CIVICUS speaks about the rise of the far right in Germany with Jakob Guhl, Senior Manager, Policy and Research at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD).

Founded in 2006, ISD is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to safeguard human rights and reverse the rising tide of polarisation, extremism and disinformation worldwide.

What are the major far-right groups in Germany?

Currently, the major far-right political party is Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has just achieved its highest-ever results in national polls, standing at around 22 per cent. In some East German states with elections coming later this year, AfD leads polls with over 30 per cent.

There are also more traditional neo-Nazi parties such as The Homeland (NPD). Although it is still quite active, it isn’t very relevant anymore. It’s considered an anti-constitutional extremist party and for this reason, the Constitutional Court recently ruled that the government is allowed to withhold federal funding from it.

Additionally, there is a broad network of loose groups known as the ‘new right’ that includes the Identitarian Movement, which the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has designated as a right-wing extremist threat. The ‘new right’ is essentially made up of ethno-nationalists who assert that the German identity is an ethnic identity. They extensively use social media to bring their ideas into the mainstream and shift public discourse on topics like immigration and integration.

In terms of narratives and policies, AfD is becoming increasingly indistinguishable from these ethno-nationalist groups, as evidenced by its recent secret meeting to discuss plans for mass deportation of people living in Germany, including German citizens, whom they view as ethnically non-German.

How do far-right groups spread their messages?

There are significant interactions among ethno-nationalist groups on a personal level. They engage with each other by attending conferences, participating in podcasts and writing prefaces for each other’s books. Some even work as assistants for AfD members of parliament.

Both the ‘new right’ and AfD have been aptly using social media for many years. According to a comparative analysis we did in 2019, AfD significantly outperformed major political parties for views, likes and engagement. This trend continues today, and they also leverage YouTube or newer platforms like TikTok, which attract many young people, so they are able to reach even larger audiences.

Their messages focus on highly emotive issues, such as ‘migrant crimes’ and ‘threats to German traditions’, which tap into cultural elements that provoke strong reactions and anger. For instance, they portray the Greens, an environmental political party, as detached elites comfortably situated in central Berlin, pushing their green policies without understanding the reality of ordinary people. This populist communication style has proved effective, and it’s further amplified by the dynamics of social media algorithms that reward outrage, sensationalism and emotional content.

What public concerns has AfD tapped into?

When AfD was established in 2013, its main focus was opposition to European Union (EU) and German policies in response to the financial crisis. It was born as an anti-EU and anti-Euro party that advocated against providing financial support to Greece and other countries particularly affected by the crisis, and against the EU collective debt mechanism.

Starting in 2015, with the beginning of the so-called migration crisis, AfD shifted towards an anti-refugee and anti-Muslim discourse, depicting Islam and Muslims as alien to Germany. AfD politicians openly cooperated with the pan-European, anti-Islam, far-right political movement Pegida – an acronym for ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West’. AfD members frequently appear as speakers at their events.

During the mass protests that took place against measures to curb the spread of COVID-19, AfD was part of a broad coalition promoting COVID-19 denial and anti-lockdown narratives. The coalition included ‘new right’ groups, Holocaust deniers and conspiracy theorists, among others.

Recently, AfD and other far-right groups have tried to hijack and instrumentalise farmers’ protests over subsidy cuts, seeing them as an opportunity to undermine the government. While far-right symbols and AfD speakers have been present in these protests, the official associations of farmers have clearly distanced themselves from the far right. It is important not to stigmatise the farmers’ movement as a whole as being infiltrated by the far right, as they have completely legitimate concerns about agricultural subsidy cuts, while at the same time being alert to far-right attempts to hijack these protests.

What accounts for AfD’s growing popularity?

The popularity of the AfD stagnated during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2021 federal elections. However, starting in early 2023, it has gained momentum. The AfD often diverges from the positions of major established parties on critical issues. For instance, it has opposed German military support for Ukraine, questioned scientific consensus on climate change and rejected green policies. Their most recent surge in popularity can be in part be attributed to people’s heightened concerns about immigration, which is visible in surveys from mid-2023.

At the same time, AfD has radicalised, partially due to its relationship with ethno-nationalist groups, which has led to its monitoring by BfV as a potential threat to the constitution. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied by a trend of increasing normalisation and popularisation of AfD among the public. This tension is at the heart of today’s German politics.

Has AfD encountered any progressive resistance?

As it has grown in popularity, AfD has also encountered resistance, as attested by the ongoing protests against AfD’s mass deportation plans in numerous cities and towns. Protesters form a broad coalition comprising political parties, churches, unions, local initiatives supporting refugees, left-wing and anti-fascist groups and climate change activists like Fridays for Future.

This diverse protest movement also has internal contradictions. In a Munich rally, some speakers criticised the government for its migration policies, which they attributed to an attempt to win back voters from AfD by taking a hardline approach. Left-leaning activists argue that such policies will only pave the way for even more extreme anti-migrant measures. Despite these tensions, however, the coalition remains broad and maintains significant popular support.

How is ISD working to address extremist threats in Germany?

One of the things our Berlin office focuses on is digital literacy and media competencies initiatives. In the age of social media, it’s crucial for people to critically assess credible sources of information, be aware of manipulation tactics and understand how disinformation spreads and coordinated networks amplify specific narratives. Our goal is not to tell people what to think but to provide them with tools for critical evaluation of information sources, narratives, communication tactics and rhetorical styles.

For example, the Berlin office is actively involved in the Business Council for Democracy project, collaborating with digital literacy experts to educate adults. Many similar initiatives primarily target young people, who are often digital natives, but the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories online can affect people of all ages. We engage employers, which many people still trust, unlike political parties and media.

What forms of support do you receive, and what further support do you need?

Our cooperation with the government encompasses a wide range of initiatives. Various German federal ministries have provided funding for our research on antisemitism and far-right extremism and funded projects related to political education.

One major recent issue is the budgetary crisis and disagreement within the governing coalition on how to address it. The same budget cuts that have affected subsidies for farmers also impact on agencies dedicated to political education and projects on democracy promotion and the prevention of radicalisation. Unfortunately, this funding reduction comes at an inopportune time, coinciding with the rise of the far right and the normalisation of extremist ideas.

Compared to other countries, the German state used to extensively support civil society initiatives. It’s a double-edged sword: while it’s positive that the government invests in civil society, it has also made German CSOs somewhat dependent on the state. The budgetary crisis has disrupted the financial sustainability of many organisations, which are now unsure whether they will be able to continue their work as effectively and on the same scale.

While German CSOs could benefit from international donor support, it’s also crucial to facilitate greater knowledge exchange among activists and networks from different parts of the world. Despite variations in intensity, many countries face similar challenges of the mainstreaming of far-right ideas through social media, harassment of activists and elected officials, and local-level political violence.

Civic space in Germany is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with ISD through its website or Facebook page, and follow @ISDglobal on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Rigoberto Lobo Puentes, founder of Promotion, Education and Defence of Human Rights (Promoción, Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM), about Venezuela’s NGO bill which, if passed, will further hinder civil society’s work.

PROMEDEHUM brings together people whose common goal is education about and the promotion and defence of human rights.

How has civic space in Venezuela changed recently?

Civic space has experienced tensions for more than a decade. In 2010 the government implemented the Law of National Sovereignty and Self-Determination to restrict access to funding by human rights organisations, citing alleged external threats against the Venezuelan government. This law was only the first step. Starting in 2016, when the ruling party lost control of the National Assembly, the government began to issue emergency decrees granting powers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to audit any agreement signed with international bodies by organisations or individuals to implement projects in Venezuela. This was part of a strategy to suffocate human rights organisations financially until they were forced to shut down.

In 2020 the government body that regulates the banking system ordered banks to monitor the financial operations of civil society organisations (CSOs), supposedly to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. Following criticism from international human rights protection bodies, in 2021 the provisions of the National Office against Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in relation to CSOs were slightly amended. However, they continue to violate international human rights standards. Among other things, they provided for the creation of a new body in charge of authorising the registration and operation of CSOs and obliged CSOs to provide sensitive information.

This attack caused fissures in civil society, as many thought that since the focus was on human rights organisations, other CSOs, including humanitarian organisations, were out of harm’s way, even if they also in one way or another defended human rights. Many CSOs said they had no problem with the obligation to register. The situation was very confusing. It was never clear where the registry was or would be, and in each city, organisations were given different information.

In 2021, the ruling party-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved a national legislative plan that included a Law on International Cooperation, which also established a mandatory registry for CSOs. The aim again was to limit access to funding for CSOs.

In 2022, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force refuted the idea that all these regulations were needed. Its assessment of Venezuela concluded that there was no evidence the proposed or implemented CSO registries could prevent potential abuses linked to terrorism financing.

Finally, in January 2024 the National Assembly approved in first reading of the draft Law on Control, Regularisation, Operations and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations, better known as the NGO law. If passed, this law will allow the government to further restrict the functioning of civil society, as it broadly prohibits ‘political activities’ without clearly defining what this refers to, and could result in the imposition of sanctions or the closure of CSOs deemed to be engaging in ‘political activities’. In the session where the bill was approved, more than 60 CSOs were singled out as enemies and traitors to the homeland.

The continued threats to and vilification and persecution of CSOs and human rights defenders, and restrictions and attacks on media and journalists, raids on offices and jailing of humanitarian workers, have created a climate of great fear. Many CSOs have lost members, some have closed, and many human rights defenders have migrated for various reasons, including because they have been persecuted or fear persecution in the near future. Some organisations, including media outlets, have adopted self-censorship or changed the nature of their activities to prevent reprisals.

What impacts would the NGO law have in this context?

The NGO law seeks to limit citizen participation and human rights advocacy. It would turn the freedom of association into a matter of public order, exposing organisations to surveillance and police control. Organisations that fail to register or disclose their sources of funding could face fines, deregistration and criminal prosecution. They could be criminalised under charges of terrorism, money laundering, destabilisation, conspiracy and foreign interference.

Although the draft law may appear to target only human rights organisations, its impacts will be much broader, as it aims to take control of the entire associational fabric. All organisational forms, including political parties and education and academic organisations, are potential targets. Victims of human rights violations could lose all legal support. People affected by Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency could lose access to civil society humanitarian programmes, which could be replaced by government programmes with restrictive access conditions.

In short, the government seeks a tailor-made civil society. It has an interest in the continuity of humanitarian organisations, as they relieve it of a burden and help it maintain an image of openness with the international community. But it wants humanitarian organisations to play a purely welfare role, with no connection to human rights, and to refrain from publishing any information that might project a negative image of Venezuela.

The government has already made progress in this area. To some extent it already controls the activities of humanitarian organisations and obtains constant information on their activities throughout Venezuela.

Why has the NGO law been revived after it was put on hold last year?

The government has moved forward with this law as prospects increase of an election in the near future. The law can be used not just against human rights CSOs. It can be used against any organisational form that is considered a space for critical thought or dissent. This particularly applies to CSOs working on civil and political rights issues, demanding electoral transparency, monitoring campaigns and observing elections.

From the government’s perspective, civil society jeopardises its prospects of staying in power. Under fair electoral conditions, civil society’s monitoring, documentation and denunciation of human rights violations perpetrated by an already unpopular government could harm its electoral standing. For years the government has sought to subdue, suffocate or nullify CSOs, and this will intensify as it faces the need to ensure its continuity in power.

The NGO law had been suspended but not forgotten. The government simply waited for the right time to resume its attacks. Recently, there have been accusations against and arrests of members of the military, political parties and journalists in connection with an alleged assassination plot that has been classed as terrorism. This is part of a situation created by the government to justify actions to neutralise those who might become obstacles in the face of an election. In this context, the possibility of the NGO law being passed should not be ruled out.

How have civil society and the public reacted to these attacks?

Despite the seriousness of the law, there is a lot of misinformation and a high level of ignorance among Venezuelan citizens. Even some CSOs are unaware of its existence or its importance.

However, civil society has issued numerous criticisms. Between 2022 and 2024, national and international CSOs have published at least 15 statements and analyses of the NGO law and the law on international cooperation. Numerous forums, talks and awareness campaigns have been held, inside and outside Venezuela.

Many organisations and human rights defenders have participated in interactive sessions at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and in side events at the UN, the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas, and have submitted reports to human rights bodies. As a result of this advocacy, between 2021 and 2023, 11 statements and reports about these laws were published by international bodies.

Those of us outside Venezuela have also advocated with the governments of our host countries. In Argentina, where I am at the moment, politicians and civil society have publicly condemned the NGO law.

The Venezuelan government doubled down and on 12 January launched a public consultation on the law, without making the official text of the draft law public or inviting human rights CSOs to participate. According to the information that has come to light, most of the participants in the consultation have been state officials, including police officers. From what we have been able to observe in consultation events, which take place relatively spontaneously in various places and without an established format, and in the discussions on the issue in the National Assembly, the prevailing discourse has delegitimised CSOs, which are referred to as enemies of the state.

What guarantees does Venezuelan civil society need to keep doing its work?

To continue our advocacy work in defence of civic space we need more international organisations and people to come on board to help report on the deteriorating situation. CSOs need access to more accurate and reliable information to help build alliances more quickly and effectively.

Venezuelan CSOs continue to work to communicate any changes that occur and to raise the alarm when attacks on rights take place. We continue to advocate with other states, especially when there are changes of government that could affect international policies of states. One imminent risk is of the non-renewal of the mandate of the International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2019. This would be a serious blow to Venezuelan civil society.

Venezuelan organisations should also evaluate and rethink strategies in terms of the impact of the information we produce. We should better showcase the strengths of the Venezuelan human rights movement. Perhaps proactive transparency, to the extent that it does not put organisations and their members at greater risk, could serve to influence both the international community and the public. It is crucial that people in Venezuela understand the dimensions of the losses that the deterioration of civic space and the extinction of CSOs pose to our country.

Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with PROMEDEHUM through its website or Facebook account, and follow it on Instagram and Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Anja Olin-Pape, Head of Strategy at the Global Challenges Foundation, about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

The Global Challenges Foundation is a Sweden-based international civil society organisation dedicated to promoting improved global decision-making models to reduce and mitigate global catastrophic risks. Anja leads the Foundation’s work on UN reform and policy issues, with a focus on global risk governance, accountability and interfaces between science and policy.

What are the major global challenges your organisation works on?

The Global Challenges Foundation is dedicated to mitigating global catastrophic risks with enhanced global governance. We have recently released our 2023 annual report on global catastrophic risks. Our primary areas of concern are climate change, ecological collapse and weapons of mass destruction.

We assess the global governance system’s responses to these risks and the limitations of our joint capability to tackle them. Our job is to enhance the existing global governance system to overcome its gaps, inequalities and fragmentation, as well as the disconnect among international institutions.

We do so by supporting international organisations, researchers and partners with financial resources and helping them grow their networks and capabilities. We have supported, for example, the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism and the Earth Commissions research on planetary boundaries. We are also supporting the United Nations’ (UN) processes towards the upcoming Summit of the Future, as well as civil society and member states. The science-policy interface is a priority for us.

How able to address pressing global challenges do you think global governance institutions are?

First of all, we should acknowledge the importance and success of our current multilateral system. We have a system we can lean on. When global risks arise, we have international forums tasked with addressing them.

But the tools we have could be used better. They should also be adapted to meet the needs of the 21^st century. We have far-reaching global goals and an international rule of law system, but our commitments lack implementation. The international system lacks sufficient accountability mechanisms and the current power dynamics prevent the effective use of the tools that do exist. To act on the goals and objectives that we set for ourselves, we need to enhance implementation, follow-up and accountability mechanisms.

We also need to enhance legitimacy, by enhancing transparency and overcoming inequality in the international system. It results in short-sightedness and an inability to make the decisions we need at the time and scale that we need them. The system doesn’t provide enough access to civil society and falls short in democratic participation.

How could the main flaws of the global governance system be corrected?

One of the global governance system’s main flaws is its lack of flexibility, which hinders transformation. We are locked in a fragmented system by our siloed approach to risks and lack of recognition that global challenges are interlinked. Deciding what type of system we want is also a big challenge.

We need to address risks holistically and deal with the trade-offs and conflicts of interest that hinder transformation. Leaders also face a major trade-off: they are responsible to their people but also need consider future generations and shape the planet’s future on a global scale. We need to reassess short-term returns and steer our thinking and decision-making on an international scale. We also need to improve our foresight capabilities instead of waiting for the correct policy to be put in place once an issue arises.

We must improve the way we negotiate, make decisions and implement them. Under the current system, the typical outcome is the lowest common denominator solution. Take the Paris Agreement, for example: the 1.5 degrees goal is just the joint lowest common denominator that countries could agree on. Still, in order to meet it, we need to work our way forward freeing ourselves of those that drag us behind. By changing the way they cooperate and promoting innovative approaches to decision-making and implementation, states could build on existing institutions rather than starting from scratch.

How is the Global Challenges Foundation working towards change?

The Global Challenges Foundation is a financing organisation that supports researchers who innovate in developing approaches to enhance global safety and foster thriving communities, ensuring the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals. We support civil society and the private sector in developing ideas for change within the international system.

We focus both on relevant policy topics and blue-sky thinking. Some of our projects include a search for answers to questions such as: what would a completely new body within the UN system look like? How can we make climate change summits more impactful? How can civil society, particularly young people’s voices, be better heard? What reforms should be prioritised for the benefit of future generations? How can the UN become a more effective organisation? How can we assist member states dependent on the system to strengthen their positions and promote their ideas about the multilateral arena?

How can civil society play a bigger role in shaping global governance?

Civil society already plays a significant role in the global governance system. It is a vital tool for achieving a more democratic system, which is particularly crucial if we consider that many country leaders fail to truly represent their people. Civil society fosters accountability and transparency. It pays attention to when and by whom decisions are made and how they affect people. It promotes bottom-up approaches and connects the local to the global, bringing an understanding of the reality on the ground into the global governance system.

Civil society should keep working on fact-checking and promoting accountability in the international space. And to play even bigger role, it should seek allies among UN member states while making sure they respond to people’s needs. Civil society should not only push its own agenda on member states but also work with them on defining the agenda and policy responses. Member states constantly struggle to keep up with everything that happens within the UN space, so civil society may come in handy here too.

Get in touch with the Global Challenges Foundations through its website or LinkedIn page, and follow @ChallengesFnd and @anjaolinpape on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks about the current crisis of violence in Ecuador with Mauro Cerbino, professor and researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Ecuador.

Professor Cerbino’s research focuses on youth cultures and organisations and links between young people and violence.

How did Ecuador become one of the most violent countries in Latin America?

To understand the very complex context of violence in Ecuador, it is important to analyse the factors that have enabled this situation. In recent years there has been a great deterioration in the living conditions of young people from low-income groups. Education has lost meaning to them because it does not fulfil the purpose of offering meaningful alternatives and helping to improve their living conditions. The relationship between educators and learners has deteriorated and mutual trust has been lost.

Further, due to the absence of public policies for urban young people, it was not detected that a process of impoverishment was taking place on the ground. This was not just about economic poverty, which was indeed recently exacerbated by the pandemic, but also symbolic poverty, linked to the lack of cultural and recreational spaces for people to have the opportunity to live a meaningful life.

All this came on top of the problem of drug trafficking. As a result of Ecuador’s adoption of the US dollar as the currency in 2000, the criminal economy has grown greatly. Ecuador’s geographical position has also contributed to this: the country has seven ports, which has facilitated the export of drugs, particularly to Europe. The international criminal economy has found the right conditions to insert itself in Ecuador.

The flourishing criminal economy offered adolescents and young people ever-greater opportunities for quick profits, while the state lost its capacity to create conditions for people to live meaningful lives in local communities. The appeal of criminal alternatives was accentuated by the rise of the aesthetics of drug trafficking, which strongly attracted young people because it offered them meaning in the form of recognition, social standing and the exercise of at least a small amount of power in a very hierarchical and fractured society. In a global context marked by the society of spectacle, necropolitics – the use of social and political power to dictate how some people may live and others must die – and the commodification and obsolescence of life and death, it became impossible for legal society to compete with the seductive power of criminal organisations.

Finally, the action of criminal groups is also a symptom that the social contract is in question. These groups, their families and close circles view the state and legal society as illegitimate. For them, violent crimes, particularly murder, are wrongs to be judged by God but not by the laws of the state or by other people. Guilt for violent acts can be assumed in the face of the divine, but this doesn’t mean accepting responsibility to other people or institutions. This is the state’s greatest failure in projecting itself as governed by the rule of law, a guarantor of coexistence based on legality.

In sum, the security crisis in Ecuador responds to a combination of factors, among which the conditions experienced by children and young people stand out. Any effective response will therefore need to break with the individualistic logic and rebuild the community – through education, art, dialogue and culture – to confer meaning on the lives of so many young people who currently don’t care whether they live, kill or die.

How has the recent change of government affected this situation?

The perception of insecurity was one of the most debated issues in the last election campaign, which brought Daniel Noboa, a young man from a business family in Guayaquil, to the presidency. The debate was strongly securitised, focusing on police and military reaction and the imposition of penalties and punishments.

Noboa was elected in October 2023 to complete the term of his predecessor, Guillermo Lasso, and will only be in office for about a year and a half. With people increasingly concerned about insecurity, the president responded to the violence triggered by prison riots by declaring a state of emergency and imposing a 60-day curfew. These measures were also possibly intended to boost his popularity and improve his government’s rating in view of next year’s elections, in which he has expressed his intention to run.

In declaring a state of emergency, the government handed over the coordination of public order operations to the military. The stance taken by the government, which has referred to the situation as a state of internal war, has been echoed by the mainstream media and apparently endorsed by broad segments of public opinion. In the face of this, the political opposition has remained virtually silent. The largest opposition party, Citizen Revolution, led by former president Rafael Correa, has practically bought into the government’s decisions to avoid isolation as much as out of an inability to propose alternatives.

How have people reacted to the proposed referendum to legitimise stricter security measures?

The majority of public opinion will likely support all the security-related decisions being taken by the government, partly because people have experienced insecurity first hand, but also and primarily because of the insistent media narrative on the issue and its amplification through social media. All private media have broadcast demonstrations in favour of military and police presence on the streets.

The questions for the referendum are currently being studied by the Constitutional Court, which has not yet ruled on their admissibility. Most of the questions refer to insecurity. If the referendum proceeds as planned, the majority will likely support the government. This is because there has been virtually no public discussion of other ways of dealing with insecurity, despite decades of a security-based approach producing little result.

However, there are other ways of understanding security. As early as 1994, the United Nations put forward the notion of human security, while the Organization of American States developed the concept of multidimensional security in 2003. Both put human beings at the centre and take into account the links between security problems and structural social conditions of injustice, inequality and lack of conditions for the exercise of rights.

Do you think Noboa could become the next Bukele?

The so-called ‘Bukele model’ – based on the repressive response to violence of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele – appears to be popular in many countries, particularly those ruled by the right or the far right. In the case of Ecuador, I think some of the measures implemented in El Salvador will be replicated. For example, President Noboa has decided to build two maximum-security mega-prisons.

But the model is not entirely applicable because these are countries with different geopolitical characteristics and different criminological situations. In El Salvador the problem is gangs, while in Ecuador it is organised crime. Further, at least for the moment, Ecuador’s constitution includes strong guarantees of rights, while these have been greatly eroded in El Salvador over several years of Bukele’s rule.

To what extent is this crisis of violence a transnational problem, and what kind of international support has Ecuador received to address it?

The problem of drug trafficking is transnational and global. It involves organisations, such as mafias and cartels, that are distributed around the world. It requires effective inter-state cooperation to combat it.

Some countries, such as the USA, have offered support to Ecuador, but we know that these offers hide international policy interests that are not always explicit. The European Union has also expressed its willingness to provide assistance, but so far it’s not clear what this assistance will consist of. More and more cases of corruption and collusion of parts of the Ecuadorian state with organised crime are coming to light, which obviously hampers international cooperation with the Ecuadorian state.

In any case, international cooperation must commit to addressing the structural problems that contribute to violence. It is essential that it contributes to strengthening social policy.

Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with FLACSO Ecuador through its website or Facebook page, and follow it on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Martin Sveinssønn Melvær, Materials and Industry Lead at the Bellona Foundation, about the bill recently passed by Norway’s parliament to allow commercial-scale deep-sea mining.

The Bellona Foundation is an independent civil society organisation that seeks to meet climate challenges by identifying and implementing sustainable environmental solutions.

What’s wrong with commercial-scale deep-sea mining, and what should be done about it?

The main problem with deep-sea mining is that it is starting up too fast, without fundamental knowledge about impacts on biology, ecosystems and carbon sinks. It entails a high risk of severe environmental consequences such as massive carbon emissions, the degradation of fish stocks and the extermination of potentially key species – including some that, for all we know, could have provided a cure to the next pandemic.

Exploration and mining should be banned until the science base is sufficient to understand their impacts and how to mitigate them, and until preservation areas have been established. If science turns out to show that deep-sea mining can be done responsibly, it should be allowed to proceed, but it would still have to be strictly regulated.

A second problem is the way deep-sea mining has been pushed in Norway. The government vastly exaggerates the amounts of mineral resources in Norwegian waters. The Geological Survey of Norway has stated that the Norwegian Offshore Directorate’s estimates have not been done according to established standards and they are exaggerated and therefore misleading. Independent experts have supported this claim and pointed out that if a private company had used a similar method to the Offshore Directorate, it would have qualified as fraud.

A third problem is timing. The rush to allow deep-sea mining is based on a gross miscalculation. Seabed minerals are presented as a solution to the shortage of metals needed for the green transition. But forecasts by the International Energy Agency and other serious sources indicate that the mineral bottleneck, in which mineral supply will have problems meeting demand, will last about 10 or 15 years, while the most optimistic estimates indicate that commercial seabed mining in Norwegian waters will only be able to start between 15 and 25 years from now. The technology needed for deep-sea mining is still very immature and history shows that it takes many years of development to move new technology to an industrial scale. At Bellona, we believe the solution to the mineral bottleneck is not deep-sea mining but a strong focus on circularity combined with more sustainable mining practices on land.

Why has the Norwegian government rushed to allow commercial-scale deep-sea mining?

It’s difficult to understand why the Norwegian government would rush this process. My impression is that it’s overly eager to find a new industry that can create jobs as the oil industry declines, not realising, or not wanting to realise, that on top of being environmentally irresponsible, deep-sea mining is unlikely to be profitable. Even the main Norwegian oil company, Equinor, has warned against deep-sea mining and referred to the precautionary principle, which calls for the adoption of precautionary measures when scientific evidence about an environmental or human health hazard is uncertain and the stakes are high.

Something that should also be factored in is strong pressure by Offshore Norge, the oil industry’s lobbying organisation. Although the main oil companies have not shown much interest in deep-sea mining, Offshore Norge has promoted it very actively. You could call it ‘petroholism’. Our government is used to giving the oil industry everything it wants.

How have Norwegian environmental organisations advocated against the bill?

We have participated in public hearings and drawn media attention to the major knowledge gaps and flawed governmental process. We have met with politicians and presented the facts, and although many politicians have listened, the government managed to gather enough support to pass the bill.

Thanks to our advocacy, the bill passed in a slightly improved version that requires parliament to approve the first mining licences before mining can start. This gives us further space for continuing advocacy. We will keep fighting to stop licensing when time comes for parliament to discuss their approval.

How have key stakeholders reacted to the new law?

There has been a lot of criticism of the Norwegian process from various sources. Norwegian companies such as Morrow Batteries have signalled that they don’t want seabed minerals, while others, such as Storebrand Asset Management, have directly criticised the process.

At the European level, many have reacted strongly. European Parliament members have voiced criticism. Two famous French activists, alongside actor Lucas Bravo, have criticised the process and travelled to Norway to protest. An online petition by Avaaz gathered more than 550,000 international signatures.

Deep-sea mining should be stopped until current knowledge gaps have been filled. We encourage everyone to support a global moratorium on deep-sea mining.

Civic space in Norway is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Bellona through its website or Facebook page, and follow it on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Christopher Castillo, General Coordinator of Alternative for Community and Environmental Vindication of Honduras (Alternativa de Reivindicación Comunitaria y Ambientalista de Honduras, ARCAH), about progress made and pending issues after two years of Xiomara Castro’s presidency.

ARCAH is a community social movement that defends territories and common goods against projects that threatens peace and the wellbeing of communities, from an anti-capitalist, anti-racist, anti-patriarchal, anti-colonialist and anti-classist perspective.

To what extent has Xiomara Castro’s government, as it nears its second anniversary, lived up to expectations?

The greatest expectation of Hondurans was to put an end to an authoritarian government. The key focus of Castro’s campaign was therefore to dismantle the authoritarian state and a series of associated issues, particularly corruption, influence peddling and the capture of institutions by drug traffickers and organised crime. That goal has been partly achieved: we seem to no longer live under arbitrary power, although we continue to coexist with deep-rooted corruption and high levels of crime, insecurity and violence.

Another issue of great concern to grassroots activists are what are called ZEDEs – employment and economic development zones. In April 2022, when reporting on her first 100 days in office, President Castro proudly declared that national sovereignty was being restored, emphasising that her government had repealed the law that established these areas and provided special conditions to attract investment. However, her repeal decree had not yet been ratified by Congress. The removal of conditions for the continuation of extractive processes was still pending, and to a large extent this has remained unchanged.

The new government also promised to halt water privatisation. However, so far there are 81 Honduran municipalities where water has been privatised, and the government has continued to strengthen service providers that take the function away from public companies, particularly in Comayagüela and Tegucigalpa, the two cities that make up the Central District.

In sum, citizens’ expectations have been met in terms of overcoming the more authoritarian and repressive features of the state, but not regarding extractivist and privatisation policies, which have not yet seen significant changes.

Has the situation of human rights defenders improved?

To the extent that their struggles are linked to resistance against extractivism and privatisation, the situation of human rights defenders has not improved. We have experienced reprisals for our work, which have included death threats, kidnapping attempts and criminalisation processes. In 2023, ARCAH counted 125 attacks against the organisation and its members. In August, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted precautionary measures in favour of 11 ARCAH members, but more than five months have passed and the government has yet to implement anything in response to these precautionary measures.

Many activists seeking assistance from state protection mechanisms are being ignored or have their petitions systematically obstructed, even when they provide evidence that they are experiencing attacks and their lives are in danger.

According to the latest report by the Human Rights Secretariat, 54 cases are currently being processed, more than 100 are in the queue and only eight have measures in place. The excuse given to justify this poor performance is its limited budget, which currently stands at 32 million lempiras (approx. US$1.3 million). There are government officials who have larger budgets for foreign travel and business. Human rights should be more than just talk. They should be reflected in practice.

What’s the current state of public opinion?

A survey published by the Jesuit Reflection, Research and Communication Team (ERIC-SJ) in early 2023 showed that after one year in office Castro’s popularity had dropped by 20 percentage points. It also showed that for the majority of Hondurans the most urgent issues to tackle were the economic crisis and unemployment. Honduras is the second-poorest country in Latin America, despite a six per cent growth rate, one of the region’s highest.

According to the ERIC-SJ survey, the third most important problem, close behind economic issues, was crime and insecurity. A very large majority also perceived that murders had increased. Regarding corruption and justice delivery, however, the majority thought the situation had remained unchanged, although the new International Mission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras received high levels of support.

What should Castro’s priorities be for the second half of her term?

The main public policy priorities in Honduras continue to be education, health and the environment – in addition to the situation of excluded groups, including Indigenous peoples, women, LGBTQI+ people and peasants. Much of this exclusion is linked to the problem of extractivism, which accounts for high levels of violence against environmental activists, and almost total impunity for these attacks.

The situation of education and its link to employment is dramatic. Many people no longer want to send their children to school, because even if they graduate they still can’t get a job. It’s more profitable to bring them into the informal market to work as vendors. This has resulted in increasing numbers of school dropouts.

Change in this area must focus not only on increasing school enrolment and retention but also on providing quality education. Public education must be made attractive again to the middle and upper-middle classes to reverse the privatisation and segmentation of education.

The issue of health goes beyond hospital services to include the quality of food and consumption habits. Honduras has very high levels of malnutrition not just because of limited access to food but also because the quality of food has decreased. This is partly due to the fact that the best-quality products, such as bananas, are destined for export, and only the worst-quality products are left for domestic consumption.

Finally, the issue of extractivism should be prioritised. Announcements made about this have not yet been fulfilled. For instance, the Ministry of the Environment has issued statements on the prohibition of open-pit mining but no decree has been issued to formally prohibit this practice and the 20 existing concessions continue to operate.

There are 2,100 extractive projects underway in Honduras, of which 300 are hydroelectric dams and 900 are mining projects. Overall, 33 per cent of national territory has been handed over in concessions to transnational corporations that are developing extractive projects. ZEDEs, meanwhile, occupy 67 per cent of national territory, including all of the coast.

In 2023, 12 human rights defenders were killed. Last year Honduras was the country with the most murders of environmental activists per capita in the world, and the fourth in absolute terms. This problem has not abated with the change of government. It should be a priority to tackle this continuing violence and impunity.

Civic space in Honduras is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with ARCAH through its Facebook account and follow @Arcah_hn on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Morena Herrera, president of Citizens’ Group for the Decriminalisation of Abortion, about the struggle for abortion rights in El Salvador, which has some of the most restrictive abortion laws in the world.

Citizens’ Group is a Salvadoran civil society organisation that works to raise public awareness of sexual and reproductive health issues, advocates for the reform of abortion rights legislation and provides legal support to women accused of or convicted for having abortions or related crimes.

What’s the situation of women who need to have abortions in El Salvador?

