CIVICUS speaks about the move to expel Afghan refugees from Pakistan with Habib Malik Orakzai, president of Pakistan International Human Rights Organization (PIHRO).

Founded in 1999, PIHRO is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to empower people to defend their rights, investigate rights abuses, fight discrimination and promote social justice and peace. It provides life-saving health, education and legal assistance and protection for refugees in Pakistan.

What’s the current situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan?

The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is uncertain. It’s been gradually increasing over time, reaching around four million, with 2.3 million officially registered. Many of them work as physical labourers on daily wages, although some enjoy financial success as prominent businesspeople. Public sentiment towards refugees is generally friendly and supportive.

The Pakistani government has established over 20 Afghan Citizen Card centres in 17 districts. However, Afghan refugees continue to face obstacles in legal registration, largely due to the fact that multiple stakeholders are involved in the procedure, including the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), provincial and federal authorities, and security agencies. Challenges include bureaucratic complexities, limited human and financial resources and an ever-growing number of refugees seeking protection. Political and security concerns further complicate the registration process. Afghan refugees could choose to go to other countries but often face stricter immigration laws elsewhere.

Why has the Pakistani government ordered the expulsion of Afghan refugees?

Initially, Pakistan hosted over three million Afghan refugees, but following the Taliban takeover in August 2021 there was a growing influx of new refugees who entered Pakistan both legally and illegally. Pakistan was already going through a financial crisis and the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers added to the economic challenges. Evidence obtained by security agencies over some Afghan refugees’ involvement in recent terrorist activities and street crimes led to the government’s decision to expel unregistered refugees.

This decision has begun to be implemented. The government has conducted search operations to identify undocumented refugees and send them to the recently built camps in main cities, from where they’re being deported to the nearest borders with Afghanistan. Forcibly returned people face numerous problems in Afghanistan, including food insecurity, lack of accommodation and health issues. Those expelled during the winter face particularly harsh condition when returning.

What is Pakistani civil society, including PIHRO, in response?

Civil society organisations, although playing a limited role, are involved in advocacy efforts to prevent forced returns. PIHRO has expressed concerns over the expulsion of Afghan refugees at various forums, engaged in discussions with policymakers and collaborated with international organisations to ensure refugee protection. We are closely observing the situation and engaging with sister organisations dedicated to helping Afghan refugees develop a joint strategy for refugee settlement.

PIHRO is a member of the Asia Pacific Refugees Rights Network, through which we advocate for non-refoulement, emphasising Pakistan’s responsibility to protect Afghan refugees on its territory and prevent their forced return to Afghanistan regardless of documentation status.

Rather than expelling undocumented refugees, the Pakistani government should develop strategies to provide people fleeing Afghanistan with reasonable and timely access to registration processes, allowing them to state their claim for international protection. The authorities must work toward regularising legal status and guaranteeing the human rights of Afghan asylum seekers.

What should the international community do to help address this crisis?

The international community should increase its support to Pakistan as the major host of Afghan refugees by providing adequate funding to guarantee that asylum seekers have access to education and healthcare and have their basic needs met. We also urge other governments to increase their refugee admissions from Pakistan through resettlement programmes and facilitate better access to legal routes to safety.

Despite repeated requests, we haven’t received sufficient international support, which is crucial to prevent further escalation of the crisis. Given the current winter conditions in Afghanistan, our immediate focus is on providing shelters and kits for winter. We call on the international community to address these pressing issues and urge the government of Pakistan to halt refugee expulsions at least temporarily and collaboratively devise a strategy in consultation with the authorities in Afghanistan and the UNHCR.

Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with PIHRO through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @PIHROrg on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Natalie Samarasinghe, Global Director for advocacy at the Open Society Foundations (OSF), about the need for global governance reform and the proposal for a civil society envoy within the United Nations (UN) system.

OSFs is the world’s largest private funder of independent groups working for justice, democratic governance and human rights. It bases its work on the principles of justice, equity and expression as defining characteristics of any truly open society.

What do you think are the biggest shortcomings of the current global governance system?

The most evident issue is its lack of effectiveness. While the global governance system is essential and is tasked with significant responsibilities, it is not delivering results. It’s dysfunctional and fails to respond to the biggest challenges we face – the existential climate emergency, the pandemic, the cost-of-living crisis and other major conflicts. The system is not dealing with these challenges – it’s not anticipating them nor preventing their escalation.

The global governance system is also dysfunctional in addressing lower-magnitude issues. We were used to seeing the UN Security Council struggle to deal with big conflicts in which one of the permanent members had a close interest. But now we are seeing the UN being kicked out from countries where there is no such interest. Decades-old peacekeeping operations are being questioned for having achieved too little. Debt is another good example of an area where we don’t seem to be able to get fair deals on the table.

This plays a significant role when it comes to legitimacy. We have a system that has baked-in inequalities. The quota system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the structure of the UN Security Council are obvious examples. These were initially accepted because there was a common understanding that, to an extent, they worked. This is no longer the case: these systems are not doing what they are supposed to do: keep big powers in check. And it’s an even bigger problem because they are still tasked with fulfilling essential functions that millions of people across the world depend on.

But there is no alternative global forum to replace the current system. While there are institutions such the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, we still heavily rely on the IMF and the World Bank for most of the development infrastructure and humanitarian needs. And when we are looking for verified information, such as updates on the situation in Israel and Palestine, we still place trust in UN sources.

Although the current global governance system is dysfunctional, we still depend on it in crucial ways. So one of the massive issues we face is how to create something new without tearing down the old, which we still need.

How could existing global governance institutions be made more effective?

Let’s take the International Labour Organization as an example. This organisation, which predates the UN system, employs a tripartite system in which workers, employers and the government are represented – what we would now call a multistakeholder system. This means the right people are brought to the table at the right time. It’s not just the decision-makers, but also those who will take care of implementation and the ones who will be affected by the decisions.

While decision-making processes that follow this system can sometimes be painfully slow, implementation picks up speed because the decision is clear and has ownership and legitimacy for all parties involved.

There are lots of examples of processes bringing people together in similar ways. The case of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, shows that these don’t need to be time-consuming. In this case it was quite fast thanks to a structure that, although representative, included a limited number of people.

It’s also interesting to explore complementary systems operating at multiple levels. Take, for instance, the global refugee system. Despite its limited ability to address the issue of climate refugees, there is no interest in introducing changes at a global level, for fear that opening it up to discussion can end up undermining it. But there is still the possibility of introducing innovations at the city and community levels, as shown in responses to the Ukraine crisis.

Effective leadership is also crucial. Peacekeeping and mediation were not included in the UN Charter but were developed over time in response to a need. We need visionary leaders with the flexibility to generate new ideas. As we confront challenges such as climate change, the success of major gatherings such as climate summits hinges on leaders who can bring innovation and vision to the table. UN reform is urgently needed, but without good leaders it will remain elusive.

How is OSF working to advance a more robust, effective and democratic global governance system?

OSF is the largest private funder of independent groups working for justice, democratic governance and human rights, and we are looking at how best to make our support count as new challenges meet existing ones. Earlier this year, we polled people across 30 countries – large, small, high-income, developing – and the results were both reassuring and alarming: people care about democracy and human rights. An overwhelming number of respondents were positive about the enduring value of these principles. But they aren’t seeing these values translate into results on the ground or in improvements in their daily lives, especially when it comes to economic and social rights.

In addition to working with those on the ground, OSF is able to take a step back and look at the bigger picture. We can bring people together across geographies, issues and sectors. This allows for cross-learning from various human rights spaces and tools, tackling problems from different angles and supporting innovative ideas. OSF can back those advocating for change as well as provide funds to support the change-makers.

A clear example of this approach was during the COVID-19 pandemic, when we advocated for developing countries not only to have access to vaccines but also to be able to produce them themselves, including support for the establishment of a vaccine manufacturing plant in Senegal.

OSF aims to translate its advocacy into tangible actions, leveraging its privileged position to make a unique contribution.

What initiatives is civil society advancing to reform global governance?

I would like to highlight the UNMute Civil Society initiative, which advocates for a civil society envoy or a civil society champion within the UN system.

The problem with civil society engagement is that it’s often seen through a very narrow prism of who’s in the room at a particular event, without a consistent, cross-cutting approach and outreach strategy to mainstream civil society participation.

A civil society envoy could perform a number of sorely needed tasks, such as identifying gaps, assessing best practices, enhancing accessibility and streamlining processes. At the moment, it’s challenging, especially for smaller civil society groups, to navigate the plethora of websites, forms, requirements and timelines that are all different depending on which part of the UN they want to engage with. Sometimes the rules differ from event to event. An envoy could help simplify all this, and also help ensure that engagement is meaningful, substantive and helpful to all involved.

Let’s clarify that the civil society envoy would not be someone who represents civil society, just like the Youth Envoy does not represent all young people, nor the head of UN Women represent all women. This is someone who represents the UN and its commitment to having civil society not just in the room, but on the ground, helping the UN to achieve its goals.

And here’s where we could get creative. The envoy could explore ways of engaging people with digital and non-digital approaches and explore civil society engagement with the UN and also the World Bank, regional banks and other regional institutions. The envoy could also track the allocation of funds, and draw attention to the extremely low levels of funding – such as development and climate funding – that goes to groups such as grassroots women’s organisations.

The role has enormous potential in terms of the change it could inspire. This is a hugely important effort, and I am really glad that CIVICUS and many other civil society organisations are pushing for it. I also know that there are plenty of supportive UN member states, even if people tend to think they are not. We’ve moved way beyond that. If you look at the UN75 Declaration or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is a clear recognition that civil society needs to be at the table, and the envoy offers a way to do it in a more coherent and effective way.

What benefits do you anticipate from greater civil society access and participation?

Civil society participation is essential. We are not going to get anywhere on anything if we do not have people, communities, social movements and organisations involved. They have a key role in shaping responses to issues such as COVID-19 and climate change. By including civil society in decision-making, decisions gain legitimacy because they are based on what those directly affected think is the best solution.

An example of how having civil society around the table has revolutionised our approach are cash transfers. Donors were against giving cash directly to people. They would rather give vouchers or support a project. But civil society showed them that when given cash, people would mostly make the right choices without the need for much of the infrastructure otherwise needed. Similarly, civil society has helped to advance accountability for human rights violations where UN processes have not been able to, through national-level work on targeted sanctions.

Civil society groups are on the frontlines of development, climate change and humanitarian crisis. They are valuable partners of the UN and could be equally valuable partners of the World Bank and IMF if they were allowed to.

It is often said that the UN does not have enough funds or capacity to get things done on the ground – but civil society is that capacity. Instead of designing a new set of SDGs, let’s have the UN transfer power, responsibility and funding to local groups that have the legitimacy and the ability to deliver what people on the ground need and want. This would be transformative.

And civil society also acts as a conscience to international organisations and multilateral institutions by reminding them what they stand for. As we look at the suffering of civilians – in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine, Sudan and elsewhere – it seems like we have forgotten why we have humanitarian and human rights laws. Despite grave risks, civil society acts without fear or favour, calling out violations wherever they occur. And we at Open Society are committed to do what we can to help.

Get in touch with the Open Society Foundations through their website or Facebook page, and follow @OpenSociety and @OpenNatalie on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Patricia Reyes, director of Fundación Multitudes, about the process to develop a new constitution in Chile since a previous draft was rejected in a referendum in September 2022.

Fundación Multitudes is a civil society organisation dedicated to generating spaces and building capacity for civil society to participate effectively in decision-making processes.

Why does Chile need a new constitution?

The constitution-making process in which Chile has been immersed since 2022 was a response to a longstanding social and political crisis that erupted in October 2019. Faced with the eruption of social demands for greater protection, equity and guarantees of basic social rights such as education, health and social security, which in some cases were expressed with unusual violence, all political sectors agreed to initiate a constitution-making process.

Initially, an inclusive process unfolded that produced a draft constitution that incorporated adequate standards of rights protection for a democratic and social state. But the proposal failed to win the support of the more conservative parts of society and was rejected in a referendum, largely because of mistakes made in the process. These were mainly due to the political inexperience of the members of the constituent commission, who were mostly independents with no links to political parties. They overlooked the need to reach broad agreements encompassing all parts of society, and particularly traditional political players. Other factors were the incorporation of some drastic changes in political institutions and the inability to communicate the benefits of the new constitutional text adequately to the public as a whole.

After the proposal was rejected, the social demands that had triggered the process were still there, and the existing constitution continued to be as ineffective in resolving them as it was when the social outburst occurred. To solve our problems of democratic coexistence, we need a new social pact that can unite us around a shared institutional project. That is why the constitution-making process was resumed, this time in a more traditional format, which has produced a new draft that will again have to be submitted to a popular vote.

How different is the new draft from the one that emerged from the 2021 Constitutional Convention?

The new draft is a lot more similar to the current constitution. It introduces more modest changes. Compared to the previous one, I think it rolls back some rights that had already been won, particularly for historically excluded groups such as women. Nor does it introduce recognition of other vulnerable population groups , such as Indigenous peoples and children and adolescents. But it does share with the previous draft the reaffirmation of freedom of enterprise and the concept of a subsidiary state.

The two processes have been quite different because in the first case the constituent body included many citizens elected by popular vote and independent of political parties, while the second involved a Council of Experts appointed by the two chambers of Congress and a Constitutional Council elected by popular vote but made up mostly of members proposed by political parties ranging from the centre to the far right.

However, there is one thing that the proposals resulting from both processes share: both have been considered partisan in nature, viewed as aligned with the interests of a specific political camp. They reflect the division of Chile rather than being an instrument for its union.

What changes would the new draft make to the existing constitution?

Overall, the text reproduces the current institutional framework, except for the fact that it reduces the number of members of parliament. It also enshrines the same rights as the current constitution. It shares many of its strengths but also suffers from many of the same weaknesses.

The draft contains several articles that have caused controversy because of the regressive way in which they could be interpreted. For example, in the area of reproductive rights, constitutional provisions could mean that the rule that currently allows abortion in cases of rape, danger to the life of the mother and non-viability of the foetus could be declared unconstitutional.

The incorporation of a special anti-corruption body could enter into conflicts of competence with the current Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Additionally, some populist tools would be introduced to allow the immediate expulsion of undocumented migrants, along with some tax exemptions – a matter that generally does not belong in a constitutional text – and a number of highly sensitive provisions, such as the possibility of allowing terminally ill convicts to serve their sentences at home, which could benefit people convicted of crimes against humanity committed during the period of dictatorship.

On the plus side, a Victims’ Ombudsman’s Office would be established and progress would be made on decentralisation, granting greater powers to local governments.

What’s the position of different groups towards the referendum to be held on the latest draft?

Most right-wing parties approve of the project, while those on the left reject it and those in the centre have a great diversity of opinions, with some campaigning for approval and others for rejection.

But the last word will be up to voters, who are going through what has been defined as a moment of constitutional exhaustion. Because of the lengthy and controversial process and the lack of cross-cutting agreements, there is a lot of apathy and indecision, as well as conflicting positions. Right now polls show a majority of people would reject the new constitution, but the vote is on 17 December, so there is still a long way to go, and there are many people who have not yet decided how they will vote.

Civic space in Chile is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Fundación Multitudes through its website or Facebook account, subscribe to its YouTube channel and follow @FMultitudes on Instagram and Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Andy Sumner about the prospects for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the underlying dysfunctions of the current global governance system.

Andy is Professor of International Development at King’s College London, president of the European Association of Development Research and Teaching Institutes and Senior Fellow of the United Nations (UN) University World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Why are the SDGs important?

The SDGs are a set of global objectives that are for all states to pursue collectively, as part of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. They provide a framing for developing policy and a basis for developing strategy by setting goals and targets on poverty, nutrition, education, health and many other aspects of human wellbeing and sustainability. They are the most comprehensive blueprint so far for eliminating global poverty, reducing inequality and protecting the planet.

The SDGs were agreed in 2015 and are to be achieved by 2030. They were approved by all states at the UN, which at least in principle gave them political legitimacy around the world. They are therefore a useful tool for civil society advocacy. They allow you to say to any government, ‘you said you would do this’, and chances are most governments will at least want to be seen to be trying and that means allocations of public spending and other public policies.

Of course, the SDGs have their critics too, because there are a lot of indicators and some of the targets aren’t well defined and not easily measured. Some also say it’s a very top-down agenda developed by governments rather than bubbling up from the grassroots. Nevertheless, it does provide a set of key indicators of development that have been embedded in UN global agreements from many years. And in principle, governments can be held accountable for at least making some attempt to meet the SDGs.

Are the SDGs going to be met on schedule?

The world is currently far behind on the SDGs, at least regarding a range of global poverty-related SDGs. In a recent UN University brief and working paper I published alongside three colleagues from the SDG Centre, Indonesia at Padjadjaran University, we made projections for the SDGs on extreme monetary poverty, undernutrition, stunting, child mortality, maternal mortality and access to clean water and basic sanitation. Our projections indicate that economic growth alone will not be sufficient to end global poverty, and the global poverty-related SDGs will not be met by a considerable distance.

Unfortunately, I think we are looking another lost decade for global development, not only due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit the SDGs hard, but also due to the enormous debt overhang from the pandemic and the price shocks that have come from the war in Ukraine.

Looking ahead, there is a strong case for urgent debt relief. There is a debt crisis underway, in the sense that across the global south, and particularly in many of the world’s poorest countries, social, health and education spending is being squeezed simply to pay debt servicing. So this is a crisis not for financial markets but a crisis for real people.

Much of the debt is owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, so they could do something about this. Of course, there’s also some debt owed to China and private capital markets, which is potentially more complicated. Still, the IMF and World Bank could be more proactive. There are signs already that the situation is being recognised, but not enough urgency as the worry is driven by concern over debt defaults rather than the ongoing austerity crisis.

Do you think failure to meet the SDGs is linked to structural flaws in the global governance system?

I think it is possible to link the catastrophic failure on the SDGs to a failing global governance system. The measures that would be needed to meet the SDGs, notably debt relief and expanded funding, would require a deep reform of the international financing architecture.

Right now, it doesn’t make any sense. The global south may receive official development assistance and other financial flows, but a substantial share kind of evaporates in that debt servicing is sent back to the north, notably via debt service to the IMF and World Bank. Then we can consider all the global south loses, in for example, profit shifting by global companies, illicit flows to and from tax havens, payments for intellectual property for use of technology and so forth. We do see major signs that climate change and exclusion from western vaccines may be among the issues leading to a new assertiveness by global south governments. Take for just one example the recent UN vote on a global convention on tax cooperation championed by the global south.

Urgent reform of the governance of IMF and World Bank is needed that would lead to a change in their strategies around, for example, austerity conditionalities. For example, most of the agreements that more than 100 governments signed with the IMF during the pandemic included a range of austerity measures. This is totally inappropriate, especially if the goal is to meet the SDGs.

A new financing deal is also needed to address loss and damage, not only in relation to climate change – for which a fund has already been agreed, although against the wishes of the global south, it is within the World Bank for now – but also in relation to colonialism and slavery, regarding which demands for reparations remain unaddressed.

How can civil society best advocate for the SDGs?

The SDGs are very often embedded in civil society campaigning because they offer a way to hold governments to account. They require that spending is redirected towards social spending, public education and public health and other priority sectors. As a result, they require that inequalities across income, education and health are addressed.

Civil society should advocate for radical policy changes, because these are the world’s only hope of meeting the SDGs. What is needed is urgent debt relief, which would release funds for social and productive investments across developing countries, and a new focus on redistribution with growth both at the global and national levels.

To change course, we need urgent policy action on two fronts.

First, a stronger focus on inclusive growth and productive capacities. Specifically, new international financing needs to be made available through debt relief or other forms of finance to expand fiscal space across countries of the global south to allow a stronger focus on SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth. This financing should seek the expansion rather than contraction of social and productive spending.

Second, that focus should entail redistribution alongside growth, through policies that build productive capacities, introduce, or expand income transfers to meet the extreme poverty target, and ensure sufficient public investment to meet the health, water and sanitation SDGs.

In short, today’s trajectory demands a forceful, seismic shift towards redistribution, both globally and nationally. This is the pathway to follow if the world is to have any hope of achieving poverty-related SDGs.

Get in touch with Andy through LinkedIn and follow @andypsumner on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

CIVICUS speaks with Lea Schlenker, board member of Operation Libero, about the rise of right-wing populism in Switzerland’s recent elections.

Founded in 2014, Operation Libero is a Swiss civil society organisation working to preserve and advance liberal democracy by campaigning against populist initiatives and advocating for an open, progressive and just society.

How concerning are the results of the 22 October Swiss federal election?

On 22 October, the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) came first, securing 62 out of 200 parliamentary seats, nine more than it previously had. The SVP is becoming increasingly extremist, and its election victory shouldn’t lead us to trivialise the racism and hatred they stoked during the campaign. We shouldn’t normalise the fact that they called queer people ‘sick’ and let far-right extremists manage their campaign accounts on social media. We shouldn’t endorse them by posing in photos at the Federal Palace with the leader of Switzerland’s largest party.

The outcome of this election leaves us deeply concerned about issues such as climate change and asylum policies and the treatment of refugees.

The trend of the rising far right is not exclusive to Switzerland – it is being observed globally. Right-wing parties instrumentalise legitimate citizen concerns, such as inflation or the ongoing war in Europe, to spread misinformation and target minorities. Under the guise of what they call a ‘culture war’, right-wing populists stoke unfounded fears of ‘cancel culture’ and ‘foreign infiltration’. This is very worrying. As a political movement that defends fundamental rights and combats right-wing populism from a liberal perspective, we believe our work is now more necessary than ever.

How did Operation Libero engage with the election?

We launched a campaign called ‘Du hast die Wahl’ (‘It’s your Choice’). Our goal was to persuade as many progressive people as possible to participate in the elections and stand up for their values by emphasising the importance of their voice. The SVP is attacking our liberal achievements, including the freedom of religion, the right to abortion, women’s bodily autonomy and equal rights. Some SVP members deny climate change, while others flirt with autocrats like Vladimir Putin. It is our mission to thwart these attacks on democratic values.

During the campaign, we distributed stickers and used billboards across Switzerland. The design incorporated a white background on the left side and a black background on the right side, symbolising a clear choice. The design, resembling voting ballots, visually reinforced the choice people faced in the election: equal rights or sexism, populism or democracy, isolation or openness, SVP or the future. We deliberately wrote ‘future’ in white lettering on a black background, sparking a lot of public debate and challenging either black or white stereotypes. Our campaign was funded exclusively by donations from members and supporters.

Another important element of our campaign was the petition ‘Wahlen ohne Hass’ (‘Elections without Hate’), which we ran in collaboration with the National Coalition Building Institute. We advocated for elections free from hate speech targeting any minority group. This petition was primarily a response to the racist and xenophobic rhetoric employed by right-wing populists during the campaign. The SVP manipulated police reports to refer to isolated incidents as widespread trends. The impact of our petition was further amplified by the Federal Commission against Racism, which described the SVP campaign as ‘racist, xenophobic, and inflammatory’.

On election day, we rented a truck and drove it to the capital, Bern. The truck displayed the message we wanted to convey to the public: that we reject the normalisation of the SVP’s discourse and its effect of shifting the whole political spectrum rightwards.

What can be done to prevent further advances of the Swiss far right?

Right-wing populists pose a true threat when other parties meet their demands, a trend already observed in countries such as Germany. It would be a great mistake for conservative parties to respond to the election results by aligning even more closely with the SVP. The SVP must be treated as a radical outsider so that it remains a minority – albeit a large one that received 28 per cent of the vote. Swiss liberals must distance themselves from the SVP, which often conceals its populist and extremist nature behind a conservative facade.

Non-extremist parties must urgently form a coalition for an open and progressive Switzerland even if they maintain fundamental differences on specific issues. To counter the SVP’s initiatives on immigration, downsizing public media and promoting ‘neutrality’, Switzerland requires a robust progressive coalition. This is feasible, despite the SVP’s electoral advances, if conservative parties refuse to become their allies.

With a mostly conservative and right-wing parliament, it will be challenging to implement progressive reforms for a more open and equal society. But we remain hopeful because there are numerous political activists and forces aligned with our democratic vision.

How does Operation Libero work to protect human rights and safeguard democracy?

Since its foundation in 2014, Operation Libero has been dedicated to defending liberal and inclusive democracy, advocating for equal rights and fostering European collaboration. We scale up our campaigning every time our liberal democracy or its underlying values come under attack, which unfortunately occurs with regularity.

Operation Libero was founded to stop right-wing populist advances but we have expanded our mission to actively shape the country through two current initiatives. Firstly, we are working to build a broad alliance to break deadlocks in relations between Switzerland and the European Union (EU) by promoting a popular initiative to embed the objectives of cooperation with the EU in the Swiss Federal Constitution. We want to have close ties with the unique peace and freedom project that is the EU. The Europe Initiative already has the support of 11 organisations.

And in May we started collecting signatures for the Democracy Initiative, which addresses a fundamental democratic challenge: the fact that Switzerland currently excludes from citizenship, and therefore from the political decision-making process, around a quarter of its permanent resident population. Including all these people as fellow citizens with equal political rights is essential for Switzerland to become a democracy worthy of the name.

Civic space in Switzerland is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Operation Libero through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @operationlibero on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Yanina Welp, researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, about the results of Argentina’s runoff presidential election, won by a far-right outsider.

How do you explain the victory of Javier Milei, an outsider with no party structure?

Milei’s victory, like that of any other candidate, cannot be explained by a single reason. There are at least three main explanations for his victory.

First, there’s the economic situation. On top of a high level of poverty – 40 per cent and growing – Argentina has very high inflation, and the economy hasn’t grown for many years. And the same goes for formal employment. There are a lot of informal workers and many people experience high levels of uncertainty.

Second is the inability of the political class to respond to these demands. Most recently, those in power have acted arrogantly. Insecurity, corruption scandals and the passivity of the authorities in the face of all these have increased. Milei’s leadership came to embody people’s rejection of the situation. Many people voted for him because he expresses well the rejection of recent administrations, and not necessarily because they approve of or adhere to the policies he has proposed to implement.

Third, there’s the role of political leadership, and specifically of the incumbent, for doing nothing in the face of this threat and even encouraging Milei’s candidacy with the aim of dividing the opposition’s vote and therefore having a better chance at winning. This was done first by Peronists, in the run-up to the first round, and by former president Mauricio Macri ahead of the runoff, which put his Together for Change coalition in crisis.

Do you think the electorate has leaned to the right?

Unlike almost all the other candidates, who only had vague and general proposals, Milei ran on a strongly ideological platform, which he kept putting forward throughout the campaign.

However, when analysing people’s attitudes, there are contradictions, first and foremost because there is no universal notion of what is supposed to be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’. For instance, polls show growing concern about rising insecurity, and it would be very elitist to think that having this concern makes you right-wing. The rise in crime shows that it is a real concern.

It is true that in this election campaign positive perceptions of the private sector have increased compared to perceptions of the public administration, possibly as a result of Milei’s discourse but also because the image of the state has deteriorated considerably under recent administrations. In this sense, it could be said that voters have indeed moved towards the right. But Milei’s victory with almost 56 per cent of the vote shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that more than half of the electorate have ideologically leaned rightwards, or even embraced the radical right, because many voted for him because he embodies the reaction to the status quo rather than because of his ideological proposals.

During the campaign it was argued that democracy was at stake. Is Argentina’s democracy in danger?

Democracy is not in imminent danger, as was the case with military coups, which wiped democracy away overnight. There are signs of democratic erosion – but these have been there for years. There has been both progress and setbacks, including attempts to co-opt the judiciary, the misuse of state resources and clientelistic practices.

Generally speaking, Argentina’s democratic institutions work. Despite the opposition’s complaints about the electoral system, the elections took place normally and the results were out very quickly.

However, we have seen a huge setback in terms of public debate. Intolerance and verbal violence have increased. Supporters of different parties can hardly talk to each other. There is a lot of aggression on social media. These are all medium-intensity warning signs that, if not addressed, will only pave the way for more violence and authoritarianism.

How will Argentina’s political scene change following this election?

Since 2003, with Néstor Kirchner’s election to the presidency, a system of two broad coalitions formed, which since 2007, under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, has been maintained by the introduction of open, simultaneous and compulsory primary elections. These served to avoid party fragmentation but had the negative effect of eroding programmatic or ideological differences. The two coalitions that formed as a result included their own right and left wings, blurring the ideological debate and replacing it with a divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism. This ended up encouraging affective polarisation with very watertight alignments where it is increasingly difficult to find common ground.

The fact that the presidential elections were won by a party that until a couple of years ago did not exist will force the two big coalitions of recent decades, the Peronist ruling party and the opposition Together for Change, to profoundly reconfigure themselves.

Within Peronism, former president and current vice-president Cristina Kirchner was the big loser of this election. In recent times she has been absent from the political scene, leaving Peronism without clear leadership. Peronism has strong roots in trade unions and social organisations that are highly dependent on the state. These organisations have incentives to negotiate, should the new government open up that space. However, Milei’s initial discourse has pointed in a completely different direction, insisting that he will take shock measures.

What are the main challenges the new government will face?

The new government should tackle three major challenges. The first is to stabilise the economy by stopping inflation and putting the exchange rate in order. The second is to introduce reforms to increase productivity and solve the crisis in formal employment. And the third is governance. Argentina has very strong social organisations, which has both positive and negative aspects, but in any case, it is a strongly organised society that is very predisposed to conflict.

These three challenges must be tackled in a coordinated and consistent way, which is quite difficult.

Do you think Milei’s government will be able to tackle them?

I have serious doubts that the new government will be able to meet these challenges, not only in the area of stabilisation and structural reforms, but also and above all in the area of governance. Many of the proposed measures, such as adopting the US dollar as the currency, could be found unconstitutional. Other measures require legislative majorities that the new government won’t have. Its only prospect of obtaining substantial legislative support was through Together for Change, but the division of the opposition coalition leaves Milei without even a congressional quorum.

Milei has not one provincial governorship and almost no mayorships. However, Argentina’s sub-national powerholders have always been accommodating and pragmatic. Still, some key measures would go directly against the interests of the provinces, such as the elimination of co-participation, the system through which the federal state distributes public resources from national taxes to the provinces. And then there is the potential confrontation with the province of Buenos Aires.

Milei could try to rule by decree, but this would cause an instant crisis, and in case of an impeachment trial the vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, would take over. This would not ensure any positive change but would rather imply some additional negative elements.

