Coup

Rights Groups in Indonesia stand in solidarity with the People of Myanmar
We, the undersigned civil society organisations in Indonesia, and organisations with presence in Indonesia, express solidarity with the people of Myanmar and condemn the ongoing grave violations committed by the military junta. We reiterate our commitment to call on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international community to abide by its obligations to hold the perpetrators accountable and to protect the human rights of peoples in Myanmar.
BURKINA FASO: ‘For a major segment of civil society security is a more urgent concern than democracy’
CIVICUS speaks about therecent military coup in Burkina Faso with Kop'ep Dabugat, Network Coordinator of the West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network (WADEMOS).

WADEMOS is a coalition of West African civil society organisations (CSOs) that mobilises civil society around the defence of democracy and the promotion of democratic norms in the region.

What led to the recent coup in Burkina Faso, and what needs to be done for democracy to be restored?

The current head of Burkina Faso’s ruling junta, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, cited persistent insecurity as a reason for the military takeover – as did his predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Attacks by armed groups are said to have greatly increased in the months following the first coup led by Damiba, in January 2022. According to analysts, Burkina Faso is the new epicentre of conflict in the Sahel. Since 2015, jihadist violence by insurgents with links to al-Qaeda and Islamic State has resulted in the death of thousands of people and displaced a further two million.

The coup also revealed the presence of a schism in the Damiba-led junta. It was orchestrated by military officers who were part of the coup that installed Damiba as head of state, but who now claimed that Damiba did not focus on reorganising the army to better face security threats, as they had expected. Instead, he stuck with the military structure that led to the fall of the government under President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, and began to display political ambitions.

The security question remains the first challenge that needs to be addressed to make Burkina Faso a democratic state. The foremost role of a state, and more so of a democratic one, is to guarantee the safety of its citizens. A united Burkina Faso army will be necessary to achieve this.

The other thing that must be done is to see through the existing transition programme for the country to return to civilian rule by July 2024, to which the new junta has agreed.

Beyond the transition, the need to build a strong state and political institutions cannot be overemphasised. The challenges of corruption and economic marginalisation should be tackled in earnest. The need for stronger institutions is not peculiar to Burkina Faso: it is familiar to all the region, and particularly to those countries that have recently come under military rule, notably Guinea and Mali.

What was civil society’s reaction to the recent military coup?

In line with the disunity that characterises civil society in Burkina Faso, the civil society response to the coup has been mixed. But a notable section of civil society seemed to welcome the most recent coup because they saw the Damiba-led junta not only as authoritarian but also as aligned with politicians from the regime of President Blaise Compaoré, in power from 1987 to 2014. They saw the real possibility that those politicians could regain power and shut all doors on victims of the Compaoré regime ever seeing justice.

As a result, the view of the recent coup as a significant setback for the democratic transition agenda is not unanimously held among civil society. Additionally, for a major segment of civil society security appears to be a more urgent and priority concern than democracy, so the element that prevailed was the seeming incapacity of the Damiba-led junta to address the security situation.

The effort of the traditional and religious groups that negotiated a seven-point agreement between the Damiba and Traoré factions of the military, ending violence and forestalling further bloodshed, however, deserves commendation. That effort seems to have established a baseline of engagement between the Traoré-led junta and civil society. Such constructive engagement with the new government seems to have continued, with the notable participation of civil society in the 14 October 2022 National Conference that approved a new Transitional Charter for Burkina Faso and officially appointed Traoré as transitional president.

What is the situation of human right CSOs?

Burkinabe CSOs in the human and civil rights space have grown increasingly concerned about the victimisation of politicians and members of the public perceived to be pro-France as well as by the marked upsurge of pro-Russian groups demanding that France and all its interests be kicked out of the country.

On top of their concern about the raging jihadist insurgency, human and civil rights CSOs are also concerned about the stigmatisation and victimisation of citizens of Fulani ethnicity. This victimisation stems from the fact that many terrorist cells recruit Burkinabe people of Fulani extraction. There have been reports of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of Fulani people due to their alleged complicity in terrorist violence. Besides these two, no other notable cases of human rights abuses threatening civilians have been identified besides the ones already mentioned. Hence, even though it is still early in the Traoré-led government, it may be safe to rule out any consistent pattern of heightened human rights abuses under its watch.

How has the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the military coup?

In accordance with the letter of its 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the initial response of ECOWAS was to condemn the coup strongly and unequivocally, calling it an unfortunate and retrogressive development, especially in light of the progress made with the Damiba-led junta in preparing the ground for elections and democracy. ECOWAS also called for the junta to guarantee human rights and ensure stability.