Currently, El Salvador’s laws do not allow abortion under any circumstances, not even in the case of a pregnancy of a nine-year-old girl, a pregnancy entailing risk to the pregnant person’s life, or a case of foetal malformation incompatible with extra-uterine life. Even in ectopic pregnancies, which occur outside the uterus and cannot be carried to term, doctors are usually forced to wait until there is no foetal heartbeat before performing the termination, putting the pregnant woman at serious risk of haemorrhaging.

This is the reality faced by women seeking to terminate a pregnancy in El Salvador. They face legal restrictions, criminal charges, prosecution and the risk of imprisonment. All they have left is clandestine abortion, which is often unsafe. Women living in poverty face much greater risks. Those with financial resources can leave the country and seek assistance somewhere where abortion is legal, while those with no resources have no options.

This explains why suicide has become the leading indirect cause of maternal death among adolescents. In the absence of alternatives for terminating a pregnancy, some adolescents with imposed or unwanted pregnancies see suicide as the only way out.

How are Salvadoran feminist organisations, including Citizens’ Group, working for abortion to be decriminalised?

Feminist organisations in El Salvador – particularly Citizens’ Group and the Feminist Collective – have worked to open up a conversation about abortion from new perspectives. We approach it as an issue of public health, social justice and reproductive justice, as well as from the angle of democracy, since at the end of the day it is all about recognising women’s status as citizens.

Citizens’ Group works along three interrelated lines. The first is litigation and the legal defence of women criminalised for abortion or obstetric emergencies. We have denounced this as a violation of human rights and have managed to get 73 women who had been convicted out of prison.

Our second line of work is advocacy and campaigns for legal change. We have disseminated a narrative in defence of women’s rights and freedom, and we have submitted initiatives to reform the Penal Code, along with an appeal for unconstitutionality and petitions to follow up on a Supreme Court ruling that recognised the need to reform the legislation.

In this area we have made uneven progress. There has been progress in the field of public opinion, but this has not yet reflected on the legal framework, partly because politics in El Salvador are controlled by a single party, and partly because religious and conservative parts of society have an enormous influence over the state.

Our third area of work is litigation in international arenas such as the Inter-American and the United Nations human rights systems.

Who is for and against legal abortion in El Salvador?

In El Salvador, these two blocs are not homogeneous. The one that actively opposes abortion is not very numerous, but it includes people with a lot of economic power, media influence and the capacity to put pressure on institutions. They are small in number but have a lot of power. For instance, for a recent hearing at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), they hired expensive law firms and went very well prepared. They also have an army of social media trolls who attack and threaten those of us who argue that change is necessary.

However, on the side of change there are numerous organisations, not only feminist and women’s rights organisations, but also human rights organisations that have gradually come to understand that the absolute criminalisation of abortion is a violation of human rights. These organisations have supported us at IACtHR hearings even though the decriminalisation of abortion is not the main focus of their work. They have done so from a social justice perspective in the face of a reality that is too unfair for women, and particularly for poor women.

This bloc, in sum, encompasses a broad spectrum of organisations and people committed to human rights but working mostly outside institutions and with far fewer financial resources and access to influential media.

What significance could an upcoming IACtHR ruling on the Beatriz case have?

The Beatriz case is an emblematic case in the struggle for the legalisation of abortion in El Salvador. It’s the case of a young woman who was prevented by the Salvadoran state from having an abortion, even though her pregnancy endangered her physical integrity and her life.

An IACtHR ruling on this case would have enormous significance. Already at the end of 2021, the IACtHR condemned the state of El Salvador in the Manuela case, the case of another young woman who was criminalised after suffering an obstetric emergency and died because she did not receive the required medical attention. This ruling established that the criminalisation of poor women facing obstetric emergencies is inseparable from the context of absolute criminalisation of abortion.

A ruling in the Beatriz case would highlight other consequences of the absolute prohibition of abortion and could lead to legal reform that prioritises women’s rights.

Civic space in El Salvador is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Citizens’ Group for the Decriminalisation of Abortion through its website or Facebook page, and follow @AbortoPORlaVIDA on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Mariela Belski, Executive Director of Amnesty International Argentina, about the potential human rights effects of changes introduced by Argentina’s new government led by President Javier Milei.

Founded in 1961, Amnesty International is the world’s largest international human rights organisation.

What are the main measures taken by Javier Milei’s government, and what are the problems with them?

As soon as he took office, President Milei issued a decree of necessity and urgency (DNU) to legislate on a large number of issues that will affect people’s lives. Although the National Constitution establishes that the president can only issue decrees when exceptional circumstances prevent the government following ordinary legislative procedures, decrees have been used often for decades. What’s new in this case is the number and magnitude of the changes included in the DNU, in sharp contrast with the executive’s argument that this is an emergency.

In addition, the government sent to Congress an ‘omnibus law‘ that covers numerous issues not included in the DNU, such as tax reforms. Although it is also justified with arguments related to the context of emergency and economic instability, the bill pushes forward on issues that far exceed the emergency.

Many changes included in the DNU and the omnibus law raise concerns about their impact on rights in areas such as employment, health, housing and freedoms of assembly and expression. Contrary to international rights standards, through deregulation and the withdrawal of the state, both pieces of legislation will have a negative impact on people’s ability to exercise their rights.

For instance, medical insurance companies will be able to increase their fees as they like, and are already doing so. If they receive complaints about their service, the state will not impose sanctions. Drug prices will also be deregulated.

In the area of labour, a series of regressive measures is being introduced regarding severance pay, overtime pay and the extension of probationary periods, among other things. The injunctions that courts have already granted to stop the implementation of these changes have only benefited some specific employment sectors.

On housing, the DNU repeals the rent law and leaves contractual terms, amounts and the currency rent is paid in up to negotiation between landlords and tenants, allowing the landlord to impose whatever conditions they wish.

According to the omnibus law, the updating of pensions will no longer be governed by a formula set by law, but left to the discretion of the executive branch.

The bill also conceives of protest as a crime rather than a right to participation and expression of dissent. It establishes, for instance, notification requirements for any public meeting or demonstration involving three or more people. Although statements have been made that this measure would be reversed, this has not yet happened. In addition, the bill establishes the role of the ‘organiser’ to allow for the identification and eventual sanctioning of protest leaders.

In the area of security, the bill expands the circumstances in which a police officer can be considered as acting in self-defence, weakening standards of police accountability designed to prevent abuses. Given Argentina’s high rates of police brutality, this goes in the opposite direction to what’s needed.

The environment will also be affected by the DNU, which amends the forestry law to further enable deforestation, the glaciers law to permit more mining and the fires law to allow more burning. These provisions put natural resources at risk and could aggravate the climate crisis in Argentina.

In terms of gender policies, both the bill and the DNU remove any reference to diversity and gender. In particular, the omnibus law introduces changes to what’s known as the ‘1,000 days law‘, approved alongside the law on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to support those who decide to carry a pregnancy to term.

The instrumentalisation of the economic emergency to subjugate the autonomy of women, who are viewed exclusively as mothers, and the incorporation of figures such as that of the ‘unborn child’ reveal an attempt to bring about a strong regression on sexual and reproductive rights. In a country where every year more than 300 women are murdered, the real emergency should be to design effective policies against gender-based violence.

How does the new ‘anti-picket’ protocol affect freedom of expression and the right to protest?

Amnesty International believes that guidelines for police and state action set out in the Protocol for the maintenance of public order in the face of roadblocks violate freedoms of assembly, association and expression. The powers vested in police and security agents to intervene aren’t aligned with international standards on the use of force and risk escalating violence and social conflict, endangering people’s lives and physical integrity.

The protocol must reconcile the objectives of preserving ‘public order’ and ‘freedom of movement’ with the state’s obligations to respect and protect the physical integrity of individuals and the right to freedoms of assembly and expression, which are protected by the National Constitution and international human rights instruments. Both the protocol and the omnibus law seek to criminalise protesters and impose sanctions, including financial sanctions, that in practice could lead to the disappearance of collectives and organisations.

Argentina’s regulatory system doesn’t establish an order of priority between rights: neither free transit nor the right to protest take precedence over the other. The banning of demonstrations because of the possible disruption of free movement contradicts domestic norms.

The Argentine state must comply with its international human rights obligations, particularly regarding the right to protest, freedoms of assembly, association and expression and the use of force by its police and security agents.

Do you view these measures, and the way they are being taken, as a danger to democracy?

Amnesty International is concerned that a bill that will impact on numerous key aspects of people’s lives is being pushed through against the clock and during extraordinary congressional sessions.

In just three weeks the executive has proposed, through the DNU and the omnibus law, massive changes in legislation and regulations that were part of a consensus built over the past 40 years. The essence of democracy lies in citizens’ ability to take part in informed discussions on the issues that affect them. The extremely fast-paced discussion of these policies raises serious doubts about the integrity of the deliberative process.

Argentina’s context of economic and social crisis does call for profound reforms. Poverty over 40 per cent and exorbitant inflation rates demand a change of course. Reforms, however, must be carried out within the existing institutional and constitutional framework.

The omnibus law seeks a delegation of powers to the executive on a scale never seen before, in all spheres. Further, it establishes that the regulations issued in the exercise of this delegation will be permanent, except when the nature of the measure determines its transitory character and this is expressly stated.

Congress should carry out this process in an appropriate manner, following the principles set out in our constitution. Decisions that so significantly affect people’s lives should not be made in haste, but through public debate and following established procedures.

What initiatives is Amnesty International developing on these issues?

Regarding the protocol for the maintenance of public order we have presented an analysis with input and comments based on national and international standards. Our aim is to contribute to developing public policies that respect people’s rights.

Regarding the DNU and the omnibus law, we are organising meetings with officials and colleagues from various areas to jointly analyse the legislation and evaluate next steps.

Finally, we are preparing a document analysing the first 100 days of Milei’s government from a human rights perspective. In the same vein, we will be monitoring Congress closely.

Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Amnesty International Argentina through its website or its Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or Twitter accounts, and contact Mariela Belski through her Instagram or LinkedIn accounts.

CIVICUS speaks with Marc Limon, Executive Director of the Universal Rights Group and former diplomat at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, about the deficits of the global governance system and proposals for reform.

Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the Universal Rights Group is the only think tank in the world that focuses exclusively on global human rights policy.

What are the main challenges with the global governance system, and what are the Universal Rights Group’s proposals to tackle them?

A primary deficit in the global governance system is the inadequate representation of developing countries, particularly those in the global south. Despite the majority of UN member states being developing nations, there is a prevalent feeling that their needs and views are not being considered. Many feel that the system has been shaped by western powers to serve their own interests, further contributing to this perceived lack of inclusivity.

To foster greater inclusivity, the UN Human Rights Council has established a Trust Fund to encourage participation in its sessions by developing countries, particularly from small island developing states and least developed countries. These are countries that don’t have missions in Geneva and may have never attended a Council session in the past. Thanks to economic support granted by this fund, officials from these countries can travel to Geneva and participate in the Council’s sessions.

The Universal Rights Group supports this initiative by helping these countries with capacity development, facilitating their participation in Council meetings and eventually encouraging them to establish a mission in Geneva or consider running for a Council seat. By doing so, we aim to contribute to creating a more inclusive system, ensuring that developing countries are involved to the decision-making process.

What would a more robust, effective, and democratic global governance system look like?

For the global governance system to be more robust, effective and democratic, the three UN pillars – security, development and human rights – should have equal importance. Today, a lot of emphasis and funding are placed on the security and development pillars, while the human rights pillar is underfunded and under-resourced. While the UN Security Council and the UN Economic and Social Council are primary UN bodies, the Council remains a subsidiary one.

Participation by developing countries should be increased across all three pillars as well as in other international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This would create ownership among developing nations. But this would require, for instance, Security Council reform. Its current configuration, with its five permanent members reflecting post-Second World War power relations, is outdated, as seen in the exclusion of powerful developing countries such as Brazil and South Africa.

The call for diversity and inclusion extends beyond structural reforms to staffing of UN agencies. At the Office of the Higher Commissioner of Human Rights, for instance, half of staff are from western states, with Africa and Asia greatly underrepresented. It would require concerted efforts to address this kind of imbalance.

What benefits do you anticipate from a more diverse and inclusive system?

A system that embraces diversity and inclusion is more legitimate. If developing states are actively involved in the decision-making process, they are less likely to perceive that the system is imposing decisions on them.

Further, a diverse and inclusive system ensures that the topics discussed are more relevant. By considering a broader range of perspectives, the agenda becomes more responsive to the diverse needs of countries worldwide, making the system more attuned to the realities and challenges faced by a varied international community.

The bottom line is that inclusion and diversity contribute to a more effective system. Developing countries are more likely to accept and value UN recommendations, particularly on issues such as human rights, when they perceive an equal stake in the system. Having their nationals involved in different UN human rights mechanisms reinforces this sense of equality, making recommendations more credible and impactful. Particularly when it comes to human rights, it is crucial to involve victims and human rights defenders. This is the area of focus of the Universal Rights Group.

How does the Universal Rights Group involve victims and human rights defenders?

First, we focus on empowering environmental human rights defenders who are at the forefront of environmental struggles. Rather than relying solely on international environmental law and governmental actions, we recognise the crucial role of individuals and local communities who work tirelessly to protect their environment and advocate against greenhouse gas emissions. We believe that the most effective way to protect the environment is to protect those who protect it.

We also advocate for victims who seek accountability when states engage in gross and systematic human rights violations. International efforts are often focused on public shaming – on denouncing the actions of these states. But we tend to forget the victims and their rightful claim to remedy and reparations. For this reason, the Universal Rights Group is working to shift the narrative by placing the lives and faces of the victims at the forefront of the Human Rights Council. We aim to have the rights of those affected by human rights abuses recognised and prioritised so that their needs for justice, remedy and reparations are addressed.

What specific reforms are your organisation campaigning for?

Our efforts are now focused on the UN General Assembly’s 2021-2026 Review, set to assess whether the Human Rights Council should remain a subsidiary body or become a main body of the UN. This offers a unique opportunity to strengthen the Council and its mechanisms.

We have also contributed to the UN Development System reform, which places sustainable development at the heart of the UN’s work. Considering that over 90 per cent of targets of the Sustainable Development Goals are grounded in intensive human rights work, this reform integrates human rights into UN development programming. We believe that if countries make progress on human rights, they are, by extension and definition, making progress on sustainable development. That’s why we consider it crucial for the UN to integrate human rights into national-level UN development programming.

Get in touch with the Universal Rights Group through its website or Facebook page, and follow @URGthinktank and @marc_limon on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks about the results of Serbia’s recent elections and subsequent protests with Raša Nedeljkov, Programme Director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation that works to develop a democratic culture and promote civic activism through civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the development of public policy proposals.

What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

How have people reacted to election irregularities?

Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

What should the international community do?

We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship

What are civil society’s concerns about the recent Serbian elections?

The most critical concerns revolve around the municipal elections in Serbia’s capital, Belgrade. CRTA has concluded that the announced results didn’t reflect the freely expressed will of the city’s voters. Our findings revealed that electoral engineering, particularly through organised voter migration, crucially influenced the outcome of the closely contested race for the Belgrade City Assembly.

Organised voter migration is neither legal nor legitimate. Falsely registering residence for the purpose of voting in local elections outside one’s jurisdiction violates the law, undermines democratic representation and violates citizens’ right to local self-government.

Local elections were strategically staggered and held in only a third of the local jurisdictions to enable temporary voter migration and secure the victory of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) in Belgrade, where the opposition Serbia Against Violence party had strong chances of winning. As a result, Belgrade is now on the verge of being governed by people largely elected by non-residents who won’t bear the consequences of the decisions they make.

The SPP also gained significant unfair advantage in the parliamentary elections thanks to intensified political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources and institutions, and control of the most influential media. The national election wasn’t nearly fair, but this was overshadowed by the massive manipulation used to prevent political change in Serbia’s largest city.

How has CRTA worked to document electoral manipulation?

On election day CRTA deployed almost 3,000 observers and analysts. And for the first time, a CRTA observer team suffered a physical attack. Its members were attacked with bats while sitting in their parked car in the police station courtyard in Odzaci, a town in Vojvodina province. They were there to report criminal activity related to carousel voting – where people go from place to place to cast multiple voters – at a polling station. This case poignantly illustrates the tense atmosphere the elections took place in.

Our observers had a very dynamic day in Belgrade, the epicentre of electoral irregularities. They took numerous photos and videos showing buses transporting voters to Belgrade from other towns and countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They also identified several logistical centres used to coordinate the voter migration operation, which directed and transported people to polling stations across the city.

Voter migration was facilitated by manipulation of the voter register, which our team also extensively documented. Prior to the elections, we received information from various sources pointing to illegal actions by local governing bodies and the highest state authorities, all aimed at shaping election results in Belgrade in favour of the SPP. Further analysis, which we’re currently conducting, indicates that significant alterations to the voter register were made over the course of a year.

How have people reacted to election irregularities?

Tens of thousands took to the streets shortly after the results were announced. Protests were sparked by the issues we’ve denounced. Protesters are angry about electoral engineering involving illegal manipulation of the voter register and organised voter migration. They urge the state to protect the integrity of elections by prosecuting those involved in illegal manipulation.

Protesters are not necessarily supporters of opposition parties but rather citizens concerned that a critical tool to hold political elites accountable and drive change is being taken away from them. Their core demand is that fresh elections be held at all levels, contingent upon significant revisions to electoral conditions.

How has the government responded to protesters’ demands?

The government has responded with repression and defensive aggressiveness, denying all allegations, including those from international observers, and disregarding evidence of massive irregularities and criminal activities. The regime continues to assert that the elections were the cleanest ever.

The government is also violating protesters’ human rights. Over 30 people, primarily university students, have been arrested during the protests and faced pressure to confess to crimes they didn’t commit, such as receiving bribes from the opposition to engage in violent activities during protests.

Public officials have also accused CRTA of destabilising Serbia, and our staff members have been labelled as liars and subjected to hate speech by pro-regime media.

What should the international community do?

We urge the international community to look beyond immediate geopolitical considerations and consider the consequences that could follow if democracy in Serbia continues to erode. Further democratic backsliding would only bring it closer to the non-democratic part of the world.

Serbian civil society is actively proposing solutions for the challenges of a captured state and diminishing democratic standards, and our international allies should give more serious considerations to these recommendations. The international community must act soon to prevent Serbia becoming an outright dictatorship.

Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CRTA through its website or Facebook page, and follow @CRTArs and @rasaned on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Dr Richard Ponzio, Director of the Global Governance, Security and Justice Programme at the Stimson Center, about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

The Stimson Center is a non-profit, nonpartisan think tank that promotes international peace and security and shared prosperity through applied research and independent analysis, global engagement and policy innovation.

Dr Ponzio also co-directs the Stimson Center-led Global Governance Innovation Network.

What’s the purpose of the Summit of the Future planned for September 2024?

The Summit of the Future, the convening of which had been recommended by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, was originally set to be held in 2023, but following somewhat acrimonious negotiations a decision was made to delay it by a year. We witnessed a major diplomatic fault-line between several influential global south countries and a large proportion of the UN membership, caused primarily by the perceived competition between the Summit of the Future and the mid-point Summit for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG Summit), held in September 2023.

In particular, Cuba, on behalf of the G77 and China, repeatedly reiterated its lingering concerns that the Summit of the Future’s multiple tracks could divert political attention, financial resources and precious time, particularly for smaller UN missions, from the ‘main priority’ of achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

This is one significant area where civil society organisations worldwide can help bridge divisions between major groupings of UN member states. Specifically, they can help build the case that while the SDG Summit arrived at a relatively brief high-level political statement acknowledging global governance gaps in need of urgent attention to accelerate progress on the 2030 Agenda, the preparatory process for next year’s Summit of the Future is designed to realise – through well-conceived, politically acceptable and adequately resourced reform proposals – the actual systemic changes needed to fill those gaps.

This will entail comprehensively tracking the SDG Summit’s identified gaps and ensuring their coverage, backed by sufficient financing and high-level political support – including through concurrent deliberations in the G20, G7 and BRICS+ forums – in the multiple, in-depth instruments to be negotiated for the Summit of the Future, including its main outcome document, the Pact for the Future, and the associated Declaration on Future Generations, Global Digital Compact and New Agenda for Peace. In tangible ways, these instruments will help take forward the 2030 Agenda, the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the wider UN agenda.

What key considerations should policymakers take into account ahead of the Summit?

While seeking to avoid political minefields that could make working relations between major groupings of UN member states even more toxic, it is critical that in the coming weeks and months, all member states begin to coalesce around a select number of ambitious, high-impact global governance innovations that will constitute the chief legacy of the Summit. Otherwise, what’s the point of holding it, let alone the UN75 Declaration and the Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda that preceded it?

The UN 60 Summit held in 2005 was the last time the need for improvements across the entire UN system was reviewed in a single intergovernmental summit. Although governments came up short in high-profile areas such as Security Council reform and disarmament, there were three major achievements: the creation of the new UN peacebuilding architecture, which included the Peacebuilding Commission, Fund and Support Office; the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect principle; and the upgrade of an enfeebled Human Rights Commission into an empowered Human Rights Council with new tools for safeguarding human rights, such as the widely acclaimed Universal Periodic Review.

What would a successful Summit of the Future look like?

Five big-ticket reforms, one for each of the Pact for the Future’s five agreed chapter headings, would help ensure a legacy worthy of UN75 that addresses today’s toughest global challenges.

In the area of sustainable development and financing for development, the convening of a biennial UN-G20+ Summit for the Global Economy would help foster socioeconomic recovery from the pandemic, mitigate and manage cross-border shocks and address rising global inequality. Such global economic convening would push the leaders of the G20 and heads of the international financial institutions and World Trade Organization to join all 193 UN member states and the Secretary-General for the General Assembly’s annual high-level week – in which the participation of influential countries at the highest level has waned.

In the area of international peace and security, a major reform would be the upgrade of the UN Peacebuilding Commission to an empowered Peacebuilding Council equipped to prevent conflict and build just and durable peace after protracted violent conflicts. Crucially, this would involve an expanded mandate to enhance peacebuilding policy development, coordination, resource mobilisation and conflict prevention efforts in countries and regions not directly addressed by the Security Council.

In the area of science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation, it would be key to establish an International Artificial Intelligence (AI) Agency to advance the core principles of safety, sustainability, and inclusion through effective global governance to harness the potential of artificial intelligence and other cyber-technologies for humanity. Specifically, the new agency would improve visibility, advocacy and resource mobilisation for global AI regulatory efforts and provide thought leadership and help to implement General Assembly and Security Council AI and cyber-technology initiatives.

Regarding young people and future generations, the focus should be on establishing an Earth Stewardship Council (ESC) for improved governance of the global commons, as well as a new Special Envoy for Future Generations, to better carry out together the Declaration on Future Generations now being negotiated. To ensure member states’ adherence to their declaration commitments, the ESC could conduct an annual Future Generations Review.

Finally, the transformation of global governance could be achieved through reform of the global economic and financial architecture to allow for greater stability and sustainable progress. Among the most urgent changes needed is the strengthening of the global debt architecture through, for example, debt-for-nature-swaps and a representative sovereign debt authority to aid indebted countries in restructuring. There’s also an urgent need to repurpose multilateral development banks by expanding their lending capacity by more than US$100 billion, reforming voting rights and decision-making rules, instituting new measures to de-risk investments to further unleash private capital and issuing the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights more regularly and at greater scale to finance critical global public goods.

What pitfalls should the international community watch out for in the run up to the Summit?

As noted earlier, a major diplomatic fault-line has opened between several influential global south countries and a large proportion of the UN’s membership, the Secretariat and many civil society groups.

Despite a well-conceived and carefully consulted ‘roadmap’ by the summit’s co-facilitators, the permanent representatives to the UN of Germany and Namibia, and 11 carefully crafted policy briefs by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, the current approach to Summit preparation involving consultations with member states and other stakeholders has been disappointing.

Being excessively process-oriented, for most of last year it focused on determining the precise number of intergovernmental negotiating tracks and the degree of ambition within each track, risking delays to substantive work on the Pact for the Future and related instruments.

Long-overdue discussions on substance are urgently needed to improve the methods and institutions that will enable the UN to face an expansive and critical agenda that runs across its three pillars – peace and security, sustainable development and human rights. Their absence is keeping the international community from achieving the UN we need for the future we want, as the UN75 Report put it.

How can civil society engage with the Summit?

As in past UN summits, the active, well-informed and independent contributions of diverse partners from across civil society worldwide, including advocates from civil society organisations, community-based leaders, regional and country-level practitioners, scholars, policy analysts and faith community leaders, are critical to a successful outcome. As well as having innovative ideas and expertise to share, they can help amplify key messages and commitments coming out of government-led negotiations in the weeks and months ahead for the broader public in their countries, mobilising greater support for actions to address global challenges.

To facilitate further constructive contributions from civil society over the coming months, the Coalition for the UN We Need has encouraged UN missions to consider welcoming at least one individual civil society and one individual youth representative onto their negotiating teams in the months prior to the Summit, as well as to encourage open and accessible intergovernmental meetings for civil society to observe and, on occasion, offer timely substantive inputs. Member states are also encouraged to welcome and facilitate the participation of their national civil society leaders in the 9-10 May UN-Civil Society Forum in Nairobi, Kenya, which the UN Secretariat is planning with the Coalition for the UN We Need and other civil society partners committed to maximising the full potential of the Summit of the Future.

Through a combination of critical mass, quality ideas, enlightened global leadership and deft multilateral diplomacy, civil society can team up with champion governments, alongside dynamic leaders in global and regional institutions, to ensure that this literally once-in-a-generation Summit of the Future makes a meaningful difference in people’s lives. Together, governments and their partners in civil society and multilateral institutions must work quickly and resolutely to leverage this opportunity to realise the future we want and the UN we need for present and future generations.

How is the Stimson Center working to bring different stakeholders together?

Since the 2015 report of the Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance, Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, and the 2021 launch of the Global Governance Innovation Network (GGIN), the Stimson Center has encouraged constructive engagement of diverse stakeholders in civil society, government and the private sector on issues of global governance innovation, and specifically in preparation for the 2024 Summit of the Future.

Among the GGIN’s primary workstreams, it has facilitated 10 global and regional policy dialogues in the global north and south, including a forthcoming one in Africa, undertakes and commissions policy research, including from female and younger scholars, and coordinates a diverse, global online community of practice including scholars, practitioners and policy advocates.

The GGIN is also a proud founding partner of the Coalition for the UN We Need, which – along with its predecessor, the UN2020 campaign – provides a global platform to enable greater civil society impact in strengthening the UN system. In 2024, the Coalition will give particular attention to engaging civil society partners in its critical advocacy work to raise the ambition of the Summit of the Future so that it can make the UN system more inclusive, effective and accountable.

Get in touch with the Stimson Center through its website and follow @StimsonCenter, @GGINetwork and @ponzio_richard on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Jorge Santos, General Coordinator of the Guatemalan Human Rights Defenders Protection Unit (UDEFEGUA), about the imminent inauguration of a new president, which comes after 100 days of mobilisation to demand respect for the election results.

Founded in 2000, UDEFEGUA is a civil society organisation dedicated to documenting, verifying and recording attacks against human rights defenders in Guatemala.

What was the significance of the election of Bernardo Arévalo as president, and what’s the reason for the enormous resistance he has faced?

29 December 2023 marked 27 years since the signing of the peace accords that put an end to 36 years of internal armed conflict in Guatemala. That conflict claimed more than 200,000 direct victims and left deep scars on Guatemalan society. The peace accords established a structural transformation agenda to tackle the root causes of the conflict. Instead, the last three governments – and particularly that of current president Alejandro Giammattei – have done nothing but produce a severe authoritarian regression.

The presidential elections held in June and August 2023 were meant to consolidate this authoritarian regression and to finish burying the peace and democracy-building agenda.

More than 20 parties competed in the first round of the presidential election, most of them located on the right and far right and identified with the groups that have captured the state, closely linked to economic, political and military elites and organised crime.

The mere fact that the election took place was a milestone. That the winning candidate had clear democratic and progressive views made it all the more remarkable. Bernardo Arévalo’s victory represents society’s repudiation of the corrupt political elite. We were at a historic crossroads, between an authoritarian past and a possible future in which we could build a democratic state.

This explains the enormous resistance the president-elect has faced. Bernardo is the son of former president Juan José Arévalo, the first popularly elected president following the October 1944 revolution and the architect of what was called the democratic spring of those years. His legacy is still very much alive: it was then that the right to vote was extended to women, the labour code was passed and the Guatemalan Social Security Institute was established. In other words, it led to the transformation of the state.

It’s been 79 years that we have been dominated by particular groups interested in maintaining the privileges of a small segment of the population. They would obviously resist a government like Arévalo’s coming to power. However, although very powerful, these groups are in the minority and at last it seems that they are beginning to lose the privileges they have always enjoyed.

How has democracy in Guatemala been at risk?

Recent governments have completely bypassed legality. The outgoing government practically broke the rule of law. One indicator of this, which we have identified as part of the overall context of aggression against human rights defenders, is the violation of the republican principle of the separation of powers. The three branches of the Guatemalan state – executive, legislative and judicial – have been captured by mafia elites.

Repeated attempts to violate the popular will expressed at the ballot box only aggravated the situation. The Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office have pressured the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to reverse the election results, carrying out four illegal and arbitrary raids against the Tribunal.

It is important to note that national and international election observation missions, including from the Organization of American States and the European Union, corroborated the transparency of the process and stated that the allegations of fraud were unfounded.

Disregard for the will of the people expressed at the ballot box is the greatest possible insult to democracy. In the face of this, people have mobilised. Starting on 2 October, a national strike was called for an indefinite period of time to demand respect for the will of the people. 9 January marked the 100th day of peaceful resistance, led by Indigenous peoples, in defence of democracy.

What was new about these protests?

The protests called by the ancestral authorities of Indigenous peoples have been joined by numerous spontaneous expressions of citizen mobilisation. In the past, the urban and mestizo – mixed ancestry – middle classes opposed mobilisation by Indigenous peoples. This time, however, the protests led by Indigenous peoples have been supported and legitimised by broad segments of society. This broke with a long tradition of prejudice and racial discrimination by urban and mestizo society towards Indigenous peoples, and resulted in massive and widespread demonstrations throughout the country.

The protests succeeded in bringing together the 23 peoples that make up Guatemala. Broad segments of society carried out road blockades at the country’s main transit points. Passage of vehicles transporting food or providing medical services was not obstructed, as protesters cleared the way for them.

The blockades were an unprecedented demonstration of citizen joy. People rediscovered and recovered public spaces, danced on blocked streets and organised football games, yoga and chess classes on occupied spaces.

A key characteristic of the protests was their peaceful character. In the face of provocations by external forces and the national police, people responded with non-violent actions. For 100 days they held a rally in front of the headquarters of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The protesters did not leave their place and continued to demand the resignation of the attorney general, Consuelo Porras Argueta, for her repeated attempts to annul Bernardo Arévalo’s presidential victory.

What should be the new government’s priorities?

The Seed Movement – Arévalo’s party – faces important challenges. Although it will control the executive branch, the legislative branch remains highly captured by mafias. Out of 160 parliamentarians, around 130 belong to groups that make up what is popularly known in Guatemala as the ‘corrupt pact‘. The same is true of the justice system.

Bernardo Arévalo faces the enormous challenge of rebuilding public institutions. Corruption and impunity have reached such levels that services as essential as obtaining an identity card have become an ordeal. Infrastructure must be rebuilt so that people can access essential services such as health and education free of charge. The long list of human rights violations experienced by the Guatemalan people must stop.

Another major challenge is to generate a systematic and permanent process of dialogue with civil society. In particular, Indigenous peoples, historically excluded, their rights violated by the Guatemalan state, must be recognised as key political subjects.

The government of the Seed Movement will have only four years to address these challenges. We hope that its mandate will be part of a transition that will usher in a long period of governments that respond to the interests of the majority of the population.

What improvements in the situation of human rights defenders can be expected following the change of government?

In 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in the case Human Rights Defender against the State of Guatemala, initiated following the murder of a human rights defender in 2004. Our request to the Court was to include as a reparation measure the introduction of a public policy for the protection of human rights defenders. The Court accepted this request and included it in its ruling, imposing five parameters for the design of such a policy.

But efforts to develop this policy were truncated and there is only a draft document to date. It will therefore be a key responsibility of the new government to complete this process and commit itself to approving the policy and providing the resources required for its implementation.

Another of its responsibilities in this area will be to push forward a legislative agenda to dismantle all the criminalising legislation passed in recent years. This process must go hand in hand with an activation of the institutions in charge of ensuring the state’s compliance with its human rights obligations.

How can the international community support the strengthening of democracy in Guatemala?

The risk of a break with the constitution remains. The new government will have to confront one of the continent’s most conservative and backward oligarchies, responsible for the crime of genocide. Stripping these groups of their privileges will be no easy task.

Continued support and vigilance by the international community will be extremely necessary. Crucial forms of support would include the sharing of information and best practices, denouncing of human rights violations and provision of technical assistance.

On 14 January, the date of the presidential inauguration, a period of democratic transition begins that promises to leave corruption and lawlessness behind. Both the new government and Guatemalan civil society will need all the support they can get in order to achieve this.

Civic space in Guatemala is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with UDEFEGUA through its website or its Facebook and Instagram pages, and follow @UDEFEGUA and @JorgeASantos197 on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Mariano de Alba, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group, about the recent referendum called by the Venezuelan government on the status of the Essequibo territory, disputed with neighbouring Guyana, and its possible implications for democracy in Venezuela and peace in the region.

