The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society
Characteristics, Challenges and Tasks
Civil Society Index

Analytical Country Report: Jordan
2010

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FOREWORD

The release of the National Analytical Report on the Indicators of the Civil Society in Jordan comes at the best time. It is issued at a time where historical transformations are taking place in the Middle East countries, and where change and reform are spearheading popular demands in almost every country of the region, including Jordan. This report is targeted at leaders and activists of civil society in Jordan, as well as other stakeholders including the Jordanian government, the private sector, municipalities, media, academics, international donors, and others. This report provides these various groups with solid and up-to-date information and analysis of strengths possessed by the Jordanian civil society organisations, and the weaknesses they suffer from. It also supplements such information with a wide range of recommendations that allow all concerned parties to develop a processing "roadmap" for developing civil society capabilities and creating a favourable external environment for its work.

I have accompanied the implementation of this project through its various phases over the last year, 2010, and I feel extremely happy to see the fruits of this labour with the issuance of this report. I am particularly glad because the Foundation for the Future (FFF), through our support for the project, was able to translate our deep faith in partnership with the international, non-governmental organisations, and here I include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. This partnership provides an excellent example for local and regional civil society organisations, to build partnerships and alliances with each other. I must also say that the support we extended for the project has contributed to translate the values and ideas that guide the work of the Foundation for the Future. First and foremost, our work is guided by our firm belief in the role of civil society and the viability of its mobility and effectiveness, which represents the fundamental criterion for measuring the progress of societies and nations, and the benchmark for the extent of their respect for the principles of human rights, good governance and democracy.

It is well known that CIVICUS describes the Civil Society Index as a research project with a practical and applied nature, as it has been carried out by and for actors in the civil society. It is based on a methodology that measures the tangible indications of the five dimensions that reflect the state of civil society in any country. These measures include: civic engagement, the level of organisation, the practice of values, the perception of impact, and the external environment. This methodology, whenever possible, proposes to develop quality studies to enhance and complete the image of the civil society dimensions in this country or any other. In fact, this is what the national team for the draft indicators of civil society in Jordan has done. It is a pleasure for the Foundation for the Future, and I am personally pleased to see that Jordan has joined dozens of other countries which have applied this methodology. I also look forward to seeing other Arab countries in the future being able to join this unique international project.

This national report provides the opportunity to get acquainted with the characteristics of contemporary Jordanian civil society and its strengths and weaknesses. It also allows us to capture the opportunities available to civil society to address the challenges and threats that confront it today. This will help many donors, operating institutions and the official authorities in Jordan to develop policies, programmes and legislation that are necessary for the advancement of civil society organisations, the
activation of their roles, the building of their capacities and the updating of their knowledge and means of action. This study also identifies the features of the voluntary sector in the Jordanian society. It reveals its present status and entailed values, both from the perspective of the civil society institutions and from the views of the leaders and influential social forces.

I trust this study will help the agencies interested in developing the role of the civil society organisations of Jordan to upgrade the level of civic engagement with broader categories of Jordanians, and to promote the exercise of the fundamental work values of the civil society, which will allow boosting the contribution of social capital and enhancement of the efficiency of the civil society organisations and their roles in the local communities.

In other words, this study provides a viable research instrument and a framework of reference to study the Jordanian civil society. It acts as one of the foundation studies for the literature of civil society which we aspire to evolve and keep pace with, both in quantity and quality, as civil society develops. More importantly, it will help us forecast the future of Jordanian civil society and what it entails of, potentials to be strengthened and challenges that must be addressed. It will also encourage all relevant parties to think of real mechanisms to overcome these problems, thus paving the way for the advancement of civil society organisations more effectively.

If we take into account the social and popular movements experienced by the Arab world today, we are confident that new horizons have been opened to civil societies in order to take their full opportunity to participate in achieving desired change. In the case of Jordan, it is necessary to build on the major developments witnessed by the Jordanian civil society during the last two decades, and which reflected on the size and role of its organisations. There is no doubt that the future will bring more opportunities to improve the strengths and sustainability of civil society. This will allow the community to contribute positively, both in terms of addressing the challenges of poverty, unemployment and economic gaps between various categories and segments of the society, in addition to its influential contribution in promoting the values and principles of human rights, political participation and the strengthening of good governance, transparency, accountability and democracy.

The project's national team, led by Al Urdun Al Jadeed (New Jordan) Center for Research and Studies, have done well by including in this report a wide range of recommendations addressed to various stakeholders. I take this opportunity to invite leaders of civil society organisations and other partners, led by the Jordanian government and international organisations, donors and others, to place these recommendations on their work agendas, especially as these recommendations are based on an applied research work supported by surveys and case studies. I look forward to translating these recommendations into concrete actions; both in terms of building the capacity of Jordanian civil society, and at promoting the conducive political and legal environment to allow the society to become an active partner, along with the principal social partners, and here I mean the government and the private sector alike. The intention is to enable Jordan to take full advantage of the capacities of its civil society and to recruit more members and volunteers, so that all of these will become true, synonymous peers to achieve the real goals of sustainable development, effective
democratic participation, the establishment of social justice and equal opportunities and the promotion of the values of tolerance, dialogue and acceptance of others.

Mrs. Nabila Hamza
President of the Foundation for the Future (FFF)
March 2011
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The national analytical report on civil society in Jordan was prepared by a team of researchers affiliated to Urdun Jadid Research Center, in cooperation and coordination with the Civil Society Index project’s consulting committee. The team of researchers was comprised of the following:

- Project Coordinator and senior researcher: Hani Hourani
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- Research assistants: Omar Abu Rassa, Dr Bajes Ilwan, Salah Al Din Taher and Hassan Basyouni
- The consulting committee comprised of: Dr Mohammad Al Sqour, Dr Anas Mashaqbeh, Dr Mohyi Al Deen Touq, Randa Qsous, Samer Khreino, Dr Yusuf Mansur, Dr Akef Ma'ayyah, Sawsan Al Tawil, Nayfah Al Lowzi, Ahmad Awad, Fat-hallah Al Omran, Mohammad Al Raqqad, Khadijah Habashneh, Nuha Ma'ayatha, Iman Nimry, Wahid Qarmash, Salwa Al Khairy, Ibrahim Al Tamimi, Engineer Mohammad Al Rahahleh, Engineer Ahmad Aaber Al natour, Mohammad Al Hasanat
- Project coordinator/ representative of the Foundation for the Future: Aya Maraqa
- Project coordinator / representative of the United Nations Development Programme UNDP/ Jordan: Nour Maria
- Representatives of CIVICUS: Tracy Anderson, Yosi Echevery Burckhard, Andrew Firmin, Olga Kononykhina, Megan MacGarry, Jacob Mati and Mark Nowottny
- The following organisations supported the implementation of CSI in Jordan: Foundation for The Future, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP/Jordan) and CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

We would like to express our deep gratitude and appreciation for all of the people with whom Urdun Jadid Research Center has cooperated throughout the phases of this project. The Center has worked with a large group of individuals representing civil society organisations, governmental commissions, international entities and municipalities as well as experts, academicians, media workers and leaders of business organisations.

These individuals have had invaluable and diversified contributions that have led to the emergence of the final outputs of the project. They have contributed in numerous and diverse ways. These participants total more than 350 individuals.

We would like to express our gratitude to everyone who has contributed to this report for their sincere efforts which have helped us reach this final form. Without those efforts, the project would not have seen completion. We regret our inability to name every person who participated and offered precious efforts, however, we sincerely hope that while reading this report, these people can remember that they are our partners in a project to which they have contributed.

We would also like to thank the national team and the research assistants who have shouldered the greatest responsibility of conducting this report, the field surveys and
the case studies. They are Hussein Abu Rumman, Dr Basem Tuweis, Dr Nabilah Syouf, Lamis Nasser, Amro Abu Rassa’a, Dr Bajes al-IIwan, Salah al Deen Taher and Hassan al-Basyouni.

Throughout the different phases of the project, we were pleased to cooperate with: Aya Maraqa from the Foundation for the Future, Noor Mariah from the United Nations Development Programme and the coordinator from CIVICUS Yosi Echeverry Burckhdart, as they have all provided invaluable assistance to complete this project.

The Center would also like to express deep gratitude for CIVICUS’ team of researchers who have provided scientific and technical assistance. They have also accompanied us throughout the project answering our inquiries, giving advice and helping us fill any gaps in regard to the information. They have truly embodied the genuine partnership in which CIVICUS believes.

As we have previously noted in different stages of the project, this would not have seen completion without the assistance and support provided by the Foundation for the Future and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). We would like to thank these two entities for their remarkable contributions, and particularly the president of Foundation for The Future Dr Nabilah Hamzah, who is also a renowned sociologist, and the resident representative of the UNDP in Jordan, Mr Luc Stevens and Jacinta Barrins, the UNDP- country director.

Lastly, I would also like to thank the former Minister of Social Development HE Hala Lattouf Bseiso, who attended the National Workshop. In addition, we thank the president of Greater Ma’an Municipality Engineer Khaled Shammar, President of Irbid’s Chamber of Commerce Mr Mohammad Shouha and former General Manger of the Social Security Corporation Dr Omar Razzaz for hosting the regional focus groups and some of the consulting committee meetings in their institutions, and for their remarkable hospitality.

Hani Hourani
General Director
Urdun Jadid Research Center
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Civil Society Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UJRC</td>
<td>Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Organisational Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPS</td>
<td>External Perceptions Survey</td>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>WRS</td>
<td>World Values Survey</td>
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</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is a participatory research project that seeks to assess the status of civil society organisations (CSOs). It is applied by practitioners in civil society and is dedicated to serving their interests globally. The CSI is based on a comprehensive methodology which was developed by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and aims at assessing the status of the civil society, as well as creating a database of knowledge that strengthens civil society and bolsters its role.

The Civil Society Index in Jordan was conducted by Urdun Jadid Research Center and supported by the Foundation for the Future and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), while the CIVICUS research team provided technical and logistical assistance. The activities of the project were carried out by five senior researchers and numerous research assistants, while approximately 200 people representing a wide variety of CSOs, experts, academicians, media workers as well as representatives of governmental and international entities, contributed in the deliberations of the project.

In order to assess the status of civil society, the study abided by the methodology which was designed by CIVICUS and focuses on five main dimensions to measure different levels of civil society's status. This project is highly comprehensive, as the five dimensions rely on 27 main dimensions and 65 independent sub-dimensions. In addition, several methodologies, methods and research tools have been utilised to reach this evaluation, including field surveys, case studies, focus groups and other forms of consultations with experts, leaders, activists from civil society and outside it, along with references to secondary sources.

Seeking to analyse Jordanian civil society, this national report focuses on what is known as the CSI Diamond. The Diamond visually depicts the five core dimensions of CSI: Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, Perception of Impact and External Environment.
CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Report for Jordan

FIGURE 1 Jordan Civil Society Diamond

Civic Engagement: This expresses the extent to which individuals engage in social and political initiatives. It scored the lowest of the five dimensions, 36.8%. The low score of the Civic Engagement may be explained by a lack of concrete information on some sub-indicators, such as social and political volunteering in Jordan.

Level of Organisation: This dimension expresses the degree of the institutionalisation of civil society. It ranked second of the five dimensions with a score of 55.3%. The level of organising is moderate, and could have been better but for the weakness of some sub-indices, such as peer-to-peer communications among the organisations (52.6), sustainability of human resources (9.1) and international links (8.3).

Practice of Values: This dimension expresses the extent to which civil society applies core values. It ranked first with a 57.2% score. The score for the exercise of values could have been higher if it were not for the relatively low performance of civil society organisations in indices such as equal opportunities (30.6), training on labour rights (29.9), environmental standards (36.4), and corruption perceptions (10.8).

Perception of Impact: This measures the extent of civil society's impact on social issues and policies and is based on both internal perceptions (civil society leaders) and external perceptions (interest groups in the state, private sector, media and academia). It ranked third at 46.9%. The most prominent point of weakness in this dimension is the internal perception of the political impact on the community (19.3), while the internal perception of the social impact goes up to 63.3 points. In addition, the decrease of the civil society impact on the trends (21.3 points), resulting from the slight difference in the level of tolerance among members and non-members of civil society, as well as the small variation in the general spirit among members and non-members of the civil society contributed to a lower score.

External Environment: As for the environment within which the civil society operates, it was determined to score 55.3%. The grade given to the external environment is
considered as acceptable, but it has been weakened particularly by a measured number of sub-indices, especially the index of political rights and freedoms (32.5), the confidence index (31.3), and the tolerance index (27.5).

The report finds that the political openness which Jordan has seen since 1989, despite fluctuations, has led to a better environment for the growth of CSOs in which they have been able to practice their activities more freely. Increased political openness also bolstered international attention in its civil society and granted it important sources of support.

The majority of civil society enjoys acceptable infrastructure and communication capacities, with the exception of organisations working in rural and remote areas. Civil society has a diverse structure and is mostly independent, both financially and administratively. In addition, CSOs tend to have capacity to work with the media.

As for weaknesses, the general environment CSOs operate in is believed to be politically conservative and biased in favour of the state's interventionist role in their affairs, which in turn weakens impact. The majority of CSOs have poor practices of leadership turnover and limited financial transparency. They still lack adequate financial resources, while negative perceptions of foreign funding affect public confidence in CSOs. Civil society's collective capability to launch a dialogue with the state, the private sector and the foreign donors is weakened in the absence of a holistic national action strategy, which allows too much leeway for foreign donor influence.

One of the report's recommendations is the establishment of a leadership and good governance institute that can exclusively focus on developing leadership and administration skills in civil society. Recommendations also urge activation of conventions on best practices regarding the good governance and transparency of CSOs, as well as the adoption of policies on environmental standards, paid work, and equal work for women.

The report underlines the importance of developing the capabilities of leaders and activists in civil society so that they can garner support for causes related to policy change, improving laws that govern political activity and developing appropriate plans which ensure a transition from theoretical knowledge into the gaining of support and into actual implementation.

This report also recommends taking a comprehensive approach to address the practice of a large number of organisations either to appoint their leaders or select them through a non-competitive process. The recommendations highlight the need to develop an independent commission for Jordanian civil society, as well as the importance of establishing a clear methodology to measure the impact of civil society's activities on Jordanian society and the decision-making process. This would include leaders and activists undergoing training on using measurable and tangible indicators to evaluate the impact of their organisations.

The report also notes the need to place additional importance on awareness programmes, training and capacity building with regard to building networks and alliances, as CSOs must gain the skills of coordination and the exchange of information and services. The report emphasises the importance of placing the values of tolerance,
dialogue, and acceptance of others and the culture of non-violence on the agenda of
civil society in Jordan, taking into consideration that the role of the civil society in the
promotion of non-violence and dialogue is still limited and poor.

Recommendations further include encouraging voluntary work in CSOs, and indeed
promoting a culture of voluntary work and expanding membership of organisations,
including through implementing additional training and qualifying programmes and
presenting a set of financial and in-kind incentives that can attract more young people
and women into volunteering. There is also a need to develop a local concept of
‘volunteerism for work’, which can be implemented in coordination with official entities
and the private sector to combat unemployment and the decline of job opportunities for
young people. This report also calls for a legal framework to be established to govern
voluntary work. The proposed legislation would safeguard volunteers' rights and offer
criteria for the efficiency and effectiveness of voluntary work on the individual,
institutional and societal level. Establishing an independent commission that is
entrusted to coordinate and organise voluntary efforts would be important to
complement the aforementioned steps.

The recommendations also underline the importance of engaging women’s
organisations in designing, executing and evaluating social policies. In addition, it is
also important for civil society to launch additional projects to empower women and
upgrade the quality of women's lives, with special emphasis on economic
empowerment.

The report further highlights the importance of gaining sustainable financial resources.
To this end, it suggests encouraging CSOs to establish sustainable profit-driven special
departments, in order to qualify for partnerships with the private sector and ensure that
the financial performance abides by the highest degrees of transparency. Recommendations also deal with issues of social partnership with and the corporate
social responsibility of the private sector and it encourages these to help civil society
develop the administrative, accountability and technical expertise the private sector
possesses. The recommendations envision civil society as a partner in private sector
social responsibility programmes.

The report calls also for encouraging the civil society to activate, revitalise and develop
its media and communication skills, to help familiarise the public with the activities and
programmes CSOs carry out. In addition, CSOs are encouraged to develop media
content that bolsters the status of voluntary work and highlights its role in development
and modernisation. The recommendations also urge the national registry of societies at
the Ministry of Social Development in Jordan to provide qualitative data on registered
societies, and for other relevant ministries to follow these steps. The report emphasises
the need to develop databases on CSOs, which are published annually, and the need
to make these accessible on websites or in annual reports.

This report calls for the conducting of studies on the contribution of civil society to the
gross domestic product (GDP), including the development of systems of national
accounting in this regard and periodical surveys on CSOs to calculate the contribution
of voluntary work to the GDP. The report also calls for donors and the media to
highlight and focus on issues and problems of the largest part of civil society, that is,
membership-based organisations. Lastly, the report recommends encouraging
universities and research centres to conduct research and case studies on Jordanian civil society and its organisations. The project's team and the partner organisations have called for implementing a national population survey in future, instead of relying on the international surveys used in this CSI project.

I. THE CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT

Civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance and development around the world. In most countries, however, knowledge about the state and shape of civil society is limited. Moreover, opportunities for civil society stakeholders to come together to collectively discuss, reflect and act on the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities also remain limited.

The Civil Society Index (CSI), a participatory action-research project assessing the state of civil society in countries around the world, contributes to redressing these limitations. It aims at creating a knowledge base and momentum for civil society strengthening. The CSI is initiated and implemented by, and for, civil society organisations at the country level, in partnership with CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The CSI implementation actively involves and disseminates its findings to a broad range of stakeholders including civil society, government, the media, donors, academics, and the public at large.

The following key steps in the CSI implementation take place at the country level:

- **Assessment**: CSI uses an innovative mix of participatory research methods, data sources, and case studies to comprehensively assess the state of civil society using five dimensions: Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, Perception of Impact and the Environmental Context.
- **Collective Reflection**: implementation involves structured dialogue among diverse civil society stakeholders that enables the identification of civil society’s specific strengths and weaknesses
- **Joint Action**: the actors involved use a participatory and consultative process to develop and implement a concrete action agenda to strengthen civil society in a country.

The following four sections provide a background of the CSI, its key principles and approaches, as well as a snapshot of the methodology used in the generation of this report for Jordan and the limitations of the study particular to Jordan.

1. **PROJECT BACKGROUND**

The CSI first emerged as a concept over a decade ago as a follow-up to the 1997 *New Civic Atlas* publication by CIVICUS, which contained profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (Heinrich and Naidoo (2001). The first version of the CSI methodology, developed by CIVICUS with the help of Helmut Anheier, was unveiled in 1999. An initial pilot of the tool was carried out in 2000 in 13 countries. The pilot implementation process and results were evaluated. This evaluation informed a revision of the methodology. Subsequently, CIVICUS successfully implemented the first

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1 The pilot countries were Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Wales.
complete phase of the CSI between 2003 and 2006 in 53 countries worldwide. This implementation directly involved more than 7,000 civil society stakeholders (Heinrich 2008).

Intent on continuing to improve the research-action orientation of the tool, CIVICUS worked with the Centre for Social Investment at the University of Heidelberg, as well as with partners and other stakeholders, to rigorously evaluate and revise the CSI methodology for a second time before the start of this current phase of CSI. With this new and streamlined methodology in place, CIVICUS launched its current phase of the CSI in 2008 and selected its country partners, including both previous and new implementers, from all over the globe to participate in the project. Table I.1.1 below includes a list of implementing countries in the current phase of the CSI.

