs have complete freedom to protest and make street blockades, and the state almost never has enough power to control them.”

*2.6.2 Dialogue between CSOs and the state.* Bolivia held three national dialogues to reach agreement on how to allocate the HIPC resources, and write the guidelines for the Strategic Development Agenda. These dialogues were aimed at crossing the national, departmental and municipal levels and covering political, economic and social issues, with the ultimate goal of bringing together all actors in the fight against poverty. The media review also showed the efforts the state made to set up a dialogue with a wide range of social sectors but on a largely ad hoc basis and so the result is not always effective which seems to justify the reasons why 54.5% of the stakeholders consulted believe the dialogue between civil society and the state to be limited. Nevertheless, there are some public institutions, such as the Ombudsman or the Vigilance Committees that work as consultative spaces for CSOs.

*2.6.3 Cooperation / support.* According to the CSI study, only some CSOs receive resources from the state. Among these are some NGOs or organisations that implement specific projects. Some political parties are supported financially by the Ministry of Indigenous Affairs and Native Peoples under the clauses of the Electoral and Political Party Law. Nevertheless, the funding for the majority of the CSOs mainly comes from members contributions or international cooperation funding which is backed up by the fact that only 12.5% of the stakeholders consulted affirmed that their CSO receives resources from the state.

In 2003, the *Confederación de Juntas Vecinales de Bolivia* presented a draft proposal for a “Neighbourhood Associations Law” that established that the state, amongst other aspects, use fiscal or municipal funds to subsidise the country’s neighbourhood associations. However, this draft project was not yet passed. The members of the NAG corroborate these results emphasising that not only do few CSOs receive resources from the state, but also that the amount received is not significant.

## 2.7 Private Sector-Civil Society Relations

This subdimension received a score of 1 by calculating the average of the indicators as shown below:

**TABLE III.2.7: Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.7.1	Private sector attitude to civil society	1
2.7.2	Corporate social and environmental responsibility	1
2.7.3	Corporate Philanthropy	1

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*2.7.1 Private sector attitude to civil society.* The majority of the stakeholders consulted consider that the private sector's attitude to civil society is one of indifference (Table III.2.8). On the other hand, the media review reveals that 121 items (2.33% of the total) dealt

with the topic of the private sector's attitude towards civil society. Of these, 61.2% show a hostile attitude, 17.4% is indifferent, 17.4% is positive and 4.1% is supportive. Given this situation, it can be seen that according to the perceptions of the stakeholders the private corporations are indifferent towards civil society demands. However, the media reflects the tensions between civil society and corporate actors, which generate a hostile environment. Only a minority of stakeholders thinks that the relationship is favourable and supportive.

*2.7.2 Corporate social and environmental responsibility.* For 70% of the stakeholders the private sector's social and environmental responsibility initiatives are limited or insignificant. However, it should be pointed out that at the end of 2004 different business organisations and civil society institutions formed the Bolivian Council for Corporate Social Responsibility (COBORSE) in the city of La Paz.

According to the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) fact-finding study, carried out as part of the CSI implementation, big corporations seem to be interested in coordinating activities with civil society, especially in the communities where they work. They seem to be interested in keeping a positive corporate image within their social context. However, in many cases, the interaction between big corporations and civil society actors is not always smooth since in many cases, both tend to have different perspectives with regard to the social and environmental impact of corporate actions. Likewise, in many cases, civil society actors do not know that corporations engage in such activities. For that matter, the case study proposes, on the one hand, the implementation of a general CSR norm established by the state, to which big corporations should abide and on the other hand, the development of educational campaigns that make visible and socialise the CSR practices in the country (Laguna, López y Muruchi, 2005).

As the same study shows, this council aims to develop and diffuse CSR practices in Bolivia through activities, courses and workshops with different institutions and organisations. One of the obstacles to be overcome, however, is the lack of clear, general regulations provided by the state to which companies and corporations can adapt.

*2.7.3 Corporate Philanthropy.* The results of the literature review show that corporate philanthropy does not go beyond some initiatives like building educational or multifunctional establishments; provision of some public services, or maybe food distribution to poor

**TABLE III.2.8: Private sector attitude to civil society**

Favourable and supportive	19.0
Indifferent	42.0
Untrusting / Suspicious	27.0
Hostile	9.0

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

families. This is clearly reflected by the regional stakeholders, of whom only 6.7% states that their CSO receives financial support to carry out their activities from companies.

## **Conclusion**

This dimension obtained the lowest score of all four dimensions that compose the diamond. All sectors consulted seemed to agree that basic freedoms and rights are respected in the country and constraints on CSO advocacy activities are minimal. Additionally, even though Bolivian society is characterised by moderate levels of trust and tolerance, the socio-economic, political and legal contexts present difficulties for civil society.

Bolivia remains one of the poorest countries of the region and faces high rates of social inequalities. Society is also handicapped by an unfavourable bureaucratic environment characterised by corruption and inefficiency. The frequent violation of norms by both citizens and the state lead to citizens' not having confidence in the legal system and its institutions. It is also important to highlight that even though the state rarely interferes in CSO activities and often dialogues with a wide range of actors, the state–civil society relationship is characterised by low levels of cooperation and support. Only a few CSOs receive state funding or other resources to support their activities.


Thus, as discussed in the National Workshop, the result of such a context is an overwhelming set of demands that cannot be met by the state or civil society itself. As a result the state–civil society relationship tends to be conflictive based on demands that tend to surpass state response capacities.

Additionally, relations between civil society and the corporate sector present challenges. According to the perceptions of CSO stakeholders, large corporations have an indifferent attitude towards the social demands made by CSOs and rarely take into account the potentially negative social and environmental impacts of their operations. This situation provokes tensions between corporations and CSOs. In spite of these obstacles, progress is being made in recognising the rights of indigenous peoples and women.

In addition, the lack of corporate social responsibility prevents better relations, and many CSOs are perceived as viable alternatives to redressing societal demands, as opposed to the discredited public administration.

## **3. VALUES**

Bolivian civil society promotes and practices social values to a relatively strong degree as shown by the overall score of 1.7. This dimension analyses both internal practices of the CSOs as well as to what degree they promote democracy, transparency, tolerance, non-violence, gender equity and ethnic equity. This dimension also takes into account the poverty eradication and environmental sustainability initiatives carried out by CSOs. The Figure below shows the scores for each of the subdimensions:

**FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension**

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

### 3.1 Democracy

This subdimension received a score of 2, which reflects the fact that the majority of CSOs practice and promote democracy. This result is calculated based on an average of the indicators:

**TABLE III.3.1: Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes democracy**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	2
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs.* In order to evaluate this indicator, the number of CSOs that use “elections” to choose their leaders, and how much control the members of the CSOs have on decision-making, was measured. According to 75% of the stakeholders consulted, members of CSOs elect their leaders. For 65%, members have a lot of influence on decision-making, and for 33%, members have some or no influence. The results from V&T (2001) showed that within the CSOs, members are “always” consulted before decisions are taken, with a national average of 53%, showing that the majority of CSOs practice internal democracy.

*3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy.* This indicator seeks to evaluate what and how much Bolivian civil society promotes democracy within society. The results show that 67% of the stakeholders mention remembering examples of public campaigns led by CSOs to promote democracy. The most quoted examples are the demonstrations for the Constituent Assembly, for the Regional Autonomies Referendum, for the election of prefects and for women and ethnic people to participate more in politics. The media review shows a similar tendency for the CSOs promoting democracy with 181 articles, of which 37.6% are actions to promote the Regional Autonomies Referendum, 27.6% to call for general elections and 20.4% to call for the Constituent Assembly. In that sense, civil society appears active in the promotion of democracy, even though in some cases these initiatives seem to lack a wide support base.

## 3.2 Transparency

Bolivian civil society practices and promotes transparency within a range that goes from limited to moderate, which is reflected in a score of 1.7 for this subdimension, calculated based on the average of the indicators as can be seen from the Table below:

**TABLE III.3.2: Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes transparency**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within civil society	1
3.2.2	Financial transparency of CSOs	2
3.2.3	Civil society actions to promote transparency	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*3.2.1 Corruption within civil society.* Corruption is widespread in Bolivian civil society. For example, 61% of the stakeholders consulted think that cases of corruption within the CSOs are frequent. This information coincides with the results provided by V&T (2001) which show that although 52.1% of those consulted consider their leaders to be honest, 51.3% believe that leaders take advantage of members and 44% feel that they have been betrayed by their leaders at some time or another. National Workshop participants expanded on these findings mentioning that on the one hand corruption in civil society tends to happen because the leaders do not know how to keep accounts and the members do not know how to demand it. They also mentioned that there seems to be a lack of incentives that allow members to establish checks and balance systems within their own CSO (National Workshop, 09.11.2005).

*3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs.* Digging deeper into the issue of corruption within the CSOs, the data show that a small majority of the CSOs in Bolivia make their accounts available to their members. 56% of the stakeholders consulted responded that their CSOs present their balance sheets to the public. The results provided by the V&T show that around 59.9% of those who belong to a CSO said the same. However, the members of the NAG feel that there is still much to be done on transparency within the CSOs but that this is changing as more leaders and members of CSOs are becoming aware of the need for financial accountability for their organisations to run smoothly (NAG, 12.10.2005).

*3.2.3 Civil society actions to promote transparency.* In Bolivia there are a good number of civil society actions being carried out to promote state transparency; nevertheless, given that many of these activities are local, their visibility is relatively low. Therefore, the results show that 44.7% of the stakeholders mention examples of CSOs promoting governmental transparency and the majority (70.9%) remember one or two campaigns. Among the examples addressed, figure marches and strikes to demand more government transparency. Locally, as mentioned above, work on promoting transparency is not as visible to the rest of society which limits its scope as shown by the 54.4% of the stakeholders consulted who consider that the role played by civil society to promote state transparency as being insignificant or limited, whereas 38.2% believes it to moderate or significant. One of the points most emphasised is the role played by the Vigilance Committees set up within the framework of the Popular Participation Law whose task is to gradually exercise more effective social control over municipal governments, and even become involved in budget administration. According to Maydana (2004), in a survey carried out in December 2002, 66% of the Vigilance Committees around the country said that they had received information on their municipal government administration and 45% said that they had reported irregularities supposedly committed within the municipal administration, along with bureaucratic red tape and political cover ups that are rooted in the legal system.

### 3.3 Respecting Differences

The results lead to this subdimension receiving a score of 1.5 as an average of its indicators:


**TABLE III.3.3: Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes respecting differences**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Respecting differences within the civil society arena	1
3.3.2	Civil Society activities to promote the respect of differences	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

**3.3.1 Respecting differences within the civil society arena.** One of the features of Bolivian civil society is related to widespread intolerance of sexual minorities, which extends to intolerance of people living with HIV/AIDS. Civil society is more tolerant of people from different religious faiths, and respect for people of different races or from other countries seems to be progressing due to intercultural policies promoted by the state in response to demands made by civil society. Figure III.3.2 shows the responses from those asked the following question during the community survey: Would you accept a neighbour who is...? However, in general, Bolivian civil society still needs to work on tolerance, as seen from the perception of the stakeholders, of whom 33.3% consider that civil society is still significantly intolerant. The examples given are: discrimination of indigenous people and peasants; intolerance amongst those living in the east and the west of the country, and discrimination within CSOs against sexual minorities. These perceptions are supported by data obtained from the *Cultura Política y Democracia en Bolivia, 2004* study (CNE, 2004), which shows that of those interviewed, 50.6% say that there is little tolerance among neighbours. The same study shows that religious and racial tolerance is higher than political tolerance and that the least tolerated are people living with HIV/AIDS and sexual minorities. According to comments made by members of the NAG, respect for differences usually drops during times of tension and political conflict.

**FIGURE III.3.2: Respecting differences within civil society (%)**



Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.



**3.3.2 Civil Society activities to promote the respect of differences.** In spite of its limited visibility, Bolivian civil society actively promotes the respect of differences. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that 48.8% of the stakeholders consulted remember an example of campaigns to promote tolerance in the previous 12 months and 70% remember one or two. The examples most mentioned are the campaigns by various NGOs, human rights organisations, religious and women's groups on this topic. They also highlight the campaigns promoted by the gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, transsexual and transgender communities seen in the media review, taking actions that would have been unheard of a few years ago. Society has taken on certain issues, such as multiculturalism in schools, the alternative media and civil associations, especially looking to preserve local traditions. Since the stakeholders are divided on as to the role that civil society plays in promoting respect of differences (table III.3.4), it can be assumed that these campaigns still lack visibility in the general public.

**TABLE III.3.4: Perceptions of civil society activities to promote respecting differences (%)**

Insignificant	22.0
Limited	31.7
Moderate	24.4
Important	17.1

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

### 3.4 Non-violence

This subdimension received a score of 2, based on the average of both indicators:

**TABLE III.3.5: Indicators assessing the degree to which civil society practices and promotes non-violence**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the Civil Society arena	2
3.4.2	Civil Society actions to promote non-violence and peace	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

**3.4.1 Non-violence within the Civil Society arena.** Bolivian civil society frequently has carried out protests, usually taking the form of blocking roads and marches leading to public disorder in the streets and main roads, principally on the country's main road network (La Paz-Cochabamba-Santa Cruz). Secondary data shows that these non-partisan political actions are generally peaceful unless the police intervenes using violence to disperse the crowds and restore public order. This intervention by law enforcement results in stand-offs between protesters and members of the security forces (Schmidt, 2005). Only occasionally have these protests involved physical violence among people and/or have damaged private or public property, as in February 2003. This does not mean, however, that at no time do isolated civil society groups use violence to meet their goals. In reference to the perceptions of the stakeholders consulted on this topic, it can be seen that opinions are divided (table III.3.6). Many perceptions may be influenced by the image of demonstrations and protests, as portrayed by the media. The media review shows that some take a political stance classifying protests according to their political interests, often exaggerating the climate of the conflicts. Thirty percent of those consulted believe that many CSOs use violence to express their interests; whereas the rest state that violence is used sometimes or never.

**TABLE III.3.6: Perceptions of how many CSOs use violence to achieve their aims (%)**

Many	30.0
Some	32.5
Few	29.3
None	5.7

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

*3.4.2 Civil Society actions to promote non-violence and peace.* This type of action is more visible in times of social and political conflict. For example, the media review shows articles that refer to civil society campaigns to promote peace during the conflicts that arose in the months of May and June 2005. However, in general, the efforts of civil society to promote non-violence lack wide visibility and so only 40.7% of the stakeholders consulted remember having

**TABLE III.3.7: Perceptions on how often violent acts are reported by other civil society actors (%)**

Always	10.6
Generally	27.6
Rarely	54.5
Never	4.9

Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

seen a public campaign held by civil society to promote non-violence and peace in the past year. 71.2% remembers one or two campaigns. The most frequent actions mentioned are peace marches, dialogues proposed by sectors of the Catholic Church and campaigns against interfamily violence, mainly carried out by feminist groups. Likewise, 54.5% of the stakeholders believe that other civil society actors rarely report acts of violence. These data corroborate that such activities lack visibility or a broad support base (table III.3.7).

