The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) case study demonstrates the importance of having all the various stakeholders act together to achieve a global goal such as the MDGs. It also provides a number of campaigning lessons that illustrate the approach in Section 3.

The campaign to ban landmines has been widely celebrated as one of the most successful international campaigns. It mobilised grassroots activities, galvanised public opinion, lobbied governments and by the third quarter of 1997 had secured a treaty comprehensively banning the production, transfer, stockpiling and use of anti-personal landmines.

The issue

At the outset of the campaign in the early 1990s estimates suggested that more than 100 million mines had been scattered through over 60 countries as each month some 2 000 civilians were either killed or severely injured. In addition to the direct human costs the mines obstructed access to infrastructure, land and reconstruction efforts.

ICBL formation

In November 1991 the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and Medico International agreed to mount a campaign to bring together NGOs to call for a global ban on landmines. Around the same time in Europe Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Physicians for Human Rights launched a signature campaign to stop the “Coward’s War.” These two efforts were merged in 1992 when the five organisations together with Human Rights Watch agreed to coordinate their efforts and call a NGO conference on the issue. The conference called for an international ban on antipersonnel landmines, the establishment of an international fund to support victims and an effort to ensure countries involved in the trade contributed to the fund.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) invited other NGOS to support these calls. Within two years over 350 organisations around the world had given their support. NGOs also advanced the cause through national campaigns launched in Cambodia, Sweden, Germany, Britain, the United States, New Zealand, Australia and Italy with Belgium, Ireland Canada, South Africa and Afghanistan following later. In addition to lobbying political leaders and meetings with government official’s national efforts also included public awareness programmes and signature campaigns. Throughout the campaigns activists combined technical expertise and mobilisation.

State action

State initiated measures to attack global landmines began in 1992 with U.S. Senator Leahy and Congressman Evans, followed by the European Union. Multilateral focus on the campaign only really became a focus after the French Minister of Foreign Affairs called for a review of the CCW Convention. Sadly due to objections the organisations with the most experience (NGOs) were not allowed to participate in the process. Nevertheless, they attended the meetings to monitor and lobby in corridors and raise awareness.

The ICBL continued its campaign between the sessions of the review conference. The objective was to “rally public opinion and muster political support so as to stigmatize the use of anti-personnel landmines and strengthen the international communities resolve to clear mines and care for victims.” It also continued to press governments for unilateral measures and worked in regional contexts to secure mine-free zones. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commissioned a report to highlight the humanitarian costs of landmines and their limited military utility. This attracted 450 organisations, helped rally public opinion and support pro-ban states to work for a complete ban but had limited direct impact on the initial negotiations at the review conference.

Joint action

During the January session of the conference eight pro-ban states – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland – met with the ICBL to discuss future strategy. Further meetings resulted in an offer by Canada to hold a small meeting for NGOs, pro-ban governments and international organisation. Although not apparent at the time, a profound change in the nature of the campaign was underway. To this point the principal pro-ban actors (NGOs and international agencies) had engaged in a relatively typical, if extremely successful, advocacy campaign. There was not doubt the despite a lot of sympathy the campaigners were lobbying from outside. Within months however the campaign was transformed into a strategic partnership between non-state actors and pro-ban states. In October 1996 the so-called Ottawa Process, a fast track diplomatic initiative to negotiate in less than 14 months an international convention to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines was initiated at a conference attended by 50 states, the UN, ICRC and dozens of NGOs.

In 1996, a resolution was put to the General Assembly welcoming the conclusions of the Ottawa conference, and calling on states to; “pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines with a view to completing negotiations as soon as possible. The resolution was passed 156-0 with ten abstentions. Having secured the global endorsement the effort to build political will shifted to regional initiatives.

The ban

The last major stop before Oslo was the Brussels meeting were NGO coordinator, Jody Williams, coined the phase “no exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes”. In September in Oslo the Ban Treaty was negotiated and agreed. Had the U.S. not been present, a range of potential divisive issues might have occupied the delegates. Instead people were focused and the convention was strengthened during the course of the negotiations. States returned months later to Ottawa to sign the convention on 3 December 1997. One hundred and twenty two states signed the Convention. Three countries ratified the convention during the signing ceremony. The 40th ratification needed to trigger the enforcement of the Convention was signed by Burkina Faso in September 1998, a record turn around for any international treaty. The treaty came into force on 1 March 1999.