**TABLE I.1.1 List of CSI implementing countries 2008-2010**

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<tr>
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2. **PROJECT APPROACH**

The current CSI project approach (2008-2010) continues to marry assessment and evidence with reflection and action. This approach provides an important reference point for all work carried out within the framework of the CSI. As such, CSI does not produce knowledge for its own sake but instead seeks to directly apply the knowledge generated to stimulate strategies that enhance the effectiveness and role of civil society. With this in mind, the CSI’s fundamental methodological bedrocks which have greatly influenced the implementation that this report is based upon include the following.³

**Inclusiveness:** The CSI framework strives to incorporate a variety of theoretical viewpoints, as well as being inclusive in terms of civil society indicators, actors and processes included in the project.

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² Note that this list was accurate as of the publication of this Analytical Country Report, but may have changed slightly since the publication, due to countries being added or dropped during the implementation cycle.

³ For in-depth explanations of these principles, please see Mati, Silva and Anderson (2010), Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide: An updated programme description of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Phase 2008-2010. CIVICUS, Johannesburg.
Universality: Since the CSI is a global project, its methodology seeks to accommodate national variations in context and concepts within its framework.

Comparability: The CSI aims not to rank, but instead to comparatively measure different aspects of civil society worldwide. The possibility for comparisons exists both between different countries or regions within one phase of CSI implementation and between phases.

Versatility: The CSI is specifically designed to achieve an appropriate balance between international comparability and national flexibility in the implementation of the project.

Dialogue: One of the key elements of the CSI is its participatory approach, involving a wide range of stakeholders who collectively own and run the project in their respective countries.

Capacity Development: Country partners are firstly trained on the CSI methodology during a three day regional workshop. After the training, partners are supported through the implementation cycle by the CSI team at CIVICUS. Partners participating in the project also gain substantial skills in research, training and facilitation in implementing the CSI in-country.

Networking: The participatory and inclusive nature of the different CSI tools (e.g. focus groups, the Advisory Committee, the National Workshops) should create new spaces where very diverse actors can discover synergies and forge new alliances, including at a cross-sectoral level. Some countries in the last phase (2003-2005) have also participated in regional conferences to discuss the CSI findings as well as cross-national civil society issues.

Change: The principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, the CSI framework seeks to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed and to generate information and knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

With the above-mentioned foundations, the CSI methodology uses a combination of participatory and scientific research methods to generate an assessment of the state of civil society at the national level. The CSI measures the following core dimensions:

1. Civic Engagement
2. Level of Organisation
3. Practice of Values
4. Perceived Impact
5. External Environment

These dimensions are illustrated visually through the Civil Society Diamond (see Figure I.2.1 below), which is one of the most essential and well-known components of the CSI project. To form the Civil Society Diamond, 67 quantitative indicators are aggregated into 28 sub-dimensions which are then assembled into the five final dimensions along a 0-100 percentage scale. The Diamond’s size seeks to portray an empirical picture of the state of civil society, the conditions that support or inhibit civil society’s
development, as well as the consequences of civil society's activities for society at large. The context or environment is represented visually by a circle around the axes of the Civil Society Diamond, and is not regarded as part of the state of civil society but rather as something external that still remains a crucial element for its wellbeing.

**FIGURE I.2.1 The Civil Society Index Diamond**

3. **CSI IMPLEMENTATION**

There are several key CSI programme implementation activities as well as several structures involved, as summarised by the figure below:\(^4\)

\(^4\)For a detailed discussion on each of these steps in the process, please see Mati et al (cited in footnote 3).
The major tools and elements of the CSI implementation at the national level include:

- Multiple surveys, including
  - a **Population Survey**, gathering the views of citizens on civil society and gauging their involvement in groups and associations;
  - an **Organisational Survey** measuring the meso-level of civil society and defining characteristics of CSOs; and
  - an **External Perceptions Survey** aiming at measuring the perception that stakeholders, experts and policy makers in key sectors have of civil society’s impact.
- Tailored **case studies** which focus on issues of importance to the specific civil society country context.
- **Advisory Committee** (AC) meetings made up of civil society experts to advise on the project and its implementation at the country level.
- Regional and thematic **focus groups** where civil society stakeholders reflect and share views on civil society’s role in society.

Following this in-depth research and the extensive collection of information, the findings are presented and debated at a National Workshop, which brings together a large group of civil society and non-civil society stakeholders and allows interested parties to discuss and develop strategies for addressing identified priority issues.

This Analytical Country Report is one of the major outputs of the CSI implementation process in Jordan, and presents highlights from the research conducted, including

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5 In countries where World Values Survey (WVS) were recently implemented, these can be used instead since they contain variables used in the Population Survey, and this was the case in Jordan.
summaries of civil society’s strengths and weaknesses as well as recommendations for strengthening civil society in the country.

4. LIMITATIONS OF CSI STUDY

Firstly, the project methodology and approach are of an international nature, and both are designed for the purposes of comparison between the civil societies, which in turn, work in variable political environments and legal systems, and are affiliated to national cultures with a high diversity. These matters do not always allow the introduction of substantive changes to the methodology of the study, nor to the questions of the surveys carried out.

Secondly, the limited financial resources available for the project prevented the implementation of the population survey, which was therefore replaced by the international indicators available, some of which did not yield the necessary information on Jordan all the time.

Nonetheless, the study made use of several sources of information and national surveys, in addition to carrying out five case studies which shed further light on the challenges facing civil society in Jordan, particularly those issues related to voluntary work, the regional and sectoral distribution of civil society, as well as the problems of financing, transparency and good governance within the civil society organisations themselves in Jordan.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN JORDAN

Jordanian civil society’s development has been largely influenced by the events and groundbreaking developments which the Arab world has witnessed since the First World War. More than any other country in the Middle East, Jordan still lives with the repercussions of the wars, political turmoil and social and economic unrest which affected the region in the past 90 years.

The Jordanian state was founded in April 1921, following the First World War and the division of the Arab Levant, which had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire, into British and French spheres of influence. Jordan was ruled by the British Mandate which allowed the state a high degree of autonomy and to eventually realise political independence in May 1946.

Two years after the establishment of the Jordanian state, the term ‘civil society’ was used for the first time in a rare article that was published in a Jordanian newspaper in 1923. The newspaper defined civil society and modern civic organisations in the West, concluding with a call for government to adopt a positive stance towards CSOs, as opposed to obsolete social associations (Mahaftha, 1990: 115-117). However, the concept of civil society was not widespread until discussion was brought about by popular protests that erupted in April 1989. The movement, which began in protest against the rising prices of basic commodities, developed into a wide democratic movement operating throughout the Kingdom. It was this that secured Jordan’s transition into political openness and paved the way for the parliamentary elections in 1989, the first since 1967. Steps following the elections in November 1989 included
those aimed at ending martial law, recognising political pluralism and broadening the margins of public and media freedoms.

Genuine discussion on the concept of civil society began in the 1990s, when a number of local and regional projects were conducted on the civil societies in the Middle East and the Arab world. In 1993, Urdun Jadid Center (UJC) started publishing a series of research publications that defined the concepts of civil society and the public sphere. In addition, they provided brief information on the different sectors of civil society. Beginning by familiarising the public with the political parties that gained legitimacy after 1992, UJC went on to introduce other components of civil society such as labour and professional associations, women’s organisations, environmental organisations and cultural associations. They issued two editions of a guidebook on CSOs in 2000 and 2006.

In 1996, the Center executed a research project entitled ‘Civil Society and the Public Sphere in the city of Amman’ as part of a regional project covering four cities in the Islamic world: Istanbul, Casablanca, Beirut and Amman. The Center executed another research project, ‘Civil Society and Governance in Jordan’ in 1998, as part of an international project supervised by the Institute of Development Studies at University of Sussex, UK. In the two projects, lengthy discussions took place in which researchers from Jordan and the Middle East tried to agree on an operational definition of civil society that could be consistent with the general context of Arab and Middle Eastern societies. The proposed definition also needed to take much into consideration, including cultural and historic contexts and authentic forms of organisations and contemporary civic practices. In 1995, Dr. Mustapha Hamarneh published the first book on Jordanian civil society as part of a series by Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies in Cairo, which included research on civil societies in various Arab countries.

During the last two decades, despite a number of books and other publications on civil society, researchers and activists have not yet agreed upon a satisfactory definition for civil society.

1. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN JORDAN

As in many other countries, civil society has become one of the most widely used terms in the last decades. In addition, the term has been incorporated in the political platforms of Jordanian government, political parties and columnists. However, it continues to be a term difficult to comprehend, as it has numerous definitions that vary according to the perspectives of different parties.

The definition of civil society proposed by Sa’ad al Deen Ibrahim, used in the introductions of a series of reports in the Arab world issued by Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies, is deemed the oldest and most widely used definition. It was widely accepted among researchers and social activists in Jordan during the last century. This definition suggests that civil society is "a group of voluntary free organisations which occupy the public sphere between the state and the family and in its pursuit of the members' interests, civil society abides by values and criteria of respect, reconciliation, tolerance, and peaceful management of diversity and differences" (Ibrahim, Sa’ad al Deen, 1995, P 5).
The definition has combined three integral components; the voluntary component or the free conscious act by individuals, the collective organisation and the moral and behavioural component of civil society that entails the mutual respect of opinions, the seeking of agreement or compromise to solve conflicts without using violence and the adoption of peaceful means to manage diversity and differences (Ibrahim, Sa’ad al Deen, 1995, P 5-6).

In this regard, the ‘Civil Society and the Public Sphere in the City of Amman’ project team made a valuable contribution in 1996 under the supervision of Urdun Jadid Center as they made a tremendous effort to define civil society. According to their definition, civil society is the "space or sphere where different movements and organisations such as local societies, women and religious groups, cultural organisations as well as civil organisations that represent different social segments such as professional and labour organisations try to form and express opinions and bolster leverage and influence" (Hourani and Shteiwi, 1996: 8-9). The team also described civil society as a "space or civil sphere that grants freedom to found self-organisation for an active multidisciplinary society." The definition is remarkable as it revolves around public life, rather than private life; it maintains distance from the state but is still governed by the law.

The concept of the public sphere is closely associated with civil society. The public sphere was defined as a "group of institutions working on forming public opinion, such as media outlets, academic and intellectual institutions, as these organisations often lead to the formation of public opinion that acts as a political power. If the public sphere is expected to support civil society, it should be an independent sphere where public opinion can form and prosper. In other words, the public sphere is independent from the state and constitutes an integral part of civil society, which requires a specific degree of audacity to grow and prosper" (Hourani and Shteiwi, 1996: 11).

There is concern about the local element related to the previous definitions, as they have tried to answer several questions that arise in the concept of civil society, such as:

- Should organisations based on family or tribal ties and kinship relations be included or excluded in civil society?
- Are the “Maddafa” or the “Diwan”, two traditional forms of assembly, consultations and forming consensus that are derived from the rural and Bedouin life considered among the practices and manifestations of civil society?
- Are those modern civic organisations that have obligatory membership regulations (such as professional associations) perceived as part of civil society or are they officially excluded because they have obligatory membership?
- Are political parties considered a part of civil society or components of the political community?
- Is the legitimacy of civic organisations, which entails government recognition or acquiring a license from the government in advance, an indispensable condition to qualify as part of civil society?
- Do institutions founded by members of the royal family to serve the community (Royal NGOs), such as the Jordan River Foundation and others fall under the category of CSOs?

According to CIVICUS, civil society is defined as "the arena which resides outside the family, state and the market, created by individual and collective actions, organisations..."
and institutions to advance shared interests." The definition was widely accepted by the consulting committee, the regional dialogue groups, participants in the National Workshop and researchers for this project, due to the reasons given below.

This is a wide and flexible definition that encompasses various forms of acts, initiatives, individual and collective movements. It does not limit the perspective of civil society or depict it as merely a number of organisations which are usually seen as an embodiment of civil society, regardless of the efficiency of these organisations or the role they play. According to the definition by CIVICUS, civil society is not perceived as a bloc of organisations with clear-cut descriptions; rather it is an arena, which means a place or a stage for acts, activities, individual and collective initiatives. This definition highly regards interactions between individuals and groups with various forms of dialogue and influence aiming to solve problems and achieving common interests.

The concept of the arena aims to empower civil society and enables it to play a role in public affairs through activating civic engagement, or political and social participation, to achieve development and good governance. It also aims to instil the role of civil society as a partner of the state and the private sector in decision-making processes and policy creation. This definition also recognises the role kinship and tribal relations can play. It therefore considers them part of civil society, given the fact that an arena is where the movement of individuals and groups can take place, membership is also a matter of choice and they abide by the criteria of good governance. Differentiations between civil society on one hand and the state, the family and the market on the other are flexible; they are not rigid and therefore allow movement of the institutions and the individuals and enable entrance into the civil society arena. Flexibility enables actors or active players, such as corporate social responsibility initiatives in the public interest to find a place in the civil society arena. In addition, joint institutions founded by the state, in cooperation with social partners, are also close to the civil society community, such as social-economic councils comprising associations, businesses and CSOs as well as governmental institutions.

This new definition also met with some reservations, primarily around a fear of losing the values-based civic dimension and independence, which should be among the distinctive characteristics of civil society. These fears arise due to the flexibility and the potential easy movement of institutions of the market and the state into civil society. The inclusion of kinship organisations can also threaten values which CSOs should embody.

2. History of Civil Society in Jordan

As previously noted, the concept of civil society in Jordan began in an early stage of the modern Jordanian state. It was first mentioned after the establishment of the first central government in Transjordan when a renowned journalist suggested in 1923, "having a special emphasis on the civic modern organisations and enabling them to supersede the obsolete social associations". However, the concept of civil society re-emerged in the late 1980s with the financial and economic crisis in Jordan during 1988/1989. This crisis led to social protests throughout the Kingdom in April 1989 and a new era of political openness. This entailed legitimising political plurality and revoking martial law and the restrictions imposed on the media and CSOs. The era following the events of 1989 is believed to be a time of prosperity for CSOs in Jordan.
The first stage of civil society development in Jordan was between 1921 and 1948, when the first group of CSOs emerged. These did not exceed 50 entities of social societies, athletic and cultural clubs, chambers of commerce and political parties. Much of the population lived between rural areas and small towns, while the rest lived Bedouin lifestyles based on grazing livestock. This first group of CSOs operated in inconvenient and complicated circumstances, where pre-capitalism production relations dominated and were accompanied by traditional social organisations based on kinship and tribalism.

Politically, Jordan remained under a British Mandate until 1946. Afterwards, Jordan still had restrictive commitments stipulated by the alliance agreement with Britain until March 1957. Although Jordanians enjoyed rights of organisation, their freedoms were declining as a result of several consecutive national legislations which restricted movements and activities of societies, parties and the press (Hourani and Abu Rumman, 2004, 30).

The years between 1948 and 1967 marked a new stage of Jordanian civil society development. Jordan gained independence from Britain in May 1946, while Central Palestine (the west bank of Jordan River) was Appendixed and incorporated into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Transjordan and the West Bank hosted an influx of Palestinian refugees, expelled from their homes in the 1948 war immediately after the declaration of the Israeli state on 80% of the total area of Palestine. Despite the Palestinian catastrophe, there was a new dynamic dimension in Jordan, as the population after 1948 increased dramatically. There were crucial changes in the social and political map which urged the Jordanian state to promulgate a new constitution in 1952, develop a parliamentary system and issue a series of laws that safeguarded the freedoms of societies, political parties, and labour and professional associations (Hourani and Abu Rumman, 2004, 30-37). The transformations allowed for the emergence of hundreds of groups, including labour associations and women’s organisations.

Jordanian civil society had a setback in 1957 when the coalition government, headed by Suleiman Al Nabulsi, was dissolved. As a result of this, political parties were banned, students and women’s unions were prohibited and leaders of labour associations were prosecuted. However, civil society gradually managed to overcome the blow by establishing new associations, despite political parties and unions remaining prohibited (Hourani and Abu Rumman, 2004, 37-42).

Jordan lost the West Bank during the 1967 war, and subsequently hosted a new flow of internally displaced Palestinians, encountering a critical period while adjusting to the war’s political, economic and social consequences (Hourani and Abu Rumman, 2004, 42-52). However, this stage also led to the emergence of new groups of CSOs, such as societies focused on relief work due to the war. Other organisations, which had not been allowed to operate in public, re-emerged. During this period, new labour associations, teachers’ and students’ unions and other organisations were established (Hourani and Abu Rumman, 2004, 43). In September 1970, the Jordanian state clashed with Palestinian resistance groups, and political parties and several civic organisations were dissolled by force.
During the 1970s and 1980s, new segments of civil society managed to emerge such as cultural, women’s and environmental associations. Social societies were increasingly specialised during this period and new organisations were established to advance human development. Charity societies also doubled between 1980 and 1989 (Hourani and Abu Rumman, 2004: 52-69). The political openness following the 1989 general elections marked a new chapter of growth and prosperity for CSOs in Jordan, as the elections represented a turning point with the return of parliamentary life, general elections and reclaiming legitimate political activism for the first time since 1957. The National Charter, issued in June 1991, laid the foundation for a peaceful political reconciliation between the opposition and the Jordanian state. The Charter called on political and legislative reforms of the ruling system, leading to a series of laws allowing a plurality of political parties, media freedoms, and the right of organisation and association for previously deprived groups, such as women and young people. This climate of political openness allowed for the institutionalisation of human rights and democratic development organisations, research centres, and intellectual and cultural forums.

During the last two decades, the number of CSOs has increased in size and diversity; organisations also enjoy a better status at a regional level. This increase and geographic expansion was coupled with a growth of the activities organisations perform. There is also an increased awareness of the role of organisations in strengthening participation and civic engagement. Partnerships with the state and the private sector also emerged through development projects and new laws.

3. MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN JORDAN

Contemporary Jordanian civil society, according to the latest accessible data for 2010, consists of approximately 5,703 organisations that have over 1.5 million members. (See Table II.3.1). The following description is the result of two rounds of discussion, in 2009 and 2010.
### TABLE II.3.1 Distribution of Jordanian CSOs by category and membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation’s segment</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Ratio to Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and charity societies</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other societies</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-opt societies</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic and youth clubs</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural commissions</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women organisations</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour associations</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers’ union</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owner organisations</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship associations</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalist organisations</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit companies</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ clubs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societies of friendship</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societies of Alumni</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign societies</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5718</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Composite table, the preparation of UJRC, 2010, Amman, Jordan.

A number of CSO representatives participated in these discussions, along with social experts, officials in governmental institutions and researchers. The second round of brainstorming was carried out by the project’s consulting committee and comprised CSO leaders, experts and government officials among many others. The consulting committee was informed about the findings of the first round, which then laid the groundwork for the map of Jordanian civil society.

The conclusions of the two rounds are summarised as follows:
The map of the forces in Jordanian society was designed by dividing these into three main categories: those that are most influential; those having a medium influence; and the least influential. Each group was organised in descending order according to their influence.

**Group one**
The first group consists of those with most influential power. The **monarch** is the head of the executive branch, and enjoys other prerogatives shared with parliament in the process of the ratification of laws. In addition, he is general commander of the armed forces and is granted other authorities according to the Jordanian constitution (Chambers and Hourani, 17: 2007).

The **security forces** preserve internal security of the state, but are also one of the most important arms of the executive, taking strategic and tactical decisions. This
includes decisions ensuring internal political stability and pre-emptive measures against external threats.

The **government** controls an immense quantity of financial resources and is the entity seen as the largest employer; it controls planning, implementing and proposing laws before parliament, and promulgating legislations.

The **army** is important due to several factors. Firstly, it was the first institution founded before the rest of the state's institutions in the early 1920s. Several Arab-Israeli wars have increased the dependency on the army and have led to an increase of the military. The army is the largest employer of Bedouin and rural populations since the 1920s. Until recently, it has had a historic role in the promotion of literacy and in providing training in rural areas and the Jordanian Badia. Despite a peace treaty with Israel and the stability of Jordan's foreign relations with neighbouring countries, the army still enjoys important status in the ordering of the social forces, as it still constitutes a primary social pillar, the backbone of the political regime, and an active factor to preserve internal political stability.