Despite the ongoing sanctions against the country, following his meeting with Traoré, Mahamadou Issoufou, the former president of Niger and mediator sent to Burkina Faso by ECOWAS, said he was satisfied and that ECOWAS would remain by the side of the people of Burkina Faso. In what is the ECOWAS way to respond to military governments, ECOWAS will work closely with the junta to restore democratic order. The timeline stands and the deadline remains July 2024.

How have other international institutions reacted, and what should they do to support civil society in Burkina Faso?

Other international institutions have reacted similarly to ECOWAS. The African Union condemned the coup and said it was unfortunate in light of the progress already made towards the restoration of democracy. The coup was similarly condemned by the United Nations and the European Parliament.

If the international community wants to assist CSOs in Burkina Faso, what it first and foremost needs to do is support the junta’s efforts to stamp out the jihadist insurgency that continues to hold the country hostage. It should also assist the authorities in tackling not only the current refugee crisis but also the challenge of climate change, which is a contributing factor not just to the refugee crisis but also to the spread of terrorist violence.

The international community must also continue to mount pressure on the junta to deliver on its promise to adhere to the agreements the former junta reached with ECOWAS, to put an end to the victimisation of people on account of their political affiliations and ethnicity, and to set free anyone who has been imprisoned for political reasons.

Civic space inBurkina Faso is rated ‘obstructed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch withWADEMOS through itswebsite or its Facebook page, and follow @WADEMOSnetwork on Twitter.
Human Rights Council adopts resolution on Myanmar to maintain critical scrutiny on the country
CVICUS welcomes the resolution on Myanmar adopted by consensus at the Human Rights Council’s 49th Session. The resolution extends the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for a further year and maintains monitoring and reporting from the High Commissioner, with a focus on accountability.

The resolution further reiterated the Council’s ‘full support for the people of Myanmar and their aspirations for democracy and civilian government’. To this end, and as a first step, CIVICUS calls for the immediate recognition of the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar.

‘As the military junta gets ever more brutal in its attempts to seize control, enhanced scrutiny on the country remains vital,’ said Cornelius Hanung, Advocacy and Campaigns Officer for Asia. ‘The resolution reiterates how dangerous Myanmar’s military is to its people, particularly those who dare to speak out.’

The resolution also raises serious concerns about violence against and arbitrary detention of journalists and media workers, human rights defenders, casualty recorders, lawyers, environmental and land rights activists, health and humanitarian workers and other civilians, and condemns the disproportionate use of force against peaceful protesters.

Over 9,000 individuals are currently in arbitrary detention in Myanmar. Some were taken in terrifying night-time raids. Others were abducted off the streets, held in secret facilities, and denied access to lawyers. CIVICUS calls on the military junta to immediately release all those arbitrarily detained. Around 1,700 people have been killed by Myanmar’s military in the context of demonstrations against the coup since last year.

ASEAN has, to date, failed to address any of these violations; implementation of its five-point consensus peace agreement reached last year to address the crisis has stalled. The resolution called on States to cease the ‘illicit’ transfer of arms to Myanmar but fell short of calling for the full suspension of arms to the military junta.

‘For the last year, we have seen sustained and violent attacks against those fighting for democracy in Myanmar,’ said Cornelius Hanung. ‘We call on the international community to take immediate steps to protect those on the ground, including by imposing an arms embargo on the weapons used indiscriminately against the Myanmar people.’

This resolution is a step towards preventing further violations, but accountability for past and ongoing violations in Myanmar is still remote. We urge all member and observer states of the Council to support the referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court, as recommended by the High Commissioner.

Read our statement to the Council here.

Civic space in Myanmar is rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.
MYANMAR : « Si le coup d’État n’est pas renversé, il y aura beaucoup plus de prisonniers politiques »
CIVICUS parle du récent coup d’État militaire au Myanmar avec Bo Kyi, ancien prisonnier politique et co-fondateur de l’Association d’assistance aux prisonniers politiques (AAPP). Fondée en 2000 par d’anciens prisonniers politiques vivant en exil à la frontière entre la Thaïlande et le Myanmar, l’AAPP est basée à Mae Sot, en Thaïlande, et possède deux bureaux au Myanmar, ouverts depuis 2012. L’AAPP travaille pour la libération des prisonniers politiques et l’amélioration de leur vie après leur libération, avec des programmes visant à leur garantir l’accès à l’éducation, à la formation professionnelle, aux conseils en matière de santé mentale et aux soins de santé.
MYANMAR: “If this coup is not overturned, there will be many more political prisoners”
CIVICUS speaks about the recent military coup in Myanmar with Bo Kyi, a former political prisoner and co-founder of theAssistance Association of Political Prisoners (AAPP). Founded in 2000 by former political prisoners living in exile on the Thai-Myanmar border, AAPP has its headquarters in Mae Sot, Thailand and two offices in Myanmar that opened in 2012. AAPP advocates for the release of political prisoners and the improvement of their lives after their release, with programmes aimed at ensuring access to education, vocational training, mental health counselling and healthcare.
Myanmar: Release all activists and politicians detained and restore democracy

