ENGAGING TOGETHER FOR REAL CHANGE

CIVICUS CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX
ANALYTICAL COUNTRY REPORT FOR SENEGAL

2011

MOUSSA MBAYE

FOREWORD

Civil society in Senegal has grown at an exponential rate in the past few years, while becoming very diversified and quite effective at all levels of governance, local and national. It has played a role in multiple fields such as health, education, human rights and land ownership, and the state, public institutions, and donors are beginning to consider it a stakeholder which cannot be overlooked. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is a perfect illustration of how civil society is influencing public policy. To understand civil society at a national level, one must look at three dimensions: the social, the economic and the political.

Historically, one finds the emergence of Senegalese civil society in its modern form to have been mainly concerned with the social sphere. There was a need to revive social bonds following the violent transformation of social structures in Senegal that was linked to colonisation. People who settled in new urban centres, or temporary settlements as part of forced labour for building bridges or railways, sought to organise themselves to address collective needs and concerns.

This movement gave birth to associations of people who came from the same area in Senegal and was consolidated with the institutionalisation of religious brotherhoods who exploited the public space newly created and pacified by the colonialists. Another important factor was the development of cultural and sports associations, as well as the cooperative movement in rural zones which were encouraged by the state. All these groups had ethnic or religious affinities and created an intricate social life around their activities.

Civil society addressed social issues from the beginning and this tendency continued until the 1970s when a great drought struck Senegal with devastating effects on agriculture, in particular, and on the economy in general. The situation grew worse from 1975 until the 1980s due to a worldwide recession that put into question Senegal's development. During this period, the main concern for everyone was of an economic order, and civil society had to adapt to this new challenge by changing its focus on economic questions of development. This led to the birth of many NGOs (non-governmental organisations). The state set up a tax exemption policy to encourage civil society to get involved in the economy, and they encouraged people to form GIEs (economic interest groups). The NGOs became a sort of mediator between the state and society proper. This strong preoccupation with economic issues did not lead to a lack of interest in social matters. During these two historical periods, CSOs (civil society organisations) were quite focused on issues specific to the population's needs and had roots at the community level, mainly in the rural areas.

In this period, civil society was not a homogenous entity but was composed of a plethora of associations scattered throughout Senegal with little coordination or interaction between them. The chaos eventually led to efforts to create a federating body bringing together all CSOs, and CONGAD was the result. This period throughout the 1990s coincided with non-violent political transformations which brought democratic change in Africa that encouraged reflection on new forms of political governance. This was the time for national conferences held to define what new kinds of governance were possible. This was a great turning point for many African states, since change was based on the idea that is was impossible to have social and economic development without democratic foundations. It would not be an exaggeration to call that decisive moment a political revolution that had a very strong impact on civil society, and henceforth many CSOs turned to new domains such as human rights, good governance and civil freedom. This third generation of CSOs learned how to use the media as part of their strategies, were organised at a national level and strived for visibility so as to play a part in the definition of good governance.

In these three historical phases of Senegalese civil society, there are many strengths and weaknesses to address. Best practices include a consultative approach, wide consultation, and the capacity to be a watchdog of the state to make sure it fulfils its responsibilities. Weaknesses are both internal and external to civil society, including the lack of institutional coordination and synergistic methodologies, lack of human resources, the absence of a legal framework that enables civil society to fully play its part; and last of all, a general lack of a long-term vision that is indigenous to Senegal and not that of donor organisations.

But the future is looking positive with Senegalese youth rising to the challenge and demanding good governance in the public and private sectors, as well as from within civil society itself. Thousands of young people are getting busy in their villages, their neighbourhoods and their cities to claim a better future for Senegal. They must be assisted, for tomorrow they will be the leaders of Senegal.

Mohamadou Mbodj
General Coordinator
Forum Civil

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The CSI Senegal project was a collaboration between the Forum Civil and CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, with the financial support of UNDP/Senegal. We would like to thank all members of civil society who played a part in this research project and who participated in the consultations, including in the national consultation committee and the national workshop. We learned a lot from these meetings.

Without the efforts of Moussa Mbaye this report would not have been possible. His expertise and his knowledge of civil society in Senegal is very broad and his discipline was essential to the writing of the report. He greatly contributed to the index scoring meeting with national consultation committee and to the national workshop.

Kathryn Lane from Forum Civil contributed her insight and strong sense of organisation to completing this long process.

We are also grateful to the NIT (National Index Team): Djibril Diakhaté, Fatoumata Hane and Moussa Mbaye for their hard work, and all the members of the Forum Civil who contributed to this work, in particular Fatou Bintou Diop and Souleymane Diawara.

CIVICUS CSI team members who worked with us included Natalie Akstein, Tracy Anderson, Yosi Echeverry Burckhardt, Andrew Firmin, Olga Kononykhina, Mark Nowottny and Julia Sestier.

Mohamadou Mbodj
General Coordinator
Forum Civil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 2
Acknowledgements 4
Table of contents 5
List of tables and figures 7
List of acronyms 9
Executive summary 10
I. Introduction 12
1. The Civil Society Index project 12
2. Project background 13
3. Project approach 13
4. Context and relevance in Senegal 15
5. Methodology 16
6. Limitations of the study 19
II. Civil society in Senegal 21
1. The concept of civil society in Senegal 21
2. History of Senegalese civil society 21
3. Analysis of social forces 23
4. Mapping of Senegalese civil society 24
III. Analysis of civil society in Senegal 26
1. Structure 26
1.1 Breadth of participation 26
1.2 Depth of participation 27
1.3 Diversity of participation 28
1.4 Level of organisation 29
1.5 Interrelations 31
1.6 Resources 32
Conclusions 33
2. Environment 34
2.1 The political context 34
2.2 Fundamental rights and freedoms 36
2.3 Socio-economic context 36
2.4 Socio-cultural context 37
2.5 The legal environment 39
2.6 Relations between the state and civil society 40
2.7 Relations between the private sector and civil society 42
Conclusions 44
3. Values 44
3.1 Internal democracy 44
3.2 Transparency 46
3.3 Tolerance 48
3.4 Non-violence 48
3.5 Gender equity 49
3.6 Eradicating poverty 50
3.7 Environmental sustainability 51
Conclusions 51
4. Impact 52
4.1 Influencing public policy 52
4.2 Holding the state and private sector accountable 53
4.3 Responding to social interests 55
4.4 Empowering citizens 56
4.5 Meeting societal needs 58
Conclusions 60

IV: Strengths and weaknesses of Senegalese civil society 62
V: Recommendations 64
VI: Conclusion 65
Appendices 66
Appendix 1: Indicator scoring grid 66
Appendix 2: Review of key secondary data sources 69
Bibliography 72

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Areas of the survey (regions and departments covered) 19
Table 2: Summary of scores for breadth of participation 26
Table 3: Summary of scores for depth of participation 27
Table 4: Summary of scores for diversity of participation 28
Table 5: Summary of scores for level of organisation 29
Table 6: Summary of scores for interrelations in CSOs 31
Table 7: Level of communication responses 32
Table 8: Summary of scores for resources 32
Table 9: Adequacy of financial resources to ambitions 32
Table 10: Adequacy of human resources to ambitions 33
Table 11: Adequacy of technological resources to ambitions 33
Table 12: Summary of scores for political context 34
Table 13: Summary of scores for fundamental rights and freedoms 36
Table 14: Summary of scores for socio-economic context 36
Table 15: Summary of scores for socio-cultural context 37
Table 16: Summary of scores for legal environment 39
Table 17: Summary of scores for relations between state and civil society 41
Table 18: Summary of scores for relations between the private sector and civil society 42
Table 19: Summary of scores for internal democracy 44
Table 20: Summary of scores for transparency 46
Table 21: Summary of scores for tolerance 48
Table 22: Summary of scores for non-violence 48
Table 23: Summary of scores for gender equity 49
Table 24: Summary of scores for eradicating poverty 50
Table 25: Summary of scores for environmental sustainability 51
Table 26: Summary of scores for influencing public policy 52
Table 27: Summary of scores for holding the state and private sector to account 53
Table 28: Summary of scores for responding to social interests 55
Table 29: Summary of scores for empowering citizens 56
Table 30: Summary of scores for meeting societal needs 58

Figure 1: Senegalese Civil Society Diamond, 2011 10
Figure 2: Civil Society Diamond 15
Figure 3: Steps of the methodological research 18
Figure 4: Mapping of social actors and their interaction with the state 24
Figure 5: Mapping of civil society actors (according to their degree of influence) 25
Figure 6: Assessment of the effectiveness of umbrella organisations 30
Figure 7: Self-regulation efforts of CSOs 31
Figure 8: Structure dimension scores 33
Figure 9: Views on legal registration procedures for CSOs 39
Figure 10: Existence of legal restrictions on CSO advocacy activity 40
Figure 11: State control over civil society 41
Figure 12: CSO views of private sector attitudes 43
Figure 13: Environment dimension scores 44
Figure 14: Influence of CSO members on decision-making processes 45
Figure 15: Occurrences of corruption in CSOs 46
Figure 16: Promotion of government transparency by civil society 47
Figure 17: Promotion of private sector transparency by civil society 47
Figure 18: Recognition of actions by CSOs to reduce poverty 50
Figure 19: Role of CSOs in poverty eradication 51
Figure 20: Values dimension scores 52
Figure 21: Impact of CSOs on policies 53

Figure 22: Civil society effectiveness in holding state to account 54
Figure 23: Civil society effectiveness in holding private sector to account 54
Figure 24: Success of public campaigns 56
Figure 25: CSO lobbying for state service provision 59
Figure 26: Meeting social needs directly 59
Figure 27: Impact dimension scores 60

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFAO	West Africa Women's Association
AN	National Workshop
ANOCI	National Agency for the Islamic Conference Organisation
APD	Public Development Aid
ARMP	Agency for the Regulation of Public Contracts
ASC	Culture and Sports Association
CNCR	National Council for the consultation and cooperation with rural Populations
CONGAD	NGO Counsel for Aid towards Development
COSEF	Congress of Senegalese Women
CS	Civil society
CSO	Civil society organisation
DIC	Division of Criminal Investigations
DRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ENI	National Index Team
FC	Forum Civil
FRAO	Rural Foundation for West Africa
GPF	Women's Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NAC	National Advisory Committee
OCDE	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONG	Non-governmental organisation
PAS	Structural Adjustment Programme
RADDHO	African Congress for the Protection of Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
WB	World Bank
WVS	World Values Survey

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The project to produce a civil society index in Senegal was part of CIVICUS' initiative to strengthen civil society through self-assessment in around 40 countries worldwide. The approach designed by CIVICUS is based on scientific research, consultations with different civil society stakeholders, and analysis from national experts. This action/research project is an opportunity for civil society to evaluate itself by identifying its strengths and weaknesses and formulating recommendations by consensus.

The CSI project was implemented by Forum Civil with the financial support of the UNPD. Forum Civil is a Senegalese civil society organisation that fights corruption, promotes good governance, and contributes to creating a new form of citizenship.

This report provides a description of project implementation, results of the research, conclusions, and a set of recommendations. The project began with its first meeting in September 2008 and ended with the national workshop in January 2011.

According to CIVICUS, civil society can be defined as the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests. The CSI as applied in Senegal used 74 indicators grouped in 4 different dimensions (structure, environment, values and impact), and it is equally interesting to look at how these areas are interrelated. These indicators are used to map out the Civil Society Diamond. The diamond gives a quick view of the discrepancy between what would be a perfect situation (with scores of 3 for each diamond) and the actual real state of civil society (scores of 1.5, 1.5, 2.1 and 1.9).

For the present study we have the following figure:

FIGURE 1: SENEGALESE CIVIL SOCIETY DIAMOND, 2011



Generally speaking, civil society has strong values and a noticeable impact on the population that could however be stronger, but its structure and environment are relatively

weak. During project implementation it became clear that civil society is a rather vague concept and that the results of the research are not always necessarily based on a clear comprehension of the index. More profoundly, the role of civil society within a democracy remains unclear to a majority of the population. It is difficult to distinguish between the values pertaining to civil society as an actor in a democratic state and those linked to religious and cultural structures. There is confusion at times between purely political actors who belonged to civil society organisations (CSOs), non-political CSOs, and other strongly politicised CSOs.

Nevertheless, the four dimensions can be analysed in the following way:

Structure

In Senegal people generally tend to get mobilised together quite naturally for collective needs. However mobilisation tends to be stronger regarding religious issues than those concerning democracy and citizenship. The main reasons why mobilisation remains rather weak are deep poverty within the Senegalese population and the scarcity of resources available to CSOs. The CSOs are well established but would benefit from further funding, training, and a greater number of activities in synergy.

Environment

The socio-political, economic and legal environment of civil society is not as tough as in other African countries with single-party regimes and great limitations on the freedom of speech. Nonetheless, there are still many changes needed if civil society is to be independent and effective force to address corruption, mistrust and political manipulation.

Values

Civil society actors are important change agents and are appreciated for promoting democracy, transparency, tolerance, and non-violence at the institutional level. At the same time, CSO must be more pro-active. The commitment to fight poverty and promote gender equality are also fields in which CSOs are very involved. Promotion of values such as transparency, justice, tolerance is something that CSOs must first practice amongst themselves so as to set an example.

Impact

In spite of limited resources and a challenging context, the research results indicate that Senegalese civil society plays a positive role in society. At the socio-political level, CSOs have contributed to raising awareness about citizenship and democracy thanks to using communication and mass education strategies. They have made considerable efforts to help improve living conditions and to put pressure on the government to make sure that poorer peoples are able to access essential goods and services.

On the whole it appears that Senegalese civil society has strong values but a weak structure. The environment in which CSO operate does not always encourage CSO activities but it does not present any major obstacles either. The study also shows that civil society has a noticeable impact on Senegalese democracy and the country's development; however this impact is rather weak and could be very much improved. The research and the meetings clearly showed that CSOs must internally practice good governance and use democratic approaches. Civil society, having a diversity of approaches and historic roots, plays an important role in maintaining a healthy and functioning society.

I. INTRODUCTION

It is increasingly obvious that development, whether it be political, social or economic, can only take place if there are institutional mechanisms to ensure public participation in the design of public policy. The recent evolution of African states has created new possibilities for people to play a part as citizens through exerting pressure on governments to influence their decisions. These possibilities, anchored in most national constitutions, are largely implemented by groups of citizens more or less organised who are not looking to take over or exercise power, rather to demand freedom and express legitimate needs of society. The concept of civil society is used to designate this intermediate category between the state and ordinary citizens.

The conception of civil society as the place for arbitration between the state and its citizens does not make it any easier to comprehend or to grasp, especially in Africa, where the institutionalisation of democratic principles is hindered by the encounter between western notions (democracy and civil society) and older more traditional powers and structures (cultural and religious). However analysis shows that democracy is not generally hampered by these traditional structures. Generally the variety of civil society reflects the variety of the culture to which it belongs. However in Africa, depending on how advanced democracy is in the country concerned, civil society faces institutional, technical and organisational constraints as well as attempts at manipulation from political groups. There might also be a lack of enthusiasm from the state towards CSOs as the former sees the later as threatening, as an instrument of control or contestation concerning public policies which the government executes.