Milei was elected with a very large majority, so he has great popular legitimacy. But this majority could be inflated, as is often the case in runoffs, and is compounded by the volatility and impatience of a large part of Argentina’s electorate. If he succeeds in implementing his ultra-liberal programme, a global rarity, the social costs will be extremely high. And if he fails to do so, people’s disenchantment with politics could increase and their support for democracy could be called into question.

 Civic space in Argentina is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Yanina Welp via her website and follow @Welpita on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Milica Andric Rakic, project manager at New Social Initiative (NSI), about intensifying inter-ethnic violence and deteriorating civic space in Kosovo.

NSI is a civil society organisation (CSO) that seeks to empower non-majority communities to participate in Kosovo’s social and institutional life and increase trust among communities by helping people to deal with past events and promoting the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

What’s the current human rights and security situation in Kosovo?

The situation in Kosovo is highly volatile. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, but to this day Serbia doesn’t recognise Kosovo as an independent state and continues to claim it as an autonomous province of Serbia. The longstanding impasse in negotiations is straining inter-ethnic relations within Kosovo, between Kosovar Serbian and Albanian communities. Unlike past tensions that eventually subsided, the security situation has steadily worsened over the past two years.

Human rights are generally upheld in Kosovo, although rather selectively. For example, successive governments have refused to implement constitutional court decisions regarding the ownership of an Orthodox monastery’s extensive land and the establishment of an association of Serbian-majority municipalities, two longstanding demands of the Kosovo Serb community. There have been break-ins at Orthodox churches and police arrests of Kosovar Serbs without a prosecutor’s order. While the overall human rights situation isn’t bad, there are specific areas where the government fails to respect the law and court orders.

What was the significance of violence in Banjska on 24 September?

The attack occurred in the context of increased tensions in north Kosovo, which included the resignations of thousands of Kosovar Serbs working in the public sector, including the mayors of four municipalities. On 24 September 2023, Serb militants carried out an attack against the Kosovo police in the village of Banjska, in north Kosovo.

North Kosovo’s population is 90 per cent Serbian but its police force is mainly Albanian, which leads to a level of mistrust and tensions that pose a threat of violence. Those involved in the attack had a secessionist political agenda. While secession isn’t an imminent threat, it’s definitely a motivating factor, and many on-the-ground processes have had a disintegrative effect.

What role is civil society playing in normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo?

It seems that civil society has been the only healthy player in Serbian-Albanian relations. It has played a crucial role in maintaining communication in difficult times. We’ve acted as mediators between the international community and Kosovar and Serbian governments, trying to understand the perspectives of all sides.

From 2011 to 2017, effective dialogue and integrative processes were underway, albeit with slow implementation and numerous challenges. The European Union (EU) played a special facilitating role in the negotiations, motivating both sides through the promise of potential EU membership.

But now the only trend we are witnessing is towards disintegration. The lack of proper dialogue over the past two years indicates a need for a political change on at least one side to move the process forward.

How is NSI working towards peacebuilding in Kosovo?

As an umbrella organisation, we engage Kosovars in inter-community dialogue through various projects. One initiative promotes reconciliation by creating connections and fostering cooperation among young Kosovar Serbs and Albanians. As there are limited organic opportunities for them to meet, the responsibility for creating personal inter-ethnic ties lies largely on the shoulders of local CSOs. If a Kosovar Serbian and an Albanian know each other, there’s an 80 per cent probability that they’ve met at a civil society activity.

Another programme focuses on multiculturalism and bilingualism. Albanian and Serbian are both official languages in Kosovo, and our goal is to increase social acceptance and promote the learning of both. For almost 40 years we haven’t been taught each other’s language in school, which has led to a significant linguistic gap. It should be noted that Albanian and Serbian are very different languages and can both be challenging to learn.

We have a transitional justice programme, where we collaborate with associations that represent various categories of war victims, including families of missing people and internally displaced people. This regional project involves Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. We support these associations to expand their work from truth-seeking to regional reconciliation, simultaneously enhancing their financial sustainability by securing funding for new projects. We have also participated and proposed policies in the Ministry of Justice’s working group to draft a national strategy for transitional justice.

Moreover, we’ve organised diverse artistic activities, including a joint photo exhibition, ‘All Our Tears’, in which photographers captured images of war victims in Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia. The exhibition was showcased in cities including Kosovo’s capital Prishtina, Serbia’s capital Belgrade and at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Additionally, we have supported regional theatre projects that raise transitional justice issues through performance.

What challenges do you face in doing your work, and what further support do you need?

There has been a significant narrowing of civic space in Kosovo, marked by delegitimising campaigns targeting CSOs, political opponents and critics of the government, mainly through online harassment. Our organisation, along with some staff, has faced such attacks.

Engaging with the government on policy matters has been challenging, as our recommendations regarding the Kosovar Serb community are often ignored or poorly implemented. It’s evident that the government’s outreach to the Kosovar Serb community is influenced more by international pressure than a genuine willingness to engage. The contacts we maintain with government representatives are often facilitated by outside parties, either from embassies or European think tanks that hold roundtable discussions where we can directly discuss issues of the local Serb community with the government.

Kosovar civil society has sufficient funding opportunities. What we really need is support to maintain our relevance, especially when governments attempt to exclude CSOs from political decision-making processes. Whenever there’s an attempt to narrow civic space, the international community should demonstrate that it’s willing to support local CSOs, signalling their importance and thereby putting pressure on the government to take them into consideration.

Civic space in Kosovo is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with New Social Initiative through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @NSIMitrovica and @AndricRakic on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about snap elections taking place in the Netherlands on 22 November with Niels Hoogerheijde, Policy Advisor at Partos, the Dutch membership body for civil society organisations (CSOs) working in international development.

CIVICUS speaks with Iranian activist Asal Abasian about the situation more than a year since the start of the protest wave triggered by Mahsa Amini’s killing by the morality police and the prospects for change in Iran.

Asal is a journalist and queer feminist activist. After receiving threats, she fled Iran in 2021. She first stayed in Turkey, where she freelanced with various foreign-based Persian media outlets and Turkish media. She’s currently based in Paris, France.

What’s the situation in Iran since the start of the protests triggered by Mahsa Amini’s death?

More than a year after the start of the biggest protest wave we have seen since the Islamic Republic was established in 1979, it is clear that most people don’t support the regime anymore and want it gone.

But the protests have been crushed by the implacable repression of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and many people are tired of fighting.

The anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death and the eruption of the protest movement was a key moment. The regime expected protests to reignite and took every precaution to prevent them. Every living being who was seen as possibly causing any trouble was thrown into jail and repression escalated to a point that many people decided it was pointless to keep fighting.

In spite of this, civil society has continued resisting in any way possible. Underground organising and online struggles are ongoing – and activists continue paying the price. Many remain in prison – including Narges Mohammadi of the Defenders of Human Rights Center, a 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

CIVICUS speaks with Geetartha Pathak, president of the Indian Journalists Union (IJU), about the increasing violation of press freedoms in India.

Founded in 1990, the IJU is a leading federation of journalists and associations working to foster free, frank and fearless journalism in India, protect journalists’ rights and personal safety and uphold the public’s right to information.

What are the current conditions for Indian media and journalists?

People who criticise the government, the leaders of the ruling party or their impractical policies are targeted by the ruling class. Indian media and journalists are under tremendous pressure from the government. They face false accusations of sedition, abetting terrorism, corruption and fostering animosity between religious groups in retaliation for their critical coverage of government policies and work. Journalists from media outlets such as Altnews, Newsclick, Scroll and The Wire are particularly vulnerable to these attacks.

Why are the authorities targeting critical media and journalists, and what tactics are they using against them?

Journalists, particularly those from independent media outlets, have criticised the government for adopting communal approaches and reminded the authorities of their constitutional obligation to follow secular policies. Independent media have extensively covered the government’s failures in handling the COVID-19 pandemic, criticised the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act for being discriminatory and opposed recent amendments to the 2021 IT Rules that target online content considered ‘fake’ as a tool to criminalise dissent.

Journalists who do not compromise with the government and expose corruption in high places, hobnobbing by the ruling classes with a handful of corporate honchos and illegal business deals face all sorts of threats, including death threats.

The regime’s typical approach to pressure journalists involves threats, online trolling, criminalisation based on the 1978 Public Safety Act that allows arrests grounded on the alleged need to avert potential harm to ‘state security or public order’, summons of journalists by police and security forces, physical attacks and sometimes attempted murder. The situation is worsening by the day, with an increasing number of journalists being arrested, subjected to raids by police and other law enforcement agencies and facing lawsuits.

There is rampant seizure of personal laptops, phones and other tools from journalists without judicial authorisation and in violation of Supreme Court’s verdicts. Another tactic being used to put pressure on independent journalists is legal harassment through the filing of multiple court cases.

How have journalists and civil society organised in response?

Journalists are responding with mixed reactions. Despite the pressure, some continue their critical coverage, while others have toned down their voices and resorted to self-censorship. Some have surrendered under pressure and quit doing their work.

But this repression has also impacted on the popularity of the ruling party. Academics, social workers, activists and democratic-minded people have broadly criticised the government for curtailing media freedoms. Journalists’ unions and professional bodies have condemned attacks on journalists and the curtailment of press freedoms. They campaign on digital platforms and social media against restrictions on media freedoms, arrests of and attacks on journalists and media workers, internet trolling and legal harassment. They have staged protests in various parts of India.

What international support are Indian media and journalists receiving?

IJU is an affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists and consistently collaborates with journalists’ organisations from different countries. Many international journalists and human rights groups have expressed their solidarity with us, inspiring Indian journalists to further confront the challenges. The issue of the government squeezing the media is also raised in different forums of the United Nations. The Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders and other international civil society organisations have also monitored and denounced declining media freedoms in India.

Civic space in India is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the IJU through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @iju_india on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about Serbia’s upcoming parliamentary elections and civic space conditions with Vukosava Crnjanski, founder and director of the Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA).

Founded in 2002, CRTA is a Serbian civil society organisation (CSO) working to promote civic activism and develop a democratic culture through advocacy, civic education campaigns, electoral observation and the production of public policy proposals.

What are the conditions for civil society in Serbia?

The quality of civic space is worsening. In essence, the government is allergic to pluralism and keeps discrediting dissenting voices. Serbian CSOs face great pressure from pro-government media, particularly popular newspapers, which brand them as ‘mercenaries’ and ‘traitors’.

On top of this chronic situation, the situation has at times greatly escalated. In acute phases, the oppression of civil society intensifies because the government seeks to divert public attention from pressing issues that it wants to conceal. For instance, in the summer of 2020 the Ministry of Finance initiated a campaign against several CSOs, independent journalists’ associations and activists. Harassment took the form of financial scrutiny, imposed under unfounded allegations of their involvement in money laundering and connections with terrorism. A year later, the targeted people and organisations asked that the ministry disclose the results of this inquiry to dispel those accusations – but of course, the results were never made public.

What prompted the decision to call early elections?

President Aleksandar Vučić has called early parliamentary elections, to be held on 17 December. He attempted to present this as a response to the opposition’s call for snap elections, a demand that arose when none of the requests of protests held under the motto ‘Serbia Against the Violence‘ were addressed. This movement has been going on for months throughout the country, following two mass shootings in early May that left 17 people dead and 21 injured.

Vučić thrives in the campaigning phase of politics and in a political environment in which the normal functioning of institutions remains on hold. This has often happened following elections: in the past 11 years, a total of two years, four months and four days have been wasted between calls for elections and the approval of new governments. The president systematically benefits from situations of instability in which he is perceived as the sole stabilising factor.

What are the main campaign issues?

The ruling party’s key campaign message is that ‘Serbia Must Not Stop’, implying that any change would halt the country’s development. For over a decade, Vučić’s propaganda has pushed a narrative of Serbia’s alleged economic growth. It’s supported by an enormous media machinery that uses manipulative tactics and constantly calls Serbia ‘the Balkans’ tiger’, repeatedly mentioning ‘new jobs’, ‘foreign investments’ and having the ‘biggest’ infrastructure projects. This blurs the vision of some people, although most can definitely see the emptiness of their wallets.

The pro-European opposition aims to articulate the rejection of structural violence into an electoral agenda, pledging to free the state from the dominance of a single party. Meanwhile, right-wing nationalist parties commit to ‘save Kosovo’ and strengthen ties with Russia. The new slogan of the Serbian Radical Party, of which Vučić was a prominent official in the 1990s, is ‘Our Fatherland Is Serbia, Our Mother Is Russia’.

Relations with Kosovo and the imposition of sanctions on Russia stand out as critical issues and their significance is likely to grow. Yet there’s no substantive debate on these matters, which is confusing. The government tries to monopolise these topics, strictly controlling their discussion in the public sphere and labelling anyone else raising them as traitors. It aims to keep these matters opaque to the public, treating them as exclusive realms of backroom politics.

I assume that the ideologically diverse pro-European opposition will try to avoid these topics out of fear that discussing them will make them an easy target. This decision may also be influenced by opinion polls that indicate that voters are a lot more interested in other topics, namely the economy and corruption.

How is Serbian civil society, including CRTA, involved in the electoral process?

As usual, CRTA is actively engaged in the electoral process. Our observation mission is already active across Serbia, monitoring media reporting and campaign activities on the ground and reviewing the work of the electoral institution. We are paying special attention to the problem of pressure on voters. As research we have been conducting for over a year now shows, a large number of people are captured in a network of clientelism and electoral corruption. People from socially vulnerable groups and public sector employees are continuously pressured to give their support to a political party. 

In addition to monitoring the snap parliamentary elections, we are also observing the municipal elections in the capital, Belgrade.

The quality of Serbian electoral processes has been deteriorating for years and there is little reason to believe that issues such as biased media, the abuse of public resources and the misuse of public office will magically disappear. However, we are actively working to motivate citizens to vote, and many other CSOs are also about to launch their ‘Get Out the Vote’ campaigns. Whatever problems the electoral process has, increased participation will make things better.

We hope that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will deploy an election observation mission in a full capacity, as recommended by a prior needs assessment mission. This kind of international support is crucial not only on election day but also to boost our advocacy to achieve improvements in the electoral process.

Civic space in Serbia is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CRTA through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @CRTArs and Vukosava Crnjanski on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Rafael Uzcátegui, general coordinator of the Venezuelan Programme for Human Rights Education Action (Provea), about the results of recent opposition primaries ahead of the 2024 elections.

Provea is a Venezuelan civil society organisation dedicated to raising awareness among the most vulnerable groups in society about their rights and providing legal support to victims of human rights violations.

What is the opposition’s strategy for the 2024 elections?

The opposition’s strategy is to promote a joint candidacy, supported by the majority of the opposition, to face President Nicolás Maduro in the upcoming elections. This is an easy thing to say, but in the current conditions it is a big challenge. After the defeat of the strategy of exerting as much pressure as possible, which climaxed with protests in 2017 and Juan Guaidó’s so-called interim presidency in early 2019, tensions and misgivings ensued and the opposition fragmented. People lost confidence in its leadership. According to opinion polls conducted towards the end of the pandemic, Guaidó was rejected as much as was Maduro. More than 80 per cent of people did not want either of them.

In other words, there has been a crisis of representation affecting both the government and the opposition. A new strategy had to be adopted, but this was not sufficiently explained to the public. Nor was there a public assessment of the mistakes made by the traditional opposition leadership, so that distrust and resignation increased among the public. The feeling that there was nothing that could be done was so great that analysts and political leaders alike stated that hopes should be placed not on the 2024 elections but on those to be held in 2030.

But in the space of a year things have changed. The opposition primary elections have served to legitimise a joint candidacy through popular consultation. At first they seemed like a mere bureaucratic formality, but as the date approached, the primaries became a political event that exceeded the expectations of the organisers. Despite being held under conditions of absolute censorship, with physical attacks on candidates at their campaign events, with limited resources and under veiled or explicit threats from the authorities to dissuade people from participating, more than two million people voted.

This showed that there is a great need for change and restored democratic society’s confidence that change is possible. It confirmed that the strategy should be focused on elections and created a bottom-up consensus not only on a potential unitary candidacy but also on a new opposition leadership.

The return to democracy requires two key elements: the construction of agreements among the opposition and the recovery of citizens’ confidence in democratic leadership. The opposition primaries were an important first step. If it can take further steps in the same direction, the opposition could once again become a credible threat to the authoritarian regime.

How has the government reacted to the opposition primaries?

The government underestimated the effects of the primaries: it thought that censorship, disinformation and harassment would dissuade people from participating, so the high turnout was the first big surprise. It was clear that many people still thought of voting as a safe mechanism for expressing their opinions. The second surprise was the overwhelming support received by candidate María Corina Machado across all geographies and among all social groups that voted.

Machado had been criticised on the grounds that her discourse only resonated with middle class and affluent groups, but the support she received reflects a widespread aspiration for a better life. Machado even won support from the ruling party’s most loyal constituencies, which partly explained its desperate response, which has been to try to annul the primaries through the courts.

The Supreme Court of Justice – characterised by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a mechanism set up by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, as part of a machinery for persecuting dissent – has ruled to ‘suspend’ the effects of the primaries on the grounds that fraud was committed.

At the same time, in an attempt to recover the initiative, the government has tried to exacerbate nationalist sentiment by activating its dispute over the territory of Essequiba Guiana, claimed by Venezuela but under Guyanese control, and has called for a consultative referendum on the issue on 3 December.

Will Machado be able to run in 2024, or will the government seek to disqualify her candidacy?

It will be a major challenge to ensure that Machado’s candidacy is enabled and the other recommendations of the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission for elections with democratic guarantees are complied with. This is the time to fight against the authorities’ tactic of disqualifying any political leader popular enough to win key positions through elections.

The existence of conditions for the exercise of the rights of assembly and participation will depend on several factors operating simultaneously: the strengthening of the democratic camp, government-opposition dialogue, the recovery of citizen confidence and pressure from the international community.

The road towards 2024 will be long. If Machado ends up being disqualified, the opposition should establish a consensus mechanism, in which she should play an important role. It must be clear at all times that the strategy for a democratic transition necessarily involves elections.

What are the chances of achieving a democratic transfer of power?

The principle of democratic alternation is completely alien to Chavismo, the ruling movement founded by Hugo Chávez. It came to power to stay in power forever and views its ‘revolutionary’ conception of the world to be the only truth and an inescapable way to improve people’s living conditions. As in Cuba and Nicaragua, the government is forced to hold elections, even if these are no more than a simulation, for a number of reasons, not least of which is the need to gain a certain degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. There is only a fine line between simulation and farce, so elections must be organised in such a way that makes them appear genuine.

One positive factor is that Venezuela is currently under investigation by the International Criminal Court and under the scrutiny of mechanisms such as the Independent International Mission. This scrutiny is a deterrent to open and widespread repression. These are cracks that the democratic camp can exploit to ensure greater democratic guarantees in the upcoming elections.

In the coming months we will witness a tug of war between government and opposition. One negative message we are receiving from various international voices is that the 2024 elections, regardless of how they are organised, will be a milestone for normalising relations with Venezuela. I think Maduro is unwilling to organise an election that he might lose, so he will go to great lengths to divide and discourage the opposition vote.

Overcoming these hurdles will require that synergy is maintained between a cohesive political leadership, a citizenry highly motivated to participate and pressure from the international community, especially from progressive forces in the region, to prevent the more radical sectors of Chavismo and the armed forces hindering a potential transition. It is important to ensure that the more democratic sectors of Chavismo are given guarantees so that they can find a place for themselves in the transition. Ultimately, it is a question of establishing the right incentives so the costs of leaving are lower than those of remaining in power by any means.

How is civil society working to ensure the transparency and competitiveness of the electoral process?

Human rights organisations have endorsed the seven key recommendations of the EU Election Observation Mission report: strengthening the separation of powers, abolishing disqualifications, conducting a public education campaign on voting, imposing sanctions for electoral misconduct, enabling balanced media coverage, repealing the so-called ‘hate law’ to prevent self-censorship and allow for freedom of expression, and introducing a combination of incentives and sanctions to have trained and accredited polling station authorities on election day.

Civil society organisations specialising in electoral rights are leading all advocacy actions in this regard, with other organisations supporting them. On 17 October, the government and the opposition signed the ‘Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All’, known as the Barbados Agreement.

The government is supposed to honour this agreement. However, it has already shown it has no intention to do so. By initiating legal proceedings against the primaries, it has breached the first point of the agreement, which states that each political sector is free to select its candidate for the elections.

What should the international community do to help Venezuela have free and competitive elections in 2024?

There is no way to achieve a transition to democracy in Venezuela without the accompaniment and pressure of the international community. For now, the USA has taken the lead by encouraging the Barbados Agreement and establishing a mechanism for lifting economic sanctions.

However, sanctions against human rights violators and the embargo on arms sales should be retained. International initiatives to monitor and protect human rights in Venezuela must also remain active. The government is operating to prevent the extension of the mandate of the Independent International Mission, which is due to be decided by the UN Human Rights Council in 2024. This is the most important available mechanism for uncovering the facts, and its work complements that of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Finally, it is key for progressive governments in Latin America, such as those of Brazil, Chile and Colombia, to issue public and private messages to the Venezuelan authorities so that they agree to hold elections with democratic guarantees.

Civic space in Venezuela is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Provea through its website or Facebook account, subscribe to its YouTube channel and follow @proveaong on Instagram and @_Provea and @fanzinero on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Alfredo Okenve, president of the Centre for Studies and Initiatives for the Development of Equatorial Guinea (CEIDGE), about the political context in which civil society operates in Equatorial Guinea.

CEIDGE is an independent civil society organisation that has advocated for the protection of human rights in Equatorial Guinea since 1997.

Is there any space for civil society in Equatorial Guinea?

There is no space for civil society. However, in addition to working to provide care for vulnerable people and promote community development, civil society activism strives to open civic space, promote human rights and create citizen networks for protection and education.

We don’t do it because we want to be martyrs or to please anyone. We do it because this is our country, we want it to be a better place and this is the only way to bring about change. We do it under very difficult conditions, at great personal, family and professional cost. Activists in Equatorial Guinea are real heroes and they need all kinds of support – technical, technological, financial and political.

How has Teodoro Obiang Nguema managed to become the world’s longest-serving dictator?

Obiang has been president of Equatorial Guinea for 44 years. He is now an old man, weak and with diminished capacities. He is someone who has been very lucky. He is of very humble origins, the son of a Gabonese immigrant, and lost his mother at an early age. Thanks to the aid he received, especially from the Catholic Church, he was able to study and became a military officer. But despite all the power he later accumulated, he never overcame the complexes caused by his origins and his mediocre education. This has greatly affected the exercise of his roles.

Macías Nguema, the first president of Equatorial Guinea after independence in 1968, was from the same family and administrative clan. As a result, Obiang became a key player in the army and the repressive apparatus. In 1979 he overthrew the president in a coup and has remained in power ever since.

Obiang received his military training in Franco’s Spain. From the conception of power he absorbed there he became an Afro-fascist autocrat. He has been a mediocre professional and an incompetent ruler: he has been unable to make things work in a small country with enormous natural resources and a very undemanding population.

To stay in power, he has been helped, first of all, by the historical past. Equatorial Guinea has known no freedoms. Its people have never been treated as citizens and have never considered themselves as such. They are ignorant of the basics of how a state functions and have no civic culture.

He has also instrumentalised violence to dominate through fear and mistrust. He has used repression, with no limits and with total impunity, subjecting critics to torture, trumped-up charges, arbitrary trials and long prison sentences. The fear he instils in people has a real basis. There is no legal security and no conditions for a free press to function.

The regime’s omnipotent control is facilitated by the small size of the country and the quantity of economic resources at its disposal. In recent decades, Obiang and his entourage have appropriated hydrocarbon revenues while condemning the majority of the population to social and economic exclusion. The system is set up in such a way that people’s ability to ensure their economic, social and political survival depends largely on Obiang’s blessing.

What role does ethnicity play in Obiang’s rule?

Equatorial Guinea is a multi-ethnic country with a very uneven ethnic distribution of the population. The majority ethic group, the Fang, accounts for more than 80 per cent of the population, while the Bubis constitute about 12 to 13 per cent and the other four ethnic groups – Annoboneses, Bissiós Fernandinos and Ndowés – make up only five to six per cent.

The Obiang family belongs to the Fang ethnic group, and although the ethnic component is important, power is not exercised on an ethnic basis but rather on a clan and territorial basis. A family clan and a district clan from the district of origin of the former and current president have concentrated power for more than five decades. More than three decades ago, a third power base was established: the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) led by Obiang. While the country does not have a one-party system enshrined in its constitution, the PDGE functions as a quasi-single party.

The exercise of power on the basis of control requires Obiang to have instruments of repression and co-optation in all corners of the country and in all ethnic groups. Through the distribution of privileges, Obiang has secured trusted people and enforcement arms in Equatorial Guinea’s six ethnic groups. In each territorial district, he has created a commission to monitor political allegiance.

What do you think will be the effects of the entry of Teodoro Obiang’s son into politics?

In 2012 the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea was reformed to introduce a new role of vice-president. Obiang appointed his son, Teodoro Nguema Obiang, to this post, revealing his intention to perpetuate the clannish, dictatorial and kleptocratic regime.

For years the vice-president has shared power with his parents. He is a person who has limitations of all kinds: intellectual, professional, human, emotional and ethical. He is not a person with whom dialogue is possible, nor is he a person who understands power as emanating from popular sovereignty. If anything, since his rise to power the number of political prisoners, disappearances and deaths and the level of citizen insecurity have grown. Public administration is out of control, economic activity is virtually non-existent, and there are serious problems of unemployment and food insecurity.

What should the international community do to promote a transition to democracy in Equatorial Guinea?

Despite having many natural resources, Equatorial Guinea is very dependent on the international community, so if the international community really wanted to impose conditions on the regime, it could do so. Politically, the USA, the European Union and some African countries could push the country towards a peaceful transition to democracy. To this end, they should demand that President Obiang engage in inclusive and broad dialogue to reach agreements with pro-democracy social and political forces and appoint a transitional government over which he does not preside.

International cooperation should also support, with technical assistance, financial resources and expressions of solidarity, the pro-democracy activists and groups who are taking risks every day to promote democracy and human development in Equatorial Guinea.

Civic space in Equatorial Guinea is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CEID through its website or Facebook account.

CIVICUS speaks about the current move to expel undocumented migrants from Pakistan with Muhammad Mudassar, Chief Executive Officer of the Society for Human Rights and Prisoners’ Aid (SHARP-Pakistan).

Founded in 1999, SHARP is a human rights civil society organisation working for the rights and wellbeing of vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and working on issues related to trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, including through advocacy at national and international level, capacity development of stakeholders, community services and emergency response.

What’s the situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan?

Pakistan has hosted one of the world’s largest refugee populations for nearly 44 years, as it started receiving Afghan refugees in the late 1970s. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there are 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees, around 840,000 of them registered between 2017 and 2018, plus around 775,000 undocumented Afghan migrants. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, between 400,000 and 700,000 more have arrived in Pakistan to seek asylum and protection through embassies of countries such as Canada, Germany and the USA.

But the Pakistani government hasn’t announced any policy to provide legal protection to new arrivals. In January 2022, the government barred the issuing of UNHCR asylum certificates to newly arrived Afghans, leaving them in a legal limbo. Acting on behalf of the UNHCR, SHARP has been the frontline organisation offering reception facilities.

A few weeks ago, a refugee with three or four children ate a mouse poison pill while waiting for resettlement response. Fortunately, SHARP personnel were on site and she was promptly taken to the hospital and survived. This incident reflects the despair many Afghan refugees feel. They’ve spent all their savings coming to Pakistan and waiting while the cost of living only continues to increase. They often seek jobs but there is no legal provision for undocumented Afghans to work or do business. For that they have to use false Pakistani identities, and when they need to leave the country, they’re forced to sell all their assets for next to nothing. The absence of legal protections also leaves them vulnerable to forced labour, and young women are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation.

Why has the Pakistani government ordered the expulsion of Afghan refugees?

The situation in Pakistan remained peaceful for many years, largely due to the cultural and religious similarities between Pakistani and Afghan people. However, in 2014, an attack on school in Peshawar resulted in the death of over 150 students and teachers. More terrorist attacks followed across Pakistan. In response, the government made a national action plan to counter such attacks and adopted a zero-tolerance border management policy. This is because terrorists were believed to be entering Pakistan across the border with Afghanistan.

Moreover, Pakistan is grappling with a difficult economic situation, including a fuel price hike and high unemployment, with political turmoil further complicating the situation.

Social media also played a role by spreading content linking Afghan refugees to terrorism, negatively affecting public attitudes towards them. Repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan reached its peak in 2015, and relationships between host and refugee communities have increasingly deteriorated, with incidents of hostility continuously increasing over the years. Tensions escalated during cricket matches, leading to fights among Pakistani and Afghan supporters.

In response, SHARP initiated community outreach sessions aimed at engaging young Afghans and Pakistanis to identify commonalities and prioritise them over differences to prevent further violence and create an environment of peaceful coexistence.

How else is SHARP working to help Afghan refugees?

We have partnered with the UNHCR for over 24 years and we operate in 14 offices with over 300 staff members in strategic locations. SHARP is the first contact point for anyone who enters Pakistan to seek asylum. Our role is to conduct a brief initial reception interview and collect documentation to put together the claims, which are reviewed and processed by the UNHCR for further interviews and the provision of protection documentation. We also provide free legal aid and assistance to refugees and migrants, psycho-social counselling and shelter services for the most vulnerable. We make referrals for medical services, emergency cash assistance and community-based protection services.

Working alongside the UNHCR, last year SHARP submitted recommendations to the government, wrote letters to the Minister of Interior and met with the National Commission on Human Rights. I visited parliament three times to advocate for a policy for incoming Afghan refugees and the enactment of a national refugee law. Our recommendations stress the importance of a dignified and respectful approach aligned with humanitarian principles and long-term planning. We’ve urged the Pakistani government to engage with the international community, including the European Union (EU), to address this crisis and ensure that Afghans return home only voluntarily and in a dignified manner.

It’s crucial to note that while Pakistan is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, for a long time it has welcomed refugees on humanitarian grounds, treating them as friends. It shouldn’t jeopardise years of efforts by expelling them as foes. The government should establish registration centres and give people several months to come forward and register their claims for protection. As it lacks the required technical capacity and resources, it should work closely with international and civil society partners.