Global civil society alliance CIVICUS is alarmed that the military’s takeover of control of Myanmar from the civilian government represents a sharp reversal of the partial yet significant progress toward democracy made in recent years following five decades of military rule and international isolation.
Myanmar: Situation remains a human rights catastrophe
Statement at 47th Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Delivered by Lisa Majumdar

Thank you, Madame President,

We welcome the High Commissioner’s oral update, and that this critical opportunity to address the ongoing crisis in Myanmar was not lost.

It is over five months since the military junta deposed Myanmar’s elected government, and the situation remains a human rights catastrophe.

Efforts towards regional diplomacy have not borne results. The five-point plan adopted by ASEAN in April is yet to be implemented and has not resulted in any efforts towards de-escalation, or lessening of loss to life. Instead, armed conflict and other violence are intensifying, with violence particularly intense in areas with significant ethnic and religious minority groups. We urge the Council to ensure that any measures it takes this Session to address intersecting crises in Myanmar takes into account this full context.

Sweeping arrests of activists, journalists and opponents of the regime have continued across the country. Thousands have been arbitrarily arrested and detained and some have been tortured or ill-treated. They include human rights defenders, trade unionists, student activists, poets, writers, filmmakers and monks. Activists face baseless charges including ‘treason’ which is punishable by up to 20 years in prison or ‘incitement’ which is punishable by up to three years in prison.

At least 88 journalists have been arrested since the coup, as well as lawyers defending political prisoners. Dozens have fled the country or have sought refuge in territories controlled by ethnic armed organisations. The internet shutdowns, which began following the coup, have now reached a new level of severity.

The people of Myanmar cannot afford to wait and see if regional diplomacy efforts will take effect. We call on States to call for the release of political prisoners and ensure an end to a free-flowing supply of weapons to a military which shows no intention of ending its campaign of bloodshed. We welcome that several States have imposed targeted sanctions on key individuals of the military and call on other States to do the same. It is the responsibility of States to ensure that perpetrating human rights atrocities bears a cost.

We thank you.

Civic space in Myanmar is rated as Repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.
Myanmar: the junta’s efforts to erase religious minorities must be stopped
Statement at the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council

Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner on Myanmar

Delivered by Kyaw Win, Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN)

Thank you, Mr. President.

While religious oppression has been a longstanding issue in Burma, the coup emboldened the junta to further persecute, marginalise and incite violence against religious minorities. The junta perpetuates its efforts to erase the identity of all six Muslim minority groups through the denial of their citizenship. Rohingya Muslims are coerced to accept National Verification Cards, which do not provide a predictable or accessible pathway to citizenship, nor does it increase access to rights, including freedom of movement. Nonetheless, some UN agencies and embassies continue to endorse National Verification Cards (NVCs) as a pragmatic solution to end statelessness. Due to their lack of citizenship, Muslims who have been forced to flee Myanmar are faced with statelessness.

Divisive and hateful rhetoric targeting non-Buddhist religious groups is used to divide the resistance and divert attention from the coup, Since the coup, BHRN has documented cases of looting, burning, and destruction of properties, shops, and places of worship of Muslim communities. Since the coup, over 20 Islamic religious buildings were attacked by the military and more than 770 houses in Muslim villages have been burned down in Sagaing region. There has also been an increasing number of cases of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and killing of Muslims.

The UN and the international community have not done enough. The longer the international community waits to act, the more emboldened the junta becomes as it continues to commit atrocities. We ask the High Commissioner what the international community should do to ensure accountability for serious human rights violations committed by the junta, to cut revenue streams to the junta, to support Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar and those fleeing to neighbouring countries.

We thank you.

Civic space in Myanmar is rated as "Repressed" by the CIVICUS Monitor
New sentence by Venezuela´s Supreme Court consecrates a coup against the Venezuelan parliament
Spanish

Sentence No. 156, released around midnight on March 29, by which the Constitutional Chamber of Venezuela´s Supreme Court (TSJ) assumes all the powers of the National Assembly or delegates them to whom it decides, places Venezuela before the dissolution of the parliament by judicial means.