Civil society plays an important part in the achievement of social and economic progress and has attracted interest from researchers, activists, states and international organisations supporting development. Having greatly contributed to the democratic transition in many countries, especially in 1999-2000 in Senegal, civil society attracted much attention from researchers, funders, and people on global, national and international scales, who have indicated that legitimate political decisions and the expression of individual and collective freedom do not rest entirely upon regular elections. Indeed civil society is a space where various groups of citizens can meet and mobilise, discuss the issues they are concerned with and find solutions to their problems. This means it is a space with connections to international institutions, national governments and the global market.

Many achievements in the field of personal freedoms, human rights and democracy depend upon the vigour of civil society, which can be evaluated according to its structure, its environment (including its relations with the state and the private sector), its values and its impact, in short its strengths and weaknesses. The importance of civil society towards development and human progress is what led CIVICUS to develop the Civil Society Index (CSI). The CSI is a tool which gives the opportunity for a participatory process to help CSOs to better analyse their actions in order to increase their capacity and play a crucial role in developing the country.

1. THE CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT

Civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance and development around the world. In most countries, however, knowledge about the state and shape of civil society is limited. Moreover, opportunities for civil society stakeholders to come together to collectively discuss, reflect and act on the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities also remain limited.

The Civil Society Index (CSI), a participatory action-research project assessing the state of civil society in countries around the world, contributes to redressing these limitations. It aims

at creating a knowledge base and momentum for strengthening civil society. The CSI is initiated and implemented by, and for, CSOs at the country level, in partnership with CIVICUS. The CSI implementation actively involves and disseminates its findings to a broad range of stakeholders including civil society, government, the media, donors, academics, and the public at large.

The following key steps in CSI implementation take place at the country level:

1. Assessment: CSI uses an innovative mix of participatory research methods, data sources, and case studies to comprehensively assess the state of civil society.

2. Collective reflection: implementation involves structured dialogue among diverse civil society stakeholders that enables the identification of civil society's specific strengths and weaknesses.

3. Joint action: the actors involved use a participatory and consultative process to develop and implement a concrete action agenda to strengthen civil society in a country.

The following sections provide a background of the CSI, its key principles and approaches, as well as a snapshot of the methodology used in the generation of this report in Senegal.

2. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The CSI first emerged as a concept over a decade ago as a follow-up to the 1997 New Civic Atlas publication by CIVICUS, which contained profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (Heinrich and Naidoo, 2001). The first version of the CSI methodology, developed by CIVICUS with the help of Professor Helmut Anheier, was unveiled in 1999. An initial pilot of the tool was carried out in 2000 in 13 countries.[1] The pilot implementation process and results were evaluated. This evaluation informed a revision of the methodology. Subsequently, CIVICUS successfully implemented the first complete phase of the CSI between 2003 and 2006 in 53 countries worldwide. This implementation directly involved more than 7,000 civil society stakeholders (Heinrich, 2008).

Between 2008 and 2010 a special additional phase of the project was held in four African countries, with the support of UNDP Africa, in Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania, of which this report is one of the outputs. This was followed by a second full phase of a revised CSI, held in 42 countries globally.

3. PROJECT APPROACH

The CSI marries assessment and evidence with reflection and action. This approach provides an important reference point for all work carried out within the framework of the CSI. As such, CSI does not produce knowledge for its own sake but instead seeks to directly apply the knowledge generated to stimulate strategies that enhance the effectiveness and role of civil society. With this in mind, the CSI's fundamental methodological bedrocks which have greatly influenced the implementation that this report is based upon include the following:

Inclusiveness: The CSI framework strives to incorporate a variety of theoretical viewpoints, as well as being inclusive in terms of civil society indicators, actors and processes included in the project.

[1] The pilot countries were Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Wales.

Universality: Since the CSI is a global project, its methodology seeks to accommodate national variations in context and concepts within its framework.

Comparability: The CSI aims not to rank, but to comparatively measure different aspects of civil society worldwide. Possibility for comparisons exists both between different countries or regions within one phase of CSI implementation and between phases.

Versatility: The CSI is specifically designed to achieve an appropriate balance between international comparability and national flexibility in the implementation of the project.

Dialogue: One of the key elements of the CSI is its participatory approach, involving a wide range of stakeholders who collectively own and run the project in their respective countries.

Capacity development: Country partners are firstly trained on the CSI methodology. After the training, partners are supported throughout the implementation cycle by the CSI team at CIVICUS. Partners participating in the project also gain substantial skills in research, training and facilitation in implementing the CSI in-country.

Networking: The participatory and inclusive nature of the different CSI tools should create new spaces where very diverse actors can discover synergies and forge new alliances, including cross-sectoral levels.

Change: The principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, the CSI framework seeks to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed and to generate information and knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

With the above mentioned foundations, the CSI methodology uses a combination of participatory and scientific research methods to generate an assessment of the state of civil society at the national level. The CSI measures the following core dimensions:

- The structure of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external environment in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state as well as the private sector);
- The values practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment);
- The impact of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

To visually present the scores of the four above dimensions, the CSI uses the Civil Society Diamond (see Figure 2 for an example).[2] The Civil Society Diamond, with its four axes, visually summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society. CIVICUS notes that since it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about what civil society looks like in a given country.

[2] The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier.

FIGURE 2: CIVIL SOCIETY DIAMOND



4. CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE IN SENEGAL

Proper governance of contemporary societies and fair and sustainable development does not simply mean enforcing universally valid methods for political management. There can no longer be an all encompassing government with a stranglehold on public affairs. To avoid these two extreme positions, strong citizen involvement in politics (not as politicians) is necessary and this reality is currently acknowledged as an ends, a means and a valuable asset in modern democracies. Thus there are louder and louder calls for civil society to be engaged.

The electoral process in Senegal has been rather open and fair for a rather long time, thereby allowing civil society actors to become interlocutors with the government, and creating a diversified associative network thanks to the financial help of Public Aid towards Development (APD).[3] However civil society in Senegal can be defined a priori in the following way: a vague concept, an ambiguous structure, a problematic role, and making an important contribution but without a systemic approach and little valued:

1. A vague concept: the identity of CSOs themselves is rather confused, and many people seem to think that 'everything is civil society'.
2. An ambiguous structure: there is agreement on the need for a strong differentiation from the state, as is expected, but this is difficult to apply because of the political culture and the common representations of the relations to power.
3. A problematic part: there is no agreement on the place civil society should have, and the part it should play in relation to the state and the private sector.
4. An important contribution without systemic application and little valued: although their contribution to civil service tasks is undeniable, CSOs have great difficulties in scaling up, they are seldom able to move on from local or specific experimental projects, and are not very good at sketching alternative solutions to classical models.

The difficulty in understanding and applying the notion of civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in Senegal, is linked to the particular way these countries were born and how they evolved. Unlike European states where it took centuries to build centralised state machinery, and where the same is true of civil society, postcolonial West-African states were

[3] Its sponsors were long sceptical because of the inefficiency and orthodoxy in the management of subsidies by African states, and hence of the uncertainty regarding the response to the social and economic needs of the most disadvantaged.

built without the usual long-term maturing of agreements and social contracts on which collective experiences are based. Therefore citizens do not have a strong sense of ownership of their state or nation and the state is still often perceived somewhat as a foreign entity the ways of functioning of which are alien to the deep underlying beliefs and traditions of the people. Therefore the relation between state and society is inevitably flawed and thwarted.

Civil society is also an alien concept which is not yet fully comprehended by the local population at the grassroots level. One must also be aware that next to social forces which emerge, there are also CSOs which are top-down instead of bottom-up and can be quite financially opportunistic, capturing funds to serve other purposes than the peoples' welfare. There is also sometimes a discrepancy between a project and the social base. Therefore being part of civil society or not is not a simple question. The consequences can be good or bad depending on many variables.

An in-depth reflection on Senegalese civil society is therefore essential for all stakeholders involved, to such an extent that in 2007 there were calls to hold a general congress of civil society (assises de la société civile). Civil society actors have a real need for frameworks to delineate civil society and guide its operations so that their programmes will impact on development.

To strengthen the part played by civil society it is important to set aside ideological considerations and try to understand its own particular social and historical context. This is why the CIVICUS project, an action-research venture designed to obtain an overview of the state of civil society in countries throughout the world, is particularly welcome and meaningful in the case of Senegal: it has given the incentive to answer questions that have been brewing for a long time.

Expected results from CSI Senegal:

- Better and broader knowledge of civil society on a global and national scale
- A new catalyst to promote and strengthen civil society
- Strengthening of the existing network of actors of civil society
- Better comprehension of the state of civil society through the insight of its actors
- Deeper and broader research abilities for organisations supporting civil society

5. METHODOLOGY

The CSI uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a broad range of research methods. At the core of the CSI lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines the four key dimensions described above, with each of these four dimensions composed of a set of sub-dimensions, which are in turn made up of a set of individual indicators, 74 in all, which are scored on a scale of 0 to 3. These indicators form the basis for the CSI data collection, described further below. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by the National Action Group (NAG). The research and assessment findings are discussed at a gathering of key stakeholders, the task of which is to identify specific strengths and weaknesses and make recommendations on key priority actions to strengthen civil society.

The National Index Team (NIT) was in charge of the activities of CSI Senegal. The team had three components: the National Coordination Organisation (NCO) (in this case Forum

Civil), an expert on civil society and a participatory researcher. This team was supported by CIVICUS and UNDP. The NIT first carried out a preliminary analysis of the actors and identified a National Advisory Committee (NAC) containing 12 people who represent various components of civil society.

A review of the secondary data was then performed and presented to the NAC who then examined it and used the results to design and carry out a Social Forces Analysis (an analysis of the main actors and power relations within society as a whole to help situate and contextualise civil society). This stage also allowed the NAC to draw a civil society map that shows the main forces and actors within society and the relations between them

Then the primary research was carried out: the Regional Stakeholders Consultations took place in several areas in Senegal, which was divided into five main areas, with the actors in each area invited to participate in the survey. This approach allowed us to get in touch with a wide range of local actors and ensure proper representativeness of the research. The participants answered individual questionnaires and then took part in a one day group discussion in each region. The Community Survey was then carried out to investigate the values of members of different communities, their activities within civil society and their level of involvement with CSOs inside their community.

All the information collected was then submitted to the expert on civil society (and the editorial team) who prepared a provisional national report.

The NAC then rated the indicators according to the provisional report, according to the rating guide supplied by CIVICUS. An average of the rates was calculated for each sub-dimension and consequently for each dimension. The result of the rating for the four dimensions of civil society (Structure, Environment, Values and Impact) was then graphically represented in the shape of the Civil Society Diamond.

The results of the various researches described above were then debated and validated at the National Workshop which brought together many actors involved or interested in topics relating to civil society. This workshop also allowed participants to discuss different strategies and actions that could potentially be carried out to answer the emerging questions in an appropriate way.

At the end of the workshop this final report was published, for the national and international public. A French language version was produced and disseminated in Senegal, while this international, English language version was published and disseminated by CIVICUS, as part of a set of around 30 Analytical Country Reports from CSI published between January and May 2011. It lays out the results of the research and practical recommendations for further action.

The progressive scheme of the steps of the methodology are set out in the diagram below.

FIGURE 3: STEPS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL RESEARCH



Six areas of Senegal were chosen for research according to geographical, cultural, strategic and geopolitical zonal distribution criteria, given that Senegal has 14 administrative regions. The following zones were defined for the project.

TABLE 1: AREAS OF THE SURVEY (REGIONS AND DEPARTMENTS COVERED)

AREAS	CHOSEN REGIONS	DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED
Eastern Area	Tambacounda	Tambacounda – Bakel – Goudiry
Western Area	Dakar	Dakar – Pikine - Guédiawaye – Rufisque
Northern Area	Saint Louis	Saint Louis - Podor – Dagana
Southern Area	Ziguinchor	Ziguinchor - Oussouye – Bignona
Central Area	Diourbel and Kaolack	Diourbel - Mbacké – Bambey Kaolack – Nioro – Guinguinéo

The eastern area is mainly rural, populated by the Fulani and Mandingo people, whose principal livelihood is breeding livestock. The western area is mainly urban, with approximately two million people living in Dakar and its suburbs. The northern area consists of coastal and fluvial environments, and there are many fishermen and peasants. The southern area is part of the Casamance region which has been involved since 1983 in a low-intensity civil war between the state and the Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance (MFDC). The central area's main livelihood is peanut crops and is populated chiefly by the Wolofs and the Serars; it is also where the holy cities of the two main religious brotherhoods of Senegal (Mourid and Tidiane) are to be found.

6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The CSI created a great deal of enthusiasm and involvement amongst the people concerned, especially as people were involved in successive stages. Nonetheless we were not able to meet the schedule because of organisational changes and also because of difficulties linked to working in remote communities. The vastness of the areas covered by the fieldwork was also a challenge that created difficulties to communicate and slowed activities.

While one part of the research involves citizens, another part involves members of civil society. In this case, the research is more of a self-evaluation, which encourages the subject to challenge himself/herself and his/her preconceptions. The obvious drawback is, however, that it is difficult to reach objective results using this method, since the subject's judgements can be evasive or biased.

Such an ambitious research venture, involving over 1,000 people, necessarily leads to a great amount of interpretation of the concepts used to formulate it. Civil society, the main topic of the study, is in itself a rather vague concept for many people, especially because it is to some extent an idea imported into Senegalese society from the outside. One must bear in mind that in the present study civil society has a broader meaning than in a European context, as we will discuss further. For example, religious groups and identifications, ubiquitous in Senegal, is a part of civil society from the point of some people, but not for others. A question about the impact of civil society, for example, will give rise to many different answers depending on what the interviewee understands civil society to be. Knowing that civil society is a dynamic phenomenon and gives rise to such a variety of interpretations, the general conclusions of the research must be adapted to each particular case.

An issue often brought up in the NAC and in the national workshop is the lack of subtlety in the scoring matrix that cannot adequately capture the nuances of Senegalese civil society

and of its environment. The preferred response often lies between two scores - for example with indicators 2.1.3 (weak level of trust and frequent law breaking by the state and citizens) and 2.1.2 (political parties based on personalisation, vulnerable to lobbying and many parties but little institutionalisation and weak ideological difference) it is difficult to make a choice between answers.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN SENEGAL

1. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SENEGAL

Civil society in its present form is a complex concept. To define it and to make it operational, to identify what essentially characterises civil society and to elaborate a strategy to evaluate its state, is in itself a complex and potentially controversial process. The CSI defines civil society as "the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests." This definition stresses the power struggles within civil society and the resistances it might face from the private sector or institutional partners. We must note however that the CSI defines the representatives of civil society according to their activities and their function rather than their organisational or sectoral characteristics.

According to David Lewis, there are four different schools of thought on the matter: (1) prescriptive universalists, according to whom civil society is absolutely necessary to the development of Africa; (2) western exceptionalists, for whom civil society is a purely western category that does not mean much outside Europe and North America; (3) the adaptive position, held by authors such as Camaroff (1999: 22) who refuses the Eurocentric tendency to reduce civil society to a strictly institutional arena that diminishes the part played by organisations based on ethnic origins and family ties. Finally (4), Lewis introduces Mamdani's approach where the stress on the impact of colonisation is important, and accounts for the dichotomy between the 'civilised' colonialists and the ethnic locals that became apparent in South-Africa during apartheid, and between the French colonisers and the people of Senegal.

The World Bank offered the following categorisation of civil society:

1. Community-based organisations that serve the specific interests of the population in a limited geographical area;

2. National organisations operating in a specific country;

3. International organisations which are usually based in developed countries and involved in more than one country in the developing world.