### 3.5 Gender Equity

This subdimension scored 1.7 characterised by actions bordering on moderate. The Table below shows the scores received by each of the indicators:

**TABLE III.3.8: Indicators assessing the degree to which civil society promotes and practices gender equity**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Women leaders within the civil society arena	2
3.5.2	Gender equity within the Civil Society arena	1
3.5.3	Civil Society actions to promote gender equity	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*3.5.1 Women leaders within the civil society arena.* The data show that women are generally under-represented in leadership roles within civil society. For example of the 123 stakeholders consulted by the CSI, 24% are women. This result is backed by the perceptions of all stakeholders interviewed, where 44.3% of respondents stated that female leadership within CSOs is still low. As can be seen from indicator 1.3.2, *CSO Leadership*, the members of the NAG confirm that women's participation in managing CSOs is improving because of the increasing number of women that engage in capacity building activities, which reflects their motivation to participate in public life. There are examples of such situation in the peasant movement, especially in the departments of Chuquisaca and Cochabamba.

*3.5.2 Gender equity within the CS arena.* In the last few years there has been a change in the organisational structure of CSOs, granting women more space to participate. This can be seen, for example, in the peasant organisations where there has been an upsurge in the number of female leaders that have moved successfully into the political arena. However 41% of the stakeholders consulted are of the opinion that a small minority of women participate in the CSOs. Thus, in many cases women have set up parallel organisations to make their needs more visible, especially during highly fraught political times, like happened within the coca movement in the Chapare region (Cochabamba) over the last few years and in the city of El Alto. However, it is necessary to recognise that this process may have been influenced by the conditions laid down by the international cooperation agencies to support the strengthening of women's organisations (Regional Meeting, La Paz, 25.08.05).

*3.5.3 Civil Society actions to promote gender equity.* Bolivian civil society promotes a good number of initiatives focused on gender equity, although not all are visible. Of the

stakeholders consulted, 62.6% remember an example of a public campaign to promote gender equity in the last 12 months and 67.9% says that they remember one or two examples, such as the advocacy for the enactment of the Reproductive and Sexual Rights Law and the Law against intra-familial violence.

### 3.6 Poverty Eradication

Bolivian civil society promotes actions in favour of poverty eradication. This indicator received a score of 2, because there are a lot of actions carried out, although they are not all that visible:

**TABLE III.3.9: Indicator assessing the degree to which civil society promotes and practices poverty eradication**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	Civil society actions to eradicate poverty	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*3.6.1 Civil society actions to eradicate poverty.* One of the main problems facing Bolivia is poverty; thus, various civil society sectors come together and mobilise to resolve it either directly or indirectly, even though this should be the state's responsibility (NAG, 12.10.2005). 48% of the stakeholders consulted remember an example of civil society campaigns to eradicate poverty directly such as micro credit programmes and rural development projects. Furthermore, the data obtained by V&T support those findings showing that different types of CSOs have any type of action oriented at reducing poverty levels, as shown in table III.3.10.

**TABLE III.3.10: Objectives of different types of CSOs**

CSO type	Objectives
Producers organisations	56% seek to promote economic development by enhancing agricultural production
Religious organisations	25% carry out social assistance and support to the poorest people
Neighbourhood associations	10% seeks to promote the development of basic infrastructures, roads and public health systems
Indigenous organisations	26% sep economic development through agricultural production

Source: V&T, 2001

As shown in table III.3.10, CSO actions focused on poverty eradication vary from social service to the promotion of agriculture.

However, 68.3% of the stakeholders interviewed by the CSI, rate civil society's actions to reduce or mitigate poverty as insignificant or limited and only 27.7% considers these actions to be moderate or significant. This rating is related to the overwhelming scale of poverty in Bolivia and the low levels of impact that these associations have on the macroeconomic and social context of the country. This is the context where the civil society's indirect actions to eradicate poverty have become more evident and are linked to demands for improved state income distribution, especially concerning the production and distribution of natural resources such as gas.

### 3.7 Environmental Sustainability

The actions taken by civil society to protect the environment are limited and happen mainly around mining or hydrocarbon producing centres. Therefore, this subdimension received a score of only 1.

**TABLE III.3.11: Indicator measuring the degree to which civil society promotes environmental protection**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	Civil society actions to sustain the environment	1

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*3.7.1 Civil Society actions to sustain the environment.* A small number of CSOs in Bolivia work to protect the environment. This issue is still not perceived as a problem by society, except when environmental problems directly affect populations, such as peasants who live close to mining centres where they are exposed to pollutants. Therefore, 61% of the stakeholders consulted thought that civil society actions to promote environmental sustainability are insignificant or limited. The issue was analysed in depth at the National Workshop, highlighting that Bolivian civil society tends to pay more attention to solving economic problems and due to the lack of information on environmental issues, this topic is not a priority on CSOs' agendas or for the population in general. Additionally, as seen from the results of the community survey of the 642 people consulted, 1.8% is a member of an environmental organisation or group.

### 3.8 Ethnic Equity

The ethnic-cultural diversity in Bolivia and the role that indigenous groups play in Bolivian society led the National Index Team to include this subdimension in the study. It can be seen that indigenous participation in Bolivia has increased considerably in the last few years although their exclusion has yet to be resolved. This subdimension received a score of 2 signalling that the level achieved is still moderate.

**TABLE III.3.12: Indicators measuring the degree to which civil society practices and promotes ethnic equity**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.8.1	Indigenous leaders within the civil society arena	2
3.8.2	Civil society actions to promote the rights of indigenous peoples	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*3.8.1 Indigenous leaders within the civil society arena.* This indicator seeks to analyse the degree to which indigenous people are included within leadership spheres in CSOs. Of the stakeholders consulted 34.1%, along with leaders from their respective CSOs consider themselves to be indigenous. This is mainly seen in the peasant organisations that are currently taken as a main point of reference for Bolivian civil society, due to their ability to exert pressure on politics. However, 41.8% of those consulted think that the participation of indigenous peoples in positions of leadership is still low.

*3.8.2 Civil society actions to promote the rights of indigenous peoples.* Civil society carries out a large number of activities to promote indigenous rights, especially those related to their cultural practices, to land and territory property rights and to political participation. There is no room for doubt that education policies promoted by the state have favoured indigenous values being incorporated into the Bolivian identity. However, the problem of indigenous exclusion has hampered these activities from having a wide-reaching effect. Furthermore, the media review registers campaigns aimed at penalising direct racism and discrimination against indigenous peoples.

### Conclusions


The score of 1.7, given to the values dimension, shows that the values of Bolivian civil society are relatively strong. This is mainly due to the fact that while actively promotes

values, but these actions are not widely visible. Civil society is most active in promoting democratic participation, non-violence and ethnic equality. The weakest value promoted by civil society is environmental sustainability, due to a lack of awareness and information, as well as immediate economic concerns taking priority for Bolivian civil society. Bolivian civil society is generally peaceful and only occasionally, in times of conflict, responds aggressively to state violence, however, this tends to be exaggerated by the media. In contrast, tolerance and transparency are less strongly held values in Bolivian civil society. For example, although civil society is vocal against corruption and promotes transparency, corrupt practices exist to some extent within civil society. As a consequence, several civil society stakeholders pointed to the need to develop incentives for transparency and social control within CSOs. All of these aspects give Bolivian civil society a relatively strong set of values, which become more vulnerable during times of social and political crisis, as certain values, such as non-violence, may be weakened.

## 4. IMPACT

This section describes and analyses the degree to which civil society is active and successful in performing various essential functions. The score obtained in this dimension is 1.8, which means that the impact of civil society is relatively strong. However, compared to other dimensions, the **Impact** is the strongest of the four dimensions of the Bolivian Civil Society Diamond.<sup>24</sup> This dimension analyses civil society's influence on public policy, human rights and state and large private company accountability. It also evaluates the level of impact that civil society actions have on responding to interests and social needs, and the empowerment of its citizens.

**FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension**



Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Structure received a score of 1.79 (rounded up to 1.8) and Impact received a score of 1.81 (rounded down also to 1.8).

## 4.1 Influencing Public Policy

This subdimension scored 1.7, which implies that the influence of civil society on public policies ranges between limited and middling. The Table below shows the scores obtained for each indicator:


**TABLE III.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing public policy**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Human Rights	2
4.1.2	Public Policy	2
4.1.3	Civil Society's impact on National Budgeting	1

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

To analyse civil society's influence on public policies, the Civil Society Index - Bolivia took into account three national issues in the stakeholder's survey: land and territory, the violation of civil rights in February and October 2003, and social control over budgets. The results show that the majority of the stakeholders consulted assess that civil society is moderately active in lobbying public policy and that the success of its actions is also limited (figure III.4.2). The regional meetings helped to analyse more deeply the results from the surveys. Some participants mentioned that one of the reasons for the perceived limited success is that the state is "deaf" and distant to the demands of civil society. In contrast, other participants argued that success is limited, because the demands made by civil society are usually too much for the state to deal with. One example is when demands are made for structural changes implying a reorganisation of the state. However, all agree that success is felt more at local levels, as the "State is closer to civil society and this makes it easier to listen to demands" (Regional Meeting, Sucre 20.08.2005). The media review also shows examples of civil society actions to influence public policies. Of all the items, 14% made reference to the political arena, mainly dealing with the Natural Gas Law and the Constituent Assembly.

**FIGURE III.4.2: Civil society's actions and success in promoting public policies (%)**



Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

To get a closer look at the three issues mentioned, three fact-finding studies were carried out. They confirmed the responses given by the stakeholders consulted.<sup>25</sup>

**4.1.1 Human Rights. Fact-finding study on the actions against the state violence during February and October 2003.** This fact-finding study looks at two historical moments in Bolivia, February and October 2003, when the government used military forces to repress protests violating citizens' civil and political rights. This situation led to various civil society groups such as human rights organisations, neighbourhood associations and some peasant unions to act in defence of these rights. The specificity of the situation and its current validity

<sup>25</sup> A detailed description of the results of these three studies can be found in Annex 4.

were regarded as important for the fact-finding study on CSI Human Rights in Bolivia. The NIT, along with members of the NAG thought it was important to investigate how active and successful CSOs had been in defending and promoting human rights during and after the conflicts in February and October 2003.

The results show that civil society was active but had little success in promoting and defending human rights. Civil society, through hunger strikes, marches and lobbying for peace and non-violence, pressured the then president, Sánchez de Lozada, to resign. It promoted the redressal of abuses carried out by the Sánchez de Lozada government in February and October 2003 managing to obtain indemnification for the families affected. The different CSOs organised themselves and set up a steering committee that is requesting that the ex-president and his cabinet be prosecuted. Finally, it held campaigns to inform and socialise the issue. However, the legal process to have the ex - president extradited from the U.S. to stand trial in Bolivia is bogged down and there has been no significant progress made on this aspect. This situation shows that any success is not yet visible in the “heart” of the state or the political system.

*4.1.2 Public Policies. Fact-finding study on Land and Territory Policies relating to the Yuquises area in Santa Cruz.* The analysis of Bolivian civil society’s impact on public policies noted that it was important to include land and territory policies controversial issues nationwide. The objective of the fact-finding study was to analyse how civil society organises itself to respond to the demand for land and how effective its formal and informal methods are. As the region of the Yuquises was the site of conflicts in the year the study was carried out (2005), the NIT, taking into account the recommendations of the NAG, decided to analyse this specific case to access up to date information.

Like the fact-finding study on human rights, this study saw that civil society’s actions in this field also had limited success. Civil society actors, such as the Landless Movement carried out both formal and informal actions to bring their demands for the redistribution and granting of titles of fiscal lands to the government. They publicly denounced that the Agrarian Reform Law was not being respected and took part in meetings with government representatives to negotiate the just allocation of the lands being disputed. They blocked roads, marched and took over land when they did not receive a positive response from the government. However, although the Landless Movement did manage to obtain some governmental financing to begin the process of land redistribution through resorting to conflictive means, the process is slow and is yet to be settled. In other words, progress was made in the legal and bureaucratic areas but has not gone any further.

*4.1.3 Civil Society’s impact on National Budgeting. Fact-finding study on the La Paz Social Control Mechanism for Budgets.* The role of Bolivian civil society in monitoring budgets is important, as the budget has an effect on all areas of public policy. Therefore, the NIT sought to carry out a study to see the impact civil society has on public control of the national budget and evaluate the effect this has had to date in this area. The National Dialogue Law was passed in July 2001, which created the Social Control Mechanism (SCM) as a result of the Jubilee Forum request.<sup>26</sup> Since then, national and departmental social control institutions were created, to be in charge of promoting civil society social control over budgets. Therefore, this fact-finding study analysed this topic within the framework of the La Paz Departmental Social Control Mechanism (SCM – LP), which was chosen because of its closeness to the National Social Control Mechanism (NSCM) and because it has had some positive and negative results which will enrich the results obtained by the CSI in Bolivia on this topic.

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<sup>26</sup> The Jubilee Forum was an initiative of the Catholic Church that brought together different CSOs from all over the country to discuss different issues among which were the social control of HIPC resources.

The results of the study show that civil society has been active but as in the two previous studies, this success is somewhat limited. For example, CSOs such as labour unions and different neighbourhood associations representing local and regional levels, as well as some local NGOs, participated in dialogues set up by the Catholic Church and the state to propose the creation of the National and Departmental Social Control Mechanisms. However, these mechanisms were set up based on how the state and International Cooperation conceptualise social control mechanisms. There is no state financing for the mechanisms and so it can be seen that the CSOs that participate in the departmental mechanism do not have enough money to keep it running. Additionally, the authorities are still reticent to allow social control of budgets that do not come from the HIPC and in many cases civil society groups are not trained to use the specialised information (Bedregal, 2005). As also mentioned by Juan Carlos Núñez of the Jubilee Foundation, a NAG member, at the National Workshop: “many colleagues take part in the meetings of the Departmental Councils or Vigilance Committees as members of the social control process where they get a sheet with loads of statistics and charts showing the budget performance for that year, but they don’t know where to begin, they can’t understand what they’re looking at” (National Workshop, 09.11.2005). The fact-finding study concludes that these difficulties lead to civil society not formally participating in the SCM-LP, but rather using more informal strategies such as demonstrating and marching in the streets to influence national budgets. As a result, some NGOs are in charge of doing the budget monitoring, since they have the specialised technical teams required. In spite of that, the success of their activities in this area is still subject to the problems encountered in the MCS-LP, mentioned above.

Complementing the information obtained by the fact-finding study, the publication *Auditoria de la Democracia Bolivia, 2004* shows that civil society actions to influence budgets are more effective in the local arena. According to this source, there has been a relative increase in percentage of citizen participation in the planning of municipal budgets showing the following trends: 8.8% in 2000, 12.2% in 2002 and 10.6% in 2004 (Seligson, 2004).