There is no constitutional provision that allows the judicial body, designated by means of second-degree elections, to assume the functions of the National Assembly, which directly represents the population.

The Constitutional Chamber has issued over 50 decisions that have gradually deprived the National Assembly of its legislative, controlling, investigative and designating functions, until it suspended parliamentary immunity by Sentence No. 155 the previous day, and finally assumes parliamentary functions as the legislative power.

The parliament is a fundamental pillar of democratic institutions, as it is a space for participation and expression of the different groups that make up a nation. It is the space in which elected representatives, as well as organizations and members of civil society can debate and discuss the different proposals to create legislation and public policies. In this sense, this measure not only disrupts the constitutional order, but also violates the right of citizens to participate in public affairs.

We call on the Supreme Court of Justice and the National Executive to cease ignoring the Constitution, as has been evidenced after the publication of the most recent decisions of the Constitutional Chamber, which allow for the implementation of measures and actions that undermine the Constitutional thread and break the democratic order in Venezuela, reaffirming the absence of the Rule of Law and consolidating a Dictatorial regime.

Finally, we again urge that corrective measures be taken to reverse any decision that violates the constitutional norm, ignore the power of the popular vote represented in the elected National Assembly and deepen the country's withdrawal from a democratic system of respect for fundamental guarantees and human rights, in order to restore democracy and the rule of law, beginning with restoring and respecting the functions of the National Assembly.

Subscribed by the following Venezuelan Civil Society Organizations:
Acceso a La Justicia
Acción Campesina
Acción Solidaria
Amigos Trasplantados de Venezuela
Asamblea De Educación
Asociación Civil María Estrella De La Mañana
Asociación Civil Mujeres En Línea
Asociación Civil Nueva Esparta En Movimiento
Asociación Civil Radar De Los Barrios
Asociación de Profesores de la Universidad Simón Bolívar, APUSB
Asociación Venezolana de Mujeres
Asociación Venezolana para La Hemofilia
Aula Abierta Venezuela
Banco Del Libro
Cedice Libertad
Centro de Animación Juvenil
Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, CDH-UCAB
Centro de Estudios Sociales y Culturales
Centro de Justicia y Paz, CEPAZ
CIVILIS Derechos Humanos
Coalición Cambio Climático 21
Coalición por el Derecho a la Salud y la Vida, CODEVIDA
Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas, Universidad del Zulia
Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Federación Venezolana de Colegios de Abogados, Estado Táchira
Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Federación Venezolana de Colegios de Abogados, Estado Apure
Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la Federación Venezolana de Colegios de Abogados, Estado Mérida
Comisión para los Derechos Humanos del Estado Zulia
Convite Asociación Civil
Correo Del Caroní
Espacio Humanitario
Espacio Público
EXCUBITUS, Derechos Humanos en Educación
Federación Nacional de Sociedades de Padres y Representantes, FENASOPADRES
Frente en Defensa del Norte de Caracas y Asamblea de Ciudadanos de La Candelaria
Funcamama
Fundación TAAP
Fundamujer
Fundeci
Instituto Venezolano de Estudios Sociales y Políticos, INVESP
IPYS Venezuela
Laboratorio De Paz
Llamado a la Conciencia Vial
Médicos Unidos Carabobo
Movimiento Vinotinto
Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad de Los Andes
Observatorio Global de Comunicación y Democracia
Observatorio Hannah Arendt
Observatorio Venex
Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social, OVCS
Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones, OVP
OPCION Venezuela Asociación Civil
Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos, PROVEA
ProIuris
Promoción Educación y Defensa en Derechos Humanos, PROMEDEHUM
Sinergia, Asociación Venezolana de Organizaciones de Sociedad Civil
Sociedad Hominis Iura, SOHI
StopVIH
Transparencia Venezuela
Un Mundo Sin Mordaza
Una Ventana a la Libertad
Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela
Unión Vecinal para la Participación Ciudadana
Veedores por la Educación Aragua
Sudan conflict marks failure of transition plan
By Andrew Firmin, CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report

On one side is the army, headed by Sudan’s current leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. On the other are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti. Both sides blame the other and say they will refuse to negotiate. The two worked together in the October 2021 coup that overthrew a transitional government, put in place in August 2019 after long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir was ousted following a popular uprising. They were never committed to democracy. Military forces initially tried to suppress democracy protests with lethal violence. The grimmest day came on 3 June 2019, when the RSF ended a sit-in with indiscriminate gunfire, killing over 100 people. There has been no accountability for the violence.

Read in Inter Press Service
SUDAN: ‘The only way out of this mess is through civilian rule’
CIVICUS speaks about thewar in Sudan and its repercussions for women and civil society with Reem Abbas, a Sudanese feminist activist, writer and fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP).