Is Pakistan receiving the international support it needs to tackle the situation?

The refugee crisis is a challenge for global south countries, which often lack robust legal protection and face economic difficulties. Lured by promises from third countries, asylum seekers often come to Pakistan and countries such as Bangladesh, Iran and Tajikistan and then await international assistance for resettlement. In Pakistan, hundreds approach our office daily asking for resettlement support, and we try to help, working alongside the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration.

But the strain on Pakistani security, healthcare, education and other public services has become overwhelming. If the EU or an EU country urges us to host more Afghan refugees, they should first assess how many Afghan refugees they have welcomed in recent years and consider sharing the burden through resettlement programmes. The international burden-sharing mechanism isn’t working to provide breathing space for global south countries. There should be a flexible visa regime for Afghans who are stuck here in Pakistan and waiting to reunite with their families and friends in other countries.

The situation worsened with the Ukraine crisis, because international support shifted towards addressing those humanitarian needs and the Pakistani crisis stayed largely neglected. Additionally, last year’s flash floods displaced nearly 3.4 million Pakistanis, killed around a million animals and affected numerous refugee communities. Although both the international community and the Pakistani government focused on addressing the consequences of the flood, many internally displaced people have been unable to return to their homes and are still living in camps. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine may further divert international attention and resources away from Pakistan.

We have already been warned that there would be huge funding cut by approximately 60 per cent in 2024, posing a significant challenge in maintaining work for humanitarian organisations with extensive operations across Pakistan. The uncertainty of survival over the coming year is a pressing concern for us. We appeal to the international community to share the responsibility of welcoming Afghan refugees and support Pakistani humanitarian organisations and the government to help asylum seekers rebuild their lives.

Civic space in Pakistan is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with SHARP-Pakistan through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @sharp_pak on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Zaman Ashraf about the current pre-election crackdown in Bangladesh.

Zaman is a Bangladeshi human rights defender who advocates for the rights of survivors of torture and victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and seeks stronger legal protections for human rights in compliance with international law. He currently lives in exile in Hong Kong, since human rights activism has become increasingly risky in Bangladesh.

CIVICUS speaks about the impacts of climate change and the response of climate activism with Ronan Renz Napoto, founder and executive director of Balud, a youth-led movement from the Philippines that promotes ecological consciousness by engaging with and empowering young people.

Why did you become a climate activist?

What made me a climate activist was the trauma of living through one of the strongest-ever recorded super typhoons in the world’s history. Almost 10 years ago, on 8 November 2013, super typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) hit the Philippines. It provoked a lot of global discussions on how climate change was affecting the global south, particularly the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

The typhoon caused enormous damage and killed more than 6,000 people. We lost relatives and friends, our homes were destroyed and our livelihoods were compromised.

Because typhoons usually hit around this time of year, now we are all anxious again. We are constantly reminded of how our lives and livelihoods were affected, and of how nothing changed for the better despite our efforts and the global media coverage we got.

We have continued to experience similarly destructive typhoons. Extreme weather events have affected our farmers’ crops and diminished the catch of our fishers. Climate change has resulted in greater food insecurity and poverty.

In the Philippines, climate change is no longer theoretical. It is a fact of life and a threat to our lives. Before the typhoon we had dreams and hopes for the future, but we have had to push them aside to focus on surviving and fighting back.

What is climate activism focusing on in the Philippines?

We want to hold polluters accountable for their emissions and for the neglect of their climate responsibilities. In the Philippines, environmental defenders are often threatened and risk their lives when protecting our resources from corporations’ greed. To hold them accountable for their emissions, numerous organisations and activists have submitted a landmark petition to the Philippines’ Commission of Human Rights. The next step should be to force them to decrease their emissions drastically and eventually stop emitting carbon.

We push for reparations so that communities are properly compensated, and for funding for adaptation. The transition to renewable energy sources must be a just transition, ensuring that communities’ vulnerability to disaster decreases. Otherwise catastrophes will hit over and over, and the response will continue to be reactive, limited to responding to what has happened instead of producing proactive and preventative solutions. It’s not enough to go help communities after the disaster has happened – disasters must be prevented from happening.

But the resources of the Philippines are limited, so we will need external support. Since this crisis is the global north’s doing, it is only right for them to support our adaptation.

We want global north governments to acknowledge their responsibility for their pollution and its effects on the global south. If you look at emissions data, you will find the Philippines contributes very little compared to the big polluters of the global north. But the biggest impacts of their pollution are being felt in the Philippines and the rest of the global south. This is unfair.

But it’s not just our issue; it is a global issue. What has happened – and continues to happen – in the Philippines is an experience shared with many other countries, particularly in the Pacific, where people are very susceptible to sea level rise, typhoons and cyclones.

That’s why the leaders of nine small island states have gone to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the United Nations’ maritime court, to ask it to determine if carbon dioxide emissions absorbed by the oceans can be considered pollution, and if so, what obligations countries have to prevent it.

Why is it important to have carbon dioxide emissions absorbed by oceans recognised as pollution?

In an archipelagic country like the Philippines, which is surrounded by waters, livelihoods depend on the bounty of marine resources. Whatever comes into the ocean that is not part of its natural ecosystem is bad. Pollution of our marine sanctuaries, oceans and beaches translates into health risks and economic losses. It affects sea life and therefore our food security.

Carbon dioxide is a pollutant, but it is not specifically mentioned in international law on maritime pollution, and as long as it is not recognised as such, it creates no obligations for states.

Will you take part in the upcoming COP28 climate summit?

I don’t think I will be taking part in COP 28 since it is far away, expensive and very hard to get funding for. I think this will be the case for most climate activists in the Philippines. Unsurprisingly, one of our main concerns is getting a good amount of representation in the ongoing discussions on climate change. Apart from the lack of funding, it is always hard to get into global climate discussions because there is not a dedicated space for us.

However, I look forward to seeing planned actions being implemented. So far, the results of the summits have been mostly about acknowledging concerns and making statements. Now it’s time to ensure that decisions are operationalised and states – particularly the rich and powerful ones that are part of the problem – are held to account. We cannot continue planting trees on one side while allowing them to cut down trees on the other side. That way we’ll never make any substantial progress.

Civic space in the Philippines is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Balud through its Facebook page, personal email and LinkedIn.

CIVICUS speaks with Daniel Lubin, co-founder of Na’amod (British Jews Against Occupation), about the UK government’s proposed anti-boycott bill that would prevent public bodies from using divestment as a strategy to meet human rights responsibilities and obligations.

Na’amod is a movement of British Jews seeking to end its community’s support for apartheid and occupation and mobilising for dignity, freedom and democracy for all Israelis and Palestinians.

What are the goals and contents of the proposed anti-boycott bill?

The Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill, also known as the anti-boycott bill, would ban public institutions from participating in boycotts or divesting from companies or countries that are committing, or are complicit in committing, human rights abuses when such actions would diverge from current British foreign policy. Although the bill would affect many international issues, such as the situation of the Uyghur minority in China or fossil fuel divestment, Israel is the only country explicitly mentioned in the bill, and most government statements so far have justified the bill as a tool to tackle anti-Israel sentiment and even antisemitism.

Further, the bill doesn’t differentiate between Israel proper and the Occupied Palestinian Territories – East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank – which conflates Israel’s sovereign territory with the land it occupies illegally under international law.

And domestically, this bill is just the latest UK government attempt to stifle civil liberties, following the Nationality and Borders Act, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act and the Public Order Act.

The Nationality and Borders Bill 2022 contains provisions about nationality, asylum, immigration, victims of slavery and human trafficking. The government claimed its goal was to save lives and stop people smuggling, but it introduces a treatment of refugees that is incompatible with international law.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, also known as the ‘policing bill’, expanded police access to private education and healthcare records and gave police sweeping powers, such as the authority to conduct ‘stop and searches’ without suspicion and criminalise trespassing. This expansion of powers further targets groups already disproportionately affected by over-policing, such as young Black men. Similarly, the trespassing provisions, which make ‘residing on land without consent in or with a vehicle’ a criminal offence, effectively criminalises Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities.

The Public Order Act 2023, also referred to as the anti-protest bill, stifled the right to protest by giving law enforcement agencies greater powers against protests deemed ‘disruptive’ such as those used by climate protesters.

The anti-boycott bill follows in the footsteps of these draconian pieces of legislation. It clearly does nothing to combat antisemitism. This claim is merely a fig leaf to shroud the government’s long-term campaign against civil rights in the UK.

What will be the consequences of the anti-boycott bill?

Public institutions – including councils and universities – will not be able to boycott or withdraw funds from countries or companies complicit in human rights violations. It will also bind their financial decisions to the policy of the government of the time and impede public sector workers’ right to freedom of expression.

In less tangible terms, the fact that the bill and rhetoric around it conflate criticism of Israel with antisemitism will contribute to the chilling effect that makes rights advocates feel less able to criticise Israel for fear of being labelled antisemitic. In the long term, by setting up Jews and Jewish safety in opposition to other civil and human rights struggles, this bill will end up pitting minority communities against each other.

What is civil society, including your organisation, doing to prevent the bill’s approval?

Civil rights groups and multiple Jewish organisations, including Na’amod, have voiced their opposition to the anti-boycott bill. Na’amod started campaigning it in May 2022, when it was first announced in the Queen’s Speech and the legislative process began. Last October we protested against the bill at the Conservative Party Conference and have since been raising awareness through direct action and campaigning as a part of the Right to Boycott coalition, formed by trade unions, charities and faith, climate justice, human rights, cultural, campaigning and solidarity organisations.

The coalition advocates for the right of public bodies to decide not to purchase or procure from, or invest in, companies involved in human rights abuses, abuses of workers’ rights, destruction of our planet, or any other harmful or illegal acts. We highlight the key historical role that boycott, divestment and sanctions campaigns have played in applying economic, cultural and political pressure that has led to changes in abusive, discriminatory or illegal policies. This includes the bus boycotts of the US civil rights movement, the arms embargoes used against apartheid in South Africa and divestment from fossil fuel companies to advance climate action.

As the bill returns to the House of Commons this month and faces a series of amendments, we will continue to speak out and mobilise our community against it. We cannot lose such powerful tool for progressive change.

Civic space in the UK is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Na’amod through its webpage or Facebook page, and follow @naamoduk on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks about Poland’s 15 October parliamentary election with Sonia Horonziak and Filip Pazderski, coordinator and head of the Democracy and Civil Society Programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA).

Founded in 1995, IPA is a leading Polish think tank and an independent centre for policy research and analysis that works to contribute to informed public debate on key Polish, European and global policy issues.

What were the main campaign issues?

The campaign was vicious, featuring hateful rhetoric, particularly directed at groups such as migrants. Opposition leaders, notably Donald Tusk, the head of the Civic Coalition, were targeted in every speech and interview given by members of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), even when it was completely unrelated to the subject matter.

Despite the emotional nature of the campaign, opposition parties’ messaging focused on reversing the regressive changes introduced by PiS, in power since 2015. Their electoral promises included restoring the rule of law and improving cooperation with the European Union (EU) and international partners such as Ukraine, with whom relations have deteriorated in recent months. At times, however, they were caught in the trap set by the ruling party, especially regarding migration issues, and their rhetoric wasn’t always fair toward migrants. Nonetheless, the PiS campaign was way more aggressive and hateful.

To react to that, in the final phase of the campaign the leaders of democratic opposition parties began to strongly emphasise their desire to temper social emotions and conflicts and bridge divisions. These were messages responding to the expectations of Poles, particularly from the group of undecided voters whose support was being fought for.

What factors influenced the outcome of the election?

Firstly, it’s crucial to note that, even though the official campaign started only weeks before the elections, PiS’s unofficial campaign has been underway for months, dominating the pre-election narrative. To this end, the ruling party extensively used public resources and received support from companies owned or controlled by the State Treasury. During the official campaign period, the public broadcaster exhibited a clear bias in favour of PiS, undermining the chances of any other party. Constant monitoring of the main news programme of the public TV broadcaster shows that PiS politicians were shown more often and only in a good light. By contrast, opposition party representatives were depicted only badly, and some very badly.

Moreover, during the electoral campaign PiS introduced the idea of a referendum, which was clearly unconstitutional, on issues aligned with its political agenda. In the referendum, people were asked whether they approved of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, an increase in the retirement age, the admission of immigrants under the EU relocation mechanism and the removal of the barricade on Poland's border with Belarus.

The referendum allowed state-owned companies to engage in the electoral race and provide funding to the ruling party. This wasn’t subject to control or limitations, further contributing to an uneven and biased race in favour of PiS.

However, the results favoured opposition parties, which secured enough seats to form a coalition excluding PiS. This indicated that people had grown tired of the hateful rhetoric and propaganda spread by the government. An IPA survey carried out earlier this year showed a significant increase in dissatisfaction with the country's political and economic situation. It was particularly high among young people and women, which contributed to their views being expressed at ballot boxes and the final outcome of the elections.

No one expected PiS to gain enough votes to rule alone, but two possible outcomes were predicted. In one of them, PiS would be able to form a majority coalition with the far-right Confederation grouping. In the other, which eventually materialised, opposition parties would have the opportunity to govern together. A more even race might have yielded even higher results for the opposition bloc.

How different are the parties that form the winning coalition?

Each of the three groups forming the winning coalition – the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the Left – comprises multiple parties. This raises the question of whether they will be able to stay together and form a unified front, or whether they will eventually split. Even though they have shared objectives, particularly those of restoring the rule of law and addressing corruption by implementing the EU’s whistleblower directive, they are divided on several issues.

While all parties oppose the strict abortion ban introduced by PiS, the Third Way is more conservative on women’s rights, in contrast to the Left, which holds more liberal and progressive views. Harmonising positions on social contributions also presents a significant challenge: while all agree that over the past eight years PiS has drained the public budget, there is no agreement as to which social groups should receive continued support and which should see their assistance reduced. The Polish People’s Party, a member of the Third Way, could prioritise agricultural workers, while the Left might want to focus on upholding minority rights and the Civic Coalition may emphasise support for older people. But the interests of these groups can ultimately be reconciled, perhaps as a result of a compromise leaving some of the expectations of members of these groups unanswered. It will be a little more difficult to align policies aimed at supporting business activities, a particularly important issue for the Civic Coalition and the Third Way. And for entrepreneurs, the reduction of the tax burden is mostly an important issue, while the Left's ideas may lead to tax increases.

There might also be tensions when it comes to appointing key positions and achieving a fair distribution of posts among coalition members, as several ambitious party leaders are vying for prominent roles.

But opposition parties know people expect change. We hope they’ll be wise and prioritise crucial reforms in areas such as the rule of law and tackling corruption over personal and political disagreements. This election result also marks Poland's return to the centre of European policy debates and the possibility of unlocking much-needed funds from the EU’s National Recovery Plan.

How did Polish civil society, including your organisation, engage with the electoral process?

Civil society played a crucial role in ensuring the fairness of the election. Several organisations conducted extensive training for thousands of people who volunteered to become electoral observers, empowering them to oversee the elections and ensure compliance with the law. Civil society educated voters on election participation and organised several extensive campaigns to encourage turnout, especially dedicated to women and young people, resulting in a remarkable 74.4 per cent voter turnout, a record in Poland. Civil society engagement particularly contributed to increased participation by women and young people, with turnout among young people 20 per cent higher compared to previous elections. We did our best to increase people’s engagement because it’s essential to achieve a truly representative democracy.

Another area of civil society involvement was in relation to the referendum. Almost all major civil society organisations (CSOs), including IPA, stated that the referendum was unconstitutional, manipulative, violated human rights and solely served the interests of the ruling party. We worked to inform and encourage people to vote in the parliamentary election while boycotting the referendum. This had a positive outcome: for the referendum, turnout was only 40 per cent, below the minimum validity threshold of 50 per cent, so its results were non-binding.

Do you think the government’s relationship with civil society will change under the new administration?

Expectations are high for the new government to improve relations with CSOs. The PiS government propagated a narrative that part of civil society was politicised and worked against the interests of Polish nation. It was hostile towards organisations whose objectives didn’t align with government policies. During calls for public funds from ministries and government agencies, numerous well-established and renowned CSOs were excluded while organisations that had only existed for a few months or weeks and were clearly linked to PiS or its supporters were granted large amounts of money.

Over the past eight years, civic space in Poland has not only shrunk but also shifted towards increasing support of CSOs aligned with the government’s ideology. These organisations have often received long-term support that will enable them to sustain their activities long after a change of government. Certain segments of civil society, mostly those working on human rights, anti-discrimination, LGBTQI+ rights, migrants and refugees, environmental protection and watchdog activities, have faced harassment as well as insufficient support.

The major opposition parties have pledged collaboration with civil society and the implementation of policies formulated by CSOs across Poland in 17 thematic areas. The new government is expected to remain open to international cooperation, and not to marginalise independent CSOs but instead incorporate them into the political process, including on decision-making regarding the introduction or amendment of laws. There’s also a hope for fairer competition for public funds. We need to work on equal and non-discriminatory tools to support civil society and ensure its sustainability.

What forms of international support does Polish civil society currently need?

International solidarity has always played a crucial role for Polish civil society, particularly during the last eight years, when many CSOs wouldn’t have survived without it. The hope is that international CSOs and agencies, including those from the EU and the USA, will keep providing support and collaborating with Polish CSOs and the new government. This support is particularly important in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and anti-corruption.

The international community might mistakenly believe that the positive election outcome resolves all issues in Poland, potentially diverting attention to other problematic regimes. We have already been through this once, when after 2010 many foreign donors left Poland, deeming their job finished. Shortly afterwards, populist-nationalist forces returned to power and it turned out that legal mechanisms and democratic standards were not strong enough to stop them taking control of the state.

We need to understand this is just one victory, and there is much work ahead for both Polish civil society and the international community. Some donors have already withdrawn support for activities to defend and improve civic space across Europe. It is crucial for other donors, including private foundations, to step in and support each EU member so the union can develop and thrive.

Civic space in Poland is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with IPA through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @ISPThinkTank on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about deteriorating civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with Aida Daguda and Dajana Cvjetkovic, director and programme manager at the Centre for Civil Society Promotion (CPCD).

Founded in 1996, CPCD is a civil society organisation (CSO) working to strengthen civil society and citizen participation in BiH and the Western Balkans through capacity development, advocacy and campaigning.

What are civic space conditions like in BiH?

In our nearly three decades working in civil society in BiH and the Western Balkans, we have never witnessed such a rapid deterioration of civic space. Our organisation, along with other CSOs, is deeply concerned about two new pieces of legislation introduced in Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities that make up BiH.

The first bill, already adopted, reintroduced criminal defamation into the legal system. The second, currently under parliamentary debate, is a ‘foreign agents’ bill that would criminalise CSOs that receive foreign funding or assistance for ‘political activities’ and give state institutions the power to shut them down. This would be just another tool to further restrict civil society in the hands of government authorities, who already use the mechanisms in place to oversee the work of CSOs and exert pressure and threaten us. Over the past year there have been more inspections of CSOs than ever before, specifically targeting smaller and more vocal organisations.

By silencing independent media and civil society, RS President Milorad Dodik seeks to eliminate public scrutiny and criticism in an entity marred by criminal activities and corruption and undergoing a difficult economic situation. The government is resisting democratic oversight and trying to eliminate all forms of critical thought among the public.

Moreover, in April 2023 the Sarajevo local government proposed amendments to local public order laws that would penalise the spread of ‘fake news’ and criticism of state authorities. Although the draft bill was withdrawn in June due to the public outcry it caused, the authorities have expressed their commitment to reintroducing a modified version of the bill.

These are all signals that the situation for civil society is rapidly worsening in RS and in BiH as a whole, with severe limitations being introduced on freedoms of association and expression.

How has Bosnian civil society organised against the restrictive bills?

A part of RS’s civil society is well organised and experienced in advocacy and campaigning. But overall, there are fewer than 10 CSOs that are strongly committed to their human rights mission and vision, while the rest maintain links with the government that make them less vocal against repressive laws. We provide support with expertise and funding to independent CSOs in RS, but we must be discreet because we are based in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other entity that composes BiH, and our help tends to be misunderstood by both politicians and the public in the RS.

Unfortunately, many Bosnian CSOs remain silent due to fear. In RS in particular, people are afraid for their safety and that of their families. Unlike in Georgia, where people took to the streets to defend freedom of association, people in Bosnia aren’t motivated, partly due to media narratives portraying civil society as being paid by the international community to act against the government.

We are using all available tools to raise awareness about repressive legislation within the country, at the European Union (EU) level and through communication with various civil society networks, including CIVICUS. The government argues that these laws are necessary to prevent the financing of terrorism and money laundering, but we view these as excuses.

We have informed opposition members of parliament about the potential negative consequences of the ‘foreign agents’ law but have made no impact. Our outreach to the public has been hindered by lack of media support.

However, we remain hopeful that this crisis may turn into an opportunity for Bosnian civil society to revive the sense of solidarity that we’ve lost over the past decade. These days, we constantly think in terms of projects and donors and tend to see each other as competitors when we most desperately need to be united.

How would you describe the current political climate in BiH?

Our region has historically bordered with empires, and this location has come at a price. The threat of RS’s secession has risen in recent years, posing a security problem for the entire region. Due to BiH’s location and rich natural resources and potential for energy production, many fear that its fate depends on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the interests of major powers such as China, the EU, Russia, Turkey and the USA. The people of BiH are the ones with the least influence on the decisions that will affect them.

While secession may not be imminent, the threat of it significantly impacts on people’s wellbeing. We experience a pervasive feeling of insecurity that contributes to an anxious atmosphere. This makes people easier to manipulate. Many people are considering leaving, mostly because of their sense of insecurity and the widespread corruption.

Fear is our main currency. Past experiences of police surveillance leading to arrests of protesters have deterred people from participating in demonstrations. People are losing hope that things will improve. During the war we experienced between 1992 and 1995, we had a very strong feeling of hope that when the war ended we would recover a normal life and rebuild our country. Now we have peace but we don’t have hope anymore.

How do you work to strengthen civil society in BiH, and what obstacles do you face?

Our organisation was established right after the war, so it has existed for 27 years. We were the first ones to connect CSOs from different parts of the country and our network currently includes over 350 organisations.

In 2004, we launched the first initiative of institutional cooperation between government and civil society. At that time, civil society was thriving. But over the past decade or so, the situation has steadily worsened. Civil society faces a shortage of human resources, and people hold rather negative views about civil society. We seek to change such perceptions by consistently communicating the purpose and results of our work to the public and beneficiaries of our services and activities.

We also lack strong connections with the media, which should serve as a channel between us, the government, the international community and, most importantly, our society. To show what we’re doing and what we are trying to achieve, instead of just following donors’ visibility guidelines we have established our own portal in which we collect inspiring stories of civil society’s impact in improving people’s lives.

But our biggest problem is lack of local ownership. For many years the international community did things for us, so we aren’t used to solving problems by ourselves. People aren’t used to activism; they complain and wait for others to resolve their problems. That’s one of the failures of civil society: we have implemented many projects, but never managed to spark people’s activist side.

What challenges do you face in cooperating with international partners?

International agencies implement large projects in BiH and many funds come from the international community, but we don’t see results. One of the reasons is that local civil society is pushed aside. When we inquire with donors about supporting local organisations or networks, they argue that small organisations lack the capacity to successfully implement large grants. It has become their mantra.

This hampers the development of civil society as the true democratic force our country urgently needs. We must engage in dialogue with the government to devise solutions for the numerous problems we face. We need to move past the ‘projectisation’ of civil society and focus on the long term.

This also applies to the government, which is also forced to work within the project framework, executing short-term tasks requested by the EU or other international institutions. For instance, the government, jointly with the European Commission, invested around €1 million (approx. US$1.06 million) to fulfil a request to establish a register for CSOs, but once international partners left the country, the register ceased to function. There was a failure to recognise that civil society could have created, managed and overseen the register, which could have been instrumental in developing a common civil society strategy.

This year we established an informal group of donors who support local civil society in Bosnia. We hope the international community will consistently convey the message that they must prioritise local ownership and sustainability. We don’t want to see civil society becoming a mere service provider for larger international agencies. We need to organise around genuine shared interests rather than form networks to satisfy the criteria of calls for proposals. It is time for us to think strategically about who we are and what our role is.

Civic space in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor. Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently on the CIVICUS Monitor Watchlist, which draws attention to countries where there is a serious and rapid decline in respect for civic space.

Get in touch with CPCD through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @cpcdba on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the role of civil society and its expectations for the upcoming COP28 climate summit with María Reyes, a young human rights and environmental activist from the Mexican state of Puebla.

María is part of the Indigenous Figures (Futuros Indígenas) collective, made up of peoples, including young people, from Mexico and Central America. She participates in the global south division of Fridays for Future (FFF), an organisation that fights for environmental justice and advocates for action in the face of the climate emergency.

What are Mexico’s main environmental problems?

Generally speaking, Mexico is very vulnerable to the climate crisis. Water scarcity is a central issue, partly caused by droughts, but also by infrastructure problems, as many people do not have access to piped drinking water, and by very poor distribution and overexploitation of aquifers by private companies. If we add to the existing drought the fact that in many communities there are companies that obtain concessions through non-legal and non-transparent means and appropriate the little water that is left, the situation for people becomes unbearable.

Mexico is one of the most dangerous countries to be an activist and environmental defender. In the southeast of Mexico there is a series of transnational extractive megaprojects, such as the Interoceanic Corridor and the ‘Mayan Train’, which threaten the environment through logging and water extraction, and displace wildlife, expropriate territories and resources, harm people and commit human rights violations. Local communities, particularly Indigenous communities, are criminalised when they oppose these megaprojects that are imposed on their territories without any consultation and without their consent or through the staging of rigged consultations.

CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Humberto Salazar, executive director of Fundación Esquel.

Esquel is a civil society organisation that seeks to contribute to sustainable human development, the improvement of the quality of life of the most excluded parts of the population and the construction of a democratic, responsible and supportive society in Ecuador.

How did violence as a result of organised crime affect the election?

The electoral process was deeply affected by violence. This was not limited to the death of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio. In the context of these and the previous local elections, elected representatives to local governments were also assassinated. The most notorious case was that of Agustín Intriago, mayor of the city of Manta. A candidate for the National Assembly was also assassinated, and many other candidates for different positions received threats. The list of fatal victims of violence expands if we include the seven suspects captured for the Villavicencio assassination who were killed in the prisons where they were being held.

In this context, voting preferences were surely affected. From the shadows, groups representing local and transnational mafias sent intimidating messages through violent acts that influenced people’s votes. This was very evident in the first round, when following Villavicencio’s assassination, most voters opted for candidates who until then had had no chance of reaching the runoff. This was the case with Jan Topic and Daniel Noboa, the president-elect. Both saw their numbers rebound after the assassination.

Was violence a campaign issue in the runoff?

The influence of violence on the elections went beyond being a campaign issue strategically chosen by the candidates. For voters, security became a central issue on the agenda, even surpassing in priority other key issues such as unemployment and poverty.

It is not that unemployment and poverty lost relevance, but rather that the three issues became an integrated trio of aspirations that is at the basis of current demands. The electorate is looking for quick and effective, but not isolated, answers. Security, unemployment and poverty are all elements of the same equation that citizens demand from the political system.

Although the candidates’ proposals on the issue were very general, there is a consensus in political circles that security is a key issue in Ecuador’s current situation. Consequently, in the coming days the president-elect will have to develop his security proposals in greater detail. At the polls, voters didn’t evaluate whether the proposals of either candidate on the issue were the best, nor did they have the tools to do so, but now they hope that, regardless of the policies chosen, the result of their implementation will be greater peace.

Do you see the result as indicating a rightward turn by the electorate, or do you think the vote wasn’t ideologically motivated?

The analysis of electoral preferences is not a game of addition and subtraction in which one side, in this case the right, wins, while the other side loses. Nor are we dealing with a naïve or uninformed electorate that has been tricked by a renewed right-wing alternative and has leaned towards right-wing values, principles and narratives as a result.

In the current circumstances, the vote is far from ideological. Other considerations weigh in the assessment of available options. In this case, the search for novelty prevailed, allowing for the victory of an ‘outsider’. In Ecuador, outsiders have a long track record of success.

While the winning candidate represents the right in terms of his values and models, discursively he presents himself as a renovator, much more pragmatic than ideological. This blurring of ideological content is not a unique feature of this particular candidate, but expresses a deeper process of transformation of representation in a context in which rhetoric has been emptied of content as a result of practices blatantly contradicting discourse.

People voted overwhelmingly for a candidate who managed to inspire their trust, whose traits set him apart from the polarised competition proposed by more ideological candidates. They looked for someone who offered alternatives not only to address security issues but also to tackle issues of economic recovery and welfare.

The result was also influenced by the expectations of specific audiences such as young people, who make up a major part of the electoral roll. This part of the electorate sought options for the future detached from the conflicts between those who are ultimately responsible for the crisis in which we are now immersed. In this sense, right-wing and left-wing ideological narratives were equally punished, as evidenced by the fact that all traditional parties lagged behind in the election results.

Why did defeated candidate Luisa González lose, despite having a stronger party structure?

A key factor in Luisa González’s defeat in the runoff was the weight of the figure of former president Rafael Correa as the symbol and leader of the Citizen Revolution movement. This leadership, which offers the movement a captive electorate of around 25 per cent, also creates a ceiling that, in a polarised competition between Correism and anti-Correism, does not allow the candidate to surpass the 50 per cent required to win in the runoff. The same polarisation strategy that gave Correa’s government the strength to push its agendas has reduced her chances of attracting an electorate that is not part of the party’s hardcore vote.

The revanchist narratives of Correism, expressed in the motto ‘neither forgive nor forget’, also undermined González’s support. The appeal to a return to the past reaffirmed the party’s base, but prevented it winning the votes of a broader electorate that distrusts the authoritarian tendencies of Correism and feared that the triumph of his candidate would translate into restrictions on civic space, particularly on freedom of association.

What are civil society’s expectations of the new administration?

While the president-elect does not have a history of resistance to civil society participation, during the campaign he was not particularly open to receiving proposals from and meeting with civil society groups. This creates uncertainty about how broad and effective spaces for civil society participation in public policy design and implementation will be. In principle, there are no clear threats to civic space, but there is uncertainty regarding the new government’s position on the promotion and strengthening of civil society.