The **financial sector** includes chairpersons and members of the boards of banks and insurance companies, who own immense amounts of money. They are the primary source of loans for the state and the private sector. The majority of banks and insurance companies are still based on kinship ties, as a small number of families control the boards and have great privileges. This has not changed, although the central bank and the Jordan Securities Commission have imposed additional conditions and concepts of governance on these institutions, as well as their being subject to direct monitoring.

**Religious leaders** include leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front who enjoy influence over an important segment of the citizenry through social networks and political and religious platforms.

**Leading tribes** have a high importance which stems from the fact that they constitute the social backbone of the political regime. More importantly, tribes are not only a materialistic embodiment of a production pattern or a primary social grouping; they are a part of Jordan’s social and political culture, as well as its value system.

Other influential segments are a diversified variety of senior businessmen, tribal leaders, religious minority leaders and former high ranking civil servants.

**Group two**
This group has medium influence and comprises the following segments in descending order:

Despite the decline of its status and role as a monitory legislative authority, **parliament** still has power as it has the right to vote on confidence for the cabinet, approve the governmental budget and monitor its financial performance.

**The media** has become a large industry that includes numerous sources. It is also embodied in the Jordan Press Association (JPA) and other NGOs which play a growing role.
role in influencing public opinion, especially in light of improvements of freedom of speech in recent years.

**Minority groups** including religious minorities and other social groups were granted numerous opportunities to build up power at an early stage, such as ownership of lands, better education, social organisation, acquiring privileges as agents of foreign companies and proximity to decision-making centres. These minorities enjoy political representation exceeding their numbers and play a vital role in the private sector.

**Professionals** of different specialisations constitute the backbone of the middle class, which has encountered a decline in living conditions but continues to preserve social stability and secure a necessary platform for advancement, innovation and creativity. Professional associations are the primary organisational format for workers; membership is obligatory and these groups continue to perform in arenas that are normally reserved for political parties, such as political expression, recruitment and the mobilisation of the middle class.

**Civil courts** have power from their status as a third estate according to the constitution. They enjoy considerable independence and integrity that cannot be underestimated. These courts have gained a reputable position, due to rules that have countered unconstitutional and arbitrary decisions and annulled corrupt legislation.

Workers in the **education sector** constitute a large social group, although they are not united and are distant from public affairs as they do not interact with other popular and professional segments. Although this segment lacks an organisational form, they remain powerful and are regarded with due consideration, as is evident in the recent campaign by teachers of public schools who are calling for their rights to establish an association.

**Religious interlocutors** include large segments of workers who issue the Islamic rules or "Fatwa", interpret religious regulations and lead prayers in mosques. Their power arises from their direct interaction with citizens and the fact that people resort to them on a daily basis to ask for advice and religious guidance.

**Group three**
This comprises the least influential groups:

The **Chambers of Commerce and Industry** and other business organisations, which primarily seek to defend the interests of the private sector, actually have a lower status than their resources might indicate. These organisations are still dominated by a mindset that depends on the government and they abstain from playing a leading role for the private sector.

Organisations established as initiatives by Royal Family members and **advocacy groups**, including a new generation of Jordanian CSOs that are involved in supporting vulnerable groups, such as women and young people, and eliminating discrimination against them, have come to prominence. This group includes human rights workers. These activities bring together a group of independent CSOs, institutions and initiatives spearheaded by members of the Royal family.
Ever since the beginning of the political openness era in 1989, the status of political parties has been declining. They do, however, continue to embody political plurality in Jordan and provide channels for communication between governmental authorities and the citizenry. The power of political parties is partially derived from the special importance of the Islamic Movement in the society.

Labour movements are considered the weakest groups, even among the group with the least influential powers. This is because actual numbers of members of associations is meagre, with poor internal democracy.

In the light of the previous map illustrating social forces, the status of civil society becomes clearer. Sectors of civil society have been categorised according to the same three levels:

High
NGOs and institutions launched by members of the royal family have several sources of influence. Firstly, they were established according to administrative arrangements that were exclusively designated for them and were granted exceptional sources of power that distinguish them from other CSOs. Secondly, they have better access to beneficiaries throughout the kingdom without facing the restrictions of other CSOs. Undoubtedly, these sources of power have translated into better capacities to achieve proposed objectives. They have also shown professional efficiency in solving problems, but a primary weakness is the lack of accountability and participation in decision-making processes. These organisations act as representatives of the society's organisations rather than another counterpart.

International and foreign organisations such as the UN agencies and international development agencies play important roles in Jordanian civil society. Due to increased economic interactions globally, Jordan has seen an increase of foreign organisations present in the country. These increasingly have influence over the agenda of local organisations, as these are forced to pursue the agendas of the donor rather than a local agenda based on the needs of society.

Business societies form a group that covers a wide range of organisations such as associations of business owners and the joint Chambers of Commerce with major countries. The primary weak point in this group is that it does not act as part of civil society and avoids engaging in political activity or public affairs to avoid clashing with the government. However, it has recently started developing partnership with the public sector and has shown openness towards some segments of the civil society, especially the royal NGOs as well as major CSOs.

Professional associations were among the first generation of Jordanian civil society, and are still governed by obsolete political mindsets, despite the fact that they are closely associated with contemporary life and scientific and technological advancements. The professional associations have an important role as one of the largest sectors of civil society; the important status they enjoy comes from their large membership base and substantial financial resources, which not only grant them independence but also enable them to oppose governmental policies. Although professional associations could have deployed these resources to help civil society
powers grow, they have apparently preferred to invest in these resources rather than interact openly with other civil society actors.

Medium
Women’s organisations include three national umbrella groups: The Jordanian National Assembly of Women Commissions, present in different regions and with the capacity to reach out to women in local communities; the General Federation of Jordanian women which gathers around 150 women societies operating in different regions; and the Jordanian Women Union, considered the most independent from government and the most representative of the historic experience of the women’s movement. These organisations have an important status in society due to the importance of women’s empowerment, combating discrimination and gender justice in the international agenda. They have achieved remarkable successes in the last two decades such as allocating a quota for women in parliament and municipal councils, and enhancing women’s representation in government among other prominent organisations.

Numerous organisations of protection and advocacy work in the areas of human rights, political development, women and youth empowerment, environment and education. This group has achieved important successes through establishing a specialised network, as well as developing forms of partnership with government and the private sector while playing a monitoring role over these two entities. Advocacy organisations, independent membership or non-profit based, also include official independent entities such as the National Centre for Human Rights.

Although athletic clubs constitute a relatively old form of civic organisation, they still succeed in attracting large segments of society, as people perceive sports to be a personal way of expressing identity, and which promote interaction, competition and solidarity. These reflect the diversity that lies at the core of Jordanian civil society.

Privately-owned independent media emerged following the Press and Publications Law in 1993, which allowed increased flexibility for the press and freedom of speech. The media play an important role in the expansion of the public sphere, facilitating national dialogues and influencing the formation of public opinion. Despite this, the government still maintains a tight control over major media outlets. In recent years, new forms of independent media have emerged including websites dedicated to hosting discussions and dialogues.

Kinship and tribal associations constitute a large network providing protection and solidarity among members of traditional social groupings such as families, or people from the same hometown. These networks are important at times of economic crisis or unemployment, as they act as unofficial social safety nets, complementing governmental efforts. Often organisations in this category can be politically recruited to mobilise people to support governmental actions.

Low
Labour associations have lost their traditional influence and leverage among their social bases. The General Union for Labour Associations, representing the main organised labour movement, has not been closely involved with other CSOs. It is
perceived as devoid of democratic values and non-viable; the leaders corrupt and exploitative.

Despite their large number and the fact that they are located in various regions, **cooperative societies** have never been an active component of Jordanian civil society. This is due to their being largely dominated by governmental bureaucracy.

**Charitable societies**, largely, are too focused on their local constituencies to be influential at a national level.

With the exception of the politicised student movement Thabahtouna, operating on campuses at a national level, advocating for students’ issues, the remaining **students’ movements** play limited roles. These movements are incapable of being more influential, given that political activism is prohibited in Jordanian universities and the security apparatus continues to persecute students’ movements that have affiliations to political opposition parties.

### III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN JORDAN

This chapter offers a summary of the five dimensions of civil society, namely: Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, Perception of Impact and the External Environment. It draws on the CSI quantitative and qualitative research, previous research works and the discussions that took place at different stages of the project (Advisory Committee meetings, regional focus groups, and the National Workshop held at the project conclusion).

#### 1. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

The Civil Engagement dimension describes the formal and informal participation and activism of citizens. This dimension ranked fourth among the five dimensions, at a level of 36.8%.

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6 Two surveys were carried out for the purposes of this analysis: 1) the Organisational Survey, which had a sample of 121 organisations from various civil society groups from the 12 provinces of Jordan; 2) the External Perceptions Survey, which had a sample of 50 experts and stakeholders, encompassing both regional and gender dimensions. (See Appendix 3.) The Population Survey was replaced with the World Values Survey (WVS). Several international sources were also used for CSI indicators, notably the Freedom House Survey, Transparency International, and World Bank. (See Appendix 2.)
1.1 Extent of socially-based engagement

The extent of engagement on social grounds is measured on the basis of three sub-indices, namely: community membership; community volunteerism; community engagement.

No data on social volunteerism in Jordan is available in the World Values Survey used in this study. Therefore the low score, calculated at 9.3%, represents the arithmetic average of two indicators comprising social membership (6.6%), which tells us that only 6.6% of people are members of a socially-based CSO, and community engagement (11.9%), which records the percentage of the population who regularly take part in community and social activities.

The weakness of this type of engagement is confirmed by a number of recent polls. For example, in a poll conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan, October 2009, the rate of respondents who reported that they had engaged in membership of voluntary civilian networks ranged from 1.5% to 4%. The highest percentage of respondents who joined in civic activities, 8.7%, had a family association.  

The CSI case study on the status of volunteerism in Jordanian CSOs revealed interesting findings. The base of voluntary work in CSOs is primarily composed of members of the governing bodies of these organisations. Ninety-four percent of this group work entirely voluntarily, without reward, while 6% receive some token reward such as allowances for transportation. Forty-eight percent of heads of CSOs spend

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7 See full results of the poll mentioned on the website of Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, the link: http://www.css-jordan.org
about three hours per day on a voluntary basis for those organisations, while 16% of them work one hour daily, and 12% spend an hour or less per week. At the level of elected administrative bodies, about 38% work about three hours per week, while 20% provide two hours or less per month on a voluntary basis to their organisations. This study also showed that leaders and managers of youth clubs and teachers are the individuals who volunteer the most time, where 33% of them work an hour or more per day. Following these organisations come women's organisations, charities, cultural and cooperative societies, while the least voluntary were the heads and managements of family ties and ethnic-based organisations. Eighty-four percent of surveyed organisations had received volunteers in the last year. But the study revealed that the average number of volunteers in each organisation was up to about seven volunteers only. This suggests that the total volunteer base may reach up to 35,000, which is only 1% of the total population of working and volunteering age (Al Tweisi, 2010).

### Trends of public opinion leaders, and social forces affecting the status of voluntary work in CSOs (case study)

The study on "the status of volunteerism in Jordanian CSOs" (2010) shows that the motivation for volunteer work, as perceived by opinion leaders, stems from a range of self and social interests. The highest three motivations are "Volunteering is a national duty," "Volunteering is a religious duty," and "Volunteering is a way to get a job".

With regard to readiness to volunteer in Jordanian society, they reported that 29.7% of respondents believe that Jordanian society is a society of "individual volunteerism" rather than "institutional volunteerism". Further, 48.5% of opinion leaders view the practice of voluntary work as having declined and 25.9% as institutionally weak.

Source: Dr Basem Al-Tweisi, Status of Volunteerism in Jordanian CSOS, a case study (2010) prepared for CSI Jordan.

### 1.2 Depth of socially-based engagement

To determine the depth of social involvement, it is required to take three indicators into account: depth of social membership, social volunteering and community engagement. In the absence of data on volunteering, the depth of socially based engagement scored 32.6%, comprising 11.4% for people who are members of more than one social organisation, and 53.8% as the percentage of individuals involved at least once a month in social activities with other people in social organisations. (Appendix 2: CSI Indicator Matrix)

### 1.3 Diversity of socially-based engagement

The indicator for diversity of socially based engagement is high at 85.6%. This indicator examines whether membership in civil society is as diverse as the population and, in particular, whether traditionally marginalised groups including women, minorities, people with lower social-economic status, and members from rural and remote communities, are represented. However, it could be argued that the middle class represents the highest social group in socially based membership, as they belong to trade unions and professional societies according to their professions. Overall, the engagement rates of the middle-class members in socially-based works are higher than other social groups, and this can be said to include students, youth and some groups of women in the major urban areas.
The CSI case study on volunteering work noted that 30% of volunteers in CSOs have an educational standard lower than high school level, followed by high school graduates (26%), and people with degrees (5%). But when comparing these rates with the size of their representations of the population, this makes people with degrees the highest contributing group to voluntary work. People under 25 accounted for 51% of volunteers (51%), corresponding to their actual proportion of the population. Further, 66% of surveyed organisations had received male and female volunteers, 26% only men and 7% only women (Al Tweisi, 2010).

1.4 Extent of political engagement
As is the case with socially-based engagement, political engagement is studied in three dimensions: extent, depth and diversity of political engagement. The extent of political engagement shows a remarkable difference - variation at 6.5%. As compared with the extent of engagement on a social basis (see the indicator 1.1 above). This represents the average of political membership (5.3%) and individual activism (7.6%), as there is no information on political volunteering in WVS.

1.5 Depth of political engagement
The depth of political engagement is usually measured on the basis of three sub-indicators. One of these is the political membership, which depends on the proportion of active members of political organisations such as unions, political parties, environmental organisations, trade unions, charities and humanitarian bodies. This indicator has recorded a score of 15.6 points. Meanwhile, the second sub-index measures the political volunteerism, which is the ratio of the public or the members who work voluntarily (without pay) in more than one organisation, such as labour unions, political parties or human rights organisations and environmental, occupational or women movements, or those who are active in local political or demanding movements. In other words, it is the proportion of people who work without pay in more than one organisation. It is unfortunate that the World Values Survey does not contain useful data for this indicator about Jordan. Therefore, no score was given for this indicator. The third sub-indicator is the individual activism, which measures the proportion of people who are greatly involved in the movements of political orientation, and it has achieved 38.5 points.

At the level of political membership, which measures the percentage of active members in organisations concerned with politics, such as parties, trade unions, and lobbying organisations, data obtained from national polls show a low percentage of affiliation to political parties since the mid-nineties, with only 2.4% affiliating to a political party in 1995. This fell further to 1.4% in 2000 and to 0.4% in 2009 (the Democratic Poll, 2005/2009, www.css-jordan.org).

1.6 Diversity of political engagement
This measure gauges the percentage of social groups such as women, indigenous people, members of other races, older persons, or those from rural areas, in groups or social activities, and this indicator scored 59.8%.
Conclusion

Although there is common consensus on the weakness of civic engagement in Jordan, there are a variety of explanations. The AC and regional focus groups believe one of the reasons is what might be described as "community laziness", which is reflected in the verbal claim of rights without performing duties in practice. This may be attributed to poor legislation, which does nothing to challenge entrenched and exclusive positions in organisational leadership, for example, by specifying maximum terms. In the view of many activists, when leaders survive for a long time, citizens shun joining civic associations. Some also blame the low level of civic engagement on citizens’ preoccupation with earning a living.\(^8\)

Nevertheless, some believe that Jordanian society is a "voluntary community", but people prefer to involve themselves in socially based activities without being bound by an institutional framework. Engagement of Jordanian citizens is often spontaneous, such as forms of ‘aid’ in social events of family, the neighbourhood or the village. This raises the question of whether examining organised frameworks is the only means to gauge civic engagement, and points to the importance of developing approaches to measure spontaneous and informal involvement.

In general, there is agreement that the weakness of civic engagement of a political nature is due to fear about attitudes from government authorities towards political organisation or parties. This is in addition to the weakness of political parties and their failure to provide tangible programmes directed to various sectors of citizens, such as young people, women and other vulnerable groups, and the dominance of despotism and monopoly over the leadership of political parties.\(^9\)

2. **Level of Organisation**

This dimension scored the second highest outcome among the five dimensions at 55.3%. It includes six key indicators: internal governance, infrastructure, sectoral communication, human resources, financial and technical resources, and international linkages.

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\(^8\) These views were expressed in the regional focus groups in the North and South provinces.

\(^9\) These views were expressed in the regional focus groups in the North and South provinces.
2.1 Internal Governance

All CSOs have basic regulations on their governance and management. These regulations are usually derived from legislation or regulations for each type of organisation. Societies Act No. 51 of 2008, for example, provides controls for the work of administrative bodies of charities and social organisations, while each professional association has its own law. Meanwhile, trade unions are governed by a unified system of the General Federation of Trade Unions, although this is subject to criticism from labour groups, which complain that it undermines independence.

Most membership-based CSOs have a hierarchical structure, with the governing body at the top and the public base at the bottom of the pyramid. Some have a more balanced structure, and have the presence of intermediary bodies between the public base and the governors.

The CSI Organisational Survey (OS) conducted in mid-2010 and composed of 121 people from members of governing bodies of CSOs revealed that the vast majority (95.8%) had boards of management.

More than 85% of organisations chose their current management boards in the last three years, compared to 8.3% of organisations which had chosen their governing bodies in the two years before that. Only 3.3% had chosen their governing bodies before this. Fifty-nine percent of respondents said they had chosen governing bodies through elections, 30% by means of recommendation, and almost 11% by direct appointment.

During the last ten years, a growing tendency has been observed in the selection of governing bodies by recommendation instead of election. This is usually done when an

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10 There are 12 professional associations in Jordan, each with its own law which regulates workers in every profession, see [www.lob.gov.jo](http://www.lob.gov.jo).
existing management body re-nominates itself, without presenting a rival list, and are proclaimed winners by acclamation. This is sometimes done during a general assembly, which is interpreted as some sort of election, but this is often performed without holding the actual assembly. The spread of this practice indicates a failure of internal systems of organisations, and declining standards of good governance and democratic norms. The tendency could lead to stagnation and the undermining of participation. Trade unions mostly use this method, with 15 out of 17 selecting leadership by acclamation, as illustrated by the results of last session’s trade union elections for the years 2010 - 2012.\textsuperscript{11}

The OS shows that 36.4% of CSOs have chosen their current president in the last two or four years. With the addition of organisations whose presidents did not pass more than a year in their positions, which are 19% of the sample, it can be said that approximately 55.4% of organisations do not suffer from the problem of the dominance of heads or chairpersons for long terms in the leadership of such organisations. Nevertheless, 44.6% of respondents reported that current heads of their organisations had been holding their positions without interruption for periods of over five years, with 27% for more than eight years (OS, 2010: 25).

### 2.2 Infrastructure

Over 80% of the sample organisations belong to an umbrella organisation or support network. The key networks are listed in table 1.2.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III.2.1</th>
<th>Key national umbrellas for CSOs based on membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Categories</strong></td>
<td><strong>of umbrellas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Council of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>General Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>General Union of Charitable Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Cooperative Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Jordan Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>National Committee for Women's Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As for networks, alliances and coalitions, they are deemed as new forms of umbrellas. They came to prominence only recently, and there are now several permanent or semi-permanent networks in the areas of environment, human rights, democratic development and women.