Founded in 2013, TIMEP is a civil society organisation that works to centre advocates and experts from and in the Middle East and North Africa in policy discourse to foster more fair and democratic societies.

What’s the current humanitarian situation in Sudan?

Active conflict persists in around 60 per cent of Sudan’s territory. The continuous fighting entails targeting of civilians and mass displacement. In some states, much of the civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets, schools and universities, has been damaged. In Khartoum and West Darfur states, about 70 per cent of hospitals have been damaged or partially destroyed.

Civilians and civil society activists are unsafe. The situation greatly restricts people’s freedom of movement, their ability to sustain a livelihood and their capacity to express their opinions freely. There are pockets of relative security in Eastern and Northern Sudan, but even in areas deemed secure displacement persists and schools remain closed because internally displaced people are living in them and other public buildings.

Many livelihoods have totally collapsed, leaving people increasingly dependent on aid. We are already witnessing cases of famine, particularly affecting children, resulting in deaths.

How has the conflict impacted on women and girls?

Women have always been targeted in conflicts in Sudan. Political violence, rife in Sudan given its volatile political history, has also often taken aim at women. There’s rarely any accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – the militias that are fighting against the army – are abducting women and selling them as sexual slaves in markets or holding them captive for extended periods. Families are left in distress, unsure of the whereabouts of their daughters, and are sometimes embezzled for money.

This is a war on women. Part of it stems from structural factors that place women in subordinate positions, but there’s also a punitive element directed at women for their pivotal role in the 2019 revolution that overthrew dictator Omar al-Bashir. During the revolution, women were out there, highly visible on the frontlines, and now it feels like they’re being punished for it.

The targeting of women is tearing the social fabric apart. As public spaces become unsafe for women, fewer women are participating in public life, including in economic activities and activism. This will have long-term consequences.

What roles is civil society playing in this context, and what challenges does it face?

It’s important to recognise that civil society in Sudan isn’t a monolithic entity, but rather a complex mix of different layers. Some were heavily involved during the transitional period that followed the revolution, getting deeply integrated with government structures at the time. Then there are women’s groups, each with their own focus and agenda. Alongside them, there are more formal organisations such as non-governmental organisations and trade unions. And let’s not overlook the revolutionary elements, such as the resistance committees and emergency response rooms, decentralised and horizontal structures working to shelter displaced people, support hospitals and secure food and water supplies.

The more formal parts of civil society are currently heavily involved in politics, while its revolutionary segments are deeply engaged in grassroots humanitarian efforts. They’re essentially functioning as local governments in areas where official governance structures are absent.

Despite its crucial role, civil society faces numerous challenges. The organic growth of grassroots movements is stunted by conflict and dictatorship. The polarising effects of war have led to divisions along political, ethnic and regional lines, further fragmenting civil society. Activists are increasingly targeted by the RSF or the army, threatening their ability to operate.

In an environment where conformity to mainstream opinions is increasingly enforced, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain dissenting voices. This situation underscores the urgent need to safeguard the diversity and autonomy of civil society in Sudan.

However, attention and funding often gravitate towards already well-funded organisations, leaving grassroots initiatives to rely solely on community support. While funding alone doesn’t create a functional organisation, it’s important for organisations and groups to grow in an organic way and be able to garner support from the community.

How is civil society advocating for peace and democracy?

Right now, the conversation is all about security and getting things back to normal. People are doubting whether we can even think about democracy after all this chaos. The situation’s tough, with militarisation and conflict everywhere. But the only way out of this mess is through civilian rule. We need to figure out how to link the peace process to a long-term political solution that puts us back on track for democracy.

Unfortunately, the focus of the political elite appears to be more on preserving its positions rather than addressing urgent issues. There are concerns that the largest political coalition has developed close ties with the militia, causing unease among those involved in the revolution. Without a bigger political group that really listens to people and leads responsibly, we’re going to be stuck with military rule for ages. Right now, it should be all about finding common ground and putting the focus on the people who’ve suffered most from this war – not about politicians trying to claw back power or siding with the military.

There’s a lot of talk about how the transitional government messed up and led to the coup and the war. People are sceptical about civilian rule and whether it can fix things. It’s easier to sell the idea of a military-run government when people are feeling scared and vulnerable. Even though it’s militarisation that got us into this mess in the first place, it’s understandable because people just want to feel safe again.

What should the international community do to address Sudan’s dire security and humanitarian situation?