Ingredients of success

The campaign was striking for its multidimensional quality. Many actors were involved, including individual experts, NGOs, the ICRC, states and multilateral organisations. Multiple mechanisms were employed, such as preparation of expert studies, mass promotion material, lobbying of government from below, representation at international conferences. The following key lessons have been extracted to help you to develop an effective MDG campaign.

Articulate your goal and message clearly and simply

Every issue is complicated, but the importance of a focused, clear, concise and consistent message cannot be overstated. The success of the ICBL was defining antipersonnel mines as a discrete problem with the general context of the human costs of violent conflicts.

Political relevance and timing

Campaigns must be relevant. The changing global situation in the later 1980s and early 1990s was a critical factor in the development of the ICBL. The end of the Cold War made it possible for NGOs and governments to look at issues differently. Increased attention was being devoted to conventional, as opposed to nuclear weapons and the crisis around the impact of mines was growing.

Be inclusive

The ICBL has always subscribed to the big tent theory. To become a member it is necessary to inform the coordinator that you share and endorse the campaign’s call for a total ban on antipersonnel mines and do at least one landmine related campaign activity per year. Each country and campaign was free to determine its own strategy based on the local context provided these all shared the one common goal. There were no dues and no restrictions. In addition, the effective working relationship between the ICBL and other non-state actors like the ICRC and the UN was crucial.

Communication

Clear and consistent communication is key. The campaign maintained close links to country efforts and stayed in touch using phones, faxes and emails. People were able to speak with authority about what was happening everywhere to eliminate the problem.

Consistency and continued commitment

The goal of the campaign remained the same. Campaigns fought tirelessly for the goal in every forum. As each victory was won they immediately developed the next strategy and action plan. Activists were committed to finishing the job they had begun. For example, as soon as the treaty was signed ICBL launched a plan for ratification and implementation. ICBL launched the Landmine Monitor as one mechanism to ensure compliance.

Speak with one voice

Despite significant differences of opinion were evident those closer to government and those working with victims all NGOs worked within the coalition framework. Major statements were agreed by consensus and circulated on ICBL letterheads. This enabled the ICBL to get a seat at several meetings where NGOs may be traditionally excluded.

Credibility

The ICBL grew out of fieldwork in mine affected communities. The campaign was led by organisations focusing on assisting victims and clearing mines, with most key individuals having years of experience in the field. There unparalleled expertise could not be easily dismissed by military personnel or politicians. The campaign also included people directly affected by landmines. They made compelling spokespeople who could not be easily dismissed by politicians.

Provide expertise and documentation

Members of the ICBL carried out a concerted research agenda and disseminated its research widely to both governments and the public. Materials includes information on the impacts on landmines, global mine production, trade, stock and use as well as sophisticated legal analysis and advise on treaties. These were powerful advocacy tools.

Dual target

In all cases the national campaigns began with the twin objective of raising public awareness of the crisis and lobbying government officials to commit to a comprehensive ban.

Building from below

The greatest strength was the dozens of well-coordinated country campaigns. Although the objective was a global ban considerable effort was made to disaggregate the process through regional meetings and country campaigns. A strength was that the model of the national campaigns was remarkably consistent – an inclusive coalition. Despite this there was always flexibility for local campaigns to develop their own approach, structure and activities.

The state as a partner

Although the state is often seen as the target the landmines case underlines the importance of building partnerships between NGOs and sympathetic states. Solving landmines problems required changes in state policy and the consent of states. Therefore the campaign had to involve and engage the state and use pro-ban states to lobby other states.

Need for leadership and committed workers

Successful coalitions are large and diverse. But most operate on the work and experience of a dedicated core, supported by many. Leadership was key to the campaigns success.

Know how to organise

Typical coalition members do not have the skills and expertise to organise large scale events or to lobby. Issue expertise does little good without organisational expertise when it comes to campaigning. The ICBL produced education materials on how to organise national campaigns, prepare press releases, interact with the media and other aspects of campaigning.

Use every platform to promote your message

The media is just one of many platforms to promote your message. The ICBL used conferences, statements, resolutions, email, websites, personal contacts and the media to popularise its message.

This case study has been complied from:

• The Landmine Ban: Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy by Don Hubert with preface by N Macfarlane, Institute for International Studies, Occasional paper 42, 2000.
• The Campaign to Ban Antipersonnel Mines: Potential Lessons, S. Goose, FIM 2000.

Localising the MDGs is only possible when detailed country data is available on poverty and all its dimensions, causes and trends.

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