\textsuperscript{11} See the results of trade union elections (2010/2012 - Observatory on the Labour Movement): [http://www.labour-watch.net](http://www.labour-watch.net). See also an article by Member of Parliament Bassam Haddadin in Al Ghad newspaper, 5 September 2010.
Of the sample organisations, 33.6% are affiliated to the General Union of the Charitable Societies, which comprises 1,210 organisations. This percentage is equal to the proportion of charities to the total sum of civil organisations, which is about 30%. This is followed by members of the Sports Federation, 16.4% of surveyed respondents, and thereafter come Chambers of Commerce, 5.9%, and the Federation of Jordanian Women, 3.9% and, finally, the General Federation of Trade Unions, and the Supreme Council for Youth, 3.3% each.

2.3 Sectoral communication

While the above section shows a high level of involvement in networks by CSOs, simultaneously it appears that the levels of mutual support among organisations are weak. When respondents who answered yes to the previous question (66% of the total respondents) were asked to determine the number of organisations with which they held coordination meetings, about 40% could not provide a definite answer, indicating poor levels of information about or lack of perceived benefit from networks. The majority (56.3%) said that coordination meetings have included less than five organisations, while 18.8% of them said their organisations had participated in the meetings of between six and 10 organisations, with 25% reporting meetings of more than 10 organisations.

Of the same respondents, 37.5% reported that they held between one and four network meetings in the previous year, 31.3% between five and nine and 31.3% more than 10, which means a clear majority, 62.6%, had held more than five meetings. But this represents only 41.3% of the total sample after accounting for non-responses.

Half of the sample (50.4%) responded positively to the existence of exchange of information with similar organisations; 18.2% reported that information was exchanged with from one to four organisations, 11% between five and nine, and about 16% for 10 organisations and more. Notably, more than 55% of the respondents did not answer the question.

Although there is a low level of sectoral communication, there are actually several examples of networks and alliances that have been built during the past years; most notably civil alliances formed to monitor the general elections of 2007 and 2010. In 2008, a new coalition was formed among organisations working in the field of media and human rights, along with parliamentarians and activists, to defend the right of access to information. This coalition prepared studies and policy papers, and held a series discussions and training courses. Perhaps the most successful experience was a coalition formed to discuss amendments to the Associations Law, which conducted a series of dialogues with the Ministry of Social Development until the introduction of major amendments to the Societies Act No. 51 of 2008, amounting to 22 amendments.

The general problem in these types of coordination lies in the fact that they start strong, but they do not last for long. They disappear or weaken after the completion of the task for which they were formed, although there are strong reasons to continue their work. There is a lack of resources available to sustain alliances, while another reason is the poor cooperation of government or other official parties. The more favourable the
response, the more likely it is that coalitions will continue, as participants will see value in their efforts.\textsuperscript{12}

There is also an essential role for donors in promoting cooperation and communication among CSOs. Donors should examine the strength and sustainability of alliances and partnerships as a part of the expected output of projects.

A frequently experienced problem is a lack of experience in taking on additional responsibilities by member CSOs. The question is how to create a spirit of partnerships by meeting members’ diverse interests and giving them joint ownership. The recent alliance to address the Associations Law is considered a model on this.

On the other hand, a little less than half of the leadership sample (46.3\%) reported that their organisations issue paper or electronic publications, whilst 52.1\% of the respondents said their organisations do not issue any hard or soft bulletins.

On the regularity of the publication of bulletins, less than half of the civil society organisations (56 organisations) have responded to the question, where the largest percentage of them (46.4\%) reported that they publish a paper bulletin regularly, while 32.1\% of them said they had issued paper bulletins on irregular basis. The rate of 17.9\% of the sample reported that they issued electronic bulletins regularly, while the rate of 3.6\% of the sample reported that they issued an electronic bulletins, but on non-regular basis.

About 48\% of the respondents reported that their organisations issued non-periodical publications, such as books and training manuals, while 42.1\% of the sample reported that they do not issue any non-periodical publications. About 10\% of the sample declined to provide a definitive answer.

\textbf{2.4 Human resources}

The human resources available to CSOs primarily consist of administrative bodies, salaried employees and volunteers. Only 9.1\% of CSO’s are judged to have a sustainable staff base, as measured by the CSI indicator, which calculates organisations with at least 75\% of their staff paid rather than unpaid as sustainable.

The economic viability of volunteerism is not of much significance, according to the organisations studied in the CSI, as only 18\% said that volunteering led to a significant increase in productivity. Forty-six percent of them described the return of volunteerism to be modest, and 20\% said there is no economic return from volunteering.

Concerning the level of wage-earning employees, the OS showed that 18.2\% of community organisations do not have any employees at all, 30\% have 1 to 2 employees, 25.6\% between 3 and 10, 18.2\% between 11 and 50 and 8.3\% over 50.

\textsuperscript{12} The work of the Alliance of civil society organisations which was formed to amend the Societies Act bore real fruits when the government became available for concrete cooperation with such organisations to modify this law, where 22 amendments were adopted for inclusion in its articles. The experience of the alliance is considered a model for the optimal practices on this level.
2.5 Financial and technical resources

The OS shows the largest share of CSO resources, 17.9%, comes from membership fees, followed by donations (16.6%), and other membership contributions (14.6%). External sources rank lower, with government support constituting 13.2%, foreign donors 11.7% and national companies 8.5%. All other sources total 17.6%, with the most prominent components of this thought to be the General Union of Charities' gratuities distributed to member associations, collected by the Union from the proceeds of the charity lottery sales, along with proceeds of rental property and in-kind donations.

Non-profit organisations – case study

These are a relatively new type of CSO, with the Companies Law No. 22 of 1997 allowing registration. A special register, the "register of companies that do not aim to make a profit", will be provided for them. When issued, the special regulation on non-profit corporations, Regulation No. 60 of 2007, stipulated that companies must provide social, humanitarian, environmental, health, educational, cultural or sports services or any other similar services that are not profit-making in nature.

The oldest non-profit companies were recorded in March 1998, and in October 2010 their total number reached 244, covering a wide range of areas, including the establishment of universities and hospitals.

When the new Law on Associations No. 51 of 2008 was promulgated, it extended its mandate to include non-profits. In the first amendment to the Societies Act only one year after its inception, it considered the non-profits registered under the provisions of the Companies Act before the effective date of the provisions of the Societies Act as a list of existing and registered private associations. However, a temporary law amending the Companies Act, the Temporary Law No. 35 of 2010, allowed registration of companies that do not aim at profit making within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry and Trade as was the case before, despite that being stipulated for in the law of association.

(Excerpt from a case study: "Financing of CSOs in Jordan", prepared by: Lamees Nasser and Hussein Abu Rumman, 2010, Amman, Jordan.)

The OS showed surprising results to some extent, in light of the economic and financial crisis faced by Jordan in recent years. The study confirmed that 60.3% of the sample increased their income as compared to the year before, while 23.1% had income remain the same and only 16.5% reporting a decline. However, when asked about the expenses of their organisations, 59.5% reported that expenses had increased from the previous year, 32.2% that they had stayed the same, and 8.2% said that they had declined. It is possible to conclude from this that CSOs are financially stable according to the CSI indicator, which reports that 79.3% of CSOs surveyed reported that revenues were greater that or the same as their expenditures in the year before the survey was conducted.

There is a scarcity of sources of funding for civil society organisations, and there is also scepticism in the community in about reliance on international funding sources, either for ideological or political reasons, or due to reasons related to sustainability and transparency. As a result, many voices both internal and external to civil society call for
the use of traditional means adopted in Islam, such as "Al Waqf endowment" and "Al Zakat Alms", but these ideas still need strenuous efforts to translate them into concrete and practical initiatives. (Al-Naeem, Abdullah Ahmed, Abdel Halim, Asma Mohamed: 2009, Gerhart Centre for Arab Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, AUC, Egypt)

The OS showed that 78.2% of respondents report good technological resources. Specifically 82% have a fixed telephone line, with only 16.5% having no phone at all, and 83.5% have permanent computer access, whilst 13.2% have no access. A near majority, 47.1% have constant Internet access and 7.4% have sporadic access, meaning that a large proportion of organisations, up to 44%, do not have any Internet access.

2.6 International linkages

This indicator analyses civil society's international linkages by using a ratio of the number of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in the country compared to the total number of INGOs worldwide. In Jordan\textsuperscript{13} this ratio is rather low at 8.3%.

The 1990s saw an increase in Jordan in the number of connections to INGOs, either through their establishment of offices in Jordan, or by domestic CSOs joining international coalitions and participating in international events. This increase was driven by several main factors: Jordan’s political and economic openness during that phase, Jordan’s accession to the Convention on the Euro-Mediterranean, and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America.\textsuperscript{14} As a result, the number of foreign CSOs registered with the Ministry of Social Development rose from 12 in 1989 to 49 in 2010. In addition, at least 35 foreign organisations have registered as NGOs in Jordan during the last decade. (Hourani and others, 2006, p. 547, and www.mosd.gov.jo).

Over the last two decades, local CSOs have increased involvement in regional and international dialogues, particularly CSOs covering human rights and environmental concerns among other issues. But the effectiveness of participation is limited, with their slight role in influencing regional and international policies of networks and organisations the subject of complaint by those involved.

Despite a recent decrease in international linkages of civil society in Jordan, the current decade has witnessed a remarkable growth of American CSOs in Jordan. Almost all the major American organisations working in the field of democracy and freedom, human rights and labour have representation in Jordan, followed by German CSOs. Furthermore, many UN bodies operating in Iraq use Amman as a base. This calls into question the low figure for this indicator.

\textsuperscript{13} Urdun Jadid Research Centre and CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation would like to thank the Union of International Associations for their collaboration with the CSI project in providing this data.

Conclusion
Civil society in Jordan enjoys a good regulatory level, where the overwhelming majority of organisations are privileged with elected governing bodies, with an acceptable level of rotation and devolution, but also with increasingly undemocratic selection. This requires intervention through legislation to set a maximum term of office.

Although the vast majority of Jordanian CSOs join networks, levels of coordination and cooperation are weak or limited. Lack of continuity of alliances is attributed to lack of responsiveness from government, which weakens incentive to continue.

CSOs have reasonable volunteer levels, but otherwise appear to have human resource bases that do not enable them to realise full potential. The decline of the index of sustainability of human resources in the civil society to the rate of 9.1 points reflects this issue. In terms of financial and technological resources, the existence of a critical balance between resources of organisations and expenditures is noticeable, with a deficit for the most part. Although the organisational survey has shown an increase in the resources of the majority of civil society organisations in 2010 compared to 2009, this fact does not reflect the sustainability or the abundance of resources available to these organisations. It is clear that the majority of organisations have the minimum resources to barely cover their expenses, which impedes the expansion of activities or the establishment of income generating projects. On the other hand, the majority of organisations have a reasonable degree of communication tools, but an absence of Internet access requires immediate action.

Jordan is a country open to foreign CSOs with international activity, allowing local CSOs opportunities to network and receive financial, technical and logistical support. On the other hand, the effective participation of local CSOs in international forums is extremely limited.

3. Practice of Values
This dimension recorded the highest result among the five dimensions with a score of 57.2%. It consists of five key indicators: democratic decision-making, labour regulations, code of conduct and transparency, environmental standards, and perception of values in civil society as a whole.
3.1 Democratic decision-making governance

The decision-making process is an important dimension in examining whether civil society practices its values. Returning to the OS, 53.7% of organisations responded that elected administrative bodies make decisions in their organisations, followed by 19.8% for working teams, 8.3% a particular council, 6.6% each for a particular leader and members, and 3.3% an elected leader.

Experience shows there is a tendency by administrative bodies to authorise the chairperson to assume the task of managing day-to-day CSO activities. Often this is the case when a chairperson has been long in office, or by virtue of the powers invested in the chairperson under the statute of an organisation.

3.2 Labour regulations

The OS showed that most Jordanian CSOs lack labour regulations or protection for the rights of women. Of the surveyed CSOs, 69.4% said there were no written policies and instructions regarding the work of women in their organisations.\(^\text{15}\)

The vast majority of organisations (95.1%) declined to answer the question as to whether staff members were members of unions, while of those that did answer, 8.3% reported the presence of five or more members of unions, and 6.6% reported having between one and four. The failure of a majority of organisations to answer this question highlights that trade unions are not prevalent among the workers in CSOs. This may be

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\(^{15}\) Jordan’s labour law requires private sector institutions to develop regulations governing labour relations between workers and management, but there is no such condition for CSOs, often due to the low number of wage earners. It is necessary that these associations embark upon some optional initiatives to develop such regulations or written standards (see the regulatory survey of the state of the Jordanian CSOs, 2010, Amman, Jordan, p. 45).
attributed to a lack of knowledge by the sampled individuals, with some of them facing this question for the first time. Furthermore, 67.8% of respondents indicated their organisations do not have training programmes for new workers. More positively, 52.9% reported having labour standards policies, while 53.6% of the remaining organisations that do not have such a policy expressed willingness to develop one.

3.3 Code of conduct and transparency

The Organisation of Jordanian CSOs shows that the code of conduct and transparency in Jordanian civil society scores 72.9.

In the CSI Organisational Survey, 48.3% of CSOs report that they have a publicly available code of conduct, while a high 97.5% state that they make their financial information publicly available.

CSOs have not made efforts to develop mechanisms of self-regulation. Limited attempts have been made to develop codes of conduct for best practice in the area of governance and transparency, but these initiatives did not become institutionalised, despite an urgent need for the promotion of trust among CSOs and between them and their social partners. Jordanian CSOs have experienced a number of challenges that necessitate efforts to strengthen confidence in their merits as social partners, especially in light of increasing opportunities to build partnerships with other sectors in the course of political and economic reforms. CSOs face repeated attacks in the press and among political and social classes because of their partial reliance on external financial support, requiring them to be able to prove the fairness and transparency of their financial dealings.

In this context, it may be noted that the first attempt to develop a collective code of conduct came in the context of the project of the ‘Study Days of the Leaders and Cadres of CSOs’ which was implemented in the years 2006-2008. More than 50 organisations embarked upon an attempt to adopt general rules of governance, transparency and accountability. A committee was formed to develop a draft charter, but even when this charter was reviewed in May 2009, no concrete steps were taken for its implementation. This was due to a lack of experience, but there remains a need to translate the charter into a timetable and implementation plan.

3.4 Environmental standards

The environmental standards indicator of 36.4% gauges the proportion of CSOs that have public policies on environmental standards. Of the organisations that do not have such a policy, 56% reported that they plan to initiate one.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{16}}\text{In the course of the project entitled “Study days for leaders and activists of Jordanian civil society” that was implemented from mid-2006 till mid-2008, six reports were issued including 18 subjects which were discussed during the said project. The code of ethics of good governance in civil society organisations had been discussed on the ninth study day (June 11, 2007). Discussion of the Charter of Ethics had been discussed again in another workshop held in May 2009.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{A timetable and an implementation plan for the charter of the best practices in the area of civil society governance will be included in the policy paper issued on this project.}\]
3.5 Perception of values in civil society as a whole

The Perception of Values in Jordanian civil society is rated at 51.2, which combines three sub-indicators: perceived non-violence (40.8), perceived internal democracy (58.1) and perceived levels of corruption (10.8). Jordanian CSOs showed moderate recognition of their role in the promotion of internal democracy. Only 58.1% reported that such a role was either medium or important.

On the question of whether there are violent elements in civil society, 61.2% of the sample reported that no parties in civil society used violence to express their interests, although 37.2% felt such violence was present.

OS respondents were also asked about their perceptions of the frequency of financial corruption within CSOs. Of these, 28.1% reported that such cases occur "sometimes", 25.6% that cases of corruption were "repetitive", and 21.5% that they were "quite frequent", which is cause for alarm, given that only 15.7% of respondents said that CSO corruption is very rare.

In order to test the stance of CSOs on manifestations of intolerance and discrimination within their ranks, the respondents were asked two questions. The first sought their view on the frequency of discrimination or intolerance within civil society, and 61% of the sample said that there were no such cases of discrimination or intolerance, or they were limited to just one or two examples. The second question asked those who reported more than one or two examples about the weight of the forces that practise discrimination and intolerance within civil society. In the response 69.6% described those forces as "marginal players", or "forces that are completely isolated and strongly condemned as a whole by civil society." In contrast, 16.5% of respondents stated that discriminatory groups are "an important player," while 6.6% said such forces had "the power to dominate civil society." These represent a strong warning about the growing phenomenon of discrimination and intolerance within civil society.

On the assessment of respondents’ views on the current role of civil society in promoting a culture of non-violence and peace, about 30% described this role as significant, while 32.2% said it was average, and 30.6% it was limited or insignificant.

Conclusion

The almost 60% of CSOs' important decisions that are made by elected councils or members is a healthy percentage, which signifies the presence of a largely democratic governance system. This does not excuse the significant share of organisations where decisions are made by other means, such as delegation of power to a taskforce or a unilateral leader. Deliberations on good governance consider that it does not mean only the presence of elected councils, but also reflects the rotation and devolution of leadership positions and the participation of members and intermediary bodies in the process of decision-making. It also demands the presence of open lines of communication with stakeholders. This raises the importance of developing domestic legislation to develop standards, especially on internal regulations for good governance.

The study also showed a dire shortage of internal regulations and conventions on the rights of working women and men, with about 70% of organisations surveyed reporting
no special policies regarding women in the workplace. In addition, about 48% of organisations have no policies on labour standards, nearly 60% have no code of conduct for employees, and 64.5% no environmental standards.

However, the study revealed potential for a relatively positive future as a large portion of organisations surveyed expressed willingness to develop such policies. This leaves no room for doubt that the mere raising of such questions to CSOs through the CSI has contributed to putting these issues on the agenda. The matter does require more, however, than a mere reminder of these issues, and there is now a need to instigate follow-up mechanisms for the development of commitments along these lines.

Thirdly, the research reveals a serious concern about corruption within the ranks of CSOs, since 47% of the sample described such phenomena as frequent or very frequent. Although there may be some exaggeration by the organisations, it is worth noting that this concern has yet to translate itself into greater financial transparency.

With regard to intolerance and discrimination within civil society, the study revealed that the majority of respondents do not report examples of repetition of intolerance. There is common recognition that forces practicing discrimination and intolerance are marginal or isolated. But the belief by one quarter of CSOs that such powers represent an important or dominant player in civil society offers a strong warning about intolerance, and indicates a need for education on this issue.

The same applies to the issue of violence. Violence in Jordanian society has strongly increased in recent years, with a notable rise in academic conferences and university studies on the topic. Although civil society is not isolated from general social violence, what is striking is that the self-assessed role of CSOs in this sphere is weak. It is suggested that civil society form a taskforce to develop its future role on this front.

4. **Perception of Impact**

This dimension ranked third among the five dimensions with a score of 46.9%. It consists of seven key indicators: responsiveness (internal and external perceptions), social impact (internal and external perceptions), policy impact (internal and external perceptions), and the impact of civil society on attitudes.
**FIGURE III.4.1 Perception of Impact indicators**

Indicators were generated by both the CSI Organisational Survey and the External Perception survey, which consulted experts from outside civil society about the sector.

**4.1 and 4.4 Responsiveness (internal and external perception)**

In order to measure the impact of civil society, the Advisory Committee selected two key issues for Jordan: ‘improving the quality of life’ and ‘democratising the political life legislations’. Respondents were asked their views on the impact of civil society on these issues.

The leadership sample of civil society organisations showed a response of 45.7 points, representing internal perceptions of both questions mentioned above. While 49.6% of the sample of leadership reported that the impact of civil society to "improve the quality of life" is of average or high effect, the rest said that it was of a limited effect.

As for the second issue of the "democratization of political life laws", a lower percentage of 41.7% of respondents reported that the impact of civil society in this area ranges between medium and high. The remaining percentage of respondents said that the impact was non-existent or very limited.