It is hardly a surprise that this classification of CSOs was criticised by many political scientists and activists in Africa such as Peter Ekeh,[4] Claude Ake, Camaroff and Camaroff, Mahmood Mamadani, David Sogge and others, since it is a projection of the dichotomy between civic and non-civic civil society prevalent in western political literature upon the African public sphere, splitting it up into modern and traditional civil society (Nkwachukwu, O. 2003).[5]

2. HISTORY OF SENEGALESE CIVIL SOCIETY

In the 1950s, while most African countries were becoming independent, the world picture of the social and economic spheres was being massively influenced by human sciences, which tended to turn the problem of under-development into a question of modernisation. However in most countries, this problem of development or modernisation mainly revolved around the prevalent part played by the state in the growth process, controlling natural resources and popular mobilisation. During the 1970s, the decline of ideological models freed the space for a new theoretical reflection. This was progressively taken over by themes and intellectual

4 Ekeh, Peter (1992): "The constitution of Civil Society in Africa History and Politics", in B Caron, A Gboyega and E Osaghae (eds), 'Democratic Transition in Africa'. Ibadan, University of Ibadan Press.
5 Nkwachukwu, Orji (2003): Conventional Notion of Civil Society, International Civil Society Organisations and the Development of Civil Society in Africa, International Civil Society Forum, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, September.

efforts following the guidance of international organisations such as the UNDP, the World Bank ans the OCED, which became the main sponsors of research on development, which was split into research on development and research-action.

These two approaches served to shed light on the contradiction between the dynamism of the people and the lack of efficiency of the state bureaucracies to deliver services. With the spread of neo-liberalism, state partners were bypassed more frequently and replaced by members of civil society and private businesses who gradually became essential partners in the development process. The Washington Consensus was the first step towards elaborating a trilogy made up of the state (the first sector), the private sector (the second sector) and civil society (the third sector). This led to the creation in Senegal of ENDA Third-World organisation in 1972 as part of a UNDP programme, and the Swedish Organisation for International Development, which then became an NGO in 1978.

Then during the 1980s the Structural Adjustment Programmes advocated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund compelled the African states to gradually withdraw from several areas of social and economic development. The 1980s was a decade of many economic and political crises, in which states globally drew back from many areas. This minimalist approach to the part played by the state and the corresponding increase of social inequities led the middle classes to develop strategies to challenge the established autocratic powers, entrenched since independence through the structure of the traditional nation state and its radical version the partisan state. This context created and aggravated conflicts and mass poverty, and increased migrations and spontaneous urbanisation, and degraded the environment. The ensuing void is what the CSOs were trying to fill.

In 1984 CONGAD was created as a consortium to bring together Senegalese NGOs. The 1980s and 1990s were decades of great expansion for local NGOs that gradually came together and started to constitute a civil society with the emergence of the African Congress for the Protection of Human Rights (RADDHO), Forum Civil, National Council for Rural Coordination (CNCR) and many other sub-regional organisations such as Rural Foundation for West Africa (FRAO), Caritas, Tostan (‘Breakthrough’ in Wolof language), and Association of West African Women (AFAO). The liberalisation of politics and the efforts to reduce the influence of marabous and brotherhoods on the electoral processes, in alliance with the creation of a free press, strongly contributed to the birth of contemporary civil society in Senegal.

Analysts also judge that if the NGOs are an important part of civil society, it is not only made up of these. A broader conception of civil society should also include trade unions, community-based organisations, brotherhoods and religious associations. All of these have played a part depending on their own goals and specificities, but above all on their human, technical and material resources.

A glimpse at the history of these organisations, the unions for instance, shows that they emerged to challenge large corporations which controlled the labour market and were frequently foreign businesses. The unions gained profile through their various struggles, not only towards improving the living conditions of their members, but also for establishing a political organisation (at the state level) respectful of republican principles. One must not forget the roots of resistance to power as a socio-cultural tendency in Senegalese society long before the sixties, for example during the railway workers' strike in 1947.

The obvious roots of community and associations are the shared socio-cultural values and tendencies that give birth to collective action. Peasant organisations are very present in villages and often stem from the people themselves. Associative life is strongly anchored in society and provides a normative frame for collective action; and civil society draws strength from this. The state facilitated the creation of GIEs (economic interest groups) and GPFs (groups promoting women) in the 1980s which led to a flourishing of these types of entities.

This includes organisations of diasporas who wish to help their relatives but can end up helping a whole village or community.

Civil society in Senegal is particularly active in providing services to marginalised persons and groups, but despite the goodwill it has, it lacks the necessary financial resources and therefore the ability to make this type of assistance systematic. This is why civil society is expected to put pressure on the state to meet its responsibilities towards poor people, but CSO can also carry out their missions by assisting the state to implement such programmes. This multiple functioning, as a partner, as an interface, as an opposition force, makes civil society difficult to study, because it tends to be evanescent.

The civil society was asked to carry out such a mission in support of the state as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that the World Bank and other funders wanted to see developed. Civil society was supposed to ensure the soundness of the strategy by designing, following and controlling all the different steps of the process. However its participation in the process was highly insufficient, because of several factors: obstruction from the state bureaucracy, lack of financial and technical resources, and the tightness of deadlines imposed by the World Bank.

Until now Senegalese civil society has not been active enough in its lobbying activities towards the state. However there are two promising exceptions to this general state of affairs. The first was when the Collective of NGOs helped to set up a transparent electoral process in 1999-2000, albeit one that was not followed through in 2007. The second is the sustained effort from Forum Civil to ensure greater transparency in the management of public affairs.

3. ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL FORCES

Civil society works in a field structured by the actions of many entwined forces. Depending on their power within society, and their ability to mobilise and exert pressure, these forces have a different amount of influence on social, economic and political processes. The state must try to accommodate all these various actors and forces, visible or hidden, when it is deciding on policies or assigning and investing public funds.

The NAC worked on identifying all these different protagonists which influence societal regulation, and evaluating their respective positions and interactions. Below is an illustration of the results of this analysis provided by the NIT.

FIGURE 4 MAPPING OF SOCIAL ACTORS AND THEIR INTERACTION WITH THE STATE



The arrows converging on the state show how pressure is applied on its defining of public policies. We chose to focus on one single dimension to keep the analysis simple: we have tried to assess the level of pressure (not necessarily in a pejorative sense) or influence the state has to face and therefore take into account when defining public policies, and to show which social forces exert this influence and help define the topics that civil society then has to react to.

4. MAPPING OF SENEGALESE CIVIL SOCIETY

Most formal Senegalese CSOs are based in the big urban centres of Dakar, Saint Louis, and Thiès, which is normal since they are often set up by educated urban citizens who have been through the western schooling system. Some of these CSOs choose to go and take their work inland into rural areas to help structure and organise the more traditional associations. However many ethnic and religious CSOs have rapidly modernised and adapted to the new legal system, using the media and new technologies to spread their messages, bring their supporters together and influence decision making.

Recently the difference between formal and traditional CSOs has diminished drastically, remaining only in some fields. Most of the CSOs that belong to CONGAD are active in various areas of development (healthcare, education, water and other basic needs) and have become adept at fitting in between the state and the market. The programmes they implement mainly aim to control and influence state policies, to strengthen the ability of recipients to protect their interests through participative methods, and advocate development initiatives at local levels.

The mapping of civil society is set out below.

FIGURE 5 MAPPING OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS (ACCORDING TO THEIR DEGREE OF INFLUENCE)



III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SENEGAL

In this section we study the results obtained from the surveys and the consultations during the process by the NIT, supervised by the NAC.

Where there is no contrary indication, the data expresses the view of the CSO actors, from the regional consultations.

1. STRUCTURE

1.1 BREADTH OF PARTICIPATION

This sub-dimension helps develop a picture of the size of civil society by assessing the extent of citizens' engagement. The indicators include the percentage of citizens who take part in non-partisan political activities, who donate to charity, are members of a CSO, do voluntary work and are involved in community activities. Data for this section comes from the CSI Community Survey.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR BREADTH OF PARTICIPATION

No.	Indicator	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political activities	3.0
1.1.2	Charitable giving	3.0
1.1.3	CSO membership	1.0
1.1.4	Volunteering	3.0
1.1.5	Collective community action	3.0

1.1.1. Non-partisan political activities means the subject has taken part in a particular action (for instance writing a letter to a newspaper, signing a petition, taking part in a demonstration or a march). The percentage of people who have taken part in any one of these activities is 66.2%. According to the CSI scoring grid this is a rather high proportion. This means that citizens are rather involved in civic activities, whether they belong to CSOs or are acting as individuals. It is interesting to compare this high level of engagement with the very weak civic sense (see indicator 2.4.3).

1.1.2. Charitable giving: 86.4% of people have donated money (or goods such as food or clothes) to charity (including religious charity) in the past 12 months before the survey. Donations to religious charity are not unusual in Senegal, and are indeed, quite traditional, but it is hard to obtain statistics about them. Nonetheless it would be useful to find out how many people actually donate to charity because they are moved by solidarity or compassion, rather than from religious motivations for giving to religious organisations (alms or contributions to Koranic schools for instance). It seems that CSOs in general are not yet able to use this momentum, considering how little financial autonomy they have achieved and the external provenance of most of the funds they spend, as will be addressed later.

1.1.3. CSO membership: 47.1% of the people in the community sample belong to a CSO. This is not a small amount, but it is still a minority, and is scored accordingly by the CSI scoring grid.

1.1.4. Volunteering: the percentage of people who do voluntary work on a regular basis (at least once a year) is a good indication of the potential for the populace to get involved and contribute to causes promoted by civil society. The community survey shows that 81.2% of the sample is involved in volunteering. However only 15.7% of them are involved in

volunteering within CSOs, which means that most of these activities take place outside the frame of any given organisation.

1.1.5. Collective community actions: the percentage for this indicator is 76.1%. This is the proportion of people who have taken part in a collective community action in the past 12 months before the survey (for instance taking part in a community meeting, or an event organised by the community, or in a collective effort to solve a community problem).

Judging this sub-dimension, it is not easy to extract a clear trend from the analysis of the five indicators. We must stress the necessity to understand the difference between religious and non-religious domains. Religious or community activities do not always translate as actions promoting democracy and good governance, i.e. demanding from the state that it fulfil its obligations and responsibilities. Quite often the considerable power of these religious organisations serves class interests rather than society as a whole.

1.2 DEPTH OF PARTICIPATION

To estimate the size of civil society, it is also important to find out how often and how intensely people get involved in civil society activities. This sub-dimension looks at how many people perform charity work, what kind of volunteer work they do and how many different CSOs they belong to. Data for this section also comes from the Community Survey.

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR DEPTH OF PARTICIPATION

No.	Indicators	Score
1.2.1	Scale of charitable giving	0.0
1.2.2	Involvement in volunteering	1.0
1.2.3	Membership in several CSOs	0.0

1.2.1. Scale of charitable giving: The aim of the community research was to find out what percentage of their income people donate to charity on a regular basis. However the data was insufficient to quantify this indicator. The NAC agreed that it is difficult to evaluate this aspect because very few people actually know how much their annual income is worth. The group agreed to settle on less than 1%, mainly because of the high level of poverty in Senegal.

1.2.2. Degree of involvement in volunteering: the question assessed here is how many hours volunteers dedicate to volunteer work on average. The average reported is 13 hours but the median value, 5 hours, is more useful here since there are strong variations. The NAC believes it is very difficult to realistically calculate how much time people spend volunteering, since for most Senegalese people the definition of volunteering is unclear, and indeed, counting the time spent doing something is also unusual.

1.2.3. Multiple membership of CSOs: 18.2% of people in the community survey belong to at least one CSO. The percentage of these members of a CSO who belong to more than one is 37.5%.

The intensity of engagement does not seem very high; therefore we must call people's involvement in civil society wide but weak. It is interesting to note that at the birth of most CSOs, lots of people tend to take part, but that after one or two meetings the number decreases and the remaining hard core is made of engaged people who are activists within the organisation.

1.3 DIVERSITY OF PARTICIPATION

Once we have defined civil society as an arena where conflicting interests and power struggles are at play, the equitable representation of diverse social groups (especially traditionally marginalised groups) becomes an important issue. This sub-dimension looks at the participation of women, of minorities and other social groups in leadership and membership in CSOs, and also at the geographical distribution of CSOs to find out if rural peoples and specific areas are adequately represented in civil society.

TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR DIVERSITY OF PARTICIPATION

No.	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Diversity in CSO membership	2.0
1.3.2	Diversity in CSO leadership	2.0
1.3.3	Geographical distribution of CSOs	2.0

1.3.1. Equitable representation of social groups by CSOs: There is no unequivocal and operative definition of the categories used here (for instance the poor, the upper class, the elites) which could be the reason for the variety of answers.

Participation of rural populations in CSOs: Rural populations are perceived as absent, excluded or insufficiently represented. 77.5% of the interviewees gave one of these three responses.

Participation of women in CSOs: In the enquiry concerning CSO actors women were reported as insufficiently represented in CSOs. However for many people they are equitably represented and no one believes they are absent or excluded. In the community research, 42.3% of the interviewees from CSOs were women, whereas 45.7% of the whole sample was women. This seems to indicate that women are slightly under-represented.

Participation of ethnic minorities in CSOs: The opinion on ethnic minorities (the Wolof are the majority, and therefore any other ethnic group, such as the Diola, the Serer and the Toucouleur are a minority) in CSOs is rather contrasted. Most of the time the answer is under-representation (48.6 %), but nearly 44% of the interviewees believe they are well represented, although 23% believe they are absent or excluded, which is a much higher result than the one concerning women for instance.

Participation of religious minorities in CSOs: The distribution is similar to that of the previous category, except the figure for absence or exclusion is double. Under-representation or total absence of religious minorities, if we add up the answers concerning Christians and animists, add up to 58%, which is a rather high percentage.

Participation of poor people[6] in CSOs: As far as this category is concerned, the distribution of answers can be read in two different ways:

The amount of opinions that they are absent or excluded is 24%, which is high, and means there are three rather balanced opinion groups.

If we add up the scores for under-representation and absence or exclusion, the total is 62%.

In any case, the low level of participation in CSOs by poor people seems obvious. This could be linked to the fact that they are mainly concentrated on the daily challenge of satisfying

6 The common definition of poverty is living on less than US$2 per day, but this is subject to great subjective variation depending on the country, the income of the interviewee, and many other factors.

their essential needs and surviving, and that therefore they do not have much time to give to activities that would distract them from achieving this task. This is a global phenomenon and is not particular to Senegal. For instance in the USA, the poor class has the lowest level of participation in elections, even though the same elections have a deep impact on their living conditions.

Participation of upper classes and elites in CSOs: Generally this category designates the rich, who are mainly politicians or businessmen. For a vast majority of the interviewees (60%), they are well represented in CSOs. However over a third think they are underrepresented or absent (this last answer scored 14%).

The debates within the NAC on this topic agreed with the fact shown by the survey that there are indeed important social groups that are under-represented in CSOs.

1.3.2. Leadership in CSOs:

- Women are perceived as rather under-represented in leadership of CSOs. If we add up the values for absent or excluded (2.2%), largely underrepresented (18.7%) and underrepresented (54.7%), we get a sum total of 73.4%..
- The situation is the same regarding poor people, with a total of 70%.
- For ethnic minorities, the percentage is a little lower (63.8%), but the absence or exclusion response scores much higher (23%).
- Religious minorities are also under-represented but to a lesser extent than the above categories.