It is worth noting that the two second-round competitors had a conservative bias beyond their ideological leanings to the right or left. Hence the uncertainty as to how the new president will respond to social demands from the gender equality agendas of feminist groups and the LGBTQI+ community, the demands of the Indigenous movement regarding plurinationality and interculturality, and the concerns of the human rights movement regarding the search for policies to tackle crime that do not sacrifice rights.

What is certain is that there is a huge number of problems that the new government will have to address. To sustain its initiatives beyond the one and a half years of his term in office, the new president will need to make a broad call for action and produce a basic agenda endorsed by national multi-stakeholder agreements. Policies on security, labour – with an emphasis on youth employment under a model of intergenerational inclusion – and combating chronic child malnutrition will be indispensable. The so-called Democracy Code, the 2009 law that establishes the electoral system, the management of elections and the requirements for the functioning and financing of political parties and movements, must also be reformed.

Do you think this election put an end to political instability?

The instability is not over, but the election provided a temporary and short-lived escape valve for the tensions of the multi-dimensional crisis affecting Ecuador. The government’s grace period, however, will be very limited: it will have to produce measures in the short term that show it’s on the way to resolving major problems.

Two things could work against it: the slowness of the bureaucratic apparatus to develop transformative projects and the power struggle that could block its initiatives in the National Assembly. The relationship between the executive and legislative branches will be key. If the executive once again finds itself blocked by a multitude of special interests demanding perks to enable the approval of its initiatives, the crisis will again deepen.

Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Fundación Esquel through its website or Facebook page, and follow @FundacionEsquel on Instagram and Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh – the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians – with Lida Minasyan, a feminist peace activist and Resource Mobilisation Consultant at the Central Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central and North Asia (CEECCNA) Collaborative Fund.

Founded in 2022, the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund is a feminist fund that mobilises sustainable resources for social justice movements across the CEECCNA region.

What is the current security and human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh?

The ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was forcibly displaced within days of the Azerbaijani government launching a full-scale attack on 19 September. A week later, 100,632 people had arrived in Armenia, having left behind their homes, their belongings and the lives they had built.

Several actions deliberately targeted against civilians occurred before the start of the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, leaving the 120,000 Armenians who lived there completely isolated. People endured nine months of severe food insecurity, fuel shortages, electricity outages, communications breakdowns and medical supply shortages. This resulted in a humanitarian crisis that put people, particularly those with vulnerabilities, at risk. Many pregnant women had miscarriages and stillbirths, people with chronic illnesses couldn’t receive their medication and treatment, and risk of infection increased due to the lack of hygiene products. These were just a few of the severe challenges people faced during the blockade.

The Lachin road was reopened several days after the Azerbaijani offensive, when people, already traumatised and starving, experienced a direct threat to their lives. They had no choice but to leave their homes in search of safety in Armenia.

Why did Azerbaijan initiate the blockade and military offensive?

The nine-month blockade and the offensive were meant to achieve the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. The intentional deprivation of essential resources for survival followed by the direct attack to take over Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the creation of conditions for the Armenian population to leave, indicate that Azerbaijan is not contemplating any peaceful end to the conflict or human rights guarantees for Armenian people to feel safe in their homes and continue living in Nagorno-Karabakh.

By leveraging additional threats against Armenians and Armenian sovereign territories, demonstrating its military power, and consistently introducing new conditions in the negotiation process with Armenia, Azerbaijan intends to assert its dominance. This approach reinforces a policy of hatred towards Armenians spanning decades and undermines the peacebuilding process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?

Displaced people endured a journey of over 20 hours to reach Armenia, during which they had no access to food, water or sanitation facilities. As a result, most of them arrived thirsty, hungry and in need of medical attention. When they began arriving, local organisations, activists and volunteers were among the first to give them food, hygiene products and assistance to register for the state support system.

Local civil society organisations engage in continuous needs assessments of displaced people, using dynamic data collection approaches, as the situation is changing rapidly. In addition to the immediate provision of goods, there are medium and long-term needs to address. Displaced people need psychological assistance to overcome trauma, sustainable medical support, permanent housing, access to education and employment and services to prevent and address gender-based violence.

As part of the CEECCNA Collaborative Fund, we provide timely updates about the situation to our international partners and mobilise and direct resources to local organisations. Due to limited resources, Armenian civil society activists worked under a lot of pressure because they had to initiate fundraising efforts while simultaneously providing emergency response.

The Armenian government has provided displaced people with one-time financial support, essential products and access to temporary accommodation. For all its good intentions, however, the government also lacks resources and capacity to provide adequate long-term assistance to displaced people.

Has the international community’s response been adequate?

The response has been slow and inadequate. A few months into the blockade, the international community refused to call the situation a humanitarian crisis and many turned a blind eye to the deteriorating conditions of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population.

After numerous appeals and demands from civil society, some international agencies began releasing statements urging the Azerbaijani government to open the Lachin corridor. They mainly referred to the International Court of Justice’s orders of 22 February and 6 July 2023, which unequivocally mandated Azerbaijan to ensure unrestricted movement of people, vehicles and cargo along the corridor in both directions.

Despite these decisions, the road remained blocked. A group of four United Nations experts also expressed their concern about the continued closure of the Lachin corridor and called on the Azerbaijani authorities to promptly reinstate unimpeded and safe movement along the road, as stipulated by the November 2020 ceasefire agreement.

The lack of more compelling action by the international community created an unhindered environment for the attack to occur. Many organisations are currently responding by issuing new alerts and appeals, along with providing much-needed humanitarian support. However, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia require sustainable peace and human security, which will only be achievable through a negotiation that is inclusive of the voices of those most profoundly affected by the conflict. We advocate specifically for the inclusion of women in formal negotiations, in order to pave the way to sustainable peace.

The international community’s crisis-response support is highly appreciated, but it should be complemented by long-term funding for dialogue, peacebuilding and the reestablishment of human security. Armenian civil society working to alert about potential risks of conflict escalation on the borders of Armenia could also benefit from their support.

Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Learn more about CEECCNA Collaborative Fund in this blog.

CIVICUS speaks with Najeeb Ahmad Fokeerbux, founder of the Young Queer Alliance (YQA), about the recent ruling by the Mauritius Supreme Court that declared the criminalisation of same-sex relations unconstitutional.

The YQA is a non-governmental, youth-led and apolitical organisation registered in Mauritius that seeks to empower LGBTQI+ people and organisations, promote equality and lead change.

What is the situation of LGBTQI+ rights in Mauritius?

The human rights of LGBTQI+ people in Mauritius have progressed for one and a half decades now. The issue of healthcare for LGBTQI+ people was raised in the National Assembly as early as 1995 with regard to HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment. Since then, we’ve seen strides with HIV interventions targeted at LGBTQI+ people with change accelerating since 2008. The Employment Rights Act was passed in 2008, and would later become the 2019 Workers’ Rights Act. The Equal Opportunities Act was promulgated in 2012 and the Civil Status Act was amended in 2021, allowing for the registration of sex at birth of intersex persons as ‘undetermined’.

Yet local organisations, including the YQA, have faced a deadlock in addressing some pressing needs and aspirations of LGBTQI+ people such as the decriminalisation of homosexuality, the recognition of trans people and marriage equality, and it didn’t seem that legislative change would occur anytime soon.

What was the process leading to the decriminalisation of same-sex relations?

Conversations around litigation to challenge section 250(1) of the 1838 Criminal Code, which criminalised homosexuality, started as early as 2014. Numerous community consultations were held, but no queer people were ready yet to take on the challenge. It was a David versus Goliath situation.

Since YQA was founded in 2014, advocacy efforts started making progress with policymakers. Conversations gained new momentum in 2018 with the queer community winning support from international allied organisations. India decriminalised homosexuality in 2018, and with around 65 per cent of Mauritians being of Indian descent, this had a lot of impact. There didn’t seem to be a reason for Mauritius not to follow suit.

In September 2019, with the support of two law firms based in Mauritius and France, three friends and fellow activists and I approached the Supreme Court to seek constitutional redress on the basis that section 250 (1) of the Criminal Code violated our fundamental rights and freedoms and was therefore unconstitutional. Two additional cases followed: one by renowned gay artist Henry Coombes and another one by a young queer activist, Ridwaan Ah-Seek.

But change wasn’t going to happen if we only sought it in court. We had to accompany the legal process with efforts to change the hearts and minds of people. In other words, we had to fight two battles – one in court and another in society – at the same time, while ensuring that plaintiffs remained safe and didn’t lose the courage to continue a legal battle that would take years.

The YQA mobilised the community and funding from donors for this strategic and planned effort. In addition to our lawyers, we got support from the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, the Equal Rights in Action Fund of the National Democratic Institute, the European Union delegation in Mauritius, Planet Romeo Foundation and The Other Foundation. They supported a range of projects to empower LGBTQI+ ambassadors, provide media training, engage with both the public and private sectors and undertake research. We submitted the results of a research project we conducted in 2021 to the courts as evidence.

The four plaintiffs – two Hindus, one Christian and one Muslim – brought to court our stories as queer people from all parts of Mauritian society. Three of us being public officers, we were able to show the challenges we faced due to this abhorrent law being on the books. We played our part and our skilled lawyers played theirs. One thing led to another, and four years later, on 4 October 2023, LGBTQI+ people in Mauritius no longer needed to live with the constant fear of being criminalised.

What made Mauritius not follow the regressive path taken in some other African countries?

The Supreme Court showed independence, impartiality and sensitivity to human rights. The principle of separation of powers was upheld. Mauritius is seen as a respected political and economic player in the region. We hope we will be an example for other Commonwealth and African Union member states to follow.

However, we recognise that unfortunately, many African countries are plagued by dangerous imported extremist doctrines that are erasing the core meaning of being African. The situation is worse than that when the colonial masters enslaved us, for it is our own kin, people with our same skin colour and the same African roots, who are dehumanising and un-Africanising us, while it is them who are bringing in an imported ideology – homophobia.

What’s next on the LGBTQI+ agenda in Mauritius?

Two issues that need to be tackled are the recognition of trans people and marriage equality. By preparing ourselves and providing there are adequate resources, the YQA will be able to help us overcome these two injustices.

This ruling paved the way for greater inclusion of LGBTQI+ people in Mauritius. But although same-sex private sexual relationships among consenting adults have been decriminalised, it remains crucial to educate queer people and people in general about the ruling and its implications for human freedom, equality, dignity and rights.

What international support do you receive, and what further support do you need?

The YQA works in networks with LGBTQI+ activists and organisations in the region and beyond. This is what makes our queer movement a global one. And it contributes to learning, sharing and lifting each other’s spirits.

Achieving the recognition of trans people and marriage equality will require institutional support, strengthened allyship, the participation of the private sector and sustained funding. At the same time, Mauritius is set on the path to becoming an upper-middle-income or high-income economy, making organisations such as the YQA ineligible for donor aid. Donors have to understand that the overall economic situation does not benefit LGBTQI+ people equally and should therefore continue providing targeted support, capacity development and funding to LGBTQI+-led organisations to continue our work.

Civic space in Mauritius is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Young Queer Alliance through its webpage or Facebook page.

CIVICUS speaks about the civil society humanitarian response to the Azerbaijani blockade and military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh – the disputed territory within Azerbaijan that until recently was governed by ethnic Armenians – with Shushanik Nersesyan, Media and Communication Manager at People in Need (PIN) Armenia.

Founded in 1992 by a group of journalists involved in the 1989 Czechoslovak ‘Velvet Revolution’, PIN is a civil society organisation (CSO) working in the fields of humanitarian aid, human rights, education and social work. Since it was established in 2003, its permanent office in Armenia has worked to strengthen Armenian people’s abilities to improve their lives and the communities they live in.

How did the Azerbaijani blockade affect people in Nagorno-Karabakh?

It all started in December 2022, when Azerbaijani civilians identifying themselves as environmental activists began obstructing the Lachin corridor, which links Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In April 2023 Azerbaijan set up an official checkpoint that largely cut off the passage of people and goods between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Once it was under Azeri control, it was possible to use the corridor only in exceptionally urgent cases, through the intermediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or Russian peacekeepers.

On 29 July Azerbaijani authorities abducted V Khachatryan, a 68-year-old Nagorno-Karabakh resident who was being evacuated by the ICRC for urgent medical treatment through the Lachin corridor. Khachatryan remains in captivity. Another incident occurred in late August when three Nagorno-Karabakh students were captured by Azerbaijani border guards while travelling to Armenia via the corridor. They were only released 10 days later. Free movement of people to Armenia became impossible.

The prolonged blockade led to a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of essential goods – including electricity, fuel and water – and the closure of basic services. People in Need, along with Action Against Hunger and Médecins du Monde France, condemned it but, regrettably, our efforts to open to road for the trucks with food to Nagorno-Karabakh were thwarted.

The situation changed with the shelling that caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent people on 19 and 20 September. Since 24 September, over 100,000 people have fled Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian regions, where they are also facing an emergency situation due to food and hygiene needs, plus longer-term issues of housing, education and jobs.

How has Armenian civil society responded to the humanitarian crisis?

CSOs including PIN deployed humanitarian projects to help blockade-affected people. CSOs conducted visits and issued statements. In Kornidzor, on the border, representatives from dozens of Armenian CSOs gathered during the blockade, urging the international community to uphold human rights and ensure the passage of humanitarian aid for civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The unimpeded delivery of essential goods, including food, hygiene items, medicine and fuel, as well as the unrestricted movement of people, including critically ill patients, are fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law.

What work is PIN doing in this context?

Since 1992, as a newly established organisation, PIN has been there to help people affected by the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from February 1988 to May 1994. We have actively contributed to the growth of Armenian civil society, which has remained resilient throughout this crisis. We coordinate our efforts with the government and local authorities to closely monitor the situation on the ground and carry out numerous humanitarian projects.

We continue assisting the most vulnerable populations. Since September 2020, we have provided essential humanitarian aid and long-term efforts for the social and economic integration of thousands of people.

As a humanitarian organisation, we advocate for rights and a peaceful resolution of conflicts in adherence with international law. Along with our partners, we have expressed our concerns, called for measures to prevent the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe and continuously raised internal and donor funds to help people in need.

When people started fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh, we immediately mobilised PIN funds to support the first recipient centre in the Syunik border region to deliver aid such as food, clothes and blankets to forcibly displaced people and create a special space for children’s activities while their parents dealt with registration and searching for accommodation. Additionally, we launched the SOS Armenia appeal and new humanitarian assistance projects funded by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, the Netherlands Refugee Foundation, Start Network and USAID.

As people continue to leave their homes in search of safety without being able to take their belongings, humanitarian organisations must continue providing assistance to support their basic needs.

Civic space in Armenia is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with People in Need Armenia through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @PIN_Armenia on Twitter.

CIVICUS discusses the results of the 15 October runoff vote in Ecuador’s presidential election with Ruth Hidalgo, executive director of Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation).

Participación Ciudadana is a non-partisan and pluralist civil society organisation (CSO) that works to strengthen democracy in Ecuador.

How did organised crime violence affect the electoral process?

The electoral process that just ended has been marked by political violence: a presidential candidate, a mayor and a prefect were assassinated. There has also been a climate of violence on the streets due to the actions of drug gangs, who extort protection money known as ‘vaccines’ from the public and uses it to finance organised crime groups.

This made the issue of security one of the central topics in the debate between the second round candidates, and one that has generated the highest expectations.

The two candidates’ proposals, however, were broadly similar, although with some differences in tone and characteristics of their own. Both aimed to strengthen the presence of the armed forces as co-executors alongside the police of anti-crime policies.

How do you interpret the triumph of a centre-right alternative?

This was not necessarily an ideological vote. The weakness of political parties in Ecuador means that ideology is losing strength. For some time now, the country has been debating not between right and left but between Correism and anti-Correism: it is the controversial legacy of former president Rafael Correa, in power for a decade between 2007 and 2017, which continues to polarise Ecuadorian society.

The winning candidate, business leader Daniel Noboa, represents at least by his origins a centre-right option. But if he has won, it is because he has managed to capture the votes of a young electorate that is not on either side of the polarisation and has rather opted for a new vision, a young candidate with no political baggage who offers a form of politics that, unlike that of his predecessors, is not confrontational.

What factors worked against the candidacy of Luisa González?

Correa’s candidate, Luisa González, was hurt by the constant presence of Correa during most of the campaign, which ended up overshadowing her candidacy. Although in the end she tried to distance herself from that influence, she did not manage to position herself as a renewed Correist option, which is what she should have conveyed in order to have a chance of winning. She remained stuck to the worn-out and questioned political image of the former president.

I believe that the element of Correa’s legacy that leads to the greatest rejection is his confrontational and threatening way of dealing with those he views as political enemies. This seems to be eliciting more and more discontent and disapproval. While the amount of support González received was not small, this set a ceiling for her that she was unable to break through. This was precisely the reason her opponent was able to prevail.

How has the space for civil society evolved in recent years, and what can be expected under the new government?

Civil society, in my opinion, has recovered its presence and freedom of action after Correa’s time in power, during which it was restricted and in some cases persecuted. Let’s not forget that an important environmental CSO, which confronted the government because of its extractivist policies, was arbitrarily shut down and then legislation was passed to regulate the registration, operations and closure of CSOs at the government’s discretion, with the aim of removing those that bothered the government. Many civil society activists and journalists were criminalised for their work.

The expectation of civil society under the new government is the same as always: to have an enabling environment that allows it to carry out its activities freely. We expect a government that protects and promotes freedom of association.

What should be the priorities of the new president?

It’s worth remembering that these were early elections called to elect President Guillermo Lasso’s successor after he used the ‘cross-death’ mechanism, dissolving congress to prevent it impeaching him, but simultaneously cutting his mandate short. This means Noboa will only serve as president for the rest of Lasso’s term: a mere 18 months, too little time for the many challenges he will face.

The new president takes over a country plagued by insecurity and violence, with a high fiscal deficit, almost zero growth, very high unemployment rates and on top of that, one that is once again experiencing the El Niño climate phenomenon, with warming water currents that produce extreme weather events and record temperatures. These are all issues he will have to prioritise, with public policies aimed at mitigating the most important problems in the areas of the economy, climate change and public security. To do so, he will need to build a strong team and create spaces for dialogue and reconciliation. He will need to demonstrate openness to civil society and seek political agreements that are public, not under the table.

Every election presents an opportunity. As always in a country with so many needs, expectations are high. The main task ahead for the new government is to strengthen Ecuador’s democracy, which will demand an enormous amount of work.

Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Participación Ciudadana through its website or Facebook account, subscribe to its YouTube channel and follow @participacionpc on Instagram and @ParticipacionPC and @RhidalgoPC on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about activism in the closed civic space of North Korea with Bada Nam, Secretary General of People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE).

Founded in 2006 and based in South Korea, PSCORE is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that works to improve human rights in North Korea, assist North Korean escapees settling in South Korea and address barriers to reunification of the two Koreas.

Is there anything resembling civil society in North Korea?

North Korea values organisational activities, requiring every citizen to participate simultaneously in several groups such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, North Korea’s Socialist Women’s Union and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. All of them are government-organised and exert control over people rather than encourage critical thinking. Mentioning civic organisations from the outside world is strictly forbidden.

Congregating and engaging in activism in any way critical to the regime is a serious criminal offence, with punishments that can extend to the death penalty. As a result, any such activity must be covert, and it’s difficult to obtain accurate information on the existence of an underground civil society.

North Korea is a surveillance state, where people are always cautious about what they say, even to close friends and family members. It’s impossible to gather colleagues and engage in civic activities because everyone is made to monitor each other and failure to report treasonous crimes to the authorities would also result in severe punishment. Public criticism sessions and public executions are also examples of how the regime strikes fear into the population.

People are deterred from opposing the government not only because of the extreme punishment they would face but also due to North Korea’s policy of guilt by association, which puts their close relatives at risk. The ‘Songbun’ class system classifies people according to their political loyalties, as ‘loyal’, ‘wavering’ or ‘hostile’, and family members may be demoted in this classification system, affecting their life opportunities, including career options and access to food rations. In serious cases, entire families may be sent to political camps and die from forced labour or starvation. Therefore, North Koreans don’t dare imagine opposing the government.

Have there been any recent changes in the ways the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

The North Korean government has always responded to dissent in an extreme manner. However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the surveillance and security system has increased dramatically, making it nearly impossible to escape from North Korea. Extra security measures are in place along the borders and a shoot-to-kill policy is enforced against those trying to escape. The situation was exacerbated further during the COVID-19 pandemic when the China-North Korea border was closed, both halting trade and also impeding the flow of defectors.

Information poses the greatest threat to the North Korean regime, especially due to the influence of the recent ‘Korean wave’ that has made South Korean popular culture increasingly prevalent. Most people in North Korea have been exposed to South Korean dramas and music, leading some to adopt South Korean manner of speech and fashion style. In response, the government has intensified monitoring, enacted strict laws and imposed severe punishments for consuming or distributing foreign media. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, enacted in January 2023, explicitly prohibits the use of foreign languages and specifically bans South Korean terms such as ‘oppa’, which translates as ‘older brother’ and is used as a form of endearment for a boyfriend.

How do people manage to escape North Korea?

Most North Koreans escape across the border with China, often with the help of a broker. Brokers reach out to wealthy families in North Korea or help those who have escaped to China get to South Korea. Defectors in South Korea sometimes contact a broker to help other family members flee.

China has a policy of forced repatriation for North Korean refugees, and its advanced surveillance system makes it extremely difficult to travel in China undetected. If apprehended and returned to North Korea, defectors and their families face severe punishment.

Most North Korean refugees must travel through several countries before reaching safety. From China, they might flee to Mongolia and Southeast Asian countries such as Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Many North Koreans end up seeking asylum in Thailand, where the government assists them and helps organise their journey to South Korea.

What help do escapees receive?

The assistance available to North Korean refugees depends on the laws and diplomatic relations of countries with North and South Korea. Civil society, including PSCORE, helps North Korean defectors settle in South Korea by teaching essential life skills. Thanks to our volunteer teachers, we focus on providing educational support, including English lessons and vocational workshops. In the past, we also assisted escapees in reaching South Korea but, unfortunately, this became impossible due to China’s growing securitisation and the impact of COVID-19.

Once in South Korea, North Koreans must undergo a 12-week training programme at the Hanawon rehabilitation centre, where they learn various skills to adapt to the South Korean lifestyle and have access to medical treatment and mental health services. While the South Korean government has implemented programmes to assist refugees, the process of fully integrating into South Korean society is still difficult for people who have previously lived under the totalitarian regime. Psychological trauma from refugees’ journey to freedom may have lasting effects on their lives.

How do escapees work to raise awareness and advocate for change in North Korea?

There are many CSOs, mainly based in South Korea, that support North Koreans inside the country and abroad. Some organisations send messages, information, K-dramas and K-pop to North Korea using USB sticks. South Korean news outlets, such as Daily NK and NK News, have sources in North Korea that provide insights into the current situation. PSCORE and other North Korean human rights groups conduct interviews with defectors and publish reports based on their testimonies.

Our primary activities involve organising public awareness campaigns through seminars and events. We also share short catchy videos on various North Korea-related topics via our social media channels. Our large international team of interns plays a crucial role in advocacy by translating our social media content into various languages. This makes our mission and content visible to the rest of the world.

PSCORE was granted special consultative status with the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2012, facilitating our engagement with the international community. We hold an annual side event at the UN Human Rights Council to share the latest information on North Korea’s human rights situation. We leverage international pressure to try to bring about change.

What further international support do diaspora activists need?

The topic of North Korean human rights is seen as a very political issue in South Korea. This means that CSOs are affected by each change of government, as policies toward North Korea shift with every administration. While PSCORE’s objective is centred on achieving peace and improving human rights in North Korea, we receive limited support compared to other CSOs due to the interpretation of our activities as politically charged, even though PSCORE is a non-partisan and non-religious CSO. Increased media exposure could help us secure more funding.

Insufficient funding is a common challenge for North Korean human rights organisations. It hinders the potential to raise awareness and support refugees in South Korea. North Korean activists need more platforms to amplify their voices and continue advocating for change. Still, we hope that more donations will come as the international community becomes more interested in the cause of human rights in North Korea.

Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with PSCORE through its website or its Facebook and Instagram pages, and follow @PSCORE911 on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the struggle for LGBTQI+ rights in Botswana with Dumiso Gatsha, an LGBTQI+ activist and founder of Success Capital.

Success Capital is a youth and feminist-led organisation working to strengthen youth agency and autonomy in human rights and sustainable development while challenging power, privilege and patriarchy through intersectionality. Its approaches include participatory research, peer-to-peer knowledge sharing and advocacy.

Has the 2019 High Court ruling that decriminalised same-sex relations led to improvements?

The 2019 ruling had structural effects: by declaring the criminalisation of same-sex intimacy unconstitutional, it eliminated not only the possibility of prosecution but also the excuse that was often used to exclude LGBTQI+ people from service delivery. It affirmed our existence as Batswana, Africans and people and heralded a new field of untapped opportunities for improving the lives of all people in Botswana, not only LGBTQI+ people.

Documented instances of violence against queer people in social settings, hate speech and intolerance online have increased. This doesn’t mean violence itself has increased – only that it is now more visible. Decriminalisation has improved the environment to report on and seek redress for human rights violations, injustices and inequities.

However, there has also been backlash, and violence may be on the rise as a result of the higher visibility, agency and advocacy by LGBTQI+ people.

It’s true that in Botswana there weren’t any immediate negative reactions to the High Court ruling, unlike in countries such as Kenya or Namibia, where progressive judgements elicited immediate protest action. But, reflective of wider and broader anti-gender ideology influences, earlier this year there have been protest marches led by churches, a whole four years after the High Court ruling. This means that for those opposed to LGBTQI+ rights, the matter is far from settled.

The anti-rights reaction was triggered by a member of parliament’s request to consult with churches on the procedural steps parliament needed to take to amend the Penal Code in line with the 2021 ruling by the Court of Appeal that upheld the High Court’s decision. From what we understand, this ruling was needed to finally put the matter of decriminalisation to rest, having ensured that all processes had been exhausted within Botswana’s jurisdiction.

Representatives of churches and members of parliament questioned the very essence of our democracy. They publicly threatened politicians in a pre-election year, bringing confusion about the democratic process and denouncing our existence as citizens who have rights.

The strength of the backlash despite the time that has passed shows that decriminalisation is only the beginning. It is not the solution or end point in fulfilling human rights, but it serves as a basis for much-needed interventions in social, cultural, institutional and public participation spaces.

How has civil society, and your organisation in particular, responded?

Fighting back has been a slow and protracted process because of limited resources. Botswana’s higher middle income country status and narrow avenues for civil society engagement have meant that the gains made from decriminalisation could not be strategically amplified across the human rights, sexual and reproductive rights and democratic landscape.

Success Capital has less than five per cent of the resources that more prominent civil society organisations have. This means grassroots, hidden and hard-to-reach communities and constituents are left behind – notably in more rural, climate-affected and impoverished areas, where queerness, migrant status, disability, sex work status and being an ethnic minority are all second to socioeconomic status and the need to secure a livelihood.

Our constituents didn’t feel threatened by the anti-LGBTQI+ protests, which is reflective of their resilience and agency. But this was a moment to gauge how unprepared philanthropy is to respond to backlash and regressive attempts. I was shocked when a funder asked me what I was doing about it while knowing full well that they had delayed disbursing funds aimed at removing human rights barriers for LGBTQI+ people.

Still, we commemorated Pride and helped host the Changing Faces Changing Spaces conference organised by the East African Sexual Health and Rights Initiative, for which we helped secure visas and provided advice to LGBTQI+ people and sex workers from across Africa. We worked in solidarity with East African groups in the context of increasing anti-LGBTQI+ sentiments, engaged in strategic policy-oriented dialogue with other civil society leaders, made a solidarity visit to Namibia and networked to ensure that we would be prepared for whatever came next. None of this was externally funded – it was pure feminist decolonial action underpinning our belief in our own freedom, with or without decriminalisation.

Has there been any change in the state of public opinion in Botswana on LGBTQI+ rights?

The Afrobarometer survey has noted some improvements in public opinion, but intolerance and hate speech remain prevalent. National-level data is not always reflective of the situation in local and grassroots communities. Language, socioeconomic status and the availability of services all contribute to how people in Botswana participate and perceive different issues.

For example, in our own community engagements in rural locations we have noted that abortion is mostly accepted on the basis of an understanding of the challenges experienced by many who end up pregnant. However, more than one abortion is frowned upon. And we see similar nuances across sexual orientation, sex characteristics and gender identity issues. For instance, feminine queer men tend to be tolerated more than trans women, as are masculine lesbian women giving birth, while bisexual men are emasculated online. Social parameters are too wide to be readily captured without meaningful resources and political will to ensure all LGBTQI+ people are included in state policy and programming.

Have you experienced any negative repercussions from your work?

Yes. Invitations have been rescinded and scrutiny increased. We are policed on who can be invited to take part in social participation mechanisms that include government officials. We are denied an audience despite fulfilling all the necessary steps in writing invitations, submitting proposals and following up through the hierarchy. For instance, we applied for approval for civil society participation in the 2023 World Bank-International Monetary Fund Spring meetings, and despite receiving permission from parliamentary caucuses, a ministry interrogated us on what we wanted to do and why we wanted to attend.

We had our email address blocked to prevent us submitting future statements to the United Nations. We have been denied funding for being too radical, and calling out funders has not really worked for us.

I’ve had several encounters with law enforcement. The first happened when a fellow volunteer was strangled and I recorded audio of the incident before police confiscated my phone. We are exploring a case on this at the moment. The second happened when a trans colleague was questioned because how she presented was not the same as the gender stated on her identity card. And more recently, we were told of plainclothes police in non-branded cars patrolling and possibly shooting people who don’t stop on highways when instructed to in the middle of nowhere. This kind of policing is harmful, unlawful and abusive, and is being used to target LGBTQI+ people without any accountability.

Where do these restrictions come from?

Some restrictions we’ve faced reflect a regional landscape in which LGBTQI+ networks have shut down, limiting representation, and a global trend in which eligibility, visa and logistical support have only worsened, limiting civil society participation in advocacy and governance mechanisms.

Civil society in Botswana is not immune from these trends. Even within the Global Fund mechanism, the most prominent enabler of those fighting for sexual health rights, delays have taken up most of the current financial year, compromising eight months of service provision.