The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that works to prevent wars and design policies to build a more peaceful world.

Why did the Venezuelan government decide to submit the Essequibo issue to a referendum?

The announcement of the referendum came first as a reaction by the Venezuelan government to the recent oil bidding rounds conducted by Guyana in maritime areas that Venezuela considers as pending delimitation. As the referendum was being organised, it became clear that the Venezuelan government was attaching additional value to it as a tool to test its capacity for electoral mobilisation a few months in advance of the presidential election due to take place later this year.

In addition, by placing the dispute with Guyana on the public agenda, the Venezuelan government seeks to stoke nationalist sentiment in the Venezuelan population, and most particularly among the armed forces, a key group in its strategy to retain power.

What’s the legal value of the referendum?

According to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Justice, Venezuela’s highest judicial body, consultative referendums, a mechanism established in the Venezuelan constitution, are not binding. This view was publicly ratified by the chief lawyer who was appointed by the government to prepare the referendum questions.

But for political reasons, since before the referendum and particularly in view of its results, the government has insisted that it does have a binding character in order to justify a series of actions it has announced in relation to the territory in dispute. These, however, have been no more than symbolic announcements, since Venezuelan armed forces have not effectively entered the disputed territory, which has been under Guyanese administration for many, many years.

How did the opposition react to the referendum, and how will this impact on the 2024 elections?

There were differences among various opposition groups on how to position themselves in relation to the referendum. First of all, it should be noted that on 17 October, when the government and the opposition met in Barbados to sign an agreement on the conditions to hold elections, they also signed another agreement in which they committed themselves to ‘ratify the historical rights’ of Venezuela and to ‘uphold the full validity of the 1966 Geneva Agreement’, the treaty that reignited the dispute, in which Guyana, Venezuela and the UK agreed to seek a solution to the conflict. As a result, at least part of the opposition leadership found it difficult to oppose the referendum.

However, María Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, elected as a unity candidate in primaries held in late October 2023, did criticise the referendum, arguing that ‘sovereignty must be exercised, submitted to consultation’. The most important difference within the opposition is that some opposition leaders believe that one should participate in all electoral processes, regardless of the conditions, while others do not. Some voted in the referendum, while others didn’t.

Ahead of the presidential elections, a key element of the government’s strategy is to foster division among the opposition, so that one part ends up calling for non-participation due to lack of sufficient guarantees and another part decides to participate. In the face of a divided opposition the government has a real chance of winning the election, since under the current electoral system whoever gets the most votes, even if short of 50 per cent, is elected. The election will take place in an authoritarian context in which the conditions for the competition will be poor and there is a high risk of government repression.

What has been Guyana’s reaction?

Guyana is focused on seeking a favourable decision at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where in 2018 it filed a lawsuit seeking ratification of the validity of the 1899 arbitral award that gave it the territory it now controls and administers, and which Venezuela ignores, arguing that the award was the product of procedural fraud.

However, recent tensions complicate the picture for Guyana. First, because, at least on paper, the Venezuelan armed forces have substantially superior capabilities compared to Guyana’s. Hence Guyana’s intention to seek to strengthen its military alliances and obtain guarantees from allied states. Second, the uncertainty resulting from these tensions could affect the remarkable recent economic growth of Guyana, a country with a small population but high income due to the recent discovery and exploitation of oil resources. Already in mid-December 2023, London’s Lloyd’s insurance market rated the Guyanese exclusive economic zone as risky, which could increase the cost of shipping oil from there.

What are the risks of an escalation into armed conflict?

The referendum has substantially increased tensions between Guyana and Venezuela. Guyana saw the referendum and the subsequent actions of the Venezuelan government as a threat. But Guyana has also taken advantage of the tensions to try to strengthen its diplomatic and military alliances with states such as the UK and the USA.

In the short to medium term, the risk of these tensions escalating into armed conflict is low, partly because the international reaction would be so critical of it. Moreover, while the Venezuelan government has announced and gone through with actions such as appointing an authority for the territory in dispute, it has been careful to ensure that the implementation of these actions has remained on Venezuelan territory for the time being.

But escalation is not out of the question. Tension could lead to a limited confrontation, following which it could become difficult for one or both of the countries to de-escalate.

From the Venezuelan perspective, escalation is a risky gamble because it could generate greater discontent among the Venezuelan armed forces, which would have to risk their lives, particularly if Guyana receives the support of a key ally such as the USA. Moreover, the Venezuelan government is striving to reintegrate itself into the international community, and initiating a conflict with Guyana would derail those efforts.

On the Guyanese side, it is uncertain whether military support would actually come in the event of a substantial military conflict. Such a conflict could also make it very risky for some companies operating in Guyana to continue doing business there. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, barring any surprises, attempts to keep tensions on the public agenda will predominate, but without resulting in any real escalation.

At the end of the day, both countries, as the neighbours they are, will be obliged to try to negotiate. Even if Guyana obtains a favourable ICJ decision, that will hardly be the end of it, as without Venezuela’s cooperation it will be very difficult to enforce the judgment. Moreover, the maritime area will still be pending delimitation, so sooner or later negotiations will have to take place in any case.

What is the status of diplomatic negotiations?

Serious diplomatic efforts have been undertaken by various countries to try to convince both governments of the importance of lowering tensions and avoiding armed conflict. These efforts resulted in an agreement signed in St Vincent and the Grenadines on 14 December. There, it was agreed to de-escalate tensions and hold a new meeting in Brazil before the end of March.

However, distrust between the two governments remains deep. The visit of a British warship to Guyana in late December, which Venezuela interpreted as a threat to which it responded by conducting military exercises on its territory, did not help a bit.

The outlook is complicated by the fact that both governments believe they can make political gains out of these tensions, Venezuela for predominantly domestic political reasons, and Guyana first and foremost to strengthen its military alliances, and secondarily because, if it manages the situation well, the ruling party’s prospects could improve ahead of elections in 2025.

Behind the scenes, diplomatic efforts continue because in the face of the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, the idea prevails that there is no international space for another armed conflict, and even less so in Latin America and the Caribbean, which for so many years has been a zone of peace, at least as far as inter-state conflicts are concerned.

Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the International Crisis Group through its website or its Facebook and Instagram accounts, and follow @CrisisGroup and @marianodealba on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the repression of civil society and human rights defenders and LGBTQI+ rights in Burundi with Carina Tertsakian, co-founder of the Burundi Human Rights Initiative (BHRI).

Active from mid-2019 until December 2023, the BHRI was an independent initiative that worked in cooperation with a range of people inside and outside Burundi to document the human rights situation and advocate for human rights.

Has there been any improvement in the human rights situation in Burundi?

Burundi’s overall human rights record has remained largely unchanged since President Évariste Ndayishimiye took office in 2020. Back then people had high hopes because the new president had a less bloody past than his predecessor. But there’s been little progress in the protection of civil and political rights. The authorities have continued to arrest, prosecute, ill-treat and sometimes torture people for political reasons. Those arrested have included activists, journalists and opposition members.

Even though the most serious forms of rights violations such as political killings and enforced disappearances have decreased, human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists have been arbitrarily arrested simply due to their involvement in human rights activities or their affiliation with independent civil society organisations (CSOs). They are typically accused of undermining internal state security or territorial integrity, among other baseless charges.

What are the conditions for LGBTQI+ people in Burundi?

In August 2023, 24 people were arrested for their alleged involvement in organisations that help LGBTQI+ people. While some were acquitted or released, others faced sentencing. One activist who was acquitted passed away before being released. The case is ongoing, drawing attention to the larger underlying issue that homosexuality is still criminalised in Burundi.

It’s nearly impossible to identify openly as an LGBTQI+ activist in Burundi. While some organisations engage in activities to support LGBTQI+ people, they avoid explicitly identifying as LGBTQI+ organisations. The 24 people who were arrested, for instance, had participated in training on awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS.

In his recent year-end speech, President Ndayishimiye vilified LGBTQI+ people, labelling homosexuality as a sin and encouraging public stoning of those perceived as ‘homosexuals’. This horrifying statement has further fuelled hateful rhetoric online. On a positive note, a Burundian CSO and several prominent activists in exile strongly criticised Ndayishimiye’s statement, something that is extremely difficult to do inside Burundi.

To what extent is it possible for human rights organisations to work in Burundi?

In 2015, a significant political and human rights crisis unfolded in Burundi, marked by a violent crackdown on civil society, particularly on critics and those suspected of opposing the government. As a result, leaders of major human rights organisations fled the country and remain in exile. Some faced charges and were convicted in absentia, including to life imprisonment.

Human rights activism can hardly be carried out openly in Burundi anymore. Ever since 2015, activists addressing politically sensitive issues face direct threats and can’t work freely inside the country. Even those previously affiliated with human rights organisations that no longer operate in Burundi continue to face arrests.

Activists advocating for economic and social rights experience comparatively less pressure. Some CSOs working on anti-corruption and good governance issues have been more or less allowed to function, although the government has occasionally impeded their activities, for example, by disrupting or prohibiting press conferences.

Have Burundian activists found safety in exile?

Exiled activists based in Europe or Canada are relatively safe, whereas those in Rwanda may encounter additional pressure. In 2015, as many HRDs and journalists fled, the government in Burundi banned or suspended their organisations and shut down several independent radio stations. Some exiled journalists established radio stations abroad, mainly in Rwanda.

The Burundian government has taken advantage of recently improved relations with Rwanda and pressured the host country to silence these journalists or hand them over. The Rwandan government gave some of these journalists an ultimatum to either remain silent or leave, forcing some to halt operations from Rwanda and relocate again. Some of these journalists were among a broader group, including other HRDs, who were tried and sentenced in absentia.

What are your key demands for the Burundian government?

Burundi’s civil society demands that the government lift civic space restrictions, enabling HRDs, journalists and other independent voices to express themselves freely without harassment. We support these demands.

First of all, the government must release Floriane Irangabiye, a journalist sentenced to 10 years in jail in May 2023. Five other HRDs were charged and tried earlier, in April. The government targeted them because of their association with an international organisation the regime dislikes and accused them of illegally receiving funds. Although released after two months thanks to international pressure, some have been given a suspended sentence, so we call for all charges against them to be dropped.

The safety of exiled activists must also be ensured before they can return, which requires the lifting of their sentences. As long as HRDs continue to face convictions in absentia, there will be significant impediments to any form of human rights activism in Burundi. We further urge the government to revoke the bans and suspensions imposed on CSOs since 2015.

Despite the government’s claim that Burundi is a democracy, it is certainly not. If it were, it would allow people to voice criticism and the activities of HRDs wouldn’t be criminalised.

What support do Burundian human rights activists receive from international allies, and what further do they need?

When European Union countries, the USA and other governments raise concerns about blatant human rights violations in Burundi, particularly through their embassies in the country, it really makes a difference. Although it may take years to secure the release of an HRD, intensified international pressure has proven effective.

There are too few independent human rights groups left in Burundi, and it’s difficult to provide international support to virtually non-existent entities. Those still active are mostly individual activists, so it is challenging for donors to support them. One notable exception is the independent newspaper Iwacu, which, despite facing constraints, continues its work. We encourage donors to sustain their support of the media outlet, which represents one of the few remaining independent voices in Burundi.

Human rights organisations operating from exile need ongoing support, and could expand their work if they had more sustainable funding. It’s hard to work from abroad. After several years in exile, activists begin to feel disconnected and demotivated as they don’t see things change.

Civic space in Burundi is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

CIVICUS speaks with Stirling Dean, Chair and Executive Director of the United Institutions Foundation, about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

The United Institutions Foundation administers the institutional development of United Institutions, a planned new global institution for international cooperation between the public, private and civil sectors.

What’s the current state of multilateralism?

Multilateralism has served as the foundation of the global rule-based order for over 70 years and still does today. However, it is currently under severe strain and being undermined by a host of interconnected challenges.

First and foremost, our world is facing a host of escalating global challenges including climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution and inequality, which threaten the wellbeing of people and the planet. The multilateral system and many of our institutions are chronically overstretched due to the sheer number, complexity and scale of these challenges. Further, meeting the day-to-day demands coming from these challenges takes priority, making it difficult to tackle the root causes. Countries are also falling far behind in realising the new multilateral agreements that we have put in place to address these challenges, including the 2030 Agenda that established the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

At the same time, we face a deteriorating international security environment, armed conflicts and deep divisions within and between nations. We are moving towards a more multipolar world with renewed distrust and competition between major powers. We are also seeing a rise in populism, nationalism, protectionism, misinformation and deliberate attempts to undermine democratic values around the world, which are also negatively impacting on multilateralism and international cooperation.

Civic space is furthermore shrinking around the world, as many countries work to undermine human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. This is in direct opposition to the principles of the 2030 Agenda as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has been signed and ratified by those same countries. These practices affect not only people at the local and national levels but also have repercussions for the governments themselves, for their relations with other nations and for multilateralism as a whole. Moreover, they negatively affect the realisation of our global agendas, which affects us all.

Moreover, we have paid far too little attention to the need to strengthen the multilateral system. Our current structures and institutions were largely built for the circumstances of the last century and many are now outdated and haven’t been upgraded and adequately equipped for the complex interlinked challenges and political realities of today’s world. They also don’t adequately account for the much larger set of stakeholder groups that are engaged in global affairs today. Lack of connectivity, integration, inclusion, alignment and coordination across governance structures, mechanisms, sectors, policy areas and geographies are significant challenges.

Financing is a key challenge as well. Our global systems and institutions are chronically underfunded and development cooperation continues to be insufficient to meet demand, as only a handful of countries are delivering on the official development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income.

On the positive side, the United Nations (UN) system is still making a tangible difference for countries and millions of people around the world. Countries did come together at the UN to adopt new global agendas, and to a large extent are committed to engaging with each other through multilateral institutions. They are also aware of the governance challenges we face and are actively looking at ways to turn the tide.

Moreover, non-state stakeholders across sectors and geographies are engaged and committed to addressing our challenges and realising these agendas. They are also calling for strengthened inclusion in global decision-making and working to hold governments to account.

Last but not least, according to surveys conducted by the UN and other institutions, the vast majority of the world’s people still strongly support and believe in international cooperation and multilateralism. And that is essential.

Are non-state stakeholders sufficiently included in key deliberations at the UN?

Non-state stakeholders have been engaged in UN deliberations since its founding and have been quite instrumental in helping drive many of the developments and decisions that states have made at the UN. However, due to the intergovernmental nature of the UN there have always been barriers to stakeholder engagement, and participation has been limited. Moreover, the inclusion of non-state stakeholders is often treated as an afterthought and regarded by many as mere tokenism.

To a large extent non-state stakeholders believe that their level of inclusion and participation in UN deliberations is completely insufficient. They argue that when it does take place, it is mostly limited to two-minute interventions with no follow up, which does not constitute meaningful engagement, debate or collaboration, and I tend to agree. For decades, they have called for greater and more meaningful engagement, and with the ever-growing number of stakeholders engaged in global affairs, this call is today stronger than ever.

What can be done to improve things?

There have been multiple attempts to strengthen working methods between UN member states and non-state stakeholders and to increase inclusion and participation in UN deliberations, but, with few exceptions, the resulting changes have most often been minor due to built-in resistance, constraints related to the intergovernmental nature of the organisation and pushback from various member states.

However, there are proposals for reform worth considering. These include the recommendations made by the Unmute Civil Society initiative, led by the governments of Costa Rica and Denmark, and the proposed establishment of a UN civil society envoy, supported by multiple civil society campaigns.

UN member states could also explore the plethora of already established engagement methodologies used by individual UN agencies, civil society, the private sector and some national and local governments. These include comprehensive e-consultation platforms, hearings, co-creation workshops, civil society mechanisms and focus groups, just to mention a few. There are literally dozens of opportunities that could be explored.

We will have to wait and see what proposals make it into the Pact for the Future, the outcome document of the upcoming Summit of the Future. Given past experiences, if any changes are made, they will most likely be incremental and nowhere near what is needed. Also, while the scope of the outcome document does include an important proposal for increased inclusion of youth, it does not address the need to strengthen inclusion and participation of all stakeholder groups. I hope this will change during the upcoming negotiations of the zero draft of the document.

What’s at stake in the Summit of the Future?

UN member states are holding the Summit of the Future with the aim of agreeing on a range of reforms and investments to reinvigorate multilateralism, strengthen international cooperation and accelerate progress in realising global development agendas.

A host of reform proposals have been put forth and are being considered for inclusion in the summit and its outcome document. These include possible reforms to the UN, reform of the international financial architecture, strengthening global emergency response, adopting a new agenda for peace, strengthening digital cooperation and accounting for the interests of future generations in global decision making, among others. It is a tall agenda but a very necessary one. Each of the proposed reforms is important and will be required in helping us turn the tide.

Concerningly, however, numerous mission-critical governance challenges, reforms and investments, some of which were included in the UN Secretary-General’s ‘Our Common Agenda’ report, were not included in the agreed scope of the summit outcome document. These include realising a whole-of-society approach, breaking silos, investing in our capacity to implement integrated approaches, realising a more networked and inclusive multilateralism and strengthening inclusion and participation of all stakeholder groups in global decision making, among others. If these issues are not addressed, many of our governance challenges will remain and negatively affect our ability to achieve the results that we need.

What is United Institutions, and how can it help improve multilateralism?

Strengthening multilateralism and international cooperation to address our global challenges and realising our agendas will require a lot more than the proposals currently being considered for the Pact for the Future. The scale and urgency of our challenges also calls for more than incremental reforms, it requires transformation.

As outlined in ‘Our Common Agenda’, we need a more networked, inclusive and effective multilateralism that involves all stakeholder constituencies and enables us to work in a more comprehensive and integrated manner. This requires an investment in the connectivity and capacity of the global ecosystem of mechanisms and stakeholders beyond the UN. It also requires that a host of system-wide governance challenges are solved, including silos, fragmentation and lack of inclusion. It would also require us to work together across sectors to build trust, strengthen relations, realise integrated approaches and establish global solidarity. These are functions the UN is not designed for and are not addressed by the UN reform proposals being considered for the Pact for the Future. Fragmented ad hoc solutions will not suffice either. Getting there will instead require strategic investments into functions and capabilities of the multilateral system and the global governance architecture that complement existing structures.

The United Institutions is a planned new global institution, integrator platform and permanent world forum for global cooperation between the public, private and civil society sectors, being developed for the international community. It is intended to serve as a complement to the UN. It is developed with a view to strengthen governance, cooperation and collective action, and to support and enable the international community to realise a more networked and inclusive multilateralism, build out the institutional framework at the global level and link sectors, mechanisms and processes together across policy areas and geographies.

The platform will provide a unifying charter, enabling environment and infrastructure for cooperation at the global level, and is designed to work in coordination with existing mechanisms at the international and national levels. It will enable existing structures and institutions to strengthen their interconnectivity, coordination and alignment in a coherent and integrated manner, and to transform institutional silos and fragmentation into systemic and sustained cooperation, integration and collective action. Among its functions, it is also intended to support and help transform working methods and relations between non-state stakeholders and UN member states, and to strengthen civic engagement and civic space at the global level.

Both the plans for the United Institutions and the proposals being considered for the Pact for the Future are aimed at strengthening multilateralism and international cooperation, but they don’t address the same needs and instead complement each other. The United Institutions is currently in preparatory development ahead of its institutional formation and operationalisation. To learn more about this, please visit www.unitedinstitutions.org.

Get in touch with the United Institutions Foundation through its website or Facebook page, and follow @ui_foundation on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Aria Danaparamita, Advocacy Director of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), about the UK’s new migration treaty with Rwanda, aimed at sending asylum seekers arriving unlawfully in the UK to Rwanda for processing.

The JCWI has been challenging policies that lead to discrimination, destitution and the denial of rights in the UK for more than 50 years. It provides legal and advice services to immigrants and asylum-seekers.

How different is the new treaty that the UK signed with Rwanda from its predecessor?

The new agreement is different from the previous one because it’s a treaty between the governments of the UK and Rwanda, while the previous one was only a memorandum of understanding. A treaty is legally binding under international law and requires scrutiny by the UK parliament, while the previous agreement was simply signed by the UK Home Secretary.

The new treaty is accompanied by draft ‘emergency legislation’ seeking to provide the legal basis for maintaining that Rwanda is a safe country, which is a prerequisite for the treaty to be implemented without the UK breaching its international obligations towards asylum seekers.

The treaty includes provisions aimed at addressing the concerns raised by the UK Supreme Court about the systemic risks of human rights violations if people were to be sent to Rwanda. However, these provisions – which are at this point just words on paper – will be wholly inadequate. The Supreme Court was unanimous and unequivocal in its evidence-based finding that Rwanda is not a safe country, and the risks are systemic and cannot be improved in a matter of months, despite the government’s wishes. Because of this, the treaty and the provisions in the Rwanda Bill are nothing more than an attempt to legislate the fiction that Rwanda is safe, despite overwhelming evidence on the contrary.

Many people across the UK and across civil society are united in their strong rejection of the Rwanda plan. We have told the government ever since the first Rwanda flight was planned that this is a cruel and inhumane plan, and that it risks breaching the UK’s obligations under international law as well as our moral duty to protect people in search of safety. We continue to resist the government’s failed and inhumane Rwanda plan because we should not be sending people to places where their lives are at risk – whether Rwanda or anywhere else.

Do you view this as part of a wider trend?

We are seeing more and more policies that are hostile towards people on the move, particularly in western, former colonial countries. It is both ironic and unjust that the countries that have historically benefited, and continue to benefit, most from migration are now turning people away at their borders, often with high levels of violence. Across European lands and seas, we have seen lives taken away by cruel border regimes that do not value migrants as people. We urge the UK government to stop making policies driven by hate and hostility, and instead protect the rights of everyone to move, work and live freely.

Migration is a fact of life. We as humans have always moved, whether to the next town or to another country across the world. In fact, the most recent immigration statistics show that the UK urgently needs migrant workers to increase its labour force.

But instead of recognising the genuine need to welcome migrants in this country, or acknowledging the ways people contribute to our communities, the government continues to scapegoat migrants and fuel racist rhetoric to cover its policy failures – to address the deepening cost-of-living crisis, to reform our crippled healthcare sector, or to provide adequate public services after years of austerity.

What would the impact if the Rwanda plan were to be implemented?

The Rwanda plan has always been cruel, inhumane and, as the Supreme Court’s judgement unequivocally shows, unlawful. We cannot send people away to places where their lives might be at risk. It is against international law, our domestic law and our moral compass as a society.

If the Rwanda Bill is passed, it will almost certainly breach international law. The Home Secretary himself has acknowledged that he cannot guarantee it will comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. It will also stand to breach numerous conventions, from the Refugee Convention to the Convention against Torture.

The human cost of this bill will be catastrophic. Even before it has passed, we have seen the prospect of being sent to Rwanda drive the people we support into extreme anxiety and mental distress, and we continue to see alarming rates of self-harm and suicides. We cannot let this bill pass or be implemented. By implementing it, the government will be forcing people to face certain and irreversible harm.

 How is UK civil society, and your organisation in particular, working to help migrants?

JCWI support migrants in various ways, including by providing legal representation and high-quality legal advice. We also campaign alongside migrants and grassroots communities for migrant justice.

For doing this work, in recent years we have faced increasingly hostile and racist rhetoric led by those in power and enabled by the media. However, we will not let this stop us. We know that most people are kind and compassionate and believe that we all have the right to live safe, thriving lives regardless of where we are from. Together we can build the world we want to live in, free from harm and border violence.

Civic space in the UK is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the JCWI through its webpage or Facebook page, and follow @JCWI_UK on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Elisabeth Pramendorfer, Geneva Representative, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

The GCR2P is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works to uphold the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, which the United Nations (UN) adopted in 2005. This principle seeks to ensure that the international community mobilises to prevent and stop the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

What is the Responsibility to Protect?

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing – often referred to as mass atrocity crimes. R2P was conceptualised as a political and operational response to the failures of the international community to prevent and respond to the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was unanimously adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit. 

R2P is a political commitment and call to action. It means that sovereignty does not provide a state with carte blanche to commit crimes against its own population. It stipulates that every state has the primary responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes and that the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist them in meeting that responsibility. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its population, the international community must take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.

In practice, this means that states have a responsibility to build and strengthen an atrocity prevention architecture by ensuring human rights protection, guaranteeing equal access to justice and a strong rule of law, and memorialising and acknowledging past atrocities, among other measures.

A variety of measures may be involved in assisting other states in upholding R2P, such as providing technical assistance and capacity strengthening or supporting military and police training. In situations where atrocity crimes are imminent or ongoing, the toolbox of action may include the use of good offices, mediation, negotiation or other forms of preventive diplomacy; the imposition of arms embargoes and targeted sanctions against identified perpetrators; the establishment of UN-mandated investigative mechanisms to document and report on atrocity crimes; and the deployment of peacekeeping missions.

It is key for the response to any given situation to be context-specific, based on the unique drivers, motivations and risk factors of violence, the enabling and mitigating factors that are in place, and an in-depth understanding of who is targeted and why – all of which, even within the same crisis, may change over time and pose different risks to different groups. This is what we call ‘atrocity prevention’.

How well are existing global governance institutions fulfilling this responsibility?

Since 2005, we have seen remarkable institutional progress in advancing R2P as a political norm. There have been more than 90 resolutions by the UN Security Council and over 75 by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that refer to R2P, including for situations in the Central African Republic, North Korea, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Many governments around the world have committed to the advancement and implementation of R2P, including by becoming members of inter-governmental networks such as the UN Group of Friends of R2P and the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, which also includes regional organisations such as the European Union and the Organization of American States.

The UN General Assembly meets annually to exchange on best practices and lessons learned in upholding our individual and shared R2P. The UN has an office, the Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P, fully dedicated to advancing R2P. Longstanding efforts to mainstream atrocity prevention on a national, regional and multilateral level have helped us better understand how to identify risk factors of atrocity crimes and develop early warning models.

Yet the international community continues to fail to uphold universal human rights and prevent atrocity crimes – in China, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Sudan and Syria, among many others. It also struggles in ensuring accountability and ending impunity.

While R2P is the most effective principle around which the international community can coalesce when vulnerable populations face the threat of atrocity crimes, it does not have independent agency. As with so many other protection agendas, implementing R2P and making atrocity prevention a living reality rests largely with governments as political actors. And more often than not, political leaders fail to implement principles and institutions fail to uphold mandates.

It is a sad reality of our job that politics and governments’ strategic interests often come in the way of meaningful action and that some serious country situations simply don’t receive the attention they should. Western governments’ extraordinary solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s illegal act of aggression shows how rapidly the international community can respond, including by establishing investigations at the UNHRC, imposing an expansive sanctions regime, opening an investigation at the International Criminal Court and obtaining provisional measures by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These much-needed actions show that when there is political will states are able to uphold their responsibility to protect populations at risk and turn condemnation into action. At the same time, it has raised valid and long-overdue questions of why we have not seen a similar response to crises in Ethiopia, Myanmar or Sudan.

Do you think this failure to respond is linked to structural flaws in the global governance system? 

The international community has all the tools and measures to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes effectively – and any other human rights violations and abuses, for that matter. Implementing R2P means nothing other than implementing existing obligations under international law, including the Geneva Conventions and the Refugee Convention. But states continuously fail to make consistent use of this remarkable protection regime, both in an individual and collective capacity.

We are witnessing a hierarchy of victimhood and an arbitrariness in compassion and condemnation. Mounting evidence of atrocity crimes in Gaza has revealed blatant double standards in our response to crisis situations, particularly by states that pride themselves as champions of human rights, justice and international law. So I don’t think it is structural flaws in the existing global governance system that explain our failure to protect people everywhere and at all times – it is the lack of states making principled and consistent use of it regardless of where atrocities are imminent or ongoing.

As we have commemorated 75 years of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention, we must remember that legal and political protection instruments – including R2P – only have meaning and value if we as an international community and as individual stakeholders are committed to respecting and upholding them anywhere and at all times. Failure to do so will seriously harm our credibility and legitimacy when we do take action and call for respect for those norms and values.

At the same time, we must ensure that affected communities, human rights defenders and victim and survivor groups are systematically included in policy discussions and decision-making processes. For a crisis response to be effective, it needs to be transformative, rooted in the needs of affected communities and tied to long-term efforts to further peace, development and human rights.

How is civil society in general, and the GCR2P in particular, advocating for R2P?

Although R2P as a political commitment rests with states, most times it is CSOs that are the driving force behind pressuring governments to adhere to it. Our work and that of countless civil society activists around the world is fundamental in reminding states that they not only have a responsibility to protect their own populations but also mustn’t look away when rights are violated elsewhere.

Through advocacy with UN member states, regional organisations and the multilateral system, we provide strategic guidance to governments, UN officials and other key stakeholders on what needs to be done – by whom, how and when – to prevent mass atrocities. We wouldn’t be able to do this if it weren’t for the civil society colleagues around the world who are at the forefront of documenting violations and abuses, holding their government and others to account and providing support and assistance to victims, survivors and affected communities, often at great personal danger. Our job is to amplify their voices, expertise, demands and calls to action in the arenas we operate in.

One aspect of our work I would like to highlight is the fight against impunity. Ensuring accountability for mass atrocity crimes – which may include truth-telling, reparations, criminal investigations and transitional justice processes – is not only an end in itself but can help deter future mass atrocity crimes. We have worked hand in hand with human rights defenders and affected communities around the world to advance accountability efforts, including by leading campaigns for the establishment of UN investigations into atrocity crimes in Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan, Sudan, Venezuela and Yemen, as well as the establishment of an Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria, and contributing to efforts so that The Gambia filed a case against Myanmar before the ICJ for violations of provisions of the Genocide Convention.

I would like to pay tribute to all our colleagues around the world who tirelessly fight to ensure ongoing attention on injustice, violence and suffering for even the most forgotten crisis. Every small success – be it advocating for special sessions to discuss an emerging crisis at the UNHRC, the opening of a universal jurisdiction case against perpetrators, or a government’s decision to re-engage with the international system and commit to genuine reform – is a step in the right direction. Every time the international community puts the spotlight on atrocity perpetrators somewhere, it sends a signal to those committing similar abuses elsewhere.

Get in touch with the GCR2P through its website or Facebook page, and follow @GCR2P and @ElisabethGCR2P on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Francesca Restifo, Senior Human Rights Lawyer and UN Representative of the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), about the deficits of the global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

Established in 1947, the International Bar Association is the world’s leading organisation of international legal practitioners, bar associations and law societies. With a membership of over 80,000 lawyers and 190 bar associations and law societies spanning all continents, it influences the development of international law and helps shape the future of the legal profession throughout the world. The IBAHRI was created in 1995 to provide human rights training and technical assistance for legal practitioners and institutions, strengthening their capacity to promote and protect human rights effectively under a just rule of law.

What does the IBAHRI do, and how does it interact with international human rights organisations?

A leading institution in international fact-finding, the IBAHRI produces expert reports with key recommendations, delivering timely and reliable information on human rights and the legal profession. It supports lawyers and judges who are arbitrarily harassed, intimidated or arrested through advocacy at the United Nations (UN) and domestic levels and provides training and trial monitoring. We advocate for the advancement of human rights in the administration of justice, focusing on UN human rights mechanisms and pushing onto the UN’s agenda justice issues such as judicial independence and protection for all legal professions as essential building blocks to sustaining or reinstating the rule of law.

To achieve this, the IBAHRI also trains lawyers, judges and bar associations to promote and protect human rights at the domestic level and engage with UN human rights mechanisms. For example, the IBAHRI is working with Afghan lawyers and judges in exile, and particularly with women, to denounce the ongoing gender persecution in Afghanistan. The IBAHRI works with lawyers and academics to promote jurisprudence to punish the specific crime of gender-based apartheid.

We are also supporting Ukrainian lawyers on issues of accountability for war crimes, including via domestic jurisdiction and training them on international fair trail standards.

To what extent do current global governance institutions protect the rule of law around the world?

In January 2023, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that ‘We are at grave risk of the Rule of Lawlessness’. Today, adherence to the rule of law is more important than ever. As Guterres pointed out, from the smallest village to the global stage, the rule of law is all that stands between peace and brutal conflict or repression.

In Palestine, Sudan and Ukraine, we are witnessing systematic war crimes committed by states. We are witnessing increasing violations of the UN Charter with the annexation, resulting from the threat or use of force, of a state’s territory by another state.

The ongoing devastating conflicts in Syria and Yemen have resulted in atrocities, thousands of deaths and incommensurable suffering. Unconstitutional changes in government are deplorably back in fashion. The collapse of the rule of law in Myanmar has led to a cycle of violence, repression and severe human rights violations. In Afghanistan and Iran, systematic attacks against women’s and girls’ rights that amount to gender persecution are creating an unprecedented regime of gender-based apartheid. In Belarus, Russia, Venezuela and many other places, authoritarian regimes are silencing the opposition and cracking down on civil society and civic space, repressing peaceful protests with excessive force and violence. In Haiti we see a severe institutional crisis coupled with an almost non-existent rule of law, leading to widespread human rights abuses and the escalation of crime rates.

At a time plagued with conflicts, division, crackdown and mistrust, states continue to contravene international law with impunity. Created to anchor the protection of rights, the multilateral system is in deep crisis. In the aftermath of the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we must reaffirm the strong and mutually reinforcing relationship between the rule of law, accountability and human rights.

Do you view these failures as linked to structural flaws in the global governance system?

The collapse of the rule of law, coupled with failures by the UN system to establish just and effective responses and address global challenges, has undermined trust in leaders and institutions. These challenges are interconnected and can only be addressed by interconnected responses, through a reinvigorated multilateralism, placing the UN, its Charter and its values at the centre of joint efforts.