1.3.3. Balance of geographical distribution of CSOs: Almost two thirds of the interviewees (59%) believe that CSOs are mainly based in urban centres and large cities; however a large amount of people (41%) think that CSOs are rather well distributed over the national territory, but half of this 41% (19% of the whole sample) still wish the more remote areas were better represented.

The participants in the National Workshop proposed to change the score from 2 to 3, observing that even in the most remote areas a few CSOs are to be found.

On the whole, we can say that there is a rather good diversity within CSOs (representation and locality) but there is still work to do.

1.4 LEVEL OF ORGANISATION

This sub-dimension looks at the basic structural parameters of civil society and evaluates its stability and its maturity, as well as its ability to act collectively. The individual indicators test the existence and efficiency of CSO umbrella organisations, the efforts to self-regulate, the level of support structures and international connections.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR LEVEL OF ORGANISATION

No.	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	0.0
1.4.2	Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	2.0
1.4.3	Self-regulation	2.0
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	1.0
1.4.5	International linkages	2.0

1.4.1. Existence and representativeness of CSO umbrella organisations: CSO actors generally think that CSO coalitions only include a minority of associations, which came as a surprise to the members of the NAC. This result is probably due to the narrow comprehension of civil society by many of those interviewed as comprising only modern and organised structures such as NGOs and trade unions. People belonging to these kind of organisations however believe that umbrella organisations include many CSOs.

1.4.2. Efficiency of CSO umbrella organisations: This indicator assesses the extent to which CSO actors believe existing federations or coalitions are able to reach the aims they have defined. The efficiency is perceived as medium since 43% of interviewees think they are efficient. This opinion is counterbalanced by more mixed perceptions (38%), while 19% believe they are inefficient.

FIGURE 6: ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UMBRELLA ORGANISATIONS



1.4.3. Self-regulation: Key questions here are: are efforts towards self-regulation being made within CSOs? How efficient and how binding are the existing self-regulation mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs obeys a collective ethical code (or any other form of self-regulation)? The actors agree on the fact that self-regulation exists but disagree regarding its intensity (36% believe that only a minimum effort is made) and its efficiency (40% believe there are mechanisms but little impact, whereas only 18% say there are efficient mechanisms that have an impact). On the whole, the perception of efforts towards self-regulation in CSOs is rather average. However CSO actors feel very much concerned by this issue.

FIGURE 7: SELF-REGULATION EFFORTS OF CSOS



1.4.4. Level of support infrastructures: Key questions in this indicator are: what is the level of the support structure for CSOs? How many support organisations for civil society are active throughout Senegal? Are they efficient? Many people believe support structures for civil society are insufficient, whether they are perceived to be non-existent (13%) or limited (60%). The total for this opinion is a conclusive 73%.

1.4.5. International linkages: There is a strong tendency reported towards integration within international networks.

As this sub-dimension shows, the level of organisation of civil society is rather weak. We must add that the planning and management abilities of CSOs are often very low, which can highly reduce their efficiency and impact, as well as their credibility.

1.5 INTERRELATIONS

It is important for CSO actors to communicate and cooperate to keep civil society strong. This sub-dimension looks at instances where information was exchanged and coalitions created to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations between the actors of civil society.

TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR INTERRELATIONS IN CSOS

No.	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	1.0
1.3.2	Co-operation between CSOs	2.0

1.5.1. Communication between CSOs: This does not seem to be one of their strengths. The amount of communication between CSO actors is perceived to be moderate, low or very low by almost 79% of those consulted.

1.5.2. Cooperation between CSOs: Even though there are many examples of intersectoral cooperation – for instance between the CNES (National Confederation of Employers of Senegal) and Forum Civil as part of the ARMP (Agency for the Regulation of Public Contracts) – many people (56) believe it is insufficient

TABLE 7: LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION RESPONSES

Level of communication	
Very limited	17
Limited	56
Moderate	45
Significant	32

Quite often a lack of cooperation between members of civil society is prompted by competition for funding and the weakness of intellectual property rights in Senegal. Another reason could be the strong sub-sectoral difference and consequent distrust between types of CSOs (for instance the press, the NGOs and the brotherhoods) which means it is difficult for actors of civil society to get to know each other and work together.

1.6 RESOURCES

This sub-dimension looks at civil society's ability to mobilise and use resources. It assesses CSOs' ability to respond to the problems they face with the resources, whether human, financial or technical, they have at hand.

TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR RESOURCES

No.	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	1.0
1.6.2	Human resources	1.0
1.6.3	Financial, infrastructural and technological resources	1.0

1.6.1. Financial resources: Participants were surprised by the figures obtained for this indicator since donor funded CSOs (mainly NGOs, compared to unions, which are supported by membership fees, or the media by sales) systematically complain to their major sponsors about a lack of funds. It is difficult for CSOs to get micro-funding since sponsors tend to give out large subsidies to entities that are able to manage them, which drastically reduces possibilities

TABLE 9: ADEQUACY OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO AMBITIONS

Adequacy of financial resources to ambitions	Percentage
Suitable	10%
Rather suitable	37%
Unsuitable	39%
Completely unsuitable	14%

1.6.2. Human resources: CSOs are generally perceived as having suitable resources to fulfil their goals and ambitions. But according to a third of the interviewees this point is still a problem.

TABLE 10: ADEQUACY OF HUMAN RESOURCES TO AMBITIONS

Adequacy of human resources to ambitions	Percentage
Suitable	33%
Rather suitable	38%
Unsuitable	23%
Completely unsuitable	6%

1.6.3. Technological and infrastructural resources: These were assessed as somewhat more challenging.

TABLE 11: ADEQUACY OF TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES TO AMBITIONS

Adequacy of technological resources to ambitions	Percentage
Suitable	13%
Rather suitable	23%
Unsuitable	42%
Completely unsuitable	22%

The NAC therefore gave these indicators a mark of 1 each, which means that on average CSOs do not have suitable resources to meet their assignments

CONCLUSIONS

FIGURE 8 – STRUCTURE DIMENSION SCORES

In Senegal people will easily get together to fight for the satisfaction of collective needs. However the extent of mobilisation seems higher where religious cases are concerned. On the other hand there seems to be a lack of involvement towards the promotion and protection of active citizenship. One of the main reasons for this lack of intensity or depth in engagement is probably the great poverty and lack of resources of CSOs. CSOs have deep roots but they need strengthened capacities and better synergy.

The NAC gave the structure dimension a score of 1.6 out of 3, based on the results of the NIT survey and the committee's debates.

2. ENVIRONMENT

This dimension assess the context or environment within which civil society operates and evolves, and how enabling or restricting it is.

2.1 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

In any given country the political context defines the frame of civil society and its possible forms of action. This sub-dimension looks at the various aspects of the political situation in Senegal and its impact on civil society. The individual indicators include: the political rights of citizens, the extent of political competition (the amount of freedom and power given to parties not in power), the rule of law, corruption, the actual power of the state and the level of decentralisation. It draws considerably from secondary data, assessed by the NAC.

TABLE 12: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR POLITICAL CONTEXT

No	Indicator	Score
2.1.1	Political rights	2.0
2.1.2	Political competition	2.0
2.1.3	Rule of law	2.0
2.1.4	Corruption	1.0
2.1.5	State effectiveness	2.0
2.1.6	Decentralisation	0.0

2.1.1. Political rights: Key questions here include, how strong are restrictions on citizens' political rights? Can they for instance freely take part in elections, elect political leaders and create political parties? After debating the issue, the NAC decided to give this indicator 2 points, which matches the following definition in the CSI scoring grid: “Citizens have substantial political rights and opportunities to participate in politics. There are minor and rare cases of restrictions to full political freedom and to the citizens' participation to political proceedings.” This means that in general people feel free to take part in political life and are not scared of retaliation. Citizens have a strong tendency to observe and comment on political events in Senegal, even though participation outside of electoral periods is rather low. This seems to be linked to distrust rather than to actual repression. We must however remark that in Casamance, there are restrictions on political freedom due to the conflict between the state and the rebels that has been going on for almost 30 years.

During the National Workshop participants wished to change the rating from 2 to 1. They said that there are also indirect restrictions on political rights. There is not really a legal problem but a structural one, since the political process seems more and more corrupt and the peoples' decisions are being bypassed.

2.1.2. Political competition: The indicator should have been rated according to the following question: “What are the main characters of the party system in terms of the amount of parties, the ideological spectrum they cover, their level of institutionalisation and the level of competition between parties?” The NAC decided that the following definition would be close to reality: “Several parties, but scarcely institutionalised and/or lacking an ideological difference.” This matches a score of 2 on the CSI scoring grid.

People in Senegal tend to discuss politics rather freely and openly regardless of time and place. This means there is a great variety of opinions. There are devoted political partisans as well as sceptics who have absolutely no trust in political leaders and institutions. (See also indicator 4.3.2 that shows that 30% of the interviewees are distrustful towards political parties.) There are more than 100 political parties but only a dozen that are really active, and people tend to relate to them on a personal or geographical rather than ideological basis.

Senegal has been rather stable politically since the independence and its history is marked by democratic milestones, so the people are rather proud of their system of political competition.

2.1.3. The rule of law: There was a fierce debate within NAC about which score to choose on this matter. After many discussions the NAC settled on: “there is a moderate amount of trust in the law from the citizens. Violations of law by the state and citizens are not rare” (score 2) rather than: “there is little trust and there are many violations of law by the state and citizens” (score 1).

This grade of 2 out of 3 is interesting since complaints from international sponsors and organisations about disregard for the rule of law are very frequent in Senegal. Many studies say that justice is extremely corrupt. We believe the high grade is mainly due to the lack of sufficient possibilities in the CSI scoring grid rather than recent improvements.

2.1.4. Corruption in the public sector: The NAC believes there is substantial corruption in the public sector. After much procrastination the decision was made to give this indicator a score of 1. There was a hesitation between 0 and 1. The group chose 1 because the question concerned public service only, regardless of corruption in the private sector. If the private sector had been included, the grade would have been 0.

However NAC members noted that Senegal has gradually been falling in the classifications on the perception of the amount of corruption in the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International.

The group maintained a score if 1 but insisted on signalling the fact that things have become much worse in the last few years.

2.1.5. State effectiveness is concerned with what extent the state able to fulfil its duties. There was a debate between two options: “the abilities of the Senegalese administration are extremely limited” (score 1) and: “the state administration is functional but perceived as incompetent and/or unreceptive” (score 2). In the end the group chose score 2 because ‘extremely’ would not be a good reflection of the situation even though many people think the state is very limited and perceived as incompetent and unreceptive. There was a wide feeling within the NAC that the administration, although it is not actually incompetent, is very often the victim of manipulations and orders from the highest levels of state power, which means it only rarely works for public welfare.

2.1.6. Decentralisation: Even though there were no statistics available, members of the NAC unanimously agreed that the proportion of state spending given to local authorities is less than 20%. In the scoring matrix, this scores 0.

There has however been a lot of progress towards decentralisation in the last decade through the PNDL (National Program for Local Development) as well as previous programmes. The central state has become aware that it cannot do everything by itself and that the people are asking for a more local state apparatus to care for their needs. Local authorities are gradually becoming stronger. Therefore grade 0 can be considered a little harsh. Decentralisation cannot be measured only according to financial resources, even though they are essential.

The political context sub-dimension plays an important part in the functioning of civil society, especially in a democratic regime such as Senegal. Development is widely influenced by factors linked to the political context. Senegal is still one of the 25 least developed countries in the world, which shows there are still many problems to deal with. Therefore we must not be deluded by the high scores for parts of this section.

2.2 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

This sub-dimension looks at constitutional rights directly linked to the functioning of civil society: fundamental civil rights (freedom of speech, assembly and association) and the rights and freedom of information and media. It examines how far these rights and freedoms actually go in law and in practice.

TABLE 13: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

No.	Indicator	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	2.0
2.2.2	Right of information	2.0
2.2.3	Freedom of press	1.0

2.2.1. Civil liberties: For most members of the NAC civil liberties are respected in Senegal, but there are occasional and isolated violations.

2.2.2. Right to information: The NAC noted that there are laws guaranteeing public access to information. However:

- In practice there are many obstructions to this right.
- The government can easily find a legal way of not revealing information it wants to keep hidden (for instance information on mining or on the audit of certain agencies such as the National Agency for the Organisation of the Islamic Conference - ANOCI) when financial or highly political interests are at stake.

In the end the group agreed on the following statement: “legislation relative to public disclosure of information exists, but in practice it is difficult to get hold of governmental papers” (score 2). Freedom of information is a critical issue for good governance. This is why efforts must be made to improve this legislation and reduce obstructions.

2.2.3. Freedom of press: The NAC gave this indicator a score of 1, which means that freedom of press is often violated in Senegal. Investigative journalists often face trials because of the news they have covered, newsrooms are vandalised when members of the government are unhappy with an article, and threats of financial asphyxiation from private groups tend to produce a certain amount of self-censorship. All this means freedom of press is under a constant and growing threat in Senegal.

During the National Workshop, participants proposed to change the rating from 1 to 2 because they consider that threats to the media are not ‘frequent’.

Even though the legal framework is good compared to many other African countries there is still much to be done from Senegalese civil society towards establishing a truly efficient democratic system.

2.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

TABLE 14: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

No.	Indicator	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context for civil society	1.0

This sub-dimension looks at the socio-economic context of Senegal and at its impact on civil society by enquiring about the extent of conditions judged to present a barrier for civil society

(widespread poverty, civil war or conflict, severe economic or social crisis, severe socioeconomic iniquity, adult illiteracy).

2.3.1. Socio-economic context and functioning and functioning of civil society: we look at how much civil society is affected by the socio-economic conditions within Senegal.
The NAC investigated on the following challenging factors:

1. Widespread poverty (over 40% of the population live on less than US$2 a day);
2. Civil war (an armed conflict in the last five years);
3. A serious ethnic or religious conflict;
4. A serious economic crisis (external debt higher than GNP);
5. A serious social crisis in the last two years;
6. Serious socio-economic inequalities (Gini coefficient on inequality higher than 0.4);
7. Generalised illiteracy of adults (over 40%);
8. Lack of water infrastructure (less than 5 litres per 10,000 inhabitants)

Widespread poverty, a conflict in Casamance, a serious economic crisis, growing inequalities and the illiteracy problem all exist in Senegal. There is also the issue of employment, especially for young people. Therefore the socioeconomic environment is very difficult.

Since at least five of the conditions listed above are present in Senegal the NAC gave this indicator grade 1 following the CSI scoring grid. The corresponding statement for the scoring reads: “The economic and social conditions significantly limit efficient functioning of civil society.”

As we have already said, civil society does not have adequate means to reduce poverty (there is also a debate on whether it or the state should attempt this task). It is also clear that in a conflict area civil society cannot act. Lack of education and poverty further hinder the efforts of civil society towards mobilising and making more active citizens out of people who are busy trying to survive and who are often mistrustful of change.

2.4 SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT

TABLE 15: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT

No	Indicator	Score
2.4.1	Trust	1.0
2.4.2	Tolerance	2.0
2.4.3	Public spiritedness	0.0

Civic norms (such as trust) are often judged to be essential parts of social capital (Putnam 1993) and even of civil society itself (Bratton 1994: 2). The index takes these norms into account as an important resource that belongs to the external environment of civil society. This sub-dimension looks at levels of trust, tolerance and civic awareness among the members of society to assess whether socio-cultural norms and attitudes are favourable to civil society.