These same questions were addressed to a sample of stakeholders to identify the external perception of the impact of civil society on issues of paramount importance. The sample gave a response at the rate of 51.5%, 5.8% higher than the internal perceptions of civil society organisations themselves.

Fifty-four percent of the sample of stakeholders reported that the influence of civil society on the quality of life is of an average or high impact. Forty-nine percent of the sample reported that democratisation of political life legislation was positive, varying between medium and high.

**TABLE III.4.1 Impact of civil society on improving quality of life in Jordan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of civil society</th>
<th>OS Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>EPS Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Report for Jordan
Comparing results from the two samples, it appears that civil society’s perception of its impact on critical issues is modest, while external stakeholders appear to afford a more positive impact to civil society. With regards to the impact on improving the quality of life, stakeholders showed greater appreciation, believing impact to be medium or high at a rate of 54% compared to civil society’s own estimate of medium or high impact at 47.9%. As for the influence of civil society on democratising the laws of political life, external stakeholders gave a moderate or high estimate of impact of 48.0% compared with a rate of 39.6% from civil society.

4.2 Social impact: internal perception

CSO representatives were asked to identify two social issues on which CSOs concentrate their efforts. The two most frequently selected were support to poor and marginalised people (48%) and education (18.2%), with lower scores for social development (6.6%), health (3.3%), humanitarian relief (2.5%), and housing and employment (1.7% each). (OS, 2010, p. 49 – 51).

Organisations surveyed have shown that their social impact on the issues selected reaches up to 63.3 points, which represents their average awareness of the general social impact of the civil society (59.1 points) and the social impact of the respondent organisation itself (67.6 points).

4.3 Policy impact: internal perception

The effect of civil society on national policies was also examined, including an analysis of the role of CSOs in support of specific policies, as well as the outcome of CSO campaigns in advocacy of specific policies.

Unlike the relatively high internal perception of the social impact of the civil society organisations in Jordan, this sample of leaders gave low estimates of the impact of

### TABLE III.4.2 Impact of civil society on democratising the laws of political life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of civil society</th>
<th>OS Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>EPS Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has no effect</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited effect</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium influence</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High rate of influence</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

these organisations on the public policy, which did not exceed an average of 19.3 points.

The general political impact of the civil society reached 28.6 points, while the estimate of the surveyed organisations themselves for their impact on policies arrived at 10.7 points.

In terms of the nature of the policies supported, 27.8% reported that they had made efforts to advocate for social policies, 22.2% had focused on the laws of association, with 11.1% each focusing on policies in the areas of economics, education, associations and unions.

Twenty-two organisations (18.2% of the total sample) were asked to identify the results of their efforts in three selected domains, which are: Social Policies, Laws of Association and Economic Policies and Education. Of these 22, 45.5% reported policies supported by their organisations in the first area had been adopted. The same amount (45.5%) said that policies supported are still under debate, while 9.1% stated their organisations have not achieved any significant results. As for the second and third areas, a high percentage of respondents (50% in the second area, 63.3% in the third area) would not give answers. Apart from this, 31.8% reported that policies they supported in the second area were still under debate, while 18.2% stated that policies they had introduced had been adopted. For the third area, the small percentage (22.7%) said that the policies they supported were still under debate, while 13.6% of them reported that the policies had been adopted (OS, 2010: 53/54).

4.5 Social impact: external perception
When asked to assess the impact of civil society on social issues, a sample of stakeholders gave a high assessment that reached 75.6 points. This score represents an arithmetic average of the social impact of civil society in selected areas (79.1) and the overall impact on the social context (72). The estimate of stakeholders or experts for the social civil society influence exceeds the estimate made by the civil society leaders themselves, and by a rate of up to 12.3%.

A sample of stakeholders were also surveyed on the impact of civil society on social issues in general, and about 60% of the respondents said that impact was average, while 24% said it was limited, and 4% of the sample that it was negligible. Twelve percent scored impact as high.

4.6 Policy impact: external perception
External stakeholders were asked to assess in which policy areas civil society is most active. Fifty-two percent said that it was most active in social development policies, followed by policies in the political sphere (22%), policies on development in general (10%), human rights (4%) and health (2%).

With regard to the evaluation of the sample of the stakeholders of civil society’s political impact, these respondents have given an estimate of up to 52.6 points, which represents the arithmetic mean of the political impact of the civil society in specific areas (59.1 points), and the overall impact of civil society on policies (44.9 points). Such figures mean that stakeholders and civil society leaders together agree that the
impact of civil society organisations in Jordan on social issues is much greater than their impact on public policies, and with a difference of up to 23% in favour of the social impact of CSO's, from the stakeholders point of view.

In conclusion, 44% of external stakeholders reported that civil society’s influence on policy-making processes in general was limited, 36% of them said that the influence was average, and only 8% that it was high, while 10% said that the civil society had no influence at all.

4.7 Impact of civil society on attitudes
This section discusses the impact of civil society on trustworthiness and tolerance, and the level of trust evident in civil society. It draws from the World Values Survey 2005.

The issue of confidence in CSOs is associated with the concept of social capital, which means the strength of individual relationships among members of the community, and the extent of reliance of the individual on the mutual relations to improve the terms and conditions of his/her life. Mutual trust must be available to individuals in their daily dealings, but trust does not arise from a vacuum, being bound by associational frameworks such as family and personal friendships, and fellowships arising from the neighbourhood or workplace, amongst others. Similarly, the same rules apply to trustworthiness between groups, where each social group has its own network that provides services at the collective level. Therefore the view of social capital as a comprehensive concept means the existence of behavioural patterns and networks of social interests enabling people to have collective work, from sources where social capital forms the trustworthiness and mutual interests (Burayzat, 2008). The following sections examine the impact of civil society on the generation of social capital.

In answer to the question “In general, do you see that most people are trustworthy, or that most of them cannot be trusted?” data from WVS 2005 shows Jordanians to have a low confidence level in people. Only 31.1% feel people can be trusted. This finding is below the level of confidence expressed by respondents in other Arab and Islamic countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, while Muslim communities with levels of confidence lower than Jordan include Bangladesh, Morocco, Turkey and Algeria. (Burayzat, 2008),
4.7.1 Difference in trust between civil society members and non-members
The scores achieved at the level of the civil society impact on the trends do not exceed 21.3 points, being the arithmetic mean of four sub-indices. These sub-indices are the difference in the level of confidence among members of civil society and the non-member citizens (12.3 points), the difference between members’ and non-members’ level of tolerance (2.1 points), and the difference in the level of public spiritedness, which is also not more than 3 points, and the index of confidence in the civil society itself, which scored 67.8 points, a very high estimate.

4.7.2 Difference in tolerance between civil society members and non-members
Respondents in WVS 2005 were asked which groups they would not wish as neighbours: drug addicts, people of different race, people with HIV/AIDS, immigrants / foreign workers, homosexuals, people of different religion, alcoholics, unmarried persons living together, or people who speak a different language.

Respondents in Jordan indicated the following categories as undesirable neighbours:
- Drug addicts 97.8%.
- Homosexuals 96.7%.
- People with HIV/AIDS 96.3%.
- People who speak other languages 49.5%.
- People of non-Jordanian nationality 33.9%.

The difference between members of civil society and non-members in the level of tolerance is very small, not exceeding 2.1 points. This reinforces the belief that civil society organisations do not play an effective role in influencing the attitudes of their members towards promoting and enhancing the value of tolerance. This stresses the need to develop special programs to promote human values, especially the values of tolerance and acceptance of others, as well as the combating of discrimination.
4.7.3 Differences in public spiritedness between civil society members and non-members

Respondents were asked about justification for anti-social acts. The answers of Jordanian respondents were:

- 95.2% would not accept bribes while performing a job.
- 83.0% would not evade taxes.
- 82.6% would not evade payment for public transport.
- 70.6% would not claim benefits to which they are not entitled.

Generally speaking, the preceding figures show a high general spirit among the citizens, but they also show the existence of differences in attitudes towards corrupt practices, including nepotism, which is acceptable to about 30% of the respondents. On the other hand, the differences in the general spirit decreases between members and non-members of the civil society as it does not exceed 3 percentage points, which indicates the need to work on improving trends in members of civil society organisations with regard to the general spirit.

4.7.4 Trust in civil society

WVS 2005 shows the highest degree of trust is accorded to religious institutions associated with mosques (69.5%), followed by environmental organisations (28.3%), then charities and humanitarian activities (25.7%), women's movements (23.4%) and government institutions (12.4%) (WVS, 2005).

Conclusion

The study reveals that the perceptions of stakeholders on the impact of civil society on policies and social issues are higher than the self-assessment of impact by CSOs. The national team believe this reflects a degree of pessimism and frustration among CSOs on the reflection of their activities on society and public policies.

Generally, self perceptions of leaders of civil society regarding their impact on social issues revealed a better assessment than their impact on public policies, which is understandable, given the constraints and influences surrounding the political environment, which restrict areas of interaction of civil society in the realm of policies much more than its activities in the social and economic development domains.

It was observed that stakeholders were in agreement with leaders of CSOs regarding key areas of civil society activity, being work with the poor and marginalised people, social development, education and health. Both parties also agreed on the influence of civil society on these issues as ranging between middle and low. This raises the question of reducing the gap between the efforts and impact of civil society.

The study also revealed a high level of confidence in religious institutions and environmental organisations, and low levels of confidence in the rest of CSOs and government institutions.

This, in turn, raises the necessity for civil society to pay attention to the development of education and enlightenment about the work of civil society in terms of values, in
addition to upholding the values of tolerance and acceptance of others, and responsibility for citizenship and social action.

5. **EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT**

This dimension consists of three key sub-dimensions with 12 indicators: socio-economic context, socio-political context, and socio-cultural context. The dimension score is 55.3%.

**FIGURE III.5.1 External Environment indicators**

This section aims to answer the key question: “Does the general environment provide suitable conditions for the growth of civil society, or does it impede its development?” In order to answer we must consider the various components of the external environment, especially the social-economic, the social-political and the social-cultural contexts.

5.1 **The socio-economic context**

The Jordanian economy is often described as a limited natural resource economy as it is based on a tight local market, and situated in the centre of an unstable region. Out of Jordan’s area of 89,000 square kilometres, the desert and dry lands occupy 86% of the whole area, and Jordan suffers from scarcity of water sources, and is considered as one of the ten most water-impoverished countries in the world.

However, the economic and social context has recorded 64.8 points, which is the outcome of the four sub-indicators: The basic capacities, corruption, inequality and economic context, as discussed below.

5.1.1 **Guide to the basic capabilities**

The Social Watch Basic Capabilities Index represents the average of three criteria covering health and basic educational provision. Its values range from 0 to 100, with higher values reflecting higher capabilities. The Basic Capabilities Score for Jordan is 97.3. This means that there is a high level of core capabilities in Jordan, under the above-mentioned (index) directory. This may be true with respect to the proportion of spending on basic education and health, but it does not reflect the truth completely. Consider the quality of basic education and health, both inspiring worsening complaints about deteriorating services, since the learning outcomes are not commensurate with
the needs of the market, while 36% of the population lack adequate health insurance, and that health insurance provided by the Government for its employees does not include all expenses of treatment and medicines.

Jordan has a population of 5.85 million inhabitants (2008), with a population growth rate of 2.2% per year. This means that Jordan will double its population in 32 years (Public Statistics, 7: 2008). Jordan is a young society, with the proportion of people under the age of 15 standing at 37.3%, compared to only 3.3% over 65. This means that the economically active population is less than 60% of the total population (Public Statistics, 7: 2008).

Jordan’s population is divided between urban people, the majority at 82.6% of the total population, and rural residents, not exceeding 17.4% of the total population (Jordan Today, 1: 2009).

As a result of reduced mortality and improved health and medical services, life expectancy has risen to 73 years: 71.6 years for males, and 74.4 years for females (Jordan Today, 1:2009). The rate of infant mortality is up to 19 per thousand live births, mortality rates of children under five have risen slightly to 20 deaths per thousand live births (Jordan Today, 1:2009).

Jordan has suffered from relatively high unemployment since the end of the 1980s, estimated at a rate of 12.9% for 2008; while unemployment among females is double that of males, amounting to 24.1%, as shown by a study issued by the Economic and Social Council (Al Tabba’, 2009). The contribution of women in the labour force is low at 14.9%, compared with 43% participation of women in countries with low average income (Al Tabba’, 2009).

Infrastructure is generally good, with 97.7% of houses linked to the public water network, and nearly 100% of homes connected to electricity. The percentage of Jordanian families that have a telephone line is 33.4%, but the percentage of households that have a cell phone is up to 94%. Households with computers are rated at 36.3%, but the percentage of the families that have the ability to access the Internet is no more than 7.9%. Nearly all (98.7%) Jordanian families have televisions, and about 39% families depend on private cars for transport (Jordan in Figures, 32).

5.1.2 Corruption
Over time, Jordan has fluctuated significantly on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, while achieving little progress. The best Jordan achieved was 5.4 in 2006, on a scale of 1 to 10 with higher scores indicating lower levels of corruption, but it fell significantly the following year to 4.7. This brought a decline from the rank of 40 out of 163 countries to 53 out of 179 countries in 2007 (Transparency International, 2010). This was a shock for officials and the public alike.

During recent years a series of laws were developed aimed at improving government transparency and strengthening oversight controls and accountability in public and private sectors. In addition to the legislative structure, institutional structures to combat corruption were complemented through the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the establishment of the Board of Grievances, in addition to pre-existing institutions, particularly the Audit Bureau. It is clear that despite the presence of new
laws and institutions, Jordan was not fully fortified against the spread of corrupt practices, which broke out recently in a number of government institutions, and other projects in both the public and private sectors.\footnote{At the time of this report’s preparation the Anti-Corruption Commission is investigating a corruption case involving enterprises in both the public and private sectors, but it did not issue any resolutions condemning the government officials in various corruption cases previously seen by this commission.}

In late July 2009 the establishment of the Transparency Society was announced, comprised of 20 founders, including former ministers, MPs, media and civil society activists. But the Society has failed to produce any significant work to enhance the situation of accountability and integrity in Jordan. Public opinion polls since 2006 show that people believe corruption in public and private sectors to be constantly increasing, with a social acceptance for some types, such as nepotism, favouritism and abuse of office careers “which means that wide range of citizens accept access to services or benefits through preferential treatment to them, such as nepotism or cronyism”. About 64.7% of the polled national sample said there was corruption in the public sector, compared to 52.1% in the private sector. The estimate of public opinion leaders of corruption in both sectors was at a much higher rate, with 74.2% recorded for the corruption in the public sector, and 64.1% in the private sector (Strategic Studies, 2006).

For the types of corruption perceived as most prevalent in the public sector, cronyism and nepotism came to the forefront (73%), followed by: bribery (65.4%), abuse of office (63.4%), forgery (55%), and embezzlement (52.2%). As for the private sector, bribery came first (68%), then favouritism and nepotism (62.2%), fraud (59.3%), abuse of office (58.3%), and forgery (57%) (Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006).

There is a general feeling that those involved in acts of corruption do not receive the appropriate punishment. It is possible they are removed from their positions, but they are often not brought to court, and no recovery of public funds is attempted. The role of Parliament in this area is limited and formal, with parliamentary committees tending not to reach critical resolutions on corruption cases (The New Jordan and Al Urdun Al Jadeed Center, 2008).

**5.1.3 Inequality**

Despite several economic reforms, Jordan still suffers from high rates of unemployment and poverty. Unemployment, according to official sources, is at 14.8%, while the unemployment rate among young people aged between 20 and 24 years old is rising up to 28.7%. The poverty levels are still high as well, and range between 15% and 30% of the population living below the poverty line (Saif and Al Tabba’, 2006). Using the Gini Coefficient to measure inequality (where zero indicates perfect equality, and one equals complete inequality), the distribution of national income has improved only slightly: from .379 in 1997 to 0.355 in 2006. This is not commensurate with the economic growth rates achieved during these years (Saif and Al Tabba’, 2006). In order to fit the CSI scale of 0-100, the Gini coefficient score is reversed, by subtracting the score from 100. This creates a scale of 0-100, where 0 represents absolute inequality and 100 represents absolute equality. Therefore, Jordan’s score for this indicator is 61.2 (100-38.8).
A public survey conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies in 2008 shows that 54.7% of the sample hold the view that the financial situation of their families has worsened, compared to 13% from the same sample who reported that their family financial situation has improved (the Centre for Strategic Studies, 2008).

A study, conducted in 2008, showed that economic growth reached an average of 6%, and expenditures and per capita income had increased in various income categories. However this was not accompanied by improvements in equality, but rather increasing inequality, with most of the increased income concentrated at the higher income levels of the population. For example, 2% of the population increased their per capita consumption between the years 2004 and 2006 by an average of 2,800 US dollars; an amount equivalent to about four times the maximum per capita consumption of the poorest 10% of the population in 2006 (Saif and Al Tabba, 2008). Figure III.5.2 shows vast disparities in per capita income growth for income groups between 2002 and 2006.

**FIGURE III.5.2 Annual income per capita, 2002 and 2006**

![Graph showing income distribution](image)

*Source: Dr Ibrahim Saif and Dr Yasmin Al Tabba, A study of the Middle Class in Jordan, 2006, the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.*

The richest 30% of the population possessed 58.8% of the total national income in 2006. Simultaneously 40% of the population, representing the middle class, got a decreasing share of 29.9% (compared to 30.6% in 2002). The share of the poorest 30% of the population decreased to 11.4% of income in 2006. Generally, the richest 2% of the population got 12.8% of the total national income in 2006, representing an increase of about 2% share of national income in 2002 (Saif and Al Tabba, 2008).
Indicators of inequality also have a gendered dimension. The gender gap in levels of illiteracy is higher among women than men, amounting to 7.3%. The proportion of female to male enrolment in kindergarten is less by 4.8%, and basic education enrolment is less by 1.2%. However, the proportion of female teaching staff is more than twice the proportion of males in the basic education stage. Female school principals form three times the number of male principals at the basic education stage, while variations in secondary education stage become less, although generally it is in favour of the female principals (Al Tabba', 2009: 5 / 7).

Politically, the participation of women has improved in municipal councils, parliament and government departments, but is still below the expected levels for equality and gender justice. Women occupy 27.4% of municipal council seats, 6.4% of House of Representatives seats, 12.7% of the membership of the Senate, and 14.3% of the Council of Ministers. The representation of women in the diplomatic corps is 17.2%. As for civil society, trade unions are 21% female, but membership in the councils of trade unions does not exceed 4.8%. Political parties have 27.8% women membership, according to sources of the Jordanian General Statistics.  

A recent study about the status quo of gender mainstreaming in the public sector showed a decrease in the proportion of females as the career ladder goes up. The study estimates the proportion of females in leadership positions at 18%, and 46% in the executive administrative functions (Al Tabba', 2009).

5.1.4 The economic context
The CSI indicator score of 49.7% for the economic context measures the ratio of external debt to Gross National Income, the source being from the World Bank Development Indicators.

19 Under the new election law the quota reserved for women’s seats in the House of Representatives rose from six to 12. Overall, the number of women deputies (2010/2014) increased to 13 seats or 10.8% of the total number of 120 seats.
The estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of Jordan in 2009 was 17.8 billion dinars, or about US$25 billion. The average per capita of GDP is 2,979 dinars. There was a decline in annual growth rate of GDP at constant prices of 8.5% in 2007 to 7.6% in 2008 and then to 2.3% in 2009 (Bulletin of Finance, 2010: 10), under the impact of the economic crisis that hit Jordan between 2008 and 2010.

Net public debt amounted to 10.34 billion Jordanian dinars, equivalent to 53.3% of the GDP projected for 2010. It consists of public debt of 6.308 billion dinars, most of which comes from banking sources and 3.546 billion dinars of foreign debt, which comes from industrial nations, Arab states and international and regional institutions (Financial Newsletter, 2010: 8).