We are facing a crisis of trust, a disconnect between people and the institutions that are supposed to serve and protect them, with many people left behind and no longer confident that the system works for them. We need to rethink ways to ensure effective responses.

In his Our Common Agenda report, the UN Secretary-General emphasised the need for the UN to support states, communities and people in rebuilding the social contract as a foundation for sustaining peace, stressing that justice is an essential dimension of the social contract.

However, we witness ever-increasing justice gaps, with many justice systems delivering only for the few. It has been estimated that 1.5 billion people have unmet justice needs. In many places around the world, women effectively enjoy only three quarters of the legal rights of men. Legal disempowerment prevents women, vulnerable groups and victims from using the law to protect and defend themselves.

When states fail, the UN should mobilise against impunity and hold perpetrators to account through fair, independent judicial proceedings.

What are the most needed reforms in the area of global governance?

First, it is time to rethink, renew and rebuild trust in international institutions and support governments to rebuild the social contract with their people and within societies. UN institutions must start by rebuilding, restoring and sustaining the rule of law, both internationally and domestically, by supporting victims and survivors and providing access to justice, remedy and reparation. To do so, a more inclusive, effective and principled multilateral system is urgently needed.

Communities need to see results reflected in their daily lives. People need to see their rights realised and need to know they can seek justice if their rights are violated.

Means are within reach, but they need to be better used and reformed to ensure their effectiveness. From the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to the UN Human Rights Council, with its accountability mechanisms including fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry, there are institutions and mechanisms to promote and reinforce the rule of law. But they need to be enabled to provide effective solutions. For instance, if the Human Rights Council’s commissions of inquiry collect, analyse and preserve evidence of atrocity crimes, there must be states willing to use that evidence to bring cases before the ICJ.

The International Criminal Court is the central institution of the international criminal justice system, but the veto power enshrined in article 27(3) of the UN Charter systematically impedes the prosecution of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute. All states have a responsibility to prevent genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and ensure that such crimes are ended and punished when they occur, as per the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international law. However, we have recently seen the excessive use of the veto preventing the UN Security Council (UNSC) from exercising its function to address the most severe threats to international peace and security. Permanent UNSC members have a particular responsibility in this regard, given the powers vested in the Council to adopt effective measures to restore international peace and security and prevent or end such crimes. A reform of the UN system is needed to limit the veto, and in the meantime, we need to think of creative ways to overcome it.

We need to empower justice systems to better and more effectively use the principle of universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes under international law and hold perpetrators to account. Through international cooperation, states should support domestic trials. For example, UN member states must be more proactive in supporting Ukraine’s justice system to conduct effective investigations and prosecute international crimes with fair trial guarantees.

Some interesting developments that may help address accountability gaps deserve some attention. Although international law is largely concerned with states’ rather than individuals’ obligations, the so-called Global Magnitsky Acts and the system of individual sanctions represent an interesting paradigm shift in the field of accountability for violations of international human rights law, including regarding corruption.

The Global Magnitsky Acts have been considered one of the most promising ways to address serious human rights violations and corruption in the future. They were established in response to the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in a Moscow jail cell in 2009, following which his client and US-born financier Bill Browder led a 10-year fight to strengthen national legal frameworks and responses to alleged gross violations of human rights. This led to a legal revolution in several countries across regions, including Canada, the USA and the European Union and its member states.

How is civil society in general, and the IBAHRI specifically, advocating for reforms?

Lawyers are at the forefront of the struggle for the protection of human rights. Without an independent, competent legal profession, victims of human rights violations are unable to exercise their right to redress. Lawyers, judges and bar associations have a vital role to play in promoting accountability, ending impunity and ensuring remedy for victims and survivors.

As part of the world’s leading organisation of international legal practitioners, bar associations and law societies, the IBAHRI is ideally placed to engage the global legal profession with such mechanisms and to advocate for the advancement of human rights and the independence of the legal profession.

We work with the legal professions at large to sustain the rule of law, ensure implementation of international human rights standards, enhance judicial independence and fair trial guarantees and encourage an effective and gender-responsive administration of justice. The IBAHRI supports the work of lawyers and legal professionals to bring about accountability for war and atrocity crimes, provide legal defence to those arbitrarily and unjustly detained, improve legal frameworks, promote the common acceptance of legal rules and encourage greater engagement with the UN system.

Get in touch with the IBAHRI through its website or Facebook page, and follow @IBAHRI on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Iván Chanis Barahona, president of Fundación Iguales, about the situation of LGBTQI+ people and the struggle for equal marriage rights in Panama.

Fundación Iguales is a Panamanian civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at ending discrimination based on sexual diversity through diagnosis, awareness-raising and human rights advocacy. Taking an intersectional approach, it also promotes the rights of women, Afro-descendant people, older people and other excluded groups.

What progress has the struggle for LGBTQI+ rights in Panama made since homosexuality was decriminalised in 2008?

Public opinion has steadily evolved towards an attitude of respect towards LGBTQI+ people. Although there is still a long way to go, especially due to the absence of public policies recognising the rights of the sexually diverse population, the strengthening of a civil society that promotes human rights is a tangible step forward.

It is important to emphasise that, although homosexuality was decriminalised in 2008, institutional discrimination has persisted, not only in attitudes but also in numerous rules and regulations. For instance, the police's disciplinary regulations include as a very serious offence ‘the practice of homosexuality and lesbianism’. This is as serious a misdemeanour as ‘firing unnecessary shots in a way that harms others’ or ‘physically attacking a colleague or subordinate’. The general regulations for firefighters also codify ‘publicly practising homosexuality (or lesbianism)’ as a very serious offence.

Likewise, homosexuals are still not allowed to donate blood and there is no law recognising gender identity or banning discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression. Panama is also one of the few countries in the region without a law for the protection of human rights defenders.

What was the significance of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ (IACHR) call for the approval of equal marriage in Panama?

The IACHR’s call came in 2020 in the context of a thematic hearing requested by Fundación Iguales in response to the long delay by Panama’s Supreme Court of Justice in processing the various claims of unconstitutionality of the ban on civil marriage between same-sex couples. The hearing generated many expectations, particularly among same-sex couples who, after years of waiting, had been denied their right to access to justice, and therefore their dignity.

Fundación Iguales and other LGBTQI+ human rights organisations were able to draw attention to our demands, and the IACHR was categorical in its recommendation that Panama should comply with its Inter-American commitments. But the expectations generated were clearly dashed because the government did not comply with the agreements resulting from the hearing, which included the establishment of a working group between the IACHR and the state to follow up on the demands we expressed at the hearing, and which the IACHR confirmed should be fulfilled within a short period of time.

How have Panamanian LGBTQI+ organisations, and Fundación Iguales in particular, worked to achieve legal change and overcome cultural resistance?

In recent years, LGBTQI+ organisations in Panama have grown and increased our advocacy work on various issues and in a variety of spaces, with good results. Collaboration among organisations has been key in addressing cultural resistance to our work.

At Fundación Iguales we have focused on social work and on supporting litigation around equal marriage claims before the Supreme Court. We make intensive use of the Inter-American human rights system, mainly through thematic hearings at the IACHR and by participating in the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. We also work within the framework of the global human rights system, leading national processes and sending input to bodies such as the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

At the same time, Fundación Iguales has led a national campaign for same-sex civil marriage, Yes I Do, which has been joined by other CSOs such as Convive, Diversa, Hombres Trans and Pride Connection. Companies such as BBDO, Diageo and LLYC, and institutions including the Canadian and UK embassies and the Regional Office for Central America of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, among others, have joined in.

We have been supporting trans people in the long process to get their names changed for many years, together with the Panamanian Association of Trans People and Trans Men Panama. We have participated and collaborated in the organisation of Pride marches, with a focus on academic and cultural offerings, along with the lesbian feminist organisation the International Coalition of Women and Families.

Who supports and who opposes LGBTQI+ rights in Panama?

Those of us in favour are a diverse group that complement each other, strongly supported by our families and by young people overall. There are numerous companies, embassies, international institutions, media outlets, journalists and academic institutions that speak out strongly for Panama to be an inclusive country where LGBTQI+ people are respected and valued. Connections with other minority groups of Panama, such as Afro descendants, consolidate our intersectional message.

The group opposing our rights is an extreme faction of conservative and religious groups. However, it is important to clarify that many conservative and religious people in Panama are in favour of respect for and non-violence against LGBTQI+ people.

Unfortunately, many institutions that are supposed to protect us, such as the police and the Supreme Court, have strongly opposed sexual diversity rights. Their arguments are deeply flawed and tend to focus on a very schematic view of the ‘natural’ versus the ‘unnatural’. The Supreme Court shamefully expressed itself along these lines by stating that the primary function of marriage is procreation for the continuation of the species. The conclusions drawn from these arguments are extremely violent and unacceptable in any modern society.

Why is progress made in the field of public opinion still not reflected in the legal framework?

There has been very clear progress in the realm of public opinion. For instance, according to polls, the Yes I Do campaign has had a huge impact on Panamanian society: in just three years it shifted the opinions of more than 300,000 people, a huge number for a country of just 4.2 million. That so many non-LGBTQI+ people support our aspiration for a discrimination-free society is a clear sign of change.

But these positive changes are not reflected in the legal framework due to a lack of political will. Our country has an outdated, populist, ineffective and unethical political leadership. Our leaders haven’t understood that they are dissociated from the changes of our time in terms of the evolution of human rights, international law and the principles of liberal democracy. But change is unstoppable: new generations are clearly adopting pro-rights, pro-diversity and pro-inclusion positions, and it is only a matter of time before they reach key decision-making positions.

How is the struggle continuing given that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the ban on same-sex marriage?

The struggle will consolidate, reinvent itself and go on. By giving the government the green light to discriminate, in this case against same-sex couples and their right to form a family that is recognised and protected by the state, the Court has made clear its animus towards LGBTQI+ people. No longer can anyone say that discrimination is subtle or imaginary: it has become obvious and obscene to all people, not just to LGBTQI+ people who suffer it directly. The situation has become clearer than ever, which has led to more people engaging in the struggle for LGBTQI+ rights.

In sum, the Court’s deplorable decision has broadened the reach of the LGBTQI+ cause, and in that sense constitutes a key moment in the move towards shaping the country we want, with a focus on protecting human rights and the environment, combating social and economic inequalities and promoting transparency and the fight against corruption.

Civic space in Panama is rated as ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Fundación Iguales through its website or Facebook page, and follow @figualespanama on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about police violence in the USA with Abdul Nasser Rad, Managing Director of Research and Data at Campaign Zero (CZ).

Launched in 2015, CZ is an activist-led and research-driven civil society organisation that works to end police violence and promote public safety beyond policing.

What factors affect the level of police brutality in the USA?

Police violence remains a threat in some parts of the country, and particularly to some communities. In 2022, US law enforcement officers killed 1,251 people. While this number is the highest to date since our data tracking began in 2013, it’s crucial to note that trends vary across regions. Some cities have witnessed an increase in such incidents, while others have seen improvements.

Several factors help explain variations in police violence and use of force across the USA. Racial segregation and socio-economic neighbourhood indicators, for instance, have been found to predict police violence, along with individual-level demographic factors such as the race of the officer involved.

A combination of historical disinvestment and a societal tendency to respond to social issues with enforcement and prison-related measures rather than restorative or human-centred solutions are leading drivers of the disproportionate impact police violence has on communities of colour. A book by Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness, provides a comprehensive analysis of the myth of Black criminality and the use of the carceral state in perpetuating the second-class treatment of Black people in the USA.

How are you working to end police violence?

Our approach is to work both on immediate harm reduction and long-term transformational change, aiming to reshape the way society approaches public safety.

CZ provides robust, accurate and up-to-date data on police violence in the USA, which is critical given the absence of such efforts by the federal government. We develop comprehensive datasets that help identify where harm is being caused and pilot solutions to remove the harm. We prioritise transparency and make all our work public. The campaigns we develop are meant to be accessible so other organisations and activists can take the lead in implementing similar initiatives.

We align with the transformational change perspective. We recognise that the current system is deeply flawed and requires radical rethinking. At the same time, we see the value in harm reduction as a necessary parallel strategy in the short term.

Our efforts are concentrated in two main areas. First, we engage in harm reduction initiatives through several campaigns. For example, ‘8 Can't Wait’ focuses on reducing police killings by advocating for the adoption of eight policies that restrict the use of force. Since the launch of the campaign in June 2020, over 340 cities have restricted the use of force and 19 states have changed their policies. Some changes include the banning of chokeholds, implementing a duty to intervene, requiring de-escalation and exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force.

A campaign aimed at reducing unnecessary police deployment, ‘Cancel ShotSpotter’, achieved the cancellation of contracts or the prevention of the expansion of contracts in several large metropolitan centres. ShotSpotter’s technology often mistakes loud noises for gunshots, leading to more police encounters with civilians, sometimes resulting in fatal outcomes. Another campaign, ‘End All No Knocks’, was launched after the tragic police killing of Breonna Taylor, and seeks the cessation of no-knock warrants. It has resulted in six states restricting their use.

While running these campaigns, we also actively work towards systemic change, consisting of the dismantling and transformation of the policing system. Beyond harm reduction, our goal is to fundamentally transform public safety strategies. We advocate for a shift away from overreliance on policing and instead promote holistic, community-based solutions that prioritise safety and wellbeing for everyone.

What challenges have you faced in doing your work?

A common challenge relates to data inconsistencies, lack of data transparency and ensuring the accuracy of our data platforms and analyses.

But one of the most severe challenges lies not in the data but in the ways it can promote harm rather than foster more thoughtful approaches. For example, when the crime rate increases, the system responds with enforcement and incarceration rather than human and restorative solutions. It’s devastating to see the same punitive strategies over and over again. Combating fear and punitive social responses deters us from our long-term work of dismantling oppressive systems, creating frustration and a sense of moving backward.

At its core, the problem is that society doesn’t treat or view every individual as a human being of equal value. If it did, it wouldn’t support punitive responses to people experiencing crises. It can be frustrating to work towards dismantling this system while simultaneously mitigating harm from the same system we’re trying to dismantle.

We confront challenges and failures daily, often facing more obstacles than successes. This is the nature of social justice and liberation work. So building resilience is critical. It’s vital to maintain faith and keep engaging in restorative practices. The commitment and joy in the work endure as long as hope is kept alive and a vibrant community surrounds you.

How do you collaborate with other local and international stakeholders?

Our work is with and for communities most impacted on by the US carceral system. Domestically, we collaborate with any stakeholder willing to advance solutions aligned with our values. Direct engagement with stakeholders of diverse ideologies is necessary for policy change. As noted by the intersectional feminist writer Audre Lorde, it is not our differences that divide us, but our inability to recognise, accept and celebrate those differences.

We are just beginning to build international relationships. Over the past year, we’ve engaged with the international community through sharing our research and expertise in building robust data systems and contributed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ efforts to develop best practices on fatality counts and in-custody deaths.

To achieve our mission, we need to keep building trust, and we do this by making our work as transparent, robust and easily accessible as possible. Partnerships will help us secure resources to sustain the work and gather the feedback we need to continuously improve.

Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Campaign Zero through its website or Facebook page, and follow @CampaignZero on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Dr Mubashar Hasan about the ongoing crackdown on dissent in Bangladesh ahead of 7 January general elections.

Mubashar is a Bangladesh-born academic and social justice activist. He is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway.

What’s the current political climate in Bangladesh?

The political climate in Bangladesh is tense. The election is being organised under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the world’s longest-serving female head of government. The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has said it’s not going to participate in an election held under this administration, arguing that there isn’t a level playing field for parties to compete freely and fairly.

Judicial harassment is rife. In September, the New York Times reported that 2.5 million opposition activists faced judicial cases, with each facing multiple cases and some up to 400. Journalists have found that many cases against the opposition were fabricated. The police have even reportedly filed cases against BNP activists who were long dead or living abroad.

On 28 October 2023, the opposition organised a massive rally. To stop this becoming a full-blown people-led movement, the government aggressively repressed it. A few opposition activists retaliated and then the government blamed the violence on the opposition. At least 15 people were killed, including two police officers. More than 20,000 opposition activists have been incarcerated since late October.

This election-related violence is largely the result of state violence. Human Rights Watch recently described the ongoing developments as an autocratic crackdown. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are being restricted and forcefully violated, affecting the legitimacy of the election process. Extremely politicised state institutions are being used as an extension of the ruling party, a trend many argue could lead to the materialisation of a totalitarian state.

Is there any space for civil society to operate in Bangladesh?

The space for civil society in Bangladesh is closed. Civil society organisations are free to operate only as long as they don’t challenge the ruling system.

Just as in any autocratic country, there is an increasing activism going on in the diaspora. There are many Bangladeshi activists living in Australia, as well as in Malaysia, Sweden, the USA and elsewhere. BNP leader Tarique Rahman lives in exile in London.

People in the diaspora are using the leverage that comes with living under democratic governments to spread information about what happens in Bangladesh. Those diaspora activists argue that it is their duty to expose what is going on back home.

There are also key investigative journalists working from exile. A site called Netra News runs out of Malmö in Sweden, and it is still quite influential in exposing serious illegal acts by the government. There are several emerging YouTube commentators and analysts who have been very courageous. They have millions of followers.

How big a problem is disinformation in Bangladeshi politics?

Disinformation has always been a problem. Authoritarian governments don’t like the free flow of information. They want to control information and seek to discredit independent voices, just as Trump did in the USA, trashing fact as fiction and making fiction fact. And he was the authoritarian leader of a democratic country, which Bangladesh is not.

Partisan elements within the government of Bangladesh and ruling party members treat those who dare challenge the official narrative as enemies. As I mentioned in one of my recent articles for the Diplomat Magazine, the government is the dominant force promoting political disinformation. The main opposition party has also promoted disinformation in some instances but independent factcheckers have concluded that the volume of political disinformation promoted by the opposition is miniscule compared to the government.

There has been recent reporting by the Financial Times focused on how the Bangladeshi ruling party is using AI-driven disinformation to disrupt the upcoming election. But this is a one-sided election in which we already know who the winner will be. In this election voters do not have real choice. Why the ruling party is promoting AI-driven disinformation is therefore a mystery.

What are your expectations for election day and its aftermath?

Many things will unfold in the coming days. Voter turnout will most likely be low. The government will deploy military forces nationwide, perhaps even putting them in charge of distributing ballot boxes and election materials.

There will be some violence, probably by the opposition, followed by arrests. The opposition will persist in demanding a free and fair election and the resignation of the government. Some loss of life is sadly to be expected.

This election is also taking place within a wider geopolitical context. China, India and Russia are strongly supportive of the Bangladeshi government, whereas the USA keeps talking about free and fair elections, which puts it on the side of Bangladeshi people.

At this point, not much is in the hands of Bangladeshi people. Without effective external pressure towards democracy, change is unlikely. Civil society’s work will only become more challenging in Bangladesh as the government steps up its repression. 

Civic space in Bangladesh is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Mubashar through his webpage and follow @mh23rights on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Andreas Bummel, co-founder and Executive Director of Democracy Without Borders (DWB) and the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, about the deficits of the current global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

Founded in 2017, DWB is an international civil society organisation with national chapters and associates across the world, aimed at promoting global governance, global democracy and global citizenship.

What’s wrong with existing global governance institutions?

Global governance has rightly been described as a spaghetti bowl, and that’s because there is too much fragmentation, overlap, incoherence and opacity, with many parallel and siloed processes going on at the same time, involving who knows how many institutions, initiatives and projects.

CIVICUS speaks about the challenges of global governance with Carlos Quesada, founder and executive director of the Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights (Race & Equality).

Race & Equality is an international civil society organisation (CSO) that works with activists and organisations in Latin America to promote and protect the human rights of people who are excluded because of their national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation or gender identity. It does so through training, documentation of human rights violations and advocacy work at the national and international levels.

What opportunities does the current institutional system of global governance offer?

The current system offers opportunities to work for the improvement of international standards for the protection and promotion of human rights, which we have taken advantage of. Race & Equality played a key role, for instance, in developing the Inter-American Convention Against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Forms of Intolerance (CIRDI) and the Inter-American Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance, the approval of which was achieved following 13 years of work with various countries in the region.

We work closely with political bodies of the Organization of American States (OAS) such as the General Assembly and the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs. In the global system of the United Nations, we help our national counterparts influence treaty bodies, during the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process in their countries, and in their interactions with Special Procedures – the Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups and Independent Experts.

Our strategy focuses on supporting struggles for the rights of women, LGBTQI+ people, children and people of African descent using treaty bodies. In this way we ensure that our recommendations are integrated into the observations and conclusions of member states in bodies such as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.

What are the main problems with the current global governance system?

Returning to the previous example, although we have achieved the adoption of two Inter-American conventions against racism and discrimination, unfortunately only six states in the Americas have ratified CIRDI and one of them, Brazil, has issued a reservation limiting its use to cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Only two states in the hemisphere have ratified the Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance.

The main deficit of the global governance system lies in the lack of implementation of what has been agreed. There is a gap between states’ public declarations and promises in these instances and their real commitment to compliance. Despite progress, words are often not translated into tangible actions.

Another example of this deficit is the low number of IACtHR rulings that are fully complied with. There is no mechanism to punish states that fail to comply with court rulings. The only positive aspect is that they are not time-barred, so there is always hope that a change of government takes place and the new government decides to comply with them.

The fact that recommendations are not binding is a major challenge for both the Inter-American system and global systems and has been a fundamental structural problem since their inception. Sanctions should be binding, but they are not, and at the end of the day the process becomes a dialogue of good intentions where states promise to comply with recommendations, but in practice they rarely do.

What do you think a more robust, effective and democratic global governance system would look like?

The big challenge for civil society is to trigger a cascade effect from the local to the international levels. This involves strengthening democracy at the local level so that democratic principles are reflected in various spaces, even reaching international institutions such as the OAS. There should be real democratic political participation so that democratic states embrace a genuine commitment to respect and promote human rights and sanction violations.

This commitment must not be merely declarative but must be genuine and accompanied by effective dialogue with civil society to advance standards for the promotion and protection of human rights. Currently, states and CSOs are engaged in monologues – we don’t engage in dialogue with each other. Civil society uses these spaces to make recommendations, but often lacks an interlocutor on the other side. States, for their part, make speeches for the world to hear, without establishing real dialogue. There is a need to move towards a more participatory and collaborative model.

What reforms are you campaigning for?

Race & Equality is promoting the CIRDI2024 campaign with the aim of achieving full ratification of CIRDI before the International Decade for People of African Descent ends next year. Our goal is to achieve the 10 ratifications needed to create an Inter-American Committee to Prevent and Punish Racial Discrimination in the Americas.

We are also participating, alongside other CSOs in the Americas, in dialogues on how to improve civil society participation in the political bodies of the OAS. This way, we seek to transform current monologues into real dialogues between civil society and states. We want these dialogues to be real, tangible and effective, promoting more meaningful collaboration.

In addition, we are promoting a campaign to make the rulings of the IACtHR binding. This step is essential to ensure the protection and prevention of human rights violations in the Americas. We are committed to producing significant and tangible changes to strengthen mechanisms for the protection and promotion of human rights.

Get in touch with Race & Equality through its website and follow @raceandequality on Instagram and Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Kaisa Kosonen, Senior Policy Advisor at Greenpeace Nordic, about the outcomes of the COP28 climate summit and the vital role played by civil society in setting the agenda for fossil fuel phase-out. Kaisa was Greenpeace International delegation’s lead at COP28.

What were the opportunities for civil society to influence the negotiations at COP28?

I think the biggest influence civil society made was in agenda setting. Fossil fuel phase-out was never an official agenda item at this COP, but we managed to make it the number one topic for the global stocktake, and the main benchmark for success.

Within the United Nations (UN) space at COP28 civil society was guaranteed a certain level of participation and access. However, areas dedicated to civil society, such as side event and press conference rooms and pavilions for civil society organisations, were noticeably separated from negotiation areas, government press conferences and media zones.

On top of this, a unique aspect of COP28 was the record number of fossil fuel lobbyists who participated, securing more passes than all delegates from the 10 most climate-vulnerable nations combined. This influx of lobbyists introduced a different dimension of economic influence to the summit.

Were climate activists, both local and international, able to exercise their right to protest?

Greenpeace chose to focus its activities exclusively within the UN area, known as the blue zone. Within this area, protests were allowed if prior permission had been sought and granted. However, we encountered increased constraints and a lot of back-and-forth this time, with some unfounded wordsmithing on banner texts. Other groups also mentioned that their protests were redirected to less relevant locations and some activists experienced an atmosphere of intimidation.

It is crucial that the UN Secretariat and security safeguard civil society spaces in COPs. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly should not be subject to negotiation with the host country’s presidency.

What’s your assessment of the COP28 final declaration?

The COP28 outcome delivered a long-awaited signal on ending the fossil fuel era, along with a call to massively scale up renewables and energy efficiency this decade. But it fell short in some aspects, containing potentially dangerous distractions and loopholes. The lack of sufficient means to achieve the proposed goals raises questions about the practical implementation of the commitments. Real progress will be determined by actions taken on the ground.

Civil society played a crucial role setting the agenda at COP28, successfully steering the focus of world governments towards the urgent need for a fossil fuel phase-out aligned with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees warming limit. This shift in attention, sustained for almost two weeks, marked an unprecedented achievement during a UN climate summit. There’s no way back now.

Despite its weak language, the declaration sent a clear signal that the fossil fuel era will come to an end. The practical requirement for ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’ to achieve ‘net zero by 2050’, if implemented sustainably, would mean a near-complete phase-out of fossil fuels within the next three decades. To truly end the fossil fuel era, bold visions must now turn into historical action on the ground.

The call for countries to contribute to the phase-out in a ‘just, orderly, and equitable manner’ emphasises the responsibility of wealthy states to take the lead and support global south countries in their transition.

The operationalisation and initial capitalisation of the loss and damage fund also mark a turning point for global climate action – but only if it is built on.

In the year ahead, the fund must be set up so that funding can start flowing to those who need it. Permanent, predictable funds must be established to meet the growing needs, flowing from the countries and corporations that have contributed most to the climate crisis towards those that have contributed less but are disproportionately impacted on by its effects. We must prevent further losses and damages through a fast and fair fossil fuel phase-out.

What further steps need to be taken for the COP28 outcomes to have a tangible and positive impact?

With this COP28 outcome we now have new global benchmarks for aligning action with the Paris Agreement 1.5 degrees limit and climate justice. This crucial roadmap includes accelerating global emission cuts, increasing reliance on renewables and energy efficiency, expediting the transition away from fossil fuels, putting an end to deforestation and fostering the growth of climate finance. Focus must now shift to real action on the ground.

Over the next year, states face a critical period where they must formulate new national climate targets and plans to deliver their fair contributions to all these global goals. Simultaneously, countries need to collaboratively design the future landscape of international climate finance, moving beyond existing commitments to fill the growing gaps.

What are your thoughts on the choice of Azerbaijan as COP29 host?

The choice of Azerbaijan as the host for COP29 raises many concerns, given its economy’s very high reliance on oil and gas exports, and poor track record on human rights. The upcoming COP should primarily focus on delivering climate finance to those made vulnerable and lacking capacity, and on redirecting financial flows away from problems and towards solutions. Key to this is holding the fossil fuel industry and major polluters accountable for the damage they have caused, which won’t be easy with a host that’s highly invested in fossil fuels.

That said, as the history of this process shows, when a determined group of progressive countries come together to drive change, and they are supported by the global climate movement, breakthroughs can happen. So the priority now is to ensure that by COP29 next year, countries will have taken key steps to accelerate the fair and swift transition away from fossil fuels on the ground, and that they’re ready to take the bull by the horns and make polluters pay.

Get in touch with Greenpeace through its website, Instagram and Facebook accounts, and follow @Greenpeace and @kaisakosonen on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks with Anouk Wear, research and policy adviser at Hong Kong Watch, about recent district council elections held in Hong Kong amid an ongoing crackdown on dissent.

Founded in 2017, Hong Kong Watch is a civil society organisation (CSO) based in the UK that produces research and monitors threats to Hong Kong’s autonomy, basic freedoms and rule of law. It works at the intersection between politics, academia and the media to shape the international debate about Hong Kong.

What was the significance of Hong Kong’s 2023 district council elections?

On 11 December 2023, Hong Kong held elections spanning 18 district councils with a total of 479 seats. District councillors advise the Hong Kong government on local issues within their districts and have funding to promote recreational, cultural and community activities.

These elections were especially significant because following the previous round, held in 2019 and won by pro-democracy candidates by a landslide, the Hong Kong government introduced several changes to ensure that the pro-China camp would maintain the majority in future elections.

The 2023 election was marked by a record-low voter turnout of just 27.5 per cent. Many people abstained because they felt a sense of despair given that all candidates had to be vetted and approved by the Chinese state. This left no opposition voices to vote for, diminishing the significance of the election.

We want genuine universal suffrage, not a ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’, as the founding chairman of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, Martin Lee, aptly warned in 2014. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then.

What tactics did the government use to control the election?

As analysed in a briefing we published recently, the election fit into a broader trend of democratic erosion in Hong Kong.

In 2021, changes to Legislative Councils were introduced under the slogan ‘Patriots Governing Hong Kong’,  aimed at screening out democrats and ensuring that only pro-establishment candidates aligned with Beijing could run for seats. To that effect, candidates are now required to pass two major political barriers before participating in the election.

First, they must secure nominations from all five sectors of the Election Committee, a 1,500-member electoral college made up of representatives of various constituencies, including industry, professions, grassroots organisations, the government and Hong Kong representation in Chinese bodies. Second, they are screened by the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee, mainly composed of government officials. Candidates who don’t have a strong pro-China agenda can be disqualified on grounds of not being ‘patriotic’ enough.

A similar approach was applied to district council candidates. In April 2023, Chief Executive John Lee announced that upcoming district council elections would be open exclusively to patriots, with only a certain number of ‘depoliticised’ seats focused on administrative tasks elected by the public. He added that people who love the country and are willing to serve can participate in district councils through ‘various other ways’. In line with these reforms, only 88 seats were directly elected by the public, compared to 452 in the previous election, with 179 to be appointed by the chief executive.

Moreover, in the lead-up to the elections, three members of the League of Social Democrats were followed and arrested for planning a protest against the election, which they called a ‘birdcage’, stating that ‘Hong Kong people’s right to vote and to be elected seems to be absent’.

What should be done to restore democratic freedoms in Hong Kong?

Civil space has drastically shrunk since the 2019 district council elections. Following the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, over 60 organisations have been disbanded, including CSOs, political parties, trade unions and media outlets. Many organisations have relocated abroad, while others have adjusted the scope of their work to protect their members who remain in Hong Kong.

It’s crucial that discussions are continued, the human rights situation is monitored and detailed reports are provided as steps towards restoring democratic freedoms in Hong Kong. We shouldn’t accept new repressive laws as the norm but instead stay vocal about any regressive legislation and rights violation.

It’s important to keep speaking up for people in Hong Kong and human rights defenders in exile. For example, recently the Hong Kong national security police issued five arrest warrants offering HK$1 million (approx. US$ 128,000) bounties for exiled pro-democracy Hong Kong activists based in the UK and USA. We strongly condemn this illegal attack against our friends and colleagues. We urge governments to take a stand and protect Hong Kong human rights defenders within their jurisdictions.

How is Hong Kong Watch working towards this end, and what international support do you need?

We work to inform and educate legislators, policymakers and the media, as well as raise awareness among the wider public about violations of human rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law in Hong Kong. We advocate for actions to assist victims of rights violations through a combination of in-depth research reports, opinion editorials, monthly media briefings, interviews and advocacy campaigns.

It’s crucial to hold Hong Kong and China accountable for their violations of international human rights law and urge them to fulfil their obligations. For instance, the 2022 review of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, tasked with monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), found that Hong Kong violated its international legal obligations and recommended that the authorities take tangible steps, with a clear timeline, to introduce universal suffrage and reform the electoral system in compliance with the ICCPR.

We’re engaging in this effort through submissions to the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as to the upcoming Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council.

We deeply appreciate the support we receive from governments, legislators, civil society and people worldwide. But we need more international solidarity, particularly at the governmental level, to pressure Hong Kong authorities to comply with their obligations under international law and ensure that other states refrain from conducting business as usual with Hong Kong, in view of the grave and systematic nature of human rights violations the current regime commits.

Civic space in Hong Kong is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Hong Kong Watch through its website or Facebook page, and follow @hk_watch and @anoukwear on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks about deteriorating civic space conditions amid political and security instability in Lebanon with Fadel Fakih, Executive Director of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH).

Founded in 1997, CLDH is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to enforce human rights for all, denounce human rights violators and fight impunity by providing legal and rehabilitation services.

What’s been the impact of the ongoing political paralysis?

Since April 2023, Lebanon’s parliament has repeatedly postponed municipal elections under the pretext of lack of funding and technical and logistical obstacles. This has impeded local democratic processes critical for addressing community needs, allocating resources and delivering essential services. The prolonged delay in holding elections has diminished people’s ability to raise concerns, hold local authorities accountable and participate in decisions directly affecting their lives.

Parliament has also been unable to designate a president since the incumbent’s mandate expired in October 2022. It has tried and failed to elect a new president 12 times already. This political deadlock has significantly impacted on national governance and decision-making processes.

A fully functional presidency is essential to guide Lebanon through its multifaceted crises and ensure the effective operation of government institutions. The absence of a president has obstructed the formation of a new government that would have to enact reforms and address urgent political, economic and security concerns. This has exacerbated public frustration and deepened a pervasive sense of uncertainty.