2.4.1. Trust: How trustful are people towards one another in Senegal? The following results come from the community sample: 80.6% think that “one can never be too cautious” in interpersonal social relations, whereas the rest (19.4%) think that “most people are trustworthy”. Therefore distrust is ‘rather widespread’ (classed as 10 to 30% of trust on the CSI scoring grid) in Senegalese society, which means a score of 1.

This mark is interesting, for on the one hand Senegalese people are very welcoming and

open-minded which means they actually do have a certain amount of trust, but on the other hand distrust is growing. Is this linked to urbanisation, to the growing level of criminality and the competition for essential resources? Is it due to poverty and the growing difficulty of a context leading to disintegration of values, loss of reference points or the growing impossibility of relying on traditional solidarity?

During the National Workshop the participants proposed to change the grade from 1 to 2 because they believe a majority of people trust their fellow citizens and that this type of trust is a pillar of Senegalese society.

2.4.2. Tolerance: How tolerant are members of society towards each other? The question to assess this in the community survey was: “out of this list of groups of people could you name the ones you would not like to have as neighbours?” The will or the refusal to have certain types or groups people as neighbours is used to assess the level of tolerance. According to the results the less ‘tolerated’ categories are homosexuals (in 57.5% of cases), people living with HIV/AIDS (45.4%), immigrants and foreign workers (39.2%), and people of a different race (37.7%) or religion (37%)

According to the debate within the NAC, the image of Senegal as a country of strong ‘teranga’ (hospitality and tolerance) remains true. Nonetheless recurring economic crises and the aggressive cultural values carried by globalisation are felt to be contributing towards intolerance. Some members also mentioned the fact that the caste problem has still not been solved.

Following these different elements the NAC agreed on the following statement: “society is defined by a moderate level of tolerance,” which scored 2.

2.4.3. Public spiritedness: How strong is public spiritedness among members of society? Interviewees in the community survey were given three statements and asked to say if the behaviour in each of them is always justified, sometimes justified or never justified:

- Claim state benefits to which one is not entitled is always justified for 10.1% of people, sometimes for 12.6% and never for 77.3%, a great majority.
- Not paying on public transport is always justified for just 3.3% of interviewees, sometimes for 7.8% and never for 79.4%
- Cheating on taxes if you can avoid paying them is always justified for 7.8% of people, sometimes for 12.8% and never for 79.4%.

Judging from these results, there appears to be a rather high civic sense and a good notion of the public good. However the NAC contrasted this view by claiming that in Senegal there is “a very low awareness of public good in society” (the average rating from the World Values Survey[7] public good awareness is above 3.5) and gave this indicator a score of 0. Indeed the criteria used in the questionnaire did not seem to reflect the amount of ‘civicness’ in Senegal.

Members of the NAC mentioned the recurring examples of low public spiritedness from political leaders (as demonstrated by misappropriation of public funds, for instance) of all parties, the fact that cultural conceptions and mentalities do not always support public good,[8] and ignorance of regulations due to the high level of illiteracy and the lack of basic civic education which would inculcate essential values and habits.

7 The World Values Survey is an ongoing academic project by social scientists to assess the state of socio-cultural, moral, religious, and political values of different cultures around the world. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

8 “Alalu buur” in the Wolof language means, the government’s thing, i.e. It does not belong to anyone.

The National Workshop proposed to change the rating from 0 to 1 because they believed that people do have notions of public good and that a “very low level“ does not reflect the situation in Senegal.

2.5 THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

This sub-dimension assesses how favourable the present legal environment is for civil society. This topic has attracted considerable attention from researchers (CIVICUS 1997, International Centre for Legislation on Non-profit activities 1998, Salamon and Toepler 2000). The specific indicators for this section are based on an assessment of this research. They take into account the evaluation of registration proceedings for CSOs, the legal constraints on the advocacy activities of CSOs and tax exemptions promoting philanthropy.

TABLE 16: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

No	Indicator	Score
2.5.1	Registration of CSOs	1.0
2.5.2	Lobbying and criticism of the state	1.0
2.5.3	Taxes and laws favourable to CSOs	1.0
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	1.0

2.5.1. CSO registration: Legal registration procedures are perceived to be rather unfavourable (less than half of answers are positive) concerning the criteria of speed and simplicity. However they seem to be satisfying as far as cost, fair application of law and absence of favouritism and discrimination are concerned.

FIGURE 9: VIEWS ON LEGAL REGISTRATION PROCEDURES FOR CSOS



The NAC decided to give this indicator a score of 1 which means that “registration is not easy and two or three essential quality criteria are lacking.”

2.5.2. Restrictions on CSO's advocacy and lobbying activities: the NAC believes that “there are excessive and badly defined restraints to lobbying activities” and gave this section a score of 1 on the CSI scoring matrix.

FIGURE 10: EXISTENCE OF LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CSO ADVOCACY ACTIVITY



When the government is disturbed by advocacy activities, for instance regarding corruption, members of civil society often expect retaliation, for example, an investigation by the Division for Criminal Investigation (DIC).

The National Workshop proposed to change the grade from 1 to 2, believing that the situation in Senegal is not so bad according to them, compared to The Gambia for instance. They believe CSOs are free to lobby, depending on the topic concerned.

2.5.3. Taxes and laws favourable to CSOs: key questions for the NAC members here are, are the tax system and its laws favourable to CSOs? How broad is the range of CSOs eligible for tax exemption, if there are any? How important are these exemptions? For the members of the NAC, “the tax system is too heavy on CSOs. Tax exemptions are available only for a limited category of CSOs or when revenue is low,” scoring 1, as most CSOs do not profit from them.

2.5.4. Tax benefits for humanitarian philanthropy: Questions here are, how strong are tax exemption incentives, or other tax benefits encouraging individuals and businesses to donate? The NAC says there are tax benefits for philanthropy, but that they are only available to a very small amount of actions and organisations. Many testimonials showed that “people who would like to donate goods to charities are often discouraged by the amount of obstacles they face, which are often more numerous where non-profit activity is concerned.” For instance there are many donations of school manuals and books from abroad but the school then ends up having to pay absurdly high customs tariffs to collect them which they obviously cannot do.

Tax exemptions for private companies performing charity (through foundations for instance) are not yet documented, although it would be interesting to find out what the regulatory and practical terms are.

2.6 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This relationship is well documented by researchers (Boris and Steuerle 1999, Greenstein and Heinrich 1998, Rosenblum and Post 2002, Kuhnle and Selle 1992). These sub-dimensions looks at the nature and the quality of relations between state and civil society by assessing the autonomy of CSOs and the amount of communication, cooperation and support between the state and CSOs.

TABLE 17: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

No	Indicator	Score
2.6.1	Autonomy	2.0
2.6.2	Communication	1.0
2.6.3	Cooperation	1.0

FIGURE 11: STATE CONTROL OVER CIVIL SOCIETY



2.6.1. Autonomy: Few of the CSO interviewees believe the state interferes a lot (15%) or not at all (10%) in civil society's affairs. Most of them believe interference happens sometimes (46%) or rarely (29%). However a comfortable majority (61%), combining responses for 'a lot' and 'sometimes' believes the state exerts some level control over civil society.

On the whole the autonomy of CSOs could still be improved. The NAC decided on a score of 2: "CSOs are submitted to frequent and unjustified interferences in their operations." Control is exerted through long and unpredictable financial and administrative proceedings. Sometimes the state will send agents to inspect statutes or programmes. These inspections are tedious and difficult to pass. There is a strong fear of state investigations when CSOs cross certain boundaries of criticism towards the state.

2.6.2. Communication between state and civil society: Most (92%) believe communication is limited (50%) or moderate (42%). The NAC believes "the state only tries to communicate with a small number of CSOs on an ad hoc basis" (scoring 1 on the scoring matrix). When selecting CSOs it will talk to, the state obviously prefers the ones unlikely to criticise it. Forum Civil, for instance, was excluded from the Public Procurement Regulatory Agency (ARMP) because it was uncompromisingly demanding good governance in signing public contracts.

The National Workshop wished to change the grade from 1 to 0, saying the state does not make efforts to communicate with civil society except as window dressing. The debate was interesting because other participants on the other hand argued that it is civil society that refuses communication because it prefers to criticise and attack the state. They mentioned the PRSP process, saying that civil society sometimes sends "representatives who are not

serious" to take part in such matters.

2.6.3. Cooperation with the government and state support to CSOs: The indicator is supposed to assess the proportion of CSOs that receive help from the state (as subsidies, contracts or other kinds of help). The assessment was informed by the ratio of CSOs that get substantial financial support from the state (more than 10% of their financial resources).

Members of the NAC were surprised by the figures obtained in the research concerning CSO actors. They unanimously agreed on the fact that state support is rather weak. Some members said that only organisations sporting "the same political colour" as the state get support. The view was, "Even when political collusion is obvious funds are very limited. If you simply check out the headquarters and human resources of most CSOs – including the press – you will get an idea of how scarce the funding is." This explains why the indicator received a score of 1, according to which "only a very limited amount of CSOs are supported by the state."

2.7 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY

There is less research material on this matter than on state-civil society relations but it is attracting growing interest (CIVICUS 1999, Serrano 2001, Covey and Brown 2001, Yablonski 2001, Social Venture Network 1999). This sub-dimension assesses the attitudes of the private sector towards civil society as well as the level of social responsibility and philanthropy in businesses.

TABLE 18: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY

No.	Indicator	Score
2.7.1	Attitude of the private sector	1.0
2.7.2	Corporate social responsibility	0.0
2.7.3	Corporate philanthropy	1.0

2.7.1. When it comes to the attitude of the private sector, the perception is this: 66% offered a negative judgment and 34% positive. The participation of national private sector associations in CSO initiatives is perceived to be rather rare (58%) or casual (29%). There are not many examples of cooperation between the private sector and civil society. We must say that fighting against corruption often means targeting the private sector also. As in most parts of the world, the private sector jealously watches over its 'business secrets' and transparency is not always welcome.

FIGURE 12 CSO VIEWS OF PRIVATE SECTOR ATTITUDES



2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility: CSOs were also asked about corporate social responsibility, and asked to discuss how many large corporations in Senegal take into account the social and environmental consequences of their activities.

This issue is not very well dealt with in Senegal. Most CSO actors believe corporate social responsibility is limited (52%) or insignificant (37%). The sum total of these scores is 89%. Therefore the NAC gave this indicator grade 0, judging that these results match the statement that “large corporations do not show any interest towards the environmental and social consequences of their actions.” The only example of social responsibility that came up during discussion concerned SONATEL (National Telecommunication Corporation). On the other hand many cases of environmental degradation were mentioned, such as Sococim (cement), and lead dumping in Mbane.

2.7.3 Extent of corporate philanthropy towards CSOs: According to the survey of CSO actors, most CSOs (83%) seem to receive important funds from private businesses. This figure is puzzling because it is very different from what the facts suggest. It would be interesting to delve deeper into this issue and carry out an in-depth analysis. According to the NAC “only a small amount of CSOs receive funding from the private sector” (score 1).

On the question of funding in general, 41.49% of CSOs say they receive a large proportion of their funding from the state and 34.55% receive funds from national businesses. This percentage goes up to 49.45 % when foreign businesses are included. More than half (51.71%) of CSOs say that membership fees provide over 10% of their total financial resources while commissioning fees provide the same proportion for 21.42% of CSOs.

CONCLUSIONS

FIGURE 13: ENVIRONMENT DIMENSION SCORES



The overall score for this dimension is 1.17. The socio-political, economic and legal environment of civil society is not as bad as in other African countries with single-party regimes and strong restrictions on freedom of speech. Nonetheless it is still rather difficult for civil society to become autonomous and to efficiently control political leaders, mainly because of corruption, distrust, political manipulation and other factors.

Civil society is tolerated by the state more than actually encouraged. “The political context is unfavourable because public power believe CSOs are at threat and consider them a part of political opposition forces. On the other hand opposition parties don’t trust CSOs because it is afraid they could become competitors.”[9]

Private sector businesses also stay away from CSOs and do not cooperate enough with civil society to make a difference. The legal environment, the socio-cultural and socio-economic contexts are also unfavourable to the growth and assertion of civil society and often create major obstructions such as poverty and the low level of education.

3. VALUES

This dimension assesses the extent to which CSOs practice and model internally the values they are generally seen to promote and assumed to be motivated by.

3.1 INTERNAL DEMOCRACY

This sub-dimension judges the extent to which CSOs carry out internal democracy (by designating leaders and making decisions) and what their level of involvement is in promoting democracy on a societal scale.

TABLE 19: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR INTERNAL DEMOCRACY

No	Indicator	Score
3.1.1	Democratic behaviour within CSOs	1.0
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	2.0

9 Djibril Diakhaté, community research report, CSI Senegal.

3.1.1. Democratic behaviour within CSOs: key questions here are, to what extent do CSOs carry out internal democracy? Proportionally, how do members control decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

In selecting CSO management, election by members largely dominates (69%). If we examine the management selection process depending on whether a CSO is based on individual or group membership, the tendency is the same (69.2% and 69.7% respectively).Contrastingly, we can see that incidences of auto-selection (23.1%) are rather widespread in organisations based on individual membership, and selection by nominations (7.7%) are very few, while the situation is the opposite in institutional membership CSOs where nominations represent 20.2% compared with 10.1% for auto-selection of leaders. The discrepancies are probably linked to working methods which are quite different, for example, between a membership-based CSO and an umbrella CSO.

Influence of members on decision making processes within CSOs: for more than two thirds of replies, CSO members confirm that they have influence on decisional processes in CSOs, and that this influence could be estimated as moderate or substantial (almost 50% of total replies). For the remainder, this influence remained limited (16%) or insignificant or non-existent (8%).

FIGURE 14: INFLUENCE OF CSO MEMBERS ON DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES



After consulting these points of view, the NAC gave a score of 1, consistent with the view that “a majority of CSOs do not carry out internal democracy, that is to say, members have little or no control on decision making, which is are characterised by patronage and nepotism.”

3.1.2. Civil society’s role in promoting democracy: During the NAC debate, there were examples of praiseworthy efforts, for example, the NGO partnership for the elections, RADDHO, Forum Civil, but we must admit that on this topic the challenge seems substantial for civil society, as more than two thirds of the group estimated that CSO action to promote democracy within society is weak or nonexistent.

The picture is more positive when the CSO stakeholders are asked about their role in promoting democracy within society. More than half (53%) judge this role as ‘significant’ and 80% deem it to have some sort of role (if we add together replies for ‘moderate’ and ‘significant’). The NAC gave a mark of 2 to this indicator, noting that “several actions of civil society can be detected. However, wide support and public awareness of such initiatives are lacking.”

Increasingly, civil society is taking on the role of promoting democracy, which implies redefining democracy. Even if concepts of the state, citizen and society are understood, for most Senegalese people the notion of a democratic country still remains badly defined on a daily basis (outside of electoral periods).

3.2 TRANSPARENCY

This sub-dimension examines corruption and financial transparency within civil society, as well as civil society actions to promote transparency at a societal level.

TABLE 20: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR TRANSPARENCY

Ref.	Indicator	Score
3.2.1	Corruption in civil society	1.0
3.2.2	Financial transparency of CSOs	0.0
3.2.3	Civil society actions promoting transparency	2.0

3.2.1. Corruption within civil society: In consultations with CSO stakeholders, the reality of corruption within CSOs is not denied, but positions remain divided or balanced concerning estimations of how widespread it is: 44% judge it to be very rare or occasional, while 66% estimate that corruption cases are frequent or very frequent. In order to understand these figures, we may consider that in replies to questions about corruption, there is also an idea that 'everything is fine for me; it's my neighbour who has problems'. But the reality of corruption cannot be denied: we can mention scandals concerning HIV/AIDS or funds disappearing within one CSO.