It’s time for the international community to stop sticking to one side of the story and start listening to everyone involved. They’re pumping all their funds into one camp and ignoring a whole bunch of other perspectives. We need more humanitarian aid, particularly considering the famine situation. Millions of people are at risk, with nowhere to turn and nothing to support themselves with.

Investment in basic infrastructure like hospitals and water plants is crucial too. People need services, and they need them now. Some areas haven’t had clean water for months because water plants are getting caught in the crossfire.

The international community must also demonstrate political determination. People’s lives are on the line. We need clear plans and urgent action to stop this war.

I want to emphasise the significance of civil society solidarity. This is crucial when our governments show ambivalence towards our concerns. In such situations, we must become each other’s voices and amplify our collective message. We must seek ways to connect, demonstrate solidarity and collaborate effectively.

It’s important to learn from one another and work together towards shared objectives. Collaboration with civil society groups and networks across the world is greatly appreciated. It’s through such partnerships that we can make a meaningful impact and bring about positive change.

Civic space in Sudan is rated ‘repressed’ by theCIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with TIMEP through itswebsite or itsFacebook andLinkedIn pages, and follow@TimepDC and@ReemWrites on Twitter.
Sudan: Protect civilians as armed conflict escalates
The international community including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, Arab League and the United Nations should act in a timely manner to prevent a civil war in Sudan, global civil society alliance, CIVICUS, said today.
Sudan: The UN Human Rights Council should act urgently and hold a special session
Following the 25 October 2021 military coup in Sudan, CIVICUS and partners have released a call on the UN Human Rights Council to convene a special session to address the crisis in the country.

To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (Geneva, Switzerland)

Excellencies,

As violence is increasing in Sudan following the military coup of 25 October 2021 and decisive action is needed to protect the transition, Sudan’s constitutional order, and the human rights of people in Sudan, the UN Human Rights Council has a responsibility to act urgently.

The Council should fulfil its mandate to prevent violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies by convening a special session and adopting a resolution requesting the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to set up a fact-finding mission to monitor, verify and report on the situation in Sudan with a view to preventing further human rights violations and abuses, identifying perpetrators, and ensuring accountability for these violations and abuses.

Ahead of the 48^thsession of the Human Rights Council (13 September-11 October 2021), 37 civil society organisations (CSOs) highlighted[1] the need for the Council to extend its support to, and scrutiny of, Sudan. The CSOs highlighted that Sudan’s political transition remained incomplete, mentioned ongoing challenges and risks, and urged States to maintain the monitoring and public reporting capacity of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). They wrote: “[T]he Human Rights Council has a responsibility to keep Sudan high on its list of priorities and to contribute to meaningful progress in the country.”

Their call remained unanswered as the Council failed to adopt any Sudan-focused resolution.

Two weeks after the session ended, on 25 October 2021, Sudan’s military forces arrested Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and several civilian figures, including members of the Transitional Government and Transitional Sovereign Council (SC), who were placed under house arrest or taken to unknown locations. At the time of writing, several of them remain held incommunicado or under house arrest. Military elements took control of the national television and key centres of information. They imposed a partial internet shutdown in the country and closed roads, bridges, and the airport in Khartoum.

This military coup occurred one month before the head of the former Transitional Military Council (TMC), General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, who had since August 2019 been heading the SC, was due to hand over the presidency of the SC to civilian representatives, as per the power-sharing agreement and Constitutional Document of 2019.[2]

General al-Burhan announced a nation-wide state of emergency and the dissolution of the SC and the civilian-led Transitional Government.

He unilaterally announced the suspension of Articles 11, 12, 15, 16, 24-3, 71, and 72 of the Constitutional Document. These articles pertain to the SC, the Transitional Council of Ministers and Cabinet, the Transitional Legislative Council (which was to be constituted), and the TMC. The latter’s dissolution seems to have been annulled, paving the way for military rule.[3]

The coup and military takeover also threaten the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement for Sudan, which was signed on 3 October 2020 between the Transitional Government and parties to the peace process, including armed groups that were involved in the conflicts that have affected several of Sudan’s regional States in the last three decades.