What’s the current security and human rights situation in southern Lebanon?

Since 8 October 2023, villages in South Lebanon have endured daily Israeli bombardments and exchanges of fire. As a result, at least 14 civilians have been killed, including women, children and older people. The press has also been deliberately targeted, resulting in the death of Reuters journalist Issam Abdallah on 13 October. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, as of 14 November the death toll stood at 77 people, with 328 wounded.

The deteriorating security situation prompted the closure of 52 schools and forced many people to evacuate their homes, pushing the number of internally displaced people in Lebanon to over 46,000.

Moreover, the Israeli army has deployed artillery shells containing white phosphorus, in violation of international humanitarian law. This has caused extensive damage to private properties, public infrastructure and agricultural land. Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon has also sparked fires that destroyed approximately 40,000 olive trees and scorched hundreds of square kilometres of land, dealing a severe blow to one of Lebanon’s primary agricultural crops.

What are the conditions for civil society in Lebanon?

In recent years Lebanese civil society has grappled with significant challenges. In the absence of basic government action, CSOs have taken the lead in advocating for social change, human rights and political reforms. Over the past year, civil society has tried to maintain momentum for change despite escalating problems, including the vacuum in the presidency, arbitrary deportations of Syrian refugees, targeted attacks on LGBTQI+ people and external security threats.

But civil society efforts have been hindered by limited resources and a context of economic crisis, political instability, widespread corruption and a challenging humanitarian situation. Moreover, a smear campaign that powerful politicians launched in 2019 has caused a surge in hate speech and the targeting of civil society as a whole.

Additionally, during 2023 we have experienced significant backsliding on freedom of expression, as media outlets and journalists have been increasingly targeted through legal actions, arrests, harassment and intimidation. Journalists critical of political figures or parties face reprisal, as influential groups abuse their power to try to suppress media coverage that contradicts their interests. For example, several journalists were recently summoned to the Cybercrimes Bureau in retaliation for their online publications. In October, CLDH faced direct threats from former military personnel for advocating for accountability in the case of a murdered Syrian national.

Reporting on sensitive issues such as sectarian conflicts, government policies, corruption and security challenges often draws excessive attention from authorities who seek to control the narrative and conceal information that could destabilise the status quo. They also intend to use a draft media law currently under parliamentary discussion to further restrict freedom of expression.

How does CLDH work to advance human rights, and what challenges do you face?

CLDH advances human rights through a comprehensive approach that includes advocacy, research, public mobilisation, pro bono legal services for vulnerable groups regardless of nationality or migratory status, rehabilitation services for victims of torture and enforced disappearance and capacity development for key stakeholders in the human rights field. Through a project funded by the United Nations Democracy Fund, we are working to empower victims of human rights violations to become civic activists engaged in public awareness campaigns and policy reforms.

Given the multifaceted nature of our work, we frequently encounter challenges such as limited funding and resources, security risks associated with handling sensitive cases, legal restrictions, widespread misinformation and apathy, and difficulties in accessing vulnerable groups. Other obstacles arise from the economic crisis, deteriorating conditions in Lebanese prisons and financial hardships faced by excluded groups.

What forms of international support does Lebanese civil society receive, and what further support do you need?

Lebanese CSOs receive international support in the form of financial assistance and grants, which are particularly crucial during crises when resources are scarce. Support also comes in the form of capacity development programmes and technical assistance aimed at increasing impact. International partnerships and networks also help amplify the voices of Lebanese civil society and strengthen our calls for policy changes.

Further assistance is needed to ensure the financial sustainability of local CSOs and their resilience to external shocks, enabling consistent operation in difficult circumstances. Donors must align their support with local needs and priorities to address context-specific challenges.

Civic space in Lebanon is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with LCHR through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @HumanRightsCLDH on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks with Julia Tinsley-Kent, Policy and Strategic Communications Manager of the Migrants’ Rights Network, about the UK’s new migration treaty with Rwanda, aimed at sending asylum seekers arriving unlawfully in the UK to Rwanda for processing.

The Migrants’ Rights Network is a UK charity that stands in solidarity with migrants in their fight for rights and justice.

How different is the new treaty that the UK signed with Rwanda from its predecessor? Do you think it will be implemented?

The Supreme Court recently upheld a ruling that the UK government’s plan to send migrants to Rwanda was unlawful on the basis that the country is unsafe and that there was a risk of refoulement – the forcible return of migrants to a country where they are likely to face persecution.

However, the UK government has not been deterred and has pressed ahead with new legislation that would declare Rwanda a safe country. The new Bill would give the government the power to disapply elements of the Human Rights Act 1998 and ignore European Court of Human Rights injunctions against deportation flights. It also puts a legal obligation on the courts to consider Rwanda a safe country when considering removal decisions, and to not entertain any claim based on the UK’s Human Rights Act or international law obligations.

The UK government has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to outsourcing its protection obligations to other countries like Rwanda. Regardless of whether this policy is eventually implemented, it has already caused harm to migrant communities in Britain and demonstrated what lengths the government is prepared to go in deterring people from seeking safety and a new life in the UK.

What is concerning about the plan is the worrying precedent it sets for the future of migration and human rights. It shows the UK government is prepared to overhaul the judicial system to push through regressive and cruel policies.

Do you view this as part of a wider regional or global restrictive trend?

The Rwanda plan is one component of the UK’s increasingly hostile environment for migrants. This is reflective of a wider global trend. Across the world, but particularly in Europe and the USA, governments are pouring money into tightening already highly militarised borders.

In times of crisis or economic instability, governments will scapegoat excluded groups and migrants to distract from their own failings. It is the oldest trick in the book. At a time where the UK is in the midst of a chronic cost of living crisis where growing numbers of people are struggling to feed their families or pay their bills, the government is shifting the blame and attention on to migrants.

Contemporary attitudes and policies on migration draw on decades of restrictive racist immigration policies, aimed at keeping out particular groups of migrants. We must acknowledge the disparities between who is constructed as welcome in the west and who is not. For example, hostile borders and immigration policies have not been imposed on white people from Ukraine nor wealthy, western expats. Instead, it is people of colour and those from majority-Muslim countries who withstand the worst of them.

How does UK civil society and your organisation in particular work to help migrants?

At the Migrants’ Rights Network, we stand in solidarity with migrants in their fights for rights and justice. We are a charity mostly led by migrants and migratised people – people assumed to be migrants – that campaigns for transformational change to tackle oppression at its source. We are not a formal network but we work to establish and strengthen connections because we believe it is through building bonds between people that we have the greatest opportunity to achieve transformational change. We are led by the opinions, views and experiences of migrants and grassroots organisations and are willing to be challenged. In particular, we look at how racism, Islamophobia, homophobia and other systems of oppression shape immigration systems and how migrants are constructed in prevalent narratives.

Our work takes many forms. Among these, we use our platform to raise awareness of pressing issues amongst politicians and policy makers, and in the media; work with people and organisations to build campaigns and links with legal experts to pursue strategic litigation; build an evidence base for change by co-curating with affected migrants to better understand the issues and inform our work and the work of others; promote partnership and collaboration between different causes and campaigns, to enable information and resource sharing; inform migrant communities on their rights through our tailored resources and training; and develop alternative narratives to counter harmful rhetoric and narratives around migration through informative and creative campaigns.

British migration charities should focus on delivering much-needed support and campaigning for liberation, but must also ensure that they are held to account by migrants. Recommendations are often based on assumptions rather than experience, so we must ensure we remain accountable to those who have moved across borders.

Civic space in the UK is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Migrants’ Rights Network through its webpage or Facebook page and follow @migrants_rights_network on Twitter and Instagram.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks about the repression of civil society in Algeria with Nassera Dutour, a Franco-Algerian human rights activist and president of the Collective of Families of People Disappeared in Algeria (CFDA) and the Euro-Mediterranean Federation against Enforced Disappearances.

The CFDA was founded in Paris in May 1998 by Algerian mothers living in France who had relatives who had disappeared in Algeria. It defends the right to truth and justice of the families of the disappeared and has worked from the outset to raise national and international public awareness of the scale of human rights violations in Algeria.

What’s the reason for the recent increase in repression in Algeria?

In February 2019, the people of Algeria mobilised spontaneously and peacefully to demand democratic change. They took to the streets of Algiers and other cities to protest against incumbent President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s bid for a fifth term. Even after his resignation, the protest movement, known as the Hirak, lost none of its momentum, broadening its demands to call for a radical overhaul of the regime, a civilian government and a ‘free and democratic Algeria’.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic put the demonstrations on hold from March 2020 onwards, mobilisation resumed in February 2021 before experiencing a definitive decline, partly due to concerted pressure from the authorities to suppress the movement. Human rights activists, particularly those who dare to criticise the government’s rhetoric and policies, are constantly harassed and intimidated. The security forces monitor and threaten them, creating a climate of fear that is gradually becoming fatal to human rights activism. In some extreme cases, activists face physical violence, which compromises their safety and their ability to continue their essential work.

Algerian courts have used numerous provisions of the Penal Code to silence critical voices online and offline. Journalists such as Mustapha Bendjama, Khaled Drareni, Ihsane El-Kadi and Rabah Karèche have been targeted with long prison sentences for exposing corruption and abuse. The authorities have also arbitrarily restricted or blocked access to independent news websites, further undermining access to diverse information.

Among other tactics, the authorities have often invoked the ‘national interest’ to restrict the freedom of action of human rights defenders. For example, Nacer Meghnine, president of the SOS Bab El Oued association, was sentenced in 2021 for publications found at his association’s headquarters denouncing repression, arbitrary arrests and torture. The judges considered that these writings tarnished Algeria’s international image, and that by criticising Algeria for failing to apply the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture, he was inciting foreign interference. Nacer Meghnine was also convicted of direct incitement to unarmed assembly for leaflets displaying portraits of prisoners of conscience. One of the most formidable tools used by the authorities to repress dissent is anti-terrorism legislation, which has broadened the definition of terrorism.

Are independent civil society organisations able to operate in Algeria?

The CFDA remains a clandestine association despite numerous attempts to legalise it with the Ministry of the Interior and the prefecture. There has never been any justification from the government for refusing to authorise its registration.

From 2001 to 2013, the CFDA had to move its offices in Algeria every year, due to intimidation of the owners by the Algerian authorities. In France, there were two particularly violent intrusions into our offices, which were completely ransacked. The Algerian government puts a great deal of psychological pressure on the members of the organisation both in Algeria and France.

In 2023, police officers came to the Algiers offices and threatened members of the association. No action was taken, although the association’s lawyer tried to find out whether there was an investigation file on the CFDA or on the owner of the premises.

When we were organising a conference in Algiers, the authorities came to the hotel and ‘suggested’ that we should not hold the conference. CFDA staff and partners tried for hours to stand up to the police and gendarmerie, but they forced us to leave. This international seminar, which was to have been held over two days on the theme of ‘Truth, Justice and Conciliation’, was simply banned.

Our telephone and internet have been regularly cut off without any explanation, and our website and social media accounts have been hacked twice. The CFDA radio station that we set up in 2016 was immediately censored and made inaccessible in Algeria. Six years later, the site was hacked and the CFDA was forced to create another site under a different name.

CFDA members have been subjected to psychological harassment, including repeated death threats. In 2002, the French authorities warned me that Algeria had given the order to kill me.

In addition, recourse to foreign funding is drastically limited, while it is virtually impossible to gain access to state funding, which is only available to organisations affiliated with the Algerian state.

Since the Hirak, the dissolution of associations has increased exponentially. An association can be suspended if it ‘interferes in the country’s internal affairs or undermines national sovereignty’. The Youth Action Gathering and the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights have been dissolved.

Demonstrations organised in Algeria to defend human rights are often repressed by the police, with numerous arbitrary arrests and detentions, cases of short and long-term enforced disappearances and incidences of torture.

As a result of this repression, many human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists have had to leave Algeria for France or other European countries. But the diaspora continues to present a united front through joint actions such as demonstrations in Paris every Sunday, advocacy missions to national, European and international institutions, documentation and the drafting of reports for decision-making and investigative and judicial bodies, the publication of press articles and official press releases, conferences and round tables, and social media campaigns.

How does the CFDA work to protect and promote human rights in Algeria?

The CFDA advocates with international bodies and invites human rights activists and members of civil society in Algeria to take part.

The CFDA immediately informs the public as soon as it becomes aware of a human rights violation in Algeria. However, we don’t stop at denunciations: we make calls on states in writing and urge international bodies to take action through urgent appeals to various UN special procedures and to the commissioners of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The CFDA has produced several reports on human rights in Algeria, the non-independence of the judiciary, women’s rights, arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances.

In 2014 in the city or Oran, we inaugurated the Centre for the Preservation of Memory and the Study of Human Rights. This is a space open to the public for documentation, meetings and reflection on human rights issues. It has a wide range of publications on enforced disappearances and transitional justice.

The CFDA trains and informs people. It provides information through its social networks and website, as well as through its online radio station, Radio of the Voiceless. Since 2016, the radio station has covered human rights issues through regular podcasts and interviews. It is an integral part of our memorialisation work because it offers a space for expression to people who have been silenced. Since 2019, the radio station has also been following up and commenting on the Hirak and the authoritarian excesses of the Algerian regime.

The CFDA trains human rights activists in international and African human rights protection mechanisms, internal and external communication and conflict management. It invests heavily in the independence of the judiciary because it believes that the rule of law and democracy cannot exist without an independent judiciary, and that without the rule of law, the truth about enforced disappearances in Algeria will never be established.

What are your demands to the Algerian government?

With regard to the search for the truth, we demand an exhaustive and impartial investigation into all cases of disappearance so that the victim, if alive, is placed under the protection of the law, and if not, their remains are returned to their family. All those concerned by the disappearance must have access to the final results of the investigation.

The authorities must use all technical and legal means available to locate mass graves and unmarked graves, identify bodies, clarify the circumstances in which they were buried and return the remains to the families. They must set up a DNA database for identification purposes.

To put an end to impunity, the authorities must carry out immediate and impartial investigations into each alleged case of disappearance in which the instigator, perpetrator or accomplice is a public official. Any criminal complaint against an unknown person or public official must be declared admissible and investigated immediately. The state must also take urgent measures to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

In addition, appropriate and adequate reparations must be made to the victims, including adequate financial compensation, moral and psychological rehabilitation, and the fullest and most visible remembrance possible.

To ensure that the crimes of the past are not repeated, the state must respect, protect, guarantee and promote freedoms of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly for those who demand truth and justice. It must protect all the victims and their families against potential attacks on their physical and moral integrity that they may suffer as a result of their demands.

What support does Algerian civil society receive from international allies, and what other international support do you need?

International civil society organisations such as Amnesty International and the International Federation for Human Rights are constantly alert to the Algerian government’s repression.

In addition, these organisations, along with the CFDA and other Algerian organisations, have led and taken part in advocacy missions to international bodies, particularly in Europe, for the release of prisoners of conscience. We have obtained three resolutions from the European Parliament on human rights violations in Algeria.

Despite these actions, to our knowledge and great despair, no state has spoken out or denounced the repression in Algeria.

In this context, it is necessary to strengthen international solidarity to show a united front in order to create a balance of power that leads states to urge the state of Algeria to respect its international obligations regarding collective and individual freedoms and the establishment of the rule of law in Algeria, starting with judicial independence.

As for enforced disappearances, it is necessary to raise international awareness of the fact that this practice can occur under any repressive government and concerns all societies, all the more so in a globalised world where intergenerational traumas and practices are particularly mobile. This tactic first surfaced in the Latin American dictatorships of the 1970s and 80s, and is now used on every continent by authoritarian regimes of all political persuasions. Yet decision-makers and various stakeholders have shown themselves to be disengaged. We absolutely must mobilise a broad public and organise internationally to combat and prevent this crime.

Civic space in Algeria is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CFDA through its website, Instagram account or Facebook page, and follow @SOS_Disparus on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Nudhara Yusuf, Executive Coordinator of the Global Governance Innovation Network at the Stimson Center, about the deficits of the current global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

The Stimson Center is a non-profit, nonpartisan think tank that promotes international peace and security and shared prosperity through applied research and independent analysis, global engagement and policy innovation.

Nudhara also serves as Coordinator of the Global Futures Forum and as Global Youth Coordinator at the Coalition for the UN We Need.

What were the key global challenges identified during the Doha Forum?

The Doha Forum is a global platform for dialogue, bringing together leaders in policy to discuss critical global challenges and build innovative and action-driven networks that champion diplomacy, dialogue and diversity. This year it centred around the theme of building shared futures, addressing risks and opportunities.

As it couldn’t ignore the current context, we delved into the ongoing crisis in the Middle East and the humanitarian situation in the region, while also acknowledging other crises occurring elsewhere in the world. We analysed the context and the path forward, both in terms of response and recovery, including the role of the broader international community.

Two other big themes emerged during the forum. One of them was artificial intelligence and frontier technology, of which we explored the implications, risks and opportunities.

The other theme was the climate crisis. As it closely followed COP28, the Forum paid considerable attention to the ways the future of humanity is being shaped by climate change and the steps needed to address it. Insights from the Climate Governance Commission and other stakeholders contributed significantly to these discussions.

To what extent is the existing global governance system is able to address these global problems?

The effectiveness of the current global governance system hinges on how we define the role of global institutions. If we consider their ability to bring diverse agenda items to the table, I will largely agree that it works. Over the past decade there has been a notable increase in awareness regarding global issues and the foresight needed to address them. However, there’s room for improvement in democratising the agenda-setting process. To that effect, We The Peoples is campaigning for a United Nations (UN) World Citizens’ Initiative that would allow people to bring agenda items to the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.

While identifying problems seems to be a strength of the system, the challenge lies in transitioning from identifying issues to implementing effective solutions. The road ahead demands solution-oriented approaches, but again, a significant challenge here lies in the inequalities and remnants of mistrust from past global injustices. Effective solutions will require gestures of multilateral trust-building.

A big problem is that we are trying to address 21^st century challenges with 20^th century foundations. The UN was established in 1945, based on assumptions that belong to that era. How can it function on those same principles today? Take for example the global financial system, different on so many levels – with different stakeholders, practices and policies – from the one that existed when the Bretton Woods systems were created. It is worth also simply considering context: the UN was created at a time of post-war optimism; how do we create a new understanding of peace and security that reflects the need for positive peace in an increasingly tense geopolitical environment? We keep trying to stretch a system that is based on a logic from several decades ago. We need to rethink the basics.

This mismatch hinders our ability to address crises effectively. At the most, it allows for limited solutions that serve as band-aids rather than address the complex and connected causes of crises.

What changes are you advocating for?

The Summit for the Future, coming up in September 2024, is an invitation to rethink the fundamentals of the current global governance system. This summit is expected to result in a Pact for the Future, an outcome document negotiated among governments. It will be an opportunity to rethink the fundamentals of the global governance system in a more future-oriented manner.

The Pact for the Future will encompass five key chapters: sustainable development and financing for development, peace and security, science, technology and digital governance, youth and future generations, and transforming global governance. The Coalition for the UN We Need and the Global Governance Innovation Network are working on reform proposals for all five chapters.

We are calling for inclusive global governance through several civil society initiatives including the We The People’s campaign and the UNMute Civil Society campaign. As an umbrella platform, the Coalition for the UN We Need is crafting a People’s Pact for the Future to support the Pact for the Future that will be negotiated by governments.

Born out of the Global Futures Forum held in March 2023, the People’s Pact draws on the perspectives of people worldwide, resulting in three dozen recommendations. We will refine it in the run-up to the Summit in the hope that it will provide valuable insights for the UN system and member states, fostering a collaborative dialogue with civil society.

To facilitate dialogue and collaboration, the Coalition for the UN We Need is also supporting the UN Department of Global Communications in organising a UN civil society conference in Nairobi in May 2024 toward the Summit of the Future.

How can civil society have a bigger say in shaping future global governance?

International civil society is eager to be a part of the conversation. While many raise questions on the way forward with international systems and the UN, there is a very active community that wants to participate – but how they are effectively and meaningfully included is a whole different question.

We have moved from lack of recognition to some formal acknowledgement of civil society’s role in global governance to calls for networked and inclusive multilateralism. But the extent of civil society’s involvement is still constantly being debated. For example, the UN Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda report calls for greater UN system engagement with civil society through focal points, but consultations for the Summit of The Future have been held behind closed doors. There is a tension between the need for member states to have candid discussions and the call for transparency to enable civil society to provide input and hold member states accountable.

Despite these challenges, there have been notable wins, the UN Civil Society Conference set to take place in Nairobi being one of them. The hope is that member states will engage meaningfully. I personally think that COP28, for instance, has been one of the best in terms of young people’s active involvement. Young participants received increased media attention as they took part in panel discussions on the main stages, in negotiations and even as heads of some of delegations. This huge achievement is the result of young people beginning to truly understand how the system works and having become empowered to take part in it.

However, challenges persist, particularly in regions where civic space is closed.

Get in touch with the Stimson Center through its website and follow @StimsonCenter and @nudharaY on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks about ethnic violence and a humanitarian crisis in the Indian state of Manipur with Mangneo Lhungdim and Sulekha Thapa, Executive Director and Deputy Director of Oasis India.

Founded in 1994, Oasis India is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to prevent human trafficking and other forms of violence against women and children and support people so they can flourish in their community. Oasis India has also been involved in emergency relief work in Manipur.

What triggered ethnic violence in Manipur state?

Manipur and a few other northeastern states of India endured severe ethnic violence until the mid-1990s and into the early 2000s. But over the past two decades rights-based reconciliation and development efforts gained momentum, including infrastructure development initiatives that ultimately benefited local communities.

In this new context, the conflict between the majority Meitei people living in the Imphal Valley and the Kuki-Zo tribal community from the surrounding hills, now into its eighth month, could definitely have been prevented. As retired military and police officers have claimed, public order could and should have been restored within the first month of the conflict in May 2023. The state administration, supported by central security forces, had the capacity to contain the violence and prevent further displacement and killings.

The conflict is believed to be a collateral outcome of valley Meitei people demanding inclusion on the Scheduled Tribes list under the Constitution of India, which tribal communities interpreted as an attempt to grab their land. On 3 May 2023, the tribals of Manipur, under the aegis of All Tribal Students Union Manipur, carried out a protest march in most hill districts, including Churachandpur. Violent incidents during the Churachandpur march spiralled and spread statewide, turning into senseless killings, arson and displacement.

It’s difficult to identify particular reasons behind this outbreak of violence since the media coverage was initially limited and subsequent reports by independent journalists gave mixed messages and focused primarily on day-to-day events. Nevertheless, the government must fully acknowledge its responsibility and admit that it bears significant blame for such escalation of a latent ethnic conflict.

The once-cosmopolitan state of Manipur is now divided into two rival communities and there’s no prospect of the conflict ending any time soon, as there are no substantial peacebuilding efforts by the state or national government. The only hope of restoring normality in life and livelihoods in Manipur comes from collaborative efforts undertaken by local CSOs and leaders.

What’s the current situation on the ground?

The situation is relatively more stable now than during the initial three to four months of the conflict, but it still remains challenging. The deployment of over 50,000 central security personnel has led to increased militarisation.

The violence affects every aspect of the lives of people of all ages.

Agriculture is the primary occupation in the region, but a majority of farmers missed the sowing and harvest seasons due to curfew regulations and lack of resources. This has deprived them of earnings to meet the basic needs of their families and resulted in shortages of staples.

Over 60,000 people have been forcibly displaced and currently stay in camps where CSOs are the primary providers of humanitarian aid. Road communications from Manipur’s capital city, Imphal, to affected districts are severed, which complicates the delivery of relief and affects local businesses.

The strict curfew forced schools to close, causing children to miss several months of education and delaying the start of the new academic year. Healthcare services have also been disrupted. Even burying the dead was impossible for a long period, though some improvement has been noted over the past few days, when the remains of 64 people were taken back to their homelands.

The emotional impact on the residents of Manipur is profound. People have lived in fear and anxiety for a long time, and many have lost family members or their homes.

How has Indian civil society, including Oasis, worked to address the humanitarian crisis?

Several Indian CSOs have responded to the humanitarian needs in both the hills and valley districts of Manipur. In the hill districts, the primary providers have been local churches, national aid agencies, volunteers and philanthropic organisations. Many families continue to rely on supplies and assistance provided by civil society and the neighbouring states of Assam, Mizoram and Nagaland.

Civil society is working to improve the lives of internally displaced people sheltered in relief camps. Those in Churachandpur, for instance, receive vocational training, including tailoring and computer courses. Those who already have specific skills are provided with craft materials such as wool and weaving sets, to knit sweaters and woollen caps, while others have received bamboo wood and plastic knitting wire to make stools. This has become a source of income for many people, making a huge difference in their lives.

What challenges have you faced in doing your work?

For Oasis India and various aid agencies, the primary challenge has been delivering relief to the valley areas of Manipur, as the national highway was cut off, making it impossible to transport essential supplies without a security convoy. Food and hygiene kits were mainly sourced from neighbouring Mizoram and Nagaland, incurring high costs and taking 15 to 17 hours on a rough road to deliver supplies to tribal districts.

Over time, Oasis started to assist people in relief camps but could only help displaced people from the Kuki-Zo tribes. Despite efforts by our senior management to overcome obstacles, there have continued to be security challenges in reaching out to the Meitei community.

Yet another significant problem lies in mobilising resources for relief from national and international donors. The conflict’s nature as being between ethnic communities, which has been projected as having a political colour, has caused many funders to shy away.

What should be done to resolve the conflict, and how should the international community help?

International aid is insufficient. Since May 2023, neither the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department nor the United Nations Children's Fund have stepped in to provide humanitarian assistance to Manipur. The same is true for the Prime Minister National Relief Fund and the Prime Minister's Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund. The international community must collaborate with local CSOs that continue taking the lead in providing aid.

For a genuine resolution to the conflict, both the Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities must come to the table, engage in dialogue and avoid any hate speech, and collaborate to establish peaceful coexistence. To facilitate this, a ceasefire should be agreed at all buffer zones. Given the loss of trust in the state government by the tribal Kuki-Zo people, an independent empowered authority could potentially broker a ceasefire between the two warring communities. There are enough sensible people and peace-loving activists in both communities who can play critical roles in bringing about reconciliation and peace.

To put an end to the violence and prevent its repetition, perpetrators, regardless of ethnicity, should be held accountable. The Supreme Court has ordered the formation of at least 42 special investigation teams to prosecute conflict-related crimes, so at least there’s hope in this regard.

Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Oasis India through its website or Facebook page, and follow @Oasisatindia on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS discusses Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election with Brian Hioe, one of the founders of New Bloom Magazine.

New Bloom is an online magazine that covers activism and youth politics in Taiwan and Asia and the Pacific. A former fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Brian is currently a non-resident fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub.

What’s at stake in the 2024 election?

Taiwan’s elections consistently capture global attention due to the anticipation surrounding China’s response. Typically, elections feature two candidates representing the two major parties. One of them, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), is historically pro-independence and the other, Kuomintang (KMT), is historically pro-unification. This pattern persists in the current election, although there are other parties in the race.

Traditionally, Taiwanese voters opt for what they perceive as the safest choice in terms of safeguarding their hard-earned democratic freedoms. The overarching concern is to avoid actions that might trigger backlash from China.

Now it looks like the centre-left candidate of the ruling DPP is going to win because the pro-unification camp is very divided. But with multiple candidates running, fragmentation is to be expected, potentially affecting the outcome.

What are the most relevant domestic campaign issues?

There is a lot of dissatisfaction with the current government’s inability to address pressing economic issues. Young people’s salaries are very low, working hours are among the world’s longest and most people cannot afford to buy a house. We also have a declining birthrate and a growing older population.

Dissatisfaction has translated into some support for the pro-China party. The KMT is the historic Chinese nationalist party and was the ruling party during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, from 1949 to 1987. Its campaign centres on deepening economic relations with China, promising to bring back the good old days of economic success.

Environmental issues, and particularly air pollution, also weigh heavily on voters. The question of Taiwan’s future energy needs is key, as a balance is sought between maintaining a stable energy supply and minimising pollution. There is heated debate around nuclear energy. Taiwan’s environmental movement is anti-nuclear, as is the DPP, unlike the KMT. There are concerns about what to do with nuclear waste. People are worried that the frequent earthquakes that hit Taiwan could cause a potential catastrophe, as happened in Fukushima, Japan in 2011.

Past elections also featured debate on culture-war issues such as same-sex marriage, which the DPP pushed for but the KMT opposed. But these have now taken a back seat to economic and environmental issues.

However, the defining matter remains the cross-strait issue – the question of what kind of relations Taiwan will maintain with China.

What are the positions of the main candidates?

DPP candidate Lai Ching-te, the current vice president and expected winner, previously served as mayor of Taiwan’s historical capital Tainan and Taiwan’s premier. He is perceived as more conservative than the incumbent and is strongly pro-independence, although as he has climbed in the polls he has tempered his position in fear that strong rhetoric could provoke a reaction from the military or China. Despite his comparatively conservative background, he has signalled openness to progressive ideas, notably by becoming the first presidential candidate to participate in the Pride parade this October.

KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih is the current mayor of New Taipei and a former police chief with a record of involvement in the arrest of political dissidents during the authoritarian period. He is more moderate than other KMT candidates on unification issues, which is perceived to improve the KMT’s chances. However, his choice of running mate signalled a potential shift towards a more dogmatic position on unification.

The third candidate is former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, the leader of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a new party leaning towards unification. He has gained some support from young people, who tend not to support the KMT. He has a populist style, often making gaffes or misspeaking. He has faced criticism for making misogynistic and homophobic comments, but this hasn’t affected his popularity.

How do young people feel about this election?

There seems to be a notable decrease in enthusiasm and engagement with the election process. The 2020 election came around the same time of the protest wave in Hong Kong, which gave many young people a glimpse of what the future could look like for Taiwan if it were to become part of China.

Now the context is different and what prevails among people is dissatisfaction with the DPP due to challenging circumstances, which has resulted in the rise of the third-party anti-establishment candidate. Ko Wen-je is, ironically, a candidate opposed to progressive causes such as LGBTQI+ rights, but many young people are still attracted by his anti-establishment message.

In contrast, the DPP is perceived as the status quo and despite its recent progressivism under the Tsai administration has not managed to win over young people. Broadly, while millennials may still support it, Gen Z does not.

What role are foreign powers playing in the election process?

China’s persistent efforts to interfere in Taiwan’s political processes have resulted in recent arrests of people accused of operating in favour of China to influence the election, with efforts made to stiffen sentences for espionage. Ten military officials have, for example, been arrested in connection with these interference attempts.

A tactic employed to influence the election is paint the DPP as overly provocative towards China or overly reliant on the USA, suggesting that this may lead to adverse consequences. The DPP has indeed strengthened relations with the USA, while the KMT, once the US-backed authoritarian ruling party, has shifted its position. The KMT now argues that growing too close to the USA might provoke China, questions arms sales and civic exchanges and disseminates conspiracy theories regarding fictional US plans to destroy Taiwan in the event of a war.

The other side of the political aisle attacks the KMT for being too close to China and criticises its attempts to revive trade agreements such as the Cross Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), opposition to which led to the 2014 Sunflower Movement.

Have there been any concerns about the integrity of civic space?

Taiwan is the only country in Asia rated by the CIVICUS Monitor as having open civic space. There are questions about how civil society engages with both major political parties and concerns about potential co-optation. Civil society faces the challenge of balancing relations with political parties and maintaining a critical position without being perceived as partisan. Civil society is often closer to the DPP, because it is more centre-left and suspicious of China.

But there haven’t been government attempts to restrict civic space. The government does take actions to curb Chinese influence but to date has not infringed on civil society rights.

China in contrast has tried to pressure Taiwanese civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly those focusing on cross-strait issues. Five years ago, a Taiwanese CSO worker was arrested in China on vague national security charges, in what seemed aimed at sending a warning to Taiwanese civil society not to meddle with China.

China has also tried to intimidate voters. In a recent example, a person who purchased a book on the possibility of a Chinese invasion received a suspicious phone call from someone impersonating a customer service representative asking them about it.

What are your expectations for the post-election period?

Unless something unexpected happens, a DPP victory is the likeliest outcome. China is unlikely to take any drastic actions before the election, as such moves might inadvertently strengthen support for the DPP.

Following the election, however, China is expected to respond with intimidation tactics, possibly through military exercises, to signal its opposition to a new DPP administration. The intensity of these exercises may be influenced by China’s relations with the USA at the time.

In terms of civic space, should the DPP continue in power, civil society may need to broaden its outreach, both regionally and internationally, to build resilience and avoiding being sucked in by the two-party dynamics.

However, were the KMT to win, civil society would likely refocus on domestic concerns. It may regroup to resist, particularly in the face of potential attempts to reintroduce trade agreements such as the CSSTA.

If the status quo is maintained, Taiwan will continue strengthening ties with the USA and the west while actively reaching out to southeast Asian countries, a strategy aimed at reducing economic reliance on China and diversifying political ties.

The geopolitical landscape will play a crucial role in shaping Taiwan’s future, and the actions and reactions of both China and Taiwan will be closely watched on the international stage.

Civic space in Taiwan is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with New Bloom Magazine through its website, contact Brian Hioe through his Facebook page and follow @brianhioe on Twitter or Instagram.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks with Jordi Surkin, conservation director of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Bolivia, about recent fires in four of Bolivia’s nine departments.

WWF has been working in Bolivia since 1993, pursuing the vision of a country where humans live in harmony with nature.