## 4.2 Holding the State and Private Corporations Accountable

Civil society tends to be limited in holding the state and private corporations accountable. The data led to this subdimension receiving a score of 1.5. The scores for each indicator can be seen in the Table below:

**TABLE III.4.2: Indicators measuring civil society’s success in holding the state and private corporations accountable**


Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state accountable	2
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	1

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

### 4.2.1 Holding the state accountable.

Bolivian civil society actively demands state accountability; nevertheless, the impact of these actions, as seen in other areas, is limited. This situation seems to lead the stakeholders to believe that civil society is not active in this area even though the secondary data and the media review show examples of civil society carrying out actions to

**FIGURE III.4.3. Civil society’s actions and success in promoting State accountability**




Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia



promote State accountability such as: demonstrations against corrupt activities of local representatives or public complaints due to the non fulfilment of action plans in municipalities. Civil society tends to be more active and successful at promoting state accountability at the local level and so is less visible for the overall population. For example, the *Democracia en Bolivia (2005)* study reveals that: “what stands out here is the fact that the population sees local governments in a very positive light. An essential point is the fact that these authorities are directly elected, are controlled by the population and are subject to being held accountable” (CNE, 2005:150). Furthermore, the media review presents some examples where civil society came together to promote state accountability at various levels: “The neighbours from District 3 in El Alto reported that a roofing project had not been finished even though the money had been disbursed. This work was the responsibility of the Municipal Company for Urban Maintenance” (RTP, 05.05.05); “The Chuquisaca Civic Committee rejects the Prefect for not having fulfilled the commitments he had made to the Department” (Radio PANAMERICANA, 23.05.05). However, even though civil society is working on state accountability, many actions lack visibility due to the fact that they are local initiatives that have not gotten the results expected and they fail to become part of the national agenda. For that matter, the impact of those actions is still somehow limited.

**4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable.** The promotion of corporate accountability has recently become part of the agenda of Bolivian civil society. Only in the past few years have CSOs begun to discuss the social role of the private sector in Bolivia. The stakeholders consulted do not yet perceive a role for CSOs in holding large corporations accountable (figure III.4.4). Some participants at the regional meetings stated, for example, that these perceptions are based on internal corporate accountability: various large companies do not fulfil their social obligations to their workers and in some cases even hamper their workers’ demands by threatening to fire them. This aspect is linked to the instable nature of employment in Bolivia and the lack of guarantees to protect employment rights. When looking at external corporate accountability, the Social Corporate Responsibility fact - finding study carried out for this research shows that the two large corporations studied, la *Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento* (SOBOCE) and the petroleum company *PETROBRAS* believe that it is imperative to interact with civil society, especially with indigenous organisations,

**FIGURE III.4.4: Civil society’s actions and success in promoting corporate accountability**



Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

society campaigns to promote corporate social and environmental responsibility, mainly concerning the mining and petroleum companies. However, although civil society is

neighbourhood associations, civic committees and unions in the zones where they work.<sup>27</sup>

The long-term security and sustainability of their operations depend on a good relationship with these organisations (Laguna, López and Muruchi, 2005:24). According to this study, large companies’ interest in working more closely with civil society comes largely as a result of the protests held by sectors of civil society near the companies. The media review found some examples of civil

<sup>27</sup> For more details on this fact-finding study see Annex 5.

beginning to carry out activities in this respect, no impact can be seen, which is also related to the lack of clear regulations established by the state, as mentioned above.

### 4.3 Responding to Societal Interests

Civil society says that its organisations are addressing the social concerns that they consider to be priority, at least by bringing them to the public's attention. This subdimension received a score of 2, as a result of the average of the scores from the indicators:

**TABLE III.4.3: Indicators assessing meeting society's needs**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	2
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	2


Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

**4.3.1 Responsiveness.** This indicator seeks to assess to what degree Bolivian civil society responds to social interests and needs. As water and electricity supplies are a very important issue for Bolivians, the examples most given by the stakeholders on how civil society responds to their social needs centre around these two topics. Of the stakeholders consulted, 57.7% remember specific examples of civil society lobbying for priority needs and 53.9% believes that civil society has had limited success in putting forward these demands. Other related issues are those concerning better distribution of gas resources and the holding of the Constituent Assembly, which are included on the agenda of different CSOs that seek to respond to the Bolivian population's needs. It can be concluded then, that CSO in Bolivia make efforts in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.

#### 4.3.2 Public trust in CSOs.

In Bolivia, CSOs are the institutions most trusted by the population. The *Auditoria a la Democracia 2004* study shows that “the levels of trust in civil institutions are among the highest of all of the group of institutions evaluated in the study” (Seligson, 2004:125), with the Catholic Church in first place, followed by journalists and NGOs. Juan Carlos Núñez from the Jubilee Foundation and member of the NAG put

**FIGURE III.4.5: Public trust in CSOs**



Source: CSI Community survey – Bolivia, 2005.

forward the following possible explanation at the National Workshop: “the credibility that the Catholic Church enjoys is due not only to the fact that it is a religious organisation but also because of the direct relationship this institution has with the population when dealing with social issues, where over 20% of health and education services are run by organisations that work with the Church” (National Workshop, 09.11.2005). On the other hand, this trust may be the result of the fact that spaces for mediation between the state and civil society are occupied by organisations affiliated to the Catholic Church, especially in times of conflict such as those experienced in May and June 2005, where the Church played a key role in mediating the dialogue between the government and the different social groups. Therefore it is not by chance that in the community survey those interviewed also expressed their trust in the Church, the institution that received an average of 5 points out of 7 (Figure III.4.5). The

same Figure shows that TV and written press are in second place followed by neighbourhood associations. Political parties are not trusted by many with their being placed below the unions, which, as seen in the Structure dimension, are the spaces where civil society is opened to marginalized and poor sectors.

#### 4.4 Empowering Citizens

Civil society actively recognises citizen empowerment but at the same time the impact of these actions is limited. The results have been taken together to obtain a score of 2 for this subdimension. The table below shows the results of the indicators:


**TABLE III.4.4: Indicators assessing empowering citizens**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	2
4.4.2	Capacity building for collective action	2
4.4.3	Empowering marginalized people	2
4.4.4	Empowering women	2
4.4.5	Building social capital	2
4.4.6	Supporting income generation activities	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.


**4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens.** Bolivian civil society plays an important role in informing and educating citizens. It can be seen that to a large extent, these actions are aimed at specific political contexts and are also influenced by “fashionable” issues being debated internationally, such as sexual and reproductive health, HIV/AIDS prevention and the Constituent Assembly. According to the majority of stakeholders, civil society is active in this area but the impact is limited (figure III.4.6). In the CSI community survey, 17.3% of the interviewees confirm that there have been information or education activities carried out on important topics in their community or neighbourhood. Of these, 52.2% says that they have taken part in these activities. As seen above, success is mainly limited because of the Bolivian population’s great need for education and information. Therefore, one of the topics most discussed at the National Workshop was the current need for more spaces in which to educate and train the people to better target the weaknesses within Bolivian civil society, such as transparency, accountability and leadership, among others. According to the participants, those spaces can be built within the institutions through workshops and conferences and the results can be widespread through alternative radios and the Internet.

**FIGURE III.4.6: Indicators assessing actions and success in informing/educating citizens**



Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005

**FIGURE III.4.7: Civil society’s actions and success in building capacity for collective action**



Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

**4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action.** This indicator measures to what degree Bolivian civil society influences the capacities for collective action intended to gather and allocate resources and to work together to resolve common problems. The stakeholders consulted consider that Bolivian civil society is active in this area but that its impact is limited (figure III.4.7). Among the activities mentioned were: workshops on local development, leadership in the vigilance committees, production and legal matters. The limited success arises from the fact that despite all of these activities, the country's structural problems are far from being resolved.


**4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people.** This indicator measures how receptive CSOs are to the interests and needs of the people who are poor and socially excluded, among whom are many women, indigenous people and those living in rural areas. Of the stakeholders consulted, 54.5% remember at least one example of when civil society provided services to the population. The most quoted examples are literacy and community organisation campaigns on the management and administration of potable water systems. Of the stakeholders consulted, 55.9% affirm that these actions were aimed at the general public, 33.8% say that they were aimed at supporting poor sectors and families and 50.8% affirm that these campaigns were of limited success, whereas 46.1% affirm that civil society has been much more successful supporting the poor. These results may arise from the fact that many projects target vulnerable zones and have received certain visibility; however, the main problems affecting the most marginalized groups cannot be resolved only through CSO intervention.

**4.4.4 Empowering women.** Various actions mainly carried out by NGOs and feminist groups to promote women's empowerment can be seen within civil society. The secondary information shows that the women's movement in Bolivia has been very active. Among its successes are: the initiatives related to the Law against Interfamily and Domestic Violence and the Quotas Law. Nevertheless, the impact of such activities tends to be limited, as these laws do not resolve the structural problems of social and economic inequality between men and women and only slightly transform cultural attitudes that tend to discriminate against women. The activities carried out to empower women seem to lack visibility and a wide support base as seen from the community survey where only 13.7% of those interviewed affirm that they knew of activities which specifically helped women in the community to improve their living conditions.

**4.4.5 Building social capital.** This study analyses social capital by comparing interpersonal trust perceived by respondents that belong to at least one CSO with those who do not belong to any. The results were taken from the CSI community survey. These results do not show any great difference between the groups but there is a tendency to show higher levels of trust perceived among those who belong to CSOs than those who do not (figure III.4.8).

**4.4.6 Supporting income generation activities.** The main activities for supporting income generation activities promoted by civil society in Bolivia are based on productive programmes

**FIGURE III.4.8: Levels of interpersonal trust**



Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

mainly carried out in rural areas and the promotion of small business. The community survey found that 13.3% of those interviewed affirm that help was given to their community or neighbourhood to participate in productive activities that improve family income. Of these, 52.8% says that they have participated in such activities. The V&T (2001) study shows that 13% of those interviewed mention that the objective of their organisations is productive economic development, of whom 41% considers that there is relative progress towards the objective and 37% considers that progress has been moderate. Additionally, the secondary data show several CSOs that have initiatives in this area including the *Comité de Enlace de Pequeños Productores* made up of the *Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Mineras* (FENCOMIN), which brings together 350 mining cooperatives including approximately 40,000 workers; the *Comité Integrador de Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas de Bolivia* (CIOEC), which represents 229 peasant organisations in which over 100,000 families participate; the *Confederación de Trabajadores Artesanos* and another 52 artisan organisations grouped together in the Artisan Organisations Network, with 50,000 productive units; the *Federación Boliviana de la Pequeña Industria* (FEBOPI) with over 5,000 members. Faced with a lack of formal sources of employment in Bolivia, it is clear that civil society members have tended to organise themselves massively to generate their own income, in some cases with relative success. In other cases, these CSOs have undertaken actions that seek to promote informal sources of income at more local levels, such as micro enterprises (UNDP, 2005).

#### 4.5 Meeting Societal Needs

This subdimension scores 2. The Table below shows the scores for each of the indicators:

**TABLE III.4.4: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provisions	2
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	2
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalized groups	2

Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia, 2005.

*4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provisions.* The issue of basic service provision has become a detonator for social conflicts in Bolivia. The popular uprising in 2000 in Cochabamba was aimed at stopping the drinking water price hike and ended with the breaking of the contract with the company in charge of providing this service to the population. In February 2005, a similar movement rose up in the city of El Alto, demanding a change in policy on the part of the company in charge of providing water to the city. Of the stakeholders consulted, 57.7% remember specific examples of when civil society lobbied for the government to provide services to the people, among which are electricity and water. Of the stakeholders, 53.9% believe that civil society has had limited success in this endeavour and 26.3% affirms that civil society has been successful in pressuring the government on these issues. The media review also registers articles that show that civil society actively lobbies for state provision of the services mentioned above. For example, “The Civic Committee of Trinidad has finalised the strike that started four days ago. A government commission visited the strikers and promised to give solution to the problems addressed by them, such as the electrification project Caranavi – Trinidad” (Radio PANAMERICANA, 02.05.05) y “The *Central Obrera Boliviana* criticises the president’s governmental plan and rejects the economic project, because it does not guarantee employment” (Radio FIDES, 18.05.05).


*4.5.2 Meeting societal needs directly.* According to Fernando Mayorga, one of the NAG members, “Civil society in Bolivia comes together to solve society’s problems” (National

Workshop, 09.11.2005). The secondary information shows, for example, that NGOs are dedicated to directly responding to pressing social needs, replacing the state in areas such as education, health, agricultural development, among others (Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Finance, 2003). Likewise, as seen in the previous indicators, Bolivian civil society, faced with a lack of state services, provides services to the population in different ways, from spaces to inform and train people on different topics, to supporting income generation through productive and micro credit projects. However, these activities do not have the desired impact and, according to the members of the NAG, one of the problems is the lack of a joint vision among the different CSOs, which results in scattered or sporadic efforts that do not resolve the structural problems of the country (National Workshop, 09.12.05).

#### 4.5.3 Meeting the needs of marginalized groups.

This indicator analyses the degree to which CSOs are more efficient than the state when providing services to marginalized groups. The data from the community survey show that according to those interviewed, CSOs, among which are voluntary organisations and NGOs, provide better services than the state and private companies (figure III.4.9).

**FIGURE III.4.9: Bodies that provide better services to marginalized groups (%)**



Source: CSI Regional Stakeholders Survey – Bolivia, 2005.

However, the same Figure shows that according to those interviewed, the state, after the NGOs, has helped the population more. These results illustrate that there are aspects within the exclusive domain of the state such as the building of roads, the providing of infrastructure for health and education, which are out of the reach of the CSOs. On the other hand, it is important to highlight the role of the NGOs in Bolivia, which often support the state in implementing projects where the state has few advantages, such as literacy, technical support for productive areas and technical training.

## Conclusions

This dimension reveals that the impact of Bolivian civil society actions tends to be moderate. However, the impact dimension obtained the highest score of the Civil Society Diamond, a 1.8. This score is mainly the result of the impact that Bolivian civil society has on empowering citizens and responding to social interests. In general, civil society is actively trying to influence public policy and provide services to the population that are not covered by the state. However, the impact of these actions is often limited, in part, due to the inadequate technical expertise of CSOs and the state's unwillingness to respond to civil society's demands.

In relative terms, civil society's impact is most effective in responding to societal interests, meeting social needs and empowering citizens. Women's organizations have been

particularly active in empowering women in society at large, such initiatives include those relating to the Law against Interfamily and Domestic Violence and the Quotas Law. Also, income generating activities and the provision of services are high on the civil society agenda. Nevertheless, civil society's impact continues to remain limited in many cases.

The impact of civil society on public policy and state accountability received the lowest scores in this dimension. Lobbying for national budgets is one of the weakest indicators in this dimension, which seems to be due to the low capacity of actors to exercise pressure and insufficient resources. Overall, due to a lack of institutionalized mechanisms to affect government, only a few organisations utilize formal avenues to affect state policy. Instead, civil society tends to rely on demonstrations and strikes to demand change in the government. In addition, CSOs are weak when it comes to demanding corporate accountability partly due to a general understanding that the state should resolve most socio-political and economic problems.