FIGURE 15: OCCURRENCES OF CORRUPTION IN CSOS



Corruption is also a very difficult phenomenon to follow up and even to define at times. Is giving a job to a friend or acquaintance seen to be corruption in a context where a social network is fundamental for family support, sometimes even for survival?

During the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 1 to 0 as to them it appeared obvious that corruption is very widely present everywhere in Senegal and therefore they preferred 'very frequent' to 'frequent'.

3.2.2. Financial transparency of CSOs: CSOs which allow the public to have access to their financial accounts represent 82% of the total, according to CSO members questioned. But for the NAC these results are surprising. Once the notion of 'financial transparency' was thoroughly defined, they felt that very few CSOs met the criteria. They considered that the people questioned must have mixed up accountability to funders with publishing their financial statements; on the contrary, they estimated that many CSO members ignore proper financial practices in their own structures. The score of 0 seemed to correspond more with what the NAC felt, "that a small minority (less than 30%) publish their financial statement."

FIGURE 16: PROMOTION OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY BY CIVIL SOCIETY



3.2.3. Civil society actions to promote financial transparency: There are some examples of civil society actions to promote transparency at local and national government levels. Locally, initiatives for good local governance are taken by CBOs, NGOs (such as ENDA, Forum Civil, RADI) funders (such as USAID, EU) and important state programmes such as the National Program for Local Development (PNDL). At a national level there are several actors, such as Forum Civil, ENDA, the partnership for elections, OXFAM and Transparency. The main question is: what impact does civil society have in the long term on transparency in the public sector? 60% of CSO participants believe civil society is playing some role here, whether it be moderate (27%) or significant (33%)

FIGURE 17: PROMOTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR TRANSPARENCY BY CIVIL SOCIETY



Turning to the question of civil society's role in promoting transparency in the private sector, positions seem to be balanced, with 52% judging it either insignificant (16%) or limited (36%) and on the other side 48% seeing that it plays either a moderate (24%) or significant (24%) role. Active in this regard are the unions, which represent the workers' grievances in the private sector and who sometimes promote transparency by calling for a corrupt director to resign (for example, Senelec, the national electric company).

In scoring indicators, the NAC noted that "several civil society actions in this field can be mentioned. However, wide support and public awareness of such initiatives are lacking". The NAC took the view that corruption does indeed exist within CSOs and more effort can be made to prevent and expose these malpractices. Even if such internal improvements are necessary, CSOs are the best placed to promote good governance, transparency and the fight against corruption in both public and private sectors. They acknowledged that the fight will be long and difficult, will call for deep social changes, and it will sometimes be risky for those driving exposure of corruption.

3.3 TOLERANCE

This sub-dimension examines the weight of intolerant vs. tolerant forces within civil society, as well as the level of civil society's involvement in promoting tolerance within society as a whole.

TABLE 21: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR TOLERANCE

No	Indicator	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance in the civil society arena	3.0
3.3.2	CSO actions promoting tolerance	2.0

3.3.1. Tolerance within civil society: to what extent is civil society a tolerant arena? CSO stakeholders are near-unanimous concerning the absence of intolerant attitudes or behaviour within CSOs. 94% of those questioned could think of either no examples (83%) or only rare or marginal examples (11%).

But the question on the minds of the NAG was the extent to which one can evaluate within civil society forces which will be explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant? What will be the relative place of such forces in civil society as a whole? It would seem, from the replies, that this type of behaviour is not typical, but neither is it inexistent. After debate, NAC scored this indicator 3, which means that in Senegal "civil society is an open arena where expression of all types is encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society as a whole." The NAC had in mind that in Senegal there is cohabitation of a majority of Muslims and a small minority of Christians within a very tolerant context, with instances of Muslims even defending Christians facing attempts to limit their liberty.

3.3.2. Actions taken by CSOs to promote tolerance: The NAC observed that the promotion of tolerance by CSOs is remarkable at a community level. All over Senegal, especially in times of conflicts, CBOs or religious groups convene to discuss and resolve problems. When the problem is linked to intolerance or ignorance, there are strong examples of these groups acting together to provide information. An example of this is HIV/ AIDS, where tolerance towards people with HIV/AIDS so that they are not stigmatised is promoted by many CSOs. From CSO stakeholders, 35% judged this role as significant and 40% as moderate. The NAC determined that for this topic, "some CSO actions in this field can be mentioned. However wide support and public awareness of such initiatives are lacking," leading to a score of 2.

3.4 NON-VIOLENCE

TABLE 22: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR NON-VIOLENCE

No	Indicator	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence in the civil society arena	3.0
3.4.2	CSO actions promoting non-violence	2.0

3.4.1. Non violence within civil society: The key question was, how widespread is the use of violent means (such as degradation of property or violence towards a person) amongst the members of civil society for their own interests in the public sphere? At this level, the investigation also looked at the question of the existence and size of those forces within civil society which use violence to express their interests ask asked if these groups were: large with a wide social base; isolated cases, regularly using violence; isolated cases, occasionally using violence; rare and isolated.

It would appear that use of violence by groups in civil society is extremely rare (60%). Even when it takes place, it is occasional and not regular (23%), and carried out mainly by isolated

groups. Examples given were some who students burnt tyres during a strike, or youth associations which protested against Senelec and then damaged property, with many CSOs denouncing these actions.

3.4.2. Civil society actions promoting non-violence and peace: CSO members were questioned on their knowledge of examples during the last year of campaigns or programmes by civil society which promoted non violence or peaceful ways to resolve conflicts. Looking at the statistics, it appears that these examples are few in Senegal. But it must be stated that, in Casamance, where there has been a conflict for 28 years, civil society has taken many actions in favour of non violence and peace.

The same contrast already observed for other questions can be seen again here between the positive judgement of CSO stakeholders and the slightly more cautious view of the NAC, suggesting a gap between statements and concrete actions. The NAC gave this indicator a mark of 2, which means that “some civil society actions in this field can be observed. However wide support and public awareness of such initiatives are lacking.”

During the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 2 to 3 as they took the view that civil society never promotes violence. The challenge remains developing a wide interest in and awareness of actions to promote non-violence as for many participants, these actions are too few. The only exception was in Casamance, where these actions could be seen on a wide scale.

3.5 GENDER EQUITY

TABLE 23: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR GENDER EQUITY

No	Indicator	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity in the civil society arena	2.0
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	1.0
3.5.3	Civil society actions to promote gender equity	3.0

3.5.1. Equality of sexes within CSOs: CSO stakeholders were asked to evaluate “the importance of forces within civil society which are explicitly sexist or discriminate against women.” It appears that examples of civil society members who exhibit sexist values are not marginal (35.6% of responses), even if they are far from dominating or being in a majority. The majority (64.4%) think that sexist values do not exist or rarely exist within the civil society arena. A follow-up question asks whether, when sexist behaviour does take place within civil society, is it condemned or overlooked. The responses from CSOs were balanced on this point, suggesting that civil society is at a moment of transition, from denial and silence to awareness and taking of more responsibility concerning these questions in civil society. This can be seen to reflect a change of consciousness towards women in Senegal, which is seeing women starting to occupy decision-making posts in companies and government, albeit many women still do not have access to education and employment opportunities.

3.5.2. Gender equitable practices in CSOs: CSO were asked, “Does your organisation have written policies concerning equality of opportunities or equal pay for equal work for women?” More than 70% answered no, which reveals a significant challenge for CSOs; if they wish to promote equality in the state or private sector spheres, they must model and demonstrate this internally. On this indicator NAC consensus was on a score of 1, which means that sexual equity remains a minor topic within CSOs.

3.5.3 Civil society actions to promote gender equity: according to the NAC, while it faces internal challenges in this regard, externally civil society is “a driving force in the promotion

of sexual equity. The actions of civil society in this field have the advantage of having wide support and/or public awareness." This entailed a score of 3.

While the civil society sphere is the only one that emphasises the promotion of the role of women, there is still a need for more effort. The role of women is linked to the values and traditions of Senegalese culture, which itself is a mixture of several cultures (ethnic and religious). Enduring change will take time.

3.6 ERADICATING POVERTY

This sub-dimension looks at the extent to which civil society members are committed to fighting against poverty and to promoting anti poverty policies. Action on poverty is estimated to be an important indicator of civil society values.

TABLE 24: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR ERADICATING POVERTY

No	Indicator	Score
3.6.1	Civil society actions to eradicate poverty	2.0

3.6.1. Civil society actions to eradicate poverty: with the PRSP, there are many funder and state supported initiatives for reducing poverty. Civil society plays a substantial role in programmes initiated here, including in partnership with the state. Eradicating poverty is indirectly related to all efforts in such fields as creating employment, supporting agriculture, improving education and health matters; there are hundreds of actions in this field across Senegal at both local and national levels.

FIGURE 18: RECOGNITION OF ACTIONS BY CSOS TO REDUCE POVERTY



The role of CSOs in the reduction of poverty is judged quite positively, but the NAC agreed on a score of 2, as despite many initiatives the real means necessary to wipe out poverty are not made available to civil society. There is even a question asked concerning the responsibility for eradicating poverty: is it the job of civil society or of the state?

During the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 2 to 3 as they noted that civil society is a driving force in the struggle against poverty, and more efficient than the state. In this regard they gave examples of agricultural programmes and micro-finance.

FIGURE 19: ROLE OF CSOS IN POVERTY ERADICATION



3.7 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

One of the universally accepted principles is the importance of protecting the environment and promoting sustainable forms of development. This sub-dimension evaluates the extent to which civil society is actively committed to promoting preservation of the environment.

TABLE 25: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

No	Indicator	Score
3.7.1	Civil society actions to promote environmental sustainability	2.0

3.7.1. Civil society actions in support of the environment: Some CSOs work in the field of environmental issues, particularly at a local level, for example, IED, ENDA, the Wula Nafa programme, or by sector, for example in the fishing or forest sectors. Environmental issues are not found transversally in many programmes, but people are becoming more aware and civil society members as well as the population are beginning to understand these issues through targeted programmes.

The scoring by the NAC of 2 corresponds to that for the preceding indicator, as despite initiatives to support environmental issues, impact remains limited.

CONCLUSIONS

Civil society forms an important and well respected agent in promoting democracy, transparency, tolerance and non violence within society at an institutional level: at the same time, civil society should probably initiate many more actions in these fields. Other fields of action where CSOs have an advantage are the commitment to the fight against poverty and for gender equity.

While promoting the values of transparency, equity, tolerance and so on, CSOs are obliged to follow the same lines themselves, to model these values and present themselves as examples of best practice. It would however appear that this challenge is far from being achieved by CSOs. Although the method of selecting leaders is mainly election by members, the influence of members in decision taking seems less important. Corruption is present within CSOs without being considered a dominant characteristic, but financial transparency is practically absent. On top of this, promoting policies which bring gender equity to the CSO level itself will be another big challenge to face. The overall score for this dimension is 1.93.

FIGURE 20: VALUES DIMENSION SCORES



4. IMPACT

4.1 INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

The first sub-dimension under impact looks at how widely civil society can influence state policies. Civil society's impact is assessed by CSO participants and the NAG by considering its influence and achievements on four specific issues: the national budgetary process, the crucial human rights question, and two other matters of national priority, selected on the basis of public opinion polls.

TABLE 26: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

No	Indicator	Score
4.1.1	Civil society's impact on social policy	2
4.1.2	Civil society's impact on public policy	2
4.1.3	Civil society's impact on key policy issues	2

4.1.1. Influencing public policies: The evaluation is based on three main pre-identified fields. The impact assessment from regional consultations of CSO members is below.

FIGURE 21: IMPACT OF CSOS ON POLICIES



Following debates between NAC members, the point of view was that "a moderate level of CSO action has been observed and/or CSO objectives have been partially achieved," yielding a score of 2.

Within civil society there remains a debate, because some NAC members believe that civil society has very little influence on the state, while others consider that the influence is greater. Analysis of state decision making is necessary in order to go more deeply into this matter. However, there are some obvious examples that can be cited where CSOs have been able to press the state to make positive changes, such as the public procurement code, technical undertakings in the health sector, decentralisation, and unionisation within the education sector.

4.2 HOLDING THE STATE AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACCOUNTABLE

The important role of civil society as a 'watchdog', making both state and private companies accountable for their decisions and actions, has been well researched (Lanegran 1995, Diamond 1994, Hyden 1995). This sub-dimension deals with civil society follow up and evaluation of transparency, and where necessary denunciation, of actions undertaken by the government and the private sector which violate civil society's declared aims, objectives and tasks.

TABLE 27: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR HOLDING THE STATE AND PRIVATE SECTOR TO ACCOUNT

No	Indicator	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state to account	2.0
4.2.2	Holding the private sector to account	1.0

4.2.1. Holding the state accountable: considering responses from the regional CSO consultations, we see a recurring trend: CSOs judge themselves to be satisfyingly active, while admitting that the impact on government accountability remains limited, even very weak.

FIGURE 22: CIVIL SOCIETY EFFECTIVENESS IN HOLDING STATE TO ACCOUNT



Many civil society members are dissatisfied with the Senegalese government's results after promises that were made, and are concerned about achieving real development, especially for employment, medical care, housing and education, and civil society is finding it difficult to get any explanation from government on why these objectives have not been reached.

4.2.2. Holding the private sector to account: civil society judges itself rather inactive in this field (74%), but with a weak or non-existent impact (81%). There are indeed few initiatives within civil society (apart from unions) concerning private companies, except in the mining sector (such as mineworkers' social funds) and in response to the 'doing business' indicators set by some funders' programmes (such as USAID and World Bank).

FIGURE 23: CIVIL SOCIETY EFFECTIVENESS IN HOLDING PRIVATE SECTOR TO ACCOUNT



During the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 1 to 0 as they were unable to mention one case where the CSO had managed to influence a company in terms of transparency or good governance.

4.3 RESPONDING TO SOCIAL INTERESTS

TABLE 28: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR RESPONDING TO SOCIAL INTERESTS

No	Indicator	Score
4.3.1	Civil society responsiveness	3.0
4.3.2	Public trust in civil society	2.0

To what extent do civil society positions and priorities reflect the real interests and needs of the population as a whole? This indicator is crucial when measuring how deeply civil society is rooted in the larger Senegalese society. The wide spectrum of civil society may occupy different positions – some may be found to be elitist, others receptive and concerned with attacking real societal problems. This sub-dimension analyses civil society to see if it is representative and working towards societal interests. In doing this, we are looking not only at the effectiveness of civil society responses to priority social matters, but also at the level of public trust in civil society.

4.3.1. Responsiveness: Are civil society members really aware of the main concerns of the population and do they take these into consideration and if so, then at what level? The NAC was clear that they strongly do, and awarded a score of 3. To the NAC it was obvious that CSOs represent the interests of constituents because looking at the list of CSO umbrellas, such as the Platform of Non-state Actors (ANE) and CONGAD, they are concerned with all social fields, such as education, health, agriculture, fishing, micro-finance, peace and human rights, which are the main concerns of the population. The hardest question to deal with is to what extent constituencies are satisfied with the results of actions taken place within organisation.