How have the fires that broke out in October evolved?

It is important to clarify that the use of fire is an ancient practice as part of agricultural management and land preparation. However, the fires have got out of control as a result of ongoing droughts that may be linked to climate change. In 2019, 6.4 million hectares burned in Bolivia. There are years when the situation is not as severe, but it is still significant.

The impact and scale of fires varies from year to year depending on climatic factors. Extreme weather conditions of drought, temperatures and winds – as part of the impact of climate change – along with high levels of deforestation increase the likelihood of large fires.

Fires have also got out of control due to the growing inappropriate use of fire. Some agricultural producers use fire to prepare land without taking the necessary measures to prevent it spreading beyond their plots. And of course, there is also the use of fire for illegal purposes such as land speculation and illegal plantations.

Is the increase in the incidence and severity of fires linked to climate change?

The most tangible change Bolivia has experienced has been unusually high temperatures. The temperatures we have persistently experienced in recent months have been extremely high. In addition, almost 300 municipalities have been declared to be in a state of emergency due to droughts, and their main problem is often the lack of water. It has not been raining.

In Latin America we experience the climatic phenomena of La Niña and El Niño, which are cyclical and manifest themselves in the form of droughts and floods. So not everything is attributable to climate change. What we can indeed attribute to climate change are the unprecedentedly extreme manifestations of these phenomena.

What are the impacts of these fires?

We are seeing that many hectares that are burned year after year are no longer regenerating. The resilience of these forests is fading away.

The negative impact of forest fires not only translates into loss of biodiversity: it also affects everyone's quality of life. The human impact is enormous: hundreds of thousands of people have had their health affected by smoke this year and many communities have been displaced.

As a consequence of forest fires, water wells in many communities are drying up. In 2019, for example, many families had to leave their communities and migrate to urban centres due to smoke and lack of water. This year there are hundreds of families in this situation.

The situation has also been desperate in cities because of the smoke and increased heat. Throughout November, Santa Cruz was among the most polluted cities in the world due to smoke from the fires. We hardly saw the sun all month. Classes had to be suspended because many children were having respiratory problems. A few weeks ago, the city had an all-time record of electricity consumption because people were desperately using air conditioning for ventilation and keeping cool.

How is civil society helping tackle the problem of forest fires?

First of all, it should be noted that there is no government in the world that could stop the fires if at the same time people continue to set the forests on fire. And even less so in contexts of drought, high temperatures and winds of 80 kilometres per hour, as we have had recently.

On top of this, the Bolivian government's capacity to fight fires is limited. It does not have adequate equipment or the necessary number of firefighters.

WWF Bolivia is helping to provide equipment to the self-organised volunteer firefighters who are coming together to mitigate these fires. It is important to clarify that we are a conservation group rather than an emergency organisation. However, we try to contribute within our possibilities.

We have been working actively with Indigenous communities so that they put together a risk management plan. This helps them to take action to reduce the likelihood of fires. We are also working to strengthen the capacities of municipal governments to monitor fires and issue early warnings.

What should the government do to effectively prevent and control fires?

Within the national government there’s been debate on reversing a package of laws that are perceived as contributing to exacerbating the situation. An important first step would be to revise and consolidate a legal and regulatory framework to protect forests and biodiversity.

Existing laws should also be enforced. It is essential to increase the penalties for arson because currently the fines are derisory and therefore do not deter anyone. We need to reduce the prevalence of fire misuse, because these are the fires that get out of control.

Civic space in Bolivia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with WWF Bolivia through its website or Facebook profile, and follow @wwf_bolivia on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Marina Kostylianchenko of Viasna about the closure of civic space and criminalisation of activism in Belarus.

Viasna (‘Spring’) is a Belarusian human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that provides assistance to political prisoners and their families. It was founded in 1996 in response to large-scale repression of protests by the regime of President Alexander Lukashenko. In 2003 it was shut down by the government and subsequently persecuted for operating as an unregistered organisation. Repression increased in reaction to 2020 protests that followed a presidential election widely seen as stolen. Viasna founder Ales Bialiatski was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. In 2023 he was sentenced to 10 years in prison and Viasna was declared an ‘extremist group’.

What tactics of repression have the authorities used against Viasna?

Ever since it was established in 1996, Viasna has been under scrutiny. It was able to operate officially for only a very short period, as the Supreme Court dissolved it as early as 2003. Successive attempts to secure legal status have been unsuccessful so we have continued working without official approval. Just like other people in Belarus, we have faced repression, including detentions, fines and imprisonment for our human rights activism.

A big shock came in 2011 when Viasna founder and leader Ales Bialiatski was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison on fabricated charges of tax evasion. He was unexpectedly released under an amnesty nearly three years later.

An unprecedented peak in repression followed the 2020 mass protests. This had a profound impact on the operation of human rights organisations. For example, Viasna expanded its scope to include a hotline for people to seek advice and report detentions and other human rights violations. We also started collecting information about politically motivated criminal prosecutions and recognising detainees as political prisoners, documenting instances of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and ultimately launching the #FreeViasna campaign for the release of imprisoned human rights defenders.

In 2021 the government focused on dismantling civil society. Security forces conducted home and office searches and issued arrest orders targeting Viasna staff and staff of other CSOs and independent media. On 14 July, 15 Viasna members and volunteers were detained nationwide, including Ales Bialiatski, his deputy Valentin Stefanovich and lawyer Vladimir Labkovich, who are still in custody. In 2023 they were sentenced to 10, nine and seven years in jail respectively, along with substantial fines, for allegedly smuggling money and financing protests. The coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service, Marfa Rabkova, and volunteer Andrei Chepyuk, also remain in prison, with sentences of almost 15 and six years respectively.

In August 2023, Viasna was declared an extremist organisation, which in line with recent amendments to the Criminal Code means that any staff member could be criminally prosecuted and sentenced in absentia. Anyone might also face criminal liability for providing information or contributing to Viasna’s work in any way.

The authorities are trying to erect a barrier between us and the people we help. But despite the repression, we haven’t halted our work for a single day.

In what conditions does Viasna currently work?

We operate in exile. Most members of Viasna had to leave Belarus in 2021 to avoid prison and be able to continue their human rights work.

Forced relocation has implications, as over time a gap inevitably emerges between those who left and those who remain in Belarus.

Moreover, new challenges and areas of work have arisen. For instance, an increasing number of people are being released after completing their sentences and require medical care, rehabilitation and help with adjusting back into society. Those who left Belarus face difficulties in adapting to a new environment and struggle with getting legal status, employment, housing and everyday matters.

Even though the coordinator of the Viasna volunteer service has been imprisoned for over three years, our work with volunteers both inside Belarus and among the diaspora has never ceased. Volunteers are mainly engaged in research and data collection, translation of texts into multiple languages and the creation of illustrations and designs. They also assist at events we organise or participate in.

Do imprisoned activists face further pressure while in jail?

In 2023, all our colleagues were transferred to reformation colonies to serve their sentences. The conditions there are particularly harsh, primarily due to severe restriction of communication with the outside world. Unlike in pretrial detention facilities, where human rights activists could receive letters, parcels and money transfers from sympathisers, now only close relatives, usually only one or two people, are allowed to call or send mail and parcels. Even then, calls are limited to a maximum of 10 minutes a week and parcels to one or two per season.

Another form of pressure exerted on political prisoners is confinement for 10 or more consecutive days in cold punishment cells where they are not allowed to have warm clothes or other belongings, including books and pens. Inmates are punished for any reason, such as not adhering to the prescribed greeting procedure, failing to fasten a button or neglecting to shave. If a political prisoner commits several such violations, they are classed as a ‘persistent violator of internal regulations’, which justifies further pressure.

All prisoners, except older ones and those with disabilities, are required to work, usually in hazardous industries or cold rooms for eight or more hours a day. Wages are symbolic: after subtracting various payments for their maintenance in prison, only tiny amounts are transferred to prisoners’ personal accounts, which are then used to pay off fines.

We practically have no information about our imprisoned colleagues’ health conditions, but we know barely any medical care is provided in prison facilities.

How have you organised to support your imprisoned colleagues?

In 2021, in collaboration with Amnesty International, Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights, Libereco, Ostgruppen and other partners, we initiated a solidarity campaign to advocate for the immediate release of our imprisoned colleagues.

We’re continually exploring new modes of engagement with Belarusian civil society and other communities to advance our cause. For instance, on 8 December 2023 we unveiled an art installation, ‘Unbreakable’, in the heart of Vilnius, depicting the faces of five Viasna political prisoners and featuring descriptions in three languages – Belarusian, Lithuanian and English. We participate in any event available to speak about the plight of our colleagues criminalised for their commitment to human rights.

Several international awards have significantly bolstered attention for our cause. In 2022 Viasna was honoured with the Tulip of Human Rights award from the Dutch government, and Ales Bialiatski became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate alongside the Ukrainian Center for Civil Liberties and the Russian organisation Memorial. As a result of the Nobel Prize people in other countries found out who Ales is and why he is in prison, and expressions of support and solidarity increased.

What support do you receive from the international community, and what further support do you need?

A coalition of international human rights organisations has repeatedly issued joint statements urging the immediate release of Viasna’s political prisoners. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Parliament and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have also been vocal about the more than 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus.

Unfortunately, we haven’t yet identified the leverage that would foster the immediate release of Viasna activists. At the same time, the authorities are doing everything to isolate our colleagues and make them believe they’ve been forgotten. That’s why it’s so important to show support by sending them letters and postcards, helping their families and friends, signing petitions and holding solidarity actions around the world. For example, Libereco activists stage monthly rallies in Berlin and Zurich and organise solidarity races to raise awareness.

Every show of support matters. We urge people to join our initiatives, spread information as widely as possible and come up with new forms of solidarity actions. To this end, we have created free-of-charge designs for printing on T-shirts, posters, leaflets, stickers and postcards. We would also appreciate support for our activities and our incarcerated colleagues through a subscription on Patreon or a one-time donation via Stripe.

Civic space in Belarus is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Viasna through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @Viasna on Twitter. Contact the #FreeViasna campaign through its website and follow @FreeViasna on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks with members of the Collective for the Freedom of Kenia Hernández about the criminalisation of activism in Mexico.

Kenia Hernández is an Amuzga Indigenous woman, defender of Indigenous peoples’ rights to land and territory. She coordinates the Zapata Lives Libertarian Collective, which promotes peaceful resistance to the extractivist development model imposed by the Mexican state. There are currently nine open legal cases against Kenia on fabricated charges linked to her activism, and she has been unjustly imprisoned since October 2020. She is part of the CIVICUS Stand as My Witness campaign seeking her release.

What’s the situation of Kenia Hernandez and the struggle for her release?

Kenia’s work has always focused on denouncing and mobilising against serious human rights violations. Now she is experiencing firsthand the criminalisation of human rights and Indigenous rights activism that so many other activists in Mexico have gone through. The system seeks to keep her behind bars for as long as possible to prevent her continuing to do her work, and to this end prolongs the deprivation of her liberty by repeatedly opening new criminal cases against her.

The campaign for Kenia’s release has two components: a legal struggle, led by a legal team that monitors the proceedings against her, and a political struggle, focused on raising the profile of her case. It is important that the whole country knows what is happening and that people continue to talk about Kenia’s case, and the injustice and impunity she is suffering. We cannot look the other way because her reality is the reality of many other criminalised activists.

How many cases similar to Kenia’s do you estimate there are today?

Kenia’s case is part of a pattern of criminalisation aimed at hindering the work of those defending human rights and the rights of Indigenous peoples in Mexico. The fact that Kenia is an Indigenous woman, a mother, a lawyer and a human rights defender is no coincidence: it is the very reason for her imprisonment.

Other activists have suffered worse fates than prosecution and jail: they have been victims of assassinations, attempts on their lives and enforced disappearances.

It is difficult to estimate how many criminalised activists and political prisoners there are in Mexico because there is no official body tracking them exhaustively. But it is a reality that we corroborate constantly. The main targets of this persecution are racialised activists, usually in a situation of poverty and vulnerability, who fight for a cause the government finds inconvenient. What those causes are depends on the context; each state is different. But they all fall victim to the same criminal system and are equally subjected to the violation of their rights and exposed to injustice and impunity.

To what extent has Kenia’s criminalisation succeeded in silencing demands?

Whenever a situation of criminalisation occurs, the group of activists accompanying or supporting the criminalised defender also fears for their own freedom. After all, what the criminalisation of defenders seeks to do is threaten the whole collective in order to deactivate it.

Perhaps there was a moment when the group supporting Kenia was afraid to raise its voice. The mere fact of working to make Kenia’s situation visible and make demands on her behalf puts us all in a situation of vulnerability. But we have overcome this fear and have continued to put forward our demands and make visible the situation of this particular criminalised defender and the perverse functioning of a criminal justice system that is profoundly racist and classist.

What are your demands to the Mexican state?

President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, in his ‘Mañanera’ – a daily morning meeting with media – on 30 December 2022, instructed the Secretary for Security and Citizen Protection, Rosa Isela Rodríguez, to follow up on the case of Kenia Hernandez, which was our request. We demand that Ms Rodríguez meet jointly with Kenia’s legal team and with Federal Roads and Bridges (CAPUFE) so that they can have a dialogue and reach an agreement for her prompt release with reparations. CAPUFE is the federal agency that brought charges against Kenia in eight federal criminal cases for the alleged crime of attacks on general communication routes.

In view of the appeal made by United Nations rapporteurs and the fact that Kenia’s case was highlighted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as an example of the criminalisation of protest in Mexico, we hope that all the documentation and support gathered will be taken into account and will result in Kenia’s prompt release, and the recognition that she has been criminalised for her work as a defender of human rights and Indigenous peoples.

Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Collective for the Freedom of Kenia Hernández through its Facebook page and follow @ParaKenia on Twitter and libertad_para_kenia on Instagram.

CIVICUS discusses the situation in Niger since the July military coup with Clément Kocou Gbedey, National Coordinator in Niger of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP).

WANEP is a regional organisation founded in 1998 in response to the civil wars that ravaged West Africa in the 1990s. With over 700 member organisations, it includes national networks in every member state of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It takes a collaborative approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, working with civil society, governments, intergovernmental bodies and other partners to establish platforms for dialogue, experience sharing and learning. In 2002, it entered into a partnership with ECOWAS to implement a regional early warning and crisis response system.

What have been the main developments since Niger’s military coup?

The military coup of 26 July 2023 had economic, political and security consequences. Following the coup, ECOWAS imposed several economic sanctions on Niger. Sanctions include the suspension of all financial and commercial transactions between ECOWAS member states and Niger, the freezing of the assets of the military officers responsible for the coup, a travel ban on the military officers involved, the closure of land and air borders with Niger and the establishment of an exclusion zone for all commercial flights to and from Niger. The sanctions have weakened the country’s economy, leading to a rise in the price of basic foodstuffs.

There have been several important developments on the political front. On 27 September, the French ambassador left Niger, something that was celebrated as a patriotic victory. The junta also suspended the French media outlets France 24 and RFI and called for the departure of the 1,500 soldiers deployed at Niger’s three French bases. The resident coordinator of the United Nations system also left.

Since then, the junta has appointed Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine as prime minister and called for a three-year transition period before civilians take over. Two new bodies have been set up to support the transition process: the Court of State and the Commission to Combat Economic, Financial and Fiscal Crime.

The junta also officially launched the Solidarity Fund for the Safeguard of the Homeland, tasked with mobilising resources to strengthen the capabilities of security forces engaged in the fight against terrorism and insecurity by providing them with weapons and logistical resources, particularly transport equipment. It is also responsible for the voluntary return, relocation and local reintegration of people forcibly displaced by insecurity.

At the end of November, Niger and Burkina Faso jointly withdrew from the Sahel G5, an institutional framework for coordinating regional cooperation on development and security policies in West Africa, founded in 2014 and including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The decision followed a review of the organisation’s operations and its joint anti-jihadist force, which never managed to establish itself effectively on the ground.

In its place, Niger formed an alliance with Burkina Faso and Mali with the aim of countering any threat of armed rebellion or external aggression, stressing that ‘any attack against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more contracting parties will be considered as aggression against the other parties’.

Also in November, the junta revised Niger’s immigration laws and repealed a law that criminalised the smuggling of migrants into the country. This decision was rejected by the European Union (EU), which feared that it would increase migratory flows to Europe.

What has been the impact of the end of the security agreements with the EU?

Geopolitically, Niger has distanced itself from its traditional partners, notably France, which was its main ally in what was described as the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.

Niger is seeking to cut its umbilical cord with the former colonial power. In the early hours of the coup, ECOWAS and France wanted to mobilise military forces from neighbouring countries against Niger.

On the same day that it denounced Niger’s common security and defence agreement with the EU, the government signed an agreement to strengthen military cooperation with Russia.

Niger has drawn closer to Russia with this agreement to strengthen military cooperation, and to China, which is offering investment in the infrastructure and mining sectors.

Is there any dialogue between the junta and the opposition to establish the conditions for the restoration of freedoms and a democratic transition?

For the time being, there are no clear signs of a diplomatic dialogue between the military junta and the deposed president Mohamed Bazoum or his supporters. It’s been promised that an inclusive dialogue will soon be organised including all the nation’s active forces to define the terms of a democratic transition.

But I find no evidence to be concerned about the preservation of civil liberties in Niger. Freedom of expression is essential for a democratic society, but if ‘fake news’ is used to destabilise political governance, it can be expected that restrictions will be imposed.

The process of democratic transition will encounter many obstacles. Challenges include corruption, insecurity, political polarisation, human rights abuses, border closures, trade paralysis, rising food prices and very high levels of poverty.

Public confidence in democratic institutions can be subject to variations, influenced by factors such as political stability, the transparency of electoral processes and the capacity of institutions to respond to the needs of the population.

What are the regional implications of the situation in Niger?

Niger is a strategic country for the security and development of the Sahel region, which faces violent armed groups and humanitarian crises. Niger is home to around 450,000 refugees and displaced people, mainly from Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria.

When it overthrew Bazoum and installed a junta, the military justified its action by citing the deteriorating security, economic and social situation, as well as accusations of corruption levelled against the Bazoum administration.

The international community strongly condemned the coup and called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order. The African Union, the EU and France, the USA and other countries suspended diplomatic relations with Niger and imposed economic sanctions on the military regime. They have also threatened military intervention if the military does not release political prisoners and respect human rights.

The people of Niger are not in favour of international military intervention. However, they have expressed concerns about the country’s security and stability. To help stabilise the situation, ECOWAS should lift the sanctions unjustly imposed on Niger.

Niger’s neighbours expressed their support for diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis by peaceful means and called for dialogue between all stakeholders to preserve stability. They also feared that the coup would encourage foreign influence in the region, particularly from China, Iran and Russia.

Civic space in Niger is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with WANEP through its website or Facebook page and follow @WANEP_Regional on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing conflict in Gaza with Abdalaziz Alsalehi, senior researcher at the Social and Economic Policies Monitor (Al-Marsad).

Al-Marsad is a civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks to protect the rights of the most marginalised Palestinians through evidence-based policy analysis and monitoring and coalition building for advocacy, dialogue and cooperation.

What’s the current situation in Gaza and the West Bank?

The current situation is a continuation of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Crimes against Palestinian civilians have persisted since 1948 to this day. Occupation forces continue to arrest, kill and displace Palestinians within their territories.

Despite the world’s attention focusing on the attacks committed by Hamas, the 7 October events cannot be isolated from the historical context of Palestinian suffering, not just in Gaza but also in the West Bank.

Gaza has been subject to Israeli siege and control for about 16 years, while the West Bank is under a system harsher than apartheid. Life there is exceedingly challenging for Palestinians. The poverty rate in the West Bank and Gaza is over 29 per cent and the unemployment rate sits at about 27 per cent. These rates constantly go up and down due to economic instability.

But the problem is not only economic and social, it is also distinctly political. Occupying forces and settler militias commit horrifying crimes against Palestinians. In 2022 alone, 224 people, overwhelmingly male, were killed – 53 in Gaza and 171 in the West Bank. Fifty-three were children. In the same year, the Palestinian Ministry of Health recorded 10,587 injuries caused to Palestinians by Israeli occupation forces and settler militias’ gunfire. Forty-five per cent were caused by live ammunition.

Well before October 2023, attacks against healthcare facilities and providers were widespread, with 177 recorded incidents of assaults against patients, medical teams and healthcare facilities in 2022. Nine of these attacks targeted healthcare facilities, 97 targeted ambulances and 83 affected injured and sick people. Additionally, 173 incidents involved assaults on medical personnel. The nature of these attacks varied, including direct assaults with individual weapons, hindrance of the movement and work of medical teams, exposure to psychological violence and aggressive searches.

This has been the plight of Palestinians for decades, but the situation escalated dramatically after 7 October.

Between 7 October and 5 December, the state of Israel has killed at least 15,523 civilians in Gaza and 245 in the West Bank, 70 per cent of them women and children. The escalation may be a response to the Hamas attacks, but data from previous years suggests that there had already been a shift from covert to direct killing and direct forced displacement. This is apparent in the fact that through its war in Gaza, Israel has disproportionately killed children and women without achieving any of its declared goals.

What led to the current escalation of conflict?

The lack of a political horizon leading to the liberation of Palestinians has brought us here. Palestinians have been victims of occupation for decades. The continuous suppression operations and the displacement of Palestinians from their lands in the years following the 1993-1995 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization have led to this outcome.

It is crucial to note that although it witnessed no Palestinian escalation in recent years, Israel undermined any real opportunities for Palestinian economic empowerment, aiming for an economy controlled by Israel. Additionally, there were violations against sacred sites, particularly Al-Aqsa Mosque, as part of the ‘Judaisation’ of Jerusalem. This coincides with racial segregation on external roads and ongoing settlement activities, leading up to the events of 2021 when Palestinians in the occupied territories – and within the 1948 borders – and in Jerusalem rose up against the occupation. They continue to bear the consequences of those events to this day.

All this is part of a series of events that Palestinians have been enduring since 1948 in the face of the colonial project that continues to uproot them from their land.

Some believe that the current form of the government in Israel has led to the explosion of events, but this is not accurate. The occupation has long continued unchanged regardless of changes of government in Israel.

It is worth noting that the region is changing and evolving, and global powers are undergoing radical transformations. With the war between Russia and Ukraine, the world’s attention diverted from the Palestinian cause and the ongoing oppression of Palestinians. Meanwhile, unconditional US support for Israel persists, which comes with the imposition of numerous conditions on Palestinians, who are witnessing the appropriation of their lands. These issues contribute to changes in the situation on the Palestinian front against the occupation. It cannot be conclusively determined at this moment whether changes will be in favour of Palestinians or not, but it does stir up stagnant waters.

What challenges do Palestinian voices face in sharing their stories and demands internationally?

My opinion is that western media – in the USA and Europe – is controlled by Zionist lobbies and manipulate facts and generate disinformation. Israel is also notorious for creating propaganda that serves its interests. Pro-Israel lobbies are so strong that some people fear exclusion in their societies if they voice their concerns about the situation of Palestinians.

The challenge for Palestinians today lies in reaching a wider global audience. The world is not just Europe and the USA.

Israel controls communications in occupied Palestine. When its control fails, it resorts to arresting people, and if this also fails it resorts to killing. However, Palestinians continue to convey their message to the world, and the world is beginning to open up to the truth, with part of it fully aware of what is happening in occupied Palestine. It is crucial for people in other societies to engage.

Global governance institutions should also play an active role in conveying the messages and countering the suffering of Palestinians. The current negligence by the United Nations Security Council, the World Health Organization and the Red Cross is extremely dangerous. It paves the way for a global loss of trust in these institutions.

What are the conditions for civil society in Palestine?

Civil society is besieged. For 30 years, the Israeli occupation has undermined the work of CSOs, disabling their role in promoting self-reliant development, political change and an end to the occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. In recent years, the occupation government has become more explicit in suppressing CSOs, directly closing them down, confiscating their assets and arresting their staff.

The occupation also imposes restrictions on the funding of CSOs. The political conditions on funding imposed by European and particularly US funders have led to the cessation of work by hundreds of CSOs.

But the real gap arises from the fact that funders have transformed CSOs into an operational sector without linking them to a political horizon. Billions of dollars have been spent on agriculture, infrastructure and water, with little benefit. The Palestinian Authority also believes that CSOs narrow its political space because they are often critical of it too. But the truth is CSOs play a key role in overseeing the effectiveness of economic and social programmes.

Beyond formal non-governmental organisations, civil society has essentially been destroyed, much like all civic bodies in the occupied Palestinian territories have been destroyed by the occupation. I would like to make clear that I’m speaking about civil society in its broad sense, encompassing various entities such as unions, youth clubs, political parties, collectives and social movements. This has played a crucial role in the retreat of political organisations that the occupation has fought against for decades.

What international support do Palestinians receive, and what further support do you need?

Essential sectors such as health, education and agriculture continue to suffer from a severe lack of support. The focus in recent years has been on advocacy and pressure, which is not the primary issue that needs attention to change the political reality.

Above all, action is needed towards the goal of ending the occupation, by making Israel pay the price through boycotts on the economic, academic, cultural and even diplomatic levels. Israel must also face international courts for committing war crimes.

How should the Israel-Palestine conflict be addressed?

With all due respect, the framing of the question is part of the problem. What we are witnessing is not a conflict between states, but the resilience of an entire people against occupiers who have been killing, displacing and oppressing them for decades.

When the issue is framed correctly, the answers become clearer. The problem lies in the colonial mindset: peace will only come when this is brought to an end. It is possible for Jews, Christians and Muslims to live together here as they did before 1948.

A long-discussed solution that has not yet achieved any tangible form is the two-state solution with a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and its capital in East Jerusalem, including the return of refugees and a restoration of their material and moral rights. This could be implemented through global political pressure on Israel, boycotting the occupation until it complies with these conditions.

But over the years Israel has not even accepted a version of this solution in which Palestinians relinquish more than 75 per cent of their historical land. Which brings us back to the roots of the problem: the colonial displacement of Palestinians from their land. This is what the occupying state seeks, and this what the world, especially free nations, should act against.

Civic space in Palestine is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Al Marsad through its website or Facebook page, and follow @almarsad_ps on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks about the far-right victory in the snap elections that took place in the Netherlands on 22 November with Niels Hoogerheijde, Policy Advisor at Partos, the Dutch membership body for civil society organisations (CSOs) working in international development.

Did the election victory of the far right come as a surprise?

It did come as a surprise. Usually the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) achieves increasingly good results in the final days of the election campaign only to underperform on election day. This is what we expected to happen this time, so when we saw a PVV poll surge in the days prior to 22 November, we thought the numbers were inflated and its victory was not a realistic possibility – just as with previous elections. This year, however, the PVV did perform as the polls forecasted.

The result may be viewed as part of a wider regional trend. As far as Europe goes, far-right politicians are using migration or blaming migrants for all the crises that their countries are going through. The government of Italy is led by Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy. Support for Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is growing in France. Reform UK, the party launched by Nigel Farage, is also rising in the polls. The common denominator of all of these is the use of a negative narrative about migrants to win people over – and it is working.

How have civil society and progressives reacted to the election results?

The day after the election results were announced, there were various demonstrations across the country in favour of human rights and in solidarity with asylum seekers, LGBTQI+ people and particularly the Dutch Muslim community, who have been the PVV’s main target for years.

The PVV has put forward despicable proposals that are not only unconstitutional but also truly inhumane. People, including in civil society, have strong fears about what could happen to Dutch Muslims, asylum seekers and other excluded groups if we get a government led by the PVV.

In addition, there are worries about the Netherlands’ international reputation. The PVV wants a Dutch exit from the European Union and wants to abolish the entire budget for development cooperation.

How much leeway would a coalition government led by PVV leader Geert Wilders have to implement its promised policies?

Throughout the campaign – and his whole political career – Wilders has made outrageous and even unconstitutional promises of what he will do if elected. But we shouldn’t forget that he will not govern alone. He will need to reach agreements to form a working majority in parliament.

What he is able to do will truly depend on the composition of the government. It is too early to tell because the elections were only three weeks ago. But the government formation process started that same week. Many things have happened since, involving many politicians. I think three parties on top of the PVV are bound to be involved in the new government in some way.

It is very unlikely that the largest party in the current caretaker government, the conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, will not have any role in the future government. It used to be the main ruling party, and even as a junior coalition partner, its presence will still be important. The other two relevant parties are the New Social Contract (NSC) and the Farmers and Citizens Party (BBB).

We might see the formation of a majority coalition including the four of them, or a minority coalition government composed of only some of these parties, seeking the support of other parties on specific topics. For the moment, politicians from all parties are making statements on conditions to work with other parties. Such statements are all part of the negotiation process so they should not be taken at face value but with the strategic goals of the respective party in mind.

What can be done to prevent regressive policies materialising?

Wilders’ proposals range from the ridiculous to the outrageous. They include an entry ban for asylum seekers, the closure of mosques and Islamic schools and outlawing the Quran. In the past, he has also proposed to create a Ministry of Deportation, to introduce a tax on women wearing hijab and to shoot young criminals of Moroccan descent in the knees. All of this is very well documented and most of it is unconstitutional.

His key issue, the one that has made him most popular, concerns migrants and asylum seekers. Wilders wants to shut down the asylum system and not let any new asylum seekers into the Netherlands. By doing this, the Netherlands would breach its obligations under international law to provide safe haven for refugees.

It is crazy to think if he had received a majority of parliamentary seats, these policies would have already materialised. As he lacks such a majority, Wilders must negotiate with other parties. And this is where we and other civil society groups come in, talking with party representatives about policy priorities and people’s needs and concerns. Potential coalition partners can play a crucial role, which is why Partos is calling on the BBB and NSC to stand up for the Netherlands’ international reputation.

We have always been an outward-looking country that prides itself on its international reputation and tries to uphold international law. The city of The Hague, the site of our national government, profiles itself as the capital of international law, peace and justice. If you are truly committed to those values, you cannot abolish development cooperation altogether or do away with international treaties. You must respect the rule of law, the Dutch Constitution and our country’s international commitments.

Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Partos through its webpage and follow @PartosNL on LinkedIn and Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Kaspars Zālītis, a human rights activist and board member of Mozaika, about the recent legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships in Latvia.

Founded in 2006, Mozaika is the oldest LGBTQI+ civil society organisation (CSO) in Latvia. It promotes gender equality and anti-discrimination, raises awareness of diverse sexual orientations, gender identities and expressions of identity, promotes an understanding of diverse family models and their legal recognition and advocates for the harmonisation of Latvian laws with international standards.

How significant is the legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships in Latvia?

The Latvian parliament’s decision to legalise same-sex civil partnerships is historic, particularly considering the nine unsuccessful attempts that preceded it, spread over 24 years.

The decision, which involves eight separate pieces of legislation granting various rights to people in same-sex civil partnerships, is the first step, and a very significant one, to pave the way for further recognition of LGBTQI+ human rights in Latvia. This victory stands as a collective achievement of LGBTQI+ organisations working in tandem with legislators and shows how cooperation between civil society and politicians can foster positive change.

We have some wonderful politicians who facilitated the adoption of this package of laws, while we take the credit for having persuaded them to include LGBTQI+ issues on their agenda. Latvia’s first out LGBTQI+ president has also greatly contributed to a positive image and representation of the community.

Have you experienced backlash?

We’ve experienced instant conservative backlash and the issue is not yet settled. The civil partnership bill was passed by a small majority, and opposition parties asked the president not to promulgate it so they could have time to collect signatures for a referendum to repeal it.

As of today, seven out of eight amended laws have already been signed and are set to come into force on 1 January 2024, allowing people in same-sex civil unions to enjoy some social security and tax benefits and hospital visiting rights. However, the crucial piece of legislation that would allow notaries to register same-sex civil partnerships has been put on hold while the opposition seeks to collect the more than 155,000 signatures needed to call a referendum.

If called, the referendum will be binding if at least 50 per cent of the people who voted in the last election show up and vote. And if a majority of them rejects the law, it will be repealed.

The Latvian LGBTQI+ community is hopeful that this move won’t succeed. Hopefully there will be no referendum, or not enough people will vote in it if there is one, or they will vote against the repeal. We hope the president will be able to promulgate the law so that it can come into force by mid-2024.

How is Mozaika working to advance LGBTQI+ rights in Latvia?

Mozaika is Latvia’s only LGBTQI+ advocacy organisation and for a long time it was the only LGBTQ+ organisation in Latvia. We held a monopoly on LGBTQ+ issues, which resulted in some issues being overlooked due to resource constraints. Thankfully, several new LGBTQI+ organisations have recently been established to bridge the gaps.

Over 18 years, Mozaika has done a lot of work in advocacy, organising Pride events, conducting capacity development for civil society and providing training for the police and other professions. We have continuously engaged in conversations and raised awareness about LGBTQI+ issues among the public. Our efforts have led to a significant improvement in social attitudes toward LGBTQI+ people. In 2015, only nine per cent of people had a positive attitude, with around half neutral. A recent poll indicates a shift, with 25 per cent now expressing a positive attitude, while half maintain a neutral stance.

How do you connect with the international LGBTQI+ movement, and what further support do you need?

We cooperate closely with regional LGBTQI+ organisations to exchange best practices and learn from each other. One of the greatest examples of our cooperation is the annual Baltic Pride, rotating between the capitals of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with Latvia’s capital Riga hosting the event in 2024. Mozaika is also a part of international umbrella organisations, including ILGA-Europe.