This lack of impact primarily results from widespread socio-economic problems and vast basic needs of the Bolivian population, which cannot be solved by CSO interventions alone. There is a need to establish closer links between the state, civil society and private companies, for them to work together to resolve many of the problems hindering Bolivia's development.

## IV STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BOLIVIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

The relationship between the state and civil society in Bolivia is characterised by paradoxes, where the lower the level of institutionalisation of the public and political arenas, the greater the perception of non-partisan political action. As shown above, since the state is unable to guarantee a stable political environment, by addressing the high levels of corruption within the inefficient bureaucratic apparatus, civil society has used different forms of non-partisan political action to influence public policy and to counteract these state limitations. This situation strongly influences civil society's actions and impact. It positively affects CSOs' organisation and mobilization capacities; however, it negatively affects the impact these actions can have. This means that most street blockades, marches and demonstrations seek structural changes that do not necessarily contribute to the development of the poorest areas, but rather focus on the transformation of the political structure. Thus, the impact of CSOs' actions in this arena becomes less evident, since the state appears unable to renovate its institutions or guarantee the transformation of its political structures. Taking into account these considerations, the strengths and weaknesses are detailed as follows:

### STRENGTHS:

1. Bolivian civil society has high levels of participation and high levels of membership and affiliation to social organisations. Proof of this can be found in the high number of CSOs and number of citizens belonging to them.
2. One virtue is the high value placed by civil society on collective community action. However, this is primarily seen as a way to mitigate poverty, which could be strengthened if the state regarded small economic and productive organisations as new forms of social cohesion.
3. The organisational capacity of civil society to eradicate poverty is a central element to the political and socio-economic context described in this report. However, without support from the state, these efforts may have a reduced impact.
4. In spite of the media presenting Bolivian civil society as violent, the study shows that only in times of political conflict, and in response to state violence, do some isolated groups use violence as a means of achieving their goals. When these CSOs were involved in violence, it very seldom affected people's lives. However, if the state does not strengthen the institutional mechanisms for listening to and addressing societal demands, violent actions may increase putting democracy at risk.
5. Likewise, civil society is showing efforts to generalise democratic practices within its organisations and to promote democracy and tolerance of ethnic diversity. This is another aspect that should be institutionalised, in order to guarantee better social cohesion.
6. Finally, it is important to highlight that CSOs are distributed throughout the country and represent Bolivian diversity from local to national levels. These highly dispersed, but organised structures, have enormous potential for strengthening democracy and state decentralisation.

### WEAKNESSES:

1. Bolivian civil society has not resolved its deep-rooted problem of gender inequality, although it is making an effort. This was one of the most controversial discussions at



the National Workshop, as the effects of the actions taken by some women's groups have put the issue on the national agenda.

2. The respect of individual rights, which also include the rights of sexual minorities, is not yet widely observed.
3. Bolivian civil society has still not managed to address environmental sustainability and is restricted to abiding by legal regulations based on a common sense of well-being.
4. The actions of Bolivian civil society have their greatest impact on citizen empowerment, through political engagement. However, these actions have a limited impact on public policy, since CSOs face a state embroiled in conflict and limited in its ability to respond to the needs of society. This is mainly due to the political and economic crisis.
5. One highlight from the National Workshop was the fact that civil society has generated a slew of demands that may hamper their actions, since they are incoherent and lead to its fragmentation. It is interesting to see that different sectors of civil society are highly aware of their rights, but not of their obligations, such as paying taxes.
6. Civil society lacks the capacity to generate continuous and solid mechanisms for social control, especially in the struggle for state transparency. At the same time, there is a weak relationship between civil society and private corporations, which result from the fact that the corporate sector has just recently begun to take into account the potential negative social impacts of their operations.
7. It is important to highlight, that even though Bolivian civil society exercises important values, such as internal democracy, it is clear that only a small minority of CSOs that make their financial accounts publicly available, that women are still underrepresented in civil society leadership positions and only a few CSOs actively seek to sustain the environment.

## V RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations are based on the input of over 110 civil society actors and state representatives at the National Workshop, which took place in La Paz in November 2005.

One of the main problems facing Bolivian civil society is the fact that civil society and state mediating institutions are facing a crisis. Not only have political parties been proven to lack strategic vision, but also the legal and judicial systems lack legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. Another problem is that there are too many, and too diverse, demands on the state generated by civil society actors, which the state is unable to incorporate and respond to effectively.

Workshop participants recommended that CSOs should deepen their knowledge of mechanisms of institutional dialogue, which the state has set up in its legislative, executive and judicial structures. Civil society should make use of them to bring social demands to the forefront of the national agenda. It is also necessary to strengthen the skills and capacities of CSOs with regard to advocacy and for CSOs to make better use of the existing rights relating to freedom of information. Another fundamental factor for change is linked to the education system, which should expand its focus to include topics related to tolerance of minority groups and public honesty.

It was pointed out that the fragmented character of civil society needs to be overcome. The different organisations within civil society need to interact with each other more regularly and more space for dialogue, especially on controversial topics, such as the Constituent Assembly and the Autonomy's Referendum, needs to be provided.

There is also a need to initiate a debate on public good and notions of citizenship, since these areas involve citizen rights and obligations. Likewise, while progress has been made on issues of tolerance, much work still needs to be done on individual rights of sexual minorities and women. Awareness needs to be raised about the factors that damage the environment. These factors need to be openly addressed and the role played by big companies needs to be monitored.

These efforts will not be successful if the state does not reform its institutions to overcome the neo-patrimonial attitudes rooted in their daily practices. This calls for a change in the political and legal system, in order to develop rational and democratic practices leading to a better and more appropriate response to the social, political, legal and cultural demands of civil society. Such a change would go a long way in restoring the public's trust in the legal and political institutions of the country.

The Constituent Assembly, scheduled for 2006, offers the possibility of transforming these weak legal and political institutions, through the establishment of a new Constitution, based on equity and the input by civil society actors.

Finally, the economic conditions of the country need to be improved through the creation of income-generation activities and through ensuring equal access to employment. These actions should be linked to income redistribution policies that guarantee a better use of the material and financial resources of the country.

## VI CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions summarise the main findings and recommendations obtained from the CSI implementation in Bolivia. The conclusion follows the four-dimensional CSI framework, examining civil society's **Structure**, its **Values**, the **Impact** of its actions and the socioeconomic and political **Environment** in which CSOs interact.


The Civil Society Diamond, which visualises the state of Bolivian civil society along these four dimensions (figure VI.1.1), reflects the current crisis of the Bolivian state, which has intensified since 2000. This state of crisis is mainly expressed in the low scores obtained in the **Environment** dimension, which scored 1.4. As observed in this report, this score

results mainly from the weak legal environment and weak political system that is connected with an inefficient bureaucratic structure of the state apparatus. A fundamental factor of this crisis is the state's lack of capacity to negotiate, interpret and meet the social demands expressed by CSOs. Such a situation is closely connected to the economic context, which is characterised by widespread poverty, the unequal distribution of the country's resources and decreasing levels of employment. The relationship between civil society and the corporate sector is characterised by indifference, since large corporations rarely take into account civil society's demands for them to address the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations in the communities where they operate. It was also observed that CSOs have not yet been able to create effective monitoring mechanisms to hold large corporations accountable for the consequences of their actions.

However, even though civil society's environment has weaknesses, there are positive factors, such as rather high levels of trust among citizens and tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities. Additionally, basic freedoms and rights are respected by the state as well as citizens, the multi-party system allows people to have different political options, and there are minimal legal constraints on CSO advocacy activities. However, Bolivian civil society has become widely politicised, with a tendency to overwhelm the precarious state institutions, which is putting democracy at risk.

This situation is linked to the organisational capacity of Bolivian civil society, which is rather strong, as seen in the score of 1.8 received for the **Structure** dimension. Non-partisan political actions, such as demonstrations, street blockades and strikes, which are mainly organised by highly effective national and departmental umbrella organisations, obtained the highest score in this dimension. This dimension also shows that even though volunteer work, on a regular basis, is not very popular, people regularly engage in collective action, especially in the countryside and poor neighbourhoods. Citizens usually get together to solve problems that are not addressed by the state. In spite of these positive traits, CSOs' internal structures reveal some limitations. Some social groups, especially women and the poor, remain underrepresented in leadership roles, and CSOs' human and financial resources are not

**FIGURE VI.1.1: Civil Society Diamond – Bolivia**



Source: Civil Society Index – Bolivia

sufficient to meet their organisational needs. Furthermore, civil society in Bolivia is fragmented since communication across organisations and subsectors is still limited and unsystematic. Even though various CSOs are able to coordinate certain actions, especially in times of great social conflict, these alliances are sporadic and short-term.

The diamond shows that the **Values** dimension obtained a score of 1.7. Tolerance together with corruption and the limited promotion of environmental sustainability were the lowest indicators within this dimension. The latter seems to be tied to a lack of information on how to sustain the environment and in many cases to the fact that civil society tends to give priority to immediate economic concerns instead of environmental problems. Even though some groups are actively promoting gender equity, women are still underrepresented in leadership positions of CSOs. Even if these aspects stand out as weaknesses, there are a number of positive values embraced by civil society, such as its commitment to democratic practices, non-violence, poverty eradication and the promotion of ethnic equity.

Finally, in spite of the positive values and mobilization capacity of Bolivian civil society, it has not been able to significantly **impact** public policy or achieve state and private sector accountability. One of the weakest indicators in the impact dimension are the activities to influence the national budget. Furthermore, because of the weak and inefficient legal and political environment, CSOs have wasted their efforts lobbying a state that cannot respond to many of their demands. However, the impact dimension obtained the highest score of the Civil Society Diamond, a 1.8. This score is mainly the result of the impact that Bolivian civil society has on empowering citizens and responding to social interests. CSOs are very active in carrying out community activities, in addressing key problems resulting from poverty, which are not tackled by the state. These activities are mainly oriented to informing citizens and building people's capacity on technical as well as political topics. Also, many CSOs engage in income-generation activities that mainly benefit women. However, in spite of all these activities, the impact in this area is not all that visible, mainly because of the vast needs of the Bolivian population, which cannot be addressed by CSO interventions alone.

The results presented in this report were analysed at the National Workshop in November 2005. More than 110 CSOs and state representatives participated and contributed with practical recommendations on how to strengthen civil society. First, CSOs should build on their strong organisational and mobilising potential by creating stronger bonds with each other. In order to deal with the fragmented character of CSOs, room for dialogue between different civil society sectors should be opened. Such dialogue should address topics that are related to the rights and obligations of citizens. Capacity building of CSOs' leaders is also necessary, as is widening information channels between state and CSOs. The educational system should be oriented to promoting and addressing social values in order to address corruption, intolerance and gender inequality. Likewise, the state should work towards strengthening and transforming its political and legal institutions so that a reliable democratic system of governance evolves. Finally, it is crucial to deal with the socio-economic conditions, by establishing resource redistribution policies to guarantee social cohesion and equity. All these recommendations should be tackled through a proactive relationship between the state, civil society and private corporations.

To conclude this report it is important to highlight that the CSI in Bolivia has provided relevant information that gives CSOs and other social actors the opportunity to better understand the state of Bolivian civil society. This endeavour has not only resulted in two reports in English and Spanish, but will be part of CIVICUS' global CSI publication on the state of civil society in around 50 countries around the world. Thus, this publication aims to be useful to Bolivian CSOs as a tool to help them understand themselves and strengthen their relations with both the state and private companies, in order to resolve the political, economic

and social problems that the country is currently facing. The publication also contributes to comparative analysis on civil society across countries and to the international debate on the role civil society plays in times of globalisation.

## **LIST OF ANNEXES**

- ANNEX 1: LIST OF NATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP (NAG) MEMBERS**
- ANNEX 2: LIST OF CIVIL SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED**
- ANNEX 3: OVERVIEW OF THE CSI RESEARCH METHODS**
- ANNEX 4: POLICY IMPACT STUDIES**
- ANNEX 5: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STUDY**
- ANNEX 6: THE IMAGE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MEDIA**
- ANNEX 7: CSI INDICATOR SCORING MATRIX**

**ANNEX 1: LIST OF NATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP (NAG) MEMBERS**

<b>No.</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>INSTITUTION</b>
1	Xavier Albó	Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA)
2	Fernando Mayorga	Centro de Estudios Superiores Universitarios de la Universidad Mayor de San Simón (CESU – UMSS)
3	Ivonne Farah	Ciencias del Desarrollo – Post Grado de la Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (CIDES – UMSA)
4	Juan Carlos Núñez	Fundación Jubileo
5	Zulema Lehm	The Nature Conservancy
6	Luis Tapia	Ciencias del Desarrollo – Post Grado de la Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (CIDES – UMSA)
7	Gonzalo Rojas-Ortuste	Researcher
8	Julia Ramos	Federación Departamental de Mujeres Campesinas de Tarija “Bartolina Sisa”
9	Enrique Camargo	Ex president Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG)
10	Ignacio Faldín	Representative of Gobierno Municipal de Concepción - Provincia Ñuflo de Chávez – Santa Cruz
11	Oscar Bazoberry	Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA)

## ANNEX 2: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

No.	NAME	INSTITUTION
<b>LA PAZ</b>		
1	Fernando Rodríguez	Capítulo Boliviano
2	Álvaro García Linera	Universidad Mayor de San Andrés
3	Ricardo Pericón	Grupo voluntario Carros de fuego
4	Nelson Sempertegui	“Irupana” company
5	Mónica Beltrán	Centro de la Mujer “Gregoria Apaza”
6	Walter Gutiérrez	Consejo Educativo Aymara
7	Jannet Calatayud	Huayna Tambo
8	José Luis Barroso	Cámara Nacional de Transporte
9	René Carvajal	Asociación Nacional de Pensiones
10	Eugenia Cardozo de Mariaca	Damas Voluntarias del Hospital del Niño
11	Felix Patzi	Universidad Mayor de San Andrés
12	Juan César Rodríguez	Colegio Economistas La Paz
13	Eddy Carlos Vásquez	Afro Bolivian Movement
14	Luis Rico	Artist
15	Julieta Ojeda	Mujeres creando
16	Gumercindo Gutiérrez	Federación Departamental Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz
17	Jaime Solares Quintanilla	Central Obrera Boliviana
18	Napoleón Pacheco	Fundación Milenium
19	Lic. Málaga	Cámara Nacional de Exportadores
20	José Gonzáles	Confederación de Trabajadores en Salud
21	María René Duchén	Periodista ATB – Canal de Televisión
22	Carlos Escóbar	Sociedad de Ing. de Bolivia
23	Pilar Martínez Ormachea	IBIS Dinamarca
24	Audalia Zurita	Ex Ministra de Trabajo
25	Julio Pabón Chávez	Federación de Juntas Vecinales
26	Lucio Huanca Madani	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia
27	Edgar Patana Ticona	Central Obrera Regional de El Alto
28	Sacha Lorenti	Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia
29	Carlos Parra	Familia Galán
30	Alberto Salcedo Peñaloza	Ekklesia – Iglesia cristiana
31	Vico Laura	ABAIEN
32	Martina Santos	Federación Nacional de Trabajadoras del Hogar
33	Freddy Morales	Confederación de Trabajadores Prensa
34	Katiusca Moya	Asociación de Consejalas de Bolivia
35	Eulogio Condori	ADEPCOCA
36	Eduardo Espinoza	Federación de Cooperativas Mineras
37	Silvia de Koziner	Ketal Supermercados
38	José Luis Noya	Empresa “Liliana Castellanos”