I think we are underestimating the reach of anti-rights groups. Although global anti-rights influences have existed for decades, domestic counterparts have recently grown emboldened and are increasingly well resourced. Botswana’s higher middle income country status reflects a skewed and unequal income distribution and hides the fact that the few with capital and wealth side with the conservative, morally driven powerholders and are not afraid to deploy their influence against human rights activists. Criminalisation is good business for the politicians that also run corporations. Inequality is good news for those with means and power to subjugate those left behind.

How do you connect with LGBTQI+ rights movements abroad and internationally? What international support do you receive, and what further support do you need?

LGBTQI+ activists are dynamic and diverse. Success Capital has always engaged in collaborative knowledge sharing, linking with other initiatives and sharing the space in advocacy sessions, side events and mobilising actions. We take pride in unearthing young, emergent and nascent activists and movements that operate in the margins and sharing our platform with them. This helps us continue and challenge conversations in rooms we can’t access or engage in.

Since decriminalisation, international support has been quite high. It has, however, been skewed. It has followed a hierarchy that’s reflective of wider trends, with more institutionalised groups having easier access to funding and benefitting from the development industrial complex the most. Grassroots organisations continue to be left behind, lacking institutional or long-term funding.

Solidarity is like sunshine – everyone deserves some. That’s why the ecosystem needs to be steered towards collaboration. And it must focus on strategising so that we don’t merely react to crises and anti-rights action, but we take the initiative in the struggle for our rights.

Civic space in Botswana is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Success Capital through its website or Facebook page, and follow @ProSuccessBW on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Peter Lewis, president of Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation (ANTaR), about the recent defeat in a referendum of a proposal to recognise Indigenous Australians in the constitution and create a permanent institution so they can speak directly to government and parliament on matters relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

ANTaR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that works in solidarity with and advocates for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia, conducting independent research and analysis and providing Australians with quality information on priorities concerning First Nations rights.

What was the process leading to the referendum?

In December 2010, an Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians was established and started discussing how to constitutionally recognise First Nations peoples. In January 2012, the panel suggested a new section be added to the Constitution – ‘Section 51A’ – to recognise First Peoples as the original inhabitants of the nation now known as Australia. The federal government later announced that a referendum on the matter would be delayed by two to three years due to an absence of widespread public support.

In December 2015, a Referendum Council was established and began consultations on how best to establish constitutional recognition of First Nations peoples. A discussion paper was released in October 2016 and articulated the central suggestions for constitutional reform to include a declaration of recognition, a ban on racial discrimination and a First Nations Voice to Parliament, with the right to be consulted on legislation relevant to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

In May 2017, a convention at Uluru heard the outcomes from the First Nations Dialogues, with 250 First Nations leaders and representatives in attendance. Despite the generosity of spirit embodied by the Uluru statement, in October 2017 the government of then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull outrightly rejected its proposals, breaking is promise of ‘doing things with’ Aboriginal people instead of to them. Turnbull made this decision unilaterally, without any consultation with or regard for the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, a national representative body, or members of the Referendum Council.

In March 2018 the government established another Joint Select Committee that was tasked to again inquire into and report on constitutional change. Its final report endorsed a constitutionally enshrined Voice to Parliament. By the end of 2018, the Labor opposition had promised to establish a Voice for First Nations people and vowed to take the issue of constitutional recognition to referendum if elected to government in 2019.

On 29 September 2022, the inaugural meeting of the Referendum Working Group and the Referendum Engagement Group discussed the steps to a 2023 referendum on a First Nations Voice to Parliament. The Constitutional Alteration (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice) 2023 Bill was introduced to parliament on 30 March 2023. On the same day, a Joint Select Committee was formed to analyse and report on the bill.

The committee heard from witnesses and published submissions, and recommended that parliament pass the bill without amendment. The House of Representatives passed it on 31 May and the Senate did so on 19 June. This meant a referendum would be called within the next six months.

A constitutionally enshrined First Nations Voice to Parliament would offer a first step toward structural and symbolic reform, ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples can have a say about the laws and policies that impact on their lives and communities.

Who sided for and against?

The federal leadership of conservative parties – the Liberal and National parties – did not support the referendum. However, there was some support for the Voice within the conservative parties federally and in some states and territories.

There was also some opposition by a minority of First Nations leaders on the basis that the Voice did not represent an adequate transfer of power and that a treaty should come before any changes to the constitution. But a vast majority of First Nations leaders and organisations supported recognition and voice, as did most civil society organisations and some business organisations.

ANTaR was active in the Yes campaign and worked with others to establish Allies for Uluru. In October 2022 we initiated a Yes to Voice, Truth and Treaty Campaign.

The Yes campaign also received support from international CSOs such as Amnesty International and Oxfam, and its measures were supported by United Nations (UN) experts, and specifically by successive Special Rapporteurs on the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

But the referendum was used by neo-Nazi and QAnon adherents to stoke fear about First Nations peoples’ aspirations.

What kind of disinformation was circulated?

The No side of the debate made a number of false claims ranging from the misleading to clear lies. There were claims that the Voice would be a third chamber of parliament and that it would delay all decision making. There were claims that Australians would lose their homes as a result, and that it would enable First Nations people to establish their own military, and even that it would allow the UN to take over Australia. There were claims that the move was legally risky and that it would divide the nation – although currently the federal government can legislate for First Nations people through the ‘race powers’, a constitutional clause that says the government can make special laws for people of any particular race. So the nation is clearly already divided.

Why do you think the initiative failed, and what will the consequences be?

In Australia referendums rarely succeed, and in fact have never succeeded without support from all major parties.

The No case included much disinformation and fearmongering and a majority of the electorate responded negatively. It should however be noted that many inner-city and inner suburban areas, as well as First Nations-dominated remote areas, voted yes.

Because of this result, there will be little change and First Nations people’s recognition, representation and rights will depend on whoever is in government at the time. First Nations organisations will renew their calls for justice and recognition of their sovereignty and press on issues such as treaty-making, truth-telling and reducing disadvantage by providing greater agency for First Nations communities.

Civic space in Australia is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with ANTaR through its website or Facebook and Instagram pages, and follow @ANTaR_National on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the role of civil society in the response to the recent earthquake in Morocco with Victoria Vrana, Chief Executive Officer at GlobalGiving.

Founded in 2002, GlobalGiving is a nonprofit organisation working to accelerate community-led change. When a crisis happens, GlobalGiving works to quickly deliver funds to vetted organisations that are best suited to lead immediate and long-term relief and recovery.

What can governments do to reduce the damage caused by natural disasters?

Governments play a critical role in disaster response, and there is a global need for enhanced disaster preparedness and risk reduction efforts. Even though every US$1 invested in disaster risk reduction saves US$6 in damages, the current global spending on disaster response is five times higher than the spending on risk reduction. Prioritising disaster-resilient homes and businesses, early warning systems and risk mapping saves lives. Still, relatively little attention is being paid to these essential activities worldwide, leaving the most vulnerable communities, including children, women and low-income families, underprepared when disaster inevitably strikes.

How does civil society help address disasters?

When governments impose aid restrictions or, in the chaotic aftermath of a disaster, block roads or runways, circumventing red tape becomes crucial for delivering aid directly to those in need. During earthquakes, friends, families and neighbours emerge as the true first responders, standing on the frontlines alongside local organisations. The goal of GlobalGiving is to deliver aid into their hands as quickly as possible. We rapidly mobilise resources and make disbursements within a few days after a disaster strikes. 

What work is GlobalGiving doing in Morocco? 

There is an ongoing disaster response with many stakeholders involved. GlobalGiving collaborates with over two dozen vetted nonprofit partners, actively involved in earthquake-affected areas. Many of them are registered and based in Morocco and others have decades of experience working in the country. We focus on empowering those local, community-led organisations to make a lasting impact by providing them with the necessary tools and resources for pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis situations.

GlobalGiving is a safe and trusted organisation with over 20 years of experience accredited by the BBB Wise Giving Alliance and highly rated on Charity Navigator. All donations to the GlobalGiving Morocco Earthquake Relief Fund contribute to relief and recovery efforts in Morocco.

Initially, the fund has been instrumental in addressing survivors’ immediate needs in food, fuel, clean water, medicine and shelter. As time passes, our fund will shift its focus to support recovery efforts. The most significant challenge is rebuilding lives and communities following disaster. Our partners will be working to meet the most pressing needs over the coming months, but the rebuilding process will likely take years, leaving many people without permanent homes in the meantime.

What international support does Morocco currently need, and how can people help?

Some of the greatest needs include food, water, emergency medical supplies and temporary relief and emergency supplies for displaced families. Our partners are also providing mental health and psychosocial support for affected communities, including frontline workers. You can contribute to all these efforts by donating to the GlobalGiving Morocco Earthquake Relief Fund.

History demonstrates that attention shifts elsewhere over the next few weeks after a disaster takes place, but affected communities are left grappling with the impacts for years to come. In the case of Morocco, we’ve already observed a decline in news coverage, leading to diminishing international support. A startling 70 to 80 per cent of disaster funding is directed at short-term relief, with the majority allocated within the first two months of a disaster. Therefore, continuous support to local groups and those with contextual knowledge is of paramount importance.

At GlobalGiving, we advocate for planned donations that help survivors in the long run. So we encourage people to consider making a smaller immediate donation, followed by further contributions over time or, even better, to set up a monthly recurring donation to provide a steady source of income to help communities meet their long-term needs.

When you donate locally in the aftermath of an earthquake or another natural disaster, your contribution goes to organisations that have been living and working in the affected area and are better able to find context-specific solutions. Those people were there before the earthquake hit and will stay long after the news cameras are gone. 

Civic space in Morocco is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with GlobalGiving through its website or Facebook page, and follow @GlobalGiving and @vicvrana on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the struggle for LGBTQI+ rights in Japan with Akira Nishiyama, Deputy Secretary General of the Japan Alliance for Legislation to Remove Social Barriers based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Japan Alliance for LGBT Legislation, J-ALL).

Founded in 2015, J-ALL seeks to remove social barriers based on sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI). It does so by convening consultations, producing research, developing policy proposals, raising awareness among the public and lobbying government officials and legislators.

What are the implications of recent court rulings on same-sex marriage in Japan?

In 2019, five lawsuits were filed at Japanese district courts addressing same-sex marriage. Four out of five court rulings were positive. Nagoya and Sapporo district courts declared that not allowing same-sex marriage was against the Constitution, while Fukuoka and Tokyo district courts ruled that it was ‘in a state of unconstitutionality’.

The Osaka court was the only one to rule negatively on the three constitutional clauses in question. Clause 1 of article 24 says that marriage shall be based on the mutual consent of both sexes, and the court argued that this clause pertains to heterosexual couples only and doesn’t guarantee same-sex marriage. The court affirmed that legal protection for same-sex relationships hasn’t been fully discussed yet and therefore the Civil Code and Family Register Act, which doesn’t recognise same-sex marriage, is not against clause 2 of article 24, which upholds individual dignity and the essential equality of sexes in matters of marriage and family. Finally, the court argued that there are now minimal differences in the treatment of heterosexual and same-sex couples, and so the lack of recognition of same-sex marriage doesn’t violate article 14, which guarantees equality under the law.

Have you seen any positive change in public attitudes to LGBTQI+ people?

Since the lawsuits were filed, there have been significant societal changes. Various surveys indicate public support for same-sex marriage, and over 300 municipalities have introduced a partnership system for same-sex couples.

According to the 2019 research led by Professor Kazuya Kawaguchi from Hiroshima Shudo University, almost 65 per cent of the population supports same-sex marriage, with the percentage reaching 80 per cent among people in their 20s and 30s. Also, almost 88 per cent support legislation prohibiting bullying and discrimination against sexual minorities. Similar results have been observed in other studies.

How positive is the recently adopted law against discrimination?

The law passed in June 2023 is not an anti-discrimination law based on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), because it lacks the tools to address actual cases of discrimination. It should be understood as a ‘SOGI Understanding Law’: it primarily aims to promote public awareness of sexual and gender diversity. It mandates the government to create a basic implementation plan and operational guidelines, publish an annual white paper to monitor progress, conduct academic research and establish a liaison council to coordinate policy implementation. It also encourages ‘efforts’ by national and local governments, employers and schools to promote understanding through awareness-raising, setting up consultation services, educational activities and other necessary measures.

LGBTQI+ groups are concerned that article 12, which states that in implementing the measures each actor shall pay attention to ensure that all citizens can live with ‘peace of mind’ regardless of SOGI, may be interpreted by right-wing groups intentionally to mean that if one person raises concerns, local government cannot implement those measures. However, during the legislative session it was clarified that article 12 was added to emphasise a guiding principle stipulated in article 3, which declares that all citizens, irrespective of their SOGI, are respected as irreplaceable individuals who share basic human rights equally, and unjust discrimination based on SOGI is inexcusable.

Japanese civil society is still uncertain whether this law will have a positive impact, given that the implementation plan and guidelines are yet to be formulated. We hope that the law will be interpretated and applied in accordance with the guiding principles based on a thorough understanding of the legislator’s intention.

Have these legal changes been met with an anti-rights backlash?

This year, anti-LGBTQI+ remarks made by a former secretary of the prime minister in February and Japan’s hosting of the G7 Summit in May accelerated a social movement urging anti-discrimination legislation. As a result, there has been heightened criticism from some conservative members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and religious groups.

Anti-transgender discourse has surged by exploiting women’s anxieties. It has gone along the lines of ‘if the law is passed, men claiming to be women will be able to come into women’s public toilets and baths (‘Sento’ in Japanese)’. A new caucus was formed within the LDP, allegedly to protect the peace of mind and safety of women and the fairness of women’s sports. Members of this caucus submitted a request to the Ministry of Justice to keep the ‘compulsory sterilisation’ requirement for legal gender recognition. The LGBTQI+ community must continue discussions on how to counter this backlash.

What are the next steps in your struggle?

Three crucial steps should be taken. First, a proper anti-discrimination law banning discrimination on the basis of SOGI must be enacted. Second, marriage equality must be recognised.

And third, inhumane requirements for legal gender recognition must be removed through the revision of the Act on Special Cases in Handling Gender Status of Persons with Gender Identity Disorder or the approval of new legislation. The compulsory sterilisation requirement has been criticised both domestically and internationally. Recommendations to eliminate it were formulated by various states at Japan’s Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations Human Rights Council in January 2023. However, the Japanese government did not accept these recommendations. A Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of this requirement is expected by the end of this year, and we hope it’ll mark the beginning of a movement to amend Japan’s gender recognition law.

While many other things must be done to protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ people in Japan, we believe it’s crucial to first amend and enact laws on these three issues.

What international support do you receive, and what is needed?

At the international level, LGBTQI+ organisations from G7 member states, including us, have formed a new civic engagement group named ‘Pride7’ (P7) to highlight human rights violations related to SOGI globally and propose policy recommendations at G7 summits. In March, we organised the P7 summit with activists from G7 and global south countries and, as a result, handed the P7 communiqué to the governments of Japan, the UK and the USA. Additionally, 15 embassies in Japan released a joint video message ahead of the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, urging protection for the rights of LGBTQI+ people and expressing intolerance towards discrimination. With substantial support from the international community, we aim to pass on the P7 presidency to Italy, the host of the 2024 G7 summit.

We would appreciate your support to inform wider audiences about the current situation in Japan. Please follow our activities on our website or social media, and contribute through either a one-time or a monthly donation. If you represent a private company, we invite you to cooperate by adhering to the Declaration of Business Support for LGBT Equality in Japan, which we promote as a part of our global campaign called ‘#EqualityActJapan‘.

Civic space in Japan is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with J-ALL through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @lgbtourengokai on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the human rights situation and the closure of the United Nations (UN) office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda with Dr Livingstone Sewanyana, founder and Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) and UN independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.

Founded in 1991, FHRI is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) working to advance democratic development and fundamental freedoms in Uganda.

What were the achievements of the UN human rights office in Uganda, and why is it closing?

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was established in Uganda during a period of conflict that particularly affected northern Uganda, with a head office in Kampala and regional offices based in north and northeastern Uganda. Its main objective was to promote reconciliation and peacebuilding, which was successfully achieved.

The UN office played a key role in creating awareness among communities about their rights and ways to defend them. It conducted extensive human rights monitoring to expose violations and contributed significantly to building the capacity of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) – the national human rights institution – and various local CSOs through technical assistance and, at times, financial support for their programmes.

After the goal of rebuilding northern Uganda was achieved, the agreement was extended multiple times, with 2023 agreed as a potential cut-off. The Ugandan authorities cite the achievement of its goals as a reason not to prolong the UN office’s mandate. Civil society groups, however, think its closure will result in the loss of a crucial player in the field of human rights, given the critical role it played in terms of democratisation in Uganda, capacity development, technical assistance and human rights monitoring.

How do you assess the work of the UHRC?

The UHRC is entrusted with a broad mandate, encompassing both promotional and protective functions, along with a tribunal for handling human rights complaints. As the national human rights institution, it consistently submits annual reports to parliament.

While the UHRC’s promotional efforts are commendable, challenges arise in its protective role because this requires goodwill from the state. Insufficient resources and lack of political will, particularly on controversial issues, hinder its ability to function effectively.

The UHRC’s independence has always been questioned. Although the authorities may not interfere directly with its work, the lack of executive action on its recommendations undermines its potential and credibility. The UHRC needs more space to execute its mandate effectively.

How does FHRI defend and promote human rights?

For over 32 years, we’ve monitored, documented and reported human rights abuses. Our reports reach various stakeholders, including government, parliament, international bodies, the media and civil society. We also engage with young people through university programmes, fostering an understanding of rights and obligations. We actively assist victims of human rights violations through our legal aid programme, which handles over 1,000 cases every year, and provide mediation and administrative support services.

Our campaigns include a 30-year effort to abolish the death penalty. Although Uganda has retained it, the death penalty is now restricted to the most ‘serious crimes’, and opportunities for a prerogative of mercy have been established. If someone who’s been sentenced to death is not executed within three years, their sentence is automatically commuted to life imprisonment. We have consistently challenged the application of the death penalty in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.

We also engage in legislative advocacy, analysing bills and voicing our position on their human rights implications, as seen in our response to the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2023, which unfortunately retained a provision for the death penalty. However, we succeeded in securing the removal of the mandatory death penalty provision by parliament.

We actively report to the UN Human Rights Council and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As a UN independent expert, I recently presented my sixth report to the Human Rights Council, sharing findings from my visit to the Republic of Georgia.

In sum, our work cuts across community, district, national and international divides. Taking a holistic approach, we conduct awareness raising, capacity development and advocacy campaigns and provide legal protection to victims of abuse through recourse to courts. We are affiliated with the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty and the International Federation of Human Rights Defenders.

What challenges do Ugandan human rights organisations face?

Civic space is getting more and more restricted and civil society is becoming more apprehensive. We have limited funding to carry out our work and regularly face legislative challenges, such as the restrictive Public Order and Management Act of 2013, which constrains assemblies and public meetings.

Civil society groups are confined to operating within the narrow framework of the law, and it’s difficult to expand the frontiers of your work. Recently, 54 CSOs have had to suspend their operations due to non-compliance with the NGO Act 2016.

To ensure the sustainability of our day-to-day operations we need expertise, and retaining experienced staff is difficult due to the potential lure of international organisations.

There’s a need to broaden civic space and ensure an enabling environment for everyone to exercise their rights. For this to happen, the state must implement recommendations from the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process and UN treaty bodies.

What international support do you receive, and what support do you need?

CIVICUS has been instrumental in supporting our human rights monitoring and reporting work. We have submitted several joint reports to the UN Human Rights Council and UN Human Rights Committee.

We also require assistance in capacity development to promote better understanding of the human rights architecture. Most crucially, financial support is needed to empower human rights defenders to participate in forums and carry out their work effectively. In a society grappling with poverty and high unemployment, the demand for technical and financial assistance is high, and human rights organisations are often looked upon as potential providers.

Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with FHRI through its website or Facebook page, and follow @FHRI2 and @LSewanyana on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Céline Danhier, director of O’YES, about the recent conservative backlash to the implementation of a sex and relationships education programme in state schools in Belgium’s Walloon region. Disinformation is spreading, claiming that the programme’s aim is to hypersexualise children, and there have been arson attacks on schools as a result.

O’YES was founded to focus on HIV/AIDS. Since 2011 it has broadened its scope to health promotion while working on the sexual health of young people aged 15 to 30, taking a peer education approach.

What is EVRAS and why has it become controversial?

Education in relational, emotional and sexual life (EVRAS for short) is an educational process aimed at increasing young people’s ability to make informed choices that will help them develop their relational, emotional and sexual life and respect themselves and others. Its aim is to guide each young person towards adulthood by using a comprehensive approach in which sexuality is understood in its broadest sense and includes relational, emotional, social, cultural, philosophical and ethical dimensions.

The relational dimension encompasses social, family, friendship, love, personal and other relationships. The affective dimension includes everything to do with feelings, emotions and self-esteem, while the sexual dimension includes the biological, psychological, affective, legal and ethical aspects of sexuality.

The EVRAS approach is based on the values of respect, equality, acceptance of differences and openness to others. It aims to provide reliable, impartial and comprehensive information to help young people develop a critical mind, ensure their rights are protected, consider the impact of their choices on their wellbeing and that of others and make decisions throughout their lives.

As with all significant advances in women’s rights, such as the pill and the voluntary termination of pregnancy, EVRAS has been the subject of controversy fuelled by small extremist groups.

The entry into force of an inter-ministerial political agreement and reference framework has reignited controversy around EVRAS despite the fact that these activities have taken place in Belgium for over 40 years.

They have been compulsory since 2012, but were made so by a decree that had no clear objectives, procedures or controls to ensure that schools complied with their obligations. For example, a poster on a restroom wall could suffice for a school to be listed as having carried out EVRAS activities. As a result, there was no equal access for all young people. The new agreement will give every young person in grade six of primary school (aged 11 to 12) and in the fourth year of secondary school (aged 15 to 16) access to a guaranteed level of information during their schooling for two hours each year.

Who opposes this, and how has O’YES got involved in the debate?

As explained in a recent article published by public broadcaster RTBF, the disinformation campaign against EVRAS is being waged by a network made up of COVID-19 conspiracy theorists, people immersed in paedo-criminal theories, children’s defence associations and ultra-conservative and far-right associations. It should be noted that it is not just religious groups that are behind the misinformation circulating about EVRAS.

Mainstream media are well informed and, for the most part, treat information objectively. But a serious problem lies with social media and the algorithms that lock in people who view this type of content and persuade them that their arguments are well founded. Social media have a huge influence on people who are undecided.

Mobilising Facebook in relation to hate speech could be an avenue worth exploring. In fact, it’s through these different channels that we’ve launched an information campaign on EVRAS: what it is, what its objectives are and what the issues at stake are regarding public health, combating violence and boosting self-esteem.

Do you see this as part of a broader conservative reaction to advances in sexual and reproductive rights?

There is indeed a conservative and ideological reaction to progress in sexual and reproductive rights. Every time there is a major advance on an issue relating to relationships and emotional and sexual life, conservative movements oppose it. This was the case when the first family planning centres opened in the 1960s.

Anti-EVRAS groups spread disinformation to frighten the public and parents in particular. They use moral panic to divide public opinion and sow doubt among a section of the public that is not aware of the news. The same dynamics have been observed around COVID-19 and vaccination.

The trend was initially viewed as regional but we soon realised it was global, or at least international at the European level. We would therefore like to work on this at a European level. At present, however, we continue working at the national level in order to pass on relevant, coherent and accurate information to people who have questions about EVRAS.

How does O’YES promote the sexual and reproductive rights of young people?

O’YES is a not-for-profit association set up in 2009 by and for young people. It is active in the field of health promotion. Its mission is to train and raise awareness of sexual health issues among young people through peer education in order to change attitudes and improve behaviour over the long term.

O’YES is active throughout the year in the living environments of young people in the Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles – Belgium’s French-speaking community – setting up a series of interactive and educational games, workshops and training courses.

With a view to improving the sexual health of young people, O’YES bases its project on several methods, at the crossroads between the youth, health, education, health promotion and prevention sectors.

Being a youth organisation means addressing a public mainly made up of people under the age of 30 and helping them develop their responsibilities and personal skills. In this way, O’YES helps them become responsible, active, critical and supportive citizens.

’Our field of action is the sexual health of young people, particularly those aged 18 to 30. Sexual health is defined by the World Health Organization as ‘a state of physical, mental and social well-being in relation to sexuality. It requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility of having pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free of coercion, discrimination and violence’.

Peer education is a highly effective means of prevention that has already proved its worth in other countries and in many areas, particularly sexual health. This approach allows sexual health issues to be tackled in a fun and relaxed way while achieving positive, tangible and lasting results. Young people are able to raise awareness among their peers, promote prevention and create teaching tools and innovative campaigns. It’s prevention for young people by young people, without taboos or complexes.

Civic space in Belgium is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with O’YES through its website.

CIVICUS speaks with Jerusalem Girmay, Chief Communications Officer of Omna Tigray, about the state of emergency imposed in Ethiopia and its implications for the Tigray region.

Omna Tigray is an international civil society organisation with members in Australia, Canada, the USA and Europe, focused on fighting injustice, advocating for peace and economic development and amplifying the voices of people in Tigray. 

What’s currently happening in the Tigray region of Ethiopia?

The situation in Tigray is dire and has been marked by several concerning recent developments. One of the most pressing issues is the increasing death toll due to starvation following the suspension of food aid delivery by the US bilateral agency USAID and the World Food Programme. Over 1,000 people have already lost their lives due to lack of food, with no definite timeline for the resumption of aid delivery.

The healthcare situation is also intensifying, with patients suffering from chronic illnesses unable to access medication. The lack of essential medicines has already resulted in the deaths of some patients, highlighting the urgent need for medical supplies.

Additionally, a new wave of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is fleeing western Tigray in an attempt to escape further atrocities and hunger. Some have sought refuge in IDP camps in northwestern Tigray. Ethnic cleansing campaigns persist in towns such as Tselemti, where residents report daily torture and killings, forcing them to identify as ethnic Amharas. IDPs in camps elsewhere face harsh conditions exacerbated by poor weather, as heavy rains have caused flooding and affected shelter conditions.

The presence of the Eritrean army in Tigray, which advanced into various areas in western Tigray in August, adds to the region’s complex and fragile security situation.

The latest report from the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia documents atrocities perpetrated ‘by all parties to the conflict’ since 3 November 2020 – the start date of the armed conflict in Tigray – including mass killings, rape, starvation, destruction of schools and medical facilities, forced displacement and arbitrary detention.

How are Ethiopian authorities dealing with human rights violations by Eritrean troops?

The Ethiopian government continues to allow and tolerate violations by Eritrean troops in Tigray. During the conflict in Tigray, they contributed to abuses by running collaborative operations with Eritrean forces, obstructing humanitarian access, imposing media and communication restrictions and making limited efforts to establish credible investigation and accountability mechanisms.

The continued presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray, especially after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement that supposedly ended the conflict, only fuels human rights abuses. For justice and accountability and to achieve lasting peace and stability in the region it is crucial that these concerns are addressed.

Why has the Ethiopian government pushed for an end to the involvement of international human rights bodies?

The Ethiopian government’s push to end the involvement of international human rights bodies such as the United Nations International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Commission of Inquiry reflects its lack of commitment to transparency and accountability and reluctance to address human rights violations, particularly in Tigray. The government’s proposed transitional justice policy, ‘Policy Options for Transitional Justice in Ethiopia’, was formulated without any substantive and meaningful input from victims – particularly those from Tigray, who have suffered the most from these atrocities – and grassroots organisations. The international community must advocate for continued independent investigations and accountability for human rights violations in Ethiopia.

What is the situation in the rest of Ethiopia?

There is a broader human rights crisis in Ethiopia that extends beyond Tigray. Reports indicate that human rights violations, including violence and displacement, persist in various regions throughout the country.

Successive declarations of a state of emergency, with the most recent imposed on 3 August, have significantly restricted civic space by limiting freedoms of assembly, expression and movement. The Ethiopian government has suppressed civil society and silenced dissenting voices.

In Tigray, these measures exacerbated preexisting challenges, impeding people’s ability to advocate for their rights. The repercussions of these restrictions were especially severe, considering the concurrent humanitarian crisis and conflict. These limitations have had profound consequences in Tigray and across the country, obstructing efforts to address human rights violations.

How has the international community responded to the conflict and crisis?

The international community has responded with varying degrees of concern. While sanctions imposed by the European Union and the USA on some Ethiopian officials have sent a strong message, more international support is necessary to protect human rights and hold perpetrators of violations accountable. Diplomatic efforts and humanitarian aid must be increased to effectively address the ongoing crisis in Tigray and throughout Ethiopia.

Get in touch with Omna Tigray through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @OmnaTigray on Twitter and Instagram.

Civic space in Ethiopia is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

CIVICUS speaks about the activism of North Korean escapees with Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Founded in 2001 and based in the USA, HRNK is a human rights organisation with the principal objective of raising international awareness of North Korea's human rights situation.

Is it possible to carry out any form of activism in North Korea?

No form of activism is possible in North Korea. There is no civil society due to an overwhelming and unprecedented level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment. The markets that emerged following the famine of the 1990s and the newly created domestic mobile phone network allow North Koreans to engage in limited forms of market activity, but even this is subject to state surveillance and control. Every North Korean, regardless of whether they are a member of the ruling party or a government official, belongs to a party-controlled organisation, such as the Youth League or the Women’s Union. Anecdotal information from sources inside the country suggests that there is sporadic opposition and resistance to state agents at the local level, but the regime has gone to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of any organised opposition.

Have there been any recent changes in how the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

Under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the North Korean regime has intensified its crackdown on those attempting to smuggle in information from the outside world or attempting to access such information. In December 2020 the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s highest legislative body, passed the ‘Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law’. This law imposes severe criminal penalties on those who access or disseminate foreign content, including movies, dramas, music and books. The penalties are especially severe, up to a life sentence of hard labour, for those who smuggle in or disseminate South Korean media.

How do people manage to escape North Korea?

Leaving the country without official authorisation is regarded as treason in North Korea. To escape, North Koreans need the assistance of religious networks, international civil society organisations (CSOs) and brokers who operate in the China-North Korea border region. The author and journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick has called this escape route ‘Asia’s underground railroad’. In some cases, family members or relatives who have already escaped pay brokers to arrange the escape. The most common route is through China and Southeast Asia. Upon arrival in Thailand, the escapees either choose to go to South Korea or apply for asylum in other countries.