Like every CSO, we struggle with funding sustainability to maintain our activities and ensure financial independence. Given that LGBTQI+ issues are still not popular among local funders, Latvian LGBTQI+ organisations face additional challenges. Even though we’ve achieved significant milestones, we urge the international community to keep monitoring the political situation in Latvia to avert a broader conservative backlash that could jeopardise our accomplishments.

What are your next steps?

The positive changes witnessed since our founding in 2006 reflect the extensive and strategic character of our work. We’re going to persist in litigation on various fronts, such as addressing inheritance rights, seeking recognition for same-sex couples who have married or registered abroad and advocating for the recognition of the children of same-sex families. We’ll also keep working to combat the rising trend of online hate speech and anti-LGBTQI+ propaganda.

Civic space in Latvia is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Mozaika through its website or its Facebook page and follow @lgbt_mozaika and KasparsZ on Twitter.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks about the recent TikTok ban in Nepal with Anisha, provincial coordinator for Gandaki Pradesh at Body and Data.

Founded in 2017, Body and Data is a civil society organisation promoting an accessible, safe and just digital space for all people in Nepal. Anisha, known by her digital name Aneekarma, oversees a project focused on online expression by women and LGBTQI+ people and leads Body and Data’s digital rights initiative in Nepal’s Gandaki province. 

Why did the Nepali government ban TikTok?

The government has cited multiple reasons for banning TikTok. It cited concerns about a rise in cybercrime, the disruption of social harmony – mainly due to the circulation of ‘vulgar’ content that ‘damages societal values’ – and TikTok’s perceived promotion of a ‘begging culture’, as content creators use it to seek money or gifts from their audience during live sessions. They also invoked the fact that the platform is being banned in some global north countries, although those bans normally apply only to government phones.

Ultimately, it all boils down to an attempt to restrict freedom of expression. TikTok has grown to be a significant platform. It serves a diverse audience including housewives, older people, small business owners and entrepreneurs. Recently, people began using TikTok to voice opinions and exercise free speech against the authorities, provoking anger and fear among political leaders who have stepped up surveillance.

How will this ban impact on digital rights?

Nepal is a democratic country where freedom of speech and expression are fundamental, and the ban on TikTok has raised concerns about these rights being compromised. These concerns have been exacerbated by the government’s plans to introduce a separate bill aimed at tightening control over social media.

The enforcement of the TikTok ban infringes on the basic rights of freedom of expression and access to information. The platform was used not just for entertainment and for small enterprises to promote their products and services but also as a channel to share diverse opinions, engage in creative expression and amplify the voices of excluded communities, particularly women.

Bans on popular social media platforms add complexity to the ongoing international debate regarding digital rights. There are growing concerns surrounding the intersection of technology, free expression and governance in the digital age. The TikTok ban sparks discussions on the delicate balance between government regulation and individual liberties.

What potential privacy or security concerns arise from users shifting to other platforms?

Because of TikTok being banned, users have started to migrate to alternative platforms, which raises further privacy and security concerns. It is paramount that digital rights are safeguarded during this transition.

User education and awareness campaigns on privacy and security best practices are needed to enhance digital literacy. Users must be confident that their personal information is well protected. Transparent data practices, including clear information on data collection and usage, are vital for building user trust and enabling informed decision-making.

The influx of new users to alternative platforms may also introduce potential cybersecurity threats. Platforms should continuously invest in security measures such as encryption protocols, regular audits and prompt vulnerability fixes. It is also essential to implement user authentication and verification mechanisms to mitigate risks such as fake accounts and identity theft.

The situation in Nepal raises additional concerns due to the government’s limited understanding of cybersecurity. The absence of consultation with experts before this type of decision is made poses severe risks, as evidenced by instances of people’s personal data being exposed and government websites being hacked.

The TikTok ban only made the gap in the oversight of data privacy clearer. A comprehensive approach is required to address these issues, integrating technological measures, transparent policies, education initiatives and regulatory frameworks to ensure robust safeguards for user privacy and digital rights.

What are the global implications of the growing trend of TikTok bans?

The growing trend of countries considering or implementing bans on TikTok due to security concerns reflects a global unease surrounding potential risks associated with the platform. Often intertwined with geopolitical tensions, the TikTok ban signals broader government efforts to control the digital space in the name of national sovereignty. These bans underscore an intensified scrutiny of data privacy and security practices on digital platforms, with governments expressing reservations about the potential misuse of user data.

This trend is reshaping the global tech landscape, prompting questions about the dominance of specific platforms and the role of international tech companies. Governments face a significant challenge in striking a delicate balance between encouraging innovation and implementing regulations to address security and privacy concerns.

As users encounter bans on TikTok, they may migrate to alternative platforms, fostering increased competition and influencing user demographics and content trends. This trend emphasises the need for international collaboration on digital standards and regulations to address security concerns and establish a framework for responsible behaviour in the global digital arena.

Ultimately, bans on TikTok carry broader implications for the future of digital platforms, shaping discussions on user awareness, advocacy and the delicate interplay between innovation and regulation in the evolving digital landscape.

How can governments regulate platforms without compromising people’s rights to free expression and privacy?

Governments face the complex challenge of regulating social media platforms to combat misinformation and disinformation while also safeguarding their citizens’ rights to free expression and privacy. Sophisticated strategies are required to achieve a balance between national security imperatives and global digital rights.

Just as TikTok has established its own guidelines regarding harmful content, governments can collaborate with technology companies to define clear and transparent standards for social media conduct that do not compromise people’s right to express their opinions, but rather that counteract misinformation. It is crucial to implement robust fact-checking mechanisms and foster media literacy to empower users to distinguish between reliable and deceptive information.

International collaboration to standardise regulations is key to preventing the infringement of digital rights across borders. The adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies, such as end-to-end encryption, preserves individual privacy while facilitating uninhibited self-expression. It is paramount to recognise that state-controlled surveillance and censorship directly threaten our freedom of expression. Rather than resorting to outright bans, governments should prioritise measures that address concerns about misinformation and privacy to strike a nuanced balance that safeguards fundamental rights.

Civic space in Nepal is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Body and Data through its website or Instagram page, and follow @bodyanddata and @aneekarma on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Spanish political scientist and political consultant Eva Silván about the recent re-election of Pedro Sánchez as Spanish prime minister at the head of a coalition with left-wing and pro-independence parties, in a country deeply divided by the Catalonia issue.

How did socialist Pedro Sánchez manage to win a new mandate rather than a government that included the far right being formed?

On 28 May 2023, municipal and regional elections were held in Spain. The results showed a political map clearly favourable to the centre-right Popular Party (PP), which received some 750,000 more votes than the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), from which it snatched almost all local power. The PP regained six of the 10 regional governments that were in the hands of the PSOE, but in five of them – Aragón, Baleares, Cantabria, Comunidad Valenciana and Extremadura – it needed the support of the extreme right-wing party Vox to reach a majority that allowed it to form a government. The PSOE was only able to retain three of the 17 regional governments: Castilla la Mancha, Navarra and the Principality of Asturias.

Faced with this result, the following day socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez made a surprise move, bringing forward general elections, scheduled for the end of the year, to 23 July. This served to curb internal contestation at the loss of territorial power. It was the first time that general elections have been held in July, in the middle of summer. These elections found an exhausted citizenry and political class, and came as Spain started its mandate at the head of the European Union.

The context seemed favourable for the PP, as the results of the May elections seemed to anticipate an epochal shift. In the first weeks polls were indeed favourable to the PP. But its signing of government agreements with Vox brought a reaction of rejection among a very large part of public opinion, which mobilised in fear that the entry of the far right into government would mean a setback for hard-won rights.

The PP also erred by focusing its electoral campaign on Sánchez and his alleged lies and shifts of position. This did not serve to mobilise the electorate and ended up working against the PP when the some of the arguments put forward by its leader, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, were exposed as false in the only election debate he took part in.

Sánchez, for his part, ran a campaign in which he showed leadership, had an extensive media presence, including in outlets that had been hostile to his government, and spearheaded a social media campaign that enabled him to connect with new audiences. This, together with fear of the far right, ended up isolating the PP, which although it took the most votes performed much worse than expected.

Having come first, Feijóo was given the task of forming a government, but he was unable to gather enough support. Vox’s backing did not suffice, and no other party wanted to be part of a government that included the far right.

What will be the costs of the alliances formed by Sánchez to retain government?

The political landscape resulting from the 23 July elections called for agreements. No party received sufficient support for its candidate to be elected prime minister without the backing of other political forces.

Once Feijóo’s attempt to form a coalition government failed, it was the turn of Sánchez, who sought agreements with the nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia.

Throughout his career, Sánchez has shown great flexibility and adaptability: he knows how to read the situation and decide what to do to develop a progressive agenda that allows him to govern. In this case, this included admitting the possibility of an amnesty law for politicians prosecuted or tried for promoting Catalan independence, which during the campaign he denied he would do.

The support gathered by the new government is the clearest manifestation of the fact that, following the break-up of the two-party system and the emergence of a multi-party politics, we have entered a stage of bloc politics characterised by polarisation, with two blocs led by the PP and the PSOE whose identities are defined not so much in terms of the left-right divide as in territorial terms.

According to available data, the PSOE’s alliance with two pro-Catalan independence parties, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Junts per Catalunya, has the majority support of Catalan society, and the same is true in the Basque Country. In fact, the PSOE won the most votes in these two territories in the general elections.

In the case of the Basque Country, the agreements reached between the PSOE and the nationalist forces are based on the transfer within two years of competences provided for in previous agreements, in addition to some longstanding demands such as the transfer of the financial management of social security and the development of an autonomous framework for labour relations.

In Catalonia, the agreements focus on the transfer of the management of commuter trains and an increase in public resources earmarked for Catalonia or a debt write-off, a move that has been strongly rejected by the PP and Vox. And specifically in relation to Junts, the agreement was possible thanks to the PSOE’s promise, already fulfilled, to send an amnesty bill to parliament. In the event that the law is approved and then ratified by the Constitutional Court, it will put an end to the criminal status of all politicians involved in calling a Catalan independence referendum in 2017 and allow the return to Spain of separatist leader Carles Puigdemont, more than five years after he settled in Belgium, evading justice.

How has the public reacted to the agreement?

The amnesty law is, broadly, supported or rejected on the basis of geography. The biggest demonstrations against it have taken place in cities governed by the PP, while elsewhere they have been very small.

As soon as it became known that there was going to be an agreement between PSOE and Junts, demonstrations and violent protests began outside the PSOE’s headquarters. Demonstrations by far-right groups included anti-constitutional symbols and flags and fascist and xenophobic chants. In competing for the leadership of anti-amnesty demonstrations, the PP called for Sunday demonstrations that were more peaceful in tone, but equally firm in their opposition.

According to polling data, a majority of public opinion rejects the amnesty law. None of the government’s arguments in support of the law have public approval. The amnesty divides PSOE voters and unites those of the PP and Vox.

A survey published in October found that 57 per cent of people rejected the amnesty. A more recent poll finds that support is concentrated among voters of the left-wing coalition Sumar and pro-autonomy parties. Territorially, there is majority support only in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

Arguments against the amnesty law range from very simplistic claims, such as that it will ‘break Spain apart’, to legal arguments centred on the privilege it would entail for the accused and the violation of the principle of equality before the law. In contrast, Sánchez’s arguments underline the opportunity to advance coexistence among Spaniards and resolve a problem that has divided Spanish society for the past decade. It is undoubtedly one of Sánchez’s riskiest moves since he became prime minister, both in the public eye and within his party.

What are the main problems that should be tackled by the incoming government?

This will be the period of plurinationality. Territory will become the backbone of Spanish politics.

But there are other important issues. One of them, which also causes fierce debate and has been demanded by the European Commission, is the renewal of the judiciary. The mandate of the Council of the Judiciary, tasked with ensuring judicial independence, expired five years ago, leading to its biggest institutional and reputational crisis since the transition.

The main issues of concern to Spanish society are inflation, access to housing, healthcare and the situation of young people. Spain is among the European countries where it takes the longest time for young people to get jobs and become independent. The new government will have to find ways to improve the productivity of the Spanish economy, promote measures to tackle climate change and deal with a socio-demographic reality affected by a falling birthrate and an ageing population.

The two parties that form the coalition government, PSOE and Sumar, dominate the progressive side of the political spectrum. Their government agreement seeks to advance the policies already promoted in the previous administration, with social measures such as the gradual reduction of the working week to 37.5 hours, the extension of paternity and maternity leave to 20 weeks, an increase in the public housing stock for affordable rentals and the commitment to continue raising the minimum wage. They also push for measures to respond to climate change, such as reducing domestic flights on routes with rail alternatives that take under two and a half hours and the production of cheap and clean renewable energy. It remains to be seen whether these measures receive the support of the rest of the parties that allowed the formation of this government, particularly those on the centre-right axis such as the Basque Nationalist Party and Junts.

Civic space in Spain is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Eva Silván through her website and follow @silvan_miracle on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing repression of dissent in Algeria with Rachid Aouine, Director for SHOAA for Human Rights.

SHOAA for Human Rights is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) aimed at supporting and protecting human rights in Algeria. Founded in 2020 and based in London, UK, it raises awareness of human rights and monitors, documents and denounces state abuses of rights.

What’s the current situation for civil society in Algeria?

Algeria’s seen an unprecedented increase in repression, particularly targeting freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. The authorities are employing a range of tactics to silence dissent, including legal amendments and new laws that broaden the scope of offences related to public order disturbances and activities deemed to threaten national security.

Activists and journalists face criminal charges for the ‘dissemination of false information’ and ‘incitement to unarmed gatherings’. Concerns arise with the introduction of terrorism charges under article 87 bis of the Penal Code, which could target peaceful activists advocating for governance changes. Widespread abuse of pretrial detention contrary to the presumption of innocence has become the norm.

The suppression of critical associations, restrictions on political parties and limitations of academic freedom contribute to widespread repression and further reflect that Algeria doesn’t comply with the provisions of the international human rights treaties and conventions it’s ratified. In summary, Algerian authorities are using legislative measures to curb dissent, restrict fundamental rights and limit the activities of civil society, political parties and academics.

Is it still possible for independent CSOs to work in Algeria?

Independent CSOs face significant challenges due to legal restrictions and government actions. Associations Law No. 12-06 imposes stringent regulations, requiring official authorisation for CSOs to operate and penalties for unregistered or suspended associations up to imprisonment. The dissolution of associations and political parties further narrows the space for independent civil society. State restrictions on foreign funding further endanger the financial sustainability of CSOs.

Activists encounter arrest, detention and conviction, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship. This has led to a more cautious approach that has affected the vibrancy of civil society.

Despite these challenges, some CSOs continue to operate in Algeria and persist in advocating for causes under government scrutiny. Most, however, have had to move abroad to evade direct pressure and legal constraints.

Overall, the environment poses difficulties, if not making it impossible, for independent CSOs to operate.

How does SHOAA for Human Rights help Algerian activists under threat?

Our multifaceted support system encompasses an array of strategies. We collaborate with international human rights organisations, United Nations (UN) treaty bodies and other international institutions to draw attention to rights violations in Algeria and ensure activists are protected under international standards. We also collaborate with Algerian diaspora organisations and activists both inside and outside Algeria to meticulously document human rights abuses, including arrests and unfair trials. This documentation serves as a foundation for robust advocacy and awareness campaigns.

Cooperation with Algerian human rights lawyers and international legal experts is key to ensuring that activists have proper legal representation when prosecuted. The establishment of safe havens and support networks is critical for activists facing immediate threats in Algeria. To that end, we collaborate with international organisations and governments willing to provide political refuge. We also engage in capacity development to empower activists with the knowledge and skills to navigate legal challenges effectively.

How has Algerian civil society reacted to the pressure?

In response to increased repression, Algerian civil society has demonstrated resilience by mobilising and presenting a unified front. We have engaged in collective advocacy, as evidenced by the detailed recommendations submitted to two UN Special Rapporteurs during their country visits to Algeria.

Civil society has taken a coordinated approach to improve legal frameworks. Our unified set of demands includes calls for legal reforms, the release of detainees, investigations into human rights abuses and the protection of fundamental freedoms such as the rights to assembly and association. This cohesive agenda indicates alignment among different segments of civil society.

To foster international solidarity, we’ve built alliances with the Algerian diaspora and global activist communities. Through joint campaigns, initiatives and collaborative efforts, we amplify our collective voice and exert pressure on the Algerian government to uphold human rights. This reflects a strategic collaboration in search of international support and intervention in response to the challenges faced domestically.

These efforts convey a strong sense of solidarity among the Algerian people, emphasising their collective desire for the respect of constitutional provisions and international treaties and conventions. This unity underscores a shared commitment to human rights and democratic values, despite the challenges posed by governmental repression. Our endeavours depict a narrative of resilience and concerted action toward positive change.

What are your most urgent demands to the Algerian government?

Algerian civil society, operating in and outside Algeria, aspires to a series of legal, institutional and procedural changes to foster a more democratic and rights-centred environment.

We urge the government to align the Penal Code with the international human rights standards set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that Algeria has ratified. We urge a revision of Associations Law No. 12-06 to safeguard the rights to freedoms of assembly and association. It is imperative to stop attacks on civil society and political parties and rehabilitate bodies that have been suspended or dissolved. In seeking revisions to Law No. 23-02 and Law No. 23-08, we aim to ensure the protection of trade union rights and the right to strike. We also advocate for an amendment to Article 87 bis in the Anti-Terrorism Law to define acts of terrorism, in compliance with international human rights law.

Other pressing demands include the immediate and unconditional release of detainees held under laws conflicting with international human rights standards and the investigation of detention conditions, including in military prisons. To ensure transparency and justice, civil society calls for the public release of findings of investigations into incidents during peaceful assemblies, along with financial compensation for affected families. We demand accountability. Those responsible for torture, violence and deaths of protesters must be brought to justice to prevent the recurrence of abuses. We also call for the implementation of robust human rights monitoring practices by human rights CSOs.

What international support does Algerian civil society need?

Algerian civil society actively seeks international support to achieve compliance with constitutional and treaty obligations, advocate for legal reforms and ensure the release of political prisoners, as well as accountability for perpetrators.

The international community must exert diplomatic pressure on Algerian authorities to foster constitutional adherence and respect for fundamental rights. Support is necessary to align the Penal Code with international human rights standards and reform laws related to freedoms of assembly and association and trade union rights. International advocacy for the release of detainees subjected to arbitrary arrests, unfair trials and other forms of repression is crucial, along with accountability for human rights violations. This could be achieved through joint submissions to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process and cooperation with UN special mandate holders.

Algerian civil society, particularly human rights CSOs, also needs international financial aid to sustain its activities, while ensuring that national legislation doesn’t incriminate organisations receiving support.

In sum, international solidarity should encompass diplomatic pressure, advocacy efforts, financial assistance, collaboration with local civil society activists, media coverage and public awareness campaigns.

Civic space in Algeria is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with SHOAA for Human Rights through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @shoaa_org on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about global governance challenges with Marta Benavides, a spiritual leader who has led numerous sustainable peace initiatives in and outside of El Salvador, for which she has had to go into exile several times. Nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 as part of the 1,000 Women of Peace initiative, Marta leads national and international networks that advocate for a culture of peace, sustainability, inclusion and the rights of women, Indigenous peoples, traditionally excluded groups and the Earth.

How do you assess the current role of the United Nations (UN) within the global governance system?
The UN is a valuable instrument that shows us the way to live in peace on a healthy planet. Within the UN, one of the most essential bodies, because of the issues it works on, is the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). It provides frameworks and horizons to be reached. However, it is one of the programmes and processes that receives the least attention.

Several important processes are currently taking place within the UN framework, such as Agenda 2030, which is being widely misrepresented, although it could and should be a valuable framework. If states were to take it seriously, it would serve to assess their performance on each of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and identify areas to work on for the common good and the health of the planet, as well as strategies to implement to that end.

In the case of my country, El Salvador, which currently has a serious deforestation problem, Agenda 2030 could serve to understand how we should proceed in accordance with the rights of Mother Earth and work on the challenges we face today to protect the environment and mitigate climate change. Unfortunately, however, this is not officially considered a priority and those who undertake actions to this end are persecuted and punished.

The UN plays a key role in coordinating and brokering commitments between states, particularly in such urgent areas as climate change. Right now, COP28, the annual climate conference, is taking place in the United Arab Emirates. We should be discussing strategies to tackle climate change, yet agreements to continue extracting fossil fuels are still being promoted. We fail to realise that we are part of nature and must live in harmony and peace with nature, so that we can also live in harmony and peace with each other.

What is the way to develop a culture of peace?
To develop a culture of peace we can and should follow the example of Indigenous peoples. They are the ones who have safeguarded life on the planet all along. They believe that every decision must take into account its impact on the collective, and not just for the present but for seven generations to come. If each generation follows this principle, a culture of peace is established. Such a transformation requires deep, systemic and structural social change.

A culture of peace requires that the problem of poverty be addressed from its roots. The world as it stands today, with two-thirds of its population living in poverty and extreme poverty, is unviable. We must work collectively to meet the basic needs of every human being to live in justice, peace and dignity, thinking both of the present and future generations and caring for nature, which sustains and supports life.

Unfortunately, there are few of us today who adopt this way of thinking and living. Many take what they want by force, from nature and from their neighbours, without caring for the wellbeing of others. Therefore, the existential challenge of these times is to live and act consciously, even when the pressures of today’s world demand the opposite from us.

My support for the culture of peace was born from the teachings of my mother and father, who gave me such guide for living, and consolidated as a result of my work during the civil war in El Salvador. In the mid-1970s, when I was working supporting humanitarian work with Monsignor Oscar Romero, I realised that people were not inherently needy, but that their social circumstances made them so, so it was necessary to change those circumstances. At that time this was a very sacrificing and dangerous job: we received constant threats and finally, one night, Monsignor Romero was assassinated. He courageously and lovingly chose to go as far as necessary, demonstrating his character and his integrity by standing by the people. His legacy was and is to walk with the people, to accompany them, to stand in solidarity and be one with them.

I also chose to do so, by living for the revolution rather than dying for it. I didn’t embrace martyrdom. I knew that my task was to live as long as possible and to carry out as many transformative tasks as I could. And I have done so. For me, that is the meaning of living simply, which is not the same as simply living. It is living a meaningful and useful life in sustainability.

What initiatives is civil society working on to promote a culture of peace and human rights?
There are many civil society-led proposals to promote a culture of peace and human rights. However, the challenge lies in approaching these projects in a sustainable way, one that is committed every day and at every step to creating a peaceful world and a healthy planet. This is the practice of planetary- global citizenship. Initiatives are often pursued with goodwill but in isolation, without understanding the importance of working intentionally and collaboratively, collectively and consciously.

For example, while governments should develop national plans to implement the necessary climate commitments at the local level, few states have developed effective national plans to avoid exceeding 1.5 degrees of global temperature rise. In the face of this official failure, it is civil society that is organising to propose solutions.

To create conditions for social governance, the sovereign people must exercise their right and duty to work alongside the authorities, reminding civil servants that they are our employees. But it is governments, with their teams and resources, that should bring together all parts of the population, particularly the least privileged who suffer most from the impacts of climate change. This would allow for a just transition without people and the planet being exploited.

In other words, there are good projects, but one-off projects are not enough. We must transform the way we live to achieve a lasting and sustainable peace that allows all human rights to be respected individually and collectively and at all levels, from local to global.

Are you working on any campaign for UN reform?
I have been working with the UN since the 1970s. In the beginning, the process I supported most was the decolonisation of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Back then, the central issue was the struggle for the independence of the remaining colonies.

Today, I consider it crucial to focus on the rights of Indigenous peoples. Their active participation in decision-making processes must be guaranteed by respecting their right to free, prior and informed consent and their participation in implementation. This is essential for the practice of true global governance.

It is also important to move in the direction indicated by two UN Security Council resolutions that have not been given the importance they deserve. Resolution 2,250 of 2015 calls for the inclusion of young people in decision-making from an early age. This approach is the framework for the effective and transformative work of all post-2015 UN agendas, including Agenda 2030 with the SDGs and Agenda 2036 on Habitat. Young people and children must be able to participate in the process of creating the societies that we need to live in peace, on a healthy planet.

Resolution 1,325 of 2000 recognises and affirms the right of women, who bear the brunt of all types of conflict, to participate effectively in peacebuilding processes.

It is worrying that neither of these resolutions have been seriously taken into account to lead the way, so reform projects are adrift. The upcoming UN Summit of the Future in September 2024 will be a crucial opportunity for young people and human rights defenders to contribute to shaping the UN we aspire to and need if we are to have the future envisaged in the post-2015 agendas.

This commitment means reviewing existing agreements and working to reform the UN and its founding documents to provide guidelines for the practice of planetary-global citizenship that prioritises the wellbeing of nature and people. We must take up the declaration of human rights to lead the way. This is the challenge we must not postpone. The UN was created for the promotion and maintenance of lasting and sustainable peace, and today more than ever it is our challenge and privilege to work towards its achievement.

Follow @benavides_marta on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Andrea Barrientos, Senator of the Citizen Community (Comunidad Ciudadana) party for the department of Cochabamba, about recent fires in four of Bolivia’s nine departments. An estimated four million hectares have been affected by the fires, causing huge losses of flora and fauna and forcing Indigenous communities to leave their homes.

Andrea Barrientos is the main opposition politician who has complained about the government’s inaction in the face of forest fires.

What caused the recent forest fires in Bolivia?

The vast majority of the fires have occurred in protected areas: the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), the Madidi National Park and the Noel Kempff Mercado National Park. These are humid forests, which should not burn. It’s clear that these are arson attacks.

In dry forests, where spontaneous fires do occur, the source of the heat is identified and eliminated. But this is not possible in the case of arson, behind which there are powerful economic interests protected by politically powerful people.

It is believed these fires are being set for three reasons: to plant coca, in the case of TIPNIS in Cochabamba, for illegal mining, in La Paz and Beni, and in all three cases for land grabbing. For these reasons, more than three million hectares of protected areas have been burned.

A very worrying fact is that the Authority of Fiscalisation and Social Control of Forests and Land and the National Institute of Agrarian Reform have not provided geolocalised information on the fires, so neither the fire brigade nor the departmental government has had the possibility of identifying those responsible and imposing sanctions. This is a case of conspiracy to commit a crime and a cover-up by the central government.

Nobody has done anything. We have practically had to wait for rain before the fires were finally put out.

What have been the effects of the fires?

The result has been a considerable loss of biodiversity. The minimisation of the fires and the lack of response from the authorities is ecocide. Unfortunately, although laws can be changed, the biodiversity that has already been lost cannot be recovered.

The four million hectares and 10 million animals burned will have a negative impact on food security. The effects of the fires come on top of the floods and landslides caused by the rains that have placed seven of the country’s nine departments on orange alert.

The impacts on human health are imminent. Without forest there is no water, and the mercury-laced water left by mining is undrinkable.

What are your demands to the authorities?

We are demanding transparency and action. As long as there is corruption, nothing will change. To put out a fire you simply have to go to the source and put it out. As long as there is no will to act, the fires will continue.

Civil society support is vital for the government to recognise the fires and the loss of biodiversity. In four departments of Bolivia people have mobilised, and this has been a turning point. On 13 November, people took to the streets demanding that the authorities declare a natural disaster in the face of the increasing magnitude of the forest fires.

We need a government that thinks of our Amazon not as a land occupied by forest that needs to be cut down, nor as a source of income, but as an area preserved for the world. This is a vision that, unfortunately, our current national government does not have.

Citizen Community has launched popular actions – legal mechanisms that allow citizens to participate actively in the protection of collective rights and interests related to heritage, the environment, public space, security and public health, among others – and has initiated lawsuits for the protection of the environment in Madidi National Park. At first these initiatives were rejected by communities because the negative effects were still abstract to them, but now these same communities are looking to us for help because they are suffering the consequences of illegal mining and drug production in what used to be a forest. They realise that mercury is having a catastrophic impact on their lives and is making them sick with cancer.

Civic space in Bolivia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Andrea Barrientos through her Facebook page and follow @AndreaBSahonero on Twitter and Instagram.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks about intensifying inter-ethnic violence in north Kosovo and civil society’s ongoing peacebuilding efforts with Bjeshkë Guri, coordinator of the ‘Dealing with the Past’ programme at Youth Initiative for Human Rights Kosovo (YIHR-KS). Founded in 2004, YIHR-KS is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to protect and promote human rights and democratic values with a focus on transitional justice and strengthening the role of young people at the local and regional levels.

What’s the current security and human rights situation in Kosovo?

The security and human rights situation in Kosovo is complex and multi-faceted. While Kosovo’s Constitution ensures robust human rights protection and incorporates several international human rights mechanisms into its legal framework, inconsistent law implementation creates a fertile ground for rights violations to flourish. Unfortunately, violations persist across many domains, with discrimination and violence against women, LGBTQI+ people, children and non-majority communities being prevalent issues.

In recent years, ethnic violence has increased in north Kosovo, triggered by the implementation of ID and licence plate regulations in 2022. These policies increased tension and ultimately led to Kosovo-Serbs resigning from public institutions and boycotting local elections. Violent clashes were reported in north Kosovo between Kosovo-Albanian police factions and peacekeeping soldiers on one side and Kosovar Serbs on the other. On 24 September, an attack unfolded at Banjska Monastery involving around 30 armed people from Serbia and the Kosovo-Serb community. The incident resulted in a fatal shootout that killed one Kosovar police officer and three attackers. This has heightened tensions further and created a fragile political and diplomatic situation between Kosovo and Serbia.

Political leaders, driven by nationalist propaganda, foster social divisions between two ethnic groups. The risk of secession in north Kosovo, if not properly addressed, would pose a precedent for other separatist conflicts and cause destabilisation in the whole Balkan region. Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed the geopolitical landscape and the stability paradigm in Europe. This created an even greater need to extinguish local conflicts and prevent their recurrence, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia.

What should be done to normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia?

Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence since 2008 has created obstacles against normalising relations between the two states and induced an economic blockade as well as presenting international diplomatic challenges. The normalisation of relations requires a process of social change alongside the implementation of agreements and resolution of underlying problems, such as the establishment of an association of Serb-majority municipalities and the enhancement of institutional functionality in north Kosovo as well as the recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty by Serbia.

Civil society on both sides constantly works to improve the situation through a range of initiatives, including continuous support in the negotiation process. However, deteriorating political relations are exacerbating public tensions. As a result, CSOs in Kosovo have difficulties in engaging with communities that are predominantly Kosovo-Serbian.

What are relations between the Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serbian communities like?

The war in Kosovo claimed thousands of lives and destroyed the social fabric, replacing it with hatred and isolation. The rupture in communication between most Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs has made the two communities closed and isolated, seeing each other as enemies. Children are often brought up in fear and unaware of the wider context and problems shared by all communities in Kosovo. The influence of media, nationalist organisations and an aggressive environment pressure young people to take sides and view ‘the other’ as the cause of all problems. Ignorance about each other is the source of the prejudices and hostility that persist to this day.

An important factor lies with the education system. Various nationalist narratives are perpetuated through history books, as evidenced by an analysis we conducted in 2017. Kosovo-Serb young people learn from history books produced by the Serbian government, which barely mention the Kosovo             War and portray Serbian people as the main victims. Xenophobic language has created isolation, prejudice, lack of trust and a feeling of insecurity in both communities.

How is YIHR-KS working toward reconciliation and peacebuilding in Kosovo?

Compared to political institutions, Kosovar CSOs have done most of the effort when it comes to dealing with our recent history. Over the years, the Kosovo government initiated efforts related to transitional justice, including the establishment of an inter-ministerial working group to develop a national strategy on transitional justice, a preparatory team for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a War Crimes Institute. Unfortunately, these initiatives became politicised and to this day Kosovo hasn’t been able to implement a comprehensive transitional justice strategy.

To address the current polarised situation, YIHR-KS launched the ‘Dealing with the Past’ programme, aimed at building a collective memory and lasting peace in Kosovo and the Balkan region. We conduct workshops and memory initiatives aimed at educating young people about the Kosovo War and providing them with opportunities to connect with peers from ‘the other side’.

One notable initiative is the Virtual Museum of Refugees, a digital archive featuring stories of forcibly displaced people. By collecting and sharing refugee interviews, this archive helps preserve memory and provides a basis for the understanding of Kosovo’s past through personal stories. It’s also a platform for refugees to connect with others who may have undergone similar experiences and thus foster a better understanding among survivors of what happened in the war. The museum challenges ethno-nationalistic narratives and builds a shared vision for reconciliation.

We facilitate residential and regional exchanges for young people from Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serbian communities so they can share experiences, ideas and opinions and learn about transitional justice, intercultural dialogue and negotiation skills. We also organise visits to sites where war crimes occurred against both Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs for them to hear stories from victims’ family members. This experience is transformative because it bridges gaps created by propaganda, which is based on concealing crimes committed against the ‘other’ group.

Every year we conduct street actions to commemorate the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances and the National Day of Missing People. We use these to demand greater commitment and engagement from the government of Kosovo to seek truth and establish justice for over 1,600 missing people of all ethnicities.

We closely cooperate with all YIHR offices in the region, and particularly with Serbia’s due to our shared and troubled past. Together with YIHR Serbia, we issue joint statements and are vocal about the human rights violations committed in the 1990s Balkan wars and the present political and social tensions.

What further international support does Kosovar civil society need?

Civil society activities in Kosovo have significantly expanded over recent years, creating space for policy advocacy and the promotion of transparency and democratic ideals. However, despite the large number of CSOs addressing pressing issues, there is a lack of funding for activities.