39	Max Gastelú	Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia
40	Lupe Andrade	Journalist
41	Rafael Archondo	Journalist
42	Susana ErosteGUI	UNITAS – NGO network
43	Marco Velasco	Pastoral Social Cáritas
44	Gonzalo Vidaurre	Cámara Nacional de Industrias
45	Ricardo Montecinos Gallo	Federación de Asociaciones de Municipios (FAM)
46	Roxana Roca	Asociación Boliviana de Padres y Amigos de Niños Especiales
47	Martín Condori Flores	Consejo Nacional de Ayllus del Qullasuyo (CONAMAQ)
48	Alfredo Humberto Salazar	Junta de Vecinos Zona Sur

### COCHABAMBA

49	Nelson Guillén	Asociación de Comerciantes Minoristas
50	René Crespo	Federación de Fabriles
51	Jhonn Zambrana	Foro de Defensa del Medio Ambiente
52	Marco Antonio Carrillo	Los Tiempos
53	Roberto Tricot	Universidad Mayor de San Simón
54	Marcelo Rodríguez	Federación Universitarios Local
55	Esther Balboa	Universidad Mayor de San Simón
56	Teresa Hosse	Centro de Comunicación y Desarrollo Andino (CENDA)
57	Arturo Echeverría	Compañía Boliviana de Cemento (COBOCE)
58	Cecilia Estrada	Instituto de Formación Femenina Integral
59	Javier Artero	Federación de Entidades Empresariales
60	Iver Seoane	Comunidad GLBTH
61	María Teresa Zegada	Universidad Mayor de San Simón
62	Julietta Montaña	Oficina Jurídica de la Mujer
63	Rina Canedo	Movimiento Carismático
64	Pablo Cuba	Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social – CERES
65	David Herrera	Partido Político Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)
66	Carlos Arévalo	Asociación de Periodistas
67	Ricardo Pol	Gobierno Municipal de Cochabamba
68	Willy Soria	Red Ada
69	Roberto Laserna	Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social (CERES)
70	Rafael Puentes	Academic
71	Oscar Olivera	Coordinador de Defensa del Agua
72	Raúl Bohrt	Club de Leones Cochabamba
73	Marcelo Romero	Distrito Scout Cochabamba

### SANTA CRUZ

74	Dionisio Gutierrez Cubo	Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB)
75	Miguel Cuellar	CIES Salud Sexual y Reproductiva
76	Ma. Eugenia Canedo	Colectivo Rebeldia
77	Amancio Vaca Solano	Consejo Educativo Amazónico
78	Anacleto Supayebe Barbery	Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz

79	Nelson Bartolo Camargo	Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní
80	Hernan Cabrera M.	Federación Sindical de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Santa Cruz
81	Lorgio Balcazar Arroyo	Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz
82	Luis Adolfo Saucedo Hurtado	Unión Juvenil Cruceñista
83	Yamille Bravo Pinto	Fundación Amigas de la Naturaleza
84	Miriam Suarez Vargas	Casa de la Mujer
85	Juan Carlos Jordan Morón	Bomberos Voluntarios
86	Mabel Prado Ortuño	Pro Mujer Santa Cruz
87	Horacio Avila	Asoc. Cruceña de Comparsas
88	José M. Cervantes Gutierrez	Federación Universitaria Local
89	Roger Vargas Pinto	Federación Departamental de Juntas Vecinales
90	Walter Nogales Irahola	Cámara Departamental de Pequeña Industria y Artesanía (CADEPIA)
91	Mario Requinta Alvarez	Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Arroceras (FENCA)
92	Hernán Mendez Porcel	Asociación de Comerciantes Gremialistas
93	Manuel Camacho Lino	Junta Vecinal Plan 3000
94	Jorge Avila Antelo	Cámara Forestal de Bolivia
95	Alfredo Rodriguez Peña	Grupo Nacional de Trabajo para la Participación (GNTP)
96	Eduardo Wills Justiniano	Federación de Ganaderos de Santa Cruz
97	Hermes Justiniano	Fundación para la Conservación del Bosque Chiquitano (FCBC)
98	Ruth Lozada de Parejas	Comité Cívico Femenino
99	Elizabeth Oblitas Bello	Marie Stopes Bolivia
100	Pastor Miguel Carrasco	Comunidad Cristiana SION
101	Elizabeth Contreras	Federación de Maestros Urbanos
102	Adrian Leños Hutzfeldt	Mancomunidades de Municipios Chiquitanos
103	José Mirtenbaumk	Docente Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno
104	Padre Mauricio Bacardit	Pastoral Social Cáritas Santa Cruz (PASOC)

### CHUQUISACA

105	Ana María Arroyo	Asociación de Pequeños Productores de Leche de Chuquisaca
106	Ximena Dávalos	Representante del Defensor del Pueblo en Chuquisaca
107	Gil Montecinos	Maestros Rurales de Educación de Chuquisaca
108	Vladimir Gutiérrez	Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo de Chuquisaca (CEDEC)
109	Patricia Pereira	Servicio Departamental de Educación (SEDUCA) Chuquisaca
110	Marco Antonio Dipp	Periódico "Correo del Sur"
111	María Esther Padilla	Centro "Juana Azurduy de Padilla"

### POTOSÍ

112	Eduardo Maldonado	Representante del Defensor del Pueblo en Potosí
113	Valencio Huayta	Gobierno Municipal de Potosí
114	René Navarro	Comité Cívico Potosinista
115	Rommy Colque	Consejo de Ayllus Originarios de Potosí (CAOP)

### BENI

116	Jorge Melgar	La Palabra del Beni
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117	Jenny Abuawad	Servicio Departamental de Educación (SEDUCA) Beni
118	Eduardo Solares	Servicio Departamental de Salud – Beni
119	Francisco Maza	Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños de Beni (CPEMB)
120	Gerarda Abregó	Confederación de Mujeres Indígenas del Beni (CEMIB)
121	Luis Alberto Maldonado	Comité de Vigilancia - Trinidad
122	Selva Velarde	Representante del Defensor del Pueblo en Beni
123	Carmelo Arteaga	Federación de Ganaderos del Beni

SOURCE: Stakeholders Survey, E&E, 2005

## **ANNEX 3: OVERVIEW OF THE CSI RESEARCH METHODS**

The Civil Society Index in Bolivia was implemented using the following research tools:

### **I. Bibliographical Review of Existing Secondary Information**

There was a constant review of printed materials relevant to Bolivian civil society. In the initial phase, a systematised draft report was drawn up containing all of the information found related to civil society. Afterwards and during the field phase, the bibliographic review was updated with additional secondary sources.

Various unedited documents and web sites from 29 CSOs were analysed based on the following list of types of CSOs:

1. Business or trade associations
2. Professional organisations
3. Unions or any other workers' organisations
4. Religious or spiritual groups
5. Political groups or citizens' groups
6. Cultural groups or associations (music, theatre, etc.)
7. Groups related to education
8. Sports and youth associations
9. Women's organisations
10. NGOs, Human Rights Organisations and Volunteer Organisations
11. Ethnic community associations
12. Environmental associations

### **II. Primary Research**

The primary research consisted of the four components listed below:

1. Regional stakeholders consultations
2. Community survey
3. Media review
4. Fact finding studies

#### **1. Regional stakeholder's consultations**

The stakeholders represent different sectors inside and outside of civil society. The consultations consisted of filling out a survey designed by CIVICUS and discussing the preliminary results in regional workshops.

#### **Stakeholders' survey**

In July and August 2005, the company *Encuestas & Estudios* carried out the survey with representatives of different CSOs, private companies and the state who knew about issues relating to civil society. Of the 123 people consulted:

- 84.6% were from the cities of La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba and the rest were from the cities of Sucre, Potosí and Trinidad.

- 61.5% were leaders or representatives of CSOs, 15.6% belong to state institutions, 16.4% to the private sector and 6.6% to NGOs.
- 72.7% were men and 27.3 women.

The company *Encuestas y Estudios* (E&E) was hired to carry out the surveys in the cities of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz and the National Index Team carried out the surveys in Sucre, Potosí and Trinidad. The list of the stakeholders consulted can be found in Annex 2.

## **Regional Workshops**

Four regional workshops were held during the month of August 2005 in the cities of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Sucre, where 55 people participated.

- 34.5% participated in La Paz, 23.6% in Santa Cruz, 20% in Cochabamba and 21.8% in Sucre.
- 1% belonged to the private sector, 10.9% to the state, 29% to NGOs and 59.1% to CSOs.
- 56% of those participating were women.

The workshops lasted for six to eight hours and issues from the surveys and the preliminary results were discussed.

## **2. Community survey**

The *Encuestas y Estudios* Company also worked in the implementation of the Community survey. For six weeks in July and August 2005, 642 people were consulted around the country. The samples were taken from the departments according to the number of inhabitants, which were further divided into Primary Sampling Units (PSU) and then into Secondary Sampling Units (SSU), to make up well-defined clusters. The levels of stratification taken into account to classify the sample consisted of:

**Stratification Level 1:** The urban sector was limited to a sample from larger and intermediary populations. The rural area yielded a sample of concentrated rural populations and a sample from the widespread populations. It was decided to set up four strata levels according to population size distributed according to the percentage each level makes up to the national total:

- Populations above 20 thousand (Greater Urban 57%)
- Populations between 2 and 20 thousand (Intermediate Urban 10%)
- Populations between 500 and 1,999 (Concentrated Rural 5%)
- Populations below 500 (Widespread Rural 28%)

**Stratification Level 2:** Each one of the second level strata was divided into clusters of similar populations (predefined in the E&E database by zones or areas of 10 thousand inhabitants) called Primary Sampling Units (PSU). The most densely populated areas had more of these PSUs and the less populated had fewer of them. Each cluster represented a clearly defined region where a set number of surveys were administered (20 per PSU).

**Stratification Level 3:** Each of the PSUs also had a number of SSUs defined by the E&E database. The zones with approximately 200 households in each PSU were selected and a set number of 10 questionnaires administered.

**Control level 1:** Each PSU was also positioned in a level according to its prevalent socio-economic characteristics or the main forms of production or ecological level in the rural areas.

**Control level 2:** As we did not want to interview only those who were at home, mainly women and older people, a control for age and sex was introduced into each PSU to ensure a distribution of 50% men and 50% women (according to the distribution from the last census) and lead to percentages by age that replicate (at least by group) the distribution shown by the National Institute of Statistics (INE).

The sample represents the Bolivian population and the 642 people consulted show a sampling error of  $\pm 4.62\%$  in 95% (confidence interval). This means that if the same sample is taken 100 times, 95% of the time it will yield 4.62% above or below its real value. Below is a list of the populations or areas selected randomly for the sampling, which initially estimated using 640 people:

CC	Department	Municipality	Conglomerate	Size	Estimated sample	Sample obtained
9	Beni	Cercado	Ciudad de Trinidad	1	20	17
9	Beni	Riberalta	Riberalta	1	20	20
3	Cochabamba	Cochabamba	Cochabamba	1	50	40
5	Chuquisaca	Sucre	Ciudad de Sucre	1	20	18
1	La Paz	La Paz	Ciudad de La Paz	1	70	57
1	La Paz	El Alto	Ciudad de El Alto	1	40	39
7	Pando	Cobija	Ciudad de Cobija	1	20	17
6	Potosí	Potosí	Ciudad de Potosí	1	20	16
6	Potosí	Tupiza	Tupiza	1	10	8
2	Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz	1	60	49
2	Santa Cruz	Montero	Montero	1	20	18
8	Tarija	Yacuiba	Yacuiba	1	20	19
9	Beni	San Borja	San Borja	2	10	10
3	Cochabamba	Aiquile	Aiquile	2	10	10
4	Oruro	Huanuni	Huanuni	2	10	13
2	Santa Cruz	Robore	Robore	2	10	11
2	Santa Cruz	Puerto Suarez	Puerto Suarez	2	10	10
2	Santa Cruz	Ascensión de Guarayos	Ascensión de Guarayos	2	10	11
8	Tarija	Villamontes	Villamontes	2	10	10
5	Chuquisaca	Zudañes	Zudañes	3	10	11
4	Oruro	Toledo	Toledo	3	10	14
6	Potosí	Llica	Llica	3	10	11
3	Cochabamba	Bolivar	Bolivar	4	10	12
3	Cochabamba	Arque	Arque	4	10	13
3	Cochabamba	Aiquile	Caquingora	4	10	12
5	Chuquisaca	Las Carreras	Las Carreras	4	10	14
5	Chuquisaca	San Lucas	Ocurí	4	10	12
1	La Paz	Colquiri	Vivaque	4	10	12
1	La Paz	Coro Coro	Caquingora	4	10	11
4	Oruro	Chipaya	Chipaya	4	10	12
4	Oruro	Belen de Andamarca	Belen de Andamarca	4	10	13

7	Pando	Arroyo Grande	Filadelfia	4	10	14
7	Pando	Bella Vista	Bella Flor	4	10	10
6	Potosí	San Agustín	San Agustín	4	10	12
6	Potosí	Tomave	Thola Pampa	4	10	16
6	Potosí	San Pablo	San Pablo de Lipez	4	10	14
2	Santa Cruz	Santa Rosa	Puerto Nuevo	4	10	0
2	Santa Cruz	Concepción	Dolorida	4	10	11
2	Santa Cruz	Sarah	Sarah	4	0	14
8	Tarija	San Lorenzo	Sella	4	10	11

	<b>Estimated</b>	<b>Obtained</b>
<b>TOTAL QUESTIONNAIRES</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>642</b>
National sampling error	4.62%	

The demographic profile of those consulted is the following:

- 50.2% women and 49.8% men from the following departments:

Department	Number	%
La Paz	118	18.4
Santa Cruz	123	19.2
Cochabamba	86	13.4
Oruro	52	8.1
Chuquisaca	56	8.7
Potosí	77	12.0
Pando	42	6.6
Tarija	40	6.3
Beni	47	7.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>100.0</b>

SOURCE: Community survey, E&E, 2005


- Age ranges:

Range	%
18 to 25	28.7
26 to 35	25.1
36 to 45	19.9
46 to 55	12.6
56 to 65	9.0
Above 65	4.7

SOURCE: Community survey, E&E, 2005

- 82.4% of those consulted are from a low socio-economic level; 14.5% middle and 3.1% high.
- The level of education reached by those consulted is shown as follows:

### Level of schooling of those interviewed



SOURCE: Community survey, E&E, 2005

### 3. Media Review

For six weeks in May and June 2005, the Multimedia Group & Entertainment Company monitored the news in the following media:

TV Channels – Total of 15 daily newscasts, five days a week.