However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in late 2011, the North Korean regime has intensified border security. The Chinese government has also taken steps that make it more difficult for the escapees to move inside China. In addition, the Chinese government has a longstanding policy of forced returns, whereby it repatriates any North Korean refugees arrested in its territory. This violates China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, since North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution upon return.

This, combined with the COVID-19 border lockdown, means the number of escapees reaching South Korea has plummeted. The highest annual recorded number of arrivals to South Korea was 2,914 in 2009, but this fell to only 67 in 2022. The easing of COVID-related measures is likely to result in a greater number of attempts to flee.

What kind of help do escapees receive?

Most escapees choose to go to South Korea, as they are granted citizenship upon arrival under South Korea’s constitution. The South Korean government provides various forms of economic, educational and job training assistance to North Korean refugees. International and local CSOs also help them adjust to life in South Korea.

The situation is still difficult for many escapees, given how different the two societies have become in over seven decades of division. According to the latest available data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, a total of 34,000 escapees have resettled in South Korea to date. Refugees who choose to go to other countries, including the UK and the USA, primarily receive help from CSOs and other escapees who have already relocated there.

How do escapees work to document and denounce human rights violations in North Korea?

North Korean escapees play a critical role, given their first-hand experience of life under the regime. Many refugees, including those who are survivors of North Korea’s detention facilities, provide vital testimony to CSOs that seek to document and raise awareness of human rights violations in North Korea. Escapee testimony has also played a critical role in the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, whose 2014 report concluded that the North Korean regime has committed crimes against humanity pursuant to policies determined at the highest levels of the state. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea and the Seoul office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to work closely with North Korean escapees.

Some refugees operate their own organisations. In addition to documenting and raising global awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea, they are often involved in sending outside information to North Korean people. Methods they use include radio broadcasts, leaflet balloons flown across the Korean demilitarised zone and rice and micro-SD cards in plastic bottles that are floated across the maritime border between the two Koreas. It is also common for individual escapees to send money to family members in North Korea with the help of brokers.

How does HRNK support escapees?

HRNK works closely with North Korean escapees to document and raise awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Given the lack of on-the-ground access inside North Korea, we employ a methodology that combines satellite imagery analysis, witness testimony and open-source investigation.

Testimonies are often given by escapees who have already resettled in South Korea, although HRNK has sometimes obtained information through refugees with contacts inside North Korea. HRNK has held consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since April 2018 and reports to various UN bodies and hosts side events in Geneva and New York. We have facilitated the participation of North Korean escapees at these events to amplify their voices on the international stage.

What further international support do diaspora activists need?

North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.

Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with HRNK through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @committeehrnk on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about Syria’s ongoing civil war and human rights crisis and its prospects for democratic change with Fadel Abdul Ghany, founder and Executive Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).

Founded in 2011, SNHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) that works to monitor and document human rights violations, protect victims’ rights and hold perpetrators accountable, promoting the conditions for transitional justice and democratic change.

What is the current security situation in Syria?

We have a team of approximately 22 people in Syria that daily monitors and documents human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture and forced displacement. We have published daily reports on the civilian death toll for a decade. In September 2023, 55 civilians, including 12 children, were killed. Ninety-seven were killed in August, 55 in July and 42 in June. In the first half of 2023, 501 civilians lost their lives due to the ongoing conflict. Our monthly reports also cover arbitrary arrests, with 223 cases reported in August and 204 in September.

We document crimes committed by all armed groups involved in the conflict, categorising them by perpetrator. From March 2011 to June 2023, a total of 230,465 civilian deaths were reported, with over 87 per cent attributed to Syrian regime forces and Iranian militias, three per cent to Russian forces and two per cent to ISIS. Based on our reporting and news of grave and pervasive violations no territory in Syria can be considered safe or secure.

What are the working conditions for your colleagues in Syria?

We consider ourselves on the frontline because we document violations on the ground and identify perpetrators. Our team operates discreetly in Syria, either from the office or from their homes using fantasy names. We safeguard their identities for security reasons. Their safety is more important than any documentation.

Our team faces intense pressure, and if arbitrarily arrested, they risk severe torture by the regime led by Bashar al-Assad or other parties. We do our best to protect and provide security education to our staff. Our IT infrastructure is highly secure, and we’ve implemented measures to thwart cyber-attacks, which have included Russian attempts to hack our website.

What’s the situation for Syrian refugees?

Many Syrians aren’t safe in other countries either. In Lebanon and Turkey, refugees face the risk of forced return to Syria in violation of international law, specifically the 1951 Refugee Convention. Conditions are dire, with Syrians often blamed for economic hardship in host countries, even though Lebanon and Turkey receive substantial funding from the European Union and other donors to welcome refugees.

The feeling of insecurity and lack of proper protection in neighbouring countries, which host over 70 per cent of refugees, drive Syrians towards-called ‘death boats’ to seek safety elsewhere in Europe. The international community should better distribute the responsibility of welcoming refugees, because the current allocation isn’t fair.

What should the international community do to address Syria’s dire human rights and humanitarian situation?

The international community must intensify efforts to achieve a political transition and end Syria’s 13-year-long conflict, which is taking a lot of lives and causing immense suffering, with widespread torture and forced displacement of half the Syrian population. Any prospect of political transition has been absent due to insufficient international pressure on all parties in the conflict, and particularly on the Assad regime, leaving the Syrian people and the conflict largely neglected.

The international community must actively support efforts to fight impunity. The Assad regime has got away with numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity. There should be a collective effort to bring justice. If accountability is to be achieved, it also requires a political transition leading to the establishment of independent local courts.

Chinese and Russian veto power at the United Nations Security Council obstructs the referral of war crimes to the International Criminal Court. With limited universal jurisdiction, only 27 sentences have been issued in Germany and other countries against Syrian war criminals, mostly from non-state terrorist groups such as Al-Nusra or ISIS.

True accountability requires dismantling the Assad regime, the Syrian National Army, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Islamist organisation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other non-elected entities ruling Syria through fear.

Aid should be directed to people affected by the recent earthquake and those displaced in northwest and northeast Syria. Continuous assistance is also vital for Middle Eastern states hosting most Syrian refugees. Such comprehensive support on a large scale is essential for advancing the Syrian movement toward democracy.

How is Syrian civil society working for a transition to democracy?

Syrian civil society continues to protest to demand respect for human rights, investigates rights violations and expose perpetrators based on the principle of equality and promote human rights through education. We work hard to spread the culture of human rights in a country with one of the world’s worst human rights records and to get rid of a decades-long dictatorship.

SNHR publishes reports and statements urging a halt to violations and providing recommendations to other states. We conduct in-depth bilateral meetings with various foreign ministries, including those of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA, and convene other high-level meetings. We actively participate in and organise advocacy events. The most recent, held on 21 September, focused on human rights violations and avenues for accountability and was co-hosted by the USA and co-sponsored by France, Germany, Qatar and the UK.

I believe the international community should also provide substantial financial and logistical support to active Syrian CSOs that have played a significant role in the Syrian civil war and have, to some extent, replaced the state.

What has triggered recent protests across Syria?

Since early August, many regime-controlled areas of Syria have witnessed peaceful civil demonstrations. People took to the streets because they felt even more hopeless following Assad’s interview with Sky News Arabia on 9 August. He didn’t apologise nor did he express any willingness to change the way he’s ruling the country. Instead, he said that if he could go back to 2011, he would kill even more people than he did.

There are ongoing protests in areas of northern Syria that aren’t controlled by the regime. Protesters seek to hold the Syrian regime responsible for the worsening economic, social and political conditions. Their calls echo those of the 2011 Arab Spring: they demand an end to family rule and a transition to democracy, freedom of speech, the release of illegally detained people and accountability for perpetrators. Their major message is that Assad must go.

We have monitored and documented multiple vicious methods used by the regime’s security forces to suppress protests, including arrest, torture, enforced disappearances and prosecution of hundreds of protesters. The regime uses its media outlets to slander protesters or anyone criticising it as traitors or collaborators working with foreign entities. The Syrian regime has also attempted to stage counter-demonstrations with loyalists chanting pro-regime slogans and threatening anyone opposing the regime.

Civic space in Syria is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with SNHR through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @snhr and @FADELABDULGHANY on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with about civil society work in Eritrea’s context of closed civic space with Helen Kidan, chairperson of the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR).

Founded in 2003 and based in South Africa, EMDHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that raises awareness about the lack of civil and democratic freedoms and promotes the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Eritrea.

What’s the situation for civil society in Eritrea?

Eritrea has never truly implemented its 1997 Constitution and until Eritrea it is run by the rule of law, human rights abuses will continue with no recourse to justice. This includes completely closed civil society space, with no semblance of rights of association, assembly and expression.

Since Proclamation No. 145 of 2005 went into effect nearly two decades ago, there has been no independent civil society in Eritrea. According to this law, the only way CSOs can implement programmes is in partnership with government agencies, which restrict the areas, themes and focus of the projects that can be implemented. There are obviously very few CSOs present and active in Eritrea.

The only way to start creating any space for independent CSOs in Eritrea would be to have Proclamation 145/2005 revoked.

What is EMDHR doing to try to improve the situation?

EMDHR advocates against the ongoing human rights abuses in Eritrea as well as for the rights of Eritrean refugees in the diaspora. Our mission is to promote and defend human right values as established in international legal instruments and advance democratic change, rule of law and constitutionalism in Eritrea, with the ultimate aim of building a society in which people exercise their basic rights and live in peace, dignity and prosperity.

We provide training, sustain networks and produce and disseminate information to create awareness of the situation of Eritreans. We have made several presentations at the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in Geneva, and in July 2022 we made a presentation at the UN in New York.

We are currently working with African CSOs to bring the ongoing crisis in Eritrea to the African level and get support for Eritrean refugees. We have also commissioned a report on the state of Eritrean CSOs that makes recommendations to the international community.

In early September 2023 we co-organised the Africa Civil Society Organisations Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Through a joint project with Africa Monitors, Eritrean Satellite Television and Eritrean Diaspora for East Africa, a CSO based in Kenya, we have provided training to Eritrean human rights activists, including on digital activism, and created a space for Eritrean CSOs and activists to be able to work together.

In 2019 we provided in-person training in a workshop held in Uganda. In 2017 we co-organised a conference in Brussels on the ongoing Eritrean refugee crisis, with which we tried to elicit a reaction from members of the European Parliament, commissioners and CSOs from across Europe. And in 2015 we campaigned and got asylum for Eritrean footballers in Botswana.

What’s it like to be a diaspora activist? How do you connect with activists within Eritrea?

It’s extremely frustrating because it makes our work less effective. Connecting with people inside Eritrea is very hard as internet penetration in Eritrea is only two per cent. The government basically controls all media: all independent media ceased to exist in 2001. This is why most information is brought to us by people who have recently left the country. But while the work is challenging, it is still possible to get information. And when the government reacts to our work, we know what we do is making an impact.

A lot of funders provide funds to African organisations only when they operate in their home country. The fact that we are not able to operate inside Eritrea means we also suffer financially and hence a lot of Eritrean CSOs are forced to sustain themselves on the basis of voluntary work.

Additionally, the work remains emotionally and psychologically draining, as many Eritrean activists in the diaspora are threatened with harm to family members still living in Eritrea for speaking out against the regime back home.

As Eritrean human rights defenders, even if you are operating outside the country, the government will always discredit your work. All those that don’t agree with them are seen as traitors. The government uses social media as a means of trolling and tries to attack websites and other social media channels.

What sparked recent protests by Eritrean refugees in Israel, and how has the Israeli government responded?

Those protests appeared to have been organised by a new group called Brigade N’Hamedu, which is trying to overthrow the regime. Their members hold demonstrations across the world, and they particularly attack the festivals that the regime holds abroad, which they view as a means of raising funds for the regime and spreading its propaganda. They are tired of government interference and intimidate Eritreans who have left their country but still support the Eritrean government. They want all Eritreans who claim asylum but express support for the Eritrean government to have their asylum revoked.

This is a movement of young Eritreans but a lot of veterans and older members of the community support them, as they see them as the most plausible means of removing the regime. Although they have succeeded in mobilising Eritreans, however, there seems to be no clear strategy and this could be a stumbling block. They are very unlikely to succeed.

In response to these protests, and using their unprecedented violence as an excuse, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he wants all Eritreans removed from Israel. The predicament of Eritreans in Israel was already dire, but this has now opened the doors for the far-right government in Israel to deport all Eritreans. However, the UN, Israeli human rights groups and other human rights groups outside Israel are asking that genuine refugees whose lives are at risk not be deported to Eritrea.

Civic space in Eritrea is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with EMDHR through its website or Facebook page, and follow @emdhrorg on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the recent Supreme Court ruling decriminalising abortion in Mexico with Brenda Rodriguez, communications coordinator of Information Group on Reproductive Choice (GIRE, Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida).

GIRE is a feminist and human rights organisation that has been working for almost 30 years so that women and other people with the capacity to bear children can exercise their reproductive rights.

What is the current state of abortion rights in Mexico?

In recent years, Mexico has made rapid progress in making abortion a guaranteed health service for all women and people with the capacity to bear children. Currently, 12 states have partly decriminalised voluntary abortion, but another 20 still consider it a crime.

Even in states where abortion has been decriminalised access to the procedure for all women and pregnant people is not guaranteed. Barriers to access are a constant.

So there is still a long way to go. Among the many pending issues is the need to stop considering abortion a crime and, instead, to include it in health and public policy regulations to ensure information is provided and guidelines are published guaranteeing comprehensive, safe and quality care.

Why is the recent Supreme Court ruling important?

The ruling issued by the Supreme Court on 6 September was a landmark achievement. This ruling decriminalised abortion at the federal level, forcing the Congress of the Union to repeal the articles of the Federal Penal Code that criminalise abortion. As a result, institutions that are part of the federal health system, such as the Mexican Institute of Social Security and the Institute of Security and Social Services for State Workers, will have to provide this service throughout Mexico to anyone requesting it.

This will have a major impact because these institutions serve the majority of the Mexican population, and a trend long observed by GIRE is that these institutions deny service under the argument that abortion is a crime under the Federal Criminal Code, the legislation that applies to the health personnel serving in them.

The Congress’s obligation to repeal the crime of abortion at the federal level will become effective once it receives formal notification from the Court, and must be implemented in the course of that same session.

Do you see this court ruling as a victory of the Mexican women’s movement?

The recent Court ruling marks a before and after in the struggle for reproductive justice, and it would not have been possible without the tireless commitment of feminist movements at local, national, regional and global levels, of which GIRE is a part.

The cultural change driven by the feminist movement throughout the Latin American region has been key to advances in pro-choice regulation and social decriminalisation and access to abortion as a health service.

GIRE has worked for the right to choose for over 30 years, during which time it has worked hand in hand with decision-makers, the media, public opinion and many organisations and collectives. The road travelled has resulted in a strong network on all fronts that has socially decriminalised abortion on the basis of the recognition of reproductive autonomy as a right.

Our work has been comprehensive. We have produced reports on the state of abortion rights in Mexico and made specific recommendations to ensure that access is guaranteed as a health service. We have carried out public policy advocacy and supported cases challenging human rights violations caused by the denial of the right to abortion. Our communications work has also been key, helping us place the issue of abortion on the public agenda, contributing to its social decriminalisation.

The strategy to repeal the crime of abortion at the federal level kicked off two years ago. In September 2021, in response to an action of unconstitutionality against the penal code of the state of Coahuila, the Federal Supreme Court unanimously declared that the absolute criminalisation of consensual abortion is unconstitutional. In September 2022, based on this precedent and as part of a legal strategy to eliminate the crime of self-procured and consensual abortion from all criminal codes, GIRE filed an appeal for legal protection against the Federal Congress and executive for having issued a regulation that criminalised consensual abortion.

It was in response to this amparo appeal – a writ for protection of rights – that the Court reiterated that the absolute criminalisation of abortion violates the human rights of women and pregnant people.

Have you experienced an anti-rights reaction?

There are conservative reactions and resistances all the time, but unlike what used to happen until a few years ago, these are no longer so up-front. The most important barrier we face today is the absence of service guarantees, as in some states where voluntary abortion has been partly decriminalised those who would have to provide it continue to put up obstacles. Conservative resistance is even more intense in the 20 state congresses that have yet not reformed their penal codes, but we are confident this will change.

Although there are never guarantees that backsliding won’t occur, we currently have the advantage of a very pro-choice public opinion.

What measures need to be taken to ensure effective access to abortion throughout Mexico?

From a human rights perspective, it is necessary to guarantee access to quality health services, including abortion procedures. For this to become a reality, abortion should no longer be included in criminal codes and should instead only be subject to health and public policy regulations that ensure that information is provided and guidelines published that ensure comprehensive, safe and quality care. GIRE will continue to work to ensure that the crime of abortion disappears from all of Mexico’s state penal codes and access to the service is guaranteed in practice for all people throughout Mexico.

Is the Mexican process part of a broader regional trend?

The green tide that rose in Argentina in 2018 permeated the entire region with a force never seen before. Latin American streets have been filled with green scarves – a symbol of autonomy and freedom – and pro-choice slogans. GIRE is a prominent member of this Latin American movement, establishing alliances, creating strategies and new narratives, and sharing knowledge with organisations working throughout the region to make abortion rights a reality.

This inspiration will continue to guide us. Our movement is unstoppable. In Mexico, the green tide and its libertarian impulse is materialising in the demand, put forward in coordination with other groups and movements, for reproductive rights to cease to be considered an issue that only concerns women and child-bearing people and to be incorporated into the political agenda as a key element of equality.

Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with GIRE through its website or Facebook page, and follow @gire_mx on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about recent arrests of leading environmental activists in Vietnam with Penelope Faulkner, President of Quê Me: Vietnam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR). The crackdown came just months after the Vietnamese government signed a deal to receive billions of dollars of international aid to tackle climate change, partly on the condition that it would involve grassroots activists in the effort.

VCHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) founded in Paris in 1975 to promote and defend civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in Vietnam. Working closely with other CSOs, it monitors human rights abuses, informs international opinion through reports and press alerts and mobilises international support for human rights and the release of prisoners of conscience in Vietnam.

Has the situation of Vietnamese climate activists improved following the deal signed by the government to receive international aid to tackle climate change?

The jailing of prominent climate activist Hòang Thị Minh Hồng on bogus charges of tax evasion answers your question. Hòang Thị Minh Hồng is founder and former CEO of CHANGE, a CSO that advocates for action on climate change, the environment and wildlife protection. She is a high-profile environmental activist and former Obama Foundation scholar, and was listed by Forbes magazine in 2019 as one of the 50 most influential women in Vietnam. She was forced to close CHANGE in 2022 in the wake of the arrests of other environmental rights activists, after being harassed by the government.

Her arrest therefore came as a shock, but not a surprise. Her arrest is eminently political, because she has access to a high-level audience in the global environmental community, and her actions and international appeals have a strong influence on the movement for climate change worldwide.

Hòang Thị Minh Hồng was arrested in June 2023. The Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was signed in late 2022. To secure this US$15.5 billion deal, Vietnam pledged to involve civil society in accelerating the country’s shift from coal to renewable energy. Yet six months later, they broke this pledge, and the crackdown continues.

Just this month, Vietnam arrested another prominent environmental rights defender, Ngô Thị Tố Liên, executive director of the Vietnam Initiative for Energy Transition. It is still unclear what charges she faces, but the trumped-up charge of tax evasion is a predictable option. At the time of her arrest, her organisation was working with the United Nations (UN) Development Programme to help implement the JETP.

Ms Tố Liên is the seventh high-profile environmental rights defender arrested since the government launched this crackdown in June 2021. Vietnam clearly has no political will to respect its international commitments, and the repression of grassroots activists is bound to continue.

Why is the Vietnamese government cracking down on the grassroots climate movement?

Up until now, government repression had largely been targeted at political and religious dissidents, human rights defenders and activists calling for freedom and political reforms. Vietnam uses political repression, threats, harassment, arrests and detention under vaguely worded ‘national security’ provisions in the Criminal Code to crack down ruthlessly on bloggers, journalists, followers of non-recognised religious groups, people who participate in demonstrations and civil society activists from all walks of life. At least 200 prisoners of conscience are languishing in Vietnam’s prisons today, some serving sentences of up to 20 years in extremely harsh conditions.

Until recently, the Vietnamese government did not perceive environmental rights defenders as a threat. On the contrary, the authorities have benefited massively from the diverse activities of Vietnamese associations in the fields of development and environmental protection, as well as from the substantial contributions of international CSOs working in Vietnam. In a recent report published in official media, Vietnam said it had received over US$677 million from international environmental CSOs between 2020 and 2022.

Two elements drastically changed this: the ratification of the European Union (EU)-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), which came into force in August 2020, and the impact of the rising global movement to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

As in all EU free trade agreements, EVFTA provides for a civil society pillar to monitor implementation of the chapter on trade and sustainable development, which includes environmental issues and labour rights. The pillar consists of two domestic advisory groups (DAGs), one in the EU and one in Vietnam.

Mai Phan Lợi and Bạch Hùng Dương, leaders of the Centre for Media Educating Community, and lawyer Đặng Đình Bách, chair of the Law and Policy of Sustainable Development Research Centre, were Steering Committee members of VNGO-EVFTA, a civil society network created in Vietnam to raise awareness about EVFTA and encourage participation in the Vietnamese DAG. As such, they actively promoted the independent role of civil society in the monitoring process.

These actions put them at odds with the government, whose intent was to maintain the Vietnamese DAG under tight state control. In June 2022, the three men were arrested and sentenced to terms of 30 months to five years in prison for alleged tax evasion. On 10 September 2023, just one day before US President Joe Biden’s visit to Vietnam, Mai Phan Lợi was given early release. But Đặng Đình Bách, who has refused to plead guilty or repay any alleged tax demands, is serving a five-year sentence in Prison No. 6 in Nghe An, where conditions are extremely harsh.

How did the global movement against fossil fuels become a factor in the crackdown?

The Vietnamese government hates losing face. It tolerates activists when they support government development programmes but has zero tolerance for criticism, especially in the international arena. And the ‘crime’ of this new generation of climate change activists in the eyes of the Vietnamese government is to speak out openly to advocate for cleaner energy policies in Vietnam.

Đặng Đình Bách joined 353 CSOs from 58 countries in signing a letter to  the G7 Summit calling on world leaders to ‘stop all fuel finance from bilateral and multilateral funding sources, and encourage other governments to do the same’. Award-winning environmentalist Ngụy Thị Khanh, who was also sentenced to two years in prison for tax evasion in June 2022, had written to the government to denounce the disconnect between Vietnam’s international pledges to reduce carbon emissions and the Communist Party’s Power Development Plan aimed at building 27 new coal-fired power plants between 2021 and 2030. She also signed the Hanoi Declaration alongside other CSOs calling on the government to ‘guarantee implementation of provisions in the 2013 Constitution and related texts concerning grassroots democracy, which require consultations with the people and people’s representatives on energy projects from the very moment of their conception’.

For Vietnam, these high-level public declarations are tantamount to threats against national security, and the authorities decided to silence their voices by any means. To avoid international condemnation, instead of charging them under national security laws, it has resorted to the old pretext of tax evasion charges, using loopholes and vague wording in tax laws to silence environmental rights defenders.

Our organisation, VCHR, was among the first to denounce this crackdown on environmental rights defenders, which we see as the tip of the iceberg in a new and far-reaching assault on civil society, and we continue to denounce this at every opportunity. This month we presented the human rights situation in Vietnam at a meeting of the EU DAG in Brussels.

How much space for civil society is there in Vietnam?

In Vietnam’s one-party state, the space for civil society has always been restricted. However, in recent years the authorities have developed a whole range of tools, including new laws, technologies and repressive methods to stifle civil society voices.

Despite government censorship, the internet used to provide a vital space for civil society, but the Cybersecurity Law and other regulations have seriously affected freedom of expression online. One prominent blogger, Nguyễn Anh Tuấn, recently left Vietnam to live in Canada because since the Cybersecurity Law came into force in 2019 he had found it impossible to continue any meaningful activism.

To suppress protests, the government has set up squads of anti-riot police all over the country who are ready to intervene at a local level to nip protests in the bud and prevent them gaining momentum.

New regulations have been enacted to limit CSO access to international funding and ban them organising conferences on topics such as human rights. We have documented these, and many other developments, in a recent report we published jointly with the International Federation for Human Rights. Despite these difficulties, civil society activists keep on. They are extremely brave and resilient. I admire them immensely.

These restrictions also make it extremely difficult for CSOs such as VCHR, based in Paris, to support activists in Vietnam. We stay in contact with movements in Vietnam and circulate information in Vietnamese. VCHR has also conducted in-country human rights training, notably on freedom of religion or belief for the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam’s youth movement. However, the responsibility of supporting activists without putting them in danger is extremely heavy, and this work is getting increasingly difficult. I can happily say that no one was ever arrested because of VCHR’s training or other programmes, and this was thanks to the trust and confidence built over many years working in Vietnam.

What international support does Vietnamese civil society need?

The international community should do far more to denounce Vietnam’s repressive policies and practices. As a human rights defender for many decades, I am always surprised how Vietnam manages to escape condemnation for human rights abuses that would cause outcry if they happened in China, Myanmar or elsewhere. Political prisoners are dying in Vietnam due to ill-treatment and lack of medical care. Journalists and bloggers are serving 10 or 15-year sentences simply for exchanging emails. Now environmental activists are being imprisoned for trying to create a cleaner environment for their people. Yet at the same time, the UN Secretary-General applauds Vietnam at the UN General Assembly as a shining example of a country committed to climate change. How can this be?

Economic pressure should be applied when Vietnam fails to uphold its commitments. The JETP should be blocked until Vietnam releases all environmental rights defenders, ceases the current crackdown and guarantees the involvement of civil society in this process. Countries with bilateral trade agreements should use them to press for human rights progress in Vietnam. So much can be done. VCHR is doing its best to amplify the voices of activists in Vietnam and engage in international advocacy to call for greater pressure from the international community. It is a long and hard path, but I believe that in the long run, as the song goes, we shall overcome.

Get in touch with VCHR through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @vchr2016 on Twitter.

Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

CIVICUS speaks about the closure of the United Nations (UN) office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda with Robert Kirenga, Executive Director of the National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders-Uganda (NCHRD-U).

Founded in 2013, NCHRD-U is a civil society organisation (CSO) that coordinates Ugandan human rights defenders (HRDs) to work collectively to safeguard their work and protect their safety.

What work did the UN human rights office in Uganda do?

The UN human rights office in Uganda had a great impact on human rights over its 18 years. Initially, when Uganda was still plagued by a civil war that lasted almost 20 years, this office was instrumental in addressing human rights concerns in the conflict and post-conflict period. The UN set up sub-regional offices to monitor, document and report on the human rights situation and build state and non-state capacities in the field of human rights protection and promotion.

The UN office cooperated well with law enforcement agencies, the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), which is the national human rights institution, and CSOs. By supporting or holding joint activities aimed at defending human rights, the UN contributed to the visibility of various national institutions. It provided civic education materials to enhance the capacities of HRDs to understand, appreciate and apply treaty and charter-based mechanisms for upholding human rights in Uganda. Sometimes the UN provided funding for initiatives commemorating international human rights events, including Human Rights Defenders Day on 9 December, Human Rights Day on 10 December, International Day for Persons with Disabilities on 3 December and the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture on 26 June, among others.

Why is the UN office closing, and what’s been the reaction of Ugandan human rights organisations?

The UN human rights office is closing because the Ugandan government decided not to renew or extend its mandate, stating it believes it has fulfilled its role. Reactions to this decision have been mixed, with some feeling it was premature, as the office had still significant work to do, particularly since it was providing crucial support to the severely underfunded UHRC.

The closure of the office also had a significant impact on its employees and service providers, as it resulted in job losses and affected the income of landlords and other service suppliers. Many CSOs that had joint programmes with the UN office are experiencing a serious gap in their operations.

Some believed the local capacities the UN had developed over time were sufficient for local institutions to take on the responsibility of protecting and promoting human rights in Uganda, while others argued that the office had become compromised by the condition that whatever it did had to be in a joint venture with the UHRC. This led some to perceive the office as weak and ineffective when it came to reporting on and condemning significant human rights abuses during the 2021 general election, which included extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and torture.

How do you assess the work of the UHRC?

The UHRC has made efforts despite being underfunded. Its robust legal and policy gives it the authority to carry out its mandate impartially, so what it truly needs are human and financial resources so it can execute the full range of its duties. In can be independent if it’s adequately resourced and its members are guaranteed the security of tenure.

For a long time, the UHRC was hampered by lack of leadership due to the executive’s delays in appointing its members. There’s a public perception that appointees serve the interests of the appointing authority rather than the country, as the appointment process lacks public involvement and rigorous scrutiny. The appointment procedure must be reformed to become more transparent and participatory, embedding scrutiny at every stage, from nominations to parliamentary vetting.

The UHRC has also faced criticism for not fully exercising its powers, including the ability to summon state officials accused of serious human rights violations to hold them accountable and use quasi-judicial powers such as the power to release unlawfully detained people.

What work does NCHRD-U do?

Our mission as a coalition of HRDs is to safeguard the rights of HRDs and advance their work in a secure environment by collaborating with national, regional and international like-minded organisations. We pursue this mission in three key programme areas: capacity building, emergency support and protection, and advocacy.

In our capacity-building programme, we focus on enhancing the capabilities of HRDs to maintain their personal security, including digital safety. Our emergency support and protection initiative provides assistance from various security angles to HRDs under threat. Our advocacy efforts focus on improving the working conditions for HRDs by advocating for conducive laws and policies that protect human rights activism within local jurisdictions.

We also serve as the coordinating body for UN Charter and treaty-based mechanisms in Uganda. In this capacity, we bring together Ugandan CSOs to prepare and compile shadow reports for the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process and human rights treaty bodies.

What human rights violations are experienced by LGBTQI+ people in Uganda?

LGBTQI+ people face human rights violations and abuse from a homophobic and intolerant society. They are often victims of discrimination in employment, are forcibly evicted by landlords and subjected to humiliation, derogatory name-calling, arrests, physical assaults and, in extreme cases, homicide. LGBTQI+ people can’t register organisations to advance their rights and can’t exercise their freedom of expression due to the fear of being identified, so they’re denied basic human rights. Communities are hostile to LGBTQI+ people. In essence, they do not enjoy the same freedoms and rights as others in society.