During the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 3 to 2, as they took the view that some matters were not yet being adequately addressed.

4.3.2. Public trust in CSOs: in the community survey, the following question was asked: “I am going to mention several organisations. For each one, could you tell me if you entirely trust, partially trust, little trust or do not trust at all?” The organisations having the highest level of trust are the armed forces (71% high trust) and religious groups (66.5%). The police service does however not have a good score (41%).

Those having the higher scores in terms of mistrust are political parties (29.4% no trust at all), political leaders (28.7%) and central government (25.5%).

Meanwhile the media, apart from TV, benefits from moderate trust, as 10.7% mistrust and 27.4% have little trust (38.1% if we add these two categories) but the rest of the respondents were more positive. For TV, results are similar, except that mistrust is higher (43.6% if we add scores for mistrust and little trust).

On top of those already mentioned, the following groups, without having negative values, obtain percentages of mistrust which suggest that they still have a lot of work to do in order to regain public trust: unions (50.5%), major companies (45%), and to a lesser extent, the best known CSOs (31.4%) and the NGOs (33.2%).The all round percentage of trust in CSOs was noted at 65.5%. On the CSI scale this percentage corresponds to a small majority (51-75%), and therefore NAC gave a score of 2 to this indicator.

Overall, the public now expects CSOs to help resolve their problems so that they can meet their families’ needs and ensure their children’s future. People are used to waiting for the state to bring them solutions, and for some issues, this is the only option (for example, building roads, building health centres and equipping them with medicine and personnel) but attitudes are beginning to change. The population is starting to do things for itself, looking

actively for solutions or demanding that the state satisfy their rights. CSOs can accompany these initiatives and/or instigate others without doing everything for the population.

4.4 EMPOWERING CITIZENS

Another widely recognised role of civil society is its contribution to strengthening the role of the citizen role by giving them more choice and enabling them to better control decisions that affect their lives. This sub-dimension looks at several elements, such as the impact of educating/informing citizens, developing their capacity for collective action and building social capital. It also examines civil society's role in empowering two traditionally marginalised groups: women and poor people.

TABLE 29: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR EMPOWERING CITIZENS

No	Indicator	Score
4.4.1	Informing / educating citizens	2.0
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action	1.0
4.4.3	Empowering marginalised people	3.0
4.4.4	Emancipating women	3.0
4.4.5	Building social capital	2.0
4.4.6	Supporting livelihoods	2.0

4.4.1. Informing and educating citizens: In the community survey, 85.5% of respondents can give an example of a CSO providing information or awareness raising of some kind. Although this implies good recognition and value of CSO roles, in the regional consultations of CSOs, it would appear that while efforts exist and are recognised, citizen education and information campaigns are not yet seen as wholly satisfactory, given that results are divided. Campaigns used different combinations of methods according to different programmes (including, information provision, advertising spots or other methods through the media). In the chart below, we can see that extreme values cancel each other out, while negative judgments predominate in terms of majority values (little success scoring higher than unqualified success).

FIGURE 24: SUCCESS OF PUBLIC CAMPAIGNS



Moreover, results from the community survey on informing and educating the public show that 60% of those questioned are not satisfied. Explanations here may include illiteracy and its complications as well as the multitude of local languages, which should be employed to inform as many people as possible. Civic education is a long term learning process which

needs to be consistently supported, but most programmes do not last for long; training and informing cannot be done in a simply didactic manner, and there must be examples and practical training, all of which is time and resource intensive.

Some good examples do however exist of civic education programmes in schools (for example, the Forum Civil programme in technical high schools on how to be an active citizen, the World Education programme in middle schools for peace education, and the GraRedep project for citizen awareness).

After analysing these results, the NAC concluded that “civil society is active in this field, but its impact is limited,” scoring 2.

4.4.2. Building capacity for collective action: CSO activity in this field is considered insufficient by 55% of those questioned in regional CSO consultations, with actions undertaken judged as being or slightly or not at all productive in 66% of cases. After examining these findings, the NAC agreed on a score of 1, which means that “civil society action in this field is very limited and has no impact.”

Research results and NAC scores for this indicator are somewhat surprising, as civil society actions depend on socio-cultural values that uphold collective actions, and therefore it seems rather illogical that civil society does not strengthen these abilities. By carrying out collective actions, this should strengthen this collective capital, creating a virtuous circle. Perhaps there is a problem with the question: when we talk about strengthening capacities, people tend to automatically think of further training, and there are no training sessions about collective actions. Very often groups, structures and committees are created for the needs of a particular programme, but once a mission is over, the group dissolves, rather than ensuring a follow up and continuity of actions. This implies that civil society must invest further in ensuring that people can organise themselves, mobilise funds and work together to solve their common problems.

During the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 1 to 2 as they felt that civil society does indeed strengthen the capacity of the population to take collective action each time they are able to mobilise a group on a rights issue.

4.4.3. Emancipating marginalised people: 75.4% of those questioned in the community survey say that CSOs have specifically helped poor people within the community to improve their living conditions. NAC members therefore gave a score of 3, which supposes that “civil society plays an important role.” Significantly successful examples advanced are the work carried out with people with disabilities (FSAPH, Handicap International), pro-poor programmes in the agricultural/rural development field and programmes supporting people made homeless during the Casamance conflict.

During the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 3 to 2, as despite strong efforts made by civil society, its impact is still weak, mainly due to lack of funding.

4.4.4. Emancipating women: 74.2% of those questioned in the community survey judged that CSOs have “specifically helped women within the community to improve their living conditions.” There are numerous programmes which target women. However, during the National Workshop, participants suggested changing the mark from 3 to 2 as they noted that although civil society makes an effort, impact is weak. The challenge in seeking to improve the status of women is of course that actions within society are profoundly steeped in cultural, religious and social practices.

4.4.5. Building social capital: The key question here is, to what extent does civil society build

social capital amongst its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness among members of civil compare to those of non members? The data from the community survey tells us that the level of trust seems higher amongst CSO members (23.2%) than in the general population (16.2%). This is hardly surprising, as members of an organisation generally willingly get together, by auto-selection, to achieve a common aim, and therefore want to collaborate with other people. Social capital is a difficult concept to define, and harder still to quantify with precise examples. There is a plethora of key expressions such as social cohesion (Hanifan, 1916), associative life, civil commitment (Bourdieu, 1972), communal governance (Bowles and Gintis, 2000), cumulative value of social networks (Putnam, 2000), and so on. The NAC found that the concept is not easy to study using a questionnaire such as that used in the CSI, and it is preferable not to try to come to many firm conclusions on this indicator. In a normative framework, CSOs have a dual role as both a consumer and generator of social capital, and trust in civil society can be seen as one indicator of social capital. NAC therefore concluded that civil society does not diminish social capital in society, but contributes moderately, scoring 2. It is interesting to juxtapose the score of 2 for this indicator with score of 1 for the indicator on strengthening capacity for collective action, and to question the differences, as in essence the two indicators have a common concern.

4.4.6. Supporting livelihoods: This asks the question of the extent to which civil society is active and successful in creating/supporting employment schemes and income generating actions, particularly for women and the poor. In the community survey, 72.9% of respondents reported that CSOs have helped community members set up income generating activities. The National Workshop, following the NAC, set a score of 2 for this indicator, considering by this that “civil society is active in this field but its impact is limited.”

4.5 MEETING SOCIETAL NEEDS

One of civil society’s essential roles is its contribution to meeting urgent societal needs, in particular those of the poor population and other marginalised groups. This sub-dimension looks at civil society’s capacity to respond not only by directly meeting those needs (for example in promoting initiatives for self-help or providing services) but also through urging the state to provide improved services. This sub-dimension also looks specifically at the effectiveness of meeting the needs relative efficiency of civil society in dealing with the needs of marginalised groups.

TABLE 30: SUMMARY OF SCORES FOR MEETING SOCIETAL NEEDS

No.	Indicator	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	2.0
4.5.2	Meeting social needs directly	2.0
4.5.3	Meeting needs of marginalised groups	3.0

4.5.1. Lobbying for state service provision: Many programmes plead the cause for providing basic services in a quantitative and qualitative way. We can mention COSYDEP - education actions, USAID - health and education programmes, PEPAM - drinking water, ENDA Graf - health and CNR - agriculture as among examples.

Information from regional CSO consultations shows that civil society is very active in this field in a positive way and perceives action on this front to be quite successful, even though 55% of respondents believe they could be more efficient.

The NAC gave this indicator a score of 2, saying that “civil society is active in this area but its impact is limited.”

FIGURE 25: CSO LOBBYING FOR STATE SERVICE PROVISION



4.5.2. Meeting social needs directly: How good is civil society at directly serving communities? The community survey offers a positive response, with 72.7% recognising an instance of a CSO directly intervening to meet a need, for example, digging a well. However it must be taken into account here that the amount of valid answers – 27% of the total – was very low compared to others. Regional CSO consultations gave 75% positive answers to this question. The part played by CSOs in supporting social needs is perceived to be moderate to significant by a majority of people (64%). The needs provided for are varied, for instance health assistance, education and drinking water, but mainly correspond to essential social services.

FIGURE 26: MEETING SOCIAL NEEDS DIRECTLY



The NAC chose to give this indictor 2 (meaning active but with a limited impact), as CSOs do not have sufficient resources to cope with the extent of needs. Indeed CSOs, supported by sponsors, play an important part in providing health and education services, but the view of many is that in a truly democratic system the state should provide them. CSOs and sponsors cannot replace the state in the long run; it would be neither efficient nor tenable. The state must therefore make strong public policy choices, backed with budgetary

decisions, to meet these essential needs, and part of civil society's role should be to advocate for this.

Participants in the National Workshop proposed to change the grade from 2 to 1, saying that civil society makes efforts to answer emergency needs, but the impact still remains weak.

4.5.3. Meeting needs of marginalised groups: a question in the community survey asked respondents to compare CSO and state efficiency in providing services to marginalised people, such as very poor people, people with disabilities, street children and people suffering from the conflict in Casamance. We found that CSOs are considered to be more efficient than the state by 82.8% of the interviewees. Following these results the NAC decided to give this indicator a score of 3.

CONCLUSIONS

FIGURE 27: IMPACT DIMENSION SCORES

The overall score for this dimension is 2.1. The many activities of CSOs have not all had the expected results, which is not particularly surprising as there are many programmes and projects. Time, as well as resources and capacities, is a key constraint in effectively carrying out these actions. Civil society must reach a critical mass where the state will have no other choice than to take it into account in order to improve the state's own impact. The efforts made by CSOs to eradicate poverty, which remains high, are still very insufficient, and realistically there is a limit to what civil society alone can achieve here.

Despite the weakness of resources and the difficulty of the context, results show that Senegalese civil society plays a positive role in society. On the socio-political level, CSOs have helped develop new civic awareness through communication strategies and mass education. There have also been noticeable efforts towards improving living conditions and pressuring the state to provide essential services to the most disadvantaged populations.

CSOs enjoy a comfortable level of trust from the public. The real challenge is still to make the government and the private sector truly responsible, and to strengthen collective action capacities to help achieve this.

IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SENEGALESE CIVIL SOCIETY

Values of collectivity and collective action are part of Senegalese culture, and it is upon these values that civil society can build its forces. Senegalese civil society has contributed towards improving good governance in the public sector at national and local levels. It has been working to strengthen democracy, to build a law abiding state and to promote human rights. Since resistance to the SAP (Structural Adjustment Programme) and its consequently fatal social consequences, or more recently, the massive participation of civil society in mobilising citizens for the 2000 elections, hope and trust in civil society exists among the Senegalese population. In fact, civil society is the only actor trying to strengthen Senegalese democracy, but is not yet powerful enough, not having a critical mass of citizens, to systematically influence state decision making concerning policies and public priorities.

We must closely examine civil society to understand its particular forces and problems. Trade unions played an important role in workers' rights during the construction of the Senegalese state, even if they are now co-opted by the government. With few resources, CBOs, which are quite close to citizens, have answered citizens' needs in various communities, but their structural impact is rather limited. There are NGOs, CBOs and religious groups working to fight poverty, but without the necessary resources. Moreover, the role of religious groups, especially the marabous, is still problematic when they act as an intermediary between the state and the population. At times the stabilising forces of religion are the same forces which prevent citizens from demanding their rights, at the right moment and in an organised manner. The press is a central force of civil society, making information accessible to citizens and encouraging a transparent democracy, but then again, with the aim to sell as many copies as possible, sometimes using scandals and sensationalism while supplying little real information, the media is prevented from being as useful an ally as it could be to citizens and CSOs in building a democracy.

From a sociological point of view, the value of a peaceful society, which is to say, social behaviours that reject conflict and favour modes of compromise, is as a stabilising force. But this strength is also a weakness: if the population is always urged to calm down, to wait, to seek a compromise instead of vocalising and mobilising to address their concerns, change will not come. In the Senegalese context, it is socially difficult to ask someone to be personally accountable for a problem and the failure to resolve it; this is seen as a personal attack rather than professional criticism, for example holding accountable a state official or a minister.

Civil society lacks a clear identity and it is difficult to give it a clear form by defining it operationally or pragmatically. This is due to the diversity of its members and the difficulty of linking programmes to impact. Some civil society members take more and more of a partisan profile, pursuing the same aims as political party organisations. Suspicion and mistrust seems to exist among some civil society members and with the state, a situation which weakens all stakeholders and makes the sector as a whole appear less credible. Some CSO leaders use their structures to reach positions of power or to control and obtain resources. While fundraising is always an obstacle for civil society actions, CSO strategic plans are too often shaped by the availability of donor funds and their priorities. It is therefore necessary to reconfigure CSOs in Senegal by forming politically neutral entities whose mission would be to give oversight and ensure that the government exercises its power in an equitable manner and according to the law.

The generally recognised weaknesses of CSOs are their lack of ability to plan, monitor financial management, sustain human resources and follow up their programmes and actions. Civil society promotes transparency but does not sufficiently practice what it

preaches. Above all, CSOs have shown themselves little able to work in synergy on a long term basis in order to combine their forces and attack the problems of the Senegalese people. There are also weaknesses in the mobilisation of the population in the long term so as to ensure CSO impacts.

Within CSOs, the management methods used in general are vertical and non-participative even after members elected their management. The most important point when structuring CSOs should be involvement of their members in their actions, and after this should come steps to bolster the legitimacy of CSOs: a representative organisation is needed to gain trust and to draw successfully on the mandate of CSO members. Senegalese civil society must therefore strengthen its legitimacy in order to increase the level of trust that the population has in it.

Nevertheless, a new generation of civil society members is present today. It wants to play a role in the political context, the equal sharing of resources, prevention and handling of conflicts, instilling a law abiding state and enabling efficient citizen participation in managing affairs that affect their lives. Senegalese youth wishes to take its country's destiny into its own hands, and it is notably very critical of leadership examples and the working of state structures, even of civil society structures.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Senegalese civil society needs to be strengthened through promoting strong values of transparency, integrity, and of taking responsibility for itself. This translates into applying a working code, making financial statements accessible on websites and involving an organisation's members in its major decisions.

Civil society should also be a major partner in government choices concerning public policies. In order to succeed, many changes are needed, starting with proactive initiatives for dialogue with the state instead of simply making criticisms. Even more difficult is how legitimate CSOs position themselves, having been mandated by members, versus the state, and insist that CSOs, in the people's name, represent their participation and voice in debates over public policies. Civil society must be a member of the political field, but without seeking power, and it must remain neutral concerning political parties. CSOs must be well prepared to be able to demonstrate expertise in each sector.