General al-Burhan sought to justify the illegal takeover by blaming “political infighting” within civilian bodies and groups, including the Transitional Government and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the coalition that brings together the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), civic groups, and political parties that signed the Declaration on Freedom and Change of January 2019 and led the peaceful popular revolution of 2018-2019 that led to the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019, and the political transition. General al-Burhan even asserted that the army had ousted the government to avoid a “civil war.”[4]

* * * * * * * * *

Immediately after the coup was reported, and despite restrictions on communications, protesters peacefully took to the streets to denounce the military’s illegal actions and demand the reinstatement of the government and a transition to civilian rule. The SPA called for strikes and civil disobedience. Protesters erected barricades in the streets. Soldiers opened fire on crowds and reportedly killed at least ten people and injured dozens. Arrests have been reported.[5]

These acts demonstrate the armed and security forces’ lack of commitment to a democratic transition to civilian rule and their determination to consolidate control, including by using violence. The 25 October 2021 military coup followed a reported coup attempt on 21 September 2021, which “the military blamed on a cadre of Bashir-allied Islamists but which several diplomats described […] as a trial balloon,” as tensions were growing within the SC.[6]

Fears of a full-fledged, bloody crackdown are mounting. These fears are made credible by the illegal actions of the reconstituted TMC, the history of violence and abuse that characterises Sudan’s armed and security forces, including the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the current context, including restrictions on communications, which are reminiscent of the shutdown that was imposed following the atrocities committed on 3 June 2019 (known as the “Khartoum massacre”[7]).

While the total number of arrests made is unknown, it is likely to increase after the release of the present letter. Human rights defenders (HRDs), protest organisers, journalists, and independent voices, in particular women human rights defenders (WHRDs), women journalists, and women and girls protesting the coup, are at a heightened risk of being subjected to violations and abuses. These include arbitrary arrests, the use of unwarranted and lethal force, beatings, ill-treatment and torture, and sexual and gender-based violence, as was the case during the Khartoum massacre.[8]

* * * * * * * * *

The coup has drawn condemnation. States, including partners of Sudan, condemned it as a betrayal of the transition, demanded the release of political leaders, and urged full observance for the Constitutional Document and the reinstatement of transitional institutions.[9]

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), of which Sudan is a Member, issued a statement in which its Executive Secretary, Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu, said he was “alarmed by the current political developments.” He “strongly condemn[ed] any attempt to undermine the transitional government” and called for the “immediate release” of all arrested political leaders.[10]

The Arab League expressed “deep concern” about the military coup. The organisation’s Secretary-General urged all parties to “fully abide” by the Constitutional Declaration signed in August 2019.[11]

The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, who learned “with deep dismay of the serious development of the current situation in Sudan,” called “for the immediate resumption of consultations between civilians and military” and reaffirmed that “dialogue and consensus is the only relevant path to save the country and its democratic transition.” He further called “for the release of all arrested political leaders and the necessary strict respect of human rights.”[12] However, despite the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government,[13] he did not convey a “clear and unequivocal warning to the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change that, under no circumstances, will their illegal action be tolerated or recognized by the [AU].”

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) met on 26 October 2021. The following day, it released a communiqué[14] in which it “strongly condemn[ed] the seizure of power by the Sudanese military on 25 October 2021 and the dissolution of the Transitional Government, and totally reject[ed] the unconstitutional change of government, as unacceptable and an affront to the shared values and democratic norms of the AU.” It decided to “suspend, with immediate effect, the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities until the effective restoration of the civilian-led Transitional Authority.”

While this is a positive step, more needs to be done to stop military rule and protect the transition, Sudan’s constitutional order, and the human rights of people in Sudan. As repression increases, AU mediation efforts and Human Rights Council action are not mutually exclusive but complementary.

The UN Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, “strongly condemn[ed] the ongoing military coup d’état in Khartoum and all actions that could jeopardize Sudan’s political transition and stability.” He called for the immediate reconstitution of the governing arrangements provided for under the Constitutional Document.” He referred to the “unlawful detention” of the Prime Minister, government officials and politicians as “unacceptable” and called for the immediate release of those detained arbitrarily. He added: “Any attempts to undermine this transition process puts at risk Sudan’s security, stability and development.”[15]

The Special Representative for Sudan and Head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Mr. Volker Perthes, said he was “deeply concerned about reports of an ongoing coup and attempts to undermine Sudan’s political transition.” He “called on the security forces to immediately release those who have been unlawfully detained or placed under house arrest” and urged an “[immediate] return to dialogue and [engagement] in good faith to restore the constitutional order.”[16]

For her part, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Michelle Bachelet, “strongly condemn[ed] [the] military coup in Sudan and the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency, the suspension of key articles of the Constitutional Document and the governing bodies.” She reminded “military and security forces to refrain from unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, to respect people’s freedom of expression, as well as the right of peaceful assembly.” She added: “It would be disastrous if Sudan goes backwards after finally bringing an end to decades of repressive dictatorship.”[17]

On 26 October, the UN Security Council met behind closed doors to discuss the crisis. It failed to adopt a resolution to unequivocally condemn the military coup, or even to release a statement.