- ATB Red Nacional (3 daily newscasts, mainly in La Paz)
- BOLIVISIÓN (3 daily newscasts, mainly in La Paz - Cochabamba)
- RTP (3 daily newscasts, mainly in La Paz – El Alto)
- UNITEL (3 daily newscasts, mainly in Santa Cruz)
- RED UNO (3 daily newscasts, mainly in Santa Cruz)

Newspapers – 3 dailies, seven days a week. Sections analysed: main, financial, social, security, supplements. The sports, commercial, social and international pages were not taken into account.

- La Razón (printed in La Paz)
- El Deber (printed in Santa Cruz)
- Los Tiempos (printed in Cochabamba)

Radio stations – 3 daily newscasts, five days a week

- Panamericana (La Paz, but broadcast nationwide)
- FIDES (La Paz, but broadcast nationwide)
- Santa Cruz Red Amazónica (Santa Cruz)

A total of 2,521 clips were registered:

- Press total: 406 (16%)
- TV total: 1,285 (51%)
- Radio total: 830 (33%)

The procedure used for the media review was as follows:



**Information gathering.** The news broadcast on TV and radio and published in the newspapers selected in La Paz and Santa Cruz was collected.

**Note taking.** As the recordings were made, the first classifications were written up to later be able to select those that were relevant.

**Revision.** Once notes had been taken, the contents of each article or broadcast (items) were analysed according to relevant civil society topics and organisations.

**Data input.** Once the items were selected, they were then systematised and registered in the CIVICUS MS-Access database according to the fields and indicators on the main form.

**Analysis.** The analysis was carried out taking into account the following:

- **Frequency:** Once the items were registered, the frequency of broadcast was noted enabling us to see the continuity of the item from the first broadcast to the last and to see the importance given to the topic.
- **Content:** the analysis of the contents followed these conditions: Use of value judgements, intent, photographs or images, prejudiced or favourable views, editorial opinion, among others. All of these can be seen in the “observations” field.
- **Agenda:** Recurring frequency and a political position characterise the agenda of the media, which was evaluated in the study.
- **Image:** This criterion comes at the end of the analysis and corresponds to an evaluation of how the media presented the CSO (i.e. the image of CSOs presented in the article was positive, neutral or negative).

#### 4. Fact - finding studies

The CSI - Bolivia also carried out four related fact-finding studies on the following topics:

- Fact-finding study on Human Rights: The events of February and October 2003
- Fact-finding study on Land and Territory Public Policies: Yuquises Case
- Fact-finding study on Social Control of Budgets: La Paz Department Social Control Mechanism
- Fact-finding study on Corporate Social Responsibility: Large companies and Peasant Economic Organisations

Each of the fact-finding studies is described in detail in the following annexes.

## ANNEX 4: POLICY IMPACT STUDIES

Three fact-finding studies were carried out to take a deeper look at civil society's impact on public policy: one on human rights, social issues and another on civil society's impact on the budget process.

### **Fact-finding study on Human Rights: Civil Society Campaigns and Actions and their Impact on Promoting and Defending Human Rights (February and October 2003)**

*Ángela Andrea Velasco Terán*<sup>28</sup>

#### *Introduction*

A fact-finding study was carried out within the framework of the CSI in Bolivia to analyse the degree to which civil society is active and successful in promoting and defending Human Rights in the country. Due to the relevance of this issue in Bolivia, two specific moments were considered: February and October 2003, when the government, through its institutions, violated citizens' Civil and Political Rights by repressing the demonstrations that took place against the Sánchez de Lozada government. In order to interpret and understand the influence civil society has on human rights, the study combined qualitative and quantitative research methods using semi structured interviews with key informants, non-participatory observation, an opinion survey, as well as book reviews, clippings and review of audiovisual material.

#### *Human Rights in Context*

In February 2003, then-president Sánchez de Lozada passed a decree to implement a direct tax on salaries mainly affecting the working classes, which on average earn less than 200 \$US per month. Various social sectors, especially the working classes and national police force, began street demonstrations against the tax hike arguing that their wages were not enough to fulfil their needs and that the tax hike would negatively affect their family income. The government decided to use the armed forces to disperse the protesters and restore social order. During this period, the military confronted protesters and the police resulting in the death of 33 people and injuring 182. This situation proved to be the first deadly confrontation between the state and civil society groups during that year.

Some months later, details of the government initiative to sell natural gas to the US through Chilean ports came to the public's attention. The government passed a Supreme Decree granting the companies the right to extract Bolivian gas for 40 years. According to different social sectors, this Decree was not considered beneficial to the country because gas production was mainly exported and hardly enjoyed by Bolivian citizens. At the end of September, various social sectors began to mobilise through protest marches and road blockades in different cities around the country, mainly in El Alto, rejecting the sale of gas under unfavourable conditions for Bolivia.

These blockades led to a shortage of gasoline in the seat of the government (La Paz), since gasoline delivery trucks were stopped on the roads of El Alto by demonstrators. As a consequence, the government launched the "National Emergency", Supreme Decree 27209, ordering the armed forces to distribute fuel to the city of La Paz at any cost: "The redressal of any damage to property and people that might be produced as an effect of fulfilling the objective of this Supreme Decree is guaranteed by the Bolivian State". Over the next few days this Supreme Decree led to the soldiers opening the way for a convoy of lorries and tankers transporting fuel and liquid gas from the plant in *Senkata*, located in El Alto, to the city of La

<sup>28</sup> Student who has finished her studies at the department of Anthropology at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés de La Paz – Bolivia. The study was carried out from May to August 2005.

Paz, using their weapons to clear the road that was blocked by unarmed civilians.<sup>29</sup> The soldiers also tried to repress the protests in different neighbourhoods in El Alto by using violence and by trying to contain the massive peasant march. These confrontations resulted in the violation of human rights where over 50 civilians died and 400 were injured.<sup>30</sup> Faced with this panorama, middle-class sectors joined the peasant, unions, workers and indigenous peoples' protests openly rejecting the stance of the then president of the Republic, and demanding his resignation, which finally happened on 17 October 2003 when he fled to the US.

This fact-finding study seeks to analyse: a) how civil society organised itself when faced with these historical conflicts; b) what activities it carried out to support the victims of the abuses and to demand the redressal for the human misery inflicted by the State; and c) how successful these actions have been.

### ***Main results***

On the one hand, the capacity of Bolivian civil society to gather together different sectors of the national population, including divided factions, to protest against a state that represses the rights of demonstration and mobilization by using armed forces to control demonstrations and murder or injure some civilians was observed. On the other hand, it was evidenced that Bolivians have the capacity to come together to support the families affected, backed by some NGOs, forming different associations to demand that the government redress damages. Likewise, the Pro Justice and Peace Commission was set up to provide legal and humanitarian assistance to the families affected. Furthermore, civil society organised itself by forming the steering committee to bring Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to trial, which responds to the demand to charge the material and intellectual masterminds who caused the death of many citizens in February and October 2003.

Although many of these actions have had a limited impact, such as compensation for the families affected, the approval of the trial by the Senate and the formal charging of the cabinet of ministers in power at the time; these actions have not had a significant effect because of slow judiciary proceedings that are of limited reach.

The study also showed that the Bolivian people have scant knowledge of their rights, which is the first step in being able to defend themselves. There was evidence that the diffusion campaigns held by different human rights organizations around the country did not have a significant effect on the population. Few people know what their rights are and few can differentiate the different types of rights. Very few mentioned having received information about their rights and the majority does not have confidence in the work of the human rights organisations in the country.

### ***Conclusions***

The fact-finding study shows that civil society actively promotes and defends human rights although its impact is still limited. There is a capacity to mobilise and come together; however, there are spaces where civil society's demands have not had a great effect, mainly when dealing with fulfilling legal processes such as bringing Sánchez de Lozada and his cabinet to trial. On the other hand, as seen before, people have limited knowledge of their rights as the information campaigns carried out by the different human rights organisations apparently do not have the desired effect on the people.

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<sup>29</sup> Liquid gas distribution plant.

<sup>30</sup> There is no official number of people who died; the numbers vary according to the source. The Ombudsman's Office calculated 59 dead and 411 injured. The Bolivian Chapter of Human Rights, Democracy and Development published a list of 73 dead and 470 injured.

## Fact-finding study on Social Policy Issues: Land and Territory Public Policy: Sector Yuquises

Omar Quiroga and Eulogio Núñez<sup>31</sup>

### *Introduction*

A component related to the demand for land was incorporated into the analysis of the state of Bolivian civil society, since this is a fundamental issue for the country. It addresses not only land redistribution policies but also the economic rights to Land. In Bolivia, lands rights have become an issue of concern as the existence of unused fiscal lands were evidenced. Thus, different social sectors, especially the landless movement, set up their demands for a better and fairer land distribution. Conflict between landowners and landless groups arose and the need for clear-cut land policies became a priority in the country. The objective of this study was to analyse how civil society comes together to demand land and how effective the formal and/or informal mobilisation methods are. The case analysed for this study deals with the occupation of lands in May 2004 by the Landless Movement in Santa Cruz in the zone known as “Los Yuquises”.<sup>32</sup> In order to interpret and understand the influence civil society has on the land issue, a detailed documental review was made of books, press cuttings and web sites.

### *“Los Yuquises” Land and Territory in Context*

The United Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), in 1999, decided to create the Landless Movement (MST), with the aim of influencing the equal distribution of lands affecting the large land owner system in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia. Since 2000 Landless unions have sprung up in different communities in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia. In May 2004, the 5<sup>th</sup> Indigenous - Peasant March was held when various indigenous and peasant organisations demanded the allocation of fiscal lands to the Landless Movement.

The National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) and the Ministry of Sustainable Development signed an agreement with the indigenous and peasant organisations and offered lands in the *Los Yuquises* zone to be reclaimed, registered and allocated. Therefore, the Santa Cruz MST presented a demand for land allocation and later went to the zone to verify the presence of fiscal lands. While doing this they were ambushed, abused and evicted by 300 armed persons. After this, in June 2004, the MST began legal proceedings to access the fiscal lands in the aforementioned zone, and at the same time, a group of 600 people belonging to the MST squatted on the same property.

This conflict came about mainly because the *Los Yuquises* zone is not legally defined and Mr. Rafael Paz Barberly claims that he is the owner of the land under dispute, whereas the members of the MST allege that they are occupying land that does not fulfil the Economic-Social Function as established by the State Political Constitution and the INRA Law.

A succession of raids, repressions, confrontations, aggressions, police interventions, peaceful evictions, detentions and interventions on the part of the INRA to reclaim the lands accompanies this process that is currently at a standstill.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, the government does not have the capacity to fulfil the commitment to grant land to those evicted from *Los Yuquises*.

<sup>31</sup> Researchers from CIPCA Santa Cruz. The study was carried out from June to August 2005.

<sup>32</sup> Landless (upper case) is understood in the text as those belonging to the Landless Movement and landless (lower case) is used to refer to those who do not possess land.

<sup>33</sup> The study refers to August 2005.

### *Main results*

The research showed the weakness of the state and its institutions when dealing with the agrarian issue, manifesting itself in a lack of political will to apply the INRA Law and prioritise the agrarian issue on the public agenda. On the other hand, civil society has mobilised to lobby for the law to be upheld and the sectors involved have become polarised. Although each sector has managed to obtain something from the government, the impact of their actions are limited as the agreements are mainly difficult to fulfil and do not have the consensus of various actors directly involved in the issue.

The impact that civil society has achieved through its lobbying for lands can be summed up as follows:

The peasant, indigenous and Landless organisations obtained financing to start the rehabilitation process of the disputed land; they committed the government to awarding lands; they had the INRA speed up the process to declare the lands rehabilitated in zone 111 adjacent to the area of conflict and that their demand for lands to be awarded. Likewise, they are negotiating with the government a programme of human resettlement and a section of the public has been sensitised to the issue, as information on large extensions of land and their unfair distribution has been brought to light.

However, these actions have had a limited impact, as the process to rehabilitate, register and allocate lands is slow. The Landless have been evicted from the disputed land, the public prosecutor's office is prosecuting the leaders of the MST who are directing the group squatting in Los Yuquises and the owners have won the constitutional right to evict the group. Even though the government did not want to reach this point for fear of further confrontations and deaths, the owners managed to prosecute some members of the Landless Movement.

### *Conclusions*

Civil society's actions have had a limited impact on land and territory policy. The study shows that the civil society actors such as the Landless Movement (MST) have used both formal and informal actions to be able to take their demands for the rehabilitation and registration of fiscal lands to the government. They publicly denounced the incompliance of the INRA Law and participated in meetings with government representatives to negotiate the allotment of these lands. They also blocked roads, marched and squatted when they did not receive a response from the state. However, although the Landless Movement managed to obtain financing to start the rehabilitation process of the disputed land, the process is slow and has yet to take shape.

### **Fact-finding study on National Budget Process Policy Issue: La Paz Department Social Control Mechanism<sup>34</sup>**

*Jorge Bedregal Marzluf<sup>35</sup>*

#### *Introduction*

One important aspect of the analysis of civil society is the degree to which its activities have an impact on the daily life of the people and society. The role of civil society in controlling the budget is important as the budget influences all areas of public policy. Therefore the NIT

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<sup>34</sup> Social Control is a sociological term that was developed in the USA. It is the mechanism in which citizens can demand State accountability under institutionalised basis.

<sup>35</sup> The author of this study is a lawyer currently studying for Master's Degree in Social and Human Development at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (CIDES-UMSA). Vladimir Díaz, Alfredo Manzano, Micaela Molina, Daniel Palacios and Darinka Vásquez also collaborated. The study was carried out between May and August 2005.

sought to carry out a diagnosis to see the impact CSOs have on the social control of national budgets and sought to evaluate the repercussions Bolivian civil society actions have had to date on this issue. The La Paz Department Social Control Mechanism was analysed for this study because it works closely with the National Social Control Mechanism (NSCM) and is one of the mechanisms that has had the most national impact. In order to analyse how effective the La Paz Department Social Control Mechanism (MCSLP) is, secondary information was gathered from documents written by researchers and key actors about social control of budgets. Additionally, primary information using structured interviews were used to contribute to reflection and debate on social control in Bolivia.