We need further support in facilitating the European Union (EU) integration agenda, aligning Kosovo’s legal system with the Community acquis – the accumulated legislation, legal acts and court decisions issued since 1993 that make up EU law, strengthening democratic values and promoting a safe and equal environment for everyone living in Kosovo.

Kosovo would also significantly benefit from joining the Council of Europe. This would enable access to expertise and resources to advance the transitional justice agenda and encourage a victim-led approach.

Civic space in Kosovo is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with YIHR-KS through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @YIHRKosovo on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about Yemen’s ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis with Radhya Almutawakel, co-founder and chairperson of Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana).

Founded in 2007, Mwatana is a Yemeni civil society organisation (CSO) that advocates for human rights, documents violations, creates awareness and provides legal support to victims.

What’s the current situation in Yemen, and what are the prospects of the conflict being resolved in the near future?

First, it’s crucial to note that the conflict in Yemen goes beyond a mere civil war, as it spans three distinct dimensions: local, regional and international. It started in 2014 when the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group seized control of Sana’a, the capital, and escalated with the intervention of a Saudi-led coalition in 2015. The ongoing conflict has been marked by relentless intensity and violations of international humanitarian law such as aggressive actions targeting civilians and critical infrastructure, resulting in what is now recognised as the world’s most severe humanitarian crisis.

Since the ceasefire agreement in April 2022, direct military operations have ceased, providing temporary relief for civilians. While movement between specific Yemeni governorates and cities has improved, the country is caught in a state of limbo, neither at war nor at peace, grappling with the near-total collapse of state institutions. A significant proportion of public sector workers hasn’t been paid their salaries since 2016. Various armed groups control extensive territories, exacerbating the severe economic crisis and food insecurity. These are the primary challenges in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.

Despite the ceasefire, numerous human rights violations continue to be perpetrated by various parties to the conflict. Since late 2022, Oman has mediated the ongoing negotiations between the Houthi group and Saudi Arabia. Throughout 2023, reciprocal visits between both parties have taken place in Sana’a and the Saudi capital Riyadh with recent reports suggesting progress in negotiations that may lead to the resolution of this decade-long conflict.

How has the war impacted on civilians?

Throughout the years-long war, civilians in Yemen have faced two types of profound impacts. First, as direct victims. Thousands of civilians have been killed and many more have been injured. Civilian infrastructure has been destroyed, including schools, hospitals, bridges, historical and archaeological sites, farms, water and food sources and civil service structures.

People have also been indirect victims: as the economy collapsed, hundreds of thousands lost their sources of income. Parties to the war enforced widespread starvation, landmines were planted, thousands of children were recruited to fight and public freedoms gained over decades of pre-war struggle, including women’s rights, have regressed. Minorities have faced persecution, and the conflict has had extensive economic, social and political ramifications.

What role has Yemeni civil society, including Mwatana, played since the beginning of the conflict?

Yemeni CSOs have been crucial partners of international institutions in implementing humanitarian response plans across different regions during years of conflict. Their programmes and interventions have addressed the needs of many vulnerable groups, bridging gaps deepened by the war.

Both local and international civil society have successfully reshaped the global narrative of the war, shifting the focus from the perspectives of conflict parties to amplifying the voices of victims and shedding light on the humanitarian and human rights tragedy. They’ve actively advocated for the establishment of an international mechanism to investigate violations committed by all parties to the war. Human rights organisations have monitored and documented violations and advocated for criminal accountability.

Mwatana for Human Rights monitors and documents human rights violations in Yemen through extensive field investigative research aimed at gathering precise information, evidence and testimonies to establish the facts and the identities of victims and perpetrators. We also provide legal support to victims of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and torture.

We are currently documenting the plight of refugees and internally displaced people and the violations they’ve endured from various conflict parties. The challenges faced by hundreds of thousands of refugees in temporary shelters underline the critical need for peace efforts to prioritise the safe return of forcibly displaced people to their homes and communities.

Mwatana’s mission extends to raising awareness and fostering a culture supportive of human rights through positive engagement with the public on social media platforms. We are actively involved in constructive dialogue with influential stakeholders to address the human rights challenges in Yemen through local and international advocacy mechanisms.

How is Mwatana working to hold perpetrators accountable?

We have a specialised unit dedicated to seeking justice, reparations and accountability for victims of rights violations. The judicial system has structural, technical and integrity challenges, including corruption and inability to ensure fair trials. As a result, civilian victims have endured widespread impunity.

Even though Yemen isn’t a party to the Rome Statute and therefore falls outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Mwatana has been gathering evidence to ensure justice for all victims and accountability for all violators.

First, we conduct comprehensive research and organise workshops and meetings with legal experts, academic institutions and experienced entities to explore available avenues for holding perpetrators accountable, including through international and United Nations (UN) mechanisms and the limited investigative procedures initiated by the conflict parties.

Second, we collaborate with the international community to enhance accountability within international legal frameworks. Along with the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and other partners, Mwatana submitted a file to the ICC. Further, in collaboration with the ECCHR and the Italian Network for Peace and Disarmament, we filed a complaint with the Italian Prosecutor and the European Court of Human Rights. Additionally, in coordination with Amnesty International, the ECCHR and Sherpa, we submitted a file to the French prosecutor. We also filed a legal intervention in the administrative case brought by the Campaign Against Arms Trade before the British judiciary. There are ongoing efforts to build cases in other countries.

Third, we’ve actively engaged with UN mechanisms through the submission of shadow reports on Yemen and Saudi Arabia to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process and UN treaty bodies, namely the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee Against Torture. We also provide written and oral briefings to various UN Special Rapporteurs and special procedures mandate holders.

Finally, we undertake a range of actions to directly pressure violating parties and relevant bodies. We conduct workshops and discussions on accountability, reparations and truth-telling, drawing upon experiences from other countries. We have released a report on reparation mechanisms, and we plan to issue another in 2024 on viable criminal accountability options. These aim to establish informed foundations for future transitional justice in Yemen.

What should the international community do to address the crisis and support Yemeni civil society?

The international community’s response to the Yemen crisis has been weak and restricted due to conflicting interests with the involved parties, ranging from economic concerns and political alliances to arms trade deals. As a result, the conflict and numerous rights violations persist without any robust international action being taken. To address this, the international community must intensify efforts for a human-rights-secure settlement, enhancing the role of civil society and upholding the rule of law, justice and mechanisms for a transition to democracy.

This requires the allocation of larger resources for civil society programmes and expansion of CSOs’ activities to extend their sphere of influence. Increased financial support is also needed to build capacity and ensure the continuity of CSO operations. It’s crucial that substantial resources are invested to support the work of local civil society in the upcoming period so that we are able to contribute to peace efforts effectively.

Beyond financial aid, it’s important to endorse the work of Yemeni CSOs on the ground. The international community should exert pressure on all conflict parties to remove any impediments that hinder the efforts of CSOs, such as annual work permit barriers. Standing by civil society while it’s facing retaliation, defamation and smear campaigns for its work and stances is an essential part of expressing international solidarity.

Civic space in Yemen is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Mwatana through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @MwatanaEn and @RAlmutawakel on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with John Vlasto, Board Chair of the World Federalist Movement (WFM), about the deficits of the existing global governance system and civil society’s proposals for reform.

Founded in 1947, WFM is a non-profit, nonpartisan organisation seeking a just, free and peaceful world where humanity and nature flourish in harmony, through the creation of more effective, transparent and accountable global governance.

What are the biggest shortcomings of the existing system of global governance?

The main problem is that decisions are made in defence of the national interest rather than to serve the common good of humanity. This means we get the lowest-common denominator compromises rather than the profound changes that humanity needs.

The way decisions are currently made is absurd. Take the ongoing COP28 climate summit: it’s a circus, a clear symptom of dysfunctional global governance. We are driving the planetary ecosystem over a cliff because although it’s clearly in humanity’s best interest to reduce carbon emissions straight away, it’s in no nation’s interest to move to do so first.

Decision making is dysfunctional because of the nature of our global governance institutions. The United Nations (UN) is basically a congress of ambassadors tasked with defending each country’s national interest as perceived by their governments. The dynamic is of competition rather than collaboration, so you end up with the lowest-common denominator compromises.

How could this problem be tackled?

To tackle global challenges we need global governance. We are taking enormous risks with our planetary home – but we don’t have to. We know how to create a legitimate and accountable decision-making process that serves the common good – through carefully implemented democracy.

We could think of global governance as a well-functioning Europe – or a well-functioning USA, for that matter – extended to the global scale.

What the world is missing that Europe has is a parliament. There is a longstanding proposal for creating a parliamentary assembly at the UN. There’s a big difference between a parliament and a congress of ambassadors such as the UN General Assembly. As explained by Edmund Burke, a British philosopher and politician of the 18th century, a parliament isn’t a collection of ‘ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain’ – it is ‘a deliberative assembly… with one interest, that of the whole’.

In a federal system like the USA, Congress has two chambers, one representing the people and another representing the states. This is a model that could be followed on a global scale. For the USA it would make no sense to have only one chamber representing the states – but that’s what we currently have at the UN, with all nations, regardless of size, having one seat at the General Assembly, an organ that consequently has little real power.

As Carlos Romulo of the Philippines said after the 1945 San Francisco conference that established the UN, ‘as a spokesman for a small nation, I want to make it very plain that my nation ... would be very happy indeed to trade the fiction of equality in a powerless Assembly for the reality of a vote equal to our actual position in the world in an Assembly endowed with real power’.

If it followed the federal model, the UN would still have a General Assembly representing the interests of nations. But it would also have a parliamentary assembly, representing the people, making decisions to serve the common good of humanity.

I believe that ultimately representatives to such body should be elected on the basis of the ‘one person, one vote’ principle, but I don’t believe we should do that tomorrow. Right now, the principle ‘one nation, one vote’ means a range from one vote per 1.4 billion people to one vote per 12,000. If we were to establish a world parliament tomorrow we should use degressive proportionality, as does the European Parliament, which means that although more populous nations elect more representatives than smaller nations, smaller nations are allocated more seats than they would strictly receive in proportion to their population. This is an intermediate solution between one nation one vote and one person one vote.

Is there anything else that can be done?

We need profound changes, the most profound being a UN parliamentary body, but in the meantime, there’s a whole bunch of lower-hanging fruit. In particular, WFM has two projects that I would like to mention.

One of them is MEGA – Mobilising an Earth Governance Alliance, (or ‘Make Earth Great Again’!). MEGA is a coalition of civil society organisations that will be working in cooperation with like-minded states to strengthen existing environmental governance mechanisms and institutions and establish additional ones. It will be officially launched in January 2024 and will offer a forum for environmental organisations, experts, like-minded governments, legislators, campaigners and other stakeholders to engage, share information and strategies and support advocacy for better global environmental governance. It will produce a wide range of reports, proposals and campaigns – some managed by MEGA itself, others by partner organisations. MEGA as a whole provides a comprehensive solution to the environmental crises we face, and a basis for global governance more broadly.

MEGA is promoting the implementation of the recommendations of the Climate Governance Commission’s 2023 report. To that end, we will be mobilising ‘smart coalitions’ of state and non-state actors – a proven method for the reform of global governance, the International Criminal Court and the landmines ban treaty being cases in point. Countries least responsible for climate change and suffering the greatest impact are potential leading members of such coalitions.

Another WFM project, launched in October, is LAW not War. This doesn’t seek to change the institutions of global governance, but to make better use of the ones we already have. It proposes to enhance the jurisdiction and use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) so that international disputes can be resolved peacefully rather than through recourse to the threat or use of force.

Specifically, the objectives of the campaign are to increase the number of states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ; encourage more frequent use of the ICJ as a dispute resolution mechanism provided in international treaties; appeal to states to make use of ICJ jurisdiction through mutual agreement for specific disputes; support UN bodies to request ICJ advisory opinions on critical issues; and encourage states to adopt constitutional amendments or legislative measures to affirm the UN Charter’s prohibition of war and the obligation to resolve international disputes peacefully, including through recourse to the ICJ.

Do you think global governance would benefit from greater civil society access and participation?

The dysfunction of global governance is not fundamentally about civil society having poor access. That’s a symptom of the core dysfunction, which is about decision making and legitimacy. If there were a world parliament, by virtue of its role it would give a voice to civil society – not only to civil society but also to business, Indigenous peoples and everyone else. A system allowing greater access to more voices would be better informed, more representative and more legitimate. But the solution is not simply giving civil society more access, because what would be the point in giving civil society the most wonderful access to a broken system? But if you created a parliament, civil society access would follow.

What would it take for the reforms that you propose to materialise?

This decision making and legitimacy dysfunction goes back to the very origins of the current system when the winners of the Second World War gave themselves a veto. It may take a crisis as big as the one that originated the system to produce the profound reform it needs. As Milton Friedman noted, what’s done in a crisis depends on the plans that are lying around at the time, so part of WFM’s role is to write the plan and keep it alive in the minds of policy makers until the crisis occurs and the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.

Exactly what such a crisis will be is unknowable, but I don’t think we’ve had a catalyst anywhere near the scale necessary yet. It took the Second World War to produce the current system, and it could take a third to produce a new one – though of course, it might be too late for that if as a result of this crisis we have been incinerated. The big question then is whether there will be sufficient catalyst for change before we pass some catastrophic tipping point.

If one takes the view that catastrophe is inevitable, or on the other hand that everything will work out in the end, then there would be no point in advocating for better global governance. In my view it could go either way, so there remains a realistic path to a just, free and peaceful world, where humanity and nature flourish in harmony, and there is no better use of time than doing what one can to help steer humanity onto this path.

Get in touch with the World Federalist Movement through its website or Facebook page, and follow @worldfederalist on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks about the move to expel Afghan refugees from Pakistan with Habib Malik Orakzai, president of Pakistan International Human Rights Organization (PIHRO).

Founded in 1999, PIHRO is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to empower people to defend their rights, investigate rights abuses, fight discrimination and promote social justice and peace. It provides life-saving health, education and legal assistance and protection for refugees in Pakistan.

What’s the current situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan?

The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is uncertain. It’s been gradually increasing over time, reaching around four million, with 2.3 million officially registered. Many of them work as physical labourers on daily wages, although some enjoy financial success as prominent businesspeople. Public sentiment towards refugees is generally friendly and supportive.

The Pakistani government has established over 20 Afghan Citizen Card centres in 17 districts. However, Afghan refugees continue to face obstacles in legal registration, largely due to the fact that multiple stakeholders are involved in the procedure, including the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), provincial and federal authorities, and security agencies. Challenges include bureaucratic complexities, limited human and financial resources and an ever-growing number of refugees seeking protection. Political and security concerns further complicate the registration process. Afghan refugees could choose to go to other countries but often face stricter immigration laws elsewhere.

Why has the Pakistani government ordered the expulsion of Afghan refugees?

Initially, Pakistan hosted over three million Afghan refugees, but following the Taliban takeover in August 2021 there was a growing influx of new refugees who entered Pakistan both legally and illegally. Pakistan was already going through a financial crisis and the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers added to the economic challenges. Evidence obtained by security agencies over some Afghan refugees’ involvement in recent terrorist activities and street crimes led to the government’s decision to expel unregistered refugees.

This decision has begun to be implemented. The government has conducted search operations to identify undocumented refugees and send them to the recently built camps in main cities, from where they’re being deported to the nearest borders with Afghanistan. Forcibly returned people face numerous problems in Afghanistan, including food insecurity, lack of accommodation and health issues. Those expelled during the winter face particularly harsh condition when returning.

What is Pakistani civil society, including PIHRO, in response?

Civil society organisations, although playing a limited role, are involved in advocacy efforts to prevent forced returns. PIHRO has expressed concerns over the expulsion of Afghan refugees at various forums, engaged in discussions with policymakers and collaborated with international organisations to ensure refugee protection. We are closely observing the situation and engaging with sister organisations dedicated to helping Afghan refugees develop a joint strategy for refugee settlement.

PIHRO is a member of the Asia Pacific Refugees Rights Network, through which we advocate for non-refoulement, emphasising Pakistan’s responsibility to protect Afghan refugees on its territory and prevent their forced return to Afghanistan regardless of documentation status.

Rather than expelling undocumented refugees, the Pakistani government should develop strategies to provide people fleeing Afghanistan with reasonable and timely access to registration processes, allowing them to state their claim for international protection. The authorities must work toward regularising legal status and guaranteeing the human rights of Afghan asylum seekers.

What should the international community do to help address this crisis?

The international community should increase its support to Pakistan as the major host of Afghan refugees by providing adequate funding to guarantee that asylum seekers have access to education and healthcare and have their basic needs met. We also urge other governments to increase their refugee admissions from Pakistan through resettlement programmes and facilitate better access to legal routes to safety.

Despite repeated requests, we haven’t received sufficient international support, which is crucial to prevent further escalation of the crisis. Given the current winter conditions in Afghanistan, our immediate focus is on providing shelters and kits for winter. We call on the international community to address these pressing issues and urge the government of Pakistan to halt refugee expulsions at least temporarily and collaboratively devise a strategy in consultation with the authorities in Afghanistan and the UNHCR.

Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with PIHRO through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @PIHROrg on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Natalie Samarasinghe, Global Director for advocacy at the Open Society Foundations (OSF), about the need for global governance reform and the proposal for a civil society envoy within the United Nations (UN) system.

OSFs is the world’s largest private funder of independent groups working for justice, democratic governance and human rights. It bases its work on the principles of justice, equity and expression as defining characteristics of any truly open society.

What do you think are the biggest shortcomings of the current global governance system?

The most evident issue is its lack of effectiveness. While the global governance system is essential and is tasked with significant responsibilities, it is not delivering results. It’s dysfunctional and fails to respond to the biggest challenges we face – the existential climate emergency, the pandemic, the cost-of-living crisis and other major conflicts. The system is not dealing with these challenges – it’s not anticipating them nor preventing their escalation.

The global governance system is also dysfunctional in addressing lower-magnitude issues. We were used to seeing the UN Security Council struggle to deal with big conflicts in which one of the permanent members had a close interest. But now we are seeing the UN being kicked out from countries where there is no such interest. Decades-old peacekeeping operations are being questioned for having achieved too little. Debt is another good example of an area where we don’t seem to be able to get fair deals on the table.

This plays a significant role when it comes to legitimacy. We have a system that has baked-in inequalities. The quota system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the structure of the UN Security Council are obvious examples. These were initially accepted because there was a common understanding that, to an extent, they worked. This is no longer the case: these systems are not doing what they are supposed to do: keep big powers in check. And it’s an even bigger problem because they are still tasked with fulfilling essential functions that millions of people across the world depend on.

But there is no alternative global forum to replace the current system. While there are institutions such the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, we still heavily rely on the IMF and the World Bank for most of the development infrastructure and humanitarian needs. And when we are looking for verified information, such as updates on the situation in Israel and Palestine, we still place trust in UN sources.

Although the current global governance system is dysfunctional, we still depend on it in crucial ways. So one of the massive issues we face is how to create something new without tearing down the old, which we still need.

How could existing global governance institutions be made more effective?

Let’s take the International Labour Organization as an example. This organisation, which predates the UN system, employs a tripartite system in which workers, employers and the government are represented – what we would now call a multistakeholder system. This means the right people are brought to the table at the right time. It’s not just the decision-makers, but also those who will take care of implementation and the ones who will be affected by the decisions.

While decision-making processes that follow this system can sometimes be painfully slow, implementation picks up speed because the decision is clear and has ownership and legitimacy for all parties involved.

There are lots of examples of processes bringing people together in similar ways. The case of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, shows that these don’t need to be time-consuming. In this case it was quite fast thanks to a structure that, although representative, included a limited number of people.

It’s also interesting to explore complementary systems operating at multiple levels. Take, for instance, the global refugee system. Despite its limited ability to address the issue of climate refugees, there is no interest in introducing changes at a global level, for fear that opening it up to discussion can end up undermining it. But there is still the possibility of introducing innovations at the city and community levels, as shown in responses to the Ukraine crisis.

Effective leadership is also crucial. Peacekeeping and mediation were not included in the UN Charter but were developed over time in response to a need. We need visionary leaders with the flexibility to generate new ideas. As we confront challenges such as climate change, the success of major gatherings such as climate summits hinges on leaders who can bring innovation and vision to the table. UN reform is urgently needed, but without good leaders it will remain elusive.

How is OSF working to advance a more robust, effective and democratic global governance system?

OSF is the largest private funder of independent groups working for justice, democratic governance and human rights, and we are looking at how best to make our support count as new challenges meet existing ones. Earlier this year, we polled people across 30 countries – large, small, high-income, developing – and the results were both reassuring and alarming: people care about democracy and human rights. An overwhelming number of respondents were positive about the enduring value of these principles. But they aren’t seeing these values translate into results on the ground or in improvements in their daily lives, especially when it comes to economic and social rights.

In addition to working with those on the ground, OSF is able to take a step back and look at the bigger picture. We can bring people together across geographies, issues and sectors. This allows for cross-learning from various human rights spaces and tools, tackling problems from different angles and supporting innovative ideas. OSF can back those advocating for change as well as provide funds to support the change-makers.

A clear example of this approach was during the COVID-19 pandemic, when we advocated for developing countries not only to have access to vaccines but also to be able to produce them themselves, including support for the establishment of a vaccine manufacturing plant in Senegal.

OSF aims to translate its advocacy into tangible actions, leveraging its privileged position to make a unique contribution.

What initiatives is civil society advancing to reform global governance?

I would like to highlight the UNMute Civil Society initiative, which advocates for a civil society envoy or a civil society champion within the UN system.

The problem with civil society engagement is that it’s often seen through a very narrow prism of who’s in the room at a particular event, without a consistent, cross-cutting approach and outreach strategy to mainstream civil society participation.

A civil society envoy could perform a number of sorely needed tasks, such as identifying gaps, assessing best practices, enhancing accessibility and streamlining processes. At the moment, it’s challenging, especially for smaller civil society groups, to navigate the plethora of websites, forms, requirements and timelines that are all different depending on which part of the UN they want to engage with. Sometimes the rules differ from event to event. An envoy could help simplify all this, and also help ensure that engagement is meaningful, substantive and helpful to all involved.

Let’s clarify that the civil society envoy would not be someone who represents civil society, just like the Youth Envoy does not represent all young people, nor the head of UN Women represent all women. This is someone who represents the UN and its commitment to having civil society not just in the room, but on the ground, helping the UN to achieve its goals.

And here’s where we could get creative. The envoy could explore ways of engaging people with digital and non-digital approaches and explore civil society engagement with the UN and also the World Bank, regional banks and other regional institutions. The envoy could also track the allocation of funds, and draw attention to the extremely low levels of funding – such as development and climate funding – that goes to groups such as grassroots women’s organisations.

The role has enormous potential in terms of the change it could inspire. This is a hugely important effort, and I am really glad that CIVICUS and many other civil society organisations are pushing for it. I also know that there are plenty of supportive UN member states, even if people tend to think they are not. We’ve moved way beyond that. If you look at the UN75 Declaration or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is a clear recognition that civil society needs to be at the table, and the envoy offers a way to do it in a more coherent and effective way.

What benefits do you anticipate from greater civil society access and participation?

Civil society participation is essential. We are not going to get anywhere on anything if we do not have people, communities, social movements and organisations involved. They have a key role in shaping responses to issues such as COVID-19 and climate change. By including civil society in decision-making, decisions gain legitimacy because they are based on what those directly affected think is the best solution.

An example of how having civil society around the table has revolutionised our approach are cash transfers. Donors were against giving cash directly to people. They would rather give vouchers or support a project. But civil society showed them that when given cash, people would mostly make the right choices without the need for much of the infrastructure otherwise needed. Similarly, civil society has helped to advance accountability for human rights violations where UN processes have not been able to, through national-level work on targeted sanctions.

Civil society groups are on the frontlines of development, climate change and humanitarian crisis. They are valuable partners of the UN and could be equally valuable partners of the World Bank and IMF if they were allowed to.

It is often said that the UN does not have enough funds or capacity to get things done on the ground – but civil society is that capacity. Instead of designing a new set of SDGs, let’s have the UN transfer power, responsibility and funding to local groups that have the legitimacy and the ability to deliver what people on the ground need and want. This would be transformative.

And civil society also acts as a conscience to international organisations and multilateral institutions by reminding them what they stand for. As we look at the suffering of civilians – in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine, Sudan and elsewhere – it seems like we have forgotten why we have humanitarian and human rights laws. Despite grave risks, civil society acts without fear or favour, calling out violations wherever they occur. And we at Open Society are committed to do what we can to help.

Get in touch with the Open Society Foundations through their website or Facebook page, and follow @OpenSociety and @OpenNatalie on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Patricia Reyes, director of Fundación Multitudes, about the process to develop a new constitution in Chile since a previous draft was rejected in a referendum in September 2022.

Fundación Multitudes is a civil society organisation dedicated to generating spaces and building capacity for civil society to participate effectively in decision-making processes.

Why does Chile need a new constitution?

The constitution-making process in which Chile has been immersed since 2022 was a response to a longstanding social and political crisis that erupted in October 2019. Faced with the eruption of social demands for greater protection, equity and guarantees of basic social rights such as education, health and social security, which in some cases were expressed with unusual violence, all political sectors agreed to initiate a constitution-making process.

Initially, an inclusive process unfolded that produced a draft constitution that incorporated adequate standards of rights protection for a democratic and social state. But the proposal failed to win the support of the more conservative parts of society and was rejected in a referendum, largely because of mistakes made in the process. These were mainly due to the political inexperience of the members of the constituent commission, who were mostly independents with no links to political parties. They overlooked the need to reach broad agreements encompassing all parts of society, and particularly traditional political players. Other factors were the incorporation of some drastic changes in political institutions and the inability to communicate the benefits of the new constitutional text adequately to the public as a whole.

After the proposal was rejected, the social demands that had triggered the process were still there, and the existing constitution continued to be as ineffective in resolving them as it was when the social outburst occurred. To solve our problems of democratic coexistence, we need a new social pact that can unite us around a shared institutional project. That is why the constitution-making process was resumed, this time in a more traditional format, which has produced a new draft that will again have to be submitted to a popular vote.

How different is the new draft from the one that emerged from the 2021 Constitutional Convention?

The new draft is a lot more similar to the current constitution. It introduces more modest changes. Compared to the previous one, I think it rolls back some rights that had already been won, particularly for historically excluded groups such as women. Nor does it introduce recognition of other vulnerable population groups , such as Indigenous peoples and children and adolescents. But it does share with the previous draft the reaffirmation of freedom of enterprise and the concept of a subsidiary state.

The two processes have been quite different because in the first case the constituent body included many citizens elected by popular vote and independent of political parties, while the second involved a Council of Experts appointed by the two chambers of Congress and a Constitutional Council elected by popular vote but made up mostly of members proposed by political parties ranging from the centre to the far right.

However, there is one thing that the proposals resulting from both processes share: both have been considered partisan in nature, viewed as aligned with the interests of a specific political camp. They reflect the division of Chile rather than being an instrument for its union.

What changes would the new draft make to the existing constitution?

Overall, the text reproduces the current institutional framework, except for the fact that it reduces the number of members of parliament. It also enshrines the same rights as the current constitution. It shares many of its strengths but also suffers from many of the same weaknesses.

The draft contains several articles that have caused controversy because of the regressive way in which they could be interpreted. For example, in the area of reproductive rights, constitutional provisions could mean that the rule that currently allows abortion in cases of rape, danger to the life of the mother and non-viability of the foetus could be declared unconstitutional.

The incorporation of a special anti-corruption body could enter into conflicts of competence with the current Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Additionally, some populist tools would be introduced to allow the immediate expulsion of undocumented migrants, along with some tax exemptions – a matter that generally does not belong in a constitutional text – and a number of highly sensitive provisions, such as the possibility of allowing terminally ill convicts to serve their sentences at home, which could benefit people convicted of crimes against humanity committed during the period of dictatorship.

On the plus side, a Victims’ Ombudsman’s Office would be established and progress would be made on decentralisation, granting greater powers to local governments.

What’s the position of different groups towards the referendum to be held on the latest draft?

Most right-wing parties approve of the project, while those on the left reject it and those in the centre have a great diversity of opinions, with some campaigning for approval and others for rejection.

But the last word will be up to voters, who are going through what has been defined as a moment of constitutional exhaustion. Because of the lengthy and controversial process and the lack of cross-cutting agreements, there is a lot of apathy and indecision, as well as conflicting positions. Right now polls show a majority of people would reject the new constitution, but the vote is on 17 December, so there is still a long way to go, and there are many people who have not yet decided how they will vote.

Civic space in Chile is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Fundación Multitudes through its website or Facebook account, subscribe to its YouTube channel and follow @FMultitudes on Instagram and Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Andy Sumner about the prospects for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the underlying dysfunctions of the current global governance system.

Andy is Professor of International Development at King’s College London, president of the European Association of Development Research and Teaching Institutes and Senior Fellow of the United Nations (UN) University World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Why are the SDGs important?

The SDGs are a set of global objectives that are for all states to pursue collectively, as part of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. They provide a framing for developing policy and a basis for developing strategy by setting goals and targets on poverty, nutrition, education, health and many other aspects of human wellbeing and sustainability. They are the most comprehensive blueprint so far for eliminating global poverty, reducing inequality and protecting the planet.

The SDGs were agreed in 2015 and are to be achieved by 2030. They were approved by all states at the UN, which at least in principle gave them political legitimacy around the world. They are therefore a useful tool for civil society advocacy. They allow you to say to any government, ‘you said you would do this’, and chances are most governments will at least want to be seen to be trying and that means allocations of public spending and other public policies.

Of course, the SDGs have their critics too, because there are a lot of indicators and some of the targets aren’t well defined and not easily measured. Some also say it’s a very top-down agenda developed by governments rather than bubbling up from the grassroots. Nevertheless, it does provide a set of key indicators of development that have been embedded in UN global agreements from many years. And in principle, governments can be held accountable for at least making some attempt to meet the SDGs.

Are the SDGs going to be met on schedule?

The world is currently far behind on the SDGs, at least regarding a range of global poverty-related SDGs. In a recent UN University brief and working paper I published alongside three colleagues from the SDG Centre, Indonesia at Padjadjaran University, we made projections for the SDGs on extreme monetary poverty, undernutrition, stunting, child mortality, maternal mortality and access to clean water and basic sanitation. Our projections indicate that economic growth alone will not be sufficient to end global poverty, and the global poverty-related SDGs will not be met by a considerable distance.

Unfortunately, I think we are looking another lost decade for global development, not only due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit the SDGs hard, but also due to the enormous debt overhang from the pandemic and the price shocks that have come from the war in Ukraine.

Looking ahead, there is a strong case for urgent debt relief. There is a debt crisis underway, in the sense that across the global south, and particularly in many of the world’s poorest countries, social, health and education spending is being squeezed simply to pay debt servicing. So this is a crisis not for financial markets but a crisis for real people.

Much of the debt is owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, so they could do something about this. Of course, there’s also some debt owed to China and private capital markets, which is potentially more complicated. Still, the IMF and World Bank could be more proactive. There are signs already that the situation is being recognised, but not enough urgency as the worry is driven by concern over debt defaults rather than the ongoing austerity crisis.

Do you think failure to meet the SDGs is linked to structural flaws in the global governance system?

I think it is possible to link the catastrophic failure on the SDGs to a failing global governance system. The measures that would be needed to meet the SDGs, notably debt relief and expanded funding, would require a deep reform of the international financing architecture.

Right now, it doesn’t make any sense. The global south may receive official development assistance and other financial flows, but a substantial share kind of evaporates in that debt servicing is sent back to the north, notably via debt service to the IMF and World Bank. Then we can consider all the global south loses, in for example, profit shifting by global companies, illicit flows to and from tax havens, payments for intellectual property for use of technology and so forth. We do see major signs that climate change and exclusion from western vaccines may be among the issues leading to a new assertiveness by global south governments. Take for just one example the recent UN vote on a global convention on tax cooperation championed by the global south.

Urgent reform of the governance of IMF and World Bank is needed that would lead to a change in their strategies around, for example, austerity conditionalities. For example, most of the agreements that more than 100 governments signed with the IMF during the pandemic included a range of austerity measures. This is totally inappropriate, especially if the goal is to meet the SDGs.

A new financing deal is also needed to address loss and damage, not only in relation to climate change – for which a fund has already been agreed, although against the wishes of the global south, it is within the World Bank for now – but also in relation to colonialism and slavery, regarding which demands for reparations remain unaddressed.

How can civil society best advocate for the SDGs?

The SDGs are very often embedded in civil society campaigning because they offer a way to hold governments to account. They require that spending is redirected towards social spending, public education and public health and other priority sectors. As a result, they require that inequalities across income, education and health are addressed.

Civil society should advocate for radical policy changes, because these are the world’s only hope of meeting the SDGs. What is needed is urgent debt relief, which would release funds for social and productive investments across developing countries, and a new focus on redistribution with growth both at the global and national levels.

To change course, we need urgent policy action on two fronts.

First, a stronger focus on inclusive growth and productive capacities. Specifically, new international financing needs to be made available through debt relief or other forms of finance to expand fiscal space across countries of the global south to allow a stronger focus on SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth. This financing should seek the expansion rather than contraction of social and productive spending.

Second, that focus should entail redistribution alongside growth, through policies that build productive capacities, introduce, or expand income transfers to meet the extreme poverty target, and ensure sufficient public investment to meet the health, water and sanitation SDGs.

In short, today’s trajectory demands a forceful, seismic shift towards redistribution, both globally and nationally. This is the pathway to follow if the world is to have any hope of achieving poverty-related SDGs.

Get in touch with Andy through LinkedIn and follow @andypsumner on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.