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In this context, the Human Rights Council cannot afford to stay silent or wait for its next regular session, which is due to open on 25 February 2022, to act.

It should make clear that the TMC cannot be considered a legitimate partner; strongly condemn the military coup; urge full respect for the Constitutional Document and the reinstatement of transitional institutions; call for an immediate stop to the violence against protesters; demand a release of all political prisoners; and demand accountability for the human rights violations and abuses committed.

The Human Rights Council should fulfil its mandate to prevent violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies, convene a special session, and request the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to set up a fact-finding mission to monitor, verify and report on the situation in Sudan with a view to preventing further human rights violations and abuses, identifying perpetrators, and ensuring accountability for these violations and abuses.

The report of the fact-finding mission should be shared with the UN Security Council. The Human Rights Council should further ensure that the High Commissioner publicly and regularly reports on the human rights situation in Sudan, relying on both in-house expertise and the work of the OHCHR country office in Sudan, and it should hold interactive dialogues on the human rights situation in Sudan twice a year.

We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information as required.

Sincerely,
1. African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)
2. AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
3. African Initiative for Peacebuilding, Advocacy and Advancement (AfriPeace)
4. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
5. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
6. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
7. CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide)
8. Darfur and Beyond
9. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
10. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
11. Global Rights
12. Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC)
13. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
14. International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI)
15. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
16. Justice Center for Advocacy and Legal Consultations
17. Kamma Organization for Development Initiatives (KODI)
18. Kenya Human Rights Commission
19. Kongamano La Mapinduzi
20. Lawyers for Justice Sudan
21. Mouvement Inamahoro
22. Never Again Coalition
23. PAX
24. Physicians for Human Rights
25. REDRESS
26. Regional Centre for Training and Development of Civil Society (RCDCS)
27. The Sentry
28. Skills for Nuba Mountains
29. Sudan Archives
30. Sudan Human Rights Hub
31. Sudan Unlimited
32. Victims Advocates International
33. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
[1] DefendDefenders et al., “The Human Rights Council should extend its support to, and scrutiny of, Sudan,” 10 September 2021 (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[2] For background, see DefendDefenders et al., “Sudan: ensuring a credible response by the UN Human Rights Council,” 3 September 2019, (and Annex) (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[3] Al Jazeera, “Sudan coup: Which constitutional articles have been suspended?” 26 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[4] France 24, “Sudan’s Burhan says army ousted government to avoid civil war,” 26 October 2021, (accessed on 27 October 2021).

[5] Al Jazeera, “‘No to army rule’: Pro-democracy protesters take to Sudan streets,” 27 October 2021; BBC News, “Sudan coup: Why the army is gambling with the future,” 27 October 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59050473 (both accessed on 27 October 2021).

[6] International Crisis Group, “Reversing Sudan’s Dangerous Coup,” 26 October 2021. See also BBC News, “Killings of Peaceful Sudanese Democracy Protesters Demand Accountability: Urgent International Action Needed to Prevent Further Violence,” 21 September 2021, (both accessed on 27 October 2021).

[7] See previous civil society letters on Sudan, in particular International Refugee Rights Initiative et al., “Killings of Peaceful Sudanese Democracy Protesters Demand Accountability: Urgent International Action Needed to Prevent Further Violence ,” 6 June 2019, ; DefendDefenders et al., “Sudan: ensuring a credible response by the UN Human Rights Council,” 3 September 2019, (and Annex); DefendDefenders et al., “The Human Rights Council should support human rights reforms in Sudan,” 9 September 2020, (all accessed on 26 October 2021).

[8] Human Rights Watch, “‘They Were Shouting ‘Kill Them’: Sudan’s Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum,” 17 November 2019, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[9] For a comprehensive list of responses by Governments and intergovernmental organizations to the military coup, see Sudan Unlimited, “World Unites with the People of Sudan and Against #SudanCoup,” (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[10] “IGAD Statement On The Current Political Development In Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[11] Asharq al-Awsat, “Arab League Expresses ‘Deep Concern’ over Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[12] “Statement of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the situation in Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[13] AU PSC, “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government” (AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI)), 10-12 July 2000, (accessed on 25 October 2021).

[14] “Communiqué of the 1041^st meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held on 26 October 2021 on the Situation in Sudan,” 27 October 2021, (accessed on 27 October 2021).

[15] “Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[16] “SRSG Statement about Reports of an Ongoing Coup and Attempts to Undermine Sudan’s Political Transition,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

[17] “Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on the coup d’état in Sudan,” 25 October 2021, (accessed on 26 October 2021).

Civic space in Sudan is rated as repressed by the CIVICUS Monitor.