### *Social Control in Context*

In Bolivia, the idea of social control, as a state accountability instrument, was imported by the government supported by the International Cooperation. In 1994 within the framework of “second generation” reforms, the Popular Participation Law was passed as a mechanism to decentralise the state by granting autonomy to the 314 municipalities. These municipalities were strengthened with more resources and skills and, at the same time, Vigilance Committees were created as a specific organisation working on the social control of the municipal plans, budget and resources; Territorial Grassroots Organisations were also set up for this purpose, to promote the participation of indigenous peoples and neighbourhood boards. The following year the Administrative Decentralisation Law was passed with the aim of completing decentralisation at the departmental level. In 1997, Bolivia was the arena for the first Latin American campaign to drop the external debt spearheaded by the Catholic Church. At the same time, the government sponsored the First National Dialogue where the idea of social control raised. In July 2001, the National Dialogue Law was passed which set up the Social Control Mechanism (MCS) as required by the Jubilee Forum, which was meant to establish a system of budget control within departmental and national government institutions. This Law also set out how the HIPC resources were to be distributed. Finally, in relation to the development of Bolivian social control, in August 2004 the “Productive Bolivia” National Dialogue was held.

### *Main results*

The study reveals that civil society actively promotes social control of budgets although the impact of these actions is limited. It can be seen, for example, that civil society participated in platforms for concerted action organised by the Catholic Church and the state proposing the creation of National and Departmental Social Control Mechanisms. However, these mechanisms were set up based on how the state and International Cooperation conceptualise them. There is no state financing for the mechanisms; the authorities are still reticent to allow budget control of money that does not come from the HIPC and in many cases civil society groups are not trained to use the specialised information.

There is little confidence in the monitoring activities of the MCS and the MCSLP. This confidence is directly linked to the state’s exclusion of other sectors from its activities. The state has built a wall around itself so that civil society can not find out what is really going on. One example of this was seen during the designing of prefectural plans and programmes. This type of project does not include civil society in the preparation, but rather simply “allows” control over their execution. In such planning, a deliberation process seldom takes place and the state almost never consults the people prior to project implementation.

With regard to budgets, CSOs seek to exercise social control through social mobilisations and street demonstrations, making little use of the departmental mechanism set up. CSOs exert pressure on how the budget is allocated to fulfil general objectives, such as more spending on education, health industry and housing, but do not prioritise expenditure in sectors that do not

benefit society in general, such as the excessive expenditure on the armed forces or other dubious sectors, including the government's reserve fund.

### ***Conclusions***

Civil society's actions to influence national and departmental budgets have not had the desired success, mainly because of its limited participation in the Social Control Mechanism set up for this end. Many of the actions are carried out informally through street protests, which tend to be more effective, especially when related to the budgets for health and education. This study has corroborated that the impact civil society could have on public policy is linked to the capacity of the state to respond to its demands and the actions that civil society promotes.

## ANNEX 5: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY STUDY

*Nicolás Laguna, Luisa López y Khantuta Muruchi*<sup>36</sup>

### *Introduction*

The fact-finding study on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) evaluates the degree to which Bolivian companies develop actions for social and environmental responsibility in the country and the degree to which they favour the development of civil society actions. The study analyses the interaction, vision and attitude of the business sector towards CSOs and the type or level of responsibility they take for the social and environmental impact their actions have. The study, as well as looking at secondary information on CSR, found primary information from material published and unpublished by the companies and the Peasant Economic Organisations (OECAS) and semi structured interviews with key informants, fields visits to the companies' and OECAs' plants and informal chats with local populations.

### *Context*

The study's background shows that the development of CSR in Bolivia is still in its early stages. Some large companies incorporated isolated CSR policies in the last decade but it was only at the end of 2004 that different Corporate Organisations and Civil Society Institutions set up the "Bolivian Council for Corporate Social Responsibility" (COBORSE). This council aims to develop and diffuse CSR practices in Bolivia through activities such as courses and workshops for different institutions and organisations.

In spite of this effort, CSR in Bolivia is not developed but rather stuck at the stage of trying to build consensus on CSR concepts and policies to be applied in the future by a greater number of companies. In Bolivia, small or medium-scale financial organisations, such as the Peasant Economic Organisations (OECAs), develop social and environmental responsibility practices without a clear idea of CSR, although their practices are organised and coordinated. Therefore, the study sought to expand the analysis of CSR not only taking into account the large corporations but also some OECAs. Among the "large corporations" studied are, the cement company SOBOCE and the petroleum company PETROBRAS Bolivia.<sup>37</sup> Both were chosen from a list of the 100 largest companies in the country. The first is a company with national capital and the second is a multinational company. The OECAs studied were: The *Asociación de Productores Lácteos (APROLAC)*, The *Cooperativa Guadalquivir*, *Central de Cooperativas del Café (CENCOOP)*, the *Federación de Caficultores de Bolivia (FECAFEB)* and the *Federación de Cooperativas Arroceras (FENCA)*.

This study analyses their interaction with and responsibility for salaried workers and their relations to different CSOs, the state and NGOs.

### *Main results*

The results of the study show that the large companies in Bolivia develop CSR policies amidst a complex context where there are multiple demands and extreme poverty. Therefore, the motivation for the companies to execute CSR policies mainly responds to civil society demands and to a certain extent to corporate policy. It has been observed that taking on CSR policies allows large corporations to keep up a good corporate image and prevent problems with the communities around their areas of operation.

<sup>36</sup> The authors are students who have finished their studies at the department of Sociology from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés. The study was carried out from May to August 2005.

<sup>37</sup> The "large corporations" were selected from the list of the 100 biggest companies in Bolivia selected under the criterion of "sales."



It can be seen that the notions and ways that the CSR actions are applied cover the three fundamentals of CSR: labour, social and environmental aspects. With respect to labour, SOBOCE and PETROBRAS Bolivia have policies for training employees as well as providing them with health insurance, social security, employment rights, salary policies and recreational activities. With respect to the social aspect, the companies consider that it is indispensable to cooperate with the community around their production plants, to set up a positive image and healthy dialogue to prevent possible social conflicts. Both companies carry out social projects in the communities where they operate, supporting health, sanitation, housing and education, and in some cases recreational, cultural and also productive projects. Their objective is to improve the income of those living near their production plants. In the environmental aspect, both companies certify their processes managing to maintain policies to protect and restore the environment based on international regulations.

Although large companies are primarily interested in supporting the communities where they operate, the dialogue between the companies and civil society is not always straight forward. Both actors have interests that can come into conflict with others' under certain conditions. Therefore, the relationship between the companies studied and some Bolivian CSOs is complex and is not always harmonious. For example, the evaluation of the actions of the companies from the CSOs interviewed was not always positive, which means that there is still a lot of work to be done on CSR. The following table summarises the main CSR actions carried out by these two large corporations:

Company	Social and Environmental Activities		
	Labour	Social	Environmental
SOBOCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training employees</li> <li>• Industrial security</li> <li>• Health and accident insurance</li> <li>• Social security</li> <li>• Employment rights</li> <li>• Salary policies</li> <li>• Guided tours for visitors and families</li> <li>• Encouragement bonuses for employees</li> <li>• Recreational activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jisunu Foundation in charge of the social activities of the company</li> <li>• Productive projects</li> <li>• Education projects</li> <li>• Tourism</li> <li>• Micro - enterprises</li> <li>• Cultural activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ISO 14001</li> <li>• The company rewards employees that have carried out environmentally-friendly activities</li> </ul>
PETROBRAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training employees, internships</li> <li>• Health insurance and yearly health examination of employees</li> <li>• Social Security</li> <li>• Employment rights</li> <li>• Salary policies</li> <li>• Recreational activities and sports tournaments</li> <li>• Employees have access to gyms</li> <li>• Encouragement bonuses for employees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health and sanitation infrastructure</li> <li>• Productive projects</li> <li>• Employment creation</li> <li>• Cultural activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ISO 14001</li> <li>• Kyoto Protocol</li> <li>• Eco-efficiency policy</li> <li>• Establishment of a nature conservancy settlement in Tarija</li> </ul>

The study shows that OECAs do not apply integral CSR policies explicitly or based on theoretical concepts, meaning that some take on social and environmental responsibility. The direct relationship of the OECAs with their members and the community allows them to adopt

actions that would be defined as CSR policies arising from the demands of civil society and their own organisational structure.

The CSR actions that the OECAs apply within their associations are mainly related to training, representation and support for their incorporation into the productive chain and the opening of markets. However, the OECAs, unlike the large companies, face difficulties in guaranteeing the health and security of their members. When looking at external social responsibility actions, it can be seen that some OECAs maintain direct contact with the community and can access resources that enable them to directly support the community and their cultural activities. There are others, however, that are more distanced from the daily life of their communities. Some OECAs, especially those who manage to export their products, apply environmental policies and have international certification that control the productive process ranging from the relationship with the producers to the delivery of the final product, whereas the smaller OECAs do not apply environmental policies systematically.

The representatives of many of the OECAs studied state that they do consider themselves to be part of civil society and to have a close relationship with different social organisations, unions and other civil society and state institutions. The relationship of the OECAs with peasant unions is closer as the members of the OECAs and the Board are mainly members and leaders of the unions, leading the OECAs sometimes to participating in the protests and road blockades.

### ***Conclusions***

The issue of CSR is new in Bolivia. Large companies are slowly incorporating this type of actions, mainly as a result of their interest in guaranteeing the sustainability of their operations in the long-term. However, companies still have a lot of work to do to promote CSR, especially for its relationship with civil society. Smaller companies, such as the OECAs, even though they do not have formal CSR policies fulfil certain principals of CSR, but are weak in securing environmental and employment matters.

## ANNEX 6: THE IMAGE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MEDIA

*Eduardo Subieta and Mauricio Gutiérrez  
Multimedia Group & Entertainment*


### **Introduction**

The Civil Society Index in Bolivia spent six weeks carrying out a media review to determine how civil society is represented in the Bolivian media. The study took place during the social protests that led to President Carlos Mesa resignation, which meant that the president of the Supreme Court was legally called on to take over the office. Since civil society played a key role during this historical moment, the results of the study may show the so-called “density” of civil society, since at times of social and political conflict civil society is very active. The study consisted of monitoring the news broadcast on five television channels: ATB, UNITEL, RED UNO, RTP and Bolivisión; three radio stations: Panamericana, FIDES and Radio Santa Cruz and three newspapers: *La Razón*, *Los Tiempos* and *El Deber*. These sources were chosen in order to examine different media perspectives: regional, east - west and political-ideological: private sector, social movements and the Catholic Church. The main results of the study are summarised below.

### **Main results**

**Quantity:** The total number of items on civil society that were monitored was 2,521, which is equivalent to an average of 70 items per day. Of the items 96% are short items with few special reports, editorials or interviews on the topic. The media that gave the most coverage to the CSOs is the Bolivian network Bolivisión with 16.4% and the lowest is the newspaper *La Razón* with 5.1% of the total of items (figure A6.1).

**FIGURE A6.1: Items on civil society per media (%)**




Source: CSI Media Review – Bolivia, 2005

**Civil Society Actors:** 77.3 % of the items focus their attention

on four types of CSOs. The majority of items were about unions such as the COB and the CSUTCB, followed by civic committees, mainly the Santa Cruz Civic Committee; then the neighbourhood associations, such as the FEJUVE in the city of El Alto, which was the main protagonist of the social movements in the seat of the government and finally the CSOs representing the private sector.

**Image:** The media review shows that media coverage tends to be “state centric” meaning that the media sees the aspects that link civil society to the state as newsworthy. Therefore, the portrayal of the CSOs in the media is based on conflict and unsatisfied demands, which

**FIGURE A6.2: Image of the CSOs per type of media (%)**




Source: CSI Media Review – Bolivia, 2005.

in the time of the sampling were extreme. For example, of the total monitored, 51.3% of new items deal with lobbying actions such as marches, road blockades and strikes held by civil society and 28.8% deal with national politics.

On the other hand, the study shows that the media also deals with regional political conflicts around the country. Although the proportion of “neutral” items was greater than the negative or positive items, some media tend to present civil society in a less neutral light because of their political

**FIGURE A6.4: Image of the CSOs on the television (%)**




Source: CSI Media Review – Bolivia, 2005.

UNITEL represents 41.7% of negative items on civil society, followed by ATB and then by the Red UNO (figure A6.4).<sup>39</sup>

### Conclusions

To conclude, the media plays an important role in constructing the public image of Bolivian civil society, which is mainly presented based on how it makes its requests to the state. The media review showed that the media, mainly the written press and some TV channels, still show perceptions shaped by ideological and political prejudices, and in many cases tend to discredit some social groups or present the regionalist or separatist slogans of some power groups.

**FIGURE A6.3. Image of the CSOs in the printed media (%)**



Source: CSI Media Review – Bolivia, 2005.

stance.<sup>38</sup> The radio stations generally broadcast a larger number of neutral items on civil society, followed by television. Nevertheless, it is remarkable to see that less than 50% of articles in the press are neutral and 37.4% present a negative image of CSOs (figure A6.2). In the printed media category, La Razón shows 43.1% of negative articles on civil society, followed by Los Tiempos (figure A6.3). In the case of TV channels,

<sup>38</sup> The will of the media was analysed according to the following three criteria: positive, negative and neutral. The language used and the image presented of the different civil society actors as presented in the item was evaluated.

<sup>39</sup> The news monitored on UNITEL and RED UNO are broadcast in the city of Santa Cruz and are regional, and they are not broadcast across the country.