As for the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2023, there appears to be some confusion and a lack of clarity around the fact that it criminalises homosexual acts, not the fact of being homosexual. But there are mixed signals regarding who can be prosecuted under the act and what charges they can face. The law was enacted in May 2023 and is in effect. The best that civil society could do was file a petition at the Constitutional Court questioning its constitutionality, and we are currently awaiting a hearing date.

What are conditions for human rights organisations in Uganda?

We face a number of challenges ranging from accessibility of financial resources to a restrictive legal environment that imposes redundant documentation and information requirements from different statutory bodies that often overlap and are very costly, cumbersome and time-consuming.

Moreover, we confront threats of closure, non-renewal of operating licences, illegal freezing of organisational accounts and intimidation, mainly from overzealous state officials, including arrests and assaults, particularly when attempting to exercise the right to protest.

Ability to operate in this challenging context varies among organisations. Some adopt a cautious approach and practise self-censorship, while others have become even more resilient and continue to pursue their agendas while challenging the status quo through legal avenues. While not many independent CSOs have had to shut down or relocate, the inability to mobilise resources and the long suspension and eventual winding up of the Democratic Governance Facility, a donor vehicle that supported CSOs, have heavily contributed to the crisis we are currently facing.

Some resources and funding continue to flow into human rights organisations from foreign missions accredited in Uganda and international organisations and foundations headquartered outside the country. However, there is a pressing need for solidarity with human rights CSOs facing challenges related to obtaining operating licences and funding constraints. Such international support is crucial to keep them afloat so they can continue their vital work.

Civic space in Uganda is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with NCHRD-U through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @NCHRD_UG and @BRKirenga on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Sieger Sloot, an actor and climate activist from a Dutch branch of Extinction Rebellion (XR), and Marjolein Kuijers, policy officer on the right to protest at the Dutch section of Amnesty International, about the government’s reaction to climate protests in the run-up to parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in November.

XR is a global decentralised network of climate activists working to compel governments to address climate change and prevent biodiversity loss and ecological collapse through the use of non-violent civil disobedience tactics.

How have relationships between the Dutch government and climate activists changed in recent months?

Sieger Our government has not initiated any communication with us. While we have had limited interaction with the municipality of The Hague regarding our protests, our demands have never been addressed. In fact, it seems that authorities are responding to our actions with increasing force and more assertive rhetoric.

In August, seven out of the eight XR activists who had been arrested on charges of sedition were found guilty. Their convictions were based on the accusation that they had encouraged others to participate in a protest. The court in The Hague sentenced five of them to 30 hours of community service and the remaining two to 60 hours of community service.

On 9 September, around 25,000 people marched with us along the A12 highway in The Hague, calling for an end to government subsidies for the fossil fuel industry. During the demonstration, police used water cannon to disperse protesters. The police detained a total of 2,400 people, including minors.

What happened in a recent dialogue with the authorities on the right to protest?

Marjolein: On 7 September there was a roundtable on the right to protest held by the Committee on Internal Affairs with the participation of civil society activists and experts. Some local authorities were also present: the mayors of The Hague and Utrecht, two major cities, Amsterdam’s chief public prosecutor and its police chief, and a former police officer with extensive experience in the field of assemblies. Topics included the importance and scope of the right to protest, measures required to safeguard this right and an examination of whether it is currently under attack. The need to revise the Public Assemblies Act was also discussed.

Protesters voiced concerns about feeling distrusted by the authorities and noted unwillingness to listen to their experiences and lack of transparency in the decision-making process regarding the right to peaceful assembly. Authorities responded by raising concern over protesters crossing the line with civil disobedience actions and stated that it would be desirable to develop additional regulations and further guidelines on the scope of the right to protest and whether protection under this right applies to certain actions, even though experts emphasised that the existing legislation is suitable and functional. Instead of adding provisions to existing legislation, Amnesty Netherlands and others have argued that some provisions, like the one enabling local authorities to ban a protest based solely on a lack of formal notification, should be eliminated as they permit undue restrictions. Interestingly, local authorities suggested that protesters should challenge restrictive decisions before a court, letting judges determine their legitimacy. However, this approach poses yet another barrier to the exercise of the human right to protest.

The government’s reasonings clearly illustrate why the right to protest is under attack in the Netherlands. It is a fundamental right that should be protected, respected and fulfilled. The authorities should take the peacefulness of protesters as a starting point and facilitate protests as much as possible. Restrictions should be the exception rather than the rule. Amnesty Netherlands, as well as others, has emphasised that the authorities should shift their perspective away from viewing assemblies and protesters as potential risks to be contained, and instead recognise them as concerned citizens expressing their opinions. The authorities should take the first steps to rebuild trust between them and protesters, starting by engaging in open dialogue more.

The fact that these issues were discussed among such a diverse group of participants, including protesters, local authorities and experts, holds significant importance. Hopefully, this dialogue will contribute to a better understanding of the scope and significance of the right to protest. This roundtable was the first step leading up to a parliamentary discussion that will take place later this year.

What are your next steps?

Sieger: We will continue to hold protests until the government of the Netherlands stops using public funds to subsidise the oil and gas industry. A recent study conducted by the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, in collaboration with the Dutch branch of Friends of the Earth and Oil Change International, revealed that every year the Dutch government provides around €37.5 billion (US$39.9 billion) in subsidies to industries reliant on fossil fuels. The report identifies 31 government subsidies, primarily in the form of tax breaks, that make it cheaper for companies to produce and consume fossil fuels, including oil, gas and coal. The largest share of these subsidies, amounting to €6.7 billion (US$7.1 billion), is directed towards the Dutch shipping industry.

For the record, every time we block a road in The Hague, our crowd more than doubles in size the next time. I anticipate this trend to continue in the future as more and more people are joining our cause.

Is climate change a campaign issue in the run-up to parliamentary elections?

Sieger: Our call to cease all fossil fuel subsidies immediately has garnered support from several Dutch political parties, finding its place in their election campaigns. The European Union’s climate chief Frans Timmermans resigned from this position to lead the centre-left coalition of the Labour Party and the Green Left in the elections.

However, some right-wing parties don’t even mention the climate crisis in their programmes. So who wins matters. It will carry significant weight in determining the future course of our country.

How have farmers’ protests impacted on Dutch politics?

Sieger: Farmers have organised, protested and formed a political party to oppose the government’s plans to cut livestock numbers or close farms in return for money aimed at cutting nitrogen emissions as ordered by a 2019 Supreme Court ruling. The farmers’ protests have influenced the government’s negotiations with agricultural organisations, which however concluded without any tangible results, requiring the new government to start them all over again. Meanwhile, many farmers are starting to recognise the challenges of sustaining their struggle.

The outcome of the elections will play a pivotal role, but in any case it’s clear that emissions must be reduced, meaning a compromise has to be reached.

What international support do Dutch climate activists need?

Sieger: Coverage by international media outlets, as well as influential individuals mentioning our protests online help us a lot. We appreciate that civil society organisations are advocating to safeguard our right to protest, and we welcome any assistance from international organisations such as the United Nations.

Civic space in the Netherlands is rated ‘open’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with XR through its website or Facebook page, and follow @ExtinctionR on Twitter.

Get in touch with Amnesty Netherlands through its website or Facebook page, and follow @amnestynl on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks with Alba Adriana Jiménez Patlán, director of the Network for Sexual and Reproductive Rights in Mexico (ddeser), about the historic ruling of the Mexican Supreme Court decriminalising abortion at the federal level.

Ddeser is a citizen network of women and young activists that disseminates information and defends, demands and monitors respect for sexual and reproductive rights in Mexico.

What is the current state of abortion rights in Mexico?

There are many shades of grey. To date, voluntary termination of pregnancy up to the 12th week of gestation, without the need to provide reasons, is legal in 12 of Mexico's 32 states. It is therefore necessary both to continue to push for decriminalisation in the 20 remaining states and to enable access to abortion services throughout Mexico. To really work for women, laws have to be implemented. Decriminalisation is a great first step, but it is still important to act to counter the denial of effective access to services.

What impact will the recent Supreme Court ruling have?

The ruling issued by the Supreme Court on 30 August, in response to an amparo appeal – a writ for protection of rights – filed by a civil society organisation (CSO), is very important. In the past, when cases like this came before the Court, we were always silenced with the excuse that states are sovereign to make decisions on these issues. But the Supreme Court has changed a lot in the last decade, and the decriminalisation of abortion through the courts in the state of Coahuila, and then in Aguascalientes, opened the way for the decriminalisation of abortion at the federal level.

As a result of this ruling, the women who have abortions and those who accompany them will no longer be criminalised throughout Mexico. Accompaniment is central to the work of civil society, and includes the provision of information, as well as reviewing and monitoring access to abortion-related services.

While the Supreme Court ruling does not resolve the issue of access to abortion services, which is often denied in states where abortion had already been decriminalised, it serves as a reminder that both the Mexican Institute of Social Security and the Institute of Security and Social Services for State Workers must provide the service without restrictions. Those of us who do accompaniment work have an essential role to play in verifying that when women turn to public health institutions they are actually taken care of.

Do you view this court ruling as a victory for the Mexican women's movement?

The decriminalisation of abortion is a huge collective achievement for the Mexican feminist movement, which operates in a highly networked way in multiple areas and ranges from those of us who provide information and create spaces for debate to the lawyers who draft bills in favour of women's rights.

But we must remember that legal, free and safe abortion is not a recent demand. It did not begin with the green tide, the regional movement that started in Argentina and gained momentum in the mid-2010s. It is an issue that the feminist movement has been pushing for since at least the 1970s, when feminists in academia and trade unions advocated for the decriminalisation of abortion and teachers and nurses demanded comprehensive sex education for public school students. Numerous activists and organisations preceded us in this struggle and paved the way for us to finally achieve the goal of free, safe and legal abortion.

Advocacy and community work have made the difference in this struggle. As an organisation we have contributed by providing information on the grounds for legal abortion and linking institutions so that other specialised organisations can train doctors and nurses to ensure the service is provided.

How does your organisation work to promote abortion rights?

We are present in 12 states across Mexico, and we are mainly involved in information distribution and networking. We provide information to women in parks, schools, streets and door-to-door, in Indigenous communities, rural areas and urban peripheries. We let women know that abortion exists and is an option. We also promote women's networks across the country to facilitate access to safe medication abortion.

We network with healthcare providers and other CSOs, such as Ipas and the Public Policy Advocacy Coordinator at Information Group on Reproductive Choice, to increase the impact of our work for Mexican women's rights.

Are you experiencing anti-rights backlash?

The situation varies from state to state. One state we need to pay special attention to is Aguascalientes, a highly conservative state that has a very conservative governor who may try to deny access to services.

Efforts by conservative forces to limit abortion rights and comprehensive sex education could result in regression. We must understand that the personal really is political, and that the enjoyment of the basic right to make decisions about our own bodies and lives depends on our political choices. Many people, especially young people, think that politics is not important, but the decision on whether to leave government offices and legislative seats in the hands of the far right has huge impacts on all aspects of our lives.

How do you connect with women's movements in other countries in the region?

Our movement is part of a broader movement that encompasses all of Latin America and the Caribbean. The green tide has been an inspiration for the whole region, and has reached the USA. The tide has already become a tsunami that won’t stop, and we feel deeply identified with it.

This regional dimension also involves a lot of work, because we do everything in our power to contribute to progress in other countries in the region. For example, decriminalisation initiatives have been submitted in Brazil and there we have been signing letters, sending videos and making statements. In Argentina we did the same things: some of us travelled there to talk to legislators about the Mexican reality regarding abortion. One of our major points of reference was and still is Colombia. Sixteen years ago we went to Colombia to see how abortion services were provided so they could be replicated in Mexico City.

We are deeply engaged with what is happening with our colleagues in Central America, where abortion is extremely criminalised. We worked intensely to achieve the decriminalisation of abortion and effective access to this right in Mexico and across the region.

Civic space in Mexico is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with ddser through its website.

CIVICUS discusses Indigenous peoples' environmental activism and civil society's hopes for the upcoming COP28 climate summit with Fausto Daniel Santi Gualina, a leader of the Indigenous Sarayaku people of the Ecuadorian Amazon.

What does it mean to be part of the Sarayaku community?

The native Sarayaku people are part of the Kichwa nation of Pastaza province, in the Bobonaza river basin. According to our history, we are descendants of the Tayakkuna, who navigated the courses of the Bobonaza, Marañón and Pastaza rivers, naming each of the places and territories we inhabit today.

According to the prophecy of our wise elders, the Sarayaku people are a people of struggle who will never surrender to anyone. Sarayaku are the ‘people of noon’, like the flower that blooms at noon. We feel strong, generous and peaceful, and are the holders of a lot of wisdom about nature. We have been pioneers in the defence and vindication of collective, territorial and nature rights. We are currently working in unity to achieve true territorial governance – the planning, administration, conservation and use of territory – implementing life plans with self-determination and inhabiting the territory together and in harmony with human, spiritual and non-human beings.

What inspired you to become a community leader?

I come from a humble family with a great culture of work and leadership, which instilled in me the importance of studying. I got a degree from Cuenca State University and did two specialisations: one in climate change and cities, and the other in leadership, governance and public administration.

From a very young age, I held positions such as class president and student council president. I was the first person to hold the position of Youth Leader with the Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza, my province. All these experiences shaped me to become a leader of my people, Sarayaku, on several occasions. I have taken part in Indigenous peoples’ struggles both by supporting the Sarayaku vs. Ecuador case – over the exploitation of Indigenous land by an oil company – before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and by participating in national-level Indigenous mobilisations.

I was coordinator of several projects, such as one on territorial governance in the communities of the Bobonaza river basin and another on free, prior and informed consultation with the Sarayaku people. Later I took on public positions such as president of the board of the Indigenous Fund of Ecuador and advisor to the Andean Parliament, and I participated in several international events on climate change, an issue that cuts across our community.

What environmental problems does your community currently face?

The environmental concerns of our people currently focus on deforestation and extractive activities such as mining and oil activity. For more than 50 years, private interests have been polluting land and aquatic ecosystems. This has had enormous socio-environmental consequences, including drought, disease, poverty and social conflict.

For some time now we have been living in conflict with an oil company that invaded our territory. We experience threats and harassment from both the company and the state. Every day more and more of our leaders and social activists are being threatened. Many have been kidnapped and some have been killed. But none of this silences or stops us, as we fight to save our territories, our living space.

We also face the problem of the lack of recognition of the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples by the state of Ecuador. Since the Sarayaku people were officially organised 45 years ago we have engaged with the state by bringing forward proposals on issues such as territorial legalisation, bilingual education, intercultural health and the recognition of collective rights in the Ecuadorian constitution. All the achievements we have made have been the result of the tireless struggle of our comrades.

But our rulers decide on extractivist public policies according to their own interests. The participation of Indigenous peoples in conservation funds is nil. Indigenous peoples are the forgotten ones of public policies.

What priority issues do you expect to see addressed at the COP28 climate summit?

One priority issue is financing. It is essential to work on financing through climate funds that are exclusive to Indigenous peoples, something that has been lacking until now.

It is also important to recognise integral territorial rights – the right of Indigenous peoples to their living spaces, as these maintain biodiversity intact and are carbon sinks: they contribute to tackling the climate crisis in a natural way. These territories must be recognised and declared free of all extractive activities in perpetuity.

There should be participation by Indigenous peoples in official negotiations, and it would be good to have regional roundtables to discuss what is specific to each region.

We are facing an unprecedented climate crisis. Only with the participation of all those working at local, regional, national and international levels will it be possible to establish and sustain serious commitments. This is why the participation of civil society in COP28 is so important. I really hope that the host government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has the will to welcome civil society. Otherwise it would be a setback and would only cause delays in the implementation of global commitments on climate change.

What are your expectations regarding the outcomes?

I don't have high expectations. We are dealing with a host that has given enormous space to those with economic power. The UAE is an oil country and the president of this COP is the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, one of the largest in the world. All this puts the outcomes at risk.

I think COPs are being used as a stage to show that oil companies are committed to managing the climate crisis, when in fact we all know this is not the case. It’s simple: if the production of fossil resources is not reduced, it won’t be possible to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the climate crisis will continue its catastrophic and irreversible course.

Indigenous peoples, with or without the recognition and support of states, have been contributing to the response to the climate crisis. We will continue to do so, but for our work to have real impact we need a global coalition of Indigenous peoples and civil society to form. We must develop our own COPs to show our commitment and present the initiatives we work on pragmatically every single day. We are the hope of the world.

Civic space in Ecuador is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

CIVICUS speaks with Isabel Abella Ruiz de Mendoza about the systemic macho violence faced by women in sport, evidenced in a recent case of abuse of power by the highest authority of the Spanish football federation.

Isabel is a sportswoman and is responsible for the equality and children and adolescents in two handball clubs. She is a founding partner and director of Abella Legal, a law firm, and an equality consultant specialising in the field of work and sport. From 2018 to 2013 she led the Basque Service against sexual harassment and gender-based harassment in sport in the Basque Country.

What were the public reactions to the non-consensual public kissing of female player Jenni Hermoso by the president of the football federation?

The non-consensual kiss that Luis Rubiales, president of the Royal Spanish Football Federation, gave Jenni Hermoso during the celebration of the Spanish team’s victory in the Women’s World Cup was just one of the visible, and still normalised, faces of macho violence.

In the typology of manifestations of male violence that women face on a daily basis in the workplace, or as in this case in sport, this is violence of a sexual nature. However, it is important to bear in mind that behind this expression of violence, there are likely other forms of psychological, economic and social violence, both against her and against her close environment, as well as against many people who have supported her, even in the virtual realm.

In the face of this, public opinion has been divided. There are those of us who believe we have a responsibility to work for equality in sport and to eradicate all expressions of sexist violence. However, others have trivialised, minimised, denied, ignored and ridiculed this episode. This diversity of reactions reflects various levels of feminist awareness among people.

Why did the sporting authorities take so long to condemn the episode?

What training in equality do the people leading these organisations have? Being a highly masculinised sector, how many have become aware of and developed critical thinking against hegemonic masculinity and its practices? How many have listened to the players and professional women in the sector? How many have renounced their privileges? How many have committed themselves to a personal project of transformation? What instruments to tackle and eradicate discrimination against women in football have they designed and implemented? What effective measures have they adopted?

All these questions could bring us closer to the causes of the timing of the reactions and the measures taken.

Do you think that this incident is indicative of deeper problems?

Indeed, a non-consensual kiss is a visible and explicit manifestation of male violence, a part of what is known as the tip of the iceberg, and hides the structural discrimination that women face in all areas of life, including sport and work.

This event is not a one-off event. Discrimination and sexist violence against women in sport are present in all disciplines and in all areas of sport and work.

We owe a big thankyou to the players of the national team because they are succeeding in prying open big cracks in the machismo of sport. Their struggle is yet another example of the long way we still have to go to achieve a fair and discrimination-free sport.

Civic space in Spain is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Abella Legal through its website and follow @AbellaLegal on Twitter and Instagram.

CIVICUS speaks with Eleonora Giovio, sports editor of the Spanish newspaper El País, about the systemic abuses faced by women in sport, evidenced in a recent case of abuse of power by the highest authority in the Spanish football federation.

What were the public reactions to the non-consensual public kissing of a female player by the president of the football federation?

The first reaction to the non-consensual kiss that Luis Rubiales, president of the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF), gave to the player Jenni Hermoso during the celebration of the Spanish team’s victory in the Women’s World Cup was of astonishment, followed by strong condemnation on social media.

The worst thing for me was that the same night, and after Hermoso had recorded a video in the dressing room in which she said she didn’t like being kissed, Rubiales went on a radio programme joking about it with the presenter. They took it as a joke, they laughed at women, Rubiales said he was not up to this ‘bullshit’ and that the people who had been bothered by the kiss were ‘dumb asses’. He downplayed his macho and inappropriate behaviour. He obviously saw no abuse of power, and he insulted all of us who had found the kiss unacceptable.

As a result of these statements, rejection on social media became stronger, as well as more widespread, because the event was televised live all over the world. The radio host apologised the next day because, he said, he was unaware of the legal aspects of the question and had not realised this could be a crime.

Public condemnation was widespread and politicians quickly joined in. The tsunami was finally unleashed when team captain Alexia Putellas, who had kept a low profile and stayed out of the spotlight all year, tweeted her famous #seacabó (#ItsOver) hashtag in solidarity with her teammate Hermoso. From then on it was unstoppable.

However, very few players in the men’s squad spoke out. I didn’t expect otherwise because I know how sexist and misogynist the world of football is. Another example of this is the case of Dani Alves, a player currently in custody on sexual abuse charges. When the situation came to light, the reaction of the FC Barcelona coach was to say he felt sorry for him. They never put themselves in the place of the victim.

Another case in which silence was thunderous was when WhatsApp messages from a coach of the Rayo Vallecano women’s team came to light in which he encouraged gang rape as a way to unite the team, and nobody in the world of football spoke out to say that this was intolerable and shameful.

There are obviously some who think we women are overreacting. But the reality is that we are no longer willing to tolerate disrespect or abuse of power. There is no turning back now.

Why did the sport’s governing bodies take so long to condemn the incident? What would have been the appropriate response?

The RFEF not only took too long to condemn the incident, but initially forced Hermoso to make a video with Rubiales to give a false image of unity and calm. Hermoso refused and the Federation issued a statement attributing phrases to her that she says she didn’t say. This is very serious and the Public Prosecutor’s Office has filed a complaint for coercion in addition to sexual assault.

Notably, it was FIFA that, despite its long history of corruption scandals, disqualified Rubiales. While the Spanish government was very emphatic, the RFEF is a private body. Mechanisms for disqualifying a federation president are very complicated, and on top of that the Administrative Court of Sport found Rubiales’ misconduct to be ‘serious’, but not ‘very serious’.

The RFEF is a tremendously macho structure. Its members are men from territorial federations who support and cover for each other. Federations are a territory not just of men but mostly of macho men. Many of them have been in office for many, many years. Profound restructuring is needed. In Spain there are only two women heading federations and only 14 per cent of federations’ executive positions are in the hands of women. At this rate, substantial change will take several decades.

Although it is very difficult to withdraw sponsorships, as contracts must be fulfilled, I found it ugly that sponsors did not condemn a gesture that was not only out of place but also a crime. The only sponsor to issue a condemnatory statement was the airline Iberia. Iberdrola, an electricity company and the one that has invested the most in football and women’s sport, issued a statement only after I published an article on the El País website. The rest remained silent. I think they should have been firmer in their condemnation, particularly in the context of the unanimous rejection throughout Spain.

Do these things happen frequently in sport?

I think sport is not free from abuses of power, psychological abuse and sexual abuse. These happen in society, in the church, in entertainment, everywhere. There is no reason to expect sport to be free of abuse. However, it is particularly difficult to bring this to light because of the deeply rooted idea that sport provides a positive environment and is good for the development of boys and girls, fostering coexistence and instilling values of effort and sacrifice. Nobody wants to expose its darker side.

Hopefully the case of Jenni Hermoso will serve as an opportunity to undertake a profound restructuring, starting with football but including other sports federations. It is a good time to begin to change the dynamics of power and ways of working, reform structures and include more women, of which there are many who are very well prepared. Abusive behaviour and power dynamics that subordinate women must cease to be considered normal. I have the feeling that in 15 or 20 years’ time we will remember this as the moment when change began.

Civic space in Spain is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Read Eleonora’s articles in ElPais.com and follow @elegiovio on Twitter.

CIVICUS discusses the military coup in Gabon with Pepecy Ogouliguende, expert in human rights, governance, gender and peace mediation and founder and president of Malachie.

Malachie is a Gabonese civil society organisation that combats poverty and promotes sustainable development and gender equality. It is active in a areas that include biodiversity protection, aid in the event of natural disasters, medical support, particularly for people living with HIV/AIDS, and human rights education, especially for the most vulnerable groups in society.

What’s your opinion on Gabon’s recent general election and subsequent military coup?

At around 3am on 30 August 2023, the Gabonese Electoral Commission announced the results of the presidential election, with incumbent Ali Bongo as the winner. A few minutes later, the military announced they had seized power. It is important to stress that this was not a coup d’état, but a seizure of power by the military. This distinction is justified by the fact that it took place without bloodshed.

The election was marred by irregularities and the announcement of the results would have led to protests, albeit legitimate, but which would have ended in violence. I would therefore like to salute the bravery of the defence and security forces.

The military then dissolved all governing institutions and set up a Transition Committee for the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI).

Was your organisation able to observe the election?

No, my organisation was unable to observe the election for the simple reason that no international or national observers were admitted. The election was conducted in total secrecy. Like all Gabonese people, I saw that the announced results did not correspond with the results at the ballot box.

The seizure of power by the defence and security forces in this particular context of public distrust of the authorities and deep suspicion of the election results is rather akin to a patriotic act.

Why has military intervention taken place now, after so many years of Bongo family rule?

Our defence and security forces, along with the public, have observed numerous irregularities and dysfunctions in the state apparatus in recent years. They therefore decided to put an end to this regime, which no longer corresponded to the aspirations of the Gabonese people.

The military saw an opportunity in the 26 August election to end the current system by assuming their responsibilities to save the nation and the rule of law. The aim of this seizure of power is to ‘restore the dignity of the Gabonese people’. As the CTRI spokesperson put it, ‘we are finally on the road to happiness’.

What’s your perspective on international criticism of the coup?

The international community simply acted by the book without first analysing the context. Gabon’s is a very special case.

Celebrations on the streets of Gabon’s main cities showed the extent to which the old regime was no longer wanted, just tolerated. These scenes of popular jubilation, which contrast with the international community’s condemnation, should be a wake-up call to the international community, inviting it to review its approach, which is more focused on safeguarding stability at all costs, often to the detriment of real social progress, development or economic growth – in short, at the expense of the wellbeing of the majority.

All those in the international community who spoke up condemned the ‘coup d’état’ and assured us that they were following developments in Gabon with interest, while reiterating their attachment to respect for institutions. Reactions from international organisations were very strong: the United Nations condemned the coup and the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) suspended Gabon because they directly associated this ‘coup d’état’ with those that had previously taken place elsewhere in the region.

The USA has distanced itself somewhat by stating that it will work with its partners and the people to support the democratic process underway. This is where we look to the rest of the international community to help us work towards building strong institutions.

We salute those states that have clearly understood the need for this change. We condemn AU and ECCAS sanctions. The international community should support states in respecting their laws and constitutions and ensuring that democracy and human rights are respected.

Do you think this coup is part of a regional trend?

First and foremost, it should be reminded that in the case of Gabon, this was a military takeover and not a coup d’état in the strict sense of the term. It was in fact the result of bad governance and failure to take account of the needs of the population, particularly social needs, but also of the thirst for change. It can have regional impacts in the sense that most African populations are experiencing the same difficulties – youth unemployment, poverty, lack of access to healthcare – and aspire to major change. When people don’t feel taken into account by policymakers, they become frustrated.

We don’t rule out the possibility that this will have an impact on our neighbours. It is not too late for the regimes in power in Central Africa to seize this opportunity to rethink the way they serve their people.

What were conditions like for civil society under Bongo family rule? Do you think there is any chance the situation will now improve?

In Gabon, the operation of organisations and associations is governed by law 35/62, which guarantees freedom of association. That said, under the old regime civil society was not taken into account. It was only partly involved in the management of public affairs.

Some leaders, particularly trade union leaders, could be arrested or intimidated if the regime felt they were being overzealous. Several Gabonese civil society leaders denounced arbitrary arrests linked to their opinions and positions.

Like the Gabonese people, civil society is delighted at the change. Civil society as a whole is committed to taking an active part in the actions and reforms carried out by the authorities during the transition, to promote respect for human rights, equity and social justice, the preservation of peace and good governance.

The CTRI has just authorised the release of some of Gabon’s leading trade unionists and prisoners of conscience. In view of the first decisions taken by the CTRI, the best is yet to come. I can safely say that the Gabon of tomorrow will be better. Today there is a glimmer of hope.

Civic space in Gabon is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Malachie through its website or its Facebook page.

The opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIVICUS.

CIVICUS speaks about the situation of political prisoners on hunger strike in Bahrain with Jawad Fairooz, founder and director of Salam for Democracy and Human Rights (Salam DHR).

Founded in 2012, Salam DHR is a human rights civil society organisation (CSO) registered in France, Switzerland and the UK. It undertakes research and advocacy for the advancement of democracy and human rights, mainly in relation to Bahrain, but also in the wider Gulf and Middle East and North Africa regions.

Maryam al-Khawaja, daughter of imprisoned human rights defender Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, intends to return to Bahrain imminently to ensure her father gets medical treatment and press for his immediate and unconditional release. Yet she, too, faces possible arrest. What’s your assessment of the situation?

Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, 62, a dual Danish-Bahraini citizen, is the co-founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and has a long history of activism. He was arrested by the government of Bahrain in 2004, 2007 and again amid mass unrest in April 2011. After this he faced a grossly unfair trial before a military court, including on charges of ‘seeking to overthrow the government’. He was tortured in pretrial custody and since his arbitrary imprisonment he has been repeatedly denied access to adequate healthcare.

On 9 August he joined some 800 other hunger strikers. They called for an end to lockdown policies that require them to spend up to 23 hours of the day in their cells, the suspension of solitary confinement, the opportunity for collective or congregational prayer in Jau Prison’s mosque, face-to-face meeting rights with family members without a glass screen and access to healthcare commensurate with that available to the public, among other improvements in prison conditions.

On 13 September the mass hunger strike ended with the authorities reportedly meeting many of these demands. This came as Bahrain’s Crown Prince visited Washington, DC, where he met with senior members of the Biden administration: the problem had to go away.

Maryam nevertheless intends to travel and she has our full support. We continue to call for Abdulhadi’s immediate and unconditional release. The Danish and European Union (EU) authorities must do more.

What is at the core of this problem is the absence of civic space in Bahrain. If there was space for independent civil society, then CSOs would have effectively alerted the authorities to prison conditions and they could have addressed the situation. An independent civic space makes it possible to find a balance in government conduct.