In addition to public debt, the Jordanian economy suffers from high public deficit in state budget, estimated in 2010 at 5.3% of GDP, and the other deficits in the trade balance and current account balance of payments. Part of the shortfall in the state budget is financed through grants and foreign aids. Meanwhile the deficit in the current balance of payments is covered in part from the remittances of Jordanian expatriates working abroad, particularly in the Gulf States (Bulletin of Finance, 2010: 9/10).

### 5.2 Socio-political context

The Civil Society Index the socio-political context is rated at 51.2 points, which is the outcome of the following sub-indicators: political rights and freedoms 32.5, the rule of law and individual freedoms 47.9, the rights of assembly and regulation 41.7, the expertise of the legal framework 78.4 and government effectiveness 55.4. Most of these indicators pertaining to rights and liberties are derived from reports of the Freedom House on Jordan. But the experience of the legal framework was based on the institutional survey which was designed by the national team for the project (Organisational Survey 2010).

The decline in most preceding indicators explains the increasing calls recently for immediate reforms to the laws of parliamentary and municipal elections, public meetings, associations, political parties, and the Labour Code. The Government has recently announced the formation of a "Committee for National Dialogue" about these laws, giving priority to reform the election and political parties' laws.

Governance in Jordan, by the provisions of the Constitution of 1952, is a representative government and a hereditary monarchy, where the King is the head of the state, and is also head of the executive branch, which is handled by the government on behalf of the King. There is also a legislative authority of a bilateral council, including the National Assembly (Parliament) which consists of the House of Representatives (with 120 elected members) and the Senate whose members are appointed by the King, and do not form more than half the number of members of the House of Representatives. There is also a judiciary authority, where the courts issue their decisions in the name of the king.

Under the Jordanian constitution, it can be seen that the King plays a central role in the political system, and dominates over various constitutional authorities, and there is no strict separation between the three authorities.
Since 1989, when Jordan conducted its first comprehensive parliamentary elections after a long absence (the last general election was in April 1967, and the Parliament was repeatedly dissolved during 1974 to 1983, and then in 1988/1989), Jordan entered into a new phase of political openness, which allowed citizens to expand the scope of their public freedoms. This phase was characterised by the adoption of multi-party elections, and political reforms were followed by moves to liberalise the economy and open up towards globalisation. Jordan was generally seen as a force of moderation and tolerance and an important factor in the stability of the region, which allowed it to receive political and economic support from the major industrial countries, particularly the United States, the European Union and Japan.

However, most political analysts and international observers agree that the reform policy, rather than becoming as a strategic propellant to progress, fell back in the second half of the nineties. When King Abdullah II was inaugurated in February 1999 he pledged to continue the reform and opening-up policy launched by late King Hussein Bin Talal. During the last decade, King Abdullah II launched a series of reform initiatives under banners such as "Jordan First", "National Agenda", and "We Are All Jordan", that revived hopes inside and outside Jordan of resuming political, economic and social reforms. But these various initiatives were soon to lose their momentum. Even more serious were proceedings to dissolve parliament and postpone elections for several years between 2001 and 2003, and 2009 to 2010, in addition to the adoption of hundreds of temporary laws under the pretext of confronting terrorism and Islamic extremism, which restrict public freedoms, especially freedom of assembly and expression. The security services resumed their old traditions which were based on restrictions of freedom for political activists and the prevention of public meetings, and even the carrying out of political arrests (Freedom House, 2010).

The Jordanian government has consistently avoided reform of the electoral system. Instead, in 1993 it approved an election law which strengthened its traditional and social base under the pretext of reducing the influence of the Islamic movement and other forces opposed to peace with Israel. The law strengthened the forces of tribalism and influential families and was not in favour of political parties, democratic forces or women. Despite frequent adjustments to the electoral law, in 2003, and more recently in 2010, the laws have failed to secure a just parliamentary representation for the population, and did not advance political development founded on political parties and civil society. Elections also remain under the supervision of the Interior Ministry, far away from the independent supervision and internal and external observations.²⁰

²⁰ The failure to reform the Jordanian election law is considered the most prominent manifestation of failure of the political reforms in Jordan, despite the amendments to election law since 1993. These amendments were known as "the Law of One Voice" and a new law for elections was introduced in 2001, then another law in 2010, on the basis of which the last parliament elections were conducted (November 2010). But these laws were the cause of the boycott of the opposition parties to the parliamentary elections twice (1997 and 2010), and undermined confidence in general elections. King Abdullah II decreed to the dissolution of the House of Representatives XV in 2007, and called for new elections, due to occurrence of violations of free and fair elections on a large scale in 2007. Even the current parliament, whose elections were boycotted by the Islamic opposition and other powers, the oversight bodies of domestic and external observers had registered the occurrence of many violations in it, and serious criticism was also recorded on each of the electoral law and electoral system. The king sacked the government, on the basis of the popular protests that erupted in January 2011, and the King asked the government to prepare a new electoral law, in addition to a comprehensive reform of the laws related to political freedoms. Please vide the mandate letter of King Abdullah II appointing Dr. Marouf Al Bakhit to form a new government. Jordan Times issued on 02.02.2011.
The executive authorities also did not respect the eligibility of the constitutional assemblies to complete their term, which is four years, nor the constitutionally-prescribed periodicity for elections, immediately after the end of the session of the Council of Representatives. Thus, on 23 November 2008 the executive authority embarked on the dissolution of the House of Representatives XV, and postponed the date for new parliamentary elections until November 2010, which kept Jordan without a legislative body for over a year.

5.2.1 Political and civil rights and liberties

Jordan received a score of 32.5 for the freedom and political rights indicator for the year 2008 based on the Freedom House guide for political rights, which uses an expanded scale of 40 scores. Accordingly, Jordan is one of those countries that provide a modest protection of political rights.

For many years, Jordan was classified by Freedom House as a partly-free country, and remained so in 2007 and 2008. But as of 2009, Jordan’s classification fell back, and it was classified as not-free. (Freedom House, 2010 Edition)

The order of political freedoms in Jordan during 2009 declined to grade 6 from 5 on the Freedom House scale. As well as the above election issues Freedom House recorded other reasons for its classification, notably the increasing intervention of security forces in political life. As for civil liberties, these fell from the level of 4 points in 2007 to 5 points in 2008, 2009 (Freedom House, 2009).

Freedom House, international organisations and local human rights monitors criticised the new law of parties, No. 19 of 2007, the application of which reduced the number of political parties in Jordan, due to militancy in the terms and conditions for the establishment of parties, and the new Law of Associations, No. 51 of 2008, which tightened restrictions on CSOs. In light of these criticisms, the government introduced amendments to the law on associations in 2009, which relaxed the impact of restrictions (Freedom House, 2010).

Level of representation of religious groups in Jordanian CSOs (case study)

Jordan contains only one group of people from a non-Muslim origin, namely, Jordanian Christians, who account for between 3 and 4% of Jordan's population, and are represented in government and parliament. Since 1929, election laws provided a special quota for Jordanian Christians. If we go back to the last parliaments, we find that they have been represented by 7.5% of the total seats in parliament. The group engage in various social and cultural activities, and have long been able to establish their own charities, clubs and multi-family ties. Moreover, they are engaged well in institutions and CSOs.

On the question of the representation of this minority in civil society organisations, 30.9% of the CSO’s leaders sample reported that this minority is represented somewhat in their organisations. The proportion that felt this minority is not represented at all in CSOs did not exceed 8.6%. The latter ratio was divided among trade unions (20%), youth and sports clubs (26.7%) and charities (14%) of all the leaders of these organisations.
5.2.2 The rule of law and personal freedoms

Based on the three indicators (out of four indicators for the formation of Civil Society according to Freedom House’s guide of civil society), which are the rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights, freedom of expression and belief; the rule of law and personal freedoms indicator in Jordan received 47.9 scores.

Therefore, Jordan is one of the countries that provide moderate protection for most civil liberties.

Although there is generally great confidence in the judiciary authority in Jordan, the courts are yet subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Council of Jurisdiction, whose members are appointed by the King. Calls were made for reform of the judiciary system and enhancement of its independence, for example, in a campaign since 1991 to establish a constitutional court in Jordan, but efforts have not yet succeeded. In addition to civil courts, the State Security Court (SSC) has extensive powers, and forms a judicial authority parallel to the civil courts, but under the authority of the Prime Minister. (Freedom House, 2010)

Although the Jordanian Constitution provides legal protection against arbitrary arrests, this is limited, as citizens may be arrested for 48 hours, and then for 10 days, without being formally charged of any crime or offence, while the State Security Court has the authority to detain people for longer periods. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, the authorities can arrest suspects without trial for up to 30 days (Freedom House, 2009).

Repeat complaints have been made that General Intelligence practise torture of political prisoners, while local and international organisations criticise conditions in prisons, which have witnessed a recent series of strikes in the last few years, with some prison officials prosecuted for violating the rights of detainees and prisoners.

Freedoms of expression in Jordan have been exposed to multiple fluctuations in recent years. In general, laws prohibit any offence to members of the Jordanian royal family and impose severe penalties. Publication laws forbid discussion of matters relating to religious beliefs and sex. Until recently, prison sentences and fines were imposed on journalists for violating press regulations. In March 2008, five journalists were sentenced for three months in jail in two separate cases for insulting the judiciary or government officials (Freedom House, 2009).

However the media generally enjoys increasing freedom to criticise government officials and public figures. In October 2010, the Minister of Environment was forced to resign after he hurled insults at reporters during a public forum, and then through his Twitter site. The number of media institutions has increased in recent years, especially private radio stations, news websites, newspapers, weekly and social magazines. Although there are several private satellite channels, they are weak in terms of content. The independent ATV satellite channel has been caught up in conflicts between the government and the private sector which have prevented its launching since 2007. This keeps the most important media, namely radio and television, within the hands of...
government, which also holds direct or indirect ownership stakes in two out of four major daily newspapers.

Some local broadcasting stations, owned by universities, municipalities and some major development institutions (such as the Jordanian Hashemite Fund) started to play important roles in local communities.\(^{21}\)

With newspapers and news websites occupying a growing area in the public domain, the government tried several times to impose restrictions and controls, the most recent being a law on crimes of information systems. But the government fell back and amended articles of this law under pressure from human rights organisations and organisations working in the field of media freedoms.\(^{22}\)

In the context of the conflict with Islamic groups, especially after their assumption of opposition, upon the signing of a peace treaty with Israel, government intervention increased in the supervision of mosques and the appointment of imams, and control of the political speeches in Friday sermons (Freedom House, 2010).

The US State Department 2010 International Religious Freedom report criticised Jordan on account that it is still harassing some citizens, foreign residents and groups suspected of carrying out missionary activities directed towards Muslims. But the report acknowledged that relations between the Muslim majority and the Christian minority are generally good. The report records as a positive the fact that there are Christian ministers who are members of the Senate. Jordan has recognised a number of established Christian communities, but there are also unrecognised churches registered as associations. The report notes that those who follow the Baha’i faith do not have their religion stated on their ID cards or in government records, and the Department of Civil Status does not recognise marriages conducted by the Assemblies of Baha’i. The report criticised the role of the Ministry of Awqaf in preventing conversion of Muslims to other religions and believes that this prevention leads to social discrimination and psychological and religious abuse. It also criticises government control of sermons in the mosques and preachers. The report also notes that recruitment forms for government positions occasionally contain questions about the religion of the applicant.

5.2.3 Associational and organisational rights
With respect to the associational and organisational rights, Jordan received a modest 41.7 score, according to Freedom House annual world survey.

The right of assembly is one of the most vulnerable rights and is subject to a restriction in Jordan, under the Public Meetings Law No. 7 of 2004. This law had been drafted in 2001 to restrict demonstrations of solidarity with Iraq and the Palestinian uprising, and under this law, any gathering, including the organisation of a seminar at a hotel or a student party, requires submission of a prior request, usually to the governor, with an advance notice of between 48 and 72 hours.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\) See the website of the Higher Media Council, which includes separate lists of various media.
\(^{22}\) See Crimes of Information Systems Act No. 30, issued in 2010, can be found at www.lob.gov.jo.
\(^{23}\) See the Public Meetings Law, www.lob.gov.jo.
The organisation of demonstrations, marches, and peaceful sit-ins in open spaces are scrutinised and are usually refused, especially when the request is made by an opposition party, student gathering or unions. Requests to hold rallies calling for a boycott of parliamentary elections in November 2010 were refused, as were attempted protests against Israeli aggression towards Gaza and the imposition of the blockade (Freedom House, 2010).  

Organisational freedoms are better than freedoms of assembly, but the rights of organisations vary from sector to sector. Under the Societies Act No. 51 of 2008, social and charitable organisations remained under government supervision through control by the Ministry of Social Development, and access to internal or external finance by these organisations requires prior approval of government. But such restrictions were relatively relaxed on the procedural level, in amendments to the Act in 2009.

Under the Labour Code, which regulates the registration of trade unions, there is no right to form new trade unions, and the number of unions is restricted to the existing number, 17 since 1974. The Labour Code and the role of the General Federation of Trade Unions prevent trade union pluralism, as there is only one general federation for unions, and there is only one union per profession. Employees working in state agencies, municipalities and public institutions are deprived of the right to have a union. Further, foreign workers do not enjoy the right to organise their own unions or trade union committees. The right to strike requires prior approval of the government, although this does not prevent the dozens of labour strikes and sit-ins each year. Several of these sectors have moved to make demands over the past few years, such as workers of the Ministry of Agriculture and the port of Aqaba, but these were opposed by severe repression. The conditions that led to the economic crisis have expanded the scope of protest among workers in state institutions, which are sometimes met with repression or arrest of the leaders of the protests. During 2010, teachers embarked on their most significant activity in several decades, demanding to establish a union, in addition to other demands about their conditions of living. They formed a national committee to follow up on their demands, and organised work stoppages and sit-ins.

University professors and academics have freedom that allows them the possibility of conducting research works, authorship and applied discussions, but professors do not have the regulatory rights they previously demanded, and their right is restricted to organising a number of professional associations of academic nature. Similarly, students have rights to take part in student unions in colleges, but they do not have the

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24 See also reports of Human Rights Watch on Jordan, [www.hrw.org/ar](http://www.hrw.org/ar), as well as reports of the National Centre for Human Rights, [www.nchr.org.jo](http://www.nchr.org.jo).

25 The Societies Act No. 51 of 2008 raised a wide range of objections from local and international human rights organisations, and following a dialogue between the Minister of Social Development and representatives from human rights organisations and other CSOs, 22 amendments were made to make the law relatively acceptable. But the government continues to impose prior approval for external funding.

26 For more details see Labour Watch of the Phoenix Centre for Studies, [www.labour-watch.net](http://www.labour-watch.net).

27 Government school teachers enjoyed the right to organise in the mid-1950, but their unions were subsequently dissolved, and since then moves to demand a union for government teachers, most notably in the late 1960s and mid 1980s, were followed by the government's recognition of their right to establish clubs. Teachers returned to demand a trade union in the early nineties, and submitted a draft law to the Council of Representatives, but the Senate defeated it, considering it as unconstitutional. But teachers returned in 2010 to place more pressure on the government and the parliament, and organised a series of sit-ins and marches which resulted in compromises, such as the formation of the General Union of Teachers.
right to establish such a union nationally.\textsuperscript{28} A politicised student movement called Zabahtona, established at the initiative of the Popular Unity Party, is the only movement across universities and colleges.\textsuperscript{29}

### 5.2.4 Experience of the legal framework

Based on the organisational survey of the CSI Project (OS, 2010), the indicator of experience of the legal framework in civil society organisations in Jordan got a high evaluation with a score of up to 78.4.

Jordan has ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the text of both covenants published in the Official Gazette of Jordan in June 2006. Many jurists argue that the issuance of such covenants in the Official Gazette gives them the status and power of Jordanian law. Civil society activists have benefited from this development in order to strengthen their demands for rights of association, assembly and expression, and to defend the independence and freedom of their organisations.

In spite of the criticism of political constraints and legal restrictions on public rights and freedoms referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the CSI Organisational Survey showed relative satisfaction from CSOs of their experience of laws and regulations, with a high score of 78.4% for this indicator. About 58% of the polled sample of CSO leaders expressed the view that such laws and regulations allow a reasonable level of operating freedom, and 9.1% went on to say that they "facilitated very much" civil society's operations, as opposed to 30% of the respondents who reported that these laws and regulations are restrictive or very restricting.

When the respondents were asked whether their organisations have faced any legal restrictions or oppositions from the government, a high percentage of them, 87.6%, said they did not face such restrictions or infringements, compared to about 10% who reported having been subjected to such restrictions or infringements.

It would seem clear that the amendments made to the Societies Act No. 51 of 2008 have contributed to improving the opinions of the CSO leaders polled sample towards the legal environment governing their work.

### 5.2.5 State effectiveness

Based on the World Bank database on Governance, which measures the ability of the state to perform specific functions, the index of the effectiveness of the state received a generally moderate score of 55.4.

Jordan is traditionally considered an effective and stable state, especially when compared to neighbouring countries and other countries in the Arab and Islamic worlds. But in the Journal of International Affairs and the Fund for Peace list of failed states, Jordan ranked 90 of 177 countries, falling within the second group of countries, which

\textsuperscript{28} There are 30 government and private universities in Jordan, in addition to 50 community colleges (medium level institutes). In general, there is a union of students in each of the institutions, but no general association, and the on-site unions do not exercise any activities outside their own institution. The number of students in universities and colleges in Jordan totals 273,509. For more information, see the website of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, www.mohe.gov.jo.

\textsuperscript{29} See the website Zabahtona, meaning “You slit our throats”, www.thab7toona.org.
bear the rating of "alarming". The status of Jordan dropped by about 4 degrees on the international ranking for the year 2009 (Al Tweisi, 2010).

The failed states report gauges states in terms of disability and failure, on a benchmark of 12 political, social and economical indicators, such as population growth, population distribution, movement and negative migration, lack of development, inheritance, the situation of ethnic groups and tribes, asylum, levels of poverty, the status of equality, legitimacy of the state, law enforcement, and sovereignty or the extent of state intervention in the affairs of other states concerned.  

In general, we can say that Jordan has failed to achieve a number of basic standards, such as governance, transparency and personal freedom, as evidenced by a fall in the status of Jordan in the indicators of perception of corruption, indicators of prosperity, economic indicators, and social capital. The retreat of Jordan in many international indicators, such as the Competitiveness Index, the index on investor protection, and index of access to loans, as well as others already mentioned, has raised wide concerns within government departments and prompted them to examine these matters in order to find ways to improve Jordan's records in these indicators.

Opinion polls in Jordan, such as the poll on democracy conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan in 2009, show that the majority of Jordanians are looking towards a democratic political system, with 80% of the respondents saying they believe that a democratic political system would be a "very good" or "good" way to rule Jordan. According to the same poll, 72% of respondents believe that a political system based on competing political parties with parliamentary elections and a government formed of the majority would be very suitable (40%) or adequate (25%) or adequate to some extent (7%) for Jordan. The authors noticed that the public preference for a competitive political system has been increasing year after year over four years (Strategic Studies, 2009).

5.3 Socio-cultural context

Various indicators show that Jordanian society is suffering from a challenge in its social capital. Confidence, which is one of the key factors in strong social capital, thrives at the level of family and inherited ties, such as the tribal and reference groups, but it falls

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30 The term "failed states" appeared in the 1990s to denote a state that fails to perform basic political, and social security functions, making them a threat to international peace and security. The Fund for Peace and the International Politics Journal started issuing an annual report on failed states in 2005.