There must also be involvement in the fields of good governance and the fight against corruption, which is transversal. In this way, civil society members must be more efficient in their ability to promote equitable governance, transparency and participative democracy, and to ensure that these are put into practice internally. These are long term efforts.

Addressing these challenges will be a difficult issue for the leaders of some CSOs, for it implies they will have to make deep changes in the management of their organisations, and these may come down to questions of personal choices, which are difficult to influence. Umbrella CSOs can at least promote these changes and can, for example, reward and popularise good examples.

If the role of civil society is to make aware, to inform and train, to speak for the defence of and help mobilise the population, then all the members, each in their particular field, should equip themselves to succeed in participatory ways. Self-assessment is needed not only to see if actions have taken place as planned, but also to take into account whether actions have had a positive impact on citizens' lives, on Senegalese institutions, and on the strengthening of democracy. We must encourage a culture of evaluation, where CSOs accept constructive criticism and are accountable for their mistakes. Is civil society ready for peer review? CSOs' abilities to do sound follow up and evaluation of their programmes must be reinforced.

Civil society must be more inclusive of women, young people, rural populations and vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities or homeless children, and it must do so in a systematic way. It must also do more to take account of different cultural sensitivities in order to enable them to contribute to promoting human rights and good governance, without exacerbating social tensions. This is indeed a critical but complicated issue. We must conceive strategies to stop corruption without contradicting socio-cultural and religious values.

CSOs must also learn to apply modern management and information sharing methods to their own activities and results, to set the example for state institutions and private companies to follow. In closing, it is vital that CSOs learn how to work together in synergy. This can only be accomplished by strengthening the capacity of different types of CSOs (such as NGOs, unions and CBOs) to socially mobilise and work together by increasing the financial resources of civil society. Efficient partnerships across a range of actions must be met by improved dialogue between the state, the people, the private sector and the actors of civil society. Democracy is a never-ending and permanent conversation between social, economic, political and religious forces, where civil society must play an important part.

VI. CONCLUSION

This study has shown that Senegalese civil society has a strong value base for taking action but needs a stronger structure, that enables it to become more effective and democratic, and that it operates in an environment that is sometimes obstructive but not debilitating. The study also showed that civil society has a noticeable impact on democracy and development; however, the impact is especially rather weak and not systemic, and much improvement need to be made. The CSI research and meetings clearly showed that CSOs must apply good governance and democratic principals to themselves in order to promote these to others.

Senegal will have elections in 2012 and there is much at stake and tensions are already present. Civil society must play an important role to promote a fair and non-violent electoral process while also strengthening the sense of citizenship. Citizens must be educated, the electorate mobilised to vote, and representative candidates must be chosen through public platforms and debates.

As a next step, Forum Civil aims to disseminate this national report to actors based in Dakar but also in more remote areas to create opportunities for dialogue between CSOs. This study could be a framework to creating synergies to face the great challenges coming up in the future for building democracy in Senegal.

APPENDIX 1: INDICATOR SCORING GRID

Dimension	*Total score*	*Sub-dimension name*	*Total for sub-dimension*	*Indicator name*	*Indicator*
1 Structure	**1.47**				
		1.1 Breadth of participation	2.6		
				1.1.1 Non- partisan political action	3
				1.1.2 Charitable giving	3
				1.1.3 CSO membership	1
				1.1.4 Volunteering	3
				1.1.5 Collective community action	3
		1.2 Depth of citizen participation	0.33		
				1.2.1 Charitable giving	0
				1.2.2 Volunteering	1
				1.2.3 CSO membership	0
		1.3 Diversity of civil society participants	2		
				1.3.1 CSO membership	2
				1.3.2 CSO Leadership	2
				1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs	2
		1.4 Level of organisation	1.4		
				1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	0
				1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	2
				1.4.3 Self-regulation	2
				1.4.4 Support infrastructure	1
				1.4.5 International linkages	2
		1.5 Inter-relations	1.5		
				1.5.1 Communications	1
				1.5.2 Cooperation	2
		1.6 Resources	1		
				1.6.1 Financial resources	1
				1.6.2 Human resources	1
				1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources	1
2 Environment	**1.17**				
		2.1 Political context	1.5		
				2.1.1 Political rights	2
				2.1.2 Political competition	2
				2.1.3 Rule of law	2
				2.1.4 Corruption	1
				2.1.5 State effectiveness	2
				2.1.6 Decentralisation	0
		2.2 Basic	1.67		

		freedoms and rights			
				2.2.1 Civil liberties	2
				2.2.2 Information rights	2
				2.2.3 Press freedoms	1
		2.3 Socio-economic context	1		
				2.3.1 Socio-economic barriers to civil society	1
		2.4 Socio-cultural context	1		
				2.4.1 Trust	1
				2.4.2 Tolerance	2
				2.4.3 Public spiritedness	0
		2.5 Legal environment	1		
				2.5.1 CSO registration	1
				2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities	1
				2.5.3 Tax laws for CSOs	1
				2.5.4 Tax laws for philanthropy	1
		2.6 State-civil society relations	1.33		
				2.6.1 Autonomy	2
				2.6.2 Dialogue	1
				2.6.3 Cooperation/support	1
		2.7 Private sector-civil society relations	0.67		
				Private sector attitude to civil society	1
				Corporate social responsibility	0
				Corporate philanthropy	1
3 Values	**1.93**				
		3.1 Democracy	1.5		
				3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs	1
				3.1.2 Civil society actions to promote democracy	2
		3.2 Transparency	1		
				3.2.1 Corruption within civil society	1
				3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs	0
				3.2.3 Civil society actions to promote transparency	2
		3.3 Tolerance	2.5		
				3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena	3
				3.3.2 Civil society actions to promote tolerance	2
		3.4 Non-violence	2.5		
				3.4.1 Non-violence within the civil society arena	3
				3.4.2 Civil society actions	2

				to promote non-violence and peace	
		3.5 Gender equity	2		
				3.5.1 Gender equity within the civil society arena	2
				3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs	1
				3.5.3 Civil society actions to promote gender equity	3
		3.6 Poverty eradication	2		
				3.6.1 Civil society actions to eradicate poverty	2
		3.7 Environmental sustainability	2		
				3.7.1 Civil society actions to promote environmental sustainability	2
4 Impact	**2.10**				
		4.1 Influencing public policy	2		
				4.1.1-4.1.4 Civil society's impact on social policy issues - combined indicator	2
		4.2 Holding state and private corporations accountable	1.5		
				4.2.1 Holding state accountable	2
				4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable	1
		4.3 Responding to social interests	2.5		
				4.3.1 Responsiveness	3
				4.3.2 Public trust	2
		4.4 Empowering citizens	2.17		
				4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens	2
				4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action	1
				4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people	3
				4.4.4 Empowering women	3
				4.4.5 Building social capital	2
				4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods	2
		4.5 Meeting social needs	2.33		
				4.5.1 Lobbying for state services	2
				4.5.2 Meeting pressing social needs directly	2
				4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalised groups	3

APPENDIX 2: REVIEW OF KEY SECONDARY DATA SOURCES

1. Chabal, P (1996): The African crisis: context and interpretation in post colonial identities in Africa, London Zed Books, pp 30-34

Two thirds of the Sub-Saharan African population live in absolute poverty. The economic crisis, aggravated by political crisis, spurs an infernal cycle of violence, including:

1. violence in interpersonal relations
2. weakening of principles of civility and of respect for the law
3. intercommunity conflicts linked to competition for resources
4. ethnic conflicts
5. child trafficking
6. exclusion of vulnerable groups such as women, children and refugees

The picture is made darker still by the fact that civil society is mainly organised along the lines of religion and ethnic or territorial origin, and therefore tends to nurture or even amplify divisions and conflicts and all their collateral harmful consequences such as poverty, mass migration and exclusion.

2. Allen, Chris (1997): Who needs civil society? In: Review of African Political Economy 73, pp 329-337

Civil society is developing in Western Africa mainly because of the disappearance of the idea of a welfare state, gradually being replaced by liberal state entities that concentrate on administrative business. The lower and poorer levels of society are left to cope by themselves with the ruthless law of the market. In this context NGOs were created that try by various actions to integrate these lower strata of population excluded from the circuit of production, attenuate poverty and its consequences, deactivate conflicts and contribute to the strenghtening of democracy.

3. Claude, Abé (2005): Reinventing development and the test of civil society in Africa, Bulletin Codesria N° 3-4, pp 70 -72

Civil society does not have a clear identity since it is difficult to circumscribe it with a pragmatic definition due to the great variety of actors and the lack of traceability of many of its actions. This means it is confusing to study, its methods are bureaucratic and nebulous and it tends to concentrate on the needs of a certain elite rather than on globally tackling the real needs of the people.

Suspicious connivance seems to exist between civil society (especially NGOs) and the states. This situation weakens CSOs and undermines their actions. Most of the time the approach tends to be vertical and non-participative, contradicting the philosophy most NGOs promote. The most important point in organising civil society is involving citizens and members in its actions, which is why the legitimacy of civil society is sometimes criticised. A representative organisation must earn the trust and mandate of its constituents.

4. M'boge, F., and S. G. Doe (2004): Les engagements africains envers la société civile: une revue de huit pays du NEPAD (African engagements towards civil society, a review of eight NEPAD countries). (Rapport AHSI, 6). Prétoria: African Human Security Initiative.

Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, South-Africa and Uganda all signed the African peer review mechanism, an instrument set up by the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's

Development) to promote good governance and respect for human rights.
This agreement endorses Larry Diamond's definition of civil society: “civil society is the ground for organised, voluntary, self-generating and independent social life, autonomous from the state and linked by legal foundations or shared laws. It involves citizens acting collectively in the public sphere to voice their interest, to share ideas, information, reach common goals, demand certain things to, the state and make state officials responsible and accountable for their actions. It is an intermediary entity between the private sphere and the state.” (Rethinking Civil Society, Usis Newsletters, Hagor 1985 pp 9-10.)

According to the authors, the aim of civil society according to the NEPAD framework is to encourage and contribute to realisation of human security, that is to make sure, “ordinary people can live a peaceful and secure life with the same conditions as others. Its aim is to protect people from danger, to help them develop their full potential and take part in decision making. “[10]

Society must work towards offering strong values to organise political action, boost production and eradicate any kind of exclusion and iniquitous behaviour. States should allow CSOs to function without obstructing them, and therefore try to avoid the situation described by Mattew Hassan Kukah: “the relation between civil society and African states is like the situation in a fortified city.” In a fortified city the relation between insiders and outsiders is rather restricted by the nature of the fort itself. Quite naturally some people belong to the inner circle and others don't.

5. Kukah, Mattew H. (2003): Democracy and civil society in Nigeria, Spectrum Books, p 49

Civil society plays an important part in the communication and flow of information both inside the community and outside. Therefore it decreases the divide between the elites and the social base and makes all public action transparent.

6. Bielefeld University, Faculty of Sociology, Research Centre for Development Sociology, Working Paper N° 357: Decentralisation, civil society and development in Senegal, prepared by Gudrun Lachennaum

The exposition of reasons for the 22 March 1996 law on decentralisation clearly indicated the principle and requirements of proximity governance involving the people in sectoral policy making. These cover nine areas: youth, territorial planning, healthcare, education, technical training, sanitisation, sport, environment and social development. The different types of local authorities design tools for participative planning and management of local resources by involving people through CBOs: the Local Development Plan for rural communities, the Communal Investment Plan for communes and the Regional Plan for Integrated Development for regions.

But in practice such tools (when they exist) are designed without consulting the people, which means decentralisation is an empty shell, from which the core – participation of actors at ground level – has somehow gone missing.

7. Marie-Hélène Mottin-Sylla: Participation de la société civile sénégalaise à la formulation des politiques de TIC, Association for Progressive Communications, Dakar, 2002

According to the author, Senegalese civil society should play the following parts towards

10 Op. Cit. M'boge, F., and S.G. Doe. 2004

implementing ITV policies:

1. organising popular recognition and the representativeness of civil society
2. clarifying the concept of civil society and the nature of alliances and antagonisms with other actors
3. organising and spreading lobbying, sensitisation and information within civil society on the content and value of ITC in order to make debate more democratic
4. carrying out specific training for lobbying techniques adapted to ITC topics
5. deepening and spreading the idea of governance
6. establishing an internal action plan to distribute tasks
7. starting consultation with other actors
8. working towards the networking of actions

8. Conférences des institutions nationales Africaines de promotion et de protection des droits de l'homme. Kampala, Uganda, 13-16 August 2002. Alioune Ndiaye: Le rôle de la société civile dans la promotion d'une bonne gouvernance

Values of collectivity and combined action are part of Senegalese culture, and it is on these values that civil society can build its forces. Senegalese civil society has contributed towards improving good governance by public powers centrally and locally. It has been working to widen democracy, to build a law abiding state and to promote human rights. Since resistance to the joint agricultural programme and its fatal social consequences, or more recently, since the massive participation of civil society in mobilising citizens for the elections in 2000, hope, a belief in civil society forces, does exist amongst the Senegalese population, which was confirmed during the local elections in 2007, with a large majority of candidates coming from civil society, presented as an alternative to political parties who had lost all legitimacy. In fact, civil society is the ever present actor in the struggle to strengthen Senegalese democracy, but is not yet powerful enough, despite a critical mass of citizens, to influence state decision making concerning policies and public priorities.

9. Mapping of Non-State Actors (ANE) in Senegal, Final report 2008

ANEs must create consultative plans and complete strategies to contribute to reducing poverty as part of PRSP processes, they must promote citizens' control over the state, they must help to set up a real space for dialogue between the different actors of political life, of civil society and of the administrative sphere. This is the only way to strengthen the foundations of democracy and good governance and ensure real development for the country in all sectors.

To accomplish this ANEs must be involved in a cooperative defining of objectives, and of executing and assessing public policies, especially policies concerning the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the PRSP.

Prepared by Djiby Diakhaté

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALLEN, Chris (1997): Who needs Civil Society?, Review of African Political Economy # 73, pp 329-337

CHABAL, P (1996): The African crisis: context and interpretation in post colonial identities in Africa, London, Zed Books, pp 30-34

CLAUDE, Abé (2005): Reinventing development and the test of civil society in Africa, Dakar, Bulletin Codesria N° 3-4, pp 70 -72

KUKAH, Mattew H. (2003): Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria, Ibadan. Spectrum Books.

LACHENNAUM, GUDRUN (2007): Développement Working Paper N° 357, Décentralisation société civile développement local au Sénégal (Decentralisation, civil society and development in Senegal), Bielefeld, University of Bielefeld, Faculty of sociology, Research Centre for Development Sociology. AEGIS European Conference on African Studies 2007, ECAS, Biannual Conference, Leiden, 11 to 14 July 2007

MOTTIN-SYLLA, Marie-Hélène (2002): Participation de la société civile sénégalaise à la formulation des politiques de TIC (Participation of Senegalese civil society in the formulation of Information and communication technologies), Dakar, Association for Progressive Communications

NDIAYE, Alioune (2002): Le rôle de la société civile dans la promotion d'une bonne gouvernance (The role of civil society in promoting good governance), Dakar, speech given at the Conference des Institutions Nationales Africaines de Promotion et de Protection des Droits de L'homme (Conference of African institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights), 13 to 16 August 2002, Kampala, Uganda