What does this mean for Maryam al-Khawaja and our courageous colleagues travelling with her? It means they should be allowed to enter Bahrain and make their demands. The government should engage with them in a spirit of transparency. The absolute worst that could happen is for dissent to be tolerated just a little bit more. While this seems unlikely to happen, it is what the government should do. We wish them all Godspeed.

How is it possible to conduct human rights activism in such a closed environment? How does Salam DHR do it?

Bahrain has closed civic space. Government officials decide which CSOs can be registered and who can stand for their boards. They prevent people from engaging in public life who have no criminal records or public complaints but rather perhaps a past association with a political movement or party that was unfairly banned years ago.

The Bahraini constitution provides for freedoms and safeguards similar to many other states, but the reality is that the government continues to carry out arbitrary arrests and stage unfair trials for acts that are not internationally recognised as crimes. The authorities torture detainees and use the death penalty, despite domestic opposition and international condemnation. They have stripped hundreds, including myself, of citizenship, depriving us of even the right to have rights in our homeland. They use the digital space to monitor and punish dissent and to foment religious and sectarian strife.

Activists linked with Salam DHR cannot, in effect, exercise their right to peaceful assembly, let alone openly campaign for freedoms of association and expression, the release of prisoners unfairly tried and imprisoned or a moratorium on the death penalty. They would risk arrest if they did that.

Yet engaging in civic activism is not totally impossible, only very challenging. Alongside CIVICUS and other partners, Salam DHR engages with allies and like-minded activists as well as the few CSOs that openly but cautiously raise human rights concerns so that the wider Bahraini society hears our message. We echo and amplify their appeals.

We are a catalyst: we help Bahraini activists access platforms to reach domestic and international audiences and provide training and development opportunities such as internships. Alone and in partnership with others, we research, document and publicise developments, grounding our message in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

How useful for advocacy purposes was the global event held by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, in March 2023?

It was mixed: Danish parliamentarians and those from other countries addressed human rights issues and the absence of an independent civic space. The IPU’s human rights team raised concerns about freedom of expression and violations against Bahraini parliamentarians. But despite the IPU’s affiliated status with the United Nations (UN), the government still denied access to independent observers and human rights organisations, denying them either visas or access and turning at least one around at the airport. This was the authorities once again restricting civic space.

A few days before the IPU meeting officially began, Bahraini lawyer and activist Ebrahim Al-Mannai called for parliamentary reforms on social media. He and three others who shared his post were arrested for publishing material that could ‘disturb public order’.

At the event itself, the government appeared uninterested in seriously engaging with visiting parliamentarians on human rights issues, despite attempts from the Danish delegation and representatives from Finland, Iceland and Ireland. Our message is clear: open up civic space, free up CSOs and political parties and liberate discourse, otherwise the cycle of political unrest will continue.

Reports indicate that the mass hunger strike in Jau Prison has ended. What’s your assessment of this episode?

The painful August 2023 mass hunger strike was wholly avoidable. It happened mainly due to the government’s stubborn and short-sighted refusal to allow civic space to exist even to a minimum degree. Had there been freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, they would have known of the deep suffering at Jau Prison. If you don’t let people say what they think, then public life can only lurch from crisis to crisis.

The hunger strike was the expression of the accumulation of a number of factors that have been present in Bahraini prisons for years and it was based on grievances that have been repeatedly expressed: prison conditions and ill treatment of prisoners amounting to torture. The abuses worsened and conditions deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, medical neglect resulted in the deaths of two prisoners, Hussein Barakat and Abbas Mallalah.

We appeal once more to the authorities to allow for the opening of civic space and provide a social vent to end the cycle of human rights crises we face.

Is the international community doing all it can to support the struggle for democracy and human rights in Bahrain?

International human rights organisations, UN treaty bodies and Special Procedures and partner states, for instance in the context of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process of Bahrain, have all joined us in calling on the government of Bahrain to abide by its international human rights obligations, starting with the basic step of letting people have a voice in public life.

Today, 15 September, is International Day of Democracy, and we are joining the UN in calling on the government of Bahrain to empower the next generation by ensuring that their voices are included in the decisions that will have a profound impact on their world. In his address, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has warned that ‘walls are closing in on civic spaces’. Those walls are also the walls of Jau Prison, where it took 800 detainees’ unjust suffering for the government to even take notice.

But the UN has also let neighbouring United Arab Emirates, which is as closed as Bahrain, host the forthcoming COP28 climate change summit. Lack of civic space means there can be no activism for climate justice in Bahrain – for instance, no public demands for accountability can be expressed over costly and environmentally damaging land reclamation in Bahrain’s northeast, which has already eroded the livelihood of fishing communities. We need to be able to address these challenges openly, with a rights-based approach, to avoid a future calamity.

And powerful states that could be putting some pressure for change are avoiding the issue. Right now, Bahrain’s Crown Prince is wrapping up meetings with senior Biden administration officials, none of whom appear to have raised civic space concerns or addressed the needless suffering of 800 Bahraini prisoners. The UK has removed Bahrain from its list of ‘countries of concern’ at the same time as it trumpeted a billion-dollar Bahraini investment in the UK. In October the EU will recommence its cycle of so-called human rights dialogues.

The international community’s inexplicable complacency over the festering human rights quagmire in Bahrain will further embolden the government in crushing civic space. Many leaders miss the point when it comes to Bahrain and its Gulf neighbours: they appear to accept the facade of what is presented as pragmatic autocracy and appear to accept regional rulers’ colonial-mindset contention that democracy will destabilise the region.

Democracies have in fact produced the most stable, enduring and dynamic systems in the world. Human rights and democracy are essential for Bahrain and its neighbours because their deficits continue to be the primary cause of resentment and unrest. A security-based approach does not remedy these problems. Bahrain’s history has shown these methods to be a failure, as it has endured continuous waves of mass unrest followed by violent crackdowns.

Authoritarianism and the forms of violence it fosters are the real destabilising forces, a cycle that can only be broken through the recognition and enactment of democratic rights. The first step towards this goal is simply letting civic space exist.

Civic space in Bahrain is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Salam for Democracy and Human Rights through its website and follow @SALAM_DHR and @JawadFairooz on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about the ongoing repression of dissent in Egypt with Ahmed Attalla, Executive Director of the Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR).

Founded in 2017 and registered in the Czech Republic, EFHR is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes human rights in Egypt, with a specific focus on criminal justice, through advocacy, research and legal support.

What are the conditions for civil society in Egypt?

Civic space in Egypt has remained highly restricted for the past decade, with the authorities consistently targeting civil society activists, journalists, political dissidents and human rights advocates.

The 2019 NGO law restricts the rights of CSOs. It mandates their registration and enables the government and security forces to interfere in their operations and order the cessation of activities deemed sensitive by the government, such as monitoring human rights conditions and denouncing violations. Organisations registered under this law may also face funding restrictions.

Some CSOs had to shut down because the authorities targeted them with counter-terrorist measures or prosecuted their directors in Case no. 173 of 2011, commonly known as the ‘Foreign Funding Case’. In some instances, the directors of these organisations were prohibited from leaving the country and their assets were frozen. Some courageous organisations have persisted in their work even in the face of attacks against their directors and staff.

In September 2021, the government launched the National Human Rights Strategy, a propaganda tool aimed at concealing the human rights crisis ahead of hosting the COP27 climate summit in 2022. As part of this initiative, it took steps to release some political prisoners and engaged in a national dialogue that contained a broader spectrum of political actors, including civil society representatives.

How has Egyptian civil society organised in the face of repression?

Civil society has adapted to the ongoing repression in various ways. Many CSOs have decided to limit their public engagement and abstain from taking to the streets or limit their work to the provision of legal aid while refraining from undertaking research and international advocacy, especially with international human rights mechanisms. Other organisations have been forced to relocate their operations abroad to safeguard their staff and ensure the continuity and integrity of their work, which has had the opposite effect of facilitating their advocacy efforts with international mechanisms and among European Union (EU) member states.

In response to the continuous pressure, many organisations have started collaborating more closely. In 2019, EFHR coauthored a joint report with eight other CSOs for the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and participated in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session in which Egypt’s human rights record was examined. In 2023, we jointly submitted another report for Egypt’s UPR. We have also engaged in joint campaigns and participated in the formation of coalitions aimed at addressing specific challenges. Egyptian CSOs are increasingly recognising the importance of working together to amplify their impact and advocate for change.

How does EFHR work in such a repressive context?

When it was founded in 2017, EFHR was officially registered in the Czech Republic with affiliates in Egypt, where our team of researchers and lawyers provides crucial legal support by attending daily court hearings and working directly with victims of prosecution. We have successfully coordinated work between our overseas office and our colleagues based in Egypt. Our work focuses on issues that are ignored by the Egyptian authorities, including issues concerning criminal justice, detention conditions and gender-based violence.

We take various security measures to protect the identities of our staff. For instance, our research publications don’t include author names or contact details, and we maintain the anonymity of our legal team. These precautions give us some space to work and leverage our findings and expertise with international mechanisms, by engaging with UN Special Rapporteurs and working groups and collaborating with EU diplomats.

However, we have also faced some challenges. Three of our lawyers have been implicated in state security cases, facing accusations of affiliating with terrorist groups and potentially engaging in the use of force. We have managed to relocate other at-risk colleagues to ensure their safety. The same is happening to other Egyptian human rights organisations, whose members either managed to flee the country or were arrested and remained in prison for least two years.

How do you support Egyptian activists under threat?

We provide legal assistance to those who have been arrested or targeted by the authorities and take measures to ensure activists’ digital security and protect their anonymity, enabling them to continue their work. We collaborate with partners and foreign embassies to put pressure on the Egyptian government, but sometimes this doesn’t work.

Within Egypt, there are a few tools available to protect our colleagues at risk. Even political parties cannot protect their members in Egypt, so they also face regular detentions. Parties often attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to release arrested politicians but after releasing them the government arrests other members of the same organisations.

Are Egyptian activists safe in exile?

Activists who work from abroad are being targeted through their families. For example, the Egyptian-American human rights advocate Mohamed Soltan, who filed a case against former prime minister Hazem el-Beblawi, saw his five family members harassed and arrested as a result of his activism. A German resident, Alaa Eladly, was arrested upon landing in Cairo just because his daughter, Egyptian activist Fagr Eladly, criticised President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi president over human rights abuses at a 2015 press conference between the president and then German chancellor Angela Merkel . The father of Belgium-based journalist and human rights advocate Ahmed Gamal Ziada has recently been detained and accused of misuse of communication, spreading false news and joining a banned group. This strategy aims to silence activists and impose an even higher personal cost for doing their work.

What can the international community do to support Egyptian civil society?

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Egypt it is important to listen to the perspectives of local human rights defenders. Our international allies and partners must exert pressure on the Egyptian government to open civic space, stop targeting journalists, civil society activists and political figures and filing trumped up charges against them, and release all political prisoners detained for defending the fundamental rights to freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression.

EU member states must revise their terms of cooperation with Egypt to prioritise human rights. For instance, they should include human rights considerations as a conditionality for providing financial aid. It is imperative to strike a balance between the interests of governments and the demands of Egyptian civil society. It is also essential to sustain financial support for Egyptian CSOs, especially now that the economic crisis has also hit civil society.

Civic space in Egypt is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with EFHR through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @egyptian_front on Twitter.

CIVICUS speaks about Zimbabwe’s August general election and its aftermath with Obert Masaraure, national president of Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe and spokesperson of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, which brings together 84 Zimbabwean civil society organisations (CSOs).

What was at stake in this election?

This was an important election. We were expecting both a democratic and an economic breakthrough after years of dictatorship and economic stagnation. Millions of young people are dropping out of school, thousands are dying after failing to secure healthcare and millions are unemployed. We expected change to happen.

But we were disappointed. Civil society tried to engage with the electoral process and play a monitoring role but was criminalised. Those who were doing voter tabulation were arrested. After the Election Management Board barred civil society groups we had to monitor the electoral process clandestinely. In the run-up to the election we also did a lot of voter education. We managed to generate excitement among voters, but on voting day they were frustrated.

What’s your assessment of the credibility of the results?

According to the results announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) on 26 August, President Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) received 52.6 per cent of the vote, while the leading opposition candidate, Nelson Chamisa of Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), received 44 per cent. But these results are not credible because the polls were held on a flawed electoral field and the ZEC failed to discharge its duty to run a reasonably free and fair election, as evidenced by multiple acts and omissions.

First, the ZEC didn’t supply ballot papers or the voter roll in time to many polling stations in the provinces of Bulawayo, Harare and Manicaland, which are traditional opposition strongholds. This was a clear attempt to suppress voters and help the incumbent stay in power.

The Electoral Act mandates ZEC to display the voter roll at all polling stations 48 hours before the polls open, but most polling stations only received it on election day. This had consequences for the opposition, because in urban areas, where the opposition is stronger, at least 180,000 voters couldn’t find their names at the designated polling stations on election day. Their names had been moved after a shambolic delimitation process but as voter rolls had been unavailable until the last minute, these voters were unable to locate their new polling stations.

According to a ZEC statement, only 23 per cent of polling stations opened on time in Harare, with 75 per cent doing so in Bulawayo and 85 per cent in Manicaland. Some polling stations in Harare were still waiting for ballot papers as late as 6pm, one hour before closing. In contrast, in the majority of the ruling party’s strongholds, typically in harder-to-reach areas, election materials were received early and all polling places were open at the scheduled time.

In urban areas there were waiting times of up to 12 hours. Many people were unable to vote within that period and voting had to be extended to 48 hours. In rural areas, where the ruling party is strongest, the maximum waiting period was 30 minutes. Additionally, an estimated 42,000 civil servants who were working as polling officials could not vote after the ZEC refused to facilitate their voting.

The overall impact of this was to disenfranchise millions of voters and suppress opposition voters while encouraging those of the ruling party.

There were also lots of fraudulent and deceptive practices. There were cases where local candidates were taken off the ballot, as happened to CCC’s Shepherd Sithole in ward 1 of Bulawayo. A shocking incident was also recorded in which party symbols for ZANU-PF and the CCC were switched, confusing voters and making it impossible to record their actual choice.

There were reports from at least 50 polling stations in rural areas that the supposedly indelible ink used could easily be washed away. This was suspected to be a deliberate attempt to allow rural voters to vote multiple times to inflate the results for ZANU-PF. The postal ballot mechanism also appeared to be abused for ballot stuffing, as at least 35 polling stations reported receiving more postal ballots than they had voters registered.

There were numerous instances of intimidation at polling stations. A ZANU-PF affiliate, Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), set up ‘exit survey tables’ in at least 1,340 polling stations. Individual voters were asked to declare who they had voted for and provide their personal details. FAZ also recorded the serial numbers of voters’ ballot papers and told voters they would be able to tell who they voted for. Needless to say, this intimidated voters who have experienced a long history of serious political violence.

This was a sham, not an election. It was a circus and a waste of resources that subverted the will of the people and illegally kept the incumbent in power.

What needs to happen next to bring about democracy in Zimbabwe?

The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has demanded the immediate announcement of a date for a fresh free, fair and credible election. We must put an end to the long history of disputed elections in Zimbabwe and usher in a legitimate government that can lift Zimbabwe up from the category of a pariah state, rebuild its economy and improve the lives of its people.

Zimbabwe needs an inclusive national dialogue to broker a political settlement leading to credible elections supervised by the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. Zimbabweans should play their role in exerting pressure on the government to force it to agree to dialogue.

Zimbabwean pro-democracy organisations must be strengthened through international support so that they can play their proper role in a transition to democracy. The international community is also invited to exert pressure so that the government agrees to engage in an inclusive national dialogue. And while it does not, the international community must isolate the country from the family of nations. A dictatorship does not deserve a seat on any international platform.

Civic space in Zimbabwe is rated ‘repressed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Obert Masaraure through its Facebook page and follow @omasaraure on Twitter

CIVICUS speaks with Sohrab Razaghi, executive director of Volunteer Activists (VA), about the situation in Iran on the anniversary of the anti-regime protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of morality police.

VA is an independent civil society organisation (CSO) based in the Netherlands, whose primary aims are building capacity among activists and CSOs, facilitating information exchange among civil society activists, community peacebuilding and advocating for the expansion of democracy and human rights in Iran and more generally in the Middle East. VA is the successor of a pioneer Iranian CSO, the Iranian Civil Society, Training and Research Centre, founded in 2001 and based in Tehran until 2007.

What is the situation in Iran one year on from the start of the protest wave?

The situation in Iran is complex. While last year’s massive protests made people hope for change, the crackdown on the protests caused hopelessness. The authorities were mostly able to suppress the protests and regain control of the streets, forcing people back into their homes.

Moreover, while the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protest movement had an appealing chant and vision, it lacked a long-term plan that could lead to change. Over the past year, it has been unable to translate its slogan into a political programme and was therefore unable to mobilise other social and political forces around its goals.

But despite the authorities’ success in regaining control, we have continued to see acts of civil disobedience across Iran. Activists, artists and academics express themselves through social media and make public displays of protest not wearing hijab. The fact that the voices of protesters have not been silenced sustains hope for change.

A concerning development, however, is the increasing gap between established civil society and the protest movement. CSOs were hesitant to participate in the protests when they began, and this gap has only increased since. There is even a lack of a common vocabulary in calling for mobilisation and articulating demands. Established CSOs disagree with what they view as radical moves by the protest movement, as they have a more conservative view of society and the future. A possible explanation for this divergence may be the generation gap, as the protest movement is formed by much younger activists.

To reassert control, the authorities have imposed stricter control over media, universities, unions and other associations. In essence, civic space has shrunk dramatically over the past year, with the authorities purging most sectors of everyone who disagrees with them.

Internationally there was a huge wave of support for the protest movement from governments, civil society and media, particularly early on. This was extremely helpful for echoing the voices of Iranian protesters and pressuring the authorities to meet their demands. But as the authorities regained control of the streets, we have seen a change in the approach of western governments. They are returning to diplomacy and negotiations with Iran, slowly normalising their relations. This has boosted the Iranian regime’s confidence, re-legitimising it and giving it space to spread its propaganda.

What tactics has the government used to limit further mobilisation?

The number one tactic of the regime to crack down on protests has been to arrest protesters. Over the past year, thousands have been arrested, including over 20,000 who were arrested during the protests. Some have been given long jail sentences.

The second tactic has been the prevention of organising and networking. Even small communities have been actively prevented from getting together. Online networking has been limited by censorship, filtering and hacking. Leaders and activists trying to establish any form of group are arrested and their work is disrupted. They threaten activists with jail and even death. They also target their personal life by demanding that they be fired or suspended from work or university. Many teachers and professors who supported the protest movement have been fired and students expelled.

To reach those who may not have joined the protest yet, the authorities spread propaganda, fake news and conspiracy theories that delegitimise the protest movement. Some communities fear the protest movement as a result.

To prevent the development of a political alternative to the regime, the authorities have targeted the opposition within and outside Iran. Their main aim seems to be to sow division among opposition groups and force them to deal with issues internal to the opposition movement instead of focusing on developing an alternative coalition. Iranian cyber forces have supported these efforts through hacking and social media manipulation.

What forms has resistance taken in response?

Iranian activists have pursued two strategies in response. First, the protest movement sought to widen its scope to increase its resilience. By mobilising excluded ethnic groups such as Baloch and Kurdish people, the protest movement expanded to more cities and communities, making the crackdown more difficult. Second, the protest movement tried to stay on the streets for as long as possible, hoping to create division among crackdown forces.

Internationally, the movement’s main strategy was to try to isolate the regime by forcing the severance of as many diplomatic connections as possible. For example, it successfully advocated for Iran to be removed from the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women and it also sought to force the closure of Iranian embassies in western states.

How have Iranian organisations from the diaspora or in exile supported the protest movement in Iran?

We have observed two phases in the involvement of the diaspora and exiled Iranian organisations in the protest movement. In the first phase, they organised large-scale solidarity mobilisations and projects in support of the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests in Iran. Over 80,000 Iranians from the diaspora participated in the solidarity protest in Berlin in Germany, for example.

After this initial phase, however, each political group in exile tried to present itself as the leader of the protest movement. This broke the solidarity and unity of the movement. Instead of fighting against the regime, some diaspora groups mostly fought each other. Independent activists and organisations in the diaspora that didn’t want to be caught in this fight decreased their involvement. For the protest movement to succeed, opposition groups and political movements need to get better at resolving their conflicts, reaching compromises and building a unified anti-regime coalition.

Has the crackdown intensified as the first anniversary approaches?

Civil society activists have continued to be arrested and organisations put under pressure and shut down. But as the first anniversary approaches, we are seeing repression increase, particularly in universities and among journalists. Universities have recently fired more lecturers and professors and expelled more students who participated in last year’s protests. Student associations have been shut down long ago and any form of student organising is banned.

Journalists are also being heavily repressed. The authorities are disrupting reporting and coverage of protest actions and calls for protests around 16 September. They are threatening and arresting journalists, prosecuting them and handing them heavy sentences.

Independent lawyers, who have been instrumental in supporting arrested and imprisoned activists, are also being threatened. Lawyers have played key roles in defending activists in court and spreading information about their trials, informing the public on the authorities’ repression. As a result, they are being threatened with losing their licences or being arrested.

Is Iran closer to change now than a year ago?

I think we are multiple steps closer to change than before. Iranians are less scared of the consequences of their activism. They dare to take action against the regime. The voice of protest is louder and the severity of the crackdown only shows how scared the regime is of the protest movement. The regime understands it won’t be easy to shut down this protest movement, which threatens the legitimacy and therefore the existence of the regime.

We also see a major lifestyle change. People on the streets are now dressed differently and are less afraid of showing their lifestyle in public. Although political change is minimal, cultural change following last year’s protests is clearly visible. This change shouldn’t be underestimated.

What needs to happen for political change to take place?

Iranians need to realise the power of being together. Change comes from power, and power comes from organising and acting together. To bring about change, we need social power and to create social power, organising is essential. By forming associations, organisations and networks, Iranians can demand and achieve change.

For this to happen, three types of changes are required. First is a change in attitude. Iranian activists need to think positively and constructively instead of negatively and destructively. Second is a change in behaviour. We will only achieve democracy if we also act democratically and use democratic tools. This means avoiding any form of violence and understanding that democracy does not rise from bloodshed and fire. Third is a change in context. It is key to empower society to say no and resist the regime.

The international community could support change by helping to increase the resilience of the social movement and its activists, both online and offline. The pursuit of meaningful and sustainable change is a marathon and it’s instrumental to echo the voices of activists and provide sustainable support. A coalition of international civil society organisations could help by providing strategic support to Iranian activists.

Civic space in Iran is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with Volunteer Activists through its website.

CIVICUS speaks about climate change, global inequality and the need for redistribution with Adrien Fabre, a France-based climate economist and founder of Global Redistribution Advocates (GRA).

GRA is a civil society organisation (CSO) that promotes public debate about three global redistribution policies that enjoy wide public opinion support worldwide – a global wealth tax, a global climate plan and a global climate assembly – and advocates towards political parties in several countries to incorporate these into their agendas and programmes.

What inspired you to become a climate economist and found GRA?

I started my PhD in economics with the goal of understanding humanity’s problems and proposing solutions. I always wanted to give voice to every human, so I naturally specialised in running surveys. Then, in the context of the Yellow Vests protests that began in 2018, I surveyed French people about their attitudes towards climate policies. This sparked interest at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which called on me to conduct a similar survey in other countries. I seized the opportunity to ask people questions they had never been asked before, such as whether they supported a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries. I was amazed by the levels of support: more than 70 per cent in every country!

I ran complementary surveys in Europe and the USA. I tried asking questions differently and tested policies in which the respondents would lose money, but the results were the same: people in western countries were willing to lose a few dozen euros per month to end climate change and global poverty. Furthermore, the support is sincere: you can read this scientific article or my Twitter thread for details.

Now, if there is such strong support for global redistribution, why doesn’t anyone propose it or defend it in public debate? To advocate for global redistributive policies to transfer resources or power from high to low-income countries I launched GRA in April 2023.

What are your proposals?

We have three main proposals to promote wealth redistribution, environmental sustainability and global cooperation to address pressing global challenges. The first is a global wealth tax on individual wealth exceeding US$5 million, with half of the tax proceeds distributed to lower-income countries.

This tax would spare 99.9 per cent of the world’s population, who have wealth below US$5 million. And if the tax were just two per cent, it would collect one per cent of the world’s GDP, which is more than the GDP of all low-income countries, home to 700 million people, combined. Our proposed tax schedule is moderate: two per cent for fortunes above US$5 million, six per cent for those above US$100 million and 10 per cent for those above US$1 billion. A tax of two per cent is far lower than the interests, rents and dividends such a fortune generates.

Our second proposal is a global climate plan aimed at combatting climate change through a worldwide carbon emissions cap, implemented by a system of global emissions trading, and financing a global basic income.

This plan would enter into force as soon as signatory countries cover 60 per cent of global carbon emissions. Participating countries would enforce a cap on carbon emissions, decreasing each year and down to net zero emissions after three decades, in line with the temperature target. Each year, emissions permits would be auctioned to firms that extract fossil fuels or import them from non-participating countries, making polluters pay. To cover the cost of emissions permits, firms would increase fossil fuel prices, which would in turn encourage individuals and businesses to change their equipment or adjust their habits, eventually reducing carbon emissions. The revenues from carbon pricing would fund a global basic income estimated at US$50 per month for each person over 15.

This plan would bring a massive redistribution from countries with a carbon footprint higher than the global average – like OECD countries – to those with a lower-than-average carbon footprint, including most of Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Latin America. It includes mechanisms to encourage participation by all countries, such as a tariff on goods imported from non-participating countries in proportion to their carbon content, a provision allowing middle-income countries such as China to opt out from the mutualisation of revenues to guarantee that it would not lose from the plan while ensuring that it decarbonises with the same carbon price, and a provision facilitating the participation of subnational entities like California or the state of New York even if the federal level does not participate.

The wealth tax and the climate plan would each redistribute one per cent of the world’s GDP from high to low-income countries every year. Extreme poverty can be eradicated. The average income in a country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo would double following the transfers.

Our third proposition is that of a global climate assembly, comprised of representatives elected through proportional representation in participating nations, tasked with drafting a comprehensive treaty to address climate change globally. Before even the beginning of that experiment in democratic governance at the global scale, the assembly would bring a radical change, as the election campaign would foster a global public debate on climate justice.

Please check our website for details: each policy has its own advocacy campaign, with a fully-fledged policy proposal, a petition and a video.

Who are you targeting these proposals at, and how are you working to get the message across?

We are targeting our campaigns at policymakers, scholars, civil society and lay people. Many scholars have endorsed our proposals. GRA is a member of civil society networks in each of our policy domains, and we are hoping that key CSOs will endorse our proposals. We have already met with cabinet members of various governments, including Brazil, Colombia, France, Germany and South Africa, as well as many European Union (EU) politicians. And we are sending dozens of emails every day to get more meetings. Once we get a book on our climate plan and the scientific article finished and published, we will reach out to the public. We will publish an open letter in widely read newspapers, calling on world leaders to discuss global redistributive policies at the United Nations (UN), the G20 and climate summits.

Hopefully, we will get media attention and the movement will grow. It will help if well-known personalities, including celebrities, endorse our proposals. But it will take a social movement to make change happen, perhaps a global demonstration. Our hope is that a large coalition of political parties, CSOs and labour unions throughout the world endorse some common policies towards a sustainable and fair future – ours, or similar ones. This will likely strengthen the parties of the coalition and help them win elections. Our research shows that progressive candidates would gain votes if they endorsed global redistributive policies.

What are the prospects of these proposals being implemented in the near future?

Our proposals are getting more and more endorsements every day. The African Union just called for a global carbon price and will defend this idea in international negotiations.

But our proposal that receives the largest support is the global wealth tax. The next European Parliament elections will be held in June 2024, and left-wing parties will campaign on a European wealth tax. We have proposed that one-third of this European wealth tax would be allocated to lower-income countries outside Europe, and there are good chances that some parties will take this forward. A petition in favour of a wealth tax has recently been signed by 130 members of the European Parliament, and politicians from all parties on the left and centre endorse our proposal. However, a majority in the European Parliament would not suffice, as this proposal would require unanimity at the Council of the EU, that is, the approval of each EU government.

However, three things can help. First, Brazil will chair the G20 in 2024, and we hope that President Lula, along with other leaders, will put pressure on global north states for global redistribution. Second, it would help if US President Joe Biden included wealth taxes on the agenda of his re-election campaign. Third, the campaign for the 2024 European Parliament elections could create momentum for some countries to move forward, even if the EU does not.

I am optimistic that wealth taxes will be implemented – perhaps not in 2024, but within the next decade. However, I fear negotiations might end up being overseen by the OECD, resulting in a disappointing agreement, as happened on international corporate taxation. Negotiations on international taxation must be hosted by the UN, not the OECD. And regarding the content of the negotiations, we should be vigilant of three elements: the exemption threshold, which should not exceed US$5 million; the tax rates, which should be progressive and not too low; and the distribution of revenues, a substantial part of which must go to low-income countries.

Civil society mobilisation will be key to promoting the global wealth tax, making it a central campaign issue and turning it into effective international policy. You can help by signing our petitions, donating, or volunteering for GRA. GRA is also hiring, so feel free to contact us!

What are your hopes and expectations regarding the upcoming COP28 climate summit?

COPs sometimes bring good surprises. Last year, high-income countries finally accepted the principle of a fund to compensate vulnerable countries for the loss and damage from climate change, after 30 years of demands from the developing world.

But I don’t expect any good news this year, as the upcoming COP28 in Dubai is chaired by the CEO of the United Arab Emirates’ state oil company. More generally, I do not expect much from COPs because its decisions are made by consensus, so countries like Saudi Arabia can block any meaningful proposal. This is what led to the current system of nationally determined contributions: while all countries supposedly share the common goal of limiting global warming to ‘well below 2°C’, there are no binding commitments, no harmonised policies, no agreement on burden-sharing, and the sum of countries’ voluntary pledges is inconsistent with the common goal.

To break the deadlock, states with ambitious climate goals should start negotiations in parallel with the UN framework. I think the EU and China should start bilateral negotiations. If they put forward something like the global climate plan that we propose, countries that would benefit from it would surely accept it, and more than 60 per cent of global emissions would be covered. This would put enormous pressure on other countries to join, and particularly other OECD countries such as the USA.

Get in touch with Global Redistribution Advocates through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @GlobalRedistrib and @adrien_fabre on Twitter.