31 Jordan ranked 86 in human development indicators issued by the United Nations Development Programme for the years 2007 and 2008, and as such it fell under the category of middle development. Thus Jordan had been ahead of Lebanon (88), Tunisia (91), Algeria (104), the Palestinian territories (106), Syria (108), Egypt (112), Morocco (126), Comoros (134), Mauritania (137), Sudan (147), Djibouti (149) and Yemen (153). But seven Arab countries came ahead of Jordan in achieving human development: Kuwait (33), Qatar (35), UAE (39), Bahrain (41), Libya (56), Oman (58), Saudi Arabia (61). Jordan has also fallen back strongly in the area of gender and women's economic participation, where it was ranked 145 among 155 countries in the last four years, compared to the previous rank of 80 out of 157 countries in 2007. Jordan also came in ranked 74 among 110 countries across the world in an economic prosperity index published by the British Legatum Institute, and fell to rank 111 out of 183 countries in the Doing Business Report in 2011, issued by the World Bank and International Finance Corporation, from the rank 107 in 2010. Jordan ranked 112 in world-class media freedoms, showing 16 places ahead of its position in the year 2008, according to the "Reporters without Borders" report on the freedom of the press.
back at the level of the relationship between society and institutions, whether governmental or civilian institutions, and among individuals in general.

Education, instead of playing a positive role in promoting confidence between citizens, would appear to be playing an inverse role, where a global survey of values revealed that the higher the level of education of individuals, the lower the degree of confidence they have. This would appear to be a regional phenomenon, not confined solely to Jordan (Burayzat, 2008).

The World Values Survey for 2005 showed that 68.2% of those polled in Jordan tend to be cautious in dealing with people, compared to 31.1% of the respondents who expressed their confidence in the majority of people. At the institutional level, the confidence levels are the highest in religious institutions (mosques), up to 69.5% (WVS 2005).

Respondents in Jordan showed a general trend toward non-acceptance and intolerance of others, such as drug addicts, homosexuals and people living with HIV/AIDS, and even foreigners or non-Jordanians and speakers of other languages (WVS 2005).

The same survey also showed a certain slackening to act against some forms of anti-social behaviour as a small proportion (less than 5%) showed acceptance of bribes in the course of performing duties, but 17% did not object to tax evasion or avoiding payment of public transport fare (17.4%), while a higher proportion (29.4%) did not see any harm in illegally claiming benefits from government (29.4%) (WVS 2005).

The question that arises here is how to encourage people to adopt values and behavioural patterns that create beneficial mutuality among members of the community and various groups, as well as between society and institutions, including the state. In other words, what are the ways and means to achieve social and cultural transformation that makes mutual trust an economic, social and political value, reflecting the ability of groups to transfer their level of trust from the level of the family and close community up to the level of society as a whole and the state (Al Tweisi, 2010)?

The municipal and parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2010 show how the transfer of trust and existing social capital at the level of family and clan and town of origin to a narrow partisan identity approach does not work to strengthen the broader fabric of the community texture, but to the contrary, it acts to dissipate the social capital of the community and the state (Al Tweisi, 2010).

Conclusion
In general, Jordan is facing several challenges, the most notable including the scarcity of natural resources and the imbalance of population distribution, strongly in favour of urban areas at the expense of the countryside, and the predominance of the economy's reliance on service sectors and the weakness of contribution of the ‘real economy’, especially agriculture, industry and mining. This imbalance has led to the concentration of the labour force in cities and non-productive sectors and to weaknesses in self-sufficiency, with a high reliance on imports of food, commodities, consumer goods and raw materials, thereby causing a deficit in the balance of foreign trade and making the
financing of the state a challenge, which in turn is a direct factor in the continuation of Jordan's dependence on aid and external resources.

Despite the fact that Jordan has implemented several programmes for economic reform, it still suffers from high rates of poverty and unemployment, and GDP growth is not reflected in a fair income distribution, as the higher income groups benefit disproportionately. Women suffer particularly from inequality.

Another challenge faced by Jordanian civil society is that it still operates in a conservative political context, despite repeated attempts at political reform in the last 20 years. The last two decades have seen a significant shift at the political level, moving from a country dominated by martial and exceptional laws, and lacking in political and party pluralism, and with the absence of a stable parliamentary and constitutional life, into a politically more open country, with strengthened political and civic liberties, and a stable parliamentary life, with some interruptions. Nevertheless, Jordan still needs to adopt effective and influential policies to build a sustainable democracy, including deep reforms of laws governing the rights of association, assembly and expression, and to ensure an electoral system that secures fair and equitable representation, and an effective parliament that bears a genuine representative character, to discharge its oversight, legislation and accountability duties.

Many leaders and activists in civil society believe that both the socio-economic and socio-political contexts do not provide a framework for encouraging civil society to play its full role, as they reduce incentives for civic engagement and inhibit civil society playing an active role in policy-making. Public polls show that the vast majority of people look towards a democratic political system, and consider it a guarantee against financial and administrative corruption, and a tool to solve the problems of Jordan's economic development. It has also been expressed by a high majority that the desired political system ought to be based on political partisan competition through free parliamentary elections, where government is formed on the basis of the parliamentary majority. Polls have also revealed that support for this system has been growing steadily, year after year.

The indicators show that the socio-cultural context is weaker still, as they have revealed a significant deficit in social capital, which is based on trust and confidence. The World Values Survey and other indicators revealed weaknesses in trust among citizens, a general tendency for non-acceptance of others and intolerance, and a slackening of adherence to values in some aspects related to corruption. The last general elections, held in November 2010, instead of forming an opportunity for the exercise of citizenship and public participation, turned out to be a field for the production of narrow partisan views and the upholding of traditional tribal, familial and regional loyalties and biases. They also offered missed opportunities for political participation, as a result of reluctance to participate or because of boycotting.

In response to these issues, participants developed a detailed list of recommendations addressed to various parties, including government, civil society leaders, media, private sector, international organisations and donors. These are detailed further below.
IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF JORDANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

This section sums up the views and conclusions that were reached within the framework of the project regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Jordanian civil society. This diagnosis is based on the results that were reached by the National Team and that emerged in the various dialogue channels of the project, in addition to the views of the consultative committee, the three regional focus groups and the participants in the National Workshop.

The participants in the various stages of dialogue exhibited wide differences in their views and expectations. Some views were closer to being utopian while others were more realistic and pragmatic. It was also noticeable that some points were stated as aspects of weaknesses and strengths of civil society at the same time. Most aspects of civil society activities include points of strength and points of weakness and stories of success and stories of failure at the same time.

1. Strengths
The relative political openness that Jordan has witnessed during the last two decades, in spite of its fluctuation, has provided a better environment for the growth of CSOs (which has seen an increase in their numbers and geographical distribution), and has helped them to practice their activities more freely.

The distinctive geo-political location of Jordan and the relative political openness of the government focused international interest in Jordanian civil society and provided important external resources for CSOs, especially in the areas of lobbying, empowerment of women and young people, human rights, environment, political participation, elections and parliament.

Some CSOs enjoy growing relations and partnerships with other organisations, including government and non-government institutions. This is particularly true for organisations lead by members of the royal family, some women’s organisations and organisations active in lobbying.

The structure of Jordanian civil society is characterised by its diversity; it usually enjoys administrative and financial independence in addition to an ability to access the media.

CSOs on the whole have the ability to reach their popular bases, especially young people and women.

The leadership of Jordanian civil society has a relatively long experience in civil and social work that has also been utilised in the service of civil society in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, they have specialised capabilities in the areas of training and capacity building of which the government or private sector can take advantage.

Most Jordanian civil society sectors have satisfactory infrastructure and communication capabilities, with the exception of organisations working in rural and remote areas.
2. Weaknesses

The social, political and cultural context in Jordan is conservative and rigid, hence it still shows a bias towards direct intervention by the state. This is contrary to ideas of the freedom of initiative of civil society and hampers the practical development of social partnerships between the state and civil society.

A significant number of CSOs (including labour unions, cooperatives and charitable organisations) lack political independence or are subject to interference from the state. This hinders their ability to reach wide sectors of citizens, isolates them and weakens their role in influencing policies.

Despite the fact that most CSOs adopt the principle of membership and have administrative boards, they suffer from the lack of rotation in leadership positions and lack of contest in electing administrative boards. This hinders them in increasing their membership and expanding their social support.

The existence of several national umbrellas and sectoral networks between CSOs is not translated into coordination and efficacy, which weakens their chances of mobilising resources and distributing them equitably between different organisations. Most CSOs also suffer from lack of financial transparency, which leads to lack of social trust. Furthermore, their role in combating corruption is still weak.

Despite the fact that CSOs have begun to develop joint codes and regulations for best practices in the areas of governance and transparency, these have not yet been put into effect and lack mechanisms for following up, monitoring or evaluation.

Despite the fact that most organisations are based on membership and volunteering, the level of recruitment and mobilisation of volunteers is still weak.

The lack of a clear, defined and comprehensive strategy by CSOs for the different components of civil society weakens their collective capability to hold a dialogue with the state, the private sector and foreign donors, in addition to weakening their ability to define their priorities. This leaves the door wide open for others, especially foreign donors, to determine these priorities.

Most CSOs suffer from a scarcity of financial resources, especially from government and the local private sector. Furthermore, the negative perspective of some sectors of society towards foreign financing affects the credibility and trust of civil society, and contributes to weak societal support for CSOs.

Significant circles of society believe that civil society is basically active in elite circles and does not reach the masses. Some also think that CSO activities are limited to major cities and do not include rural or remote areas.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

This section lists recommendations made during the project, addressed to a large range of stakeholders, as follows:
Jordanian civil society, especially if a coalition or permanent alliance emerged between organisations.

Government, especially those institutions directly concerned with the registration of CSOs, such as the Ministries of Social Development, Labour, Culture and the Higher Council for Youth.

Universities, research centres and the academic society, by which we mean colleges of social sciences and independent centres concerned with the development of public policies, promoting democracy, empowering women, young people and CSOs.

Private sector and business organisations, by which we mean corporations and institutions active in the field of supporting cultural and social programmes and activities, local communities and disadvantaged sectors, in addition to corporations that build social partnerships with local communities and CSOs.

Media, independent and state media being one of stakeholders that participated in the project had direct recommendations for, in order to promote the initiatives of civil society and publicise them in the different media sources, as well as stressing their role as a social partner in developing and discussing public policies.

Donors and international organisations, especially donor countries and organisations concerned with the promotion of democracy, rule of law and good governance.

Partners in implementing this project, with the wish of implementing similar projects in the future. By this we mean CIVICUS, Future Foundation, UNDP and Urdun Jadid Research Centre.

1. Civil Society
   Civil society strengthening
   - Work towards the establishment of an institute for leadership and good governance, in order to develop leadership and management skills for civil society.
   - Activate the code of best practices for good governance and transparency in CSOs and develop mechanisms for following-up and monitoring their execution.
   - Pay more attention to provided policies on working in CSOs. This also implies developing policies for female workers and volunteers.
   - Find a comprehensive solution for the fact that many organisations choose their leaders without any competition or election. This can be done either by supervisory and monitoring bodies (such as the Ministry of Social Development) or from inside CSOs; in addition the media can help caution against the risks of avoiding competitive democratic elections.
   - Give more attention to awareness training and capacity building in the area of building networks and alliances in addition to providing CSOs with the skills of coordination, services and information exchange and utilising resources collectively.
• Help CSOs that face technological and communications obstacles, such as the lack of internet services, to acquire such services, either from the private sector, communications sector or international donors.

• Include and consolidate the values of tolerance, dialogue, acceptance of others and the culture of non-violence on the agenda of civil society in Jordan.

• Develop a clear methodology for CSOs to measure the effects of their activities on Jordanian society and on decision making, in addition to training leaders and activists on using tangible and measurable indicators when evaluating the effects of their organisations.

• Resume the dialogue with CSO leaders (previously sponsored by the Ministry of Social Development before the current societies law was adopted) in order to develop the rules and regulations that pertain to CSOS and activate the Register Administration Council which has the mission of supervising the registration of societies.

• Conduct a detailed study of CSO publications and periodicals in order to determine the reasons behind their scarcity, their inability to continue in a sustained manner, and how this can be remedied by training and rehabilitation.

• Encourage civil society to activate and develop their media and communications plans, in order to propagate their activities and programmes.

• Conduct thorough and comprehensive studies on the status of civil society, especially in relation to its areas of operation and the extent of its effectiveness.

• Develop the capacities of civil society leaders and activists to lobby for support of policies and legislation.

• Convene training courses for leaders in the area of preparing proposals for projects.

• Call upon the various sectors of CSOs to develop and maintain their databases and upload them on their websites or publish them in their annual reports.

Empowerment of women and young people

• Concentrate on women and young people as groups that should play a bigger role in voluntary activities.

• Include women’s organisations in processes of formulating, executing and evaluating social policies.

• Pay more attention to the development of efficient management of organisations to address issues of women’s and young people’s empowerment.

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32 The last draft law of associations, No. 51 for the year 2008, has provided for the first time on the establishment of the “Registry Board of Directors”, which is chaired by the Minister of Social Development and comprises 10 members (six of them representing other ministries in addition to four individuals with expertise in the charitable work and volunteerism) appointed by the Council of Ministers upon recommendation of the Minister; the term for the registry board is two years (Article 4). The functions and powers of the Registry Board of Directors, as per the provision of Article 5 of the said act, includes the following: approval of the registration of new associations, identifying the competent ministry for the association, assessment of the work performance and appraisal of the activities of the associations in coordination with the competent ministries, issuance of an annual report on the conditions of the associations and societies, preparation of plans and programmes required to improve the conditions of the societies and associations, management and supervision of the associations Fund, reconciliation among the associations in the event of ensuing conflicts, issuance of the necessary instructions to organize the work of the Registry and coordination between the registrar and the relevant ministries. (See Societies Act No. 51 of 2008 on the website of the Ministry of Social Development: www.mosd.gov.jo).
• Adopt more empowerment programmes to improve the quality of life for women, with special emphasis on economic empowerment programmes due to their direct and tangible role in changing the status of women.
• Develop the policies relating to the operation of organisations where these are no longer appropriate for contemporary situations.
• Increase coordination and exchange of information between women’s organisations in order to reach a stage where they complement each other instead of competing against each other.

**Financing of CSOs**

• More emphasis must be put on long term financial sustainability, including through building the capacities of CSOs to encourage them to set up projects that yield profits.
• Laws relating to financing of CSOs should be comprehensively reviewed.
• The law that all non Jordanian financing must be approved by the Council of Ministers on the pretext of protecting national sovereignty must be challenged.
• CSOs should ensure that they apply the highest standards of transparency, accountability, good governance and internal democracy, which will help them qualify for partnerships with the private sector.
• Form an alliance between CSOs to implement collective and joint projects with the private sector so that they can benefit from the diverse expertise and capabilities.
• Offer the private sector profitable projects for the local community or specific social groups, providing that these projects are realistic, executable, and include defined indicators for measuring their effectiveness and returns.
• Develop awareness of CSOs in the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility and qualify themselves as a social partner with the private sector to implement CSR programmes.
• Enlighten CSOs about the heritage of Arab Islamic societies concerning the evolvement of Al Waqf endowments in order to be acquainted with the sources of endowments and their management, as well as becoming acquainted with international experiences in the area of civil society endowments to discover what can be adopted and developed for Jordanian civil society.

**Social volunteering**

• Encourage volunteering and membership in CSOs by implementing more rehabilitation and training programmes.
• Establish a national database of volunteers, their characteristics and their areas of expertise, and update it regularly through alliances of CSOs.
• Work on raising the level of appreciation by CSOs for volunteers and volunteering and develop more incentives to encourage volunteering by young people.

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33 In fact, the Societies Act No. 51 of 2008 provides in Article 3 on the establishment of two types of associations that have not been mentioned before in said law of associations. These two new associations included the "Private Assembly", with a limited group membership of not less than three and not more than twenty persons, and the "Closed Assembly" whose membership may comprise one or more individuals, and its financial resources are confined to donations provided by any of its founding members for the purpose of enabling the society to achieve its goals. These private and closed associations allow for conversion into special endowment societies to support social, scientific, and charitable or development purposes.
• Create specialised programmes that include the exchange of volunteers at the local and international levels.
• Put more emphasis on developing the capacities of volunteers through training and knowledge transfer.
• Establish a tradition of honouring volunteers and giving prominence to their standing in the community, such as the creation of prizes and awards of appreciation for best practices by institutions and individuals in volunteering.
• Conduct a periodical survey (at least every three years) to monitor and follow-up on volunteering and the changes in it.
• Urge public education and youth institutions to introduce independent and periodical programmes of volunteer activities.
• Work on developing a local concept around ‘volunteering for the sake of work’ in coordination with official institutions and the private sector in order to combat unemployment and the decline in work opportunities for young people.
• Conduct more studies on volunteering and its relationship with the role and effectiveness of Jordanian CSOs, the role of the government, and the private sector and institutions of higher education in promoting, sponsoring and rewarding voluntary activities.

2. Government and official institutions

• Establish an independent commission for Jordanian civil society.
• Call upon the National Register for Societies at the Ministry of Social Development to start producing quality data on registered societies relating to their type, size of membership, governance, resources and expenditure. This data would facilitate the conducting of more comprehensive studies on their needs and development of strategic plans for improving their status.
• Call upon other relevant ministries such as the Ministries of Culture and Labour to provide quality data on organisations registered with them.
• Call upon the General Statistics Department (GSD) and other government institutions to develop databases on CSOs and means of disclosure of information.
• Call upon the GSD to study the contribution of civil society to the gross national product (GNP), develop national accountancy regulations and conduct periodical surveys on CSOs to calculate the contribution of volunteering to GNP.
• Call upon the GSD to create a special division for CSOs with the mission of building databases and conducting surveys on these organisations at the sectoral and regional levels.
• Instigate a legal framework for the regulation of volunteer activities at various levels which protects the rights of volunteers and provides standards for the efficiency and effectiveness of volunteering at the individual, institutional and societal levels.
• Create an independent entity, similar to public utility institutions, that will be concerned with the coordination and organisation of voluntary activities in Jordan, thus becoming the national arm for attracting foreign volunteers to Jordan and a tool for the organisation of Jordanian volunteers abroad.

3. Private sector and business organisations

• Evolve the culture of social partnership and social responsibility in private sector institutions and encourage them to transfer their administrative, accounting and
technical expertise to civil society, in addition to qualifying CSOs to play a role as a partner in CSR programmes.

- Introduce action programmes that provide practical solutions for unemployment among young people through the concept of volunteering for the sake of work.
- Increase the effectiveness of the social responsibility of the private sector by supporting volunteer work programmes within CSOs.
- Contribute in the training and qualification of volunteers in private sector institutions.

4. Media

- Develop journalistic content to consolidate the standing of volunteer work in society and highlight the role of volunteers in development and modernisation, in addition to publicising social partnership between the private sector and civil society.
- Publicise success stories about the influence of voluntary work in changing the lives of individuals, families and societies.
- Develop a journalistic message that appreciates the values of volunteering among society and consolidates its value to living a more meaningful life and helping others to help themselves.

5. Universities, research centres and academia

- Encourage universities and research centres to conduct more research and publish case studies on the strengths and weaknesses of Jordanian civil society.
- Call upon the social science departments in Jordanian universities to direct Masters and Doctorate students to conduct more case studies and comparative studies on civil society and to cooperate with specialised research centres to determine the subjects and areas that most need research and development.
- Call upon Jordanian universities to introduce an obligatory course for university students dealing with voluntary work and voluntary social services.

6. International and donor organisations

- Pay more attention to the issues and problems of the larger body of the civil society composed of membership-based organisations, as presently most (including from donors and media) is focused on advocacy organisations that are usually not membership-based.