## ANNEX 7: CSI INDICATOR SCORING MATRIX

### 1. STRUCTURE

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
<b>1. 1. Breadth of citizen participation</b>	<b>How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engages in Civil Society activities?</b>				
1.1.1. Non-partisan political action	What percentage of people has ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration) in the last five years?	A very small minority (Less than 10%).	A minority (10% to 30%).	A significant proportion (31% to 65%).	A large majority (More than 65%).
1.1.2 Charitable giving	What percentage of people donates to charity? (e.g. alms, donations in kind, tithing)	A very small minority (Less than 10%).	A minority (10% to 30%).	A significant proportion (31% to 65%).	A large majority (More than 65%).
1.1.3 CSO membership	What percentage of people belongs to at least one CSO?	A small minority (Less than 30%).	A minority (30% to 50%).	A majority (51% to 65%).	A large majority (More than 65%).
1.1.4 Volunteering	What percentage of people undertakes volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?	A very small minority (Less than 10%).	A small minority (10% to 30%).	A minority (31% to 50%).	A majority (More than 50%).
1.1.5 Community action	What percentage of people has participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. a collective effort to solve a community problem)?	A small minority (less than 30%).	A minority (30% -50%)	A majority (51% to 65%).	A large majority (more than 65%)
<b>1. 2. Depth of citizen participation</b>	<b>How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in CS? How frequently/extensively do people engage in Civil Society activities? Which is the diversity of its actions?</b>				
1.2.1 Charitable giving	How much (Bs) do people donate to charity? How much do people donate to charity the last week? How much in kind? (Bs)	Less than 1%	1.1 % to 2%	2.1% to 3%	More than 3%
1.2.2 Volunteering	How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?	Less than 2 hours	2.1 to 5 hours	5.1 to 8 hours	More than 8 hours.
1.2.3 CSO membership	What percentage of CSO members belongs to more than one CSO?	A small minority (less than 30%)	A minority (30% to 50%)	A majority (51% to 65%)	A large majority (more than 65%)
<b>1.3. Diversity of Civil Society participants</b>	<b>How diverse/representative is the Civil Society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?</b>				
1.3.1	To what extent do CSOs	Significant social	Significant	Significant social	CSOs

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Score 0</b>	<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 2</b>	<b>Score 3</b>
Representation of social groups among CSO members	represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, indigenous peoples, poor people and minorities)? Which group dominate? Which one is excluded?	groups are absent / excluded from CSOs. A large majority is absent (more than 65%)	social groups are largely absent from CSOs. A majority is absent (51% to 65%)	groups are under-represented in CSOs. A minority is absent (30% to 50%)	represent a majority of social groups. A small minority is absent (less than 30%)
1.3.2 CSO leadership	To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, indigenous peoples, poor people, youth and minorities)?	Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles. A large majority is absent (more than 65%)	Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles. A majority is absent (51% to 65%)	Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles. A minority is absent (30% to 50%)	CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. A small minority is absent (less than 30%)
1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs around the country	How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?	CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	CSOs are present in all areas of the country.
<b>1.4. Level of organisation</b>	<b>How well organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?</b>				
1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	What percentage of CSOs belongs to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations (national or departmental)?	A small minority (less than 30%)	A minority (30% to 50%)	A majority (51% to 70%)	A large majority (more than 70%)
1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?	Completely ineffective (or non-existent).	Largely ineffective.	Somewhat effective.	Effective.
1.4.3 Self-regulation within civil society	Do CSOs have a code of conduct? Are the norms of the conduct code respected?	There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.
1.4.4 Support infrastructures	What kinds of CSO support infrastructures exist in the Bolivia?	There is no support infrastructure for CSOs.	There is very limited infrastructure for CSOs.	There is a moderate number of support infrastructure for CSOs	There is a significant number of support infrastructures for CSOs.

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Score 0</b>	<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 2</b>	<b>Score 3</b>
1.4.5 International linkages	What proportion of CSOs has international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?	Only a handful of “elite” CSOs has international linkages.	A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.
<b>1.5. Inter-relations</b>	<b>How strong / productive are relations among Civil Society actors?</b>				
1.5.1 Communication between CSOs	What is the extent of communication between civil society actors? How useful is this communication?	Communication is extremely limited. A small minority is communicated (less than 30%)	Limited. A minority is communicated (30% to 50%)	Moderate. A majority is communicated (51% to 70%)	Significant. A majority is communicated (more than 70%)
1.5.2 Cooperation within CSOs	How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?	Civil society actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	It is very rare that civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Civil society actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Civil society actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.
<b>1.6. Resources</b>	<b>To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?</b>				
1.6.1 Financial resources	How is the level of financial resources for CSOs? How adequate are these resources? Do CSOs manage to work self-sufficiently?	On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.
1.6.2 Human resources	How is the level of human resources for CSOs? How adequate are these resources?	On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goals.	On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.
1.6.3 Infrastructure resources	How is the level of infrastructure resources for CSOs? How adequate are these resources?	On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructure	On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and	On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructure	On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
		resource problem.	infrastructure resources to achieve their goals.	resources they require to achieve their defined goals	and infrastructure resource base.

## 2. ENVIRONMENT

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
<b>2.1. Political context</b>	<b>What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?</b>				
2.1.1. Political rights	How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties, cultural movements, unions, indigenous assemblies)?	There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.
2.1.2 Political competition	What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?	Single party system.	Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction	Robust, multi-party competition with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.
2.1.3. Rule of law	To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country? Do people trust the Law?	There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.
2.1.4. Corruption	What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?	High	Substantial	Moderate	Low
2.1.5. State effectiveness	To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?	The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social	The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-	State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the



Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
		crisis).		responsive.	public's interests.
2.1.6. Decentralisation	To what extent is government expenditure devolved to local and sub-national authorities?	Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% and 49.9%.	Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.
<b>2.2. Basic freedoms &amp; rights</b>	<b>To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?</b>				
2.2.1. Civil liberties	To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?	Civil liberties are systematically violated.	There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.
2.2.2. Information rights	To what extent does law guarantee public access to information? How accessible are government documents to the public?	No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.
2.2.3. Press freedoms	To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?	Press freedoms are systematically violated.	There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.
<b>2.3. Socio-economic context</b>	<b>What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?</b>				
<b>Description</b>	<b>Score 0</b>		<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 2</b>	<b>Score 3</b>
2.3.1. Socio-economic context  How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?	Socio-economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)		Socio-economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Socio-economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Socio-economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.
<b>2.4. Socio-cultural context</b>	<b>To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?</b>				
2.4.1. Trust	How much do members of society trust one another?	Relationships among members of society are	There is widespread mistrust among	There is a moderate level of trust among	There is a high level of trust among

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
		characterised by mistrust.	members of society.	members of society.	members of society.
2.4.2. Tolerance and pluralism	How tolerant are members of society (e.g. for people of other race, other religious persuasions, from other countries, people with HIV/AIDS or homosexuals)?	Society is characterised by widespread intolerance	Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance.	Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance.	Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance.
2.4.3. Public spiritedness	How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society (e.g. avoiding paying taxes, bribing the police, claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled)?	Very low level of public spiritedness in society.	Low level of public spiritedness.	Moderate level of public spiritedness.	High level of public spiritedness.
<b>2.5. Legal environment</b>	<b>To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?</b>				
2.5.1. CSO registration	How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process simple, quick, inexpensive, following legal provisions and consistently applied?	The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	The CSO registration is not very supportive Two or three quality characteristics are absent	The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.
2.5.2. Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticize government?	CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.
2.5.3. Tax laws favourable to CSOs	How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?	The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g., grants or donations).	The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions or preferences and/or. exemptions or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
2.5.4. Tax benefits for philanthropy	How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?	No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.
<b>2.6. State-Civil Society relations</b>	<b>What is the nature and quality of relations between Civil Society and the state?</b>				
2.6.1. Autonomy of CSOs	To what extent can Civil Society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?	The state controls civil society.	CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	The state accepts the existence of an independent Civil Society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.
2.6.2. Dialogue between CSOs and the state	To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?	There is no meaningful dialogue between Civil Society and the state.	The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.
2.6.3 Cooperation / support	How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receives state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?	The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.
<b>2.7. Private sector-Civil Society relations</b>	<b>What is the nature and quality of relations between Civil Society and the private sector?</b>				
2.7.1. Private sector attitude to civil society	What is the general attitude of the private sector towards Civil Society actors?	Generally hostile	Generally indifferent	Generally positive	Generally supportive
2.7.2 Corporate social and environmental responsibility	How developed are notions and actions of corporate social and environmental responsibility?	Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently	Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their	Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
			disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	operations into account.	1 impacts.
2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy	How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector? How important are these resources (e.g. comparing with other financial resources)?	Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.

### 3. VALUES

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
<b>3.1. Democracy</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors practice and promote democracy?</b>				
3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs	To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?	A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).
3.1.2 Civil Society actions to promote democracy	How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level? Are there CSO that have a specific mandate to promote democracy? Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting democracy be identified?	No active role. No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Only a few civil society activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	A number of civil society activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	civil society is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. Civil society activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.
<b>3.2. Transparency</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors practice and promote transparency?</b>				

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
3.2.1 Corruption within civil society	How widespread is corruption within civil society?	Instances of corrupt behaviour within civil society are very frequent.	Instances of corrupt behaviour within civil society are frequent.	There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within civil society.	Instances of corrupt behaviour within civil society are very rare.
3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs	How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs makes their financial accounts publicly available?	A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	A minority of CSOs (30% - 50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	A small majority of CSOs (51% - 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.
3.2.3 Civil Society actions to promote transparency	How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency? ¿Are there CSO that have a specific mandate to promote transparency? ¿Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting government and corporate transparency be identified?	No active role. No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Only a few civil society activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	A number of Civil Society activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Civil society is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency . Civil society activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.
<b>3.3. Tolerance</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?</b>				
3.3.1 Respecting differences within the Civil Society arena	To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena? Are the forces within Civil Society explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant? Are these forces dominant, significant o marginal? Is the relation of these forces to Civil Society strongly denounced by Civil Society at large?	Intolerant forces dominate civil society. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Significant forces within Civil Society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from Civil Society at large.	There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from Civil Society at large.	Civil Society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by Civil Society at large.
3.3.2 Civil Society activities to promote respecting	How much does Civil Society actively promote tolerance at a societal level? Are	No active role. No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be	Only a few civil society activities in this area can be detected. Their	A number of civil society activities in this area can be	Civil society is a driving force in promoting a

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
differences	there CSO that have a specific mandate to promote tolerance? Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting tolerance be identified?	detected.	visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	tolerant society. Civil society activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.
<b>3.4. Non-violence</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors practice and promote non-violence?</b>				
3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena	How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among Civil Society actors to express their interests in the public sphere? Is violence strongly denounced by Civil Society at large?	Significant mass-based groups within civil society use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Some isolated groups within civil society regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from Civil Society at large.	Some isolated groups within civil society occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by civil society at large.	There is a high level of consensus within civil society regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by civil society actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.
3.4.2 Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace	How much does Civil Society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does Civil Society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.? Are there CSOs that have a specific mandate to promote non-violence and peace and support peaceful conflict resolution? Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting non-violence and/or peaceful conflict	No active role. No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some civil society actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Only a few civil society activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	A number civil society activity in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Civil society is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. Civil society actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
	resolution be identified?				
<b>3.5. Gender equity</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors practice and promote gender equity?</b>				
3.5.1 Women leaders within the Civil Society arena.	What percentage of CSOs leaders are women?	Women are excluded from Civil Society leadership roles.	Women are largely absent from Civil Society leadership roles.	Women are under-represented in Civil Society leadership positions.	Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of civil society.
3.5.2 Gender equity within the civil society arena	How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?	A small minority (less than 20%).	A minority (20%-50%)	A small majority (51% - 65%)	A large majority (more than 65%)
3.5.3 Civil society actions to promote gender equity	How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level? ¿Are there CSO that have a specific mandate to promote gender equity? ¿Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting gender equity be identified?	No active role. No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some civil society actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Only a few civil society activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	A number of civil society activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Civil society is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. Civil society activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.
<b>3.6. Poverty eradication</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors promote poverty eradication?</b>				
3.6.1 Civil society actions to eradicate poverty	To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty? ¿Are there CSO that have a specific mandate to eradicate poverty? ¿Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to eradicating poverty be identified?	No active role. No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some civil society actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Only a few civil society activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	A number of civil society activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Civil society is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. Civil society activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.
<b>3.7. Environmental sustainability</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?</b>				
3.7.1 Civil society	How much does civil	No active role. No	Only a few civil	A number of	Civil society

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
actions to sustain the environment	society actively seek to sustain the environment? ¿Are there CSO that have a specific mandate to sustain the environment? ¿Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to protecting the environment be identified?	civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some civil society actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	society activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	civil society activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	is a driving force in protecting the environment . Civil society activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.
<b>3.8. Ethnic equity</b>	<b>To what extent do Civil Society actors practice and promote ethnic equity?</b>				
3.8.1 Indigenous leaders within the Civil Society arena	What percentage of CSO leaders belongs to indigenous groups?	Indigenous groups are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Indigenous groups are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Indigenous groups are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Indigenous groups are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.
3.8.2 Civil Society actions to promote the rights of indigenous peoples	How much does civil society actively promote ethnic equity at the societal level? Are there CSOs that have a specific mandate to promote ethnic equity? Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting ethnic equity be identified?	No active role. No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Only a few civil society activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole.	A number of civil society activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Civil society is a driving force in promoting a ethnic equitable society. Civil society activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.

#### 4. IMPACT

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
<b>4.1. Influencing public policy</b>	<b>How active and successful is Civil Society in influencing public policy?</b>				
4.1.1. Human Rights	How active and successful is Civil Society in influencing human rights? Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions	No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Civil society is active in this area and there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.



Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
	or programmes dedicated to influence human rights be identified? How significant are these campaigns, actions or programmes? Do these campaigns achieve their goals? Is there discernible impact?				
4.1.2. Social Policy Impact	How active and successful is Civil Society in influencing public policy? Can examples of Civil Society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to influence public policy, be identified? How significant are these campaigns, actions or programmes? Do these campaigns achieve their goals? Is there discernible impact?	No civil society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Civil society is active in this area and there is no impact.	Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil society plays an important role and impact is significant.
4.1.3. Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting	How active and successful is Civil Society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society is active in this area but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
<b>4.2. Holding state &amp; private corporations accountable</b>	<b>How active and successful is Civil Society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?</b>				
4.2.1. Holding state accountable	How active and successful is Civil Society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society is active in this area but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable	How active and successful is Civil Society in holding private corporations accountable?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society is active in this area but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
<b>4.3. Responding to social interests</b>	<b>How much are Civil Society actors responding to social interests?</b>				
4.3.1 Responsiveness	How effectively do Civil Society actors respond to priority social concerns?	Civil Society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing Civil Society actors.	There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing Civil Society actors.	Civil Society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.
4.3.2 Public Trust in CSOs	What percentage of the population has trust in Civil Society actors?	A small minority (less than 25%)	A large minority (25% to 50%)	A small majority (51% to 75%)	A large majority (more than 75%)
<b>4.4. Empowering citizens</b>	<b>How active and successful is Civil Society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalized groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?</b>				
4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens	How active and successful is Civil Society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?	No Civil Society activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Civil Society activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Civil Society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.
4.4.2 Capacity building for collective action	How active and successful is Civil Society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society activity in this area is very limited but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people	How active and successful is Civil Society in empowering marginalized people?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society activity in this area is very limited but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
4.4.4. Empowering women	How active and successful is Civil Society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society activity in this area is very limited but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
4.4.5. Building social capital	To what extent does Civil Society build social capital among its members? How do	Civil Society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Civil Society does not contribute to building social capital in	Civil Society does contribute moderately to building social capital in	Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in

Indicator	Description	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2	Score 3
	levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?		society.	society.	society.
4.4.6 Supporting income generation activities	How active and successful is Civil Society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society activity in this area is very limited but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
<b>4.5. Meeting societal needs</b>	<b>How active and successful is Civil Society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalized groups?</b>				
4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision	How active and successful is Civil Society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society activity in this area is very limited but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly	How active and successful is Civil Society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?	No civil society activity in this area can be detected.	Civil society activity in this area is very limited but there is no impact.	Civil Society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Civil Society plays an important role and impact is significant.
4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalized groups	To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalized groups?	CSOs are less effective than the state.	CSOs are as effective as the state.	CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.

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