7. Partners in implementation of the project

- In the future, conduct a national survey of the population instead of international surveys to develop a civil society index as international surveys about Jordan are either deficient or inappropriate for the purpose of study.
- Develop a methodology for the establishment of civil society indicators relevant to Jordan, the Arab world and the Islamic Middle East in order to facilitate comparative studies and joint implementation mechanisms, especially in countries that suffer from the lack of civil society indicators.
- Call upon partners to take advantage of the Jordanian experience in the implementation of a civil society indicators project in order to conduct similar projects in regional countries.
• Call upon the partners to follow up on the recommendations of the project by supporting a comprehensive programme for building the capacities of Jordanian CSOs in the areas that showed weaknesses.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The CSI project was implemented in 2010 in Jordan because of the need for credible and updated information, reinforced by facts, numbers and analysis of the status of CSOs. The objective is to put these facts and analysis into the hands of the main players in Jordanian civil society and all other pertinent players, such as government institutions, international organisations and donors, as well as experts, academics and others.

Based on the range of tools used in the project (including surveys and case studies, consultations with the consultative committee and dialogues with focus groups, and the national workshop), the research team developed a comprehensive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Jordanian civil society and a large set of conclusions and recommendations. The main conclusions of the report are as follows:

Civic engagement: Civil society activists and stakeholders are concerned with the results of the research relating to the lack of civic engagement in Jordan as this had the lowest rating of the dimensions that form the Jordan CSI. Particular weak points identified were extent and depth of social and political engagement.

There were several attempts to explain the lack of engagement. One of the reasons given was ‘general frustration’ due to the failure of attempts at change and reform, which convinced people of the futility of participation (especially political participation). Another explanation was the rigidity of social organisations and even the stagnancy of some of them due to the domination of the ‘old guard’ and their refusal of the principle of periodical rotation of authority. A third reason for lack of participation was the pressures of everyday life. Finally some attributed the lack of civil participation to social indolence ensuing from the lack of active citizenry, which in turn resulted from the lack of a motivating legal and political environment. In fact it was noted that the environment is rather hostile to any participation of a political nature.

Consequently, recommendations concentrated on the development of the laws pertaining to CSOs, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression. They also focused on stressing the importance of volunteering in addition to training and capacity building in such areas as good governance, transparency, participation, influencing of policies and evaluation of results; in other words, the areas that make CSOs more attractive for membership and offer motivation for volunteering and engagement in civil activities.

Level of organisation: Despite the fact that civil society in Jordan has a good level of organisation (as most organisations have elected boards), a growing number are now choosing their leadership without contest which leaves the same boards or heads of organisation for a long time. This necessitates the introduction of laws to determine maximum terms for leaders.
Although the overwhelming majority of Jordanian CSOs are integrated under general associations or organisations, the level of coordination and sectoral cooperation between these organisations is weak or limited. Additionally, initiatives by Jordanian civil society towards self-organisation are still relatively new, so these organisations have little experience in following up on these initiatives or tools to translate them into executive plans. On the whole, inter-sectoral coordination between CSOs is rare, which diminishes the political influence of these organisations in public life.

Membership in CSOs is high but the numbers of volunteers is very low, and these organisations lack the necessary experience, institutional frameworks and programmes to draw more members or attract volunteers.

As for financial resources and technology, we notice the existence of a critical balance between revenues and expenses of organisations (with some deficit in most of them). Most organisations have resources that barely fulfil their expenses, which prevents them expanding their activities. Most organisations have an acceptable level of communication tools, such as telephones and computers, while only a very small number of organisations, particularly in rural and remote areas, do not have these tools. However, a little less than half of organisations complain of not having internet services, which is a serious issue that requires attention.

On the whole, Jordan is considered open by international CSOs, which gives an opportunity for local CSOs to establish relations with them and receive financial, technical and logistical support. On the other hand, participation by local organisations at the international level is limited as they are mostly on the receiving side and not a genuine participant in dialogues and policy-making. This is a shortcoming that needs to be addressed.

**Practice of values:** This dimension recorded the highest score of the five CSI dimensions. It showed that in about 60% of organisations important decisions are made by elected councils or by members. This percentage reveals that most organisations enjoy democratic governance, yet there remains a significant number of organisations where decisions are made by other means, such as delegating decision-making to an operation team or the head of an organisation. Discussions at various stages of the project suggested that good governance not only means the presence of elected councils, but also the rotation of leadership positions and the participation of members and middle cadres in decision-making processes as well as open lines of communication with stakeholders. This demonstrates the importance of developing internal legislations that regulate the work of organisations, especially bylaws, in order to provide legal controls for good governance.

The study also revealed a deficiency in regulations and bylaws relating to the rights of workers and women. Seventy percent of surveyed organisations reported that they do not have any written policies or regulations on the employment of women, 48% have no employment policies, 60% have no code of conduct for employees and 64% have no environmental standards policies. But the study also revealed a potentially positive future, with a high percentage of organisations expressing their desire to develop such documents. The mere posing of these questions has contributed to an understanding that such issues must be on the agendas of the surveyed organisations.
The organisational survey of CSO leaders also revealed the presence of concern about the phenomenon of corruption in these organisations, as 47% of the research sample indicated that this is a recurrent issue. Although we believe that these organisations tend to exaggerate, remarkably this concern has not yet translated itself into more than complaints and concern about the spread of corruption. A case study commissioned for the project on good governance and transparency in CSOs revealed that they have exerted little effort to systematise financial disclosure or display financial transparency on their websites.

Regarding tolerance and discrimination within the ranks of civil society, the study revealed that most organisations indicated that they have no knowledge of examples of intolerance, while less than a third of organisations stating that they knew of several examples. On the whole, there is recognition that forces practicing discrimination and intolerance are marginal or completely isolated. However, the mere belief by a quarter of organisations that these discriminatory forces are a significant or dominating player in civil society carries a clear warning about the phenomenon of intolerance and requires awareness and education in this area. The same applies to the phenomenon of violence. Violence in Jordanian society has increased significantly in the last few years, especially among young people, and in universities and football stadiums. There are discriminatory tendencies among citizens on the basis of national origins. Civil society is not isolated from the phenomena of violence in society overall, yet the role of CSOs in curbing violence is still weak; they need to evolve this role in the future.

**Perceived impact**: The study has revealed that the perceptions of stakeholders of the impact of civil society on social policies and issues are higher than the CSO's own assessment of their impact. It became apparent that there were important differences between the two, especially concerning the impact of civil society on the two key issues identified (improving the quality of life and democratising the laws of political life). The project's national team believes that the impact of civil society is much higher than civil society's own perception, and that this reflects a certain degree of pessimism and frustration regarding the impact of their efforts on society and policies.

On the whole, civil society leaders' self-perceptions of their impact on social issues revealed a higher assessment than of their impact on public policies. This is understandable considering the obstacles and limitations relating to the political environment, which restricts the activities of civil society in the area of public policies much more than their activities in social and economic areas. This also raises the issue of reducing the gap between perceptions of the efforts of civil society and its actual impact.

It was also noticed that there is agreement between stakeholders and CSO leaders on their perceptions of civil society's work and activities, as both sides agreed that the support of the poor and the marginalised formed the area of most activity by civil society. On the whole, stakeholders and civil society leaders also agree that social development, education and health are significant areas of civil society activity. Both sides were also in agreement in their evaluation of the impact of civil society on these issues, which varies between average and limited.

Further, it is noticeable that the impact of civil society on the orientations of society is almost negligible, whether in the areas of trust, tolerance or public spiritedness. The
study also revealed a high rate of trust in religious and environmental institutions (with a huge margin in favour of the first), and a low level of trust in other CSOs and government institutions (with a big margin in favour of CSOs).

This leads to the question of giving these dimensions of civil society's work more prominence when developing future plans, which means paying more attention to developing the educational and awareness-raising aspects of civil society's work, including at the level of values and social attitudes.

**External environment:** Jordan is considered an average income country; experiences a high rate of population growth; a decline in the numbers of people of working age to below 60% of the total population; a high rate of poverty and unemployment; and a low level of engagement by women in economic and political participation. But the population enjoys a good level of health and educational services and infrastructure.

Jordan faces several challenges, such as a lack of natural resources, the imbalance of population distribution in urban areas, the dependence of the economy on the service sector and the weak contribution of the real economy to the gross national product. The deficits in the foreign trade budget and general budget became a direct cause for Jordan's dependency on foreign resources and foreign aid. Despite the fact that Jordan has implemented several economic reform programmes, it still suffers from high rates of poverty and unemployment. Furthermore, growth in GNP was not reflected in fair distribution of income as the high income categories were the ones who benefited. Women particularly suffer from the phenomenon of inequality which manifests itself in the form of gaps in different economic, social and political areas.

Another challenge faced by Jordanian civil society is that it operates in a conservative political context despite recurrent attempts at political reform in the past 20 years. Indeed, the last two decades have witnessed significant strides at the political level. Jordan has progressed from a country characterised by the prevalence of martial and extraordinary laws, the absence of parties and political plurality and the lack of a stable constitutional and parliamentary life to a politically open country with greater political and civil liberties and a stable parliamentary life (with a few short cessations). Nevertheless, Jordan still needs to adopt effective policies to build a sustained democracy, and these include profound reforms of the laws regulating the rights of organisation, assembly and expression in addition to an election law that secures a fair representation of the population and generates an effective parliament that is truly representative.

Many civil society leaders and activists believe that the socio-economic and socio-political contexts do not provide an encouraging framework for civil society to play a full role, as they diminish the incentives for civil engagement and reduce the ability of civil society to shape policies. Polls in 2009 revealed that an overwhelming majority of citizens aspire to a democratic political system, which they regard as a sure way to combat financial and administrative corruption, in addition to solving Jordan's economic problems. Most surveyed people indicated that the desired form of political system is one based on a competitive political party system, with free parliamentary elections and the formation of a government based on a representative majority.
On the other hand, the Jordan CSI revealed that the socio-cultural context was relatively weaker than the socio-political context. It revealed that there was a great lack of social capital based on trust. The World Values Survey and other indicators revealed that there was a lack of trust between citizens and a tendency to reject the other, along with intolerance and a sense of apathy towards some forms of corruption. The project also pointed out that the latest general elections (November 2010), instead of being an opportunity for the expression of citizenship and public participation, turned into a field for generating narrow clannishness and the heightening of traditional loyalties, including tribal, regional and family allegiances, in addition to being another lost opportunity for political participation due to boycott.

On the whole, the report revealed a set of challenges and sources of concern for participants in the project. They reflected this through their analysis of the strengths and weakness of civil society, and hence, presented a detailed list of recommendations directed to the government, leaders and activists of civil society, media, private sector, international organisations and donors.

On the other hand, it must be said that the wave of changes sweeping the Arab world (including Jordan) during the last few months have created a political climate conducive to the Jordanian civil society in order to build on the points of strength gained during the last two decades and to overcome the weaknesses which is still suffering from so far. Though it is too premature to predict the path of future events in Jordan, the door has become wide open for dialogue between the government and activists of the civil society leaders and various political parties. This dialog includes the content of political reforms and legislative political life, the freedoms of assembly and association, and the parliamentary and municipal elections. Even before the review of the amendments of the Jordanian Constitution for the purpose of allowing the formation of elected governments by the Parliament and the establishment of genuine separation of powers. The change in the general regional climate of the Middle East under the influence of the peaceful civil movements in several countries in the region has provided a positive change factor which enhances the participation of citizens and strengthens the role and place of civil society in Jordan and throughout the region.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mohammad Al Sqoor</td>
<td>Expert, social development, former minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randa Al Qsous</td>
<td>Arab Women's Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samer Khair</td>
<td>Journalist, Head of Cultural Department in the Municipality of Greater Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Yousef Mansour</td>
<td>Economic expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Akef Ma'aytah</td>
<td>Consultant, Family Guidance and Education Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mohyeddin Touq</td>
<td>General Commissioner, National Centre for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sousan Al Taweel</td>
<td>Director, Human Rights Unit, Ministry of Political Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leyan Al Ramahi</td>
<td>Future Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noor Maria</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nayfeh Al Louzi</td>
<td>Head, CSO Department, Ministry of Political Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmad Awad</td>
<td>Phoenix Centre for Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fathallah Al Amrani</td>
<td>General Union, Weaving and Textile Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohammad Al Raggad</td>
<td>Arab Organisation for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khadijah Habashneh</td>
<td>Women Activist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuha Al Ma'aytah</td>
<td>General Jordanian Women’s Union</td>
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<td>Eman Al Nimri</td>
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<td>Wahid Qarmash</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salwa Al Khairi</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Jordanian Environment Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Al Tamimi</td>
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<td>Eng. Mohammad Al Rahahleh</td>
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<td>Eng. Ahmad Saber Al Natoor</td>
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<td>Mohammad Al Hasanat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Basem Al Tweisi</td>
<td>Al-Hussein Bin Talal University, Ma'an</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Ameen Mashagbeh</td>
<td>Acting Director, General Union of Charitable Societies, Former Minister</td>
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APPENDIX 2 CSI INDICATOR MATRIX

Dimensions 1.1.2, 1.2.2, 1.4.2 and 1.5.2 relating to volunteering were not asked in the Jordan WVS and so are not included here.

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CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Report for Jordan
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## Dimension: Perception of Impact

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<td>4.3</td>
<td>Policy Impact (internal perception)</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
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<td>Social Impact (external perception)</td>
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<td>Difference in tolerance levels between civil society members and non-members</td>
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## Contextual Dimension: Environment

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<td>Socio-cultural context</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3.3</td>
<td>Public spiritedness</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3 CASE STUDY SUMMARIES

The CSI project included the implementation of five case studies, the subjects of which were chosen by the project's consultative committee. The committee picked three subjects from the model studies proposed by CIVICUS, and added two more titles relating to the empowerment of women and financing of CSOs due to their importance in analysing Jordanian civil society. The following is a brief summary of each of the five studies.

1. Status of volunteer activities in Jordanian CSOs
   This study, which was prepared by Dr Basem Twaisi, focuses on the status of volunteering in Jordanian civil society, especially in the light of increasing views that there is a decline in the role of volunteering in the last few years. The researcher conducted a civil survey of the status of voluntary work in CSOs and a survey of the attitudes of opinion leaders and influential forces, on a sample of a 100 organisations.

2. Impact of CSO programmes and policies on the empowerment of women in Jordan
   The purpose of this study, prepared by Dr Nabeela Al-Syouf, was to determine the policies of Jordanian civil society in the area of empowerment of women and reveal the impact of these policies on the performance of women's organisations. The researcher conducted a comprehensive study of five women's organisations, including the three most important national women's organisations, concluding by conducting interviews with their leaders.

3. Financing of CSOs in Jordan
   This study was prepared by Mrs Lamis Nasser and Husain Abu Rumman, with the goal of determining the ability of Jordanian CSOs to access appropriate and sustained sources of financing. The study is composed of two sections: the first deals with the legislative framework which regulates the financing of CSOs, while the second provides an insight into the orientations and views of leaders of a selected sample of 41 CSOS in relation to financing, including foreign financing and its problem.

4. Civil Society in Jordan: Its Structure, Regional and Sectoral Distribution
   This study, compiled by a team of researchers from Urdun Jadid Research Center, had the objective of updating information relating to the current status of CSOs' structure, their sectoral distribution, and the size of their membership; particularly in view of evolving definitions of civil society. The study also aimed to determine the extent of geographical spread and social spread in urban, rural and desert areas.

5. Transparency and Good Governance in Jordanian CSOs
   This study, which was prepared by Dr Bajis Al-Alwan, aimed to shed light on the status of transparency and good governance in CSOs. The researcher conducted a survey of 22 CSOs in order to develop a practical index to measure the extent of CSOs’ perceptions of transparency and good governance as well as manifestations of the practice of these in their practical life.
APPENDIX 4 SURVEY METHODOLOGY

1. Organisational survey

Research community:
The number of CSOs in Jordan is estimated at 5,700 with a total membership of over one and a half million, and they are found all over the 12 governorates of Jordan. Jordanian CSOs are divided into some 18 categories. The research sample, consisting of 121 organisations, was chosen from the various categories of civil society in the 12 governorates, taking into consideration the actual distribution of CSOs geographically and according to sector (with certain exceptions).

Method of computing research sample:
The percentage of inhabitants in each governorate was adopted as a basis for the distribution of the sample. But due to the small number of inhabitants and CSOs in some governorates, a minimum of four questionnaire forms were allocated for each. Care was taken that this method did not upset the representation of the larger governorates.

The sample was distributed upon the categories of CSOs, taking into consideration the following notes:

There are around 1,200 cooperative organisations in Jordan. Although they have never been listed as CSOs because the basis for their formation is profit, we deemed it appropriate to take a small sample (eight organisations) in order to integrate them in the assessment of the status of civil society. This has been done by other CSI countries and provides an opportunity to focus attention on the status of this category for the first time.

Several categories of CSOs are significant due to their role or the extent of their membership. As the number of these organisations is small, the minimum representation for any category of CSOs is two organisations. This includes five categories: human rights organisations, environmental societies, teacher associations, political parties, and labour unions.

After allocating eight questionnaire forms for cooperatives and 10 forms for organisations with small memberships, 102 forms were left. These were distributed to the other main categories of CSOs in accordance with their relative percentage of the total number of CSOs (taking into consideration that some of these categories includes sub-categories).

Out of the 121 organisations included in the sample, 19 of them could not respond for various reasons and were replaced by other organisations from the same categories and the same governorates.

The sample therefore included the following organisations:

Cooperatives (8), business organisations (10), trade unions (4), labour unions (2), family societies (7), religious organisations (5), political parties (2), cultural associations (15), philanthropic societies (31), teacher associations (2), youth clubs (14), women
Methodology of the study
Preparation of the survey form
Because the study falls under the framework of a comparative international project, the Jordanian research team was obliged to comply with the general methodology of the CIVICUS approach. The form was reviewed and other questions that pertain specifically to Jordan were added. At the same time, the other axes and questions were observed as provided by CIVICUS and as adopted by other participating countries. The form was discussed, as was the case with all other research tools, by experts and CIVICUS and by the project's consultative committee before it was approved for implementation.

Field research team
A field research team was formed of 12 researchers and two field supervisors, and the data was collected from the 12 governorates in three weeks in May 2010. The forms were numbered and questions coded in accordance with the method by CIVICUS and entered using the SPSS programme, then reviewed before compiling the descriptive report for the study.

2. External perceptions survey
The survey form
The survey form was prepared by a team from UJRC based, on an original form that was designed by CIVICUS. The preparation of the form went through several stages of design and discussion with the project's national team and members of the consultative committee before it was adopted and used for data collection.

The survey sample
The sample consisted of 50 personalities who are considered stakeholders and experts in dealing with and having knowledge of civil society. The number of sample members was proposed by CIVICUS. The size of the sample would permit the simultaneous comparison of national survey results within the framework evaluating the status of civil society in dozens of countries. It was also important that members of the sample belong to: the executive authority, the legislative authority, the judiciary, the private sector, the media, the academic sector, international government organisations, donor organisations and others.

Geographical and gender dimensions were taken into account. The sample members came from the governorate of the capital Amman (64%) and the rest of the governorates (36%). Women formed (36%) of the sample.

The highest percentage of stakeholders in the sample came from the academic sector (16%); both the executive authority and the media (14% each); parliament (senators and former representatives), the private sector and donor organisations (12% each); finally the percentage of stakeholders and experts belonging to international government organisations and the judiciary was between 4-6%, in addition to other entities (10%).

Data collection
The team was composed of 12 field researchers and two field coordinators. The data collection process was completed in 14 workdays, between 18th April and 10th May 2010. The forms were also subjected to a review process in the office.

**Data coding and entry**
The data was coded, entered, and analysed using SPSS. Two files were made, in English and Arabic.

**Sample features**
It is noted that the highest percentage of representation in the sample was from the legislative authority and the media, (14% each), followed by people from the executive authority (12%), donor organisations (8%) and finally those belonging to the private sector